From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Aug 1 10:08:28 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 10:08:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTog0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1h?= =?utf-8?q?rx=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: <742523756.2174699.1501275354151@mail.yahoo.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <742523756.2174699.1501275354151@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi Sasha-- I see that your access problems are straightened out. It is very common for members of xmca to have a chance in their email address that gets our server to reject it. The solution is write to bjones@ucsd.edu to get off, and then sign up yourself. This cumbersome procedure is to minimize spam getting into the discussion. I do not recall the relation between (uslovni) conditional and conventional in David's note so i could not follow that part of your note. I doknow that it was a revelation to me, trained as a third generation Skinnerian, to learn that conditioned reflex was a mis-translation of uslovni. If the word conditional had been used, i would have caught on to Pavlov's basic ideas a lot more quickly and understoon more deeply how Luria et al appropriated "second siglan system as a life preserver. The Winn text disturbed in when we first discussed it because it contained articles written by Leontiev in the late '40's. His defense of Lysenko and the ways in which he formulated his ideas displayed an alarming confluences with post WWII Stalinism. That reading forced some, incomplete, rethinking of the LSV-Leontiev falling out and the efforts of those, like myself, see their views as different emphases on a common problematic. That re-thinking can be seen in a good deal of xmca discussion. I do not recall meeting with Bernstein after that first day at Luria's lab. I was traumatized because Luria introduced me after his talk as a newly minted expert on mathematical psychology from the US and asked me to speak extemporaneously. Talk about throwing a kid in to the deep end of the pool and requiring it to swim out on its own! However, there was always a lot of cross talk among luria, his colleagues, his lab members and students not only about Bernstein, but Anokhin, Feigenberg and others, as well was as a generalized sense that they were different branches of some (to me) indistinct theoretical family. They all came under deadly attack in the Pavlovian sessions you refer to ( for those who do not understand what Sasha was referring to, see an overview here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavlovian_session. Vygotskians were among the bad guys. There is discussion of this matter in the video that accompanies the expanded Luria autobiography volume that exists somewhere online.) As to the discussion of Hegel and Spinoza, I'll leave that to you cognoscenti to discuss! mike On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 1:55 PM, Alexandre Sourmava wrote: > Dearfriends! > First, excuse me for the delay with my reaction to your posts. Among > otherthings I met difficultieswith putting my answer here. > > David,thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word > ??????????. I agree with you, that the best translation willbe > ?conventional?. This term coincides well enoughwith Vygotsky?s idea that > mature word in developmentof infant?s speech is something entirely > "random","reason-less", and "irrational", something established by > mereagreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????) > As for Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, > I?llagree with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's > andPavlov's conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov?s > ?teaching? wascanonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially > later, closer to1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the > Soviet Academy of Science.So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? > evidently shade in Luria?s andLeont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The > affinity of Vygotsky's idea of HMFand Pavlov's Second Signaling System is > not something coincidental. Anyhow, thissubject deserves seriousinquiry. > > > > Mike, yourhistorical meeting with Bernshtein was something fabulous!!! > Had you a chance to have a chat with him this time orlater, and had you > discussed with Alexander Romanovitch Bernstein?s ideas? > Thank you Mike for attached pdf with ?Soviet psychology?. It is > somethingfantastically interesting. I am much younger than heroes of > thebook, so even from my soviet perspective it looks extremely colourful > :-) and indeedit explains much? > > > > Andy, Ilike very much your witty formula ?In the 21st century, Spinoza is > no longer a dead dog, but he is adead end? :-) > But I decisively disagree with you? > I probably have too many objections to Vygotsky's theorizing, but > regarding Spinoza?s(and Marx?s) role in future psychology I agree with him > absolutely. > I can not agree with you that ?Any attempt to deploy Spinozian ontology in > experimental Psychologyis a charade? too. Surely, it is impossible to try > to apply Spinozian ideas to (andeven this in the best case) so called > ?experimental Psychology? which is basedon primitive Cartesian logic. > However, I?m sure that Hegels?smotto that Spinozism is a necessary basis > of any genuine philosophizing is as true now as it was twohundred years > ago, and that it can be applied to psychology as well. > All the best! > > Sasha > > P.S. In a few days I hope to finish updating of full Russianversion of > ?Ilyenkov and revolution in psychology?. I?ll put it here and onAcademy.edu > > ??: mike cole > ????: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > ??????????: ???????, 27 ???? 2017 6:35 > ????: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Hi David-- > > Sure you can speak for Luria, you often do ! And knowing him does not equal > understanding him and his complicated history. Still learning. > > Vygotsky died early, right on time, perhaps. > Luria lived almost as long as i have. And through even more interesting > times, worse his luck. > > I assume Vygotsky was referring to the idea of a "second signaling system" > in his comment about Pavlov recognizing the signs were special? > > Luria and (and others) leaned heavily on this concept in their adjustments > to post war Stalinist psychology. It was their use of this concept that > created a bridge to the > mis-understanding Americans who thought of themselves as learning > theorists.It provided a way for me to connect my graduate training with the > Vygotskian ideas that Luria was seeking to propagate (by my understanding > of him). > > Hence my interest in your inclusion of conditional reflexes in your list > that leads to conventions in a manner that points to some sort of common > view. > > I believe this discussion is not unrelated to the invocation of N.A. > Bernshtein by Sasha. On my first day in Luria's lab there were two guests. > Me and Nicholas Bernshtein. > > Just an accident, perhaps . > > mike > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's > > strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion. > > > > a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls > > Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably > connect > > the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer > to > > home. > > > > b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like > "Even > > a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how > it > > differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist > physiologists > > like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too. > > > > c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard > exchange, > > precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard > > operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular > > caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice > works > > either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the > cerebrum > > and between cerebrums. > > > > Marie is only six years old > > Information, please! > > Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee.... > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc > > (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis > > was > > > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were > > > approriated by > > > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > > > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and > > > "irrational" > > > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" > > > that > > > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be > "conventional" > > or > > > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any > > > sound > > > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything > has > > a > > > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be > named. > > > The > > > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a > > semantic > > > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic > > code > > > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > > > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > > > > > > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that > > ?????????? > > > is > > > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or > conventionality. > > > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost > > > anything, > > > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the > sign. > > > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov > are > > > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", > > > "conditionality", > > > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position > > and > > > > Spinoza's. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava < > avramus@gmail.com > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hi, Larry! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment > concerning > > > the > > > > > topicunder discussion. > > > > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > > > antisemiotic. > > > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > > > arbitrary > > > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > > > > (independence > > > > > from mechanical causality). > > > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > > > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole > > realm > > > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So > > the > > > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > > history > > > > and > > > > > evolution together.? > > > > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > > > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? > ????????????? > > > > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > > ??????????????-????????????? > > > ? > > > > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > > > > > > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > > > ????? ? > > > > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > > > > > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical > theory? > > > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > > > Pavlov?s > > > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these > > two > > > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who > > was > > > > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > > > > > > > > Sasha Surmava > > > > > > > > > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > > > ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I see. > > > > > > > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > > > > work, was a "founding exemplar." > > > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > > > > > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > > Andy, > > > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > > > > will open another thread. > > > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > > > > > > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > > > > > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > > > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > > > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > > > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > > > > > > > > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > > > > Larry. > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > > decision-making > > > > > > > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Andy, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > > > > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > > > > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by > > > > > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > > > > >> meaning as you mention. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > > > > >> (examples)? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > > > > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > > > > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > > > > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > > > > >> (framework) practices. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> (framework) practices being another doubling. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > > > > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > > > > >> social framework practices. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Is this reasonable? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Or not > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > > >> > > > > > >> *From: *Andy Blunden > > > > > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > > > > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > >> > > > > > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > > > > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > > > > >> mention > > > > > >> > > > > > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > > > > >> *action* are > > > > > >> > > > > > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > > > > >> > > > > > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > > > > >> "singular" action. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > > > > >> > > > > > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > > > > >> form, but > > > > > >> > > > > > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > > > > >> activity, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> activities) and the set of words (practice, > > > > > >> practices) have > > > > > >> > > > > > >> no systematic difference running across all > > > > > >> disciplines and > > > > > >> > > > > > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > > > > >> practices. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > > > > >> > > > > > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > > > > >> (Tatigkeit) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Aktivitat at all. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > >> > > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Andy Blunden > > > > > >> > > > > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > >> > > > > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > > > decision-making > > > > > >> > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Alexander, Mike, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Thanks for the article. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > > > > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > > > > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > > > > >> of practice in knowing). > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Two formulas: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > > > > >> do not co-incide > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Action IS individual > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Practice IS a social category. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > > > > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > > > > >> individual who are separate. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > > > > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a > > > > > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently > > > > > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > > > > >> FOR further thought and wording. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Ivan > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > -- > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > festina lente > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > > > > >> have been discussing > > > > > >> > > > > > >> >> LSV's sources in > > > > > >> > > > > > >> >> marx and spinoza. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> >> mike > > > > > >> > > > > > >> >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Aug 1 15:48:01 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 22:48:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> , , Message-ID: <1501627681533.48932@iped.uio.no> Hi Annalisa, like you, I am just a learner on all these venerable matters; and so I am here trying to think aloud with you. Concerning your comment on Descartes and Spinoza, I take it that Spinoza in fact built upon much of what Descartes had written before, and indeed defined the notion of 'substance' in exactly the same way. Only that Spinoza saw that from that definition it could and should not follow that there are two types of substances, soul and body. It did not follow either then that there should be reason for Cartesian doubt, that is, to fear that fiction would be confused with true ideas?a fear that could not be escaped from in the Cartesian system. Spinoza has it quite straight: 'Doubt, then, never arises in the soul through the thing itself which is the object of doubt. That is, if there should be only one idea in our consciousness, whether true or false, there will be neither doubt nor certainty, but only a certain kind of awareness. For an idea in itself is nothing but a certain awareness. Doubt arises through another idea, which is not so clear and distinct that we can infer from it any certainty as to the thing which is doubted" I am not sure if all this connects with your characterisation of Spinoza as having seen a 'historical aspect', but I can see grounds to treat it in those terms. Thus, Spinoza was concerned not so much with facts as with necessities and potentialities. So that if for Descartes the relationship between an idea and reality was a problem in and of itself, for Spinoza that relationship was a necessity, or it was not. But if it was a necessity, it was because it 'follows,' which means it is part of a sequence, and not just randomness. And, by contrast to Descartes, this time not a sequence somehow connecting mind with nature, but rather a sequence connecting nature with nature itself. Spinoza's thinking here reminds me a little (only a little) to Dewey's notion of Inquiry. Thus, Spinoza writes, 'a true idea is simple or compounded of simple ideas, and ... it shows how and why something is the case, or has been so, and that its ideal effects in the soul correspond to the specific reality of its object." It reminds me to inquiry because Spinoza seems to describe a METHOD of observation that thematises the relation between observing and the object being observed in terms of that METHOD. He then applies this to the idea of defining, which he brilliantly illustrates this way of defining with respect to the idea of the 'circle': 'a circle would have to be defined as follows: a figure described by any line of which one end is fixed and the other movable'. Because he defines the thing in terms of HOW it comes to being, which he calls its 'proximate cause' , he can (and needs) to assert that 'given the definition of the thing, there should remain no room for the question: Does it exist?' Now, whether all this is best characterised as historical, I don't know. I am guessing that such characterisation belongs more to Hegel's undertaking, which was more concrete (rather than formal and mathematical). But perhaps 'historical' is also a known or common way to describe Spinoza. Hopefully others more knowledgeable can help us. I am not familiar enough to Vedanta, and so I can not comment on the analogies you offer between the two, though a quick google search threw lots of entries on such similarities, which means I still have to read lots! Yet, I tried to follow you on how the 'potness of the pot' and the 'clayness of the clay' example did fit with all of this, but I could not. In fact, it was a bit hard for me not to see the example as precisely illustrating the Cartesian view, when I was expecting you to do the opposite. Perhaps I do not follow because I only see the elaboration partially. But, whatever the case, your question reminded me of question Ilyenkov raises and which I think is very pertinent and may serve us to better understand your metaphor: Ilyenkov notes, 'when we wish to establish a relation of some sort between two objects, we always compare not the 'specific' qualities that make one object 'syllable A' and the other a 'table', 'steak', or a 'square', but only those properties that express a 'third' something, different from their existence as the things enumerated'. It does not make sense then to raise the question: 'What is the distance between the syllable A and table' simply because distance is not a property common to the essence of tables and Syllables A. So that 'if there is no 'third' in the nature of the two things common to them both, the very differences between them become quite senseless'. Ilyenkov then, addressing the quintessential philosophical questions, wonders, 'In what are such objects as 'concept' ('idea') and 'thing' related?' With regard to the latter question, Spinoza formulated that thought and extension were two attributes of that third thing that is 'real infinite Nature'. In the example of clay and pot, I was having trouble to find this third thing, and so I found only two. All this in the hope of learning more, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: 31 July 2017 09:23 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hello, I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this thread, but I shall. Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what was to be seen on this here persistent thread. I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the apparent world as seen through Vedanta. First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different entities. As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being through thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms our thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of different substances? (Am I getting this right?) But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and that nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, as if the same "material." But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical robots, or chemical reactions? or is there choice? >From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have a different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language to another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit were identically referencing. Just thinking out loud here. Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one hopes to perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the subtle forms not just the gross. If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and that the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name and form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is subtle, and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and form of said substance. A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam in yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time (like now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is identical: H2O. This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the change of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there is as if an appearance of a linear change. W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same space, though the volume might change a little. OK, thanks for staying with me this far. As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world consists, these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, heat), and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that can be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But this is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has more rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river have more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. There is tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than the other dominant properties therein. If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put another way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, by metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry transcend the dualism as presented by Descartes? But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass intellectual persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to me that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was going on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling the Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but of a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be one unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which also creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through time and space in all directions. Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would be made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products of that substance. It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing upon one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite regression. That does not work. Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. In this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that comes of seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the goal of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history (i.e. meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by mind). This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy or as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these properties are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the aspect of the perceivable world. >From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, but it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all things depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its existence. This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but is no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot can see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food in my pot. :) Kind regards, Annalisa From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Aug 1 17:20:05 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2017 00:20:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?windows-1251?b?zvLiOiAgUmU6Cc7y4jogUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4?= =?windows-1251?q?=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: <373558886.3421481.1501456430687@mail.yahoo.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> , <373558886.3421481.1501456430687@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1501633205606.17955@iped.uio.no> Hi Alexander, as Mike said in previous e-mail, it seems you got to find the way of getting the e-mails through to the list. I am happy you are connected and hope you are able to see posts from the other threads as well. You can contact Bruce Jones bjones@ucsd.edu or myself for assistance. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava Sent: 31 July 2017 01:13 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Mike,your historical meeting with Bernshtein wassomething fabulous!!! Had you a chance to have a chat with him this time or later, and hadyou discussed with Alexander Romanovitch Bernstein?s ideas? Thank you Mike for attachedpdf with ?Soviet psychology?. It is something fantastically interesting. I am muchyounger than heroes of the book, so even from my soviet perspectiveit looks extremely colourful :-) and indeed it explains much? Sasha ???????, 27 ???? 2017 6:35 mike cole ?????(?): Hi David-- Sure you can speak for Luria, you often do ! And knowing him does not equal understanding him and his complicated history. Still learning. Vygotsky died early, right on time, perhaps. Luria lived almost as long as i have. And through even more interesting times, worse his luck. I assume Vygotsky was referring to the idea of a "second signaling system" in his comment about Pavlov recognizing the signs were special? Luria and (and others) leaned heavily on this concept in their adjustments to post war Stalinist psychology. It was their use of this concept that created a bridge to the mis-understanding Americans who thought of themselves as learning theorists.It provided a way for me to connect my graduate training with the Vygotskian ideas that Luria was seeking to propagate (by my understanding of him). Hence my interest in your inclusion of conditional reflexes in your list that leads to conventions in a manner that points to some sort of common view. I believe this discussion is not unrelated to the invocation of N.A. Bernshtein by Sasha. On my first day in Luria's lab there were two guests. Me and Nicholas Bernshtein. Just an accident, perhaps . mike On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's > strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion. > > a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls > Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably connect > the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer to > home. > > b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like "Even > a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how it > differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist physiologists > like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too. > > c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard exchange, > precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard > operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular > caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice works > either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the cerebrum > and between cerebrums. > > Marie is only six years old > Information, please! > Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee.... > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc > (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis > was > > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were > > approriated by > > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor. > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and > > "irrational" > > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" > > that > > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" > or > > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any > > sound > > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has > a > > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. > > The > > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a > semantic > > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic > code > > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > > > > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that > ?????????? > > is > > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost > > anything, > > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", > > "conditionality", > > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position > and > > > Spinoza's. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Hi, Larry! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning > > the > > > > topicunder discussion. > > > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > > antisemiotic. > > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > > arbitrary > > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > > > (independence > > > > from mechanical causality). > > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole > realm > > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So > the > > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > history > > > and > > > > evolution together.? > > > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > > > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > ??????????????-????????????? > > ? > > > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > > > > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > > ????? ? > > > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > > > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > > Pavlov?s > > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these > two > > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who > was > > > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > > > > > > Sasha Surmava > > > > > > > >? ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > > ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > >? I see. > > > > > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > > > work, was a "founding exemplar." > > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > > > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > Andy, > > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > > > will open another thread. > > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > > > > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > > > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > >? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > > >? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > > >? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > > > > > > >? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > > >? Larry. > > > > > > > > > >? Andy > > > > > > > > > >? ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >? Andy Blunden > > > > >? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > >? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > decision-making > > > > >? > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > > > > >? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? Andy, > > > > >> > > > > >>? Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > > > >>? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > > > >>? variable social actions. This doubling (by > > > > >>? including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > > > >>? meaning as you mention. > > > > >> > > > > >>? Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > > > >>? (examples)? > > > > >> > > > > >>? Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > > > >>? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > > > >>? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > > > >>? actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > > > >>? (framework) practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? (framework) practices being another doubling. > > > > >> > > > > >>? So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > > > >>? through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > > > >>? social framework practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? Is this reasonable? > > > > >> > > > > >>? Or not > > > > >> > > > > >>? Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > >> > > > > >>? *From: *Andy Blunden > > > > >>? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > > > >>? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >>? > > > > >>? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > > > >>? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > >> > > > > >>? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > > > >>? mention > > > > >> > > > > >>? to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > > > >>? *action* are > > > > >> > > > > >>? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > > > >> > > > > >>? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > > > >> > > > > >>? "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > > > >>? "singular" action. > > > > >> > > > > >>? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > > > >> > > > > >>? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > > > >>? form, but > > > > >> > > > > >>? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > > > >>? activity, > > > > >> > > > > >>? activities) and the set of words (practice, > > > > >>? practices) have > > > > >> > > > > >>? no systematic difference running across all > > > > >>? disciplines and > > > > >> > > > > >>? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > > > >>? practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > > > >> > > > > >>? German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > > > >>? (Tatigkeit) > > > > >> > > > > >>? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > > > >> > > > > >>? Aktivitat at all. > > > > >> > > > > >>? Andy > > > > >> > > > > >>? ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> > > > > >>? Andy Blunden > > > > >> > > > > >>? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > >> > > > > >>? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > > decision-making > > > > >>? > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Alexander, Mike, > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Thanks for the article. > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > > > >>? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > > > >>? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > > > >>? of practice in knowing). > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Two formulas: > > > > >> > > > > >>? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > > >> > > > > >>? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > > > >>? do not co-incide > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Action IS individual > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Practice IS a social category. > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > > > >>? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > > > >>? individual who are separate. > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > > > >>? They are alike in that both individual action & a > > > > >>? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > I do not have the background to intelligently > > > > >>? comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > > > >>? FOR further thought and wording. > > > > >> > > > > >>? > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > > >> > > > > >>? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > Ivan > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > -- > > > > >> > > > > >>? > festina lente > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > > > >>? wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > > > >>? have been discussing > > > > >> > > > > >>? >> LSV's sources in > > > > >> > > > > >>? >> marx and spinoza. > > > > >> > > > > >>? >> mike > > > > >> > > > > >>? >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Aug 2 14:47:55 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 06:47:55 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAg0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngs?= =?utf-8?q?_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Dear Sasha: Thanks for the reply. I took the time to read the English version of your paper with great interest and large areas of agreement. But the areas of disagreement, which I'll talk about in another post on "free will as infinite selection", were actually the zones of greatest interest. I think Vygotsky doesn't accept conventionality as a pervasive principle in language, and neither do I. Take, for example, Vygotsky's example "blackbird". We can say that the phonemes/graphemes (the language-specific sequence of vowels and consonants) is conventional; we know this because other languages do it differently. But once we take the "salto mortale" of accepting that "black" means the (original) color of ink and "bird" means a winged animal descended from the dinosaurs, the pairing of "black" and "bird" to describe the blackbird is natural and not conventional: it obeys laws that are clear even to the half-enculturated child. I think that is why Vygotsky can give many examples of "child made" language ("mazoline", etc.) that are non-conventional and why he can link these Mondegreens to actual etymological processes and actual words ("sidewalk"). Saussure's principle applies to language in only one place, and it happens to be the only place in which Saussure was completely competent as a linguist: sounding. Saussure's principle does not apply to either wording or meaning: these are not purely conventional but natural. I think Vygotsky did not accept Pavlov as a human psychologist, but only as an animal behaviorist. Of course, he was deferential, just as you or I would defer to Mike (who was once an animal behaviorist himself), and just as Mike himself would defer to a Luria or a Bernstein. Mere bad manners doesn't make you an original thinker. I will agree to call this deference discretion: Vygotsky didn't like to pick fights and lose them. I think that's why Vygotsky concentrates his fire on Watson, and Thorndike and not Pavlov, why he points to Pavlov the animal behaviorist's insightful remarks about the sign to shame his psychologist colleagues (this is similar to what he does in shaming Piaget and Freud with the biologizing Bleuler), and why he uses Pavlov's metaphor of a "telephone switchboard" for his own purposes I didn't just include the Chuck Berry song in memory of a great musician; I think that the lyrics show us the very point you are making about the sign. You are certainly right that by itself, treated as just another instrument, the sign doesn't have the power to confer free will on the human marionette that Watson, Thorndike--and Pavlov--imagine. If a human is a puppet on a string, it doesn't help to put another puppet in control of the string and then put the human in control of the other puppet. But that's not what signs do. That's only what casting lots, tying knots, and counting on your fingers APPEAR to do. When humans have do these things, they try to go beyond the appearance. They imagine that casting lots conveys messages from God, that knots tie themselves (as the Russian formalists said), and that counting on fingers taps into some World Three of eternal discoveries (Popper). And when they have been giving these unlikely explanations for thousands of years, some humans begin to notice that the voice of the gods sounds very familiar, that the knot tying of one child is unlike that of another, and that some cultures count toes and elbows. Dorothy looks under the curtain and realizes that the Wizard of Oz is only a wizened old man, and it turns out you don't need his help after all. Soon people are making decisions in their own heads, remembering with imaginary knots, and memorizing Maxwell's equations. Of course, you and I get the joke. This is no more happening "inside the head", with an "individual" memory, than it is happening in a lot, a knot, or on your fingers. It's happening in a whole culture--many thousands of years of thinking. But the thinking isn't "passed on" through language;it is recreated and re-elaborated with every generation. The telephone switchboard, like the conventional phoneme/grapheme, is useful at one point and one point only: helping the caller get in touch with Marie. But the actual communication between father and daughter is not conventional or automatic at all. It's natural; i.e. it's hard work. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Alexandre Sourmava wrote: > David, thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word ? > ?????????. I agree with you, that the best translation will be > ?conventional?. This term coincides well enough with Vygotsky?s idea that > mature word in development of infant?s speech is something entirely > "random", "reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mere > agreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????) As for > Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I?ll agree > with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's and Pavlov's > conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov?s ?teaching? was > canonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later, closer > to 1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy of > Science. So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? evidently shade in > Luria?s and Leont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of > Vygotsky's idea of HMF and Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not > something coincidental. Anyhow, this subject deserves serious inquiry. > Sasha > > > ???????, 27 ???? 2017 1:57 David Kellogg ?????(?): > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and "irrational" > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" that > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" or > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any sound > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has a > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. The > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a semantic > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic code > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that ?????????? > is better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost anything, > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", "conditionality", > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position and > Spinoza's. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > wrote: > > Hi, Larry! > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the > topicunder discussion. > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence > from mechanical causality). > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and > evolution together.? > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > Sasha Surmava > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): > > > I see. > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > work, was a "founding exemplar." > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > Andy > > ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- decision-making > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Andy, > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > will open another thread. > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > Larry. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> > >> Andy, > >> > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > >> meaning as you mention. > >> > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > >> (examples)? > >> > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > >> (framework) practices. > >> > >> (framework) practices being another doubling. > >> > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > >> social framework practices. > >> > >> Is this reasonable? > >> > >> Or not > >> > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >> > >> *From: *Andy Blunden > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > >> mention > >> > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > >> *action* are > >> > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > >> > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > >> > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > >> "singular" action. > >> > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > >> > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > >> form, but > >> > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > >> activity, > >> > >> activities) and the set of words (practice, > >> practices) have > >> > >> no systematic difference running across all > >> disciplines and > >> > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > >> practices. > >> > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > >> > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > >> (Tatigkeit) > >> > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > >> > >> Aktivitat at all. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > >> > >> Andy Blunden > >> > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> > >> http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > >> collective-decision-making > > > >> > >> > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> > >> > Alexander, Mike, > >> > >> > Thanks for the article. > >> > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > >> of practice in knowing). > >> > >> > Two formulas: > >> > >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > >> > >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > >> > >> > > >> > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > >> do not co-incide > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Action IS individual > >> > >> > Practice IS a social category. > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > >> individual who are separate. > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > >> > >> > > >> > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > >> > >> > > >> > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > >> FOR further thought and wording. > >> > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > >> > > >> > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > >> > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > >> > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > >> > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Ivan > >> > >> > > >> > >> > -- > >> > >> > festina lente > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > >> wrote: > >> > >> >> > >> > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > >> have been discussing > >> > >> >> LSV's sources in > >> > >> >> marx and spinoza. > >> > >> >> mike > >> > >> >> > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Aug 2 16:35:08 2017 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2017 23:35:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: <1501627681533.48932@iped.uio.no> References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> , , , <1501627681533.48932@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hello Alfredo, Thanks for your reply. I'm glad we can think out loud together. I can see that writing my post late at night may not have made me as coherent as I thought I was when I wrote it. I do agree that Spinoza was building on Descartes's work. But to consider a single substance and how it suggests a non-dual entity, was a object of his inquiry if only because to have a duality did not make sense to him. How can one substance know another? Sometimes reading Descartes, it feels like a set-up created to obscure what was really going on, and in a kind of language that the weak-minded would not be able to understand. But Spinoza and his great mind could cut through the obscurity like a hot knife through butter. And like many hot knives, he frightened a lot of butter-brains. :) But to my post, when I said what I did about Spinoza seeing the historical aspect that Descartes did not, I am referring to something (which is vague in my memory at the moment and I can't reference the book which would satisfy my doubt) that Spinoza had written about mankind making tools and which they are able to alter nature, and yet nature alters us as well. To bring this back to the interests of the list, I seem to recall LSV being intrigued by this passage of Spinoza's and that was his way into bridging Spinoza with Marx. Does anyone else know what I'm trying to recapture in my memory that is failing me at the mo'? Wasn't there discussion of this in that article about LSV's fragments? I apologize for writing so quickly so late at night and not being more explicit about that passage. It bothers me that I can't remember where I saw this. What also enamors me with Spinoza is that he was attempting to secure a method by which it would be evident to anyone who followed this method, that what he saw through his inquiry could be seen by another. Maybe I have this wrong, but that is my sense about what he was trying to do *with* his philosophy. He had a vision, but then he had the ornery job of figuring out how to talk about it so that he could share the vision with others, who understood he saw something, but they could not by themselves see it clearly. Given his life, and the violence and political upheaval he witnessed in his lifetime (of dear friends and then some), I sense that he was determined to find a way of discounting religious and political persecution and mischief through the sheer force of intellectual inquiry, something that is a mainstay of the cultural practice of Science. Such a thing, if perfected, could keep a lot of people from being killed unnecessarily. It is a noble objective. Spinoza's historical reality, of the era in which he lived, had a lot to do with why he set out on his inquiry. The same with Descartes. What we have done though is gotten so uptight (bound up) about the products of their intellectual labors (that is their writing, their books) that not enough examination is spent upon seeing how their lived histories impacted their thinking and how they were informed by these histories. The same can be said of many great and wonderful thinkers. I am not saying no one has done this, but it seems on the one hand we have their writings over here, and on the other hand we have their biographies over there. It may not be possible to know with exactitude how their histories effected their writing, but we can certainly gain a lot of evidence regarding their development. In Western thought we call this intellectual examination (which they pursued) capital-R Reason or scientific method or what have you, but in Vedanta, in regards to method of examination of what is real and that which is not real, we would use the word "pramana." This translates "means of knowledge." Advaita Vedanta is a means of knowledge of seeing what is already here (something that it has in common with scientific inquiry), but it is a means of knowledge through the careful handling of words. Which I believe is very much concerned with the precision of thought for which Spinoza was aiming to create in his method. You know... whenever we read "it necessarily follows..." he is crafting a method, by which it always is the case that A follows B, etc. What is interesting to me, or it used to be, is that Cartesian dualism never accounts for how the two connect, that is, mind and body. Unless you accept the pituitary gland explanation. (Although perhaps the vagus nerve is a better guess, but that is another conversation about not hearts and minds, but rather hearts and brains). Of course, there is little "scientific" or "objective" vocabulary concerning emotion and intuition and these other processes of thinking-feeling (much to the dismay of artists, poets, and musicians!) The meaning of the word "perezhivanie" reveals the lack of our language on this. Though, unlike Andy, I think Damasio does a good job of showing us that we must feel first before we can think, that that is how we are neurologically wired. We need the "material" of the outside world in order to "make sense" with our biological organs of perception and to map that "material" down within the brain & body in our own individual manner. This also coincides with LSV's "outside first, then inside." When you cite the quote: 'a true idea is simple or compounded of simple ideas, and ... it shows how and why something is the case, or has been so, and that its ideal effects in the soul correspond to the specific reality of its object." I trust what he means there is that the idea (as a formal thought) is accurately reflecting what is true in the world, but it need not be the manifest world, it could be of a future world, because the idea is as-if made of the "material" of the world as we know it now. If the idea is true then the idea works in time and space, if not then something is missing about the idea, which creates the doubt of its veracity...though it may have "truthiness" ?. What is true is that which cannot be negated. But it's also difficult to chase false negatives, which are weapons of mass destruction, aren't they? Though they certainly make for great Hieronymous Bosch paintings and are the substance of great imaginings of what might happen to us when we die, that perennial mystery. I love your example of the circle because, as you imply, Spinoza is enacting an actual historical rendering of a circle, how it manifests and develops, and with such precision that nothing but a circle could result. Like the Spinoza's circle, the clay pot is a "drstantam," which means "a teaching metaphor" or "illustration" in Sanskrit (I could not add the diacriticals so forgive me that, but it is pronounced drishtanam with the "drish" being pronounced as if the "i" were not present). The clay pot is a frequent metaphor used by Vedanta teachers to explain dependent realities upon absolute ones. There are as-if two things where there is one object, the clay pot. There is the clay, and there is the pot. And they sit in the same place in time and space. But which is independent of the other? The only object independent of the other is the clay. The clay exists despite the form it has. It could be a large pot, a small one, a fat one, or a flat one, it really is of no consequence to the clay; meaning that the shape does nothing to the intrinsic property of the clay, say in the way force upon a piece of coal will turn it into a diamond (as a point of contrast). If clay could be changed intrinsically by the form it was made into, why... that would be the dream of Newton's alchemy. However the pot IS dependent upon the clay, because if we were to take the clay away, there would be no pot there! So in a sense, we should not even call it "a clay pot" Really, we should call it "a potty clay." This would be more exact to an objective reality. But we don't, because (as I see it, thanks to my understanding of my Vygotskian studies and my marvelous Vygotskian teachers, including you all on this list), we see the pot as having more importance than the clay, and this of course is because of the utility a pot has to us, the meaning of the pot is of more value (because of our activity that involve all kinds of pots) than the meaning of clay, which seems incidental and prosaic. The pot could be brass, plastic, anything that holds water (figuratively and literally!) This is what is so interesting! Why wouldn't we call it "potty clay"? The only reason seems to have to do with our cultural underpinnings. We elicit the value and status with our language, through our language, and from repetition, we come to forget the substance of the pot, and focus upon its form. I would say in the same vein, we also have become habituated to ignore the substance of which Spinoza speaks. Because (analogously), we get caught up in the features of the form of the pot. Who made it, when it as-if came into existence, what its monetary value is, was it found intact in an archeological find, say in the tomb of a Pharoah. and so on. It's a never-ending inquiry because names and forms will never stay put in this apparent world. These discussions are not unworthy ones, but they are not looking at the clay for what it is. We just ignite (or continue) conversations about the pot-ness of the pot. Such discussions are also not examining the relationship of dependency of the pot upon the clay and how it is a *cognitive* effort while looking at a pot to see the clay is so subtly different than to see the pot, because the perceptual data are the same. So what is happening cognitively? And what is the difference of two minds, one who sees, and one who does not? Are they materially different? It seems to me the matter to pursue is what is the difference between the mind of ignorance and the one of knowledge? What makes them differ? I don't know if a third thing is necessary for that examination (of clay and pots). Because really there is only one thing there perceptually. A clay pot. They preside in the same location and they cannot be pulled apart. The only thing we could do is break the pot, and then the pot is no more. But the clay will remain, albeit in a different form, which we might call "a broken pot" or "broken shards" but it is no longer a bona fide pot, because its function is no more available to us. Nothing has happened to the clay however, it remains clay, just in a different form, and, a different name. But getting to a third thing, if I was pressed (And it did seem Alfredo that you were possibly pressing me in a friendly way, of course) it does seem that it is the context that matters. Are we thinking about clay pots because we are potters throwing pots? Or because we are thirsty and it's a necessary tool by which to drink water, or maybe to carry fine tea off a mountain on the backs of beasts? Or are we just sitting under a tree discussing the nature of the apparent world? The clay pot, as Vedanta uses it, is an example of explaining the non-dual world. That there is a substance (analogous to the clay) by which all things in the manifest world are dependent upon (analogous to the pot made of clay). Of course, we cannot know this substance like we can know any object in the world. Because we are of the same exact substance. What I think Spinoza was seeing, getting back to substance (and I'm not sure... did Spinoza call it a monist God, or was that word an invention of Leibniz? In other words, was the word assigned to Spinoza assigned by others, not him?) Spinoza must have felt that it has to be one substance. My sense is that Spinoza was attempting to solve this problem of dualism as set out for him by Descartes. I suggest that he knew Descartes was making a mistake, that intuitively he saw this, but intuition is not a hard ground to stand on, especially back then. The thing with dualism is, if we were to stop there with this perpetual division that can never be crossed, that it perpetuates hierarchies, it rationalizes status, it supports bigotry based upon difference. You know, class and caste and so on. But if it is possible to see sameness despite difference, then there is something truly magical before our eyes without changing anything but our attitude toward the world. It is a vision of oneness. A cognition. If we are capable of that cognition, to truly see it for ourselves, we can then celebrate what is me and you without our requirement to be the same (identical) form and expression, difference becomes a wonder, not an abberation. And yet (at the same time) we can also be of a kind because WE ARE of the same substance, which is identical to all other objects which already have been here, are here, and will be here in the future. There is a most profound freedom in knowing this. Now getting back to combing the hair of a bald man, I will confess, I'm still not clear what Spinoza meant by extension and what he meant by thought. So I would need some help in his definition of these terms. (Anyone? Anyone?) Then I might be able to comment better on your comparison of the pot example and Ilyenkov "concept and thing related" as objects. It does seem orthogonal to me. I just am not certain right now... Thanks for the grist! Kind regards, as always, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 2 20:03:57 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2017 20:03:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> , , , <1501627681533.48932@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <598292b4.5a45620a.aad51.e17e@mx.google.com> Annalisa, That was a whirlwind and i enjoyed being carried along your trajectory. I will jump in with your response to Alfredo with the third being (context). As i followed your rendition i felt in the background a particular context or third which may go by two names?: Historical consciousness Or Historical imaginal To enter the two aspects you mention of Spinoza?s ideas & Spinoza?s life to my ears generates this 3rd (historical imaginal. Now i could have said imaginal history but by saying historical imaginal my intent is to accent the imaginal aspect of historicity as this context?: 3rd aspect or (thirdness) that is implicit in much of your reflexive commentary. Yes, grist for grinding Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Annalisa Aguilar Sent: August 2, 2017 4:37 PM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hello Alfredo, Thanks for your reply. I'm glad we can think out loud together. I can see that writing my post late at night may not have made me as coherent as I thought I was when I wrote it. I do agree that Spinoza was building on Descartes's work. But to consider a single substance and how it suggests a non-dual entity, was a object of his inquiry if only because to have a duality did not make sense to him. How can one substance know another? Sometimes reading Descartes, it feels like a set-up created to obscure what was really going on, and in a kind of language that the weak-minded would not be able to understand. But Spinoza and his great mind could cut through the obscurity like a hot knife through butter. And like many hot knives, he frightened a lot of butter-brains. :) But to my post, when I said what I did about Spinoza seeing the historical aspect that Descartes did not, I am referring to something (which is vague in my memory at the moment and I can't reference the book which would satisfy my doubt) that Spinoza had written about mankind making tools and which they are able to alter nature, and yet nature alters us as well. To bring this back to the interests of the list, I seem to recall LSV being intrigued by this passage of Spinoza's and that was his way into bridging Spinoza with Marx. Does anyone else know what I'm trying to recapture in my memory that is failing me at the mo'? Wasn't there discussion of this in that article about LSV's fragments? I apologize for writing so quickly so late at night and not being more explicit about that passage. It bothers me that I can't remember where I saw this. What also enamors me with Spinoza is that he was attempting to secure a method by which it would be evident to anyone who followed this method, that what he saw through his inquiry could be seen by another. Maybe I have this wrong, but that is my sense about what he was trying to do *with* his philosophy. He had a vision, but then he had the ornery job of figuring out how to talk about it so that he could share the vision with others, who understood he saw something, but they could not by themselves see it clearly. Given his life, and the violence and political upheaval he witnessed in his lifetime (of dear friends and then some), I sense that he was determined to find a way of discounting religious and political persecution and mischief through the sheer force of intellectual inquiry, something that is a mainstay of the cultural practice of Science. Such a thing, if perfected, could keep a lot of people from being killed unnecessarily. It is a noble objective. Spinoza's historical reality, of the era in which he lived, had a lot to do with why he set out on his inquiry. The same with Descartes. What we have done though is gotten so uptight (bound up) about the products of their intellectual labors (that is their writing, their books) that not enough examination is spent upon seeing how their lived histories impacted their thinking and how they were informed by these histories. The same can be said of many great and wonderful thinkers. I am not saying no one has done this, but it seems on the one hand we have their writings over here, and on the other hand we have their biographies over there. It may not be possible to know with exactitude how their histories effected their writing, but we can certainly gain a lot of evidence regarding their development. In Western thought we call this intellectual examination (which they pursued) capital-R Reason or scientific method or what have you, but in Vedanta, in regards to method of examination of what is real and that which is not real, we would use the word "pramana." This translates "means of knowledge." Advaita Vedanta is a means of knowledge of seeing what is already here (something that it has in common with scientific inquiry), but it is a means of knowledge through the careful handling of words. Which I believe is very much concerned with the precision of thought for which Spinoza was aiming to create in his method. You know... whenever we read "it necessarily follows..." he is crafting a method, by which it always is the case that A follows B, etc. What is interesting to me, or it used to be, is that Cartesian dualism never accounts for how the two connect, that is, mind and body. Unless you accept the pituitary gland explanation. (Although perhaps the vagus nerve is a better guess, but that is another conversation about not hearts and minds, but rather hearts and brains). Of course, there is little "scientific" or "objective" vocabulary concerning emotion and intuition and these other processes of thinking-feeling (much to the dismay of artists, poets, and musicians!) The meaning of the word "perezhivanie" reveals the lack of our language on this. Though, unlike Andy, I think Damasio does a good job of showing us that we must feel first before we can think, that that is how we are neurologically wired. We need the "material" of the outside world in order to "make sense" with our biological organs of perception and to map that "material" down within the brain & body in our own individual manner. This also coincides with LSV's "outside first, then inside." When you cite the quote: 'a true idea is simple or compounded of simple ideas, and ... it shows how and why something is the case, or has been so, and that its ideal effects in the soul correspond to the specific reality of its object." I trust what he means there is that the idea (as a formal thought) is accurately reflecting what is true in the world, but it need not be the manifest world, it could be of a future world, because the idea is as-if made of the "material" of the world as we know it now. If the idea is true then the idea works in time and space, if not then something is missing about the idea, which creates the doubt of its veracity...though it may have "truthiness" ?. What is true is that which cannot be negated. But it's also difficult to chase false negatives, which are weapons of mass destruction, aren't they? Though they certainly make for great Hieronymous Bosch paintings and are the substance of great imaginings of what might happen to us when we die, that perennial mystery. I love your example of the circle because, as you imply, Spinoza is enacting an actual historical rendering of a circle, how it manifests and develops, and with such precision that nothing but a circle could result. Like the Spinoza's circle, the clay pot is a "drstantam," which means "a teaching metaphor" or "illustration" in Sanskrit (I could not add the diacriticals so forgive me that, but it is pronounced drishtanam with the "drish" being pronounced as if the "i" were not present). The clay pot is a frequent metaphor used by Vedanta teachers to explain dependent realities upon absolute ones. There are as-if two things where there is one object, the clay pot. There is the clay, and there is the pot. And they sit in the same place in time and space. But which is independent of the other? The only object independent of the other is the clay. The clay exists despite the form it has. It could be a large pot, a small one, a fat one, or a flat one, it really is of no consequence to the clay; meaning that the shape does nothing to the intrinsic property of the clay, say in the way force upon a piece of coal will turn it into a diamond (as a point of contrast). If clay could be changed intrinsically by the form it was made into, why... that would be the dream of Newton's alchemy. However the pot IS dependent upon the clay, because if we were to take the clay away, there would be no pot there! So in a sense, we should not even call it "a clay pot" Really, we should call it "a potty clay." This would be more exact to an objective reality. But we don't, because (as I see it, thanks to my understanding of my Vygotskian studies and my marvelous Vygotskian teachers, including you all on this list), we see the pot as having more importance than the clay, and this of course is because of the utility a pot has to us, the meaning of the pot is of more value (because of our activity that involve all kinds of pots) than the meaning of clay, which seems incidental and prosaic. The pot could be brass, plastic, anything that holds water (figuratively and literally!) This is what is so interesting! Why wouldn't we call it "potty clay"? The only reason seems to have to do with our cultural underpinnings. We elicit the value and status with our language, through our language, and from repetition, we come to forget the substance of the pot, and focus upon its form. I would say in the same vein, we also have become habituated to ignore the substance of which Spinoza speaks. Because (analogously), we get caught up in the features of the form of the pot. Who made it, when it as-if came into existence, what its monetary value is, was it found intact in an archeological find, say in the tomb of a Pharoah. and so on. It's a never-ending inquiry because names and forms will never stay put in this apparent world. These discussions are not unworthy ones, but they are not looking at the clay for what it is. We just ignite (or continue) conversations about the pot-ness of the pot. Such discussions are also not examining the relationship of dependency of the pot upon the clay and how it is a *cognitive* effort while looking at a pot to see the clay is so subtly different than to see the pot, because the perceptual data are the same. So what is happening cognitively? And what is the difference of two minds, one who sees, and one who does not? Are they materially different? It seems to me the matter to pursue is what is the difference between the mind of ignorance and the one of knowledge? What makes them differ? I don't know if a third thing is necessary for that examination (of clay and pots). Because really there is only one thing there perceptually. A clay pot. They preside in the same location and they cannot be pulled apart. The only thing we could do is break the pot, and then the pot is no more. But the clay will remain, albeit in a different form, which we might call "a broken pot" or "broken shards" but it is no longer a bona fide pot, because its function is no more available to us. Nothing has happened to the clay however, it remains clay, just in a different form, and, a different name. But getting to a third thing, if I was pressed (And it did seem Alfredo that you were possibly pressing me in a friendly way, of course) it does seem that it is the context that matters. Are we thinking about clay pots because we are potters throwing pots? Or because we are thirsty and it's a necessary tool by which to drink water, or maybe to carry fine tea off a mountain on the backs of beasts? Or are we just sitting under a tree discussing the nature of the apparent world? The clay pot, as Vedanta uses it, is an example of explaining the non-dual world. That there is a substance (analogous to the clay) by which all things in the manifest world are dependent upon (analogous to the pot made of clay). Of course, we cannot know this substance like we can know any object in the world. Because we are of the same exact substance. What I think Spinoza was seeing, getting back to substance (and I'm not sure... did Spinoza call it a monist God, or was that word an invention of Leibniz? In other words, was the word assigned to Spinoza assigned by others, not him?) Spinoza must have felt that it has to be one substance. My sense is that Spinoza was attempting to solve this problem of dualism as set out for him by Descartes. I suggest that he knew Descartes was making a mistake, that intuitively he saw this, but intuition is not a hard ground to stand on, especially back then. The thing with dualism is, if we were to stop there with this perpetual division that can never be crossed, that it perpetuates hierarchies, it rationalizes status, it supports bigotry based upon difference. You know, class and caste and so on. But if it is possible to see sameness despite difference, then there is something truly magical before our eyes without changing anything but our attitude toward the world. It is a vision of oneness. A cognition. If we are capable of that cognition, to truly see it for ourselves, we can then celebrate what is me and you without our requirement to be the same (identical) form and expression, difference becomes a wonder, not an abberation. And yet (at the same time) we can also be of a kind because WE ARE of the same substance, which is identical to all other objects which already have been here, are here, and will be here in the future. There is a most profound freedom in knowing this. Now getting back to combing the hair of a bald man, I will confess, I'm still not clear what Spinoza meant by extension and what he meant by thought. So I would need some help in his definition of these terms. (Anyone? Anyone?) Then I might be able to comment better on your comparison of the pot example and Ilyenkov "concept and thing related" as objects. It does seem orthogonal to me. I just am not certain right now... Thanks for the grist! Kind regards, as always, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Aug 3 10:33:05 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 03 Aug 2017 17:33:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor (tenure track) in Learning Sciences, UC Berkeley In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Uilani HUNT Date: Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 9:25 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor (tenure track) in Learning Sciences, UC Berkeley To: CC: Prudence Carter , Alan Schoenfeld < alans@berkeley.edu>, Elliot TURIEL Please pass on this announcement and encourage potential underrepresented candidates to apply to this position? We are especially seeking applications from qualified minority candidates. Thank you so much! *ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION (TENURE-TRACK) WITH AN EMPHASIS ON MATH, SCIENCE, OR TECHNOLOGY, AS RELATED TO COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT* Graduate School of Education UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY The Graduate School of Education (GSE), University of California, Berkeley, seeks applicants for an Assistant Professor (tenure track) in learning sciences with an emphasis on math, science, or technology education, as related to cognitive development. The expected start date is July 1, 2018. The successful candidate will join the cluster of GSE faculty who merge cognitive, cultural, developmental, and social perspectives with practice in studying cognition and learning in mathematics and science. Desirable qualities for this position include a research program merging theory and practice with an emphasis on student thinking and sense making. Applicants? research contexts might include classrooms, homes, online activities, and museums, and/or innovative practices that take advantage of contemporary technologies. The successful applicant should be prepared to teach and advise doctoral students specializing in either math, science, or technology education, and to contribute to the GSE?s innovative program in teacher education. Faculty in the GSE also have the opportunity to teach in the School?s popular undergraduate minor. An applicant?s minimum basic qualification for consideration of this position is a Ph.D. or equivalent, or the completion of all degree requirements except the dissertation at the time of application. Applicants must have a doctoral degree or equivalent in math, science, cognitive science, the learning sciences, technology education, or a related field by the date of hire. Applicants must also have a record of demonstrated excellence in research in one of these fields consistent with their career stage. Evidence of excellence can be demonstrated in the form of published or in press manuscripts in leading peer reviewed journals; exemplary chapters in edited books; outstanding letters from experts in the field; an exemplary research program to be accomplished in the next 5 years; and/or conference presentations or other forms of professional contributions indicative of strong participation in the research community. Preferred qualifications include experience in teaching courses related to math, science, or technology education and in working with a diverse student population. Applicants who conduct research with young children and who could contribute to an emerging interest on campus with a program in early childhood education are also encouraged to apply. We are interested in candidates who will contribute to diversity and equal opportunity in higher education through their teaching, research, and service. UC Berkeley is committed to addressing the family needs of faculty, including dual-career couples and single parents. For information about potential relocation to Berkeley, or career needs of accompanying partners and spouses, please visit: http://ofew.berkeley.edu/new-faculty. Applicants for this tenure-track assistant professor position should submit the following materials for a complete application: ? A curriculum vitae ? A cover letter ? A research statement ? A teaching statement ? A diversity statement ? 3 letters of reference (to be submitted by recommenders ? see more below) Applicants should request letters of recommendation directly through our online application system. Please refer potential recommenders (even when recommenders use a third party for sending letters ?i.e., dossier service or career center), to the UC Berkeley statement of confidentiality: http://apo.berkeley.edu/evalltr.html prior to submitting their letters. All letters of reference will be treated as confidential per University of California policy and California state law. How to apply: Visit https://aprecruit.berkeley.edu/apply/JPF01430 to apply. The deadline date to apply is *October 15, 2017*. Please contact Lani Hunt at (510) 664-9984 or lanihunt@berkeley.edu with questions. The University of California is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability, age or protected veteran status. For the complete University of California nondiscrimination and affirmative action policy see: http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/4000376/NondiscrimAffirmAct. Uilani Hunt Academic Personnel Analyst University of California, Berkeley Graduate School of Education Dean's Office 1501 Tolman Hall #1670 PH: 510/664-9984 FAX: 510/643-8904 lanihunt@berkeley.edu _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Thu Aug 3 14:50:42 2017 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 21:50:42 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6CdCe0YLQsjogINCe0YLQsjogUmU6IElseWVu?= =?utf-8?q?kov=2C_Marx=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1672890324.2189941.1501797042429@mail.yahoo.com> Dear David: Thank youfor your interest in the whole issue and for hard task of reading of my longtext :-) . The issuewith interpretation of the very idea of freedom is utterly interesting andimportant for our theoretical needs, so I?ll wait for your promised postimpatiently :-) As forconventionality or alternatively meatiness of LSV?s understanding of sign thatis also one of the most important problem for discussion cause it closely sidewith the problem of ideality and therefore with the problem of essence of thinkingor psyche. You areabsolutely correct with your ?blackbird? illustration. No doubt that the ruleof combination of two radicals ("black? and ?bird") has nothing to dowith any lot, but it is something meaty, something what we can explain asmovement according to the shape of our object. You arealso quite correct that in case of infant?s neologisms like ?mazoline? insteadof ?Vazelin? Vygotsky again didn?t apply to any conventionality or chance. But let uslook through Vygotsky?s "A tool and a symbol...". You probably rememberLSV?s dissertation about the nature of verbal sign: ?????Experimentsshow that both in plan and in speech the child is far from consciouslyrealizing the relativity of ? ? ? ? ? the sign operation or of the arbitrarilyestablished connection of sign and meaning. In order to become an ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?object?s(word?s) sign, the stimulus finds support in the properties of the designatedobject itself. Not ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?everything can represent everything? for the child in thisgame. The objects? real properties and their sign ? ? ? ? ? ? ? meanings come into complexstructural interaction during play. Thus, for the child, the word is linked tothe ? ? ? ? ? ? object through the latter?s properties and is incorporated in onestructure, common to it. That is why the child ? ? ? ? in our experiments refuses tocall the floor a mirror (it cannot walk on a mirror), bur has no qualms at ? ? ? ????transforming a chair into a train, using its properties in play, i.e.manipulating it as if it were a train. When asked ????to call a lamp ?table? andvice versa, the child refuses, because one ?can?t write on a lamp, or turn on atable?. To ????change (or swap) meanings for the child means to change theproperties of objects.? Thus?Vygotsky treats conventionality of the verbal sign as a characteristic of it'smaturity. Contrary, Vygotsky estimates children?s attempts to find ?support in the properties ofthe designated object itself? in naming the object as acharacteristic of infant's na?vet?, it?s backwardness. It is easyto give more examples of such argumentation. But I think that there is no needfor this.Ilyenkovand his friend Alexander Ivanovitch Meshcheriakov (deafblind children?strainer) insisted that all attempts to teach a deafblind child to speak based on(mis)understanding of verbal signs as arbitrary or conventional signs leads todead end. Speech doesn?t develop. The same fact was described by Ann Sullivan ? famousteacher of American deafblind woman Ellen Keller. On thecontrary, the path which starts from involving deafblind children into humanobject oriented activity mediated by all kind of human tools - chamber-pots,plates, spoons, tables, clothes etc. - gives them a chance to grasp somethingthat lies in the basis of speech and that enables them to study symbolic (likeArmslan - American Sign Language) and later even verbal language. All thiscan be commented in details in the context of Ilyenkov?s understanding ofIDEALITY and human tools as initial and universal form of human ideality. But takinginto account my low speed in English?writing (I hope that soon I?ll improveit :-) ) I?ll abstain from further explanations for a while.?As for theproblem of Vygotsky?s attitude to Pavlov and his theory. Could you or anybodyelse explain me ? WHAT does Vygotsky mean by the term of NATURAL or LOW psychicfunction? And why does he define them as PSYCHIC? ?Cheers, Sasha ? ???????, 3 ??????? 2017 0:50 David Kellogg ?????(?): Dear Sasha: Thanks for the reply. I took the time to read the English version of your paper with great interest and large areas of agreement. But the areas of disagreement, which I'll talk about in another post on "free will as infinite selection", were actually the zones of greatest interest. I think Vygotsky doesn't accept conventionality as a pervasive principle in language, and neither do I. Take, for example, Vygotsky's example "blackbird". We can say that the phonemes/graphemes (the? language-specific sequence of vowels and consonants) is conventional; we know this because other languages do it differently. But once we take the "salto mortale" of accepting that "black" means the (original) color of ink and "bird" means a winged animal descended from the dinosaurs, the pairing of "black" and "bird" to describe the blackbird is natural and not conventional: it obeys laws that are clear even to the half-enculturated child. I think that is why Vygotsky can give many examples of "child made" language ("mazoline", etc.) that are non-conventional and why he can link these Mondegreens to actual etymological processes and actual words ("sidewalk"). Saussure's principle applies to language in only one place, and it happens to be the only place in which Saussure was completely competent as a linguist: sounding. Saussure's principle does not apply to either wording or meaning: these are not purely conventional but natural. I think Vygotsky did not accept Pavlov as a human psychologist, but only as an animal behaviorist. Of course, he was deferential, just as you or I would defer to Mike (who was once an animal behaviorist himself), and just as Mike himself would defer to a Luria or a Bernstein. Mere bad manners doesn't make you an original thinker. I will agree to call this deference discretion: Vygotsky didn't like to pick fights and lose them. I think that's why Vygotsky concentrates his fire on Watson, and Thorndike and not Pavlov, why he points to Pavlov the animal behaviorist's insightful remarks about the sign to shame his psychologist colleagues (this is similar to what he does in shaming Piaget and Freud with the biologizing Bleuler), and why he uses Pavlov's metaphor of a "telephone switchboard" for his own purposes I didn't just include the Chuck Berry song in memory of a great musician; I think that the lyrics show us the very point you are making about the sign. You are certainly right that by itself, treated as just another instrument, the sign doesn't have the power to confer free will on the human marionette that Watson, Thorndike--and Pavlov--imagine. If a human is a puppet on a string, it doesn't help to put another puppet in control of the string and then put the human in control of the other puppet. But that's not what signs do. That's only what casting lots, tying knots, and counting on your fingers APPEAR to do. When humans have do these things, they try to go beyond the appearance. They imagine that casting lots conveys messages from God, that knots tie themselves (as the Russian formalists said), and that counting on fingers taps into some World Three of eternal discoveries (Popper). And when they have been giving these unlikely explanations for thousands of years, some humans begin to notice that the voice of the gods sounds very familiar, that the knot tying of one child is unlike that of another, and that some cultures count toes and elbows. Dorothy looks under the curtain and realizes that the Wizard of Oz is only a wizened old man, and it turns out you don't need his help after all. Soon people are making decisions in their own heads, remembering with imaginary knots, and memorizing Maxwell's equations. Of course, you and I get the joke. This is no more happening "inside the head", with an "individual" memory, than it is happening in a lot, a knot, or on your fingers. It's happening in a whole culture--many thousands of years of thinking. But the thinking isn't "passed on" through language;it is recreated and re-elaborated with every generation. The telephone switchboard, like the conventional phoneme/grapheme, is useful at one point and one point only: helping the caller get in touch with Marie. But the actual communication between father and daughter is not conventional or automatic at all. It's natural; i.e. it's hard work. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Alexandre Sourmava wrote: > David, thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word ? > ?????????. I agree with you, that the best translation will be > ?conventional?. This term coincides well enough with Vygotsky?s idea that > mature word in development of infant?s speech is something entirely > "random", "reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mere > agreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????) As for > Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I?ll agree > with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's and Pavlov's > conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov?s ?teaching? was > canonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later, closer > to 1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy of > Science. So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? evidently shade in > Luria?s and Leont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of > Vygotsky's idea of HMF and Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not > something coincidental. Anyhow, this subject deserves serious inquiry. > Sasha > > > ???????, 27 ???? 2017 1:57 David Kellogg ?????(?): > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and "irrational" > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" that > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" or > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any sound > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has a > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. The > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a semantic > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic code > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that? ?????????? > is better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost anything, > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", "conditionality", > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position and > Spinoza's. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > wrote: > > Hi, Larry! > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the > topicunder discussion. > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence > from mechanical causality). > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and > evolution together.? > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > Sasha Surmava > >? ? ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): > > >? I see. > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > work, was a "founding exemplar." > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > Andy > > ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- decision-making > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Andy, > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > will open another thread. > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.? It is > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > >? ? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > >? ? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > >? ? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > >? ? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > >? ? Larry. > > > >? ? Andy > > > >? ? ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > >? ? Andy Blunden > >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >? ? http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > >? ? collective-decision-making > > > > > >? ? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> > >>? ? Andy, > >> > >>? ? Following your lead it may be preferable to say > >>? ? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > >>? ? variable? social actions. This doubling? (by > >>? ? including both terms) may crystallize the intended > >>? ? meaning as you mention. > >> > >>? ? Andy is this vein can we also include the term > >>? ? (examples)? > >> > >>? ? Then the moving TRANS forming from single > >>? ? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > >>? ? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > >>? ? actions and further movement (historicity) toward > >>? ? (framework) practices. > >> > >>? ? (framework) practices being another doubling. > >> > >>? ? So moving (transforming) from single social? examples > >>? ? through exemplary social? examples crystallizing in > >>? ? social framework practices. > >> > >>? ? Is this reasonable? > >> > >>? ? Or not > >> > >>? ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >> > >>? ? *From: *Andy Blunden > >>? ? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > >>? ? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>? ? > > >>? ? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > >>? ? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >>? ? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > >>? ? mention > >> > >>? ? to say that *actions* - the individual units of > >>? ? *action* are > >> > >>? ? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > >> > >>? ? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > >> > >>? ? "individual" action. Or better, so is every > >>? ? "singular" action. > >> > >>? ? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > >> > >>? ? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > >>? ? form, but > >> > >>? ? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > >>? ? activity, > >> > >>? ? activities) and the set of words (practice, > >>? ? practices) have > >> > >>? ? no systematic difference running across all > >>? ? disciplines and > >> > >>? ? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > >>? ? practices. > >> > >>? ? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > >> > >>? ? German words for action (Handlung) and activity > >>? ? (Tatigkeit) > >> > >>? ? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > >> > >>? ? Aktivitat at all. > >> > >>? ? Andy > >> > >>? ? ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > >> > >>? ? Andy Blunden > >> > >>? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> > >>? ? http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > >>? ? collective-decision-making > > > >> > >> > >>? ? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> > >>? ? > Alexander, Mike, > >> > >>? ? > Thanks for the article. > >> > >>? ? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > >>? ? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > >>? ? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > >>? ? of practice in knowing). > >> > >>? ? > Two formulas: > >> > >>? ? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > >> > >>? ? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > >>? ? do not co-incide > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Action IS individual > >> > >>? ? > Practice IS a social category. > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > >>? ? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > >>? ? individual who are separate. > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > >>? ? They are alike in that both individual action & a > >>? ? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > I do not have the background to intelligently > >>? ? comment, but did register this theme as provocative > >>? ? FOR further thought and wording. > >> > >>? ? > And for generating intelligent commentary > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > From: Ivan Uemlianin > >> > >>? ? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > >> > >>? ? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > >>? ? > Cc: Alexander Surmava > >> > >>? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Ivan > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > -- > >> > >>? ? > festina lente > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > >>? ? wrote: > >> > >>? ? >> > >> > >>? ? >> This article might prove of interest to those who > >>? ? have been discussing > >> > >>? ? >> LSV's sources in > >> > >>? ? >> marx and spinoza. > >> > >>? ? >> mike > >> > >>? ? >> > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Aug 3 17:21:28 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 10:21:28 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: I think that Sasha, on p. 37 of "Ilyenkov and the Revolution in Psychology", slips one by us. He quotes Davydov, who says that Ilyenkov provided the logical-philosophical basis for cultural-historical theory and for Vygotsky's theory of instruction based on development. He then says that Davydov is wrong on both counts: neither Ilyenkov nor Vygotsky would have considered cultural-historical theory truly scientific, and Ilyenkov hardly ever mentions Vygotsky. Before we can ask what Sasha means by the first, he is off trying to explain why Ilyenkov doesn't mention Vygotsky much. There are lots of reasons not to mention Vygotsky when you are doing philosophy. I am more interested in Sasha's notion that Vygotsky would not have considered Davydov's version of the theory scientific. Sasha calls Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, and Marx anti-naturalists. He says it is because of their recognition of the social, cultural-historical nature of the human psyche. But in all three cases, that social, cultural-historical "nature" really is natural at its base: it depends on a "thinking body" in the case of Ilyenkov (something Descartes would not have rejected!), it depends on the domestication of the human body and mind in the case of Vygotsky, and of course it depends on the transformation of use values into exchange values in Marx. So I am not at all sure in what sense they are "anti-naturalist". If we take the Spinozan view, to be anti-naturalist is to be anti-substance, anti-thought, anti-extension. I don't think that applies to Marx, Vygotsky, or even Ilyenkov. I'm reading the Pedology of the Adolescent, and I find Vygotsky to be much more methodologically eclectic than Sasha suggests with phrases like "sole correct scientific method" and "whose theoretical analysis alone" (38). In my reading, Vygotsky doesn't think of methods like that: methods are only appropriate or inappropriate to problems of study. When you are studying behaviour, psychology may be the appropriate method, but when you are studying anatomy, try physiology. It is clear that Vygotsky has a preference for his own "functional method of dual stimulation", but that is precisely because it is appropriate to the goal of diagnosing the "next", or proximal, zone of development. I think that even the psychotherapist's couch, which as Sasha points out was artificially constructed out of Freud's overwheening self-interest, had a place in Vygotsky's "science of a natural whole": the only method he really does reject with disgust is the practice of imagining what it is like to be a child and then pretending that you have real scientific data. In the HDHMF, Vygotsky has a good deal to say about Wundt and Titchener, not all of it critical (Chapters 3,4,5, where "Titchener's Piano" is the empirical basis of his experiments with choice). In contrast, Vygotsky has nothing to say about Socrates and Plato. I think that, rather like the "aphorisms" Sasha cites on 39, Sasha's paper just touches on the problem that has always puzzled me: how Vygotsky reconciles the explanans of Spinoza with his chosen explanandum of choice and free will. It seems to me that they are reconcilable, but only through the path that Sasha refuses to take, that is, the path of the semiotic, semantic, systemic structure of the "thinking body". Vygotsky says that he wants to know what a real human does in the Buridan situation, tethered like the donkey between two equidistant and apparently equal piles of hay. Buridan himself would say that such a situation does not exist: piles of hay are never equidistant and never exactly equal, and the universe is really constructed like a chess game, where in any conceivable situation, there is one and only one perfectly rational move, even if it is quite beyond the power of man, beast, or even supercomputer to ever know what it is. That was, I gather, Spinoza's solution as well, except that Spinoza drew the logical conclusion that when you do not know which choice is better, you must necessarily defer until you do. In the meantime, the proliferation of choice, like the proliferation of method, is a positive good, the closest we miserable slaves can get to freedom. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello, > > > I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I > probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the > originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this > thread, but I shall. > > > Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what was > to be seen on this here persistent thread. > > > I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is > becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the > apparent world as seen through Vedanta. > > > First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western > viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational > (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different entities. > As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being through > thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? > > > Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that > Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms our > thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through > time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of > different substances? (Am I getting this right?) > > > But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed > helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this > nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding > Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and that > nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us > because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, as if > the same "material." > > > But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical robots, > or chemical reactions? or is there choice? > > > >From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza > worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, > transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how > Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been > named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have a > different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. > > > So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language to > another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind > versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very > turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit were > identically referencing. > > > Just thinking out loud here. > > > Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are > indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the > perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, > whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on > through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through > actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and > reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one hopes to > perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the > importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that > will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the > subtle forms not just the gross. > > > If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would > have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum > physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and that > the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. > > > So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being > material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name and > form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is subtle, > and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and form > of said substance. > > > A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different > forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam in > yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's > pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time (like > now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different > "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is > identical: H2O. > > > This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one > substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same > place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the change > of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there is > as if an appearance of a linear change. > > > W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, > through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same space, > though the volume might change a little. > > > OK, thanks for staying with me this far. > > > As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas > (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world consists, > these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, heat), > and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that can > be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But this > is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has more > rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river have > more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. There is > tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and > sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than the > other dominant properties therein. > > > If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might > also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put another > way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle > form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. > > > This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can > perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, by > metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," > through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry transcend > the dualism as presented by Descartes? > > > But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented > by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass intellectual > persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to me > that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a > story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with > impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was going > on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the > "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling the > Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! > > > I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but of > a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, > which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) > > > It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material > question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed > cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology > (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human > experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be one > unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which also > creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through time > and space in all directions. > > > Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would be > made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products of > that substance. > > > It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing upon > one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. > > > But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite > regression. That does not work. > > > Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be > experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of > self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. In > this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self > reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that comes of > seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of > him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. > > > My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance > with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the goal > of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind > develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history (i.e. > meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by > mind). > > > This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of > three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy or > as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these properties > are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the > aspect of the perceivable world. > > > >From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it > exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called > God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, but > it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all things > depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its > existence. > > > This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay > even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only > "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but is > no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains > regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still > clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and > space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. > > > When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no > unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot can > see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands > outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is > there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but > eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. > > > Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food in > my pot. :) > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > -- From gutierkd@gmail.com Thu Aug 3 19:08:22 2017 From: gutierkd@gmail.com (Kris Gutierrez) Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 19:08:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Assistant Professor, tenure track position at UC Berkeley References: <5FB5341B-F7CB-44F2-90A8-06BFAD1BCE64@austin.utexas.edu> Message-ID: <5C6F5CD5-02F2-4F75-BDBD-09E008C2C672@gmail.com> Please circulate. Kris Kris D. Guti?rrez Carol Liu Professor Graduate School of Education University of California, Berkeley 5629 Tolman Hall Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 gutierrkd@berkeley.edu > > > > ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION (TENURE-TRACK) WITH AN EMPHASIS ON MATH, SCIENCE, OR TECHNOLOGY, AS RELATED TO COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT > > Graduate School of Education UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY > > The Graduate School of Education (GSE), University of California, Berkeley, seeks applicants for an Assistant Professor (tenure track) in learning sciences with an emphasis on math, science, or technology education, as related to cognitive development. The expected start date is July 1, 2018. The successful candidate will join the cluster of GSE faculty who merge cognitive, cultural, developmental, and social perspectives with practice in studying cognition and learning in mathematics and science. Desirable qualities for this position include a research program merging theory and practice with an emphasis on student thinking and sense making. Applicants? research contexts might include classrooms, homes, online activities, and museums, and/or innovative practices that take advantage of contemporary technologies. The successful applicant should be prepared to teach and advise doctoral students specializing in either math, science, or technology education, and to contribute to the GSE?s innovative program in teacher education. > > Faculty in the GSE also have the opportunity to teach in the School?s popular undergraduate minor. > > An applicant?s minimum basic qualification for consideration of this position is a Ph.D. or equivalent, or the completion of all degree requirements except the dissertation at the time of application. Applicants must have a doctoral degree or equivalent in math, science, cognitive science, the learning sciences, technology education, or a related field by the date of hire. > > Applicants must also have a record of demonstrated excellence in research in one of these fields consistent with their career stage. Evidence of excellence can be demonstrated in the form of published or in press manuscripts in leading peer reviewed journals; exemplary chapters in edited books; outstanding letters from experts in the field; an exemplary research program to be accomplished in the next 5 years; and/or conference presentations or other forms of professional contributions indicative of strong participation in the research community. > > Preferred qualifications include experience in teaching courses related to math, science, or technology education and in working with a diverse student population. Applicants who conduct research with young children and who could contribute to an emerging interest on campus with a program in early childhood education are also encouraged to apply. > > We are interested in candidates who will contribute to diversity and equal opportunity in higher education through their teaching, research, and service. UC Berkeley is committed to addressing the family needs of faculty, including dual-career couples and single parents. For information about potential relocation to Berkeley, or career needs of accompanying partners and spouses, please visit: http://ofew.berkeley.edu/new-faculty. > Applicants for this tenure-track assistant professor position should submit the following materials for a complete application: > > A curriculum vitae > A cover letter > A research statement > A teaching statement > A diversity statement > 3 letters of reference (to be submitted by recommenders ? see more below) > Applicants should request letters of recommendation directly through our online application system. Please refer potential recommenders (even when recommenders use a third party for sending letters ?i.e., dossier service or career center), to the UC Berkeley statement of confidentiality: http://apo.berkeley.edu/evalltr.html? prior to submitting their letters. > > All letters of reference will be treated as confidential per University of California policy and California state law. > > How to apply: Visit https://aprecruit.berkeley.edu/apply/JPF01430? to apply. The deadline date to apply is October 15, 2017. Please contact Lani Hunt at (510) 664-9984 or lanihunt@berkeley.edu with questions. > > The University of California is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, > > sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability, age or protected veteran status. > > For the complete University of California nondiscrimination and affirmative action policy see: http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/4000376/NondiscrimAffirmAct . > > > From ivan@llaisdy.com Thu Aug 3 22:34:29 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 06:34:29 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <9B14E51E-2396-4801-9C3B-A1F60109E193@llaisdy.com> Re Buridan's ass: didn't Vygotsky suggest a human would toss a coin? i.e. provide themself with an extra stimulus that would differentiate the options. Ivan -- festina lente > On 4 Aug 2017, at 01:21, David Kellogg wrote: > > I think that Sasha, on p. 37 of "Ilyenkov and the Revolution in > Psychology", slips one by us. He quotes Davydov, who says that Ilyenkov > provided the logical-philosophical basis for cultural-historical theory and > for Vygotsky's theory of instruction based on development. He then says > that Davydov is wrong on both counts: neither Ilyenkov nor Vygotsky would > have considered cultural-historical theory truly scientific, and Ilyenkov > hardly ever mentions Vygotsky. Before we can ask what Sasha means by the > first, he is off trying to explain why Ilyenkov doesn't mention Vygotsky > much. There are lots of reasons not to mention Vygotsky when you are doing > philosophy. I am more interested in Sasha's notion that Vygotsky would not > have considered Davydov's version of the theory scientific. > > Sasha calls Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, and Marx anti-naturalists. He says it is > because of their recognition of the social, cultural-historical nature of > the human psyche. But in all three cases, that social, cultural-historical > "nature" really is natural at its base: it depends on a "thinking body" in > the case of Ilyenkov (something Descartes would not have rejected!), it > depends on the domestication of the human body and mind in the case of > Vygotsky, and of course it depends on the transformation of use values into > exchange values in Marx. So I am not at all sure in what sense they are > "anti-naturalist". If we take the Spinozan view, to be anti-naturalist is > to be anti-substance, anti-thought, anti-extension. I don't think that > applies to Marx, Vygotsky, or even Ilyenkov. > > I'm reading the Pedology of the Adolescent, and I find Vygotsky to be much > more methodologically eclectic than Sasha suggests with phrases like "sole > correct scientific method" and "whose theoretical analysis alone" (38). In > my reading, Vygotsky doesn't think of methods like that: methods are only > appropriate or inappropriate to problems of study. When you are studying > behaviour, psychology may be the appropriate method, but when you are > studying anatomy, try physiology. It is clear that Vygotsky has a > preference for his own "functional method of dual stimulation", but that is > precisely because it is appropriate to the goal of diagnosing the "next", > or proximal, zone of development. I think that even the psychotherapist's > couch, which as Sasha points out was artificially constructed out of > Freud's overwheening self-interest, had a place in Vygotsky's "science of a > natural whole": the only method he really does reject with disgust is the > practice of imagining what it is like to be a child and then pretending > that you have real scientific data. In the HDHMF, Vygotsky has a good deal > to say about Wundt and Titchener, not all of it critical (Chapters 3,4,5, > where "Titchener's Piano" is the empirical basis of his experiments with > choice). In contrast, Vygotsky has nothing to say about Socrates and Plato. > > I think that, rather like the "aphorisms" Sasha cites on 39, Sasha's paper > just touches on the problem that has always puzzled me: how Vygotsky > reconciles the explanans of Spinoza with his chosen explanandum of choice > and free will. It seems to me that they are reconcilable, but only through > the path that Sasha refuses to take, that is, the path of the semiotic, > semantic, systemic structure of the "thinking body". Vygotsky says that he > wants to know what a real human does in the Buridan situation, tethered > like the donkey between two equidistant and apparently equal piles of hay. > > Buridan himself would say that such a situation does not exist: piles of > hay are never equidistant and never exactly equal, and the universe is > really constructed like a chess game, where in any conceivable situation, > there is one and only one perfectly rational move, even if it is quite > beyond the power of man, beast, or even supercomputer to ever know what it > is. That was, I gather, Spinoza's solution as well, except that Spinoza > drew the logical conclusion that when you do not know which choice is > better, you must necessarily defer until you do. In the meantime, the > proliferation of choice, like the proliferation of method, is a positive > good, the closest we miserable slaves can get to freedom. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > >> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hello, >> >> >> I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I >> probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the >> originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this >> thread, but I shall. >> >> >> Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what was >> to be seen on this here persistent thread. >> >> >> I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is >> becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the >> apparent world as seen through Vedanta. >> >> >> First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western >> viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational >> (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different entities. >> As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being through >> thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? >> >> >> Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that >> Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms our >> thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through >> time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of >> different substances? (Am I getting this right?) >> >> >> But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed >> helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this >> nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding >> Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and that >> nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us >> because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, as if >> the same "material." >> >> >> But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical robots, >> or chemical reactions? or is there choice? >> >> >>> From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza >> worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, >> transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how >> Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been >> named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have a >> different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. >> >> >> So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language to >> another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind >> versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very >> turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit were >> identically referencing. >> >> >> Just thinking out loud here. >> >> >> Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are >> indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the >> perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, >> whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on >> through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through >> actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and >> reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one hopes to >> perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the >> importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that >> will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the >> subtle forms not just the gross. >> >> >> If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would >> have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum >> physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and that >> the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. >> >> >> So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being >> material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name and >> form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is subtle, >> and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and form >> of said substance. >> >> >> A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different >> forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam in >> yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's >> pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time (like >> now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different >> "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is >> identical: H2O. >> >> >> This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one >> substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same >> place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the change >> of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there is >> as if an appearance of a linear change. >> >> >> W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, >> through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same space, >> though the volume might change a little. >> >> >> OK, thanks for staying with me this far. >> >> >> As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas >> (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world consists, >> these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, heat), >> and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that can >> be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But this >> is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has more >> rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river have >> more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. There is >> tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and >> sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than the >> other dominant properties therein. >> >> >> If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might >> also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put another >> way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle >> form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. >> >> >> This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can >> perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, by >> metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," >> through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry transcend >> the dualism as presented by Descartes? >> >> >> But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented >> by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass intellectual >> persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to me >> that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a >> story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with >> impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was going >> on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the >> "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling the >> Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! >> >> >> I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but of >> a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, >> which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) >> >> >> It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material >> question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed >> cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology >> (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human >> experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be one >> unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which also >> creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through time >> and space in all directions. >> >> >> Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would be >> made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products of >> that substance. >> >> >> It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing upon >> one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. >> >> >> But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite >> regression. That does not work. >> >> >> Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be >> experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of >> self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. In >> this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self >> reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that comes of >> seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of >> him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. >> >> >> My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance >> with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the goal >> of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind >> develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history (i.e. >> meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by >> mind). >> >> >> This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of >> three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy or >> as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these properties >> are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the >> aspect of the perceivable world. >> >> >>> From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it >> exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called >> God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, but >> it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all things >> depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its >> existence. >> >> >> This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay >> even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only >> "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but is >> no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains >> regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still >> clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and >> space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. >> >> >> When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no >> unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot can >> see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands >> outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is >> there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but >> eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. >> >> >> Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food in >> my pot. :) >> >> >> Kind regards, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- From ivan@llaisdy.com Fri Aug 4 02:58:15 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 10:58:15 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiDQntGC0LI6IFJlOiBJbHllbmtvdiwgTWFyeCwg?= =?utf-8?q?=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <691f4796-9c5b-3689-3412-230e5b466980@llaisdy.com> Dear David Please could you explain a bit more your (and/or Vygotsky's) argument against conventionality, and what you mean by "natural" in this context? I don't understand how the blackbird example fits. I have three problems with the blackbird example: 1. Russian has no word for blackbird. Russian uses the phrase ?????? ?????, literally, "black thrush", so it seems strange for Vygotsky to use the word "blackbird" as an example. If you were reading in English translation, perhaps the translator was taking liberties? 2. black + bird does not imply blackbird. Not all black birds are blackbirds; not all blackbirds are black birds. In British English, blackbird refers specifically to the Turdus merula; in American English, blackbird refers to any of a number of small birds --- the so-called New World blackbirds --- none of which is the Turdus merula (and not all of which are black birds, e.g. the yellow-shouldered blackbird). Other black birds --- e.g. crows, rooks and ravens --- are not blackbirds at all. 3. As you put it, "other languages do it differently". Your argument about "black" + "bird" only applies to English. The French for blackbird is not "noiroiseau" or even "oiseaunoir", but "merle" (from the Latin merula, which isn't black+bird either). The half-enculturated German child might see a blackbird and use the phrase "schwarz Vogel", but a slightly-more-enculturated German child would use the German word for blackbird, which is "Amsel". Putting #1 aside, the limitations and variations in #2 and #3 can be explained by looking at the history of the communities using the term. But surely convention is an artefact of history, so a historical explanation would be closer to "conventionality" than "nature". The only non-conventional aspect I can see is the geographical distribution of Turdus merula (basically Europe, New Zealand and a bit of Eastern Australia). Best wishes Ivan On 02/08/17 22:47, David Kellogg wrote: > Dear Sasha: > > Thanks for the reply. I took the time to read the English version of your > paper with great interest and large areas of agreement. But the areas of > disagreement, which I'll talk about in another post on "free will as > infinite selection", were actually the zones of greatest interest. > > I think Vygotsky doesn't accept conventionality as a pervasive principle in > language, and neither do I. Take, for example, Vygotsky's example > "blackbird". We can say that the phonemes/graphemes (the language-specific > sequence of vowels and consonants) is conventional; we know this because > other languages do it differently. But once we take the "salto mortale" of > accepting that "black" means the (original) color of ink and "bird" means a > winged animal descended from the dinosaurs, the pairing of "black" and > "bird" to describe the blackbird is natural and not conventional: it obeys > laws that are clear even to the half-enculturated child. > > I think that is why Vygotsky can give many examples of "child made" > language ("mazoline", etc.) that are non-conventional and why he can link > these Mondegreens to actual etymological processes and actual words > ("sidewalk"). Saussure's principle applies to language in only one place, > and it happens to be the only place in which Saussure was completely > competent as a linguist: sounding. Saussure's principle does not apply to > either wording or meaning: these are not purely conventional but natural. > > I think Vygotsky did not accept Pavlov as a human psychologist, but only as > an animal behaviorist. Of course, he was deferential, just as you or I > would defer to Mike (who was once an animal behaviorist himself), and just > as Mike himself would defer to a Luria or a Bernstein. Mere bad manners > doesn't make you an original thinker. I will agree to call this deference > discretion: Vygotsky didn't like to pick fights and lose them. > > I think that's why Vygotsky concentrates his fire on Watson, and Thorndike > and not Pavlov, why he points to Pavlov the animal behaviorist's insightful > remarks about the sign to shame his psychologist colleagues (this is > similar to what he does in shaming Piaget and Freud with the biologizing > Bleuler), and why he uses Pavlov's metaphor of a "telephone switchboard" > for his own purposes > > I didn't just include the Chuck Berry song in memory of a great musician; I > think that the lyrics show us the very point you are making about the sign. > You are certainly right that by itself, treated as just another instrument, > the sign doesn't have the power to confer free will on the human marionette > that Watson, Thorndike--and Pavlov--imagine. If a human is a puppet on a > string, it doesn't help to put another puppet in control of the string and > then put the human in control of the other puppet. > > But that's not what signs do. That's only what casting lots, tying knots, > and counting on your fingers APPEAR to do. When humans have do these > things, they try to go beyond the appearance. They imagine that casting > lots conveys messages from God, that knots tie themselves (as the Russian > formalists said), and that counting on fingers taps into some World Three > of eternal discoveries (Popper). > > And when they have been giving these unlikely explanations for thousands of > years, some humans begin to notice that the voice of the gods sounds very > familiar, that the knot tying of one child is unlike that of another, and > that some cultures count toes and elbows. Dorothy looks under the curtain > and realizes that the Wizard of Oz is only a wizened old man, and it turns > out you don't need his help after all. Soon people are making decisions in > their own heads, remembering with imaginary knots, and memorizing Maxwell's > equations. > > Of course, you and I get the joke. This is no more happening "inside the > head", with an "individual" memory, than it is happening in a lot, a knot, > or on your fingers. It's happening in a whole culture--many thousands of > years of thinking. But the thinking isn't "passed on" through language;it > is recreated and re-elaborated with every generation. The telephone > switchboard, like the conventional phoneme/grapheme, is useful at one point > and one point only: helping the caller get in touch with Marie. But the > actual communication between father and daughter is not conventional or > automatic at all. It's natural; i.e. it's hard work. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > -- ============================================================ Ivan A. Uemlianin PhD Llaisdy Speech Technology Research and Development ivan@llaisdy.com @llaisdy llaisdy.wordpress.com github.com/llaisdy www.linkedin.com/in/ivanuemlianin festina lente ============================================================ From ablunden@mira.net Fri Aug 4 03:25:14 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 20:25:14 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiDQntGC0LI6IFJlOiBJbHllbmtvdiwgTWFyeCwg?= =?utf-8?q?=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: <691f4796-9c5b-3689-3412-230e5b466980@llaisdy.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> <691f4796-9c5b-3689-3412-230e5b466980@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: <77a568be-5a4a-45df-9f4b-9e088c273c90@mira.net> I love your intervention, Ivan, especially being a blackbird lover in South-eastern Australia. But I won't spoil it by interrupting, but look forward to David's riposte! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 4/08/2017 7:58 PM, Ivan Uemlianin wrote: > Dear David > > Please could you explain a bit more your (and/or > Vygotsky's) argument against conventionality, and what you > mean by "natural" in this context? I don't understand how > the blackbird example fits. > > I have three problems with the blackbird example: > > 1. Russian has no word for blackbird. > > Russian uses the phrase ?????? ?????, literally, "black > thrush", so it seems strange for Vygotsky to use the word > "blackbird" as an example. If you were reading in English > translation, perhaps the translator was taking liberties? > > 2. black + bird does not imply blackbird. > > Not all black birds are blackbirds; not all blackbirds are > black birds. In British English, blackbird refers > specifically to the Turdus merula; in American English, > blackbird refers to any of a number of small birds --- the > so-called New World blackbirds --- none of which is the > Turdus merula (and not all of which are black birds, e.g. > the yellow-shouldered blackbird). Other black birds --- > e.g. crows, rooks and ravens --- are not blackbirds at all. > > 3. As you put it, "other languages do it differently". > > Your argument about "black" + "bird" only applies to > English. The French for blackbird is not "noiroiseau" or > even "oiseaunoir", but "merle" (from the Latin merula, > which isn't black+bird either). > > The half-enculturated German child might see a blackbird > and use the phrase "schwarz Vogel", but a > slightly-more-enculturated German child would use the > German word for blackbird, which is "Amsel". > > Putting #1 aside, the limitations and variations in #2 and > #3 can be explained by looking at the history of the > communities using the term. But surely convention is an > artefact of history, so a historical explanation would be > closer to "conventionality" than "nature". The only > non-conventional aspect I can see is the geographical > distribution of Turdus merula (basically Europe, New > Zealand and a bit of Eastern Australia). > > Best wishes > > Ivan > > > On 02/08/17 22:47, David Kellogg wrote: >> Dear Sasha: >> >> Thanks for the reply. I took the time to read the English >> version of your >> paper with great interest and large areas of agreement. >> But the areas of >> disagreement, which I'll talk about in another post on >> "free will as >> infinite selection", were actually the zones of greatest >> interest. >> >> I think Vygotsky doesn't accept conventionality as a >> pervasive principle in >> language, and neither do I. Take, for example, Vygotsky's >> example >> "blackbird". We can say that the phonemes/graphemes (the >> language-specific >> sequence of vowels and consonants) is conventional; we >> know this because >> other languages do it differently. But once we take the >> "salto mortale" of >> accepting that "black" means the (original) color of ink >> and "bird" means a >> winged animal descended from the dinosaurs, the pairing >> of "black" and >> "bird" to describe the blackbird is natural and not >> conventional: it obeys >> laws that are clear even to the half-enculturated child. >> >> I think that is why Vygotsky can give many examples of >> "child made" >> language ("mazoline", etc.) that are non-conventional and >> why he can link >> these Mondegreens to actual etymological processes and >> actual words >> ("sidewalk"). Saussure's principle applies to language in >> only one place, >> and it happens to be the only place in which Saussure was >> completely >> competent as a linguist: sounding. Saussure's principle >> does not apply to >> either wording or meaning: these are not purely >> conventional but natural. >> >> I think Vygotsky did not accept Pavlov as a human >> psychologist, but only as >> an animal behaviorist. Of course, he was deferential, >> just as you or I >> would defer to Mike (who was once an animal behaviorist >> himself), and just >> as Mike himself would defer to a Luria or a Bernstein. >> Mere bad manners >> doesn't make you an original thinker. I will agree to >> call this deference >> discretion: Vygotsky didn't like to pick fights and lose >> them. >> >> I think that's why Vygotsky concentrates his fire on >> Watson, and Thorndike >> and not Pavlov, why he points to Pavlov the animal >> behaviorist's insightful >> remarks about the sign to shame his psychologist >> colleagues (this is >> similar to what he does in shaming Piaget and Freud with >> the biologizing >> Bleuler), and why he uses Pavlov's metaphor of a >> "telephone switchboard" >> for his own purposes >> >> I didn't just include the Chuck Berry song in memory of a >> great musician; I >> think that the lyrics show us the very point you are >> making about the sign. >> You are certainly right that by itself, treated as just >> another instrument, >> the sign doesn't have the power to confer free will on >> the human marionette >> that Watson, Thorndike--and Pavlov--imagine. If a human >> is a puppet on a >> string, it doesn't help to put another puppet in control >> of the string and >> then put the human in control of the other puppet. >> >> But that's not what signs do. That's only what casting >> lots, tying knots, >> and counting on your fingers APPEAR to do. When humans >> have do these >> things, they try to go beyond the appearance. They >> imagine that casting >> lots conveys messages from God, that knots tie themselves >> (as the Russian >> formalists said), and that counting on fingers taps into >> some World Three >> of eternal discoveries (Popper). >> >> And when they have been giving these unlikely >> explanations for thousands of >> years, some humans begin to notice that the voice of the >> gods sounds very >> familiar, that the knot tying of one child is unlike that >> of another, and >> that some cultures count toes and elbows. Dorothy looks >> under the curtain >> and realizes that the Wizard of Oz is only a wizened old >> man, and it turns >> out you don't need his help after all. Soon people are >> making decisions in >> their own heads, remembering with imaginary knots, and >> memorizing Maxwell's >> equations. >> >> Of course, you and I get the joke. This is no more >> happening "inside the >> head", with an "individual" memory, than it is happening >> in a lot, a knot, >> or on your fingers. It's happening in a whole >> culture--many thousands of >> years of thinking. But the thinking isn't "passed on" >> through language;it >> is recreated and re-elaborated with every generation. The >> telephone >> switchboard, like the conventional phoneme/grapheme, is >> useful at one point >> and one point only: helping the caller get in touch with >> Marie. But the >> actual communication between father and daughter is not >> conventional or >> automatic at all. It's natural; i.e. it's hard work. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Aug 4 07:38:47 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 08:38:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: <9B14E51E-2396-4801-9C3B-A1F60109E193@llaisdy.com> References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> <9B14E51E-2396-4801-9C3B-A1F60109E193@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: Ivan, I think that is the best explanation of the very poorly named concept "double (dual) stimulation". I have never before been able to make sense of that concept but now in two brief sentences, you've made it crystal clear. Thank you for that (extra stimulus!). -greg On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 11:34 PM, Ivan Uemlianin wrote: > Re Buridan's ass: didn't Vygotsky suggest a human would toss a coin? i.e. > provide themself with an extra stimulus that would differentiate the > options. > > Ivan > > -- > festina lente > > > > On 4 Aug 2017, at 01:21, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > I think that Sasha, on p. 37 of "Ilyenkov and the Revolution in > > Psychology", slips one by us. He quotes Davydov, who says that Ilyenkov > > provided the logical-philosophical basis for cultural-historical theory > and > > for Vygotsky's theory of instruction based on development. He then says > > that Davydov is wrong on both counts: neither Ilyenkov nor Vygotsky would > > have considered cultural-historical theory truly scientific, and Ilyenkov > > hardly ever mentions Vygotsky. Before we can ask what Sasha means by the > > first, he is off trying to explain why Ilyenkov doesn't mention Vygotsky > > much. There are lots of reasons not to mention Vygotsky when you are > doing > > philosophy. I am more interested in Sasha's notion that Vygotsky would > not > > have considered Davydov's version of the theory scientific. > > > > Sasha calls Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, and Marx anti-naturalists. He says it is > > because of their recognition of the social, cultural-historical nature of > > the human psyche. But in all three cases, that social, > cultural-historical > > "nature" really is natural at its base: it depends on a "thinking body" > in > > the case of Ilyenkov (something Descartes would not have rejected!), it > > depends on the domestication of the human body and mind in the case of > > Vygotsky, and of course it depends on the transformation of use values > into > > exchange values in Marx. So I am not at all sure in what sense they are > > "anti-naturalist". If we take the Spinozan view, to be anti-naturalist is > > to be anti-substance, anti-thought, anti-extension. I don't think that > > applies to Marx, Vygotsky, or even Ilyenkov. > > > > I'm reading the Pedology of the Adolescent, and I find Vygotsky to be > much > > more methodologically eclectic than Sasha suggests with phrases like > "sole > > correct scientific method" and "whose theoretical analysis alone" (38). > In > > my reading, Vygotsky doesn't think of methods like that: methods are only > > appropriate or inappropriate to problems of study. When you are studying > > behaviour, psychology may be the appropriate method, but when you are > > studying anatomy, try physiology. It is clear that Vygotsky has a > > preference for his own "functional method of dual stimulation", but that > is > > precisely because it is appropriate to the goal of diagnosing the "next", > > or proximal, zone of development. I think that even the psychotherapist's > > couch, which as Sasha points out was artificially constructed out of > > Freud's overwheening self-interest, had a place in Vygotsky's "science > of a > > natural whole": the only method he really does reject with disgust is the > > practice of imagining what it is like to be a child and then pretending > > that you have real scientific data. In the HDHMF, Vygotsky has a good > deal > > to say about Wundt and Titchener, not all of it critical (Chapters 3,4,5, > > where "Titchener's Piano" is the empirical basis of his experiments with > > choice). In contrast, Vygotsky has nothing to say about Socrates and > Plato. > > > > I think that, rather like the "aphorisms" Sasha cites on 39, Sasha's > paper > > just touches on the problem that has always puzzled me: how Vygotsky > > reconciles the explanans of Spinoza with his chosen explanandum of choice > > and free will. It seems to me that they are reconcilable, but only > through > > the path that Sasha refuses to take, that is, the path of the semiotic, > > semantic, systemic structure of the "thinking body". Vygotsky says that > he > > wants to know what a real human does in the Buridan situation, tethered > > like the donkey between two equidistant and apparently equal piles of > hay. > > > > Buridan himself would say that such a situation does not exist: piles of > > hay are never equidistant and never exactly equal, and the universe is > > really constructed like a chess game, where in any conceivable situation, > > there is one and only one perfectly rational move, even if it is quite > > beyond the power of man, beast, or even supercomputer to ever know what > it > > is. That was, I gather, Spinoza's solution as well, except that Spinoza > > drew the logical conclusion that when you do not know which choice is > > better, you must necessarily defer until you do. In the meantime, the > > proliferation of choice, like the proliferation of method, is a positive > > good, the closest we miserable slaves can get to freedom. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >> > >> Hello, > >> > >> > >> I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I > >> probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the > >> originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this > >> thread, but I shall. > >> > >> > >> Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what > was > >> to be seen on this here persistent thread. > >> > >> > >> I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is > >> becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the > >> apparent world as seen through Vedanta. > >> > >> > >> First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western > >> viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational > >> (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different > entities. > >> As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being > through > >> thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? > >> > >> > >> Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that > >> Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms > our > >> thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through > >> time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of > >> different substances? (Am I getting this right?) > >> > >> > >> But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed > >> helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this > >> nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding > >> Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and > that > >> nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us > >> because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, > as if > >> the same "material." > >> > >> > >> But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical > robots, > >> or chemical reactions? or is there choice? > >> > >> > >>> From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza > >> worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, > >> transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how > >> Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been > >> named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have > a > >> different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. > >> > >> > >> So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language > to > >> another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind > >> versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very > >> turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit > were > >> identically referencing. > >> > >> > >> Just thinking out loud here. > >> > >> > >> Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are > >> indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the > >> perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, > >> whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on > >> through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through > >> actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and > >> reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one > hopes to > >> perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the > >> importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that > >> will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the > >> subtle forms not just the gross. > >> > >> > >> If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would > >> have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum > >> physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and > that > >> the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. > >> > >> > >> So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being > >> material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name > and > >> form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is > subtle, > >> and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and > form > >> of said substance. > >> > >> > >> A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different > >> forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam > in > >> yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's > >> pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time > (like > >> now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different > >> "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is > >> identical: H2O. > >> > >> > >> This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one > >> substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same > >> place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the > change > >> of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there > is > >> as if an appearance of a linear change. > >> > >> > >> W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, > >> through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same > space, > >> though the volume might change a little. > >> > >> > >> OK, thanks for staying with me this far. > >> > >> > >> As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas > >> (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world > consists, > >> these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, > heat), > >> and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that > can > >> be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But > this > >> is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has > more > >> rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river > have > >> more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. > There is > >> tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and > >> sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than > the > >> other dominant properties therein. > >> > >> > >> If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might > >> also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put > another > >> way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle > >> form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. > >> > >> > >> This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can > >> perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, > by > >> metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," > >> through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry > transcend > >> the dualism as presented by Descartes? > >> > >> > >> But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented > >> by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass > intellectual > >> persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to > me > >> that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a > >> story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with > >> impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was > going > >> on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the > >> "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling > the > >> Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! > >> > >> > >> I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but > of > >> a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, > >> which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) > >> > >> > >> It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material > >> question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed > >> cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology > >> (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human > >> experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be > one > >> unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which > also > >> creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through > time > >> and space in all directions. > >> > >> > >> Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would > be > >> made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products > of > >> that substance. > >> > >> > >> It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing > upon > >> one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. > >> > >> > >> But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite > >> regression. That does not work. > >> > >> > >> Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be > >> experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of > >> self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. > In > >> this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self > >> reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that > comes of > >> seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of > >> him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. > >> > >> > >> My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance > >> with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the > goal > >> of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind > >> develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history > (i.e. > >> meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by > >> mind). > >> > >> > >> This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of > >> three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy > or > >> as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these > properties > >> are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the > >> aspect of the perceivable world. > >> > >> > >>> From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it > >> exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called > >> God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, > but > >> it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all > things > >> depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its > >> existence. > >> > >> > >> This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay > >> even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only > >> "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but > is > >> no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains > >> regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still > >> clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and > >> space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. > >> > >> > >> When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no > >> unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot > can > >> see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands > >> outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is > >> there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but > >> eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. > >> > >> > >> Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food > in > >> my pot. :) > >> > >> > >> Kind regards, > >> > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ivan@llaisdy.com Fri Aug 4 07:53:49 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 15:53:49 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> <9B14E51E-2396-4801-9C3B-A1F60109E193@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: Thank you! :) -- festina lente > On 4 Aug 2017, at 15:38, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Ivan, > I think that is the best explanation of the very poorly named concept > "double (dual) stimulation". > I have never before been able to make sense of that concept but now in two > brief sentences, you've made it crystal clear. > Thank you for that (extra stimulus!). > -greg > >> On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 11:34 PM, Ivan Uemlianin wrote: >> >> Re Buridan's ass: didn't Vygotsky suggest a human would toss a coin? i.e. >> provide themself with an extra stimulus that would differentiate the >> options. >> >> Ivan >> >> -- >> festina lente >> >> >>> On 4 Aug 2017, at 01:21, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> I think that Sasha, on p. 37 of "Ilyenkov and the Revolution in >>> Psychology", slips one by us. He quotes Davydov, who says that Ilyenkov >>> provided the logical-philosophical basis for cultural-historical theory >> and >>> for Vygotsky's theory of instruction based on development. He then says >>> that Davydov is wrong on both counts: neither Ilyenkov nor Vygotsky would >>> have considered cultural-historical theory truly scientific, and Ilyenkov >>> hardly ever mentions Vygotsky. Before we can ask what Sasha means by the >>> first, he is off trying to explain why Ilyenkov doesn't mention Vygotsky >>> much. There are lots of reasons not to mention Vygotsky when you are >> doing >>> philosophy. I am more interested in Sasha's notion that Vygotsky would >> not >>> have considered Davydov's version of the theory scientific. >>> >>> Sasha calls Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, and Marx anti-naturalists. He says it is >>> because of their recognition of the social, cultural-historical nature of >>> the human psyche. But in all three cases, that social, >> cultural-historical >>> "nature" really is natural at its base: it depends on a "thinking body" >> in >>> the case of Ilyenkov (something Descartes would not have rejected!), it >>> depends on the domestication of the human body and mind in the case of >>> Vygotsky, and of course it depends on the transformation of use values >> into >>> exchange values in Marx. So I am not at all sure in what sense they are >>> "anti-naturalist". If we take the Spinozan view, to be anti-naturalist is >>> to be anti-substance, anti-thought, anti-extension. I don't think that >>> applies to Marx, Vygotsky, or even Ilyenkov. >>> >>> I'm reading the Pedology of the Adolescent, and I find Vygotsky to be >> much >>> more methodologically eclectic than Sasha suggests with phrases like >> "sole >>> correct scientific method" and "whose theoretical analysis alone" (38). >> In >>> my reading, Vygotsky doesn't think of methods like that: methods are only >>> appropriate or inappropriate to problems of study. When you are studying >>> behaviour, psychology may be the appropriate method, but when you are >>> studying anatomy, try physiology. It is clear that Vygotsky has a >>> preference for his own "functional method of dual stimulation", but that >> is >>> precisely because it is appropriate to the goal of diagnosing the "next", >>> or proximal, zone of development. I think that even the psychotherapist's >>> couch, which as Sasha points out was artificially constructed out of >>> Freud's overwheening self-interest, had a place in Vygotsky's "science >> of a >>> natural whole": the only method he really does reject with disgust is the >>> practice of imagining what it is like to be a child and then pretending >>> that you have real scientific data. In the HDHMF, Vygotsky has a good >> deal >>> to say about Wundt and Titchener, not all of it critical (Chapters 3,4,5, >>> where "Titchener's Piano" is the empirical basis of his experiments with >>> choice). In contrast, Vygotsky has nothing to say about Socrates and >> Plato. >>> >>> I think that, rather like the "aphorisms" Sasha cites on 39, Sasha's >> paper >>> just touches on the problem that has always puzzled me: how Vygotsky >>> reconciles the explanans of Spinoza with his chosen explanandum of choice >>> and free will. It seems to me that they are reconcilable, but only >> through >>> the path that Sasha refuses to take, that is, the path of the semiotic, >>> semantic, systemic structure of the "thinking body". Vygotsky says that >> he >>> wants to know what a real human does in the Buridan situation, tethered >>> like the donkey between two equidistant and apparently equal piles of >> hay. >>> >>> Buridan himself would say that such a situation does not exist: piles of >>> hay are never equidistant and never exactly equal, and the universe is >>> really constructed like a chess game, where in any conceivable situation, >>> there is one and only one perfectly rational move, even if it is quite >>> beyond the power of man, beast, or even supercomputer to ever know what >> it >>> is. That was, I gather, Spinoza's solution as well, except that Spinoza >>> drew the logical conclusion that when you do not know which choice is >>> better, you must necessarily defer until you do. In the meantime, the >>> proliferation of choice, like the proliferation of method, is a positive >>> good, the closest we miserable slaves can get to freedom. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >>> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >>> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >>> >>> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >>> >>> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- >> globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >>> >>> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >> Ruminations >>> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >>> >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hello, >>>> >>>> >>>> I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I >>>> probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the >>>> originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this >>>> thread, but I shall. >>>> >>>> >>>> Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what >> was >>>> to be seen on this here persistent thread. >>>> >>>> >>>> I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is >>>> becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the >>>> apparent world as seen through Vedanta. >>>> >>>> >>>> First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western >>>> viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational >>>> (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different >> entities. >>>> As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being >> through >>>> thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? >>>> >>>> >>>> Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that >>>> Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms >> our >>>> thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through >>>> time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of >>>> different substances? (Am I getting this right?) >>>> >>>> >>>> But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed >>>> helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this >>>> nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding >>>> Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and >> that >>>> nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us >>>> because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, >> as if >>>> the same "material." >>>> >>>> >>>> But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical >> robots, >>>> or chemical reactions? or is there choice? >>>> >>>> >>>>> From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza >>>> worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, >>>> transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how >>>> Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been >>>> named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have >> a >>>> different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. >>>> >>>> >>>> So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language >> to >>>> another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind >>>> versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very >>>> turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit >> were >>>> identically referencing. >>>> >>>> >>>> Just thinking out loud here. >>>> >>>> >>>> Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are >>>> indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the >>>> perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, >>>> whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on >>>> through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through >>>> actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and >>>> reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one >> hopes to >>>> perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the >>>> importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that >>>> will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the >>>> subtle forms not just the gross. >>>> >>>> >>>> If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would >>>> have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum >>>> physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and >> that >>>> the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. >>>> >>>> >>>> So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being >>>> material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name >> and >>>> form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is >> subtle, >>>> and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and >> form >>>> of said substance. >>>> >>>> >>>> A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different >>>> forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam >> in >>>> yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's >>>> pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time >> (like >>>> now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different >>>> "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is >>>> identical: H2O. >>>> >>>> >>>> This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one >>>> substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same >>>> place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the >> change >>>> of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there >> is >>>> as if an appearance of a linear change. >>>> >>>> >>>> W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, >>>> through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same >> space, >>>> though the volume might change a little. >>>> >>>> >>>> OK, thanks for staying with me this far. >>>> >>>> >>>> As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas >>>> (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world >> consists, >>>> these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, >> heat), >>>> and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that >> can >>>> be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But >> this >>>> is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has >> more >>>> rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river >> have >>>> more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. >> There is >>>> tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and >>>> sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than >> the >>>> other dominant properties therein. >>>> >>>> >>>> If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might >>>> also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put >> another >>>> way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle >>>> form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. >>>> >>>> >>>> This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can >>>> perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, >> by >>>> metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," >>>> through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry >> transcend >>>> the dualism as presented by Descartes? >>>> >>>> >>>> But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented >>>> by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass >> intellectual >>>> persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to >> me >>>> that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a >>>> story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with >>>> impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was >> going >>>> on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the >>>> "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling >> the >>>> Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! >>>> >>>> >>>> I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but >> of >>>> a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, >>>> which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) >>>> >>>> >>>> It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material >>>> question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed >>>> cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology >>>> (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human >>>> experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be >> one >>>> unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which >> also >>>> creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through >> time >>>> and space in all directions. >>>> >>>> >>>> Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would >> be >>>> made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products >> of >>>> that substance. >>>> >>>> >>>> It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing >> upon >>>> one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. >>>> >>>> >>>> But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite >>>> regression. That does not work. >>>> >>>> >>>> Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be >>>> experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of >>>> self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. >> In >>>> this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self >>>> reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that >> comes of >>>> seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of >>>> him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. >>>> >>>> >>>> My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance >>>> with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the >> goal >>>> of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind >>>> develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history >> (i.e. >>>> meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by >>>> mind). >>>> >>>> >>>> This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of >>>> three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy >> or >>>> as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these >> properties >>>> are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the >>>> aspect of the perceivable world. >>>> >>>> >>>>> From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it >>>> exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called >>>> God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, >> but >>>> it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all >> things >>>> depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its >>>> existence. >>>> >>>> >>>> This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay >>>> even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only >>>> "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but >> is >>>> no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains >>>> regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still >>>> clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and >>>> space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. >>>> >>>> >>>> When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no >>>> unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot >> can >>>> see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands >>>> outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is >>>> there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but >>>> eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food >> in >>>> my pot. :) >>>> >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Fri Aug 4 09:50:16 2017 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 16:50:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?koi8-r?b?79TXOiAg79TXOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bp?= =?koi8-r?b?bm96YQ==?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com>, Message-ID: dear David, speaking of blackbirds - best, phillip Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird BY WALLACE STEVENS I Among twenty snowy mountains, The only moving thing Was the eye of the blackbird. II I was of three minds, Like a tree In which there are three blackbirds. III The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. It was a small part of the pantomime. IV A man and a woman Are one. A man and a woman and a blackbird Are one. V I do not know which to prefer, The beauty of inflections Or the beauty of innuendoes, The blackbird whistling Or just after. VI Icicles filled the long window With barbaric glass. The shadow of the blackbird Crossed it, to and fro. The mood Traced in the shadow An indecipherable cause. VII O thin men of Haddam, Why do you imagine golden birds? Do you not see how the blackbird Walks around the feet Of the women about you? VIII I know noble accents And lucid, inescapable rhythms; But I know, too, That the blackbird is involved In what I know. IX When the blackbird flew out of sight, It marked the edge Of one of many circles. X At the sight of blackbirds Flying in a green light, Even the bawds of euphony Would cry out sharply. XI He rode over Connecticut In a glass coach. Once, a fear pierced him, In that he mistook The shadow of his equipage For blackbirds. XII The river is moving. The blackbird must be flying. XIII It was evening all afternoon. It was snowing And it was going to snow. The blackbird sat In the cedar-limbs. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Aug 4 14:27:32 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 06:27:32 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiDQntGC0LI6IFJlOiBJbHllbmtvdiwgTWFyeCwg?= =?utf-8?q?=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Thanks, everybody. Particularly for the Wallace Stevens. My supervisor, David Butt, did HIS PhD thesis on the lexicogrammar of Wallace Stevens! At first it looks like almost random, "une folie integrale", but when you analyze it into clauses, you find it is very finely wrought. Vygotsky does talk about tossing coins ("the eagle and the bar" is the Russian version of heads and tails, and I gather that means that in the 1930s they were still using the one ruble coins of the Tsarist era). It's in the context of probability, and I think that the relationship between meaning and wording is not random folly, but a natural relationship, although to really see the pattern clearly you need to look probabilistically, because speakers have free will. But the specific examples he uses of "double stimulation" in the second chapter of HDHMF are casting lots, tying knots (in your handkerchief, or in a quipu) and counting on your fingers. He calls them "rudimentary functions", things which once decided life and death questions, public executions and tax revenues of empire, but which now stand in the dusty corners of the cultural mind, a plaything for children or a way of deciding who buys the next round in the pub. In Chapter Six (paragraphs 40-42), Vygotsky is talking about the experiment of "switching names", something I've been doing with real child siblings. In this case, it is calling a crow "pigeon" and a pigeon "crow". He says that it is impossible, because it would perturb expressions like "crow black" and "pigeon blue". Beyond the phonological system, there is a delicate woof and warp of wordings, and these wordings are all interdependent, both on each other and on our experiences of nature. (Actually, even the phonological system is not completely conventional, because of intonation and stress, which are natural. It's only articulation--the vowels and consonants that Saussure studied in proto-Indoeuropean--that is completely conventional) Now, suppose we go one level higher--to meaning. We find that getting information from somebody is done through a particular lexicogrammatical pattern we call "questioning" while giving them information is done through a different pattern called "making statements". These are realized as interrogatives and declaratives respectively. Can we replicate Vygotsky's experiment here? That is, can we use interrogatives to give information, and declaratives to get information? Of course! Do you not see how the blackbird Walks around the feet Of the women about you? (That is, "There is a blackbird walking around the feet of the women about you.") I do not know which to prefer, The beauty of inflections Or the beauty of innuendoes, The blackbird whistling Or just after. (That is, "Which do I prefer?") The relationship of information-getting and asking a question is natural--but it's probabilistic, because of human free will. So is the relationship between information-giving and making a statement. We can and do flout this natural relationship--not just in poetry, but in all kinds of "grammatical metaphors", like "Would you mind not cawing?" which is actually a command to a child not to yawn, or "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny", which construes a process as an entity rather than as a happening. But just because we have built devices that can flout natural laws does nothing to repeal them. Even the wing of the blackbird does not abolish atmospheric pressure or gravity, but only uses one to overcome the other. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 1:50 AM, White, Phillip wrote: > dear David, > > > speaking of blackbirds - > > > best, > > > phillip > > > Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird > BY WALLACE STEVENS > I > Among twenty snowy mountains, > The only moving thing > Was the eye of the blackbird. > > II > I was of three minds, > Like a tree > In which there are three blackbirds. > > III > The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. > It was a small part of the pantomime. > > IV > A man and a woman > Are one. > A man and a woman and a blackbird > Are one. > > V > I do not know which to prefer, > The beauty of inflections > Or the beauty of innuendoes, > The blackbird whistling > Or just after. > > VI > Icicles filled the long window > With barbaric glass. > The shadow of the blackbird > Crossed it, to and fro. > The mood > Traced in the shadow > An indecipherable cause. > > VII > O thin men of Haddam, > Why do you imagine golden birds? > Do you not see how the blackbird > Walks around the feet > Of the women about you? > > VIII > I know noble accents > And lucid, inescapable rhythms; > But I know, too, > That the blackbird is involved > In what I know. > > IX > When the blackbird flew out of sight, > It marked the edge > Of one of many circles. > > X > At the sight of blackbirds > Flying in a green light, > Even the bawds of euphony > Would cry out sharply. > > XI > He rode over Connecticut > In a glass coach. > Once, a fear pierced him, > In that he mistook > The shadow of his equipage > For blackbirds. > > XII > The river is moving. > The blackbird must be flying. > > XIII > It was evening all afternoon. > It was snowing > And it was going to snow. > The blackbird sat > In the cedar-limbs. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Aug 4 17:02:49 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 17:02:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Vygotsky and Feurebach by Peter Keiler Message-ID: XMC-ites Attached in English, Russian, and German is an articles by Peter Keiler about Vygotsky and Feuerbach that I am sure a number of you will be interested in. Most of us know Feuerbach from his famous theses and no more. Peter opens up a great many aspects of Feuerbach's writings that are echoed in various ways throughout Vygotsky's writings and links them to the political/social/ideological/ context of the shifting times. Thanks Peter. mike -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: P. Keiler Vygotsky-Feuerbach (English).pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1107795 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170804/0a5783e4/attachment-0003.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: P. Keiler Vygotsky-Feuerbach (German).pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1222280 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170804/0a5783e4/attachment-0004.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: P. Keiler Vygotsky-Feuerbach (Russian).pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 886974 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170804/0a5783e4/attachment-0005.pdf From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Fri Aug 4 19:53:44 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 19:53:44 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and Feurebach by Peter Keiler In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike, Peter provides some references that allow many to link Feuerbach references in Vygotsky to the original sources---I have some of the works published in the early 1800s, where the quotations Peter takes can be found (like vol. 2 of Collected Works). Peter does not write about what Marx took up from Feuerbach, and which he rejected (in the Theses on Feuerbach). Of relevance to the recent discussion on Spinoza. Feuerbach was well-read on Spinoza and published and taught Spinoza. To me the way Vygotsky applies the thing possible for two that is impossible for one, applied to the word, in the way Marx applied it to the commodity, appears to be a significant idea. It is significant because it runs against the constructivist strain in our community, which begins with the idea that 'meaning' is personal (people haven't been reading Mead either). Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 5:02 PM, mike cole wrote: > XMC-ites > > Attached in English, Russian, and German is an articles by Peter Keiler > about Vygotsky and Feuerbach that I am sure a number of you will be > interested in. Most of us know Feuerbach from his famous theses and no > more. Peter opens up a great many aspects of Feuerbach's writings that are > echoed in various ways throughout Vygotsky's writings and links them to the > political/social/ideological/ context of the shifting times. > > Thanks Peter. > mike > From avramus@gmail.com Fri Aug 4 23:43:30 2017 From: avramus@gmail.com (Alexandre Sourmava) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 06:43:30 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IFZ5Z290c2t5IGFuZCBGZXVyZWJhY2ggYnkg?= =?utf-8?q?Peter_Keiler?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> Point taken! The issue with distinctions between?Feuerbach and Marx is crucial. Surely?Feuerbach as materialist has to do nothing else but apply to Spinoza. But his?interpretation of basic Spinozian ideas and Marx's interpretation of Spinozism are strictly opposite. Feuerbach was consistent sensualist, while Marx standed on idea of activity. Real bodily activity. Feuerbach was psychologist?whereas in contrast Marx was antipsychologist, but activist. It looks like Vygotsky in his early soviet situation tried to base on Feuerbach's ideas indeed. And just that led him to the dead end of his semiotics. To put this another way we can say that Feuerbach as sensualist paved the way to positivism and relativism both in philosophy and psychology.In fact Ilyenkov was the first after Marx thinker, who presented basically activist, non sensealist interpretation of Spinozism and Marxism. This idea was so much big that iven EVI hemself did not fulfil it's reachness. I mean that the idea that psyche, thinking or consciousness are basically the process of acting of a corporeal subject according to the shape of his object, or in terms of Ilyenkov/Spinoza the mode of acting of the thinking body. On the contrary, Feuerbach is the father of leading to dead end idea that thinking is functioning of human brains and the bridge from the narrow space of human's head to external world is such a magic entity as (passive) sensation. Sasha ???????, 5 ??????? 2017 5:57 Wolff-Michael Roth ?????(?): Mike, Peter provides some references that allow many to link Feuerbach references in Vygotsky to the original sources---I have some of the works published in the early 1800s, where the quotations Peter takes can be found (like vol. 2 of Collected Works). Peter does not write about what Marx took up from Feuerbach, and which he rejected (in the Theses on Feuerbach). Of relevance to the recent discussion on Spinoza. Feuerbach was well-read on Spinoza and published and taught Spinoza. To me the way Vygotsky applies the thing possible for two that is impossible for one, applied to the word, in the way Marx applied it to the commodity, appears to be a significant idea. It is significant because it runs against the constructivist strain in our community, which begins with the idea that 'meaning' is personal (people haven't been reading Mead either). Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 5:02 PM, mike cole wrote: > XMC-ites > > Attached in English, Russian, and German is an articles by Peter Keiler > about Vygotsky and Feuerbach that I am sure a number of you will be > interested in. Most of us know Feuerbach from his famous theses and no > more. Peter opens up a great many aspects of Feuerbach's writings that are > echoed in various ways throughout Vygotsky's writings and links them to the > political/social/ideological/ context of the shifting times. > > Thanks Peter. > mike > From ivan@llaisdy.com Sat Aug 5 02:26:52 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 10:26:52 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?gb2312?b?p7Cn5KfTOiCnsKfkp9M6IFJlOiBJbHllbmtvdiwgTWFyeCwg?= =?gb2312?b?JiBTcGlub3ph?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1C17A968-A8BF-45D7-B54A-CB6A9E755DD3@llaisdy.com> Dear David Thank you for clarification re "blackbird". I'm afraid I still don't understand your term "natural" (e.g., intonation and stress vary between languages just as do vowels and consonants), but I will try to pick it up. Best wishes Ivan -- festina lente > On 4 Aug 2017, at 22:27, David Kellogg wrote: > > Thanks, everybody. Particularly for the Wallace Stevens. My supervisor, > David Butt, did HIS PhD thesis on the lexicogrammar of Wallace Stevens! At > first it looks like almost random, "une folie integrale", but when you > analyze it into clauses, you find it is very finely wrought. > > Vygotsky does talk about tossing coins ("the eagle and the bar" is the > Russian version of heads and tails, and I gather that means that in the > 1930s they were still using the one ruble coins of the Tsarist era). It's > in the context of probability, and I think that the relationship between > meaning and wording is not random folly, but a natural relationship, > although to really see the pattern clearly you need to look > probabilistically, because speakers have free will. > > But the specific examples he uses of "double stimulation" in the second > chapter of HDHMF are casting lots, tying knots (in your handkerchief, or in > a quipu) and counting on your fingers. He calls them "rudimentary > functions", things which once decided life and death questions, public > executions and tax revenues of empire, but which now stand in the dusty > corners of the cultural mind, a plaything for children or a way of deciding > who buys the next round in the pub. > > In Chapter Six (paragraphs 40-42), Vygotsky is talking about the experiment > of "switching names", something I've been doing with real child siblings. > In this case, it is calling a crow "pigeon" and a pigeon "crow". He says > that it is impossible, because it would perturb expressions like "crow > black" and "pigeon blue". Beyond the phonological system, there is a > delicate woof and warp of wordings, and these wordings are all > interdependent, both on each other and on our experiences of nature. > (Actually, even the phonological system is not completely conventional, > because of intonation and stress, which are natural. It's only > articulation--the vowels and consonants that Saussure studied in > proto-Indoeuropean--that is completely conventional) > > Now, suppose we go one level higher--to meaning. We find that getting > information from somebody is done through a particular lexicogrammatical > pattern we call "questioning" while giving them information is done through > a different pattern called "making statements". These are realized as > interrogatives and declaratives respectively. Can we replicate Vygotsky's > experiment here? That is, can we use interrogatives to give information, > and declaratives to get information? Of course! > > Do you not see how the blackbird > Walks around the feet > Of the women about you? > > (That is, "There is a blackbird walking around the feet of the women about > you.") > > I do not know which to prefer, > The beauty of inflections > Or the beauty of innuendoes, > The blackbird whistling > Or just after. > > (That is, "Which do I prefer?") > > The relationship of information-getting and asking a question is > natural--but it's probabilistic, because of human free will. So is the > relationship between information-giving and making a statement. We can and > do flout this natural relationship--not just in poetry, but in all kinds of > "grammatical metaphors", like "Would you mind not cawing?" which is > actually a command to a child not to yawn, or "Ontogeny recapitulates > phylogeny", which construes a process as an entity rather than as a > happening. But just because we have built devices that can flout natural > laws does nothing to repeal them. Even the wing of the blackbird does not > abolish atmospheric pressure or gravity, but only uses one to overcome the > other. > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 1:50 AM, White, Phillip > wrote: > >> dear David, >> >> >> speaking of blackbirds - >> >> >> best, >> >> >> phillip >> >> >> Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird >> BY WALLACE STEVENS >> I >> Among twenty snowy mountains, >> The only moving thing >> Was the eye of the blackbird. >> >> II >> I was of three minds, >> Like a tree >> In which there are three blackbirds. >> >> III >> The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. >> It was a small part of the pantomime. >> >> IV >> A man and a woman >> Are one. >> A man and a woman and a blackbird >> Are one. >> >> V >> I do not know which to prefer, >> The beauty of inflections >> Or the beauty of innuendoes, >> The blackbird whistling >> Or just after. >> >> VI >> Icicles filled the long window >> With barbaric glass. >> The shadow of the blackbird >> Crossed it, to and fro. >> The mood >> Traced in the shadow >> An indecipherable cause. >> >> VII >> O thin men of Haddam, >> Why do you imagine golden birds? >> Do you not see how the blackbird >> Walks around the feet >> Of the women about you? >> >> VIII >> I know noble accents >> And lucid, inescapable rhythms; >> But I know, too, >> That the blackbird is involved >> In what I know. >> >> IX >> When the blackbird flew out of sight, >> It marked the edge >> Of one of many circles. >> >> X >> At the sight of blackbirds >> Flying in a green light, >> Even the bawds of euphony >> Would cry out sharply. >> >> XI >> He rode over Connecticut >> In a glass coach. >> Once, a fear pierced him, >> In that he mistook >> The shadow of his equipage >> For blackbirds. >> >> XII >> The river is moving. >> The blackbird must be flying. >> >> XIII >> It was evening all afternoon. >> It was snowing >> And it was going to snow. >> The blackbird sat >> In the cedar-limbs. >> >> From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Aug 5 02:30:08 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 09:30:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?windows-1251?b?zvLiOiDO8uI6IFJlOiBJbHllbmtvdiwgTWFyeCwgJiBT?= =?windows-1251?q?pinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> , Message-ID: <1501925409848.34574@iped.uio.no> David, Alexander, Phillip, all, David's way of elaborating the comment that free will is not 'free' from natural relationship, and therefore from necessity; that even in Vygotsky the key is not simply 'arbitrariness' or 'conventionality', reminded me of the argument held by Sergey Mareev. Mareev discusses how Vygotsky treated 'the problem of the origination of speaking activity from labour'. He notes Vygotsky's idea of 'unity of thought and speech' that 'word creates intellect and, at the same time, it is created by intellect'. He then goes on to note that, 'one can only break this word-thought-word cycle by turning the circle into a spiral. Unlike a circle, a spiral has a beginning, and its historical beginning is labour. However, it is only a *historical* beginning, for the *ontogenetic* beginning is the word. At first, a child masters speaking and only after that would he start working' He further remarks that 'historically' means *essentially*, adding that 'the essence of speech follows from the essence of labour*. Is this kind of elaboration (the one of turning a circle into an spiral) connected to your argument, David? It is interesting that S. Mareev uses the same literature than Sasha S. uses, including Ilyenkov and Mescheryakov, to argue for exactly the opposite with regard to Vygotsky's treatment. Probably this is so because, unlike Sasha, Mareev does not mention the problems Vygotsky gets into when takas the S-R as starting point in his account of sign mediation. May it be that there is truth in all these positions? that while Vygotsky's most important legacy of a genetic unity of human thinking and communicating remains valid, the premise that 'natural perception' is passive perception of the S-R type is not and so it needs revision? Alfredo Mareev, S. (2015). Abstract and concrete understanding of activity: 'Activity' and 'labour' in soviet philosophy. In, A. Maidansky, & V. Oittinen, The Practical Essence of Man. The 'Activity Approach' in Late Soviet Philosophy (pp. 96?102). Leiden, NL: Brill. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 04 August 2017 23:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Thanks, everybody. Particularly for the Wallace Stevens. My supervisor, David Butt, did HIS PhD thesis on the lexicogrammar of Wallace Stevens! At first it looks like almost random, "une folie integrale", but when you analyze it into clauses, you find it is very finely wrought. Vygotsky does talk about tossing coins ("the eagle and the bar" is the Russian version of heads and tails, and I gather that means that in the 1930s they were still using the one ruble coins of the Tsarist era). It's in the context of probability, and I think that the relationship between meaning and wording is not random folly, but a natural relationship, although to really see the pattern clearly you need to look probabilistically, because speakers have free will. But the specific examples he uses of "double stimulation" in the second chapter of HDHMF are casting lots, tying knots (in your handkerchief, or in a quipu) and counting on your fingers. He calls them "rudimentary functions", things which once decided life and death questions, public executions and tax revenues of empire, but which now stand in the dusty corners of the cultural mind, a plaything for children or a way of deciding who buys the next round in the pub. In Chapter Six (paragraphs 40-42), Vygotsky is talking about the experiment of "switching names", something I've been doing with real child siblings. In this case, it is calling a crow "pigeon" and a pigeon "crow". He says that it is impossible, because it would perturb expressions like "crow black" and "pigeon blue". Beyond the phonological system, there is a delicate woof and warp of wordings, and these wordings are all interdependent, both on each other and on our experiences of nature. (Actually, even the phonological system is not completely conventional, because of intonation and stress, which are natural. It's only articulation--the vowels and consonants that Saussure studied in proto-Indoeuropean--that is completely conventional) Now, suppose we go one level higher--to meaning. We find that getting information from somebody is done through a particular lexicogrammatical pattern we call "questioning" while giving them information is done through a different pattern called "making statements". These are realized as interrogatives and declaratives respectively. Can we replicate Vygotsky's experiment here? That is, can we use interrogatives to give information, and declaratives to get information? Of course! Do you not see how the blackbird Walks around the feet Of the women about you? (That is, "There is a blackbird walking around the feet of the women about you.") I do not know which to prefer, The beauty of inflections Or the beauty of innuendoes, The blackbird whistling Or just after. (That is, "Which do I prefer?") The relationship of information-getting and asking a question is natural--but it's probabilistic, because of human free will. So is the relationship between information-giving and making a statement. We can and do flout this natural relationship--not just in poetry, but in all kinds of "grammatical metaphors", like "Would you mind not cawing?" which is actually a command to a child not to yawn, or "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny", which construes a process as an entity rather than as a happening. But just because we have built devices that can flout natural laws does nothing to repeal them. Even the wing of the blackbird does not abolish atmospheric pressure or gravity, but only uses one to overcome the other. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 1:50 AM, White, Phillip wrote: > dear David, > > > speaking of blackbirds - > > > best, > > > phillip > > > Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird > BY WALLACE STEVENS > I > Among twenty snowy mountains, > The only moving thing > Was the eye of the blackbird. > > II > I was of three minds, > Like a tree > In which there are three blackbirds. > > III > The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. > It was a small part of the pantomime. > > IV > A man and a woman > Are one. > A man and a woman and a blackbird > Are one. > > V > I do not know which to prefer, > The beauty of inflections > Or the beauty of innuendoes, > The blackbird whistling > Or just after. > > VI > Icicles filled the long window > With barbaric glass. > The shadow of the blackbird > Crossed it, to and fro. > The mood > Traced in the shadow > An indecipherable cause. > > VII > O thin men of Haddam, > Why do you imagine golden birds? > Do you not see how the blackbird > Walks around the feet > Of the women about you? > > VIII > I know noble accents > And lucid, inescapable rhythms; > But I know, too, > That the blackbird is involved > In what I know. > > IX > When the blackbird flew out of sight, > It marked the edge > Of one of many circles. > > X > At the sight of blackbirds > Flying in a green light, > Even the bawds of euphony > Would cry out sharply. > > XI > He rode over Connecticut > In a glass coach. > Once, a fear pierced him, > In that he mistook > The shadow of his equipage > For blackbirds. > > XII > The river is moving. > The blackbird must be flying. > > XIII > It was evening all afternoon. > It was snowing > And it was going to snow. > The blackbird sat > In the cedar-limbs. > > From ivan@llaisdy.com Sat Aug 5 04:28:32 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 12:28:32 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogVnlnb3Rza3kgYW5kIEZldXJlYmFjaCBi?= =?utf-8?q?y_Peter_Keiler?= In-Reply-To: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> References: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> Dear All (Following on from Sasha's point.) One very nice aspect of Spinoza's metaphysics, that is made full use of by Ilyenkov, is the nature of the body. In Spinoza's jargon a body is a finite mode of substance under the attribute of extension. There is no presupposition that a "body" is a physically or biologically individuated single entity (e.g. a human being). In fact, as far as I can tell, there is no presupposition that a body is a contiguous lump of spacetime. Individuation of bodies seems to be entirely a question of shared activity and conatus (Spinoza's jargon: roughly striving or self-preservation). Spinoza's metaphysics is radically anti-reductionist (e.g., "fundamental particle" is a contradiction in terms, the only fundamental entity is substance as a whole). So, in Ilyenkov, the subject of activity is often not an individual person but society or even humanity as a whole. Similarly, in Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, the child is often relatively passive, while the larger body --- the social environment --- is active (e.g., where the English translation has "the child learns" the Russian often has "the child is taught"). The child's development is a story of the child's sharing in the activity of the larger body. In earlier works, e.g., Educational Psychology, Vygotsky is perhaps still basing his own ideas on the prevailing reductionist behaviourism. A lot of Anglo-American psychology seems to presuppose the human individual (or biological mechanisms within the human individual) as a kind of fundamental particle. Best wishes Ivan On 05/08/2017 07:43, Alexandre Sourmava wrote: > Point taken! The issue with distinctions between Feuerbach and Marx is crucial. Surely Feuerbach as materialist has to do nothing else but apply to Spinoza. But his interpretation of basic Spinozian ideas and Marx's interpretation of Spinozism are strictly opposite. Feuerbach was consistent sensualist, while Marx standed on idea of activity. Real bodily activity. Feuerbach was psychologist whereas in contrast Marx was antipsychologist, but activist. > It looks like Vygotsky in his early soviet situation tried to base on Feuerbach's ideas indeed. And just that led him to the dead end of his semiotics. To put this another way we can say that Feuerbach as sensualist paved the way to positivism and relativism both in philosophy and psychology.In fact Ilyenkov was the first after Marx thinker, who presented basically activist, non sensealist interpretation of Spinozism and Marxism. This idea was so much big that iven EVI hemself did not fulfil it's reachness. > I mean that the idea that psyche, thinking or consciousness are basically the process of acting of a corporeal subject according to the shape of his object, or in terms of Ilyenkov/Spinoza the mode of acting of the thinking body. On the contrary, Feuerbach is the father of leading to dead end idea that thinking is functioning of human brains and the bridge from the narrow space of human's head to external world is such a magic entity as (passive) sensation. > > Sasha > > ???????, 5 ??????? 2017 5:57 Wolff-Michael Roth ?????(?): > > > Mike, Peter provides some references that allow many to link Feuerbach > references in Vygotsky to the original sources---I have some of the works > published in the early 1800s, where the quotations Peter takes can be found > (like vol. 2 of Collected Works). > > Peter does not write about what Marx took up from Feuerbach, and which he > rejected (in the Theses on Feuerbach). > > Of relevance to the recent discussion on Spinoza. Feuerbach was well-read > on Spinoza and published and taught Spinoza. > > To me the way Vygotsky applies the thing possible for two that is > impossible for one, applied to the word, in the way Marx applied it to the > commodity, appears to be a significant idea. It is significant because it > runs against the constructivist strain in our community, which begins with > the idea that 'meaning' is personal (people haven't been reading Mead > either). > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 5:02 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> XMC-ites >> >> Attached in English, Russian, and German is an articles by Peter Keiler >> about Vygotsky and Feuerbach that I am sure a number of you will be >> interested in. Most of us know Feuerbach from his famous theses and no >> more. Peter opens up a great many aspects of Feuerbach's writings that are >> echoed in various ways throughout Vygotsky's writings and links them to the >> political/social/ideological/ context of the shifting times. >> >> Thanks Peter. >> mike >> > > -- ============================================================ Ivan A. Uemlianin PhD Llaisdy Ymchwil a Datblygu Technoleg Lleferydd Speech Technology Research and Development ivan@llaisdy.com @llaisdy llaisdy.wordpress.com github.com/llaisdy www.linkedin.com/in/ivanuemlianin festina lente ============================================================ From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Aug 5 06:18:37 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 06:18:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and Feurebach by Peter Keiler In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5985c5c5.035f620a.4ca38.f21f@mx.google.com> Mike, Michael, Note # 22 exploring two different translations of Feuerbach?s passage is enlightening. VERSION 1: What is absolutely impossible for one person alone is possible for two VERSION 2: What is absolutely impossible for one nan alone TO ACCOMPLISH is possible for two men TO ACHEIVE. What exists in the absence of version #1 that alters the meaning from #1 to #2 ? The focus on (observation / perception) in version #1 in contrast to (accomplishing / achieving) in version #2. Keiler Peter?s insight that Vygotsky in referencing Feuerbach?s passage is speaking (in code) is illuminating, awakening further inquiry and questions awaiting polyphonic historicity as answers. RE -searching coming alive Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: August 4, 2017 7:57 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: keiler@zedat.fu-berlin.de Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and Feurebach by Peter Keiler Mike, Peter provides some references that allow many to link Feuerbach references in Vygotsky to the original sources---I have some of the works published in the early 1800s, where the quotations Peter takes can be found (like vol. 2 of Collected Works). Peter does not write about what Marx took up from Feuerbach, and which he rejected (in the Theses on Feuerbach). Of relevance to the recent discussion on Spinoza. Feuerbach was well-read on Spinoza and published and taught Spinoza. To me the way Vygotsky applies the thing possible for two that is impossible for one, applied to the word, in the way Marx applied it to the commodity, appears to be a significant idea. It is significant because it runs against the constructivist strain in our community, which begins with the idea that 'meaning' is personal (people haven't been reading Mead either). Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 5:02 PM, mike cole wrote: > XMC-ites > > Attached in English, Russian, and German is an articles by Peter Keiler > about Vygotsky and Feuerbach that I am sure a number of you will be > interested in. Most of us know Feuerbach from his famous theses and no > more. Peter opens up a great many aspects of Feuerbach's writings that are > echoed in various ways throughout Vygotsky's writings and links them to the > political/social/ideological/ context of the shifting times. > > Thanks Peter. > mike > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Aug 5 06:31:37 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 06:31:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?IFJFOiAgUmU60J7RgtCyOiBSZTogVnlnb3Rza3kgYW5kIEZldXJl?= =?utf-8?q?bach_by_Peter_Keiler?= In-Reply-To: <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> References: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: <5985c8d1.4cc9620a.f53b8.1a47@mx.google.com> Sasha, Ivan, Wolff-Michael and other participants now onstage: The boundary markers and pivots are becoming clearer. I will just add Peter?s word (crypto-Feuerbachianism) to IDENTIFY (camouflaged) sources. Perceiving OR accomplishing? That is the question Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Ivan Uemlianin Sent: August 5, 2017 4:30 AM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: Vygotsky and Feurebach by Peter Keiler Dear All (Following on from Sasha's point.) One very nice aspect of Spinoza's metaphysics, that is made full use of by Ilyenkov, is the nature of the body. In Spinoza's jargon a body is a finite mode of substance under the attribute of extension. There is no presupposition that a "body" is a physically or biologically individuated single entity (e.g. a human being). In fact, as far as I can tell, there is no presupposition that a body is a contiguous lump of spacetime. Individuation of bodies seems to be entirely a question of shared activity and conatus (Spinoza's jargon: roughly striving or self-preservation). Spinoza's metaphysics is radically anti-reductionist (e.g., "fundamental particle" is a contradiction in terms, the only fundamental entity is substance as a whole). So, in Ilyenkov, the subject of activity is often not an individual person but society or even humanity as a whole. Similarly, in Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, the child is often relatively passive, while the larger body --- the social environment --- is active (e.g., where the English translation has "the child learns" the Russian often has "the child is taught"). The child's development is a story of the child's sharing in the activity of the larger body. In earlier works, e.g., Educational Psychology, Vygotsky is perhaps still basing his own ideas on the prevailing reductionist behaviourism. A lot of Anglo-American psychology seems to presuppose the human individual (or biological mechanisms within the human individual) as a kind of fundamental particle. Best wishes Ivan On 05/08/2017 07:43, Alexandre Sourmava wrote: > Point taken! The issue with distinctions between Feuerbach and Marx is crucial. Surely Feuerbach as materialist has to do nothing else but apply to Spinoza. But his interpretation of basic Spinozian ideas and Marx's interpretation of Spinozism are strictly opposite. Feuerbach was consistent sensualist, while Marx standed on idea of activity. Real bodily activity. Feuerbach was psychologist whereas in contrast Marx was antipsychologist, but activist. > It looks like Vygotsky in his early soviet situation tried to base on Feuerbach's ideas indeed. And just that led him to the dead end of his semiotics. To put this another way we can say that Feuerbach as sensualist paved the way to positivism and relativism both in philosophy and psychology.In fact Ilyenkov was the first after Marx thinker, who presented basically activist, non sensealist interpretation of Spinozism and Marxism. This idea was so much big that iven EVI hemself did not fulfil it's reachness. > I mean that the idea that psyche, thinking or consciousness are basically the process of acting of a corporeal subject according to the shape of his object, or in terms of Ilyenkov/Spinoza the mode of acting of the thinking body. On the contrary, Feuerbach is the father of leading to dead end idea that thinking is functioning of human brains and the bridge from the narrow space of human's head to external world is such a magic entity as (passive) sensation. > > Sasha > > ???????, 5 ??????? 2017 5:57 Wolff-Michael Roth ?????(?): > > > Mike, Peter provides some references that allow many to link Feuerbach > references in Vygotsky to the original sources---I have some of the works > published in the early 1800s, where the quotations Peter takes can be found > (like vol. 2 of Collected Works). > > Peter does not write about what Marx took up from Feuerbach, and which he > rejected (in the Theses on Feuerbach). > > Of relevance to the recent discussion on Spinoza. Feuerbach was well-read > on Spinoza and published and taught Spinoza. > > To me the way Vygotsky applies the thing possible for two that is > impossible for one, applied to the word, in the way Marx applied it to the > commodity, appears to be a significant idea. It is significant because it > runs against the constructivist strain in our community, which begins with > the idea that 'meaning' is personal (people haven't been reading Mead > either). > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 5:02 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> XMC-ites >> >> Attached in English, Russian, and German is an articles by Peter Keiler >> about Vygotsky and Feuerbach that I am sure a number of you will be >> interested in. Most of us know Feuerbach from his famous theses and no >> more. Peter opens up a great many aspects of Feuerbach's writings that are >> echoed in various ways throughout Vygotsky's writings and links them to the >> political/social/ideological/ context of the shifting times. >> >> Thanks Peter. >> mike >> > > -- ============================================================ Ivan A. Uemlianin PhD Llaisdy Ymchwil a Datblygu Technoleg Lleferydd Speech Technology Research and Development ivan@llaisdy.com @llaisdy llaisdy.wordpress.com github.com/llaisdy www.linkedin.com/in/ivanuemlianin festina lente ============================================================ From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Aug 5 10:01:52 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 10:01:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?IFJFOiAgUmU60J7RgtCyOiBSZTogVnlnb3Rza3kgYW5kIEZldXJl?= =?utf-8?q?bach_by_Peter_Keiler?= In-Reply-To: <5985c8d1.4cc9620a.f53b8.1a47@mx.google.com> References: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> <5985c8d1.4cc9620a.f53b8.1a47@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5985fa17.0232620a.3878b.0e63@mx.google.com> Keiler Peter?s article on Page 90 & 91 (section: An Attempt at Decoding) I found insightful and contributing to expanding our historical consciousness (historical imaginal). I believe this section puts in context (meaningful context) Vygotsky?s attempt at (synthesis) that includes Feuerbach?s basic idea (found in paragraph 41 in ?Principles of the Philosophy of the Future? - cited on page 91 of this article) This section explores the GENERATION of man (humanity) including both the spiritual and physical man (humanity): The community of man with man is the 1st principle and criterion of truth and generality. Keiler guides us through a reading of Vygotsky?s Feuerbachian principles I found compelling. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Lplarry Sent: August 5, 2017 6:32 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: Vygotsky and Feurebach by Peter Keiler Sasha, Ivan, Wolff-Michael and other participants now onstage: The boundary markers and pivots are becoming clearer. I will just add Peter?s word (crypto-Feuerbachianism) to IDENTIFY (camouflaged) sources. Perceiving ?OR accomplishing? That is the question Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Ivan Uemlianin Sent: August 5, 2017 4:30 AM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: Vygotsky and Feurebach by Peter Keiler Dear All (Following on from Sasha's point.) One very nice aspect of Spinoza's metaphysics, that is made full use of by Ilyenkov, is the nature of the body.? In Spinoza's jargon a body is a finite mode of substance under the attribute of extension.? There is no presupposition that a "body" is a physically or biologically individuated single entity (e.g. a human being).? In fact, as far as I can tell, there is no presupposition that a body is a contiguous lump of spacetime.? Individuation of bodies seems to be entirely a question of shared activity and conatus (Spinoza's jargon: roughly striving or self-preservation).? Spinoza's metaphysics is radically anti-reductionist (e.g., "fundamental particle" is a contradiction in terms, the only fundamental entity is substance as a whole). So, in Ilyenkov, the subject of activity is often not an individual person but society or even humanity as a whole.? Similarly, in Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, the child is often relatively passive, while the larger body --- the social environment --- is active (e.g., where the English translation has "the child learns" the Russian often has "the child is taught").? The child's development is a story of the child's sharing in the activity of the larger body.? In earlier works, e.g., Educational Psychology, Vygotsky is perhaps still basing his own ideas on the prevailing reductionist behaviourism. A lot of Anglo-American psychology seems to presuppose the human individual (or biological mechanisms within the human individual) as a kind of fundamental particle. Best wishes Ivan On 05/08/2017 07:43, Alexandre Sourmava wrote: > Point taken! The issue with distinctions between Feuerbach and Marx is crucial. Surely Feuerbach as materialist has to do nothing else but apply to Spinoza. But his interpretation of basic Spinozian ideas and Marx's interpretation of Spinozism are strictly opposite. Feuerbach was consistent sensualist, while Marx standed on idea of activity. Real bodily activity. Feuerbach was psychologist whereas in contrast Marx was antipsychologist, but activist. > It looks like Vygotsky in his early soviet situation tried to base on Feuerbach's ideas indeed. And just that led him to the dead end of his semiotics. To put this another way we can say that Feuerbach as sensualist paved the way to positivism and relativism both in philosophy and psychology.In fact Ilyenkov was the first after Marx thinker, who presented basically activist, non sensealist interpretation of Spinozism and Marxism. This idea was so much big that iven EVI hemself did not fulfil it's reachness. > I mean that the idea that psyche, thinking or consciousness are basically the process of acting of a corporeal subject according to the shape of his object, or in terms of Ilyenkov/Spinoza the mode of acting of the thinking body. On the contrary, Feuerbach is the father of leading to dead end idea that thinking is functioning of human brains and the bridge from the narrow space of human's head to external world is such a magic entity as (passive) sensation. > > Sasha > >????? ???????, 5 ??????? 2017 5:57 Wolff-Michael Roth ?????(?): >?? > >?? Mike, Peter provides some references that allow many to link Feuerbach > references in Vygotsky to the original sources---I have some of the works > published in the early 1800s, where the quotations Peter takes can be found > (like vol. 2 of Collected Works). > > Peter does not write about what Marx took up from Feuerbach, and which he > rejected (in the Theses on Feuerbach). > > Of relevance to the recent discussion on Spinoza. Feuerbach was well-read > on Spinoza and published and taught Spinoza. > > To me the way Vygotsky applies the thing possible for two that is > impossible for one, applied to the word, in the way Marx applied it to the > commodity, appears to be a significant idea. It is significant because it > runs against the constructivist strain in our community, which begins with > the idea that 'meaning' is personal (people haven't been reading Mead > either). > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 5:02 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> XMC-ites >> >> Attached in English, Russian, and German is an articles by Peter Keiler >> about Vygotsky and Feuerbach that I am sure a number of you will be >> interested in. Most of us know Feuerbach from his famous theses and no >> more. Peter opens up a great many aspects of Feuerbach's writings that are >> echoed in various ways throughout Vygotsky's writings and links them to the >> political/social/ideological/ context of the shifting times. >> >> Thanks Peter. >> mike >> > >???? -- ============================================================ Ivan A. Uemlianin PhD Llaisdy Ymchwil a Datblygu Technoleg Lleferydd Speech Technology Research and Development ???????????????????? ivan@llaisdy.com ???????????????????????? @llaisdy ???????? ?????????????????llaisdy.wordpress.com ?????????????? github.com/llaisdy ????????????????????? www.linkedin.com/in/ivanuemlianin ???????????????????????? festina lente ============================================================ From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Sat Aug 5 13:09:04 2017 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 20:09:04 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4LCAmIFNwaW5vemE=?= In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1210472036.483029.1501963744253@mail.yahoo.com> Dear David, I didn?t evenmention Marx as antinaturalist. This is the exact citation from my article:?They (evidently ? LSV & EVI ? A.S.) are also at one in recognizing thesocial, cultural-historical nature of the human psyche, in their antinaturalism.? I agree with you that Marx andSpinoza can be hardly defined as antinaturalists. In case of Vygotsky andIlyenkov everything is slightly more complicated. Their common antipathy tona?ve attempts to deduce human psyche directly from corporeal basis, from genesand from neurophysiology is something evident. They both insisted that humanpsychology ascends to culture and history. And this idea makes their positionssimilar to ?antinaturalism?. Surely, it doesn?t mean that they reject Nature asthe substance in Spinozian meaning. Nevertheless, there is aproblem here. And this problem is a problem of transition from Nature toCulture and in this point Vygotsky?s superficial idea of conventional signs andcoin tossing game looks evidently less serious than Ilyenkov?s materialimplements, which are initial and universal form of ideality. Anyway, I?m slightly afraidthat there is a problem with mutual understanding in our communication, becauseinitially we are following too unlike philosophic traditions? Thus I don?t know what youmean describing LSV?s methodology as ?eclectic?? You mean that he was a thinkerfree from ideological blinders, or you mean that his theoretic culture wasregrettably low? As for me, I definitely shareposition of Hegel, Marx and Ilyenkov, and estimate eclecticism as the greatestsin for a researcher. Moreover, I am sure that intentionally Vygotsky probablyshared the similar position. Something else entirely is thefact that involuntarily Vygotsky himself sank into eclecticism to a wideextent. In fact, the trap of eclecticism is a usual risk for a researcher inthe process of building a theory. In the same time eclecticism accuratelyindicates that a researcher got lost in contradictions. Vygotsky?s interpretation offreedom that is again something what is necessary to discuss. There is two oppositetraditions in interpretation of this concept in the history of philosophy. Thefirst ? Cartesian, the second ? Spinozian. (evidently Marxism shares the secondone.) The Cartesian one implies thata person has a magic ability to act contrary to natural law. Surely, Spinoza asa materialist rejects such a possibility as something fantastic. But it doesn?tmean that Spinoza is a fan of fatalism. According to Spinoza freedomis not a possibility to dream about fairy tales of totally unfettered freedom.From Spinoza?s point of view to be free, to realize your freedom means torealize your aims. Meanwhile one can realize his/her aims only in he/she willact strictly in accordance with natural necessity.? Only in this case one will be free and willgain his aim. Otherwise, he/she will successfully break their neck. As for LSVhe was thoughtful enough to set up the problem of freedom as the centralproblem of psychology, but being not capable to overcome the Stimulus-Reactiveapproach he had no chance to solve the problem of freedom. Problem of freedomis something absolutely unsolvable for S->R automaton, and it has clear decisionfor acting subject. Anyhow, coin tossing in best case can help to solve senselessproblem of Buridan donkey and can not help a human person in substantial choice. Probablymy position in this crucial question can be clarified by my PPT presentation ?EvaldIlyenkov vs Leo Vygotsky? https://alexandersurmava.academia.edu? Cheers, Sasha ???????, 4 ??????? 2017 3:23 David Kellogg ?????(?): I think that Sasha, on p. 37 of "Ilyenkov and the Revolution in Psychology", slips one by us. He quotes Davydov, who says that Ilyenkov provided the logical-philosophical basis for cultural-historical theory and for Vygotsky's theory of instruction based on development. He then says that Davydov is wrong on both counts: neither Ilyenkov nor Vygotsky would have considered cultural-historical theory truly scientific, and Ilyenkov hardly ever mentions Vygotsky. Before we can ask what Sasha means by the first, he is off trying to explain why Ilyenkov doesn't mention Vygotsky much. There are lots of reasons not to mention Vygotsky when you are doing philosophy. I am more interested in Sasha's notion that Vygotsky would not have considered Davydov's version of the theory scientific. Sasha calls Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, and Marx anti-naturalists. He says it is because of their recognition of the social, cultural-historical nature of the human psyche. But in all three cases, that social, cultural-historical "nature" really is natural at its base: it depends on a "thinking body" in the case of Ilyenkov (something Descartes would not have rejected!), it depends on the domestication of the human body and mind in the case of Vygotsky, and of course it depends on the transformation of use values into exchange values in Marx. So I am not at all sure in what sense they are "anti-naturalist". If we take the Spinozan view, to be anti-naturalist is to be anti-substance, anti-thought, anti-extension. I don't think that applies to Marx, Vygotsky, or even Ilyenkov. I'm reading the Pedology of the Adolescent, and I find Vygotsky to be much more methodologically eclectic than Sasha suggests with phrases like "sole correct scientific method" and "whose theoretical analysis alone" (38). In my reading, Vygotsky doesn't think of methods like that: methods are only appropriate or inappropriate to problems of study. When you are studying behaviour, psychology may be the appropriate method, but when you are studying anatomy, try physiology. It is clear that Vygotsky has a preference for his own "functional method of dual stimulation", but that is precisely because it is appropriate to the goal of diagnosing the "next", or proximal, zone of development. I think that even the psychotherapist's couch, which as Sasha points out was artificially constructed out of Freud's overwheening self-interest, had a place in Vygotsky's "science of a natural whole": the only method he really does reject with disgust is the practice of imagining what it is like to be a child and then pretending that you have real scientific data. In the HDHMF, Vygotsky has a good deal to say about Wundt and Titchener, not all of it critical (Chapters 3,4,5, where "Titchener's Piano" is the empirical basis of his experiments with choice). In contrast, Vygotsky has nothing to say about Socrates and Plato. I think that, rather like the "aphorisms" Sasha cites on 39, Sasha's paper just touches on the problem that has always puzzled me: how Vygotsky reconciles the explanans of Spinoza with his chosen explanandum of choice and free will. It seems to me that they are reconcilable, but only through the path that Sasha refuses to take, that is, the path of the semiotic, semantic, systemic structure of the "thinking body". Vygotsky says that he wants to know what a real human does in the Buridan situation, tethered like the donkey between two equidistant and apparently equal piles of hay. Buridan himself would say that such a situation does not exist: piles of hay are never equidistant and never exactly equal, and the universe is really constructed like a chess game, where in any conceivable situation, there is one and only one perfectly rational move, even if it is quite beyond the power of man, beast, or even supercomputer to ever know what it is. That was, I gather, Spinoza's solution as well, except that Spinoza drew the logical conclusion that when you do not know which choice is better, you must necessarily defer until you do. In the meantime, the proliferation of choice, like the proliferation of method, is a positive good, the closest we miserable slaves can get to freedom. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello, > > > I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I > probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the > originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this > thread, but I shall. > > > Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what was > to be seen on this here persistent thread. > > > I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is > becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the > apparent world as seen through Vedanta. > > > First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western > viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational > (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different entities. > As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being through > thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? > > > Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that > Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms our > thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through > time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of > different substances?? (Am I getting this right?) > > > But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed > helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this > nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding > Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and that > nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us > because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, as if > the same "material." > > > But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical robots, > or chemical reactions? or is there choice? > > > >From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza > worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, > transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how > Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been > named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have a > different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. > > > So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language to > another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind > versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very > turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit were > identically referencing. > > > Just thinking out loud here. > > > Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are > indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the > perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, > whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on > through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through > actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and > reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one hopes to > perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the > importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that > will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the > subtle forms not just the gross. > > > If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would > have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum > physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and that > the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. > > > So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being > material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name and > form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is subtle, > and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and form > of said substance. > > > A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different > forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam in > yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's > pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time (like > now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different > "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is > identical: H2O. > > > This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one > substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same > place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the change > of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there is > as if an appearance of a linear change. > > > W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, > through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same space, > though the volume might change a little. > > > OK, thanks for staying with me this far. > > > As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas > (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world consists, > these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, heat), > and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that can > be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But this > is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has more > rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river have > more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. There is > tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and > sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than the > other dominant properties therein. > > > If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might > also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put another > way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle > form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. > > > This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can > perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, by > metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," > through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry transcend > the dualism as presented by Descartes? > > > But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented > by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass intellectual > persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to me > that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a > story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with > impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was going > on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the > "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling the > Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! > > > I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but of > a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, > which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) > > > It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material > question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed > cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology > (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human > experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be one > unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which also > creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through time > and space in all directions. > > > Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would be > made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products of > that substance. > > > It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing upon > one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. > > > But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite > regression. That does not work. > > > Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be > experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of > self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. In > this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self > reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that comes of > seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of > him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. > > > My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance > with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the goal > of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind > develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history (i.e. > meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by > mind). > > > This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of > three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy or > as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these properties > are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the > aspect of the perceivable world. > > > >From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it > exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called > God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, but > it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all things > depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its > existence. > > > This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay > even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only > "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but is > no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains > regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still > clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and > space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. > > > When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no > unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot can > see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands > outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is > there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but > eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. > > > Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food in > my pot. :) > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > -- From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Aug 5 14:04:08 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 06:04:08 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiDQntGC0LI6IFJlOiBJbHllbmtvdiwgTWFyeCwg?= =?utf-8?q?=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: <1501925409848.34574@iped.uio.no> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> <1501925409848.34574@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: I can understand Ivan's consternation; nay, I can share it. When Halliday says that the relationship between meaning and wording, and also the relationship between context and text, is a natural one but the relationship between sounding and wording is conventional, he is really meaning three slightly different things. But fortunately language has evolved to mean more than one thing at the same time; unlike a blackbird whistling or a prelinguistic child, who tends to do these things one at a time, we can "get attention", "give information", and "represent experience" all at once: "Look at that blackbird!" Even more fortunately written language has been designed to be able to tease apart and differentiate these slightly different things. First of all, Halliday means that the relationship between /b/ and /l/ and /a/ and /k/ and the word "black" is really not defining, but the relationship between "Look at that blackbird!" and getting attention, giving information, and representing the experience really is. The word "black" isn't defined and doesn't depend on the sounds we choose put into it: we can delete the final sounds as in some forms of black English and we can spell it with a redundant "c" and "k" and it doesn't change. But this is not true if we change "Look at that blackbird!" into "That blackbird is looking". With intonation, the relationship actually is defining: if I say "Look at that blackbird?" I mean something different from "Look at that blackbird!", and "Just LOOK at that blackbird" is different from "Look at that BLACKBIRD" (and even "BLACKbird" differs from "blackBIRD". Second, Halliday means that the relationship between the vowels and consonants that make up "black" and the word itself is one place--the only place--where associative psychology will work. As Henry Higgins demonstrated in "My Fair Lady", boot camp techniques can be used to train pronunciation--but not creative grammar and certainly not interpersonal meaning. Similarly, when you learn a foreign language late in life, as many of us have done, your brain will mean a word, but your mouth muscles will often interpret these words in their own familiar way, the way that they have grown used to when you were still a child. When my wife says the word "blackbird", there is an indeterminacy in that post-vocalic /r/, that cannot quite make up its mind not to be an /l/, that still thrills me: it reminds me of the first time I heard her say "milk". But thirdly, and this is where my own consternation sets in, Halliday means that the relationship between vowels and consonants on the one hand and words on the other is relatively designable, while the relationship between meaning and wording, and the relationship between context and meaning, is much more evolved. Humans really are part of nature, and their communication systems have evolved in interaction with that environment, including the parts of it that they have reconstructed around their human-specific needs. But with any complex system,we find that different parts of the system evolve at different speeds: brains appear to have evolved a lot faster than vertebrae, for example. We have, historically, huge and apparently reasonless sea changes in the phonology of our language (the Great Vowel shift in pre-Shakespearean English, and the tendency towards "vocal fry" in our own--you can hear the changes by listening to old movies). In contrast, the basic grammatical systems of tense, mood, etc. remain motivated and quite stable: there are good reasons, for example, why we give tense to processes and not to entities and good reasons why an object like an apple should be countable but not an experience like being. There are good reasons why we have proper nouns that identify individual people but not individual plants, and animals are somewhere in between, and good reasons why there is no such thing as a proper verb identifying a single, unrepeatable moment of being. Paradoxically, language models perpetual change the same way it models utter stasis. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 6:30 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David, Alexander, Phillip, all, > > David's way of elaborating the comment that free will is not 'free' from > natural relationship, and therefore from necessity; that even in Vygotsky > the key is not simply 'arbitrariness' or 'conventionality', reminded me of > the argument held by Sergey Mareev. Mareev discusses how Vygotsky treated > 'the problem of the origination of speaking activity from labour'. He notes > Vygotsky's idea of 'unity of thought and speech' that 'word creates > intellect and, at the same time, it is created by intellect'. He then goes > on to note that, > > 'one can only break this word-thought-word cycle by turning the circle > into a spiral. Unlike a circle, a spiral has a beginning, and its > historical beginning is labour. However, it is only a *historical* > beginning, for the *ontogenetic* beginning is the word. At first, a child > masters speaking and only after that would he start working' > > He further remarks that 'historically' means *essentially*, adding that > 'the essence of speech follows from the essence of labour*. > > Is this kind of elaboration (the one of turning a circle into an spiral) > connected to your argument, David? > > It is interesting that S. Mareev uses the same literature than Sasha S. > uses, including Ilyenkov and Mescheryakov, to argue for exactly the > opposite with regard to Vygotsky's treatment. Probably this is so because, > unlike Sasha, Mareev does not mention the problems Vygotsky gets into when > takas the S-R as starting point in his account of sign mediation. May it be > that there is truth in all these positions? that while Vygotsky's most > important legacy of a genetic unity of human thinking and communicating > remains valid, the premise that 'natural perception' is passive perception > of the S-R type is not and so it needs revision? > > Alfredo > > Mareev, S. (2015). Abstract and concrete understanding of activity: > 'Activity' and 'labour' in soviet philosophy. In, A. Maidansky, & V. > Oittinen, The Practical Essence of Man. The 'Activity Approach' in Late > Soviet Philosophy (pp. 96?102). Leiden, NL: Brill. > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 04 August 2017 23:27 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Thanks, everybody. Particularly for the Wallace Stevens. My supervisor, > David Butt, did HIS PhD thesis on the lexicogrammar of Wallace Stevens! At > first it looks like almost random, "une folie integrale", but when you > analyze it into clauses, you find it is very finely wrought. > > Vygotsky does talk about tossing coins ("the eagle and the bar" is the > Russian version of heads and tails, and I gather that means that in the > 1930s they were still using the one ruble coins of the Tsarist era). It's > in the context of probability, and I think that the relationship between > meaning and wording is not random folly, but a natural relationship, > although to really see the pattern clearly you need to look > probabilistically, because speakers have free will. > > But the specific examples he uses of "double stimulation" in the second > chapter of HDHMF are casting lots, tying knots (in your handkerchief, or in > a quipu) and counting on your fingers. He calls them "rudimentary > functions", things which once decided life and death questions, public > executions and tax revenues of empire, but which now stand in the dusty > corners of the cultural mind, a plaything for children or a way of deciding > who buys the next round in the pub. > > In Chapter Six (paragraphs 40-42), Vygotsky is talking about the experiment > of "switching names", something I've been doing with real child siblings. > In this case, it is calling a crow "pigeon" and a pigeon "crow". He says > that it is impossible, because it would perturb expressions like "crow > black" and "pigeon blue". Beyond the phonological system, there is a > delicate woof and warp of wordings, and these wordings are all > interdependent, both on each other and on our experiences of nature. > (Actually, even the phonological system is not completely conventional, > because of intonation and stress, which are natural. It's only > articulation--the vowels and consonants that Saussure studied in > proto-Indoeuropean--that is completely conventional) > > Now, suppose we go one level higher--to meaning. We find that getting > information from somebody is done through a particular lexicogrammatical > pattern we call "questioning" while giving them information is done through > a different pattern called "making statements". These are realized as > interrogatives and declaratives respectively. Can we replicate Vygotsky's > experiment here? That is, can we use interrogatives to give information, > and declaratives to get information? Of course! > > Do you not see how the blackbird > Walks around the feet > Of the women about you? > > (That is, "There is a blackbird walking around the feet of the women about > you.") > > I do not know which to prefer, > The beauty of inflections > Or the beauty of innuendoes, > The blackbird whistling > Or just after. > > (That is, "Which do I prefer?") > > The relationship of information-getting and asking a question is > natural--but it's probabilistic, because of human free will. So is the > relationship between information-giving and making a statement. We can and > do flout this natural relationship--not just in poetry, but in all kinds of > "grammatical metaphors", like "Would you mind not cawing?" which is > actually a command to a child not to yawn, or "Ontogeny recapitulates > phylogeny", which construes a process as an entity rather than as a > happening. But just because we have built devices that can flout natural > laws does nothing to repeal them. Even the wing of the blackbird does not > abolish atmospheric pressure or gravity, but only uses one to overcome the > other. > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 1:50 AM, White, Phillip > > wrote: > > > dear David, > > > > > > speaking of blackbirds - > > > > > > best, > > > > > > phillip > > > > > > Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird > > BY WALLACE STEVENS wallace-stevens> > > I > > Among twenty snowy mountains, > > The only moving thing > > Was the eye of the blackbird. > > > > II > > I was of three minds, > > Like a tree > > In which there are three blackbirds. > > > > III > > The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. > > It was a small part of the pantomime. > > > > IV > > A man and a woman > > Are one. > > A man and a woman and a blackbird > > Are one. > > > > V > > I do not know which to prefer, > > The beauty of inflections > > Or the beauty of innuendoes, > > The blackbird whistling > > Or just after. > > > > VI > > Icicles filled the long window > > With barbaric glass. > > The shadow of the blackbird > > Crossed it, to and fro. > > The mood > > Traced in the shadow > > An indecipherable cause. > > > > VII > > O thin men of Haddam, > > Why do you imagine golden birds? > > Do you not see how the blackbird > > Walks around the feet > > Of the women about you? > > > > VIII > > I know noble accents > > And lucid, inescapable rhythms; > > But I know, too, > > That the blackbird is involved > > In what I know. > > > > IX > > When the blackbird flew out of sight, > > It marked the edge > > Of one of many circles. > > > > X > > At the sight of blackbirds > > Flying in a green light, > > Even the bawds of euphony > > Would cry out sharply. > > > > XI > > He rode over Connecticut > > In a glass coach. > > Once, a fear pierced him, > > In that he mistook > > The shadow of his equipage > > For blackbirds. > > > > XII > > The river is moving. > > The blackbird must be flying. > > > > XIII > > It was evening all afternoon. > > It was snowing > > And it was going to snow. > > The blackbird sat > > In the cedar-limbs. > > > > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Sat Aug 5 15:58:42 2017 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 22:58:42 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6INCe0YLQsjog0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5r?= =?utf-8?q?ov=2C_Marx=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: <1501925409848.34574@iped.uio.no> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> <1501925409848.34574@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1140785408.541093.1501973922689@mail.yahoo.com> Hi, Afredo, David and all.Alfredo, you are quite exact pointing at contradiction between my and Sergey Mareev?s positions.I can agree with your guess about the basis of such contradiction. Sergey prefers to hold a position closer to early Ilyenkov whereas I had to revise some of his old ideas during my research. Surely, I think that I hold true to his basic principles such as materialism and dialectic.Thus, Ilyenkov was strident critic of Ivan Pavlov's cartesianism. In the same time, he evidently overestimated the scientific character of his physiological ideas. That is evident if we recall Bernstein and his investigations. Moreover, in his early texts Ilyenkov himself repeats old Cartesian mistakes regarding animals as mechanical S->R automatons. Late Ilyenkov evidently moved to recognition of animals as thinking subjects.I can hardly agree with your idea of combination of two hostile principles like activity and passive sensation. Precisely such attempts to combine eclectically so called Leninist principle of reflection (principle of passive sensation) with formally ascending to Marx vague verbiage about activity was the mainstream in soviet official psychology.In any way, the problem, which you arise, is very, very interesting!Sasha ???????, 5 ??????? 2017 12:33 Alfredo Jornet Gil ?????(?): David, Alexander, Phillip, all, David's way of elaborating the comment that free will is not 'free' from natural relationship, and therefore from necessity; that even in Vygotsky the key is not simply 'arbitrariness' or 'conventionality', reminded me of the argument held by Sergey Mareev. Mareev discusses how Vygotsky treated 'the problem of the origination of speaking activity from labour'. He notes Vygotsky's idea of 'unity of thought and speech' that 'word creates intellect and, at the same time, it is created by intellect'. He then goes on to note that, 'one can only break this word-thought-word cycle by turning the circle into a spiral. Unlike a circle, a spiral has a beginning, and its historical beginning is labour. However, it is only a *historical* beginning, for the *ontogenetic* beginning is the word. At first, a child masters speaking and only after that would he start working' He further remarks that 'historically' means *essentially*, adding that 'the essence of speech follows from the essence of labour*. Is this kind of elaboration (the one of turning a circle into an spiral) connected to your argument, David? It is interesting that S. Mareev uses the same literature than Sasha S. uses, including Ilyenkov and Mescheryakov, to argue for exactly the opposite with regard to Vygotsky's treatment. Probably this is so because, unlike Sasha, Mareev does not mention the problems Vygotsky gets into when takas the S-R as starting point in his account of sign mediation. May it be that there is truth in all these positions? that while Vygotsky's most important legacy of a genetic unity of human thinking and communicating remains valid, the premise that 'natural perception' is passive perception of the S-R type is not and so it needs revision? Alfredo Mareev, S. (2015). Abstract and concrete understanding of activity: 'Activity' and 'labour' in soviet philosophy. In, A. Maidansky, & V. Oittinen, The Practical Essence of Man. The 'Activity Approach' in Late Soviet Philosophy (pp. 96?102). Leiden, NL: Brill. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 04 August 2017 23:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:? ???: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Thanks, everybody. Particularly for the Wallace Stevens. My supervisor, David Butt, did HIS PhD thesis on the lexicogrammar of Wallace Stevens! At first it looks like almost random, "une folie integrale", but when you analyze it into clauses, you find it is very finely wrought. Vygotsky does talk about tossing coins ("the eagle and the bar" is the Russian version of heads and tails, and I gather that means that in the 1930s they were still using the one ruble coins of the Tsarist era). It's in the context of probability, and I think that the relationship between meaning and wording is not random folly, but a natural relationship, although to really see the pattern clearly you need to look probabilistically, because speakers have free will. But the specific examples he uses of "double stimulation" in the second chapter of HDHMF are casting lots, tying knots (in your handkerchief, or in a quipu) and counting on your fingers. He calls them "rudimentary functions", things which once decided life and death questions, public executions and tax revenues of empire, but which now stand in the dusty corners of the cultural mind, a plaything for children or a way of deciding who buys the next round in the pub. In Chapter Six (paragraphs 40-42), Vygotsky is talking about the experiment of "switching names", something I've been doing with real child siblings. In this case, it is calling a crow "pigeon" and a pigeon "crow". He says that it is impossible, because it would perturb expressions like "crow black" and "pigeon blue". Beyond the phonological system, there is a delicate woof and warp of wordings, and these wordings are all interdependent, both on each other and on our experiences of nature. (Actually, even the phonological system is not completely conventional, because of intonation and stress, which are natural. It's only articulation--the vowels and consonants that Saussure studied in proto-Indoeuropean--that is completely conventional) Now, suppose we go one level higher--to meaning. We find that getting information from somebody is done through a particular lexicogrammatical pattern we call "questioning" while giving them information is done through a different pattern called "making statements". These are realized as interrogatives and declaratives respectively. Can we replicate Vygotsky's experiment here? That is, can we use interrogatives to give information, and declaratives to get information? Of course! Do you not see how the blackbird Walks around the feet Of the women about you? (That is, "There is a blackbird walking around the feet of the women about you.") I do not know which to prefer, The beauty of inflections Or the beauty of innuendoes, The blackbird whistling Or just after. (That is, "Which do I prefer?") The relationship of information-getting and asking a question is natural--but it's probabilistic, because of human free will. So is the relationship between information-giving and making a statement. We can and do flout this natural relationship--not just in poetry, but in all kinds of "grammatical metaphors", like "Would you mind not cawing?" which is actually a command to a child not to yawn, or "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny", which construes a process as an entity rather than as a happening. But just because we have built devices that can flout natural laws does nothing to repeal them. Even the wing of the blackbird does not abolish atmospheric pressure or gravity, but only uses one to overcome the other. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 1:50 AM, White, Phillip wrote: > dear David, > > > speaking of blackbirds - > > > best, > > > phillip > > > Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird > BY WALLACE STEVENS > I > Among twenty snowy mountains, > The only moving thing > Was the eye of the blackbird. > > II > I was of three minds, > Like a tree > In which there are three blackbirds. > > III > The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. > It was a small part of the pantomime. > > IV > A man and a woman > Are one. > A man and a woman and a blackbird > Are one. > > V > I do not know which to prefer, > The beauty of inflections > Or the beauty of innuendoes, > The blackbird whistling > Or just after. > > VI > Icicles filled the long window > With barbaric glass. > The shadow of the blackbird > Crossed it, to and fro. > The mood > Traced in the shadow > An indecipherable cause. > > VII > O thin men of Haddam, > Why do you imagine golden birds? > Do you not see how the blackbird > Walks around the feet > Of the women about you? > > VIII > I know noble accents > And lucid, inescapable rhythms; > But I know, too, > That the blackbird is involved > In what I know. > > IX > When the blackbird flew out of sight, > It marked the edge > Of one of many circles. > > X > At the sight of blackbirds > Flying in a green light, > Even the bawds of euphony > Would cry out sharply. > > XI > He rode over Connecticut > In a glass coach. > Once, a fear pierced him, > In that he mistook > The shadow of his equipage > For blackbirds. > > XII > The river is moving. > The blackbird must be flying. > > XIII > It was evening all afternoon. > It was snowing > And it was going to snow. > The blackbird sat > In the cedar-limbs. > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Aug 5 16:35:48 2017 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 23:35:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4LCAmIFNwaW5v?= =?utf-8?q?za?= In-Reply-To: <1210472036.483029.1501963744253@mail.yahoo.com> References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> , <1210472036.483029.1501963744253@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hello, I want to say in contribution to this discussion that the problem of freedom (as a problem rather than as a base state) arises only when there is *a sense* of separation (that separation may not be real). However, separation creates fear which creates further separation, which creates more disharmony and disunity. Yet, whenever we find unity, there is equilibrium and/or homeostasis, even if there is movement while a system is balancing, it is still one system, or one entity, as one. If there is two (division) it means that there is absolute disconnection (otherwise it can't be two). If there is absolute disconnection between two entities, by what means can they communicate or exchange? they can't, because they are absolutely two. [As a nod to Larry, I'm sure he will say that's where the third space comes in, perhaps...but I digress.] But if it is one non-dual unity, then there can be a thing that knows itself, like the mind knows itself. There can be reflection, movement, and transformation. Like the mind "knows" the body and the body "knows" the mind, because the mind and the body are one. It is only when a thing knows itself that there is freedom to act. This isn't about being anti-naturalist, or naturalist, but something else. It is neither, nor both, because it is relational (neither and both). It almost seems better, if we want to create a dichotomy here, that there is anti-relational vs relational. Just thinking out loud...if I stop to think about it, anti-relational as a concept is dependent upon the concept of relational, which has to come first. A coin toss is relational, because it could be either/or between two choices. But one must have a coin to toss which is *one thing* to toss. :) We can't separate the heads or the tails from the coin, because it is two aspects of the same coin and dependent upon the coin. But then the coin, as the object of our attention, must have a thrower, and one or more observers, and it must have gravity, and space, there is an up, a down, a beginning state and an end state (which are also relational otherwise how can we say this is the beginning and this is the end state?) *at the same time* there had to be a mint that made the coin, and the metal, and the miner to dug it up, and the earth from which it came, etc.: it's all connected without separation. If it's separate, where do the boundaries lie? or do the boundaries lie? Actually, is our human attention which "brackets" the event of the coin toss from the universe in which it happens. Regardless of our human tendency of "bracketing", the reality of the connection of the coin to its history never changes, nor is it altered from its reality, nor how it was made in time and space, nor its connections to the universe at large, from which it emerged and into which it resolves or disintegrates (in relation to time and space). We just choose (out of human necessity) not to include the relations the coin has to the universe in our processing of the event of the coin throw, be-Cause of our human capacities to perceive in time and space, but also for our capacity for meaning (i.e., why do we call the head of the coin "the head" and likewise "the tail", when the coin is a flat thing with two equally round sides). And what does it mean if it lands heads or tails? Who decided upon that? I cannot resist the pun now to reference: just to my 2?... ? ----- Meanwhile back at the mint: 2? is a count of two single copper pennies (if we reference American currency), each with a head and a tail... I do not think this makes me a Cartesian... I don't think it makes a young David Copperfield, or a Charles Dickens either! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Copperfield Oh! We were speaking of eclecticism not elliptical eccentrism, right? Or perhaps of an Wittgensteinian ellipsis...? Where does an ellipsis *go to*, anyway? ----- Kind regards on a sunny Saturday afternoon, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Aug 5 17:26:51 2017 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 00:26:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?koi8-r?b?79TXOiBSZTogVnlnb3Rza3kgYW5kIEZldXJlYmFjaCBieSBQ?= =?koi8-r?b?ZXRlciBLZWlsZXI=?= In-Reply-To: <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> References: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com>, <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: Dear all, In reply to Ivan, I enjoyed the observation you bring up that "fundamental particle" is a contradiction in terms (to Spinoza, anyway). I would ask, at the same time, how is it that we observe a contradiction in terms. That's why I wonder if it is right to say that it has to do with whole vs parts, and perhaps it has to do with relationship instead. Can we have society void any kind of relationship? How do we define parts without the concept of "whole," or better "unity"? Can we conceive of a part with an absence of a whole to which it belongs? (Here's a question: What is a "whole part"? is it the mirror of a "fundamental particle"?) Doesn't a part even if next to another part, have a requirement to be a part of *something*? Or is this just a game of semantics? I do agree that we Anglo-Americans whenever we are, have been hobbled occasionally by behaviorism. But what of Pavlov? How does he *relate* to Watson, et al.? I dream what it would be like to have a mind never tainted by Watson or by Descartes. But would we then have a Vygotsky or a Spinoza, if not for Watson or Descartes? I cannot say...except perhaps to pose the question, "What came before all of them?" Oh there goes that ellipse again. I let it slip by. Kind regards, Annalisa From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sat Aug 5 17:39:03 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2017 17:39:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogVnlnb3Rza3kgYW5kIEZldXJlYmFjaCBi?= =?utf-8?q?y_Peter_Keiler?= In-Reply-To: References: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: Annalisa, I think all your questions about the whole part relation have been addressed by Jean-Luc Nancy in *Being Singular Plural*. I wonder why Jean-Luc Nancy is not more widely read or referred to on this list. He has written interesting things about culture, for example the piece on "Eulogy of the M?l?e", which deals with questions of individual and culture, self and other Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Dear all, > > > In reply to Ivan, I enjoyed the observation you bring up that "fundamental > particle" is a contradiction in terms (to Spinoza, anyway). > > > I would ask, at the same time, how is it that we observe a contradiction > in terms. > > > That's why I wonder if it is right to say that it has to do with whole vs > parts, and perhaps it has to do with relationship instead. > > > Can we have society void any kind of relationship? How do we define parts > without the concept of "whole," or better "unity"? Can we conceive of a > part with an absence of a whole to which it belongs? > > > (Here's a question: What is a "whole part"? is it the mirror of a > "fundamental particle"?) > > > Doesn't a part even if next to another part, have a requirement to be a > part of *something*? > > > Or is this just a game of semantics? > > > I do agree that we Anglo-Americans whenever we are, have been hobbled > occasionally by behaviorism. But what of Pavlov? How does he *relate* to > Watson, et al.? > > > I dream what it would be like to have a mind never tainted by Watson or by > Descartes. But would we then have a Vygotsky or a Spinoza, if not for > Watson or Descartes? > > > I cannot say...except perhaps to pose the question, "What came before all > of them?" > > > Oh there goes that ellipse again. I let it slip by. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Aug 5 22:23:04 2017 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 05:23:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?windows-1251?b?zvLiOiAgUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4LCAmIFNwaW5v?= =?windows-1251?q?za?= In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> , <1210472036.483029.1501963744253@mail.yahoo.com>, Message-ID: Hello, Just to add a little sprinkling of Buddhism to the mix, I noticed this in the New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/07/what-meditation-can-do-for-us-and-what-it-cant I'd call this an interesting collision of east meets west, as it concerns a thing called "American Buddhism". A few quotes perhaps relevant to this thread: "Instead of there being a single, consistent Cartesian self that monitors the world and makes decisions, we live in a kind of nineties-era Liberia of the mind, populated by warring independent armies implanted by evolution, representing themselves as a unified nation but unable to reconcile their differences, and, as one after another wins a brief battle for the capital, providing only the temporary illusion of control and decision. By accepting that the fixed self is an illusion imprinted by experience and reinforced by appetite, meditation parachutes in a kind of peacekeeping mission that, if it cannot demobilize the armies, lets us see their nature and temporarily disarms their still juvenile soldiers." and (my emphases): "Other recent books on contemporary Buddhism share Wright?s object of reconciling the old metaphysics with contemporary cognitive science but have a less doctrinaire view of the mind that lies outside the illusions of self. Stephen Batchelor?s ?After Buddhism? (Yale), in many ways the most intellectually stimulating book on Buddhism of the past few years, offers a philosophical take on the question. ?The self may not be an aloof independent ?ruler? of body and mind, but neither is it an illusory product of impersonal physical and mental forces,? he writes. As for the mind?s modules, ?Gotama is interested in what people can do, not with what they are. The task he proposes entails distinguishing between what is to be accepted as the natural condition of life itself (the unfolding of experience) and what is to be let go of (reactivity). We may have no control over the rush of fear prompted by finding a snake under our bed, but we do have the ability to respond to the situation in a way that is not determined by that fear.? Where Wright insists that the Buddhist doctrine of not-self precludes the possibility of freely chosen agency, Batchelor insists of Buddhism that ?as soon as we consider it a task-based ethics . . . such objections vanish. The only thing that matters is whether or not you can perform a task. When an inclination to say something cruel occurs, for example, can you resist acting on that impulse? . . . Whether your decision to hold the barbed remark was the result of free will or not is beside the point.? He calls the obsession with free will a ?peculiarly Western concern.? Meditation works as much at the level of conscious intention as it does at the level of unreflective instinct." can we learn something by seeing the blending of traditions here that might lend something to the discussion of freedom? I sort of wonder what Spinoza, Marx, and Vygotsky might have thought about Buddhism? From where might they have connected? Just thinking out loud... Kind regards, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Aug 6 02:27:54 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 02:27:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?IFJFOiAgUmU60J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4LCAm?= =?utf-8?q?_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> , <1210472036.483029.1501963744253@mail.yahoo.com>, Message-ID: <5986e11e.d702620a.a3f4b.6fc0@mx.google.com> Annalisa, A key phrase from Buddhism that I reference when I go walking /wandering is composed of two aspects: *arising* is the ground or fundamental term. *dependent* is the qualifier So ... the key Buddhist phrase is *dependent arising* With this consideration we move to that tricky hermeneutical word [nothingness] that indicates *absence* However if we *read* this word AS [no /thingness] we enter the realm of *dependent arising* meaning ALL is relationality and what is now absent is substantive essence. [James Ma has already presented here on CHAT the meaning or hearing the voice of ITY = quality of ...] Now the other term that I will accent is [pivot] as in *interval* and *interstice* indicating thirdness or third space Interval indicates pivoting as [distancing]. Think differentiation as required for relationality. Interstice indicates pivoting as [inter TWINING] Think doubling as in [experience] & [about experience] Now I will bring our con verse [polyphonic autobiography] *back* to Feuerbach and his exploring the *essence* of Christianity leading to Vygotsky?s key phrase [what is impossible for one / perspective / is possible for two /perspectives / ] {see K. Peter?s article / tract} When? In the moment [which has two meanings ? one moment & immediately -] Feuerbach?s essence of Christianity [quality of being Christian] leading *us* to: community of man/humanity to man/humanity as a *general* perspective with multiple *aspects*. Polyphonic autobiography In the background I hear Wolff-Michael with the refrain : Read G. H. Mead on the historicity of perspectives & read Jean-Luc Nancy on the notion of [plural singular]. I have a paper on Mead and historicity which I could send. Peirce at this time & place comes *onstage* to explore *historical consciousness* which for Peirce IS *historical imaginal* I have a paper on Peirce and historicial imaginal I could send. Question: Are these polyphonic themes leading to a *new* oikos or way of dwelling as eco-sustainability. No inevitability or transcendence only INscendence *arising* *Our* community of humanity arising within relationality *through* perspectives & aspects Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Annalisa Aguilar Sent: August 5, 2017 10:25 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alexander Surmava Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hello, Just to add a little sprinkling of Buddhism to the mix, I noticed this in the New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/07/what-meditation-can-do-for-us-and-what-it-cant I'd call this an interesting collision of east meets west, as it concerns a thing called "American Buddhism". A few quotes perhaps relevant to this thread: "Instead of there being a single, consistent Cartesian self that monitors the world and makes decisions, we live in a kind of nineties-era Liberia of the mind, populated by warring independent armies implanted by evolution, representing themselves as a unified nation but unable to reconcile their differences, and, as one after another wins a brief battle for the capital, providing only the temporary illusion of control and decision. By accepting that the fixed self is an illusion imprinted by experience and reinforced by appetite, meditation parachutes in a kind of peacekeeping mission that, if it cannot demobilize the armies, lets us see their nature and temporarily disarms their still juvenile soldiers." and (my emphases): "Other recent books on contemporary Buddhism share Wright?s object of reconciling the old metaphysics with contemporary cognitive science but have a less doctrinaire view of the mind that lies outside the illusions of self. Stephen Batchelor?s ?After Buddhism? (Yale), in many ways the most intellectually stimulating book on Buddhism of the past few years, offers a philosophical take on the question. ?The self may not be an aloof independent ?ruler? of body and mind, but neither is it an illusory product of impersonal physical and mental forces,? he writes. As for the mind?s modules, ?Gotama is interested in what people can do, not with what they are. The task he proposes entails distinguishing between what is to be accepted as the natural condition of life itself (the unfolding of experience) and what is to be let go of (reactivity). We may have no control over the rush of fear prompted by finding a snake under our bed, but we do have the ability to respond to the situation in a way that is not determined by that fear.? Where Wright insists that the Buddhist doctrine of not-self precludes the possibility of freely chosen agency, Batchelor insists of Buddhism that ?as soon as we consider it a task-based ethics . . . such objections vanish. The only thing that matters is whether or not you can perform a task. When an inclination to say something cruel occurs, for example, can you resist acting on that impulse? . . . Whether your decision to hold the barbed remark was the result of free will or not is beside the point.? He calls the obsession with free will a ?peculiarly Western concern.? Meditation works as much at the level of conscious intention as it does at the level of unreflective instinct." can we learn something by seeing the blending of traditions here that might lend something to the discussion of freedom? I sort of wonder what Spinoza, Marx, and Vygotsky might have thought about Buddhism? From where might they have connected? Just thinking out loud... Kind regards, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Aug 6 09:51:51 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 09:51:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogVnlnb3Rza3kgYW5kIEZldXJlYmFjaCBi?= =?utf-8?q?y_Peter_Keiler?= In-Reply-To: References: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: Is there perhaps an essay of Nancy's that you would recommend, Michael? I found the description of his book on singular-plural interesting, but the specific topics to which his ideas are applied are pretty far out of my professional competence. http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=643 An essay on human development would be nice. :-) mike On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 5:39 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > Annalisa, > I think all your questions about the whole part relation have been > addressed by Jean-Luc Nancy in > *Being Singular Plural*. > > I wonder why Jean-Luc Nancy is not more widely read or referred to on this > list. He has written interesting things about culture, for example the > piece on "Eulogy of the M?l?e", which deals with questions of individual > and culture, self and other > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Dear all, > > > > > > In reply to Ivan, I enjoyed the observation you bring up that > "fundamental > > particle" is a contradiction in terms (to Spinoza, anyway). > > > > > > I would ask, at the same time, how is it that we observe a contradiction > > in terms. > > > > > > That's why I wonder if it is right to say that it has to do with whole vs > > parts, and perhaps it has to do with relationship instead. > > > > > > Can we have society void any kind of relationship? How do we define parts > > without the concept of "whole," or better "unity"? Can we conceive of a > > part with an absence of a whole to which it belongs? > > > > > > (Here's a question: What is a "whole part"? is it the mirror of a > > "fundamental particle"?) > > > > > > Doesn't a part even if next to another part, have a requirement to be a > > part of *something*? > > > > > > Or is this just a game of semantics? > > > > > > I do agree that we Anglo-Americans whenever we are, have been hobbled > > occasionally by behaviorism. But what of Pavlov? How does he *relate* to > > Watson, et al.? > > > > > > I dream what it would be like to have a mind never tainted by Watson or > by > > Descartes. But would we then have a Vygotsky or a Spinoza, if not for > > Watson or Descartes? > > > > > > I cannot say...except perhaps to pose the question, "What came before all > > of them?" > > > > > > Oh there goes that ellipse again. I let it slip by. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > From ivan@llaisdy.com Sun Aug 6 10:19:02 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 18:19:02 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogVnlnb3Rza3kgYW5kIEZldXJlYmFjaCBi?= =?utf-8?q?y_Peter_Keiler?= In-Reply-To: References: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: <51c3bb27-9d2f-971a-6c3e-4a36198d96a2@llaisdy.com> Dear Annalisa Thank you for your comment. I agree, the relationship between whole and parts, and between parts is complicated --- for pluralists as well as for monists. There's a very good paper by Jonathan Schaffer (2010) called "Monism: the priority of the whole" that goes into that ("mereology") in some detail. PDF available here: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff0f/4e110da053d4ca1a2bacff43b42bb14ebdd3.pdf Best wishes Ivan On 06/08/2017 01:26, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Dear all, > > > In reply to Ivan, I enjoyed the observation you bring up that "fundamental particle" is a contradiction in terms (to Spinoza, anyway). > > > I would ask, at the same time, how is it that we observe a contradiction in terms. > > > That's why I wonder if it is right to say that it has to do with whole vs parts, and perhaps it has to do with relationship instead. > > > Can we have society void any kind of relationship? How do we define parts without the concept of "whole," or better "unity"? Can we conceive of a part with an absence of a whole to which it belongs? > > > (Here's a question: What is a "whole part"? is it the mirror of a "fundamental particle"?) > > > Doesn't a part even if next to another part, have a requirement to be a part of *something*? > > > Or is this just a game of semantics? > > > I do agree that we Anglo-Americans whenever we are, have been hobbled occasionally by behaviorism. But what of Pavlov? How does he *relate* to Watson, et al.? > > > I dream what it would be like to have a mind never tainted by Watson or by Descartes. But would we then have a Vygotsky or a Spinoza, if not for Watson or Descartes? > > > I cannot say...except perhaps to pose the question, "What came before all of them?" > > > Oh there goes that ellipse again. I let it slip by. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa -- ============================================================ Ivan A. Uemlianin PhD Llaisdy Ymchwil a Datblygu Technoleg Lleferydd Speech Technology Research and Development ivan@llaisdy.com @llaisdy llaisdy.wordpress.com github.com/llaisdy www.linkedin.com/in/ivanuemlianin festina lente ============================================================ From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Aug 6 13:35:55 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 05:35:55 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTog0J7RgtCyOiDQntGC0LI6IFJlOiBJbHll?= =?utf-8?q?nkov=2C_Marx=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: <1672890324.2189941.1501797042429@mail.yahoo.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> <1672890324.2189941.1501797042429@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: (For some terrible reason, this note from Sasha ended up in my spam filter. I remember using a yahoo account for many years and having the same problem.... Anyway, I will keep an eye on my trash from now on.) At the last ISCAR in Sydney, Mohammad El-Hammoumi urged me to read Marx's ethnographic notebooks. I'm embarrassed to say that I have only started doing so now (in anticipation of meeting him again at ISCAR in Quebec and having him check to see if I've done my homework). One of the important things about the notebooks that Mohammad pointed out to me was that they suggest that Marx was much more of a cultural relativist in anthropology than the Stalinists with their five-stage universal model of human progress were: Primitive communism isn't a universal stage; non-feudal precapitalisms existed (and the "Asian mode of production" is a place holder, an algebraic "x" like Vygotsky's "neoformation", for dealing with this possibility); socialism is a human potential subject to all the vicissitudes of human volition and not a pre-ordained destiny. Some of the more "backward" societies (e.g. Russia and the USA) are closer to achieving socialism than the more "progressive" ones (e.g. England and Germany). This surprises me a little, because I have always been in the extreme developmentalist wing of xmca (my Vygotsky is not a philosopher but a pedologist). But I imagine it comes as no surprise to Mike, or to Martin Packer, or to Greg Thompson. Or to Sasha. I think the point Sasha makes here is a very tricky but very important one: it is possible for "conventionality" to be both a sign of backwardness AND a sign of progress in language development. Take, for example, intonation. Part of intonation is natural in precisely the sense that Sasha is puzzled about: most if not all languages use a falling intonation for long declaratives, simply because as you speak the air pressure in the lungs decreases and this creates a tendency of the frequency of vocal cord vibration to fall. It is natural, not in the sense that Halliday means (that is, defining and not associative, essential and not accidental, and evolved rather than designed). It is natural in the sense that we share it with animals (I am listening to morning birds here in Sydney, and I can hear falling intonation; whale songs are almost always falling in their intonation). But part of intonation is natural in the other sense as well, and this is why it can and does differ from culture to culture in languages. Here in Australia, when people tell stories, they use a LOT of rising intonation at the end of their clauses ("ya reckon?") although the end of the turn itself still tends to fall. This indicates continuation, non-completion in the clause and termination, completeess in the turn. It does so by means that were originally natural (that is, shared with birds and whales) but which have been exapted by cultural means, just as the natural perceptual experience of blackness is exapted by cultural means in the expression "blackbird". We can see the same thing in stress: on the one hand, the loudness and slowness and distinctness of "BLACK" in "Look at that BLACKbird" is iconic: it is loud, slow, and distinct for reasons that have nothing to do with the symbol itself. But on the other hand, this naturalness is being exapted by cultural means, because "black" here is a Classifier (not an Epithet, like "ugly" or "nasty") and it suggests that it is the species that is noteworthy and not the perceptual experience of the color. And so I think it is perfectly possible for "conventionality" to play a double role as well: it can be a "natural", associative function in the early stage of language development (when a baby learns to associate milk with a particular shape and color of a bottle or with an apron) and it can also be a "cultural", conventional function and play the key role in concept formation (when the adolescent learns to associate a configuration of vowels and consonants with a particular concept). What will not work, alas, is the universal five step process of concept formation we find in Thinking and Speech, Chapter Five. I think that the reason why Vygotsky doesn't refer to this five step process in his final lectures on school age thinking (and he explicitly criticizes it in Chapter Six of Thinking and Speech) is that he recognized that, like the Stalinist five-step move through human history, it was far too teleological to reflect the real diversity in paths of development. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 6:50 AM, Alexander Surmava < alexander.surmava@yahoo.com> wrote: > Dear David: > > Thank youfor your interest in the whole issue and for hard task of reading > of my longtext :-) . > > The issuewith interpretation of the very idea of freedom is utterly > interesting andimportant for our theoretical needs, so I?ll wait for your > promised postimpatiently :-) > > As forconventionality or alternatively meatiness of LSV?s understanding of > sign thatis also one of the most important problem for discussion cause it > closely sidewith the problem of ideality and therefore with the problem of > essence of thinkingor psyche. > > You areabsolutely correct with your ?blackbird? illustration. No doubt > that the ruleof combination of two radicals ("black? and ?bird") has > nothing to dowith any lot, but it is something meaty, something what we can > explain asmovement according to the shape of our object. > > You arealso quite correct that in case of infant?s neologisms like > ?mazoline? insteadof ?Vazelin? Vygotsky again didn?t apply to any > conventionality or chance. > > But let uslook through Vygotsky?s "A tool and a symbol...". You probably > rememberLSV?s dissertation about the nature of verbal sign: > > ?Experimentsshow that both in plan and in speech the child is far from > consciouslyrealizing the relativity of the sign operation or of > the arbitrarilyestablished connection of sign and meaning. In order to > become an object?s(word?s) sign, the stimulus finds support > in the properties of the designatedobject itself. Not > ?everything can represent everything? for the child in thisgame. The > objects? real properties and their sign meanings come into > complexstructural interaction during play. Thus, for the child, the word is > linked tothe object through the latter?s properties and is > incorporated in onestructure, common to it. That is why the child > in our experiments refuses tocall the floor a mirror (it cannot walk on a > mirror), bur has no qualms at transforming a chair into a train, > using its properties in play, i.e.manipulating it as if it were a train. > When asked to call a lamp ?table? andvice versa, the child refuses, > because one ?can?t write on a lamp, or turn on atable?. To change (or > swap) meanings for the child means to change theproperties of objects.? > > Thus Vygotsky treats conventionality of the verbal sign as a > characteristic of it'smaturity. Contrary, Vygotsky estimates children?s > attempts to find ?support in the properties ofthe designated object itself? > in naming the object as acharacteristic of infant's na?vet?, it?s > backwardness. It is easyto give more examples of such argumentation. But I > think that there is no needfor this.Ilyenkovand his friend Alexander > Ivanovitch Meshcheriakov (deafblind children?strainer) insisted that all > attempts to teach a deafblind child to speak based on(mis)understanding of > verbal signs as arbitrary or conventional signs leads todead end. Speech > doesn?t develop. The same fact was described by Ann Sullivan ? > famousteacher of American deafblind woman Ellen Keller. > > On thecontrary, the path which starts from involving deafblind children > into humanobject oriented activity mediated by all kind of human tools - > chamber-pots,plates, spoons, tables, clothes etc. - gives them a chance to > grasp somethingthat lies in the basis of speech and that enables them to > study symbolic (likeArmslan - American Sign Language) and later even verbal > language. > > All thiscan be commented in details in the context of Ilyenkov?s > understanding ofIDEALITY and human tools as initial and universal form of > human ideality. > > But takinginto account my low speed in English writing (I hope that soon > I?ll improveit :-) ) I?ll abstain from further explanations for a while. As > for theproblem of Vygotsky?s attitude to Pavlov and his theory. Could you > or anybodyelse explain me ? WHAT does Vygotsky mean by the term of NATURAL > or LOW psychicfunction? And why does he define them as PSYCHIC? > > Cheers, > > Sasha > > > > > ???????, 3 ??????? 2017 0:50 David Kellogg > ?????(?): > > > Dear Sasha: > > Thanks for the reply. I took the time to read the English version of your > paper with great interest and large areas of agreement. But the areas of > disagreement, which I'll talk about in another post on "free will as > infinite selection", were actually the zones of greatest interest. > > I think Vygotsky doesn't accept conventionality as a pervasive principle in > language, and neither do I. Take, for example, Vygotsky's example > "blackbird". We can say that the phonemes/graphemes (the language-specific > sequence of vowels and consonants) is conventional; we know this because > other languages do it differently. But once we take the "salto mortale" of > accepting that "black" means the (original) color of ink and "bird" means a > winged animal descended from the dinosaurs, the pairing of "black" and > "bird" to describe the blackbird is natural and not conventional: it obeys > laws that are clear even to the half-enculturated child. > > I think that is why Vygotsky can give many examples of "child made" > language ("mazoline", etc.) that are non-conventional and why he can link > these Mondegreens to actual etymological processes and actual words > ("sidewalk"). Saussure's principle applies to language in only one place, > and it happens to be the only place in which Saussure was completely > competent as a linguist: sounding. Saussure's principle does not apply to > either wording or meaning: these are not purely conventional but natural. > > I think Vygotsky did not accept Pavlov as a human psychologist, but only as > an animal behaviorist. Of course, he was deferential, just as you or I > would defer to Mike (who was once an animal behaviorist himself), and just > as Mike himself would defer to a Luria or a Bernstein. Mere bad manners > doesn't make you an original thinker. I will agree to call this deference > discretion: Vygotsky didn't like to pick fights and lose them. > > I think that's why Vygotsky concentrates his fire on Watson, and Thorndike > and not Pavlov, why he points to Pavlov the animal behaviorist's insightful > remarks about the sign to shame his psychologist colleagues (this is > similar to what he does in shaming Piaget and Freud with the biologizing > Bleuler), and why he uses Pavlov's metaphor of a "telephone switchboard" > for his own purposes > > I didn't just include the Chuck Berry song in memory of a great musician; I > think that the lyrics show us the very point you are making about the sign. > You are certainly right that by itself, treated as just another instrument, > the sign doesn't have the power to confer free will on the human marionette > that Watson, Thorndike--and Pavlov--imagine. If a human is a puppet on a > string, it doesn't help to put another puppet in control of the string and > then put the human in control of the other puppet. > > But that's not what signs do. That's only what casting lots, tying knots, > and counting on your fingers APPEAR to do. When humans have do these > things, they try to go beyond the appearance. They imagine that casting > lots conveys messages from God, that knots tie themselves (as the Russian > formalists said), and that counting on fingers taps into some World Three > of eternal discoveries (Popper). > > And when they have been giving these unlikely explanations for thousands of > years, some humans begin to notice that the voice of the gods sounds very > familiar, that the knot tying of one child is unlike that of another, and > that some cultures count toes and elbows. Dorothy looks under the curtain > and realizes that the Wizard of Oz is only a wizened old man, and it turns > out you don't need his help after all. Soon people are making decisions in > their own heads, remembering with imaginary knots, and memorizing Maxwell's > equations. > > Of course, you and I get the joke. This is no more happening "inside the > head", with an "individual" memory, than it is happening in a lot, a knot, > or on your fingers. It's happening in a whole culture--many thousands of > years of thinking. But the thinking isn't "passed on" through language;it > is recreated and re-elaborated with every generation. The telephone > switchboard, like the conventional phoneme/grapheme, is useful at one point > and one point only: helping the caller get in touch with Marie. But the > actual communication between father and daughter is not conventional or > automatic at all. It's natural; i.e. it's hard work. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > wrote: > > > David, thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of > word ? > > ?????????. I agree with you, that the best translation will be > > ?conventional?. This term coincides well enough with Vygotsky?s idea that > > mature word in development of infant?s speech is something entirely > > "random", "reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mere > > agreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????) As for > > Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I?ll > agree > > with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's and > Pavlov's > > conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov?s ?teaching? was > > canonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later, > closer > > to 1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy > of > > Science. So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? evidently shade in > > Luria?s and Leont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of > > Vygotsky's idea of HMF and Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not > > something coincidental. Anyhow, this subject deserves serious inquiry. > > Sasha > > > > > > ???????, 27 ???? 2017 1:57 David Kellogg > ?????(?): > > > > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and > "irrational" > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" > that > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" or > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any > sound > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has a > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. > The > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a semantic > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic code > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that ?????????? > > is better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost > anything, > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", > "conditionality", > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position and > > Spinoza's. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > > wrote: > > > > Hi, Larry! > > > > > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the > > topicunder discussion. > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > (independence > > from mechanical causality). > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history > and > > evolution together.? > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > > Sasha Surmava > > > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): > > > > > > I see. > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > work, was a "founding exemplar." > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- decision-making > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Andy, > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > will open another thread. > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > Larry. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > > > > > collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > >> > > >> Andy, > > >> > > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by > > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > >> meaning as you mention. > > >> > > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > >> (examples)? > > >> > > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > >> (framework) practices. > > >> > > >> (framework) practices being another doubling. > > >> > > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > >> social framework practices. > > >> > > >> Is this reasonable? > > >> > > >> Or not > > >> > > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > >> > > >> *From: *Andy Blunden > > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> > > > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >> > > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > >> mention > > >> > > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > >> *action* are > > >> > > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > >> > > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > >> > > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > >> "singular" action. > > >> > > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > >> > > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > >> form, but > > >> > > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > >> activity, > > >> > > >> activities) and the set of words (practice, > > >> practices) have > > >> > > >> no systematic difference running across all > > >> disciplines and > > >> > > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > >> practices. > > >> > > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > >> > > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > >> (Tatigkeit) > > >> > > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > >> > > >> Aktivitat at all. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > > >> > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > >> > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > > > >> > collective-decision-making > > > > > >> > > >> > > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > >> > > >> > Alexander, Mike, > > >> > > >> > Thanks for the article. > > >> > > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > >> of practice in knowing). > > >> > > >> > Two formulas: > > >> > > >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > >> > > >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > >> do not co-incide > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Action IS individual > > >> > > >> > Practice IS a social category. > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > >> individual who are separate. > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a > > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently > > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > >> FOR further thought and wording. > > >> > > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > >> > > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > >> > > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> > > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > >> > > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Ivan > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > -- > > >> > > >> > festina lente > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> >> > > >> > > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > >> have been discussing > > >> > > >> >> LSV's sources in > > >> > > >> >> marx and spinoza. > > >> > > >> >> mike > > >> > > >> >> > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sun Aug 6 14:23:52 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 14:23:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogVnlnb3Rza3kgYW5kIEZldXJlYmFjaCBi?= =?utf-8?q?y_Peter_Keiler?= In-Reply-To: References: <314416548.61127.1501915410172@mail.yahoo.com> <67beb5a4-c352-76ab-ac03-aa21d4da7b32@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: Hi Mike, he wrote on many topics, including his *Corpus*, which should be a must read for embodiment and enactivist theorists---knowing and the body. For those interested in culture, above all language, community, and for understanding the idea of the singular plural, the plural singular, his essay "In Praise of the Melee" is a good read. The English version is in the book *Being Singular Plural (chap. 3) *(another place is in the book *A Finite Thinking* (chap. 13)*---*I got my French original from a European library, because it was printed in a European journal. I have both as printed versions. But I see that *Scribd* has a copy of the second book. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 9:51 AM, mike cole wrote: > Is there perhaps an essay of Nancy's that you would recommend, Michael? I > found the description of his book on singular-plural interesting, but the > specific topics to which his ideas are applied are pretty far out of my > professional competence. > > http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=643 > > An essay on human development would be nice. :-) > > mike > > On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 5:39 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Annalisa, > > I think all your questions about the whole part relation have been > > addressed by Jean-Luc Nancy in > > *Being Singular Plural*. > > > > I wonder why Jean-Luc Nancy is not more widely read or referred to on > this > > list. He has written interesting things about culture, for example the > > piece on "Eulogy of the M?l?e", which deals with questions of individual > > and culture, self and other > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > Dear all, > > > > > > > > > In reply to Ivan, I enjoyed the observation you bring up that > > "fundamental > > > particle" is a contradiction in terms (to Spinoza, anyway). > > > > > > > > > I would ask, at the same time, how is it that we observe a > contradiction > > > in terms. > > > > > > > > > That's why I wonder if it is right to say that it has to do with whole > vs > > > parts, and perhaps it has to do with relationship instead. > > > > > > > > > Can we have society void any kind of relationship? How do we define > parts > > > without the concept of "whole," or better "unity"? Can we conceive of a > > > part with an absence of a whole to which it belongs? > > > > > > > > > (Here's a question: What is a "whole part"? is it the mirror of a > > > "fundamental particle"?) > > > > > > > > > Doesn't a part even if next to another part, have a requirement to be a > > > part of *something*? > > > > > > > > > Or is this just a game of semantics? > > > > > > > > > I do agree that we Anglo-Americans whenever we are, have been hobbled > > > occasionally by behaviorism. But what of Pavlov? How does he *relate* > to > > > Watson, et al.? > > > > > > > > > I dream what it would be like to have a mind never tainted by Watson or > > by > > > Descartes. But would we then have a Vygotsky or a Spinoza, if not for > > > Watson or Descartes? > > > > > > > > > I cannot say...except perhaps to pose the question, "What came before > all > > > of them?" > > > > > > > > > Oh there goes that ellipse again. I let it slip by. > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Aug 6 16:03:47 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 16:03:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Melee.pdf Message-ID: <5987a06c.8155650a.cf65b.870b@mx.google.com> I GOOGLED RECOMMENDATION AND THIS PDF APPEARED Melee.pdf http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/teaching/600-13Fall/1007/Melee.pdf Sent from my Windows 10 phone From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sun Aug 6 16:31:46 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 16:31:46 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf In-Reply-To: <5987a06c.8155650a.cf65b.870b@mx.google.com> References: <5987a06c.8155650a.cf65b.870b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: No, this is not Jean-Luc Nancy's piece. This is my own article on the topic of scientific literacy. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Lplarry wrote: > I GOOGLED RECOMMENDATION AND THIS PDF APPEARED > > Melee.pdf > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/teaching/600-13Fall/1007/Melee.pdf > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Aug 6 16:42:25 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 09:42:25 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: <1210472036.483029.1501963744253@mail.yahoo.com> References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> <1210472036.483029.1501963744253@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Sasha: In the second chapter of "Pedology of the Adolescent" on methodology, Vygotsky introduces the idea that pedology is a "science of a natural whole", like geography, astronomy, ecology, and unlike biology, chemistry, physics and mathematics. Every discipline is defined by the object of study, but in some cases that object of study is itself the product of analysis into elements, while in other cases the object of study is a 'Gestalt" that appears as such in nature. In order to get the idealized object of study of biology (in order to see that bacteria, fungi, invertebrates and vertebrates are equally "living things") we require analysis into something that is not a unit but an element (e.g. metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis, equilibrium). The same thing is even more true of chemical molecules and the idealized billiard balls that physicists play with, and the object of study in mathematics is wholly imaginary, like religion and literature. But in order to get the concrete object of study of geography, astronomy, ecology and pedology, all we really have to do is to pay attention and observe: the object of study is given as such by nature. Vygotsky then says that people try to deny these sciences of natural wholes scientific status, because they supposedly do not have methods that are proper to themselves. The geographer, for example, has to consult a botanist and a zoologist and even an anthropologist to compile a geography of Australia. The astronomer depends on the physicist, the chemist, and the mathematician. Ecologists are notoriously "eclectic" in this sense (it should be obvious by now that I am not using "eclectic" in a perjorative sense, to mean a cardinal sin), and as Vygotsky puts it, the pedologist has no ways other than anatomy and physiology to describe the physical child, no ways other than those of the psychologist to describe her or his behaviour, and no ways other than those of the linguist to describe his or her speech. It is easy to conclude from this that pedology is methodologically eclectic, or--if we want to put a positive spin on it--"interdisciplinary" (like applied linguistics, which feeds omnivorously on other disciplines) or "transdisciplinary" (like my own tradition of systemic-functional linguistics, which tries to look at everything in terms of meaning, much as the nineteenth century scientists looked at everything in terms of time and history, and the eighteenth century "philosophes" thought about everything in terms of taxonomy and quantification) But Vygotsky doesn't say this. What he says is that the "primary" methods taken from other disciplines like anatomy/physiology, psychology, and linguistics are subordinated to very different goals than the ones they have on their home ground. The physiologist looks at physiology across the ages, not simply at the physiology of the seven-year-old child. But the pedologist, instead of looking at other ages, looks at the psychology of the seven-year-old and the language of the seven-year-old, and tries to explain them. To rise to explanation, the pedologist requires "secondary" methods, and these are quite specific to the science of the natural whole: the genetic method, the comparative method, and the synthetic method. For Vygotsky, the natural whole is not even the child, but the child in development--i.e. the specific age period. The age periods are like pages of a flip-book, or frames of a motion picture: put together, they allow us to see the dynamism of development. But of course putting each frame together, and putting the frames together into a moving image, require what (Basil) Bernstein called "weakly classified" forms of knowledge. David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: Actually, the English is brilliant. Any poet can give you the stoniness of the stone in English. But only a non-native can give us the Englishness of the English. dk On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 6:09 AM, Alexander Surmava < alexander.surmava@yahoo.com> wrote: > Dear David, I didn?t evenmention Marx as antinaturalist. This is the exact > citation from my article:?They (evidently ? LSV & EVI ? A.S.) are also at > one in recognizing thesocial, cultural-historical nature of the human > psyche, in their antinaturalism.? > > I agree with you that Marx andSpinoza can be hardly defined as > antinaturalists. > > In case of Vygotsky andIlyenkov everything is slightly more complicated. > Their common antipathy tona?ve attempts to deduce human psyche directly > from corporeal basis, from genesand from neurophysiology is something > evident. They both insisted that humanpsychology ascends to culture and > history. And this idea makes their positionssimilar to ?antinaturalism?. > Surely, it doesn?t mean that they reject Nature asthe substance in > Spinozian meaning. > > Nevertheless, there is aproblem here. And this problem is a problem of > transition from Nature toCulture and in this point Vygotsky?s superficial > idea of conventional signs andcoin tossing game looks evidently less > serious than Ilyenkov?s materialimplements, which are initial and universal > form of ideality. > > Anyway, I?m slightly afraidthat there is a problem with mutual > understanding in our communication, becauseinitially we are following too > unlike philosophic traditions? > > Thus I don?t know what youmean describing LSV?s methodology as ?eclectic?? > You mean that he was a thinkerfree from ideological blinders, or you mean > that his theoretic culture wasregrettably low? > > As for me, I definitely shareposition of Hegel, Marx and Ilyenkov, and > estimate eclecticism as the greatestsin for a researcher. Moreover, I am > sure that intentionally Vygotsky probablyshared the similar position. > > Something else entirely is thefact that involuntarily Vygotsky himself > sank into eclecticism to a wideextent. In fact, the trap of eclecticism is > a usual risk for a researcher inthe process of building a theory. In the > same time eclecticism accuratelyindicates that a researcher got lost in > contradictions. > > Vygotsky?s interpretation offreedom that is again something what is > necessary to discuss. > > There is two oppositetraditions in interpretation of this concept in the > history of philosophy. Thefirst ? Cartesian, the second ? Spinozian. > (evidently Marxism shares the secondone.) > > The Cartesian one implies thata person has a magic ability to act contrary > to natural law. Surely, Spinoza asa materialist rejects such a possibility > as something fantastic. But it doesn?tmean that Spinoza is a fan of > fatalism. > > According to Spinoza freedomis not a possibility to dream about fairy > tales of totally unfettered freedom.From Spinoza?s point of view to be > free, to realize your freedom means torealize your aims. Meanwhile one can > realize his/her aims only in he/she willact strictly in accordance with > natural necessity. Only in this case one will be free and willgain his > aim. Otherwise, he/she will successfully break their neck. As for LSVhe was > thoughtful enough to set up the problem of freedom as the centralproblem of > psychology, but being not capable to overcome the Stimulus-Reactiveapproach > he had no chance to solve the problem of freedom. Problem of freedomis > something absolutely unsolvable for S->R automaton, and it has clear > decisionfor acting subject. Anyhow, coin tossing in best case can help to > solve senselessproblem of Buridan donkey and can not help a human person in > substantial choice. > > Probablymy position in this crucial question can be clarified by my PPT > presentation ?EvaldIlyenkov vs Leo Vygotsky? > https://alexandersurmava.academia.edu > > Cheers, > Sasha > > ???????, 4 ??????? 2017 3:23 David Kellogg > ?????(?): > > > I think that Sasha, on p. 37 of "Ilyenkov and the Revolution in > Psychology", slips one by us. He quotes Davydov, who says that Ilyenkov > provided the logical-philosophical basis for cultural-historical theory and > for Vygotsky's theory of instruction based on development. He then says > that Davydov is wrong on both counts: neither Ilyenkov nor Vygotsky would > have considered cultural-historical theory truly scientific, and Ilyenkov > hardly ever mentions Vygotsky. Before we can ask what Sasha means by the > first, he is off trying to explain why Ilyenkov doesn't mention Vygotsky > much. There are lots of reasons not to mention Vygotsky when you are doing > philosophy. I am more interested in Sasha's notion that Vygotsky would not > have considered Davydov's version of the theory scientific. > > Sasha calls Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, and Marx anti-naturalists. He says it is > because of their recognition of the social, cultural-historical nature of > the human psyche. But in all three cases, that social, cultural-historical > "nature" really is natural at its base: it depends on a "thinking body" in > the case of Ilyenkov (something Descartes would not have rejected!), it > depends on the domestication of the human body and mind in the case of > Vygotsky, and of course it depends on the transformation of use values into > exchange values in Marx. So I am not at all sure in what sense they are > "anti-naturalist". If we take the Spinozan view, to be anti-naturalist is > to be anti-substance, anti-thought, anti-extension. I don't think that > applies to Marx, Vygotsky, or even Ilyenkov. > > I'm reading the Pedology of the Adolescent, and I find Vygotsky to be much > more methodologically eclectic than Sasha suggests with phrases like "sole > correct scientific method" and "whose theoretical analysis alone" (38). In > my reading, Vygotsky doesn't think of methods like that: methods are only > appropriate or inappropriate to problems of study. When you are studying > behaviour, psychology may be the appropriate method, but when you are > studying anatomy, try physiology. It is clear that Vygotsky has a > preference for his own "functional method of dual stimulation", but that is > precisely because it is appropriate to the goal of diagnosing the "next", > or proximal, zone of development. I think that even the psychotherapist's > couch, which as Sasha points out was artificially constructed out of > Freud's overwheening self-interest, had a place in Vygotsky's "science of a > natural whole": the only method he really does reject with disgust is the > practice of imagining what it is like to be a child and then pretending > that you have real scientific data. In the HDHMF, Vygotsky has a good deal > to say about Wundt and Titchener, not all of it critical (Chapters 3,4,5, > where "Titchener's Piano" is the empirical basis of his experiments with > choice). In contrast, Vygotsky has nothing to say about Socrates and Plato. > > I think that, rather like the "aphorisms" Sasha cites on 39, Sasha's paper > just touches on the problem that has always puzzled me: how Vygotsky > reconciles the explanans of Spinoza with his chosen explanandum of choice > and free will. It seems to me that they are reconcilable, but only through > the path that Sasha refuses to take, that is, the path of the semiotic, > semantic, systemic structure of the "thinking body". Vygotsky says that he > wants to know what a real human does in the Buridan situation, tethered > like the donkey between two equidistant and apparently equal piles of hay. > > Buridan himself would say that such a situation does not exist: piles of > hay are never equidistant and never exactly equal, and the universe is > really constructed like a chess game, where in any conceivable situation, > there is one and only one perfectly rational move, even if it is quite > beyond the power of man, beast, or even supercomputer to ever know what it > is. That was, I gather, Spinoza's solution as well, except that Spinoza > drew the logical conclusion that when you do not know which choice is > better, you must necessarily defer until you do. In the meantime, the > proliferation of choice, like the proliferation of method, is a positive > good, the closest we miserable slaves can get to freedom. > > > > > On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Hello, > > > > > > I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I > > probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the > > originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this > > thread, but I shall. > > > > > > Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what was > > to be seen on this here persistent thread. > > > > > > I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is > > becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the > > apparent world as seen through Vedanta. > > > > > > First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western > > viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational > > (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different > entities. > > As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being > through > > thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? > > > > > > Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that > > Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms > our > > thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through > > time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of > > different substances? (Am I getting this right?) > > > > > > But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed > > helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this > > nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding > > Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and > that > > nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us > > because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, as > if > > the same "material." > > > > > > But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical > robots, > > or chemical reactions? or is there choice? > > > > > > >From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza > > worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, > > transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how > > Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been > > named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have a > > different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. > > > > > > So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language > to > > another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind > > versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very > > turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit > were > > identically referencing. > > > > > > Just thinking out loud here. > > > > > > Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are > > indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the > > perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, > > whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on > > through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through > > actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and > > reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one hopes > to > > perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the > > importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that > > will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the > > subtle forms not just the gross. > > > > > > If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would > > have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum > > physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and > that > > the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. > > > > > > So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being > > material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name > and > > form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is > subtle, > > and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and > form > > of said substance. > > > > > > A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different > > forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam in > > yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's > > pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time > (like > > now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different > > "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is > > identical: H2O. > > > > > > This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one > > substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same > > place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the > change > > of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there > is > > as if an appearance of a linear change. > > > > > > W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, > > through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same > space, > > though the volume might change a little. > > > > > > OK, thanks for staying with me this far. > > > > > > As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas > > (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world > consists, > > these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, > heat), > > and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that > can > > be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But > this > > is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has > more > > rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river > have > > more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. There > is > > tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and > > sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than > the > > other dominant properties therein. > > > > > > If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might > > also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put another > > way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle > > form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. > > > > > > This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can > > perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, > by > > metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," > > through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry transcend > > the dualism as presented by Descartes? > > > > > > But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented > > by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass > intellectual > > persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to > me > > that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a > > story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with > > impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was going > > on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the > > "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling > the > > Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! > > > > > > I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but > of > > a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, > > which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) > > > > > > It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material > > question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed > > cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology > > (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human > > experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be > one > > unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which > also > > creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through time > > and space in all directions. > > > > > > Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would > be > > made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products of > > that substance. > > > > > > It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing > upon > > one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. > > > > > > But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite > > regression. That does not work. > > > > > > Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be > > experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of > > self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. In > > this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self > > reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that comes > of > > seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of > > him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. > > > > > > My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance > > with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the goal > > of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind > > develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history > (i.e. > > meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by > > mind). > > > > > > This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of > > three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy or > > as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these > properties > > are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the > > aspect of the perceivable world. > > > > > > >From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it > > exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called > > God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, > but > > it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all > things > > depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its > > existence. > > > > > > This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay > > even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only > > "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but > is > > no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains > > regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still > > clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and > > space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. > > > > > > When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no > > unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot can > > see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands > > outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is > > there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but > > eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. > > > > > > Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food > in > > my pot. :) > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Aug 6 17:31:02 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 17:31:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf In-Reply-To: References: <5987a06c.8155650a.cf65b.870b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5987b4de.469d630a.eb629.7234@mx.google.com> Michael, Yes, this is not the article but is an extension or further expansion of the notion melee that was generated from Jean-Luc Nancy?s exploration of life as melee. After reading your article hopefully I will be better prepared for engaging with the original article recommended. I will just mention that as you elaborate (character) the word (image) is also intimately related to melee. Will say more when we have had a chance to enter Nancy?s melee Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: August 6, 2017 4:34 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf No, this is not Jean-Luc Nancy's piece. This is my own article on the topic of scientific literacy. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Lplarry wrote: > I GOOGLED RECOMMENDATION AND THIS PDF APPEARED > > Melee.pdf > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/teaching/600-13Fall/1007/Melee.pdf > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Aug 6 19:29:24 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 12:29:24 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> <1210472036.483029.1501963744253@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1c1f5c8e-7169-2c61-28fa-93979a3db682@mira.net> Nice point, David. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 7/08/2017 9:42 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Sasha: > > In the second chapter of "Pedology of the Adolescent" on methodology, > Vygotsky introduces the idea that pedology is a "science of a natural > whole", like geography, astronomy, ecology, and unlike biology, chemistry, > physics and mathematics. Every discipline is defined by the object of > study, but in some cases that object of study is itself the product of > analysis into elements, while in other cases the object of study is a > 'Gestalt" that appears as such in nature. In order to get the idealized > object of study of biology (in order to see that bacteria, fungi, > invertebrates and vertebrates are equally "living things") we require > analysis into something that is not a unit but an element (e.g. metabolism, > reproduction, homeostasis, equilibrium). The same thing is even more true > of chemical molecules and the idealized billiard balls that physicists play > with, and the object of study in mathematics is wholly imaginary, like > religion and literature. But in order to get the concrete object of study > of geography, astronomy, ecology and pedology, all we really have to do is > to pay attention and observe: the object of study is given as such by > nature. > > Vygotsky then says that people try to deny these sciences of natural wholes > scientific status, because they supposedly do not have methods that are > proper to themselves. The geographer, for example, has to consult a > botanist and a zoologist and even an anthropologist to compile a geography > of Australia. The astronomer depends on the physicist, the chemist, and the > mathematician. Ecologists are notoriously "eclectic" in this sense (it > should be obvious by now that I am not using "eclectic" in a perjorative > sense, to mean a cardinal sin), and as Vygotsky puts it, the pedologist has > no ways other than anatomy and physiology to describe the physical child, > no ways other than those of the psychologist to describe her or his > behaviour, and no ways other than those of the linguist to describe his or > her speech. It is easy to conclude from this that pedology is > methodologically eclectic, or--if we want to put a positive spin on > it--"interdisciplinary" (like applied linguistics, which feeds omnivorously > on other disciplines) or "transdisciplinary" (like my own tradition of > systemic-functional linguistics, which tries to look at everything in terms > of meaning, much as the nineteenth century scientists looked at everything > in terms of time and history, and the eighteenth century "philosophes" > thought about everything in terms of taxonomy and quantification) > > But Vygotsky doesn't say this. What he says is that the "primary" methods > taken from other disciplines like anatomy/physiology, psychology, and > linguistics are subordinated to very different goals than the ones they > have on their home ground. The physiologist looks at physiology across the > ages, not simply at the physiology of the seven-year-old child. But the > pedologist, instead of looking at other ages, looks at the psychology of > the seven-year-old and the language of the seven-year-old, and tries to > explain them. To rise to explanation, the pedologist requires "secondary" > methods, and these are quite specific to the science of the natural whole: > the genetic method, the comparative method, and the synthetic method. For > Vygotsky, the natural whole is not even the child, but the child in > development--i.e. the specific age period. The age periods are like pages > of a flip-book, or frames of a motion picture: put together, they allow us > to see the dynamism of development. But of course putting each frame > together, and putting the frames together into a moving image, require what > (Basil) Bernstein called "weakly classified" forms of knowledge. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: Actually, the English is brilliant. Any poet can give you the stoniness > of the stone in English. But only a non-native can give us the Englishness > of the English. > > dk > > > > On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 6:09 AM, Alexander Surmava < > alexander.surmava@yahoo.com> wrote: > >> Dear David, I didn?t evenmention Marx as antinaturalist. This is the exact >> citation from my article:?They (evidently ? LSV & EVI ? A.S.) are also at >> one in recognizing thesocial, cultural-historical nature of the human >> psyche, in their antinaturalism.? >> >> I agree with you that Marx andSpinoza can be hardly defined as >> antinaturalists. >> >> In case of Vygotsky andIlyenkov everything is slightly more complicated. >> Their common antipathy tona?ve attempts to deduce human psyche directly >> from corporeal basis, from genesand from neurophysiology is something >> evident. They both insisted that humanpsychology ascends to culture and >> history. And this idea makes their positionssimilar to ?antinaturalism?. >> Surely, it doesn?t mean that they reject Nature asthe substance in >> Spinozian meaning. >> >> Nevertheless, there is aproblem here. And this problem is a problem of >> transition from Nature toCulture and in this point Vygotsky?s superficial >> idea of conventional signs andcoin tossing game looks evidently less >> serious than Ilyenkov?s materialimplements, which are initial and universal >> form of ideality. >> >> Anyway, I?m slightly afraidthat there is a problem with mutual >> understanding in our communication, becauseinitially we are following too >> unlike philosophic traditions? >> >> Thus I don?t know what youmean describing LSV?s methodology as ?eclectic?? >> You mean that he was a thinkerfree from ideological blinders, or you mean >> that his theoretic culture wasregrettably low? >> >> As for me, I definitely shareposition of Hegel, Marx and Ilyenkov, and >> estimate eclecticism as the greatestsin for a researcher. Moreover, I am >> sure that intentionally Vygotsky probablyshared the similar position. >> >> Something else entirely is thefact that involuntarily Vygotsky himself >> sank into eclecticism to a wideextent. In fact, the trap of eclecticism is >> a usual risk for a researcher inthe process of building a theory. In the >> same time eclecticism accuratelyindicates that a researcher got lost in >> contradictions. >> >> Vygotsky?s interpretation offreedom that is again something what is >> necessary to discuss. >> >> There is two oppositetraditions in interpretation of this concept in the >> history of philosophy. Thefirst ? Cartesian, the second ? Spinozian. >> (evidently Marxism shares the secondone.) >> >> The Cartesian one implies thata person has a magic ability to act contrary >> to natural law. Surely, Spinoza asa materialist rejects such a possibility >> as something fantastic. But it doesn?tmean that Spinoza is a fan of >> fatalism. >> >> According to Spinoza freedomis not a possibility to dream about fairy >> tales of totally unfettered freedom.From Spinoza?s point of view to be >> free, to realize your freedom means torealize your aims. Meanwhile one can >> realize his/her aims only in he/she willact strictly in accordance with >> natural necessity. Only in this case one will be free and willgain his >> aim. Otherwise, he/she will successfully break their neck. As for LSVhe was >> thoughtful enough to set up the problem of freedom as the centralproblem of >> psychology, but being not capable to overcome the Stimulus-Reactiveapproach >> he had no chance to solve the problem of freedom. Problem of freedomis >> something absolutely unsolvable for S->R automaton, and it has clear >> decisionfor acting subject. Anyhow, coin tossing in best case can help to >> solve senselessproblem of Buridan donkey and can not help a human person in >> substantial choice. >> >> Probablymy position in this crucial question can be clarified by my PPT >> presentation ?EvaldIlyenkov vs Leo Vygotsky? >> https://alexandersurmava.academia.edu >> >> Cheers, >> Sasha >> >> ???????, 4 ??????? 2017 3:23 David Kellogg >> ?????(?): >> >> >> I think that Sasha, on p. 37 of "Ilyenkov and the Revolution in >> Psychology", slips one by us. He quotes Davydov, who says that Ilyenkov >> provided the logical-philosophical basis for cultural-historical theory and >> for Vygotsky's theory of instruction based on development. He then says >> that Davydov is wrong on both counts: neither Ilyenkov nor Vygotsky would >> have considered cultural-historical theory truly scientific, and Ilyenkov >> hardly ever mentions Vygotsky. Before we can ask what Sasha means by the >> first, he is off trying to explain why Ilyenkov doesn't mention Vygotsky >> much. There are lots of reasons not to mention Vygotsky when you are doing >> philosophy. I am more interested in Sasha's notion that Vygotsky would not >> have considered Davydov's version of the theory scientific. >> >> Sasha calls Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, and Marx anti-naturalists. He says it is >> because of their recognition of the social, cultural-historical nature of >> the human psyche. But in all three cases, that social, cultural-historical >> "nature" really is natural at its base: it depends on a "thinking body" in >> the case of Ilyenkov (something Descartes would not have rejected!), it >> depends on the domestication of the human body and mind in the case of >> Vygotsky, and of course it depends on the transformation of use values into >> exchange values in Marx. So I am not at all sure in what sense they are >> "anti-naturalist". If we take the Spinozan view, to be anti-naturalist is >> to be anti-substance, anti-thought, anti-extension. I don't think that >> applies to Marx, Vygotsky, or even Ilyenkov. >> >> I'm reading the Pedology of the Adolescent, and I find Vygotsky to be much >> more methodologically eclectic than Sasha suggests with phrases like "sole >> correct scientific method" and "whose theoretical analysis alone" (38). In >> my reading, Vygotsky doesn't think of methods like that: methods are only >> appropriate or inappropriate to problems of study. When you are studying >> behaviour, psychology may be the appropriate method, but when you are >> studying anatomy, try physiology. It is clear that Vygotsky has a >> preference for his own "functional method of dual stimulation", but that is >> precisely because it is appropriate to the goal of diagnosing the "next", >> or proximal, zone of development. I think that even the psychotherapist's >> couch, which as Sasha points out was artificially constructed out of >> Freud's overwheening self-interest, had a place in Vygotsky's "science of a >> natural whole": the only method he really does reject with disgust is the >> practice of imagining what it is like to be a child and then pretending >> that you have real scientific data. In the HDHMF, Vygotsky has a good deal >> to say about Wundt and Titchener, not all of it critical (Chapters 3,4,5, >> where "Titchener's Piano" is the empirical basis of his experiments with >> choice). In contrast, Vygotsky has nothing to say about Socrates and Plato. >> >> I think that, rather like the "aphorisms" Sasha cites on 39, Sasha's paper >> just touches on the problem that has always puzzled me: how Vygotsky >> reconciles the explanans of Spinoza with his chosen explanandum of choice >> and free will. It seems to me that they are reconcilable, but only through >> the path that Sasha refuses to take, that is, the path of the semiotic, >> semantic, systemic structure of the "thinking body". Vygotsky says that he >> wants to know what a real human does in the Buridan situation, tethered >> like the donkey between two equidistant and apparently equal piles of hay. >> >> Buridan himself would say that such a situation does not exist: piles of >> hay are never equidistant and never exactly equal, and the universe is >> really constructed like a chess game, where in any conceivable situation, >> there is one and only one perfectly rational move, even if it is quite >> beyond the power of man, beast, or even supercomputer to ever know what it >> is. That was, I gather, Spinoza's solution as well, except that Spinoza >> drew the logical conclusion that when you do not know which choice is >> better, you must necessarily defer until you do. In the meantime, the >> proliferation of choice, like the proliferation of method, is a positive >> good, the closest we miserable slaves can get to freedom. >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >> >>> Hello, >>> >>> >>> I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I >>> probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the >>> originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this >>> thread, but I shall. >>> >>> >>> Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what was >>> to be seen on this here persistent thread. >>> >>> >>> I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is >>> becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the >>> apparent world as seen through Vedanta. >>> >>> >>> First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western >>> viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational >>> (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different >> entities. >>> As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being >> through >>> thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? >>> >>> >>> Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that >>> Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms >> our >>> thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through >>> time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of >>> different substances? (Am I getting this right?) >>> >>> >>> But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed >>> helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this >>> nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding >>> Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and >> that >>> nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us >>> because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, as >> if >>> the same "material." >>> >>> >>> But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical >> robots, >>> or chemical reactions? or is there choice? >>> >>> >>> >From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza >>> worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, >>> transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how >>> Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been >>> named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have a >>> different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. >>> >>> >>> So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language >> to >>> another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind >>> versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very >>> turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit >> were >>> identically referencing. >>> >>> >>> Just thinking out loud here. >>> >>> >>> Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are >>> indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the >>> perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, >>> whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on >>> through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through >>> actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and >>> reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one hopes >> to >>> perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the >>> importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that >>> will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the >>> subtle forms not just the gross. >>> >>> >>> If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would >>> have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum >>> physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and >> that >>> the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. >>> >>> >>> So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being >>> material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name >> and >>> form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is >> subtle, >>> and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and >> form >>> of said substance. >>> >>> >>> A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different >>> forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam in >>> yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's >>> pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time >> (like >>> now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different >>> "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is >>> identical: H2O. >>> >>> >>> This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one >>> substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same >>> place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the >> change >>> of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there >> is >>> as if an appearance of a linear change. >>> >>> >>> W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, >>> through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same >> space, >>> though the volume might change a little. >>> >>> >>> OK, thanks for staying with me this far. >>> >>> >>> As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas >>> (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world >> consists, >>> these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, >> heat), >>> and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that >> can >>> be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But >> this >>> is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has >> more >>> rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river >> have >>> more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. There >> is >>> tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and >>> sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than >> the >>> other dominant properties therein. >>> >>> >>> If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might >>> also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put another >>> way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle >>> form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. >>> >>> >>> This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can >>> perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, >> by >>> metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," >>> through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry transcend >>> the dualism as presented by Descartes? >>> >>> >>> But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented >>> by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass >> intellectual >>> persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to >> me >>> that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a >>> story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with >>> impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was going >>> on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the >>> "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling >> the >>> Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! >>> >>> >>> I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but >> of >>> a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, >>> which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) >>> >>> >>> It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material >>> question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed >>> cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology >>> (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human >>> experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be >> one >>> unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which >> also >>> creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through time >>> and space in all directions. >>> >>> >>> Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would >> be >>> made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products of >>> that substance. >>> >>> >>> It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing >> upon >>> one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. >>> >>> >>> But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite >>> regression. That does not work. >>> >>> >>> Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be >>> experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of >>> self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. In >>> this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self >>> reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that comes >> of >>> seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of >>> him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. >>> >>> >>> My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance >>> with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the goal >>> of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind >>> develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history >> (i.e. >>> meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by >>> mind). >>> >>> >>> This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of >>> three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy or >>> as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these >> properties >>> are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the >>> aspect of the perceivable world. >>> >>> >>> >From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it >>> exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called >>> God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, >> but >>> it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all >> things >>> depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its >>> existence. >>> >>> >>> This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay >>> even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only >>> "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but >> is >>> no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains >>> regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still >>> clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and >>> space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. >>> >>> >>> When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no >>> unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot can >>> see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands >>> outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is >>> there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but >>> eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. >>> >>> >>> Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food >> in >>> my pot. :) >>> >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > From preiss.xmca@gmail.com Sun Aug 6 20:28:43 2017 From: preiss.xmca@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 23:28:43 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] 3 Psychology Faculty Positions in Chile Message-ID: Dear colleagues, We have three calls for faculty positions in our school. I would appreciate if you could help us to disseminate these calls among possible candidates. Areas are cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and a last one whose specialization is open, but special consideration will be given to candidates working on Cognitive Psychology, Emotions and/or Motivation, and Developmental Psychology. https://chroniclevitae.com/jobs/0000379354-01 https://chroniclevitae.com/jobs/0000379351-01 https://www.nature.com/naturejobs/science/jobs/617697-interdisciplinary-position-in-cognitive-neuroscience Many thanks, David David Preiss, Ph.D. Director Escuela de Psicolog?a Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Av Vicu?a Mackenna - 4860 7820436 Macul Santiago, Chile From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Aug 7 01:48:16 2017 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 08:48:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf In-Reply-To: References: <5987a06c.8155650a.cf65b.870b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Many thanks Michael, I have just read your chapter 'In Praise of the M?l?e' and it has certainly whetted my appetite to find out more about Nancy's writing. I think there is huge potential in the shifting of focus from a language of ownership and enclosure ('my own mind') to recognition of the fluidity of interactions among substantially shared minds. I have also just read Fernyhough's 'Voices of the mind' (so many wisps, eddies and threads to follow from this discussion) and the resulting m?l?e has got me thinking about how the sharing of minds (or of mindings) which we internalise into 'private' thinking involves so much more than just the words which bob on the surface of our interactions. It is not only 'voices' which we internalise but whole, embodied interactions - the full m?l?e of our bodily responses to another person which make them the person we know. While some forms of interaction, like the (almost) entirely text-based exchanges here, may appear to flow above the undercurrents of bodies and their everyday lives, these deeper interactions still shape the ripples we are able to see and share. I say almost entirely text-based because I am sure there are some contributors to this group who have had opportunities to meet 'in person' and I suspect that this must affect the way they read each other's contributions. I am looking forward to participating in the m?tissage of the ISCAR conference in Quebec. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: 07 August 2017 00:32 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf No, this is not Jean-Luc Nancy's piece. This is my own article on the topic of scientific literacy. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Lplarry wrote: > I GOOGLED RECOMMENDATION AND THIS PDF APPEARED > > Melee.pdf > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/teaching/600-13Fall/1007/Melee.pdf > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Aug 7 09:48:03 2017 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 07 Aug 2017 12:48:03 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 3 Psychology Faculty Positions in Chile Message-ID: Good morning david, I have a colleague, Dr. Judite Blanc, from the state university of Haiti who is interested in the position in developmental psychology. ?She earned her PhD from Paris, and wanted to make sure it would be OK to apply with a french diploma. ?She is fluent in french, kreyol, english, and is working on perfecting her spanish. ?I have cced her on this email should she have any questions for you. Regards,Paul Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: David Preiss Date: 8/6/17 11:28 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l]  3 Psychology Faculty Positions in Chile Dear colleagues, We have three calls for faculty positions in our school. I would appreciate if you could help us to disseminate these calls among possible candidates. Areas are cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and a last one whose specialization is open, but special consideration will be given to candidates working on Cognitive Psychology, Emotions and/or Motivation, and Developmental Psychology. https://chroniclevitae.com/jobs/0000379354-01 https://chroniclevitae.com/jobs/0000379351-01 https://www.nature.com/naturejobs/science/jobs/617697-interdisciplinary-position-in-cognitive-neuroscience Many thanks, David David Preiss, Ph.D. Director Escuela de Psicolog?a Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Av Vicu?a Mackenna - 4860 7820436 Macul Santiago, Chile From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Mon Aug 7 10:11:36 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 10:11:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf In-Reply-To: References: <5987a06c.8155650a.cf65b.870b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Rod, you use the verb *internalize*, and it may get you immediately into trouble. When you read Mikhailov or G.H. Mead, you will see that any inner, self, is a *consequence* of social relations, a result of a continuous coming and going. Even private cogitations, or writing into a diary is social through and through (Mead, Vygotsky); pure idiolect is impossible (Feuerbach, Vygotsky, & Nancy). The other thing, m?l?e is not a thing, not a mixture, but flow. I personally do not think in terms of *inter*action, because such theorizing begins with the self-contained subjects, whereas in *trans*action, the parts cannot be independently defined--no seller without buyer, no reply without a query. Anyone who can get to the point to see him/herself as constituted by the relation, who lives the relation first before the self, who is in a position to say that who s/he is is a function of the relation rather than the other way around (as in "I am putting so much into the relation, s/he is not giving back...") will live a transformation. Cheers and back to British Columbia long weekend Monday-off Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 1:48 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > Many thanks Michael, > > I have just read your chapter 'In Praise of the M?l?e' and it has > certainly whetted my appetite to find out more about Nancy's writing. I > think there is huge potential in the shifting of focus from a language of > ownership and enclosure ('my own mind') to recognition of the fluidity of > interactions among substantially shared minds. I have also just read > Fernyhough's 'Voices of the mind' (so many wisps, eddies and threads to > follow from this discussion) and the resulting m?l?e has got me thinking > about how the sharing of minds (or of mindings) which we internalise into > 'private' thinking involves so much more than just the words which bob on > the surface of our interactions. It is not only 'voices' which we > internalise but whole, embodied interactions - the full m?l?e of our bodily > responses to another person which make them the person we know. While some > forms of interaction, like the (almost) entirely text-based exchanges here, > may appear to flow above the undercurrents of bodies and their everyday > lives, these deeper interactions still shape the ripples we are able to see > and share. I say almost entirely text-based because I am sure there are > some contributors to this group who have had opportunities to meet 'in > person' and I suspect that this must affect the way they read each other's > contributions. > > I am looking forward to participating in the m?tissage of the ISCAR > conference in Quebec. > > All the best, > > Rod > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: 07 August 2017 00:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf > > No, this is not Jean-Luc Nancy's piece. This is my own article on the > topic of scientific literacy. Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > > I GOOGLED RECOMMENDATION AND THIS PDF APPEARED > > > > Melee.pdf > > > > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/teaching/600-13Fall/1007/Melee.pdf > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] //www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Aug 7 10:45:44 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 10:45:44 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf In-Reply-To: References: <5987a06c.8155650a.cf65b.870b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5988a73d.8b02630a.1b344.24dc@mx.google.com> Michael, M?l?e is not a mixture M?l?e is a flow Shifting from parts (and wholes) in inter action To Aspects within trans actions. This feels like shifting ground Enjoy your long weekend Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: August 7, 2017 10:14 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf Hi Rod, you use the verb *internalize*, and it may get you immediately into trouble. When you read Mikhailov or G.H. Mead, you will see that any inner, self, is a *consequence* of social relations, a result of a continuous coming and going. Even private cogitations, or writing into a diary is social through and through (Mead, Vygotsky); pure idiolect is impossible (Feuerbach, Vygotsky, & Nancy). The other thing, m?l?e is not a thing, not a mixture, but flow. I personally do not think in terms of *inter*action, because such theorizing begins with the self-contained subjects, whereas in *trans*action, the parts cannot be independently defined--no seller without buyer, no reply without a query. Anyone who can get to the point to see him/herself as constituted by the relation, who lives the relation first before the self, who is in a position to say that who s/he is is a function of the relation rather than the other way around (as in "I am putting so much into the relation, s/he is not giving back...") will live a transformation. Cheers and back to British Columbia long weekend Monday-off Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 1:48 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > Many thanks Michael, > > I have just read your chapter 'In Praise of the M?l?e' and it has > certainly whetted my appetite to find out more about Nancy's writing. I > think there is huge potential in the shifting of focus from a language of > ownership and enclosure ('my own mind') to recognition of the fluidity of > interactions among substantially shared minds. I have also just read > Fernyhough's 'Voices of the mind' (so many wisps, eddies and threads to > follow from this discussion) and the resulting m?l?e has got me thinking > about how the sharing of minds (or of mindings) which we internalise into > 'private' thinking involves so much more than just the words which bob on > the surface of our interactions. It is not only 'voices' which we > internalise but whole, embodied interactions - the full m?l?e of our bodily > responses to another person which make them the person we know. While some > forms of interaction, like the (almost) entirely text-based exchanges here, > may appear to flow above the undercurrents of bodies and their everyday > lives, these deeper interactions still shape the ripples we are able to see > and share. I say almost entirely text-based because I am sure there are > some contributors to this group who have had opportunities to meet 'in > person' and I suspect that this must affect the way they read each other's > contributions. > > I am looking forward to participating in the m?tissage of the ISCAR > conference in Quebec. > > All the best, > > Rod > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: 07 August 2017 00:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf > > No, this is not Jean-Luc Nancy's piece. This is my own article on the > topic of scientific literacy. Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > > I GOOGLED RECOMMENDATION AND THIS PDF APPEARED > > > > Melee.pdf > > > > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/teaching/600-13Fall/1007/Melee.pdf > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] //www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Aug 7 10:55:26 2017 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 17:55:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf Message-ID: Quite so, Michael, but one of the consequences of my social relations is a habit of imagining a limen between 'my' thoughts and those which come to 'me' from outside. I happy to consider this an illusion but I am also prepared to accept that different people can be constituted differently so that we each refract the flow of 'interaction' differently. Isn't it this that makes meeting other people interesting? As you say, meeting is not something we can do on our 'own'. All the best, Rod On 7 Aug 2017 6:14 pm, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: Hi Rod, you use the verb *internalize*, and it may get you immediately into trouble. When you read Mikhailov or G.H. Mead, you will see that any inner, self, is a *consequence* of social relations, a result of a continuous coming and going. Even private cogitations, or writing into a diary is social through and through (Mead, Vygotsky); pure idiolect is impossible (Feuerbach, Vygotsky, & Nancy). The other thing, m?l?e is not a thing, not a mixture, but flow. I personally do not think in terms of *inter*action, because such theorizing begins with the self-contained subjects, whereas in *trans*action, the parts cannot be independently defined--no seller without buyer, no reply without a query. Anyone who can get to the point to see him/herself as constituted by the relation, who lives the relation first before the self, who is in a position to say that who s/he is is a function of the relation rather than the other way around (as in "I am putting so much into the relation, s/he is not giving back...") will live a transformation. Cheers and back to British Columbia long weekend Monday-off Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 1:48 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > Many thanks Michael, > > I have just read your chapter 'In Praise of the M?l?e' and it has > certainly whetted my appetite to find out more about Nancy's writing. I > think there is huge potential in the shifting of focus from a language of > ownership and enclosure ('my own mind') to recognition of the fluidity of > interactions among substantially shared minds. I have also just read > Fernyhough's 'Voices of the mind' (so many wisps, eddies and threads to > follow from this discussion) and the resulting m?l?e has got me thinking > about how the sharing of minds (or of mindings) which we internalise into > 'private' thinking involves so much more than just the words which bob on > the surface of our interactions. It is not only 'voices' which we > internalise but whole, embodied interactions - the full m?l?e of our bodily > responses to another person which make them the person we know. While some > forms of interaction, like the (almost) entirely text-based exchanges here, > may appear to flow above the undercurrents of bodies and their everyday > lives, these deeper interactions still shape the ripples we are able to see > and share. I say almost entirely text-based because I am sure there are > some contributors to this group who have had opportunities to meet 'in > person' and I suspect that this must affect the way they read each other's > contributions. > > I am looking forward to participating in the m?tissage of the ISCAR > conference in Quebec. > > All the best, > > Rod > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: 07 August 2017 00:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Melee.pdf > > No, this is not Jean-Luc Nancy's piece. This is my own article on the > topic of scientific literacy. Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > > I GOOGLED RECOMMENDATION AND THIS PDF APPEARED > > > > Melee.pdf > > > > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/teaching/600-13Fall/1007/Melee.pdf > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] //www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From preiss.xmca@gmail.com Mon Aug 7 13:27:19 2017 From: preiss.xmca@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 16:27:19 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 3 Psychology Faculty Positions in Chile In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Paul, Of course! Our faculty has PhDs from across the world (the USA, Europe, Latin America...) In case of more questions please write to my UC email: davidpreiss@uc.cl so we don't go off topic for the rest of the members of the list. Look forward to hearing from Dr. Blanc in case of further questions. David On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > Good morning david, > I have a colleague, Dr. Judite Blanc, from the state university of Haiti > who is interested in the position in developmental psychology. She earned > her PhD from Paris, and wanted to make sure it would be OK to apply with a > french diploma. She is fluent in french, kreyol, english, and is working > on perfecting her spanish. I have cced her on this email should she have > any questions for you. > Regards,Paul > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: David Preiss > Date: 8/6/17 11:28 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l]  3 Psychology Faculty Positions in Chile > > Dear colleagues, > > > > We have three calls for faculty positions in our school. I would appreciate > if you could help us to disseminate these calls among possible candidates. > Areas are cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and a last one > whose specialization is open, but special consideration will be given to > candidates working on Cognitive Psychology, Emotions and/or Motivation, and > Developmental Psychology. > > > > https://chroniclevitae.com/jobs/0000379354-01 > > > > https://chroniclevitae.com/jobs/0000379351-01 > > > > https://www.nature.com/naturejobs/science/jobs/617697-interdisciplinary- > position-in-cognitive-neuroscience > > > > Many thanks, > > David > > David Preiss, Ph.D. > Director > Escuela de Psicolog?a > Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile > Av Vicu?a Mackenna - 4860 > 7820436 Macul > Santiago, Chile > From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Tue Aug 8 07:34:03 2017 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 14:34:03 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAg0J7RgtCyOiBSZTog0J7RgtCyOiDQntGC0LI6IFJl?= =?utf-8?q?=3A_Ilyenkov=2C_Marx=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1188961653.3422408.1501456533184@mail.yahoo.com> <1672890324.2189941.1501797042429@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <448813666.2835276.1502202843759@mail.yahoo.com> Dear David! Thank you for your detailed explication of your understanding of the birth of speech,which enabled me to clarify the basic distinctions between our approaches tothis issue. The matter is that I cannot accept the logicof association as it is, as the logic of passive contemplation. From activistpoint of view, there is no difference between ?natural? associative function and?cultural? conventional function. Both this ?functions? are something substantiallyderived from sensualist logic and something that failed to approve it?s viabilityin practice of tiflo-surdo-pedagogy. Speech bears from practical activity, andnot from passive contemplation with all kind of associations. By the way, the Cartesianas well as Pavlovian reflexes (it is unimportantinborn or acquired) are manifestation of this leading to dead end principle of passiveassociation. >From the activist perspective, the birth of speech ascends from tool mediated objectoriented activity. E.g. on the first stage a child is learning how to eat with spoon. On the next (symbolic) stage, he/she realizes whatmeans a special movement of his/her hands as if he/she is eating with the help of spoon, but withoutactual spoon. Finally, on the third, highest stage a child easily replaces thissymbolic movement with a conventional sign which means food, process of eatingand everything which is including in collaborative tool mediated human process of spoon-feeding. ? Sasha ???????????, 6 ??????? 2017 23:35 David Kellogg ?????(?): (For some terrible reason, this note from Sasha ended up in my spam filter. I remember using a yahoo account for many years and having the same problem.... Anyway, I will keep an eye on my trash from now on.) At the last ISCAR in Sydney, Mohammad El-Hammoumi urged me to read Marx's ethnographic notebooks. I'm embarrassed to say that I have only started doing so now (in anticipation of meeting him again at ISCAR in Quebec and having him check to see if I've done my homework). One of the important things about the notebooks that Mohammad pointed out to me was that they suggest that Marx was much more of a cultural relativist in anthropology than the Stalinists with their five-stage universal model of human progress were: Primitive communism isn't a universal stage; non-feudal precapitalisms existed (and the "Asian mode of production" is a place holder, an algebraic "x" like Vygotsky's "neoformation", for dealing with this possibility); socialism is a human potential subject to all the vicissitudes of human volition and not a pre-ordained destiny. Some of the more "backward" societies (e.g. Russia and the USA) are closer to achieving socialism than the more "progressive" ones (e.g. England and Germany). This surprises me a little, because I have always been in the extreme developmentalist wing of xmca (my Vygotsky is not a philosopher but a pedologist). But I imagine it comes as no surprise to Mike, or to Martin Packer, or to Greg Thompson. Or to Sasha. I think the point Sasha makes here is a very tricky but very important one: it is possible for "conventionality" to be both a sign of backwardness AND a sign of progress in language development. Take, for example, intonation. Part of intonation is natural in precisely the sense that Sasha is puzzled about: most if not all languages use a falling intonation for long declaratives, simply because as you speak the air pressure in the lungs decreases and this creates a tendency of the frequency of vocal cord vibration to fall. It is natural, not in the sense that Halliday means (that is, defining and not associative, essential and not accidental, and evolved rather than designed). It is natural in the sense that we share it with animals (I am listening to morning birds here in Sydney, and I can hear falling intonation; whale songs are almost always falling in their intonation).? But part of intonation is natural in the other sense as well, and this is why it can and does differ from culture to culture in languages. Here in Australia, when people tell stories, they use a LOT of rising intonation at the end of their clauses ("ya reckon?") although the end of the turn itself still tends to fall. This indicates continuation, non-completion in the clause and termination, completeess in the turn. It does so by means that were originally natural (that is, shared with birds and whales) but which have been exapted by cultural means, just as the natural perceptual experience of blackness is exapted by cultural means in the expression "blackbird". We can see the same thing in stress: on the one hand, the loudness and slowness and distinctness of "BLACK" in "Look at that BLACKbird" is iconic: it is loud, slow, and distinct for reasons that have nothing to do with the symbol itself. But on the other hand, this naturalness is being exapted by cultural means, because "black" here is a Classifier (not an Epithet, like "ugly" or "nasty") and it suggests that it is the species that is noteworthy and not the perceptual experience of the color. And so I think it is perfectly possible for "conventionality" to play a double role as well: it can be a "natural", associative function ?in the early stage of language development (when a baby learns to associate milk with a particular shape and color of a bottle or with an apron) and it can also be a "cultural", conventional function and play the key role in concept formation (when the adolescent learns to associate a configuration of vowels and consonants with a particular concept). What will not work, alas, is the universal five step process of concept formation we find in Thinking and Speech, Chapter Five. I think that the reason why Vygotsky doesn't refer to this five step process in his final lectures on school age thinking (and he explicitly criticizes it in Chapter Six of Thinking and Speech) is that he recognized that, like the Stalinist five-step move through human history, it was far too teleological to reflect the real diversity in paths of development. ??? --David KelloggMacquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit:Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling withVygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminationson the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full --?David KelloggMacquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit:Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with?Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full? On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 6:50 AM, Alexander Surmava wrote: Dear David: Thank youfor your interest in the whole issue and for hard task of reading of my longtext :-) . The issuewith interpretation of the very idea of freedom is utterly interesting andimportant for our theoretical needs, so I?ll wait for your promised postimpatiently :-) As forconventionality or alternatively meatiness of LSV?s understanding of sign thatis also one of the most important problem for discussion cause it closely sidewith the problem of ideality and therefore with the problem of essence of thinkingor psyche. You areabsolutely correct with your ?blackbird? illustration. No doubt that the ruleof combination of two radicals ("black? and ?bird") has nothing to dowith any lot, but it is something meaty, something what we can explain asmovement according to the shape of our object. You arealso quite correct that in case of infant?s neologisms like ?mazoline? insteadof ?Vazelin? Vygotsky again didn?t apply to any conventionality or chance. But let uslook through Vygotsky?s "A tool and a symbol...". You probably rememberLSV?s dissertation about the nature of verbal sign: ?????Experimentsshow that both in plan and in speech the child is far from consciouslyrealizing the relativity of ? ? ? ? ? the sign operation or of the arbitrarilyestablished connection of sign and meaning. In order to become an ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?object?s(word?s) sign, the stimulus finds support in the properties of the designatedobject itself. Not ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?everything can represent everything? for the child in thisgame. The objects? real properties and their sign ? ? ? ? ? ? ? meanings come into complexstructural interaction during play. Thus, for the child, the word is linked tothe ? ? ? ? ? ? object through the latter?s properties and is incorporated in onestructure, common to it. That is why the child ? ? ? ? in our experiments refuses tocall the floor a mirror (it cannot walk on a mirror), bur has no qualms at ? ? ? ????transforming a chair into a train, using its properties in play, i.e.manipulating it as if it were a train. When asked ????to call a lamp ?table? andvice versa, the child refuses, because one ?can?t write on a lamp, or turn on atable?. To ????change (or swap) meanings for the child means to change theproperties of objects.? Thus?Vygotsky treats conventionality of the verbal sign as a characteristic of it'smaturity. Contrary, Vygotsky estimates children?s attempts to find ?support in the properties ofthe designated object itself? in naming the object as acharacteristic of infant's na?vet?, it?s backwardness. It is easyto give more examples of such argumentation. But I think that there is no needfor this.Ilyenkovand his friend Alexander Ivanovitch Meshcheriakov (deafblind children?strainer) insisted that all attempts to teach a deafblind child to speak based on(mis)understanding of verbal signs as arbitrary or conventional signs leads todead end. Speech doesn?t develop. The same fact was described by Ann Sullivan ? famousteacher of American deafblind woman Ellen Keller. On thecontrary, the path which starts from involving deafblind children into humanobject oriented activity mediated by all kind of human tools - chamber-pots,plates, spoons, tables, clothes etc. - gives them a chance to grasp somethingthat lies in the basis of speech and that enables them to study symbolic (likeArmslan - American Sign Language) and later even verbal language. All thiscan be commented in details in the context of Ilyenkov?s understanding ofIDEALITY and human tools as initial and universal form of human ideality. But takinginto account my low speed in English?writing (I hope that soon I?ll improveit :-) ) I?ll abstain from further explanations for a while.?As for theproblem of Vygotsky?s attitude to Pavlov and his theory. Could you or anybodyelse explain me ? WHAT does Vygotsky mean by the term of NATURAL or LOW psychicfunction? And why does he define them as PSYCHIC? ?Cheers, Sasha ? ? ? ???????, 3 ??????? 2017 0:50 David Kellogg ?????(?): ?Dear Sasha: Thanks for the reply. I took the time to read the English version of your paper with great interest and large areas of agreement. But the areas of disagreement, which I'll talk about in another post on "free will as infinite selection", were actually the zones of greatest interest. I think Vygotsky doesn't accept conventionality as a pervasive principle in language, and neither do I. Take, for example, Vygotsky's example "blackbird". We can say that the phonemes/graphemes (the? language-specific sequence of vowels and consonants) is conventional; we know this because other languages do it differently. But once we take the "salto mortale" of accepting that "black" means the (original) color of ink and "bird" means a winged animal descended from the dinosaurs, the pairing of "black" and "bird" to describe the blackbird is natural and not conventional: it obeys laws that are clear even to the half-enculturated child. I think that is why Vygotsky can give many examples of "child made" language ("mazoline", etc.) that are non-conventional and why he can link these Mondegreens to actual etymological processes and actual words ("sidewalk"). Saussure's principle applies to language in only one place, and it happens to be the only place in which Saussure was completely competent as a linguist: sounding. Saussure's principle does not apply to either wording or meaning: these are not purely conventional but natural. I think Vygotsky did not accept Pavlov as a human psychologist, but only as an animal behaviorist. Of course, he was deferential, just as you or I would defer to Mike (who was once an animal behaviorist himself), and just as Mike himself would defer to a Luria or a Bernstein. Mere bad manners doesn't make you an original thinker. I will agree to call this deference discretion: Vygotsky didn't like to pick fights and lose them. I think that's why Vygotsky concentrates his fire on Watson, and Thorndike and not Pavlov, why he points to Pavlov the animal behaviorist's insightful remarks about the sign to shame his psychologist colleagues (this is similar to what he does in shaming Piaget and Freud with the biologizing Bleuler), and why he uses Pavlov's metaphor of a "telephone switchboard" for his own purposes I didn't just include the Chuck Berry song in memory of a great musician; I think that the lyrics show us the very point you are making about the sign. You are certainly right that by itself, treated as just another instrument, the sign doesn't have the power to confer free will on the human marionette that Watson, Thorndike--and Pavlov--imagine. If a human is a puppet on a string, it doesn't help to put another puppet in control of the string and then put the human in control of the other puppet. But that's not what signs do. That's only what casting lots, tying knots, and counting on your fingers APPEAR to do. When humans have do these things, they try to go beyond the appearance. They imagine that casting lots conveys messages from God, that knots tie themselves (as the Russian formalists said), and that counting on fingers taps into some World Three of eternal discoveries (Popper). And when they have been giving these unlikely explanations for thousands of years, some humans begin to notice that the voice of the gods sounds very familiar, that the knot tying of one child is unlike that of another, and that some cultures count toes and elbows. Dorothy looks under the curtain and realizes that the Wizard of Oz is only a wizened old man, and it turns out you don't need his help after all. Soon people are making decisions in their own heads, remembering with imaginary knots, and memorizing Maxwell's equations. Of course, you and I get the joke. This is no more happening "inside the head", with an "individual" memory, than it is happening in a lot, a knot, or on your fingers. It's happening in a whole culture--many thousands of years of thinking. But the thinking isn't "passed on" through language;it is recreated and re-elaborated with every generation. The telephone switchboard, like the conventional phoneme/grapheme, is useful at one point and one point only: helping the caller get in touch with Marie. But the actual communication between father and daughter is not conventional or automatic at all. It's natural; i.e. it's hard work. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Alexandre Sourmava wrote: > David, thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word ? > ?????????. I agree with you, that the best translation will be > ?conventional?. This term coincides well enough with Vygotsky?s idea that > mature word in development of infant?s speech is something entirely > "random", "reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mere > agreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????) As for > Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I?ll agree > with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's and Pavlov's > conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov?s ?teaching? was > canonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later, closer > to 1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy of > Science. So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? evidently shade in > Luria?s and Leont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of > Vygotsky's idea of HMF and Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not > something coincidental. Anyhow, this subject deserves serious inquiry. > Sasha > > > ???????, 27 ???? 2017 1:57 David Kellogg ?????(?): > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and "irrational" > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" that > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" or > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any sound > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has a > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. The > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a semantic > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic code > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that? ?????????? > is better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost anything, > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", "conditionality", > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position and > Spinoza's. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > wrote: > > Hi, Larry! > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the > topicunder discussion. > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence > from mechanical causality). > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and > evolution together.? > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > Sasha Surmava > >? ? ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): > > >? I see. > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > work, was a "founding exemplar." > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > Andy > > ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- decision-making > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Andy, > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > will open another thread. > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.? It is > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > >? ? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > >? ? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > >? ? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > >? ? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > >? ? Larry. > > > >? ? Andy > > > >? ? ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > >? ? Andy Blunden > >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >? ? http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > >? ? collective-decision-making > > > > > >? ? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> > >>? ? Andy, > >> > >>? ? Following your lead it may be preferable to say > >>? ? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > >>? ? variable? social actions. This doubling? (by > >>? ? including both terms) may crystallize the intended > >>? ? meaning as you mention. > >> > >>? ? Andy is this vein can we also include the term > >>? ? (examples)? > >> > >>? ? Then the moving TRANS forming from single > >>? ? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > >>? ? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > >>? ? actions and further movement (historicity) toward > >>? ? (framework) practices. > >> > >>? ? (framework) practices being another doubling. > >> > >>? ? So moving (transforming) from single social? examples > >>? ? through exemplary social? examples crystallizing in > >>? ? social framework practices. > >> > >>? ? Is this reasonable? > >> > >>? ? Or not > >> > >>? ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >> > >>? ? *From: *Andy Blunden > >>? ? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > >>? ? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>? ? > > >>? ? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > >>? ? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >>? ? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > >>? ? mention > >> > >>? ? to say that *actions* - the individual units of > >>? ? *action* are > >> > >>? ? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > >> > >>? ? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > >> > >>? ? "individual" action. Or better, so is every > >>? ? "singular" action. > >> > >>? ? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > >> > >>? ? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > >>? ? form, but > >> > >>? ? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > >>? ? activity, > >> > >>? ? activities) and the set of words (practice, > >>? ? practices) have > >> > >>? ? no systematic difference running across all > >>? ? disciplines and > >> > >>? ? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > >>? ? practices. > >> > >>? ? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > >> > >>? ? German words for action (Handlung) and activity > >>? ? (Tatigkeit) > >> > >>? ? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > >> > >>? ? Aktivitat at all. > >> > >>? ? Andy > >> > >>? ? ------------------------------ ------------------------------ > >> > >>? ? Andy Blunden > >> > >>? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> > >>? ? http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > >>? ? collective-decision-making > > > >> > >> > >>? ? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> > >>? ? > Alexander, Mike, > >> > >>? ? > Thanks for the article. > >> > >>? ? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > >>? ? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > >>? ? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > >>? ? of practice in knowing). > >> > >>? ? > Two formulas: > >> > >>? ? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > >> > >>? ? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > >>? ? do not co-incide > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Action IS individual > >> > >>? ? > Practice IS a social category. > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > >>? ? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > >>? ? individual who are separate. > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > >>? ? They are alike in that both individual action & a > >>? ? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > I do not have the background to intelligently > >>? ? comment, but did register this theme as provocative > >>? ? FOR further thought and wording. > >> > >>? ? > And for generating intelligent commentary > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > From: Ivan Uemlianin > >> > >>? ? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > >> > >>? ? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > >>? ? > Cc: Alexander Surmava > >> > >>? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > Ivan > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > -- > >> > >>? ? > festina lente > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > >>? ? wrote: > >> > >>? ? >> > >> > >>? ? >> This article might prove of interest to those who > >>? ? have been discussing > >> > >>? ? >> LSV's sources in > >> > >>? ? >> marx and spinoza. > >> > >>? ? >> mike > >> > >>? ? >> > >> > >>? ? > > >> > >>? ? > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers. com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit. pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/ eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/ full > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 9 05:01:07 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 05:01:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times Message-ID: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> THIS IS DRAMATIC: This graph captures the depth of the crisis. The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of the planet?s population. Also... Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent living arrangement Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart that I?ve seen. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Wed Aug 9 05:38:19 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 15:38:19 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. Primarily in US and China. Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the current destructive mechanisms. Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will not survive after 21st century. 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of > the planet?s population. > > Also... > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single > occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a > single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent > living arrangement > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart > This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart > that I?ve seen. > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income- > inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- > europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Aug 9 06:30:48 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 13:30:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1502285448423.16543@iped.uio.no> Larry, it is beyond dramatic. It is so horrifying. Even more if one considers how that vertiginous runaway slope in the the 'very affluent' (what a considerate way of calling them) line resembles the one plotting the increase of CO2 in the atmosphere... Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 09 August 2017 14:01 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times THIS IS DRAMATIC: This graph captures the depth of the crisis. The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of the planet?s population. Also... Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent living arrangement Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart that I?ve seen. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From Peg.Griffin@att.net Wed Aug 9 06:42:45 2017 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 09:42:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <000001d31115$6294f130$27bed390$@att.net> Not quite sure where the information comes from about Canada, that says "single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement." Here's the recently published data that I have: http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/rt-td/fam-eng.cfm Selected geographical area: Canada Source: 2016 Census of Population One-person households (%) 28.2 Common-law couples (%) 21.3 Couples with children (%) 51.1 Young adults 20 to 34 living with their parents (%) 34.7 And here's an "infographic" page http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2017024-eng.htm PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 8:01 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times THIS IS DRAMATIC: This graph captures the depth of the crisis. The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of the planet?s population. Also... Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent living arrangement Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart that I?ve seen. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Aug 9 06:56:17 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 13:56:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com>, Message-ID: <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic (communist) society though. In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out there, xmca'ers, How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. Primarily in US and China. Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the current destructive mechanisms. Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will not survive after 21st century. 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of > the planet?s population. > > Also... > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single > occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a > single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent > living arrangement > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart > This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart > that I?ve seen. > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income- > inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- > europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Wed Aug 9 07:16:09 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 17:16:09 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: I think one of the immediate tasks for the salvation of human species from destruction is very much related with human development, thus with pedagogy. Capitalism at the beginning of the 21st century realized a serious attack to the consciousness and soul of man. I think this immediate task is to teach to man how to question current social reality within which s/he lives, to create, to sow awareness, to question and to enable men to question illusions. Capitalism is currently so far away from being able to answer clever questions. We should put clever questions before men. e.g. better socialism is not possible, you think or believe. But you think or believe, better capitalism is possible?! We need to educate people so that s/he does not nourish any illusions and hope about capitalism. If we succeed in this questioning, then, the next step will be easier, that socialism is a necessity for the future of humanity. That's why Fidel was saying to sow, to sow and to sow ideas and quoting from Jos? Marti; To be cultured is the unique way to be free. Independent minds from capitalism's way of thinking. To question also the conformist way of life in middle classes who poison the poor sections of working class ideologically. Thus: An anti capitalist pedagogy, I would like to propose. 9 A?u 2017 16:58 tarihinde "Alfredo Jornet Gil" yazd?: > Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is > another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic > (communist) society though. > > In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first > thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in > which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because > the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as > my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing > incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. > > Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education > faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most > faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I > think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly > collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly > checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my > research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal > audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my > temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels > pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out > there, xmca'ers, > > How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does > your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The > New York Times > > Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. > Primarily in US and China. > Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. > > I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by > mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the > current destructive mechanisms. > > Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is > incapable to carry over humanity. > > I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a > necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. > > Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will > not survive after 21st century. > > > > 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > > > > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half > of > > the planet?s population. > > > > Also... > > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single > > occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only > a > > single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent > > living arrangement > > > > > > > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart > > This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart > > that I?ve seen. > > > > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income- > > inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- > > europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 9 07:17:22 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 07:17:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes In-Reply-To: <000001d31115$6294f130$27bed390$@att.net> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <000001d31115$6294f130$27bed390$@att.net> Message-ID: <598b198c.842f620a.a67cc.ed32@mx.google.com> Peg, My info came from a small local newspaper referencing the census. Thanks for the clarification. I trust your figures. >From a different angle on this theme, and considering the largest North American cities such as New York or Vancouver, the statistics I have seenindicate 40% up to 50% in these metropolitan regions are dwelling types with a single occupant. So.... Focusing on trends over time, the increase in living alone (for multiple reasons) is on the rise in metropolitan regions and may be a signal of shifting values? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Peg Griffin Sent: August 9, 2017 6:45 AM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes Not quite sure where the information comes from about Canada, that says "single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement." Here's the recently published data that I have: http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/rt-td/fam-eng.cfm Selected geographical area: Canada Source: 2016 Census of Population One-person households (%) 28.2 Common-law couples (%) 21.3 Couples with children (%) 51.1 Young adults 20 to 34 living with their parents (%) 34.7 And here's an "infographic" page http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2017024-eng.htm PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 8:01 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times THIS IS DRAMATIC: This graph captures the depth of the crisis. The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of the planet?s population. Also... Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent living arrangement Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart that I?ve seen. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 9 07:48:01 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 07:48:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes In-Reply-To: <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com>, <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <598b2092.1c4f620a.5b147.01ec@mx.google.com> Alfredo, Taking the concept of (m?l?e) that Wolff-Michael presents, leaves me with a sense that nothing (no thing) is mono/Lithic everything is hybrid. If we create an image of (capitalism) being like cancer then looking to the trends in cancer research is to describe the hybrid nature of multiple types of cancers, each requiring differing responses. The concept (m?l?e) shows us a direction that rejects mono versions that posit closed determinate facts. When Wolff-Michael cautions the term (m?l?e) as proposed not to be taken as a mixture of products / elements but rather a flowing m?l?e of aspects... then creating human community is envisioned as both appropriating what has receded from view AND altering what was appropriated. In other words not overthrowing capitalism but seeing through capitalism as historically contingent. Then acting otherwise. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: August 9, 2017 6:58 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic (communist) society though. In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out there, xmca'ers, How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. Primarily in US and China. Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the current destructive mechanisms. Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will not survive after 21st century. 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of > the planet?s population. > > Also... > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single > occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a > single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent > living arrangement > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart > This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart > that I?ve seen. > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income- > inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- > europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Wed Aug 9 09:46:15 2017 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 16:46:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IE91ciBCcm9rZW4gRWNvbm9teSwgaW4gT25l?= =?utf-8?q?_Simple_Chart_-_The_New_York_Times?= In-Reply-To: <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <856722179.792210.1502297175924@mail.yahoo.com> Dear, Alfredo! Your joyless though courageousreflection sounds like something giving a hope. You are absolutely correct. The only thing we can really do is generatingtheoretic culture.? But we have to keep in mind, that theoretic culture can be falsified whereasmaterial culture - production of workers from all over the world - cannot.Hardly ever one will be sated with dummy or get warm from sham wool. Though, wecan easily deceive our students and pupils feeding them with false theoreticproducts. All this underlines the?enormous responsibility, which lies onour conscience.? Again, you are quite correct that we have to live and work inside substantiallycapitalist academic and educational institutions. Moreover, this system rejectsthose of us who slightly looks as a threat to this system. My own and now myson?s and colleague George biography is a perfect illustration of this fact. We give up too. Because we do believe that there is a real or virtual place were our ideas willbe appreciated as a modest contribution into our common struggle. Sasha ?????, 9 ??????? 2017 16:58 Alfredo Jornet Gil ?????(?): Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic (communist) society though. In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder:? 'how can I make my research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out there, xmca'ers, How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy,? ? ? in One Simple Chart - The New York Times Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. Primarily in US and China. Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the current destructive mechanisms. Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will not survive after 21st century. 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of > the planet?s population. > > Also... > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single > occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a > single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent > living arrangement > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart > This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart > that I?ve seen. > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income- > inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- > europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Aug 9 10:13:29 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 17:13:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes In-Reply-To: <598b2092.1c4f620a.5b147.01ec@mx.google.com> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com>, <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no>, <598b2092.1c4f620a.5b147.01ec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1502298809285.53913@iped.uio.no> Yes, Larry, what you say sounds right to me. Only that 'acting otherwise,' just as the concept you describe implies, cannot be acting on one's own. We need us! Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 09 August 2017 16:48 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes Alfredo, Taking the concept of (m?l?e) that Wolff-Michael presents, leaves me with a sense that nothing (no thing) is mono/Lithic everything is hybrid. If we create an image of (capitalism) being like cancer then looking to the trends in cancer research is to describe the hybrid nature of multiple types of cancers, each requiring differing responses. The concept (m?l?e) shows us a direction that rejects mono versions that posit closed determinate facts. When Wolff-Michael cautions the term (m?l?e) as proposed not to be taken as a mixture of products / elements but rather a flowing m?l?e of aspects... then creating human community is envisioned as both appropriating what has receded from view AND altering what was appropriated. In other words not overthrowing capitalism but seeing through capitalism as historically contingent. Then acting otherwise. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: August 9, 2017 6:58 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic (communist) society though. In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out there, xmca'ers, How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. Primarily in US and China. Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the current destructive mechanisms. Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will not survive after 21st century. 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of > the planet?s population. > > Also... > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single > occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a > single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent > living arrangement > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart > This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart > that I?ve seen. > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income- > inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- > europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Aug 9 10:15:37 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 17:15:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IE91ciBCcm9rZW4gRWNvbm9teSwgaW4g?= =?utf-8?q?One_Simple_Chart_-_The_New_York_Times?= In-Reply-To: <856722179.792210.1502297175924@mail.yahoo.com> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no>, <856722179.792210.1502297175924@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1502298937276.45484@iped.uio.no> Dear Sasha, that is such an unfortunate situation you undergo, but know that your ideas and contributions are very much appreciated in this community that is xmca. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexander Surmava Sent: 09 August 2017 18:46 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times Dear, Alfredo! Your joyless though courageousreflection sounds like something giving a hope. You are absolutely correct. The only thing we can really do is generatingtheoretic culture. But we have to keep in mind, that theoretic culture can be falsified whereasmaterial culture - production of workers from all over the world - cannot.Hardly ever one will be sated with dummy or get warm from sham wool. Though, wecan easily deceive our students and pupils feeding them with false theoreticproducts. All this underlines the enormous responsibility, which lies onour conscience. Again, you are quite correct that we have to live and work inside substantiallycapitalist academic and educational institutions. Moreover, this system rejectsthose of us who slightly looks as a threat to this system. My own and now myson?s and colleague George biography is a perfect illustration of this fact. We give up too. Because we do believe that there is a real or virtual place were our ideas willbe appreciated as a modest contribution into our common struggle. Sasha ?????, 9 ??????? 2017 16:58 Alfredo Jornet Gil ?????(?): Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic (communist) society though. In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out there, xmca'ers, How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. Primarily in US and China. Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the current destructive mechanisms. Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will not survive after 21st century. 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of > the planet?s population. > > Also... > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single > occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a > single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent > living arrangement > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart > This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart > that I?ve seen. > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income- > inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- > europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Aug 10 06:49:04 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2017 13:49:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes In-Reply-To: <598b198c.842f620a.a67cc.ed32@mx.google.com> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <000001d31115$6294f130$27bed390$@att.net> <598b198c.842f620a.a67cc.ed32@mx.google.com> Message-ID: The page that Peg pointed to seems to support Larry?s data: 28% one person households 26% couple with children 26% couple without children 9% lone parent family 4% non-faily household of two pr more 4% other family household 3% multi-generational household Martin > On Aug 9, 2017, at 9:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Peg, > My info came from a small local newspaper referencing the census. > Thanks for the clarification. I trust your figures. > >> From a different angle on this theme, and considering the largest North American cities such as New York or Vancouver, the statistics I have seenindicate 40% up to 50% in these metropolitan regions are dwelling types with a single occupant. > > So.... Focusing on trends over time, the increase in living alone (for multiple reasons) is on the rise in metropolitan regions and may be a signal of shifting values? > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Peg Griffin > Sent: August 9, 2017 6:45 AM > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes > > Not quite sure where the information comes from about Canada, that says "single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement." > Here's the recently published data that I have: > http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/rt-td/fam-eng.cfm > Selected geographical area: Canada Source: 2016 Census of Population > One-person households (%) 28.2 > Common-law couples (%) 21.3 > Couples with children (%) 51.1 > Young adults 20 to 34 living with their parents (%) 34.7 > And here's an "infographic" page > http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2017024-eng.htm > PG > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 8:01 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times > > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of the planet?s population. > > Also... > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent living arrangement > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart that I?ve seen. > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 10 07:29:56 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 00:29:56 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes In-Reply-To: References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <000001d31115$6294f130$27bed390$@att.net> <598b198c.842f620a.a67cc.ed32@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <314bb367-52fb-c1de-deae-c5d7845912c8@mira.net> or 14% single male households, 14% single female households 52% couples, Andy :) ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 10/08/2017 11:49 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > The page that Peg pointed to seems to support Larry?s data: > > 28% one person households > 26% couple with children > 26% couple without children > 9% lone parent family > 4% non-faily household of two pr more > 4% other family household > 3% multi-generational household > > Martin > >> On Aug 9, 2017, at 9:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Peg, >> My info came from a small local newspaper referencing the census. >> Thanks for the clarification. I trust your figures. >> >>> From a different angle on this theme, and considering the largest North American cities such as New York or Vancouver, the statistics I have seenindicate 40% up to 50% in these metropolitan regions are dwelling types with a single occupant. >> So.... Focusing on trends over time, the increase in living alone (for multiple reasons) is on the rise in metropolitan regions and may be a signal of shifting values? >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> From: Peg Griffin >> Sent: August 9, 2017 6:45 AM >> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes >> >> Not quite sure where the information comes from about Canada, that says "single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement." >> Here's the recently published data that I have: >> http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/rt-td/fam-eng.cfm >> Selected geographical area: Canada Source: 2016 Census of Population >> One-person households (%) 28.2 >> Common-law couples (%) 21.3 >> Couples with children (%) 51.1 >> Young adults 20 to 34 living with their parents (%) 34.7 >> And here's an "infographic" page >> http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2017024-eng.htm >> PG >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss >> Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 8:01 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times >> >> >> THIS IS DRAMATIC: >> >> This graph captures the depth of the crisis. >> >> The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of the planet?s population. >> >> Also... >> Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent living arrangement >> >> >> >> >> >> Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart that I?ve seen. >> >> >> https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Aug 10 07:49:49 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2017 07:49:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The NewYorkTimes In-Reply-To: References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <000001d31115$6294f130$27bed390$@att.net> <598b198c.842f620a.a67cc.ed32@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <598c72a7.01be630a.18287.1dba@mx.google.com> Martin, Peg, The interpretation depends on the (category) used and i recognize the data is aggregating all of Canada?s regions. If we focus on the 3 largest metro cities (Toronto, 6 million) (Montreal, 4 million) (Vancouver, 2.5 million) then the trend is clear. The historical trend towards increasing single occupancy residency in these 3 Canadian metro cities seems accurate. Not sure if this pattern is specific or more general? Also multiple reasons may be proposed but the trend seems significant? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Martin John Packer Sent: August 10, 2017 6:50 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The NewYorkTimes The page that Peg pointed to seems to support Larry?s data: 28% one person households 26% couple with children 26% couple without children 9% lone parent family 4% non-faily household of two pr more 4% other family household 3% multi-generational household Martin > On Aug 9, 2017, at 9:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Peg, > My info came from a small local newspaper referencing the census. > Thanks for the clarification. I trust your figures. > >> From a different angle on this theme, and considering the largest North American cities such as New York or Vancouver, the statistics I have seenindicate 40% up to 50% in these metropolitan regions are dwelling types with a single occupant. > > So.... Focusing on trends over time, the increase in living alone (for multiple reasons) is on the rise in metropolitan regions and may be a signal of shifting values? > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Peg Griffin > Sent: August 9, 2017 6:45 AM > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes > > Not quite sure where the information comes from about Canada, that says "single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement." > Here's the recently published data that I have: > http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/rt-td/fam-eng.cfm > Selected geographical area: Canada Source: 2016 Census of Population > One-person households (%) 28.2 > Common-law couples (%) 21.3 > Couples with children (%) 51.1 > Young adults 20 to 34 living with their parents (%) 34.7 > And here's an "infographic" page > http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2017024-eng.htm > PG > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 8:01 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times > > > THIS IS DRAMATIC: > > This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > > The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of the planet?s population. > > Also... > Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent living arrangement > > > > > > Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart that I?ve seen. > > > https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Thu Aug 10 16:22:59 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 06:22:59 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com>, <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <8BEB440F-3722-4DBF-BE6F-B07777B8C308@gmail.com> Hello -- This message from Alfredo struck me as especially vivid and typical of teaching in higher education today. It's that moment of getting back to work in the morning and facing afresh the question, "How can I make my research useful to the human cause?" in the face of the crowd of interests, powers and constraints that condition the response to the question - that moment is familiar to so many people! Including the need to find new jobs, over and over. Joe and I are now in Viet Nam at Ton Duc Thang University. This is the second time we've come, to teach in the Faculty of Trade Unions and Labor Relations. Like a lot of universities all over the world, it is tooling up to teach in English and become "ranked." One aspect of this is publishing. Faculty are being encouraged (you might say pressured very hard) to publish in journals on certain ranking lists. Success will be rewarded with cash (value of a couple of thousand dollars per article). This is not support for research -- it's pay for research. Joe and I are going to convene and mentor a "research group" and talk about how to get published. The enthusiasm for getting in on this bandwagon is palpable. I'm not kidding. They are highly motivated to do it. But they are not asking "How can I make my research useful to the human cause?" Joe and I are going to have to tool our mentoring to put Alfredo's question into the picture. Alfredo's snapshot of him sitting at the start of a work day is like a message from the future. I too would like to hear what the ISCAR community has to say. Thanks -- Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Aug 9, 2017, at 8:56 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic (communist) society though. > > In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. > > Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out there, xmca'ers, > > How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il > Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times > > Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. > Primarily in US and China. > Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. > > I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by > mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the > current destructive mechanisms. > > Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is > incapable to carry over humanity. > > I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a > necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. > > Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will > not survive after 21st century. > > > > 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > >> >> THIS IS DRAMATIC: >> >> This graph captures the depth of the crisis. >> >> The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of >> the planet?s population. >> >> Also... >> Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single >> occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a >> single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent >> living arrangement >> >> >> >> >> >> Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart >> This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart >> that I?ve seen. >> >> >> https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income- >> inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- >> europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Aug 10 18:45:55 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 01:45:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes In-Reply-To: <314bb367-52fb-c1de-deae-c5d7845912c8@mira.net> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <000001d31115$6294f130$27bed390$@att.net> <598b198c.842f620a.a67cc.ed32@mx.google.com> <314bb367-52fb-c1de-deae-c5d7845912c8@mira.net> Message-ID: <56F9CC82-2CC0-4A6B-84D4-03182FDED95E@uniandes.edu.co> Good point! > On Aug 10, 2017, at 9:29 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > or 14% single male households, > 14% single female households > 52% couples, > > Andy :) > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 10/08/2017 11:49 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> The page that Peg pointed to seems to support Larry?s data: >> >> 28% one person households >> 26% couple with children >> 26% couple without children >> 9% lone parent family >> 4% non-faily household of two pr more >> 4% other family household >> 3% multi-generational household >> >> Martin >> >>> On Aug 9, 2017, at 9:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Peg, >>> My info came from a small local newspaper referencing the census. >>> Thanks for the clarification. I trust your figures. >>> >>>> From a different angle on this theme, and considering the largest North American cities such as New York or Vancouver, the statistics I have seenindicate 40% up to 50% in these metropolitan regions are dwelling types with a single occupant. >>> So.... Focusing on trends over time, the increase in living alone (for multiple reasons) is on the rise in metropolitan regions and may be a signal of shifting values? >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> From: Peg Griffin >>> Sent: August 9, 2017 6:45 AM >>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes >>> >>> Not quite sure where the information comes from about Canada, that says "single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement." >>> Here's the recently published data that I have: >>> http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/rt-td/fam-eng.cfm >>> Selected geographical area: Canada Source: 2016 Census of Population >>> One-person households (%) 28.2 >>> Common-law couples (%) 21.3 >>> Couples with children (%) 51.1 >>> Young adults 20 to 34 living with their parents (%) 34.7 >>> And here's an "infographic" page >>> http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2017024-eng.htm >>> PG >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss >>> Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 8:01 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times >>> >>> >>> THIS IS DRAMATIC: >>> >>> This graph captures the depth of the crisis. >>> >>> The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half of the planet?s population. >>> >>> Also... >>> Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. Only a single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent living arrangement >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart that I?ve seen. >>> >>> >>> https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Aug 10 22:29:01 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2017 23:29:01 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: <8BEB440F-3722-4DBF-BE6F-B07777B8C308@gmail.com> References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> <8BEB440F-3722-4DBF-BE6F-B07777B8C308@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helena, Do you think that it would be possible to do both? Or is that a Faustian bargain? -greg On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hello -- > > This message from Alfredo struck me as especially vivid and typical of > teaching in higher education today. It's that moment of getting back to > work in the morning and facing afresh the question, "How can I make my > research useful to the human cause?" in the face of the crowd of interests, > powers and constraints that condition the response to the question - that > moment is familiar to so many people! Including the need to find new jobs, > over and over. > > Joe and I are now in Viet Nam at Ton Duc Thang University. This is the > second time we've come, to teach in the Faculty of Trade Unions and Labor > Relations. Like a lot of universities all over the world, it is tooling up > to teach in English and become "ranked." One aspect of this is publishing. > Faculty are being encouraged (you might say pressured very hard) to publish > in journals on certain ranking lists. Success will be rewarded with cash > (value of a couple of thousand dollars per article). This is not support > for research -- it's pay for research. Joe and I are going to convene and > mentor a "research group" and talk about how to get published. The > enthusiasm for getting in on this bandwagon is palpable. I'm not kidding. > They are highly motivated to do it. But they are not asking "How can I make > my research useful to the human cause?" > > Joe and I are going to have to tool our mentoring to put Alfredo's > question into the picture. > > Alfredo's snapshot of him sitting at the start of a work day is like a > message from the future. I too would like to hear what the ISCAR community > has to say. > > Thanks -- Helena > > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Aug 9, 2017, at 8:56 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is > another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic > (communist) society though. > > > > In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first > thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in > which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because > the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as > my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing > incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. > > > > Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education > faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most > faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I > think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly > collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly > checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my > research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal > audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my > temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels > pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out > there, xmca'ers, > > > > How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does > your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > > Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - > The New York Times > > > > Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. > > Primarily in US and China. > > Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. > > > > I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by > > mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the > > current destructive mechanisms. > > > > Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is > > incapable to carry over humanity. > > > > I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a > > necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. > > > > Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will > > not survive after 21st century. > > > > > > > > 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: > > > >> > >> THIS IS DRAMATIC: > >> > >> This graph captures the depth of the crisis. > >> > >> The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half > of > >> the planet?s population. > >> > >> Also... > >> Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single > >> occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. > Only a > >> single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent > >> living arrangement > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart > >> This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart > >> that I?ve seen. > >> > >> > >> https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/ > opinion/leonhardt-income- > >> inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- > >> europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 > >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Aug 11 01:33:11 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 15:33:11 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> <8BEB440F-3722-4DBF-BE6F-B07777B8C308@gmail.com> Message-ID: Greg - Theoretically impossible; happens all the time, however. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Aug 11, 2017, at 12:29 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Helena, > Do you think that it would be possible to do both? Or is that a Faustian > bargain? > -greg > > On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> Hello -- >> >> This message from Alfredo struck me as especially vivid and typical of >> teaching in higher education today. It's that moment of getting back to >> work in the morning and facing afresh the question, "How can I make my >> research useful to the human cause?" in the face of the crowd of interests, >> powers and constraints that condition the response to the question - that >> moment is familiar to so many people! Including the need to find new jobs, >> over and over. >> >> Joe and I are now in Viet Nam at Ton Duc Thang University. This is the >> second time we've come, to teach in the Faculty of Trade Unions and Labor >> Relations. Like a lot of universities all over the world, it is tooling up >> to teach in English and become "ranked." One aspect of this is publishing. >> Faculty are being encouraged (you might say pressured very hard) to publish >> in journals on certain ranking lists. Success will be rewarded with cash >> (value of a couple of thousand dollars per article). This is not support >> for research -- it's pay for research. Joe and I are going to convene and >> mentor a "research group" and talk about how to get published. The >> enthusiasm for getting in on this bandwagon is palpable. I'm not kidding. >> They are highly motivated to do it. But they are not asking "How can I make >> my research useful to the human cause?" >> >> Joe and I are going to have to tool our mentoring to put Alfredo's >> question into the picture. >> >> Alfredo's snapshot of him sitting at the start of a work day is like a >> message from the future. I too would like to hear what the ISCAR community >> has to say. >> >> Thanks -- Helena >> >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Aug 9, 2017, at 8:56 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >>> Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is >> another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic >> (communist) society though. >>> >>> In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first >> thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in >> which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because >> the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as >> my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing >> incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. >>> >>> Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education >> faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most >> faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I >> think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly >> collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly >> checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my >> research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal >> audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my >> temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels >> pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out >> there, xmca'ers, >>> >>> How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does >> your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? >>> >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Ulvi ??il >>> Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - >> The New York Times >>> >>> Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. >>> Primarily in US and China. >>> Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. >>> >>> I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by >>> mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the >>> current destructive mechanisms. >>> >>> Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is >>> incapable to carry over humanity. >>> >>> I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a >>> necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. >>> >>> Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will >>> not survive after 21st century. >>> >>> >>> >>> 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: >>> >>>> >>>> THIS IS DRAMATIC: >>>> >>>> This graph captures the depth of the crisis. >>>> >>>> The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half >> of >>>> the planet?s population. >>>> >>>> Also... >>>> Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single >>>> occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. >> Only a >>>> single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent >>>> living arrangement >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart >>>> This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart >>>> that I?ve seen. >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/ >> opinion/leonhardt-income- >>>> inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- >>>> europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Aug 11 02:12:51 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 09:12:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times In-Reply-To: References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> <8BEB440F-3722-4DBF-BE6F-B07777B8C308@gmail.com> , Message-ID: <1502442772721.92202@iped.uio.no> Good luck with your task at Ton Duc Thang University, Helena, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen Sent: 11 August 2017 10:33 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New York Times Greg - Theoretically impossible; happens all the time, however. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Aug 11, 2017, at 12:29 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Helena, > Do you think that it would be possible to do both? Or is that a Faustian > bargain? > -greg > > On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> Hello -- >> >> This message from Alfredo struck me as especially vivid and typical of >> teaching in higher education today. It's that moment of getting back to >> work in the morning and facing afresh the question, "How can I make my >> research useful to the human cause?" in the face of the crowd of interests, >> powers and constraints that condition the response to the question - that >> moment is familiar to so many people! Including the need to find new jobs, >> over and over. >> >> Joe and I are now in Viet Nam at Ton Duc Thang University. This is the >> second time we've come, to teach in the Faculty of Trade Unions and Labor >> Relations. Like a lot of universities all over the world, it is tooling up >> to teach in English and become "ranked." One aspect of this is publishing. >> Faculty are being encouraged (you might say pressured very hard) to publish >> in journals on certain ranking lists. Success will be rewarded with cash >> (value of a couple of thousand dollars per article). This is not support >> for research -- it's pay for research. Joe and I are going to convene and >> mentor a "research group" and talk about how to get published. The >> enthusiasm for getting in on this bandwagon is palpable. I'm not kidding. >> They are highly motivated to do it. But they are not asking "How can I make >> my research useful to the human cause?" >> >> Joe and I are going to have to tool our mentoring to put Alfredo's >> question into the picture. >> >> Alfredo's snapshot of him sitting at the start of a work day is like a >> message from the future. I too would like to hear what the ISCAR community >> has to say. >> >> Thanks -- Helena >> >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Aug 9, 2017, at 8:56 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >>> Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is >> another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic >> (communist) society though. >>> >>> In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first >> thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in >> which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because >> the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as >> my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing >> incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. >>> >>> Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education >> faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most >> faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I >> think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly >> collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly >> checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my >> research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal >> audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my >> temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels >> pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out >> there, xmca'ers, >>> >>> How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does >> your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? >>> >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Ulvi ??il >>> Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - >> The New York Times >>> >>> Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. >>> Primarily in US and China. >>> Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. >>> >>> I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by >>> mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the >>> current destructive mechanisms. >>> >>> Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is >>> incapable to carry over humanity. >>> >>> I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a >>> necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. >>> >>> Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will >>> not survive after 21st century. >>> >>> >>> >>> 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: >>> >>>> >>>> THIS IS DRAMATIC: >>>> >>>> This graph captures the depth of the crisis. >>>> >>>> The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half >> of >>>> the planet?s population. >>>> >>>> Also... >>>> Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single >>>> occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. >> Only a >>>> single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent >>>> living arrangement >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart >>>> This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart >>>> that I?ve seen. >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/ >> opinion/leonhardt-income- >>>> inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- >>>> europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Aug 11 09:19:09 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 09:19:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes In-Reply-To: References: <598af985.8a70620a.32657.0464@mx.google.com> <1502286977090.49528@iped.uio.no> <8BEB440F-3722-4DBF-BE6F-B07777B8C308@gmail.com> Message-ID: <598dd917.056b630a.741aa.3a27@mx.google.com> Helena and others engaged with this question of what is impossible leading to mis-steps or mis-takes and what is possible. What does this impossibility of theory say or indicate (about) theory? Is there some other aspect of humanity (not theory) that IS generating possibility of nurturing humanity? Possibility becoming actually Helena says, is happening ALL the time (within time) Seems to indicate no aspect of our current situation is total or mono (...) All the time small groups are creating (beach heads) generating human relations that are otherwise than commonly currently instituted. If possibility of humanity is not occurring within the vehicle of theoretical con / structures then being / becoming human may actually order, (organize) our human (causes) otherwise. Hybrid melees (flows not mixtures) being one approach (aspect) to seriously consider. Wolff-Michael?s exemplary article articulating this immanent flow form approach is worth deeper consideration as a (marriage) of personal historicity with institutional historicity. The (melee) process does not overthrow or overcome monolithic totality as such, but Rather indicates a process of utterances that are (seeing through) monolithic totalities to their historical imaginal actuality emerging within particular here and now (orders). Grist for the mill Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Helena Worthen Sent: August 11, 2017 1:35 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - The New YorkTimes Greg - Theoretically impossible; happens all the time, however. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Aug 11, 2017, at 12:29 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Helena, > Do you think that it would be possible to do both? Or is that a Faustian > bargain? > -greg > > On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> Hello -- >> >> This message from Alfredo struck me as especially vivid and typical of >> teaching in higher education today. It's that moment of getting back to >> work in the morning and facing afresh the question, "How can I make my >> research useful to the human cause?" in the face of the crowd of interests, >> powers and constraints that condition the response to the question - that >> moment is familiar to so many people! Including the need to find new jobs, >> over and over. >> >> Joe and I are now in Viet Nam at Ton Duc Thang University. This is the >> second time we've come, to teach in the Faculty of Trade Unions and Labor >> Relations. Like a lot of universities all over the world, it is tooling up >> to teach in English and become "ranked." One aspect of this is publishing. >> Faculty are being encouraged (you might say pressured very hard) to publish >> in journals on certain ranking lists. Success will be rewarded with cash >> (value of a couple of thousand dollars per article). This is not support >> for research -- it's pay for research. Joe and I are going to convene and >> mentor a "research group" and talk about how to get published. The >> enthusiasm for getting in on this bandwagon is palpable. I'm not kidding. >> They are highly motivated to do it. But they are not asking "How can I make >> my research useful to the human cause?" >> >> Joe and I are going to have to tool our mentoring to put Alfredo's >> question into the picture. >> >> Alfredo's snapshot of him sitting at the start of a work day is like a >> message from the future. I too would like to hear what the ISCAR community >> has to say. >> >> Thanks -- Helena >> >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Aug 9, 2017, at 8:56 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >>> Capitalism is incapable to carry over humanity. The other way around is >> another story, I guess. I do wish we could attain a true democratic >> (communist) society though. >>> >>> In any case, I often wonder what WE, each one of us, can do. The first >> thing I come up with, and not surprisingly because that's the field in >> which I work, is pedagogy. On the one hand, it is a contradiction, because >> the whole of pedagogy, as institutionalised field (I mean, as faculties, as >> my temporary salary, as the pursuing and achievement of publishing >> incentives, etc...), it wholly belongs to Capitalism. >>> >>> Yet, judging by the level of involvement and engagement that education >> faculties show, it seems to me that the notion of pedagogy that most >> faculty members hold is that our field is about learning, when in fact I >> think it is about generating culture. I sit every day with my freshly >> collected data at a small independent school and wonder, having briefly >> checked the discouraging world news, and I wonder: 'how can I make my >> research useful to the human cause?' But then I need to address journal >> audiences, the motives that got me the funding for my research, my >> temporary contract and the need to find a new job soon... and one feels >> pretty hopeless. I don't give up, though. It feels good having you all out >> there, xmca'ers, >>> >>> How does, e.g., the ISCAR community stands for these matters? How does >> your respective faculties/institutions stand for this? >>> >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Ulvi ??il >>> Sent: 09 August 2017 14:38 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart - >> The New York Times >>> >>> Capitalism should be destroyed urgently. >>> Primarily in US and China. >>> Otherwise, it will destroy humanity even without wars. >>> >>> I wonder if anyone is able to claim that human species can be saved by >>> mechanisms belonging to capitalism which is itself the very owner of the >>> current destructive mechanisms. >>> >>> Like it or not, communist society is the unique exit. Capitalism is >>> incapable to carry over humanity. >>> >>> I do not believe communism is inevitable but I think that communism is a >>> necessity to save human species. This is a scientific truth. >>> >>> Otherwise, we are the final generations of our species and humanity will >>> not survive after 21st century. >>> >>> >>> >>> 9 A?u 2017 15:03 tarihinde "Larry Purss" yazd?: >>> >>>> >>>> THIS IS DRAMATIC: >>>> >>>> This graph captures the depth of the crisis. >>>> >>>> The 8 richest people in the world have more wealth than the bottom half >> of >>>> the planet?s population. >>>> >>>> Also... >>>> Canada?s latest census also documents that for the first time single >>>> occupancy residency is now the dominant form of living arrangement. >> Only a >>>> single person in each apartment or townhouse is now the most prominent >>>> living arrangement >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart >>>> This chart captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart >>>> that I?ve seen. >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/ >> opinion/leonhardt-income- >>>> inequality.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170809&nl=morning-briefing- >>>> europe&nlid=69072237&te=1 >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Wed Aug 9 03:18:38 2017 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 10:18:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] JoLLE Call for manuscripts Message-ID: [https://s.smore.com/ss/5989109ea3566802cfed4792-screenshot-fb_wide.jpg?_v=1502155708] JoLLE Call for Manuscripts www.smore.com JoLLE Call for Manuscripts Have you been busy writing this summer? Are you wondering where you can send your literacy and language... From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Aug 13 07:12:57 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 13 Aug 2017 14:12:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Please, share this information In-Reply-To: <1502630558.594496162@f433.i.mail.ru> References: <1502630558.594496162@f433.i.mail.ru> Message-ID: For those who can make the trip. ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Janna Glozman Date: Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 9:23 AM Subject: Please, share this information To: mcole , Carla Anauate , Bella Kotik-Friedgut , Alfredo Ardila < ardilaalfredo@gmail.com>, Bo?ydar Kaczmarek , Nikolai.veresov , Joaquim Quintino Aires < quintino.aires@gmail.com>, Jordi Pe?a Casanova (18575) < jpcasanova@parcdesalutmar.cat>, Yulia Solovieva < yulia.solovieva@correo.buap.mx>, Antonio Puente , Neuropsychologia23 , Mark Leikin < markl@construct.haifa.ac.il>, Liudmila Liutsko , Theophilus Lazarus -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ??????? eng..docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 1805669 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170813/65b17c83/attachment-0001.bin From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 13 07:19:58 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 13 Aug 2017 14:19:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Please, share this information In-Reply-To: References: <1502630558.594496162@f433.i.mail.ru>, Message-ID: <1502634000977.35841@iped.uio.no> Thanks mike. The text mentions 'The participants of the Congress' and directs us to the website of the congress, but which congress is this and what is the website? Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 13 August 2017 16:12 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Please, share this information For those who can make the trip. ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Janna Glozman Date: Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 9:23 AM Subject: Please, share this information To: mcole , Carla Anauate , Bella Kotik-Friedgut , Alfredo Ardila < ardilaalfredo@gmail.com>, Bo?ydar Kaczmarek , Nikolai.veresov , Joaquim Quintino Aires < quintino.aires@gmail.com>, Jordi Pe?a Casanova (18575) < jpcasanova@parcdesalutmar.cat>, Yulia Solovieva < yulia.solovieva@correo.buap.mx>, Antonio Puente , Neuropsychologia23 , Mark Leikin < markl@construct.haifa.ac.il>, Liudmila Liutsko , Theophilus Lazarus From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Aug 13 08:29:20 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 13 Aug 2017 15:29:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Please, share this information In-Reply-To: <1502634000977.35841@iped.uio.no> References: <1502630558.594496162@f433.i.mail.ru> <1502634000977.35841@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi Alfredo I apologize for any obscurity. An announcement of a conference dedicated to the work of Alexander Luria was sent to xmca a while back, and this is a supplemental. I will try to find the original. Perhaps Janna can forward her original message. Mike On Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 10:21 AM Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks mike. The text mentions 'The participants of the Congress' and > directs us to the website of the congress, but which congress is this and > what is the website? > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: 13 August 2017 16:12 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Please, share this information > > For those who can make the trip. > > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: Janna Glozman > Date: Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 9:23 AM > Subject: Please, share this information > To: mcole , Carla Anauate , Bella > Kotik-Friedgut , Alfredo Ardila < > ardilaalfredo@gmail.com>, Bo?ydar Kaczmarek , > Nikolai.veresov , Joaquim Quintino Aires < > quintino.aires@gmail.com>, Jordi Pe?a Casanova (18575) < > jpcasanova@parcdesalutmar.cat>, Yulia Solovieva < > yulia.solovieva@correo.buap.mx>, Antonio Puente , > Neuropsychologia23 , Mark Leikin < > markl@construct.haifa.ac.il>, Liudmila Liutsko >, > Theophilus Lazarus > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 13 09:02:32 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 13 Aug 2017 16:02:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Please, share this information In-Reply-To: References: <1502630558.594496162@f433.i.mail.ru> <1502634000977.35841@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1502640155610.40196@iped.uio.no> no worries, I found it, here it is: http://luria-congress.urfu.ru/ Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 13 August 2017 17:29 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; glozman@mail.ru Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Please, share this information Hi Alfredo I apologize for any obscurity. An announcement of a conference dedicated to the work of Alexander Luria was sent to xmca a while back, and this is a supplemental. I will try to find the original. Perhaps Janna can forward her original message. Mike On Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 10:21 AM Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks mike. The text mentions 'The participants of the Congress' and > directs us to the website of the congress, but which congress is this and > what is the website? > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: 13 August 2017 16:12 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Please, share this information > > For those who can make the trip. > > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: Janna Glozman > Date: Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 9:23 AM > Subject: Please, share this information > To: mcole , Carla Anauate , Bella > Kotik-Friedgut , Alfredo Ardila < > ardilaalfredo@gmail.com>, Bo?ydar Kaczmarek , > Nikolai.veresov , Joaquim Quintino Aires < > quintino.aires@gmail.com>, Jordi Pe?a Casanova (18575) < > jpcasanova@parcdesalutmar.cat>, Yulia Solovieva < > yulia.solovieva@correo.buap.mx>, Antonio Puente , > Neuropsychologia23 , Mark Leikin < > markl@construct.haifa.ac.il>, Liudmila Liutsko >, > Theophilus Lazarus > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Aug 13 18:51:53 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2017 11:51:53 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Please, share this information In-Reply-To: <1502640155610.40196@iped.uio.no> References: <1502630558.594496162@f433.i.mail.ru> <1502634000977.35841@iped.uio.no> <1502640155610.40196@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: A propos! There is also going to be a symposium on Vygotsky and Bruner in Geneva in 20-22 June 2018 for Francophone Vygotskyans. See the attached. This is the seventh symposium--previous ones have all been around the publication of Vygotsky's works in French: Pensee et langage: 1997 Conscience, inconscient, emotions (2003). Psychologie de l'art (2005) La signification historique de la crise en psychologie (2010) Lecons de psychologie (2011) Histoire du development des fonctions psychiques superieures (2012). Several of them have produced very interesting edited compilations. Clot, Y. (direction) 2009 Avec Vygotski. Paris: La Dispute. Clot, Y. (direction) 2012 Vygotski maintenant. Paris: La Dispute. This one will include discussion of the pedology. A paraitre! David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 2:02 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > no worries, I found it, here it is: > > http://luria-congress.urfu.ru/ > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: 13 August 2017 17:29 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; glozman@mail.ru > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Please, share this information > > Hi Alfredo > > I apologize for any obscurity. An announcement of a conference dedicated to > the work of Alexander Luria was sent to xmca a while back, and this is a > supplemental. I will try to find the original. Perhaps Janna can forward > her original message. > Mike > > On Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 10:21 AM Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Thanks mike. The text mentions 'The participants of the Congress' and > > directs us to the website of the congress, but which congress is this and > > what is the website? > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of mike cole > > Sent: 13 August 2017 16:12 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Please, share this information > > > > For those who can make the trip. > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > > From: Janna Glozman > > Date: Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 9:23 AM > > Subject: Please, share this information > > To: mcole , Carla Anauate , Bella > > Kotik-Friedgut , Alfredo Ardila < > > ardilaalfredo@gmail.com>, Bo?ydar Kaczmarek , > > Nikolai.veresov , Joaquim Quintino Aires < > > quintino.aires@gmail.com>, Jordi Pe?a Casanova (18575) < > > jpcasanova@parcdesalutmar.cat>, Yulia Solovieva < > > yulia.solovieva@correo.buap.mx>, Antonio Puente , > > Neuropsychologia23 , Mark Leikin < > > markl@construct.haifa.ac.il>, Liudmila Liutsko < > liudmila_liutsko@yahoo.es > > >, > > Theophilus Lazarus > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Annonce_Fiche_SIV2018.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 108294 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170814/d9e163e8/attachment.pdf From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Aug 15 15:48:25 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 07:48:25 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Heart of Romantic Science Message-ID: In Melbourne, here in Australia, there is a stone cottage in the gardens of the treasury where the first huge gold deposits were winkled from the miners (by way of licencing fees) and kept. It's a very small cottage--just a sitting room and a bedroom on top of each other, like a two-storey, two-room flat in a modern housing project, except that there is a stable attached where animals lived cheek by jowl with human neighbors. It is not a replica--it's the exact house where Captain James Cook lived as little boy, bought up by the city of Melbourne for reasons better understood by Australians, and transported, stone by stone, from rural Yorkshire in England, about a century and a half after the man himself had set foot on Australia. Cook was a man a bit above his class (not much, because the glass ceiling for the son of an agricultural laborer was thick and low) and a bit ahead of his timet: his ideas about anthropology were an unstable emulsion of Rousseau and rationalism, and his erratic behavior to the more realist Hawaiians eventually cost him his life. But there were two ways in which he far outstripped his age, and perhaps they are both worth thinking about as we go to Quebec City for ISCAR, because that was where his breakthrough to romantic science really occurred. It was on the banks of the Saint Lawrence, during the "Guerre de Sept Ans" (the French and Indian War, for Americans), that Cook learned to use a plane table: to take two known distances with exact precision, and compute, using the angle between them and a bit of basic trig, the third segment of the triangle. He then freehanded the third segment and obtained a map of the approaches to Quebec City. Unlike rigorously surveyed maps and unlike purely freehanded maps, this one could be made as rigorous or as free as you liked, and that's what made it possible for Cook to jiffy-chart the "traversee" leading to Quebec City and to jerry-rig, overnight, a system of moored lifeboats to show the way for British man o' wars. This is actually quite similar to what we do in a lot of romantic science, including in text analysis. Say, for example, you want to understand how capitalism has, in our time, managed to produce an education system that enables working class navy men like Cook to operate a gun and even a plane table but somehow disables comprehension of the Communist Manifesto. Using a system-network, you can show the exact choices made by the author of the operating manual and the authors of the manifesto to any degree of delicacy you choose (clause type, indicative type, declarative type, process type, etc.) and derive the semantics and then the context from that. You can also "freehand" it by working backwards, from the context to the semantics to the lexicogrammar. It seems to me that it's THIS combination of rigor and freehanding, of verbal science and verbal art, that is the real heart of a romantic science, not some unsteady amalgam of Rousseau and rationalism. And when we bring this resource to bear upon our two texts, we find what Ruqaiya Hasan found: the difference between the operating manual and the manifesto lies not so much with the lexico-grammar as with what Bernstein called the semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation of the speaker towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards his or her context of culture. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Aug 16 04:15:57 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 11:15:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1502882159837.44658@iped.uio.no> Really interesting, David. I wonder what romantic science looks like for us who drew our way to Quebec using Google Flights. I am afraid one might find that there is neither rigour nor freehand in the google operation... which may have quite worrying implications if one considers digital technology at the service of capitalism. I was very interested in Hasan's remarks on psychological orientation; would you direct us to a particular text or fragment to get more of that? Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 16 August 2017 00:48 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] The Heart of Romantic Science In Melbourne, here in Australia, there is a stone cottage in the gardens of the treasury where the first huge gold deposits were winkled from the miners (by way of licencing fees) and kept. It's a very small cottage--just a sitting room and a bedroom on top of each other, like a two-storey, two-room flat in a modern housing project, except that there is a stable attached where animals lived cheek by jowl with human neighbors. It is not a replica--it's the exact house where Captain James Cook lived as little boy, bought up by the city of Melbourne for reasons better understood by Australians, and transported, stone by stone, from rural Yorkshire in England, about a century and a half after the man himself had set foot on Australia. Cook was a man a bit above his class (not much, because the glass ceiling for the son of an agricultural laborer was thick and low) and a bit ahead of his timet: his ideas about anthropology were an unstable emulsion of Rousseau and rationalism, and his erratic behavior to the more realist Hawaiians eventually cost him his life. But there were two ways in which he far outstripped his age, and perhaps they are both worth thinking about as we go to Quebec City for ISCAR, because that was where his breakthrough to romantic science really occurred. It was on the banks of the Saint Lawrence, during the "Guerre de Sept Ans" (the French and Indian War, for Americans), that Cook learned to use a plane table: to take two known distances with exact precision, and compute, using the angle between them and a bit of basic trig, the third segment of the triangle. He then freehanded the third segment and obtained a map of the approaches to Quebec City. Unlike rigorously surveyed maps and unlike purely freehanded maps, this one could be made as rigorous or as free as you liked, and that's what made it possible for Cook to jiffy-chart the "traversee" leading to Quebec City and to jerry-rig, overnight, a system of moored lifeboats to show the way for British man o' wars. This is actually quite similar to what we do in a lot of romantic science, including in text analysis. Say, for example, you want to understand how capitalism has, in our time, managed to produce an education system that enables working class navy men like Cook to operate a gun and even a plane table but somehow disables comprehension of the Communist Manifesto. Using a system-network, you can show the exact choices made by the author of the operating manual and the authors of the manifesto to any degree of delicacy you choose (clause type, indicative type, declarative type, process type, etc.) and derive the semantics and then the context from that. You can also "freehand" it by working backwards, from the context to the semantics to the lexicogrammar. It seems to me that it's THIS combination of rigor and freehanding, of verbal science and verbal art, that is the real heart of a romantic science, not some unsteady amalgam of Rousseau and rationalism. And when we bring this resource to bear upon our two texts, we find what Ruqaiya Hasan found: the difference between the operating manual and the manifesto lies not so much with the lexico-grammar as with what Bernstein called the semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation of the speaker towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards his or her context of culture. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 16 05:42:49 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 05:42:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science In-Reply-To: <1502882159837.44658@iped.uio.no> References: <1502882159837.44658@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <59943dca.49ce620a.5103c.35f8@mx.google.com> David, Very powerful particular example of how Cook used a combination of rigor and freehanding :: the heart of a romantic science. Leading to ... semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation [the psychological orientation *being* the semantic code orientation] of the speaker towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards his or her context of culture. Offering us this *key* Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: August 16, 2017 4:18 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science Really interesting, David. I wonder what romantic science looks like for us who drew our way to Quebec using Google Flights. I am afraid one might find that there is neither rigour nor freehand in the google operation... which may have quite worrying implications if one considers digital technology at the service of capitalism. I was very interested in Hasan's remarks on psychological orientation; would you direct us to a particular text or fragment to get more of that? Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 16 August 2017 00:48 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] The Heart of Romantic Science In Melbourne, here in Australia, there is a stone cottage in the gardens of the treasury where the first huge gold deposits were winkled from the miners (by way of licencing fees) and kept. It's a very small cottage--just a sitting room and a bedroom on top of each other, like a two-storey, two-room flat in a modern housing project, except that there is a stable attached where animals lived cheek by jowl with human neighbors. It is not a replica--it's the exact house where Captain James Cook lived as little boy, bought up by the city of Melbourne for reasons better understood by Australians, and transported, stone by stone, from rural Yorkshire in England, about a century and a half after the man himself had set foot on Australia. Cook was a man a bit above his class (not much, because the glass ceiling for the son of an agricultural laborer was thick and low) and a bit ahead of his timet: his ideas about anthropology were an unstable emulsion of Rousseau and rationalism, and his erratic behavior to the more realist Hawaiians eventually cost him his life. But there were two ways in which he far outstripped his age, and perhaps they are both worth thinking about as we go to Quebec City for ISCAR, because that was where his breakthrough to romantic science really occurred. It was on the banks of the Saint Lawrence, during the "Guerre de Sept Ans" (the French and Indian War, for Americans), that Cook learned to use a plane table: to take two known distances with exact precision, and compute, using the angle between them and a bit of basic trig, the third segment of the triangle. He then freehanded the third segment and obtained a map of the approaches to Quebec City. Unlike rigorously surveyed maps and unlike purely freehanded maps, this one could be made as rigorous or as free as you liked, and that's what made it possible for Cook to jiffy-chart the "traversee" leading to Quebec City and to jerry-rig, overnight, a system of moored lifeboats to show the way for British man o' wars. This is actually quite similar to what we do in a lot of romantic science, including in text analysis. Say, for example, you want to understand how capitalism has, in our time, managed to produce an education system that enables working class navy men like Cook to operate a gun and even a plane table but somehow disables comprehension of the Communist Manifesto. Using a system-network, you can show the exact choices made by the author of the operating manual and the authors of the manifesto to any degree of delicacy you choose (clause type, indicative type, declarative type, process type, etc.) and derive the semantics and then the context from that. You can also "freehand" it by working backwards, from the context to the semantics to the lexicogrammar. It seems to me that it's THIS combination of rigor and freehanding, of verbal science and verbal art, that is the real heart of a romantic science, not some unsteady amalgam of Rousseau and rationalism. And when we bring this resource to bear upon our two texts, we find what Ruqaiya Hasan found: the difference between the operating manual and the manifesto lies not so much with the lexico-grammar as with what Bernstein called the semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation of the speaker towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards his or her context of culture. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Aug 16 18:11:56 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 11:11:56 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science In-Reply-To: <59943dca.49ce620a.5103c.35f8@mx.google.com> References: <1502882159837.44658@iped.uio.no> <59943dca.49ce620a.5103c.35f8@mx.google.com> Message-ID: One of the songs Cook's men must have sung here in Australia is ?Heart of Oak? (the hard center of the oak tree that keels were made of). In 1760, it was part of an opera penned by the Shakespearean actor David Garrick (yes, that David Garrick--pupil of Samuel Johnson, friend of William Hogarth). The "wonderful year" it refers to was 1759--the battle for Quebec. It is still sung as a kind of unofficial anthem in the Australian navy--you sometimes hear it on Lady Beach, which is a nude beach much favoured by gay people and sailors here in Sydney. You can see why--the first verse goes like this: Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer, To add something more to this wonderful year; To honour we call you, as freemen not slaves, For who are so free as the sons of the waves? But it must have been sung with a more bitter shade of irony back in the day. A lot of Cook?s sailors had been press-ganged, and in fact even when Cook turned down an appointment as master to serve before the mast, his destitute father was given a pension by the lord of the manor, and there is some suspicion that his enlistment, which probably deterred the press gangs from the lord's estate, might have had something to do with it. Ruqaiya Hasan writes a lot about how bourgeois educational systems have tried and failed to inculcate ?glibspeak?, a faux-scientific register which uses the abstract nominalizations of scientific language in order to blur and obscure concrete realities. Here are two of her best hits on the subject. Hasan, R. (2003). Globalization, literacy, and ideology. World Englishes 22 (4) 433-448. Hasan, R. (2006). Literacy, pedagogy, and social change: directions from Bernstein?s sociology. In Knowledge, Power, and Education Reform: Applying the sociology of Basil Bernstein. R. Moore, M. Artnot, J. Beck, and H. Daniels (eds). 211-241. London: Routledge. Empirically, though, her most important work was the ten year survey she did here in Australia that showed a recognizable difference in the way that parents talked to preschoolers in working class families and the way that parents talked to preschoolers in middle class ones?and a recognizable similarity between the latter and the way that teachers talk to kids in school. As Mike has pointed out, the ?Polyphonic Autobiography? includes a good account of the debate between Labov and Bernstein on this issue, but for me it is essentially an empirical and not a political question, and these studies settles it: Hasan, R. (1991). Questions as a mode of learning in everyday talk. Language Education, Interaction and Developm,ent: Proceedings of the International Conference (Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam). Hasan, R. (2002). Semiotic mediation and mental development in pluralistic societies: Some implications for tomorrow?s schooling. In Wells and Claxton (eds). Learning for Life in the 21st Century, Blackwell: London. Probably the best place to get this stuff is in her Collected Works: Hasan, R. (2005). Language, Society, and Consciousness. London: Equinox. (This contains her critical readings of Vygotsky.) Hasan, R. (2009). Semantic Variation. London: Equinox. (These are where you find the empirical studies.) Hasan, R. (2011). Language and Education. London: Equinox. (These are the socio-political works.) There was also a good study by Marilyn Fleer and Mariane Hedegaard in MCA back in 2010?we discussed it here: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749030903222760 But when I suggested that Marilyn?s and Mariane?s results were consistent with Bernstein?s view of how some codes restrict working class children to operating machinery and other codes are more consistent with criticizing or reinforcing social structures, the suggestion was rejected for reasons I have never really understood. Perhaps it has to do with the Labov/Bernstein debate that the Polyphonic Autobiography of LCHC serves to sociohistorically contextualize so well: http://lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/polyphonic-autobiography/section-1/chapter-2/ The Polyphonic Autobiography makes it clear that in the context of the ?War on Poverty? and the beginnings of the cultural wars, it was easy to miss the point that Ruqaiya Hasan and Basil Bernstein were making. There?s a difference between being able to express a complex idea in complex DISCOURSE (as a child does when arguing with a parent) and being able to express it in complex GRAMMAR, just as there is a difference between being able to express a complex idea in complex grammar (as an older child does in telling a story) and being able to express it in complex vocabulary (as we see at university). Because human life and leisure are both finite, there is a real difference in the meaning potential of these different modes of expression. Yes, the POTENTIAL meaning potential of all human languages is equal?that is, all human languages will EVENTUALLY be able to express the whole of the relevant experience of their speakers, and since humans are equal, languages are equal in that sense. But no, the ACTUAL meaning potential of languages is not equal, because the semiotic orientation of language changes?sociohistorically as well as ontogenetically?and for that reason that meaning-potential-potential equality lies in the future, not the present. Langston Hughes makes the same point, in language that seems particularly relevant these days: Say, who are you that mumbles in the dark? And who are you that draws your veil across the stars? I am the poor white, fooled and pushed apart, I am the Negro bearing slavery?s scars. I am the red man driven from the land, I am the immigrant clutching the hope I seek? And finding only the same old stupid plan Of dog eat dog, of mighty crush the weak. (?) O, let America be America again? The land that never has been yet? And yet must be?the land where every man is free. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 10:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > David, > Very powerful particular example of how Cook used a combination of rigor > and freehanding :: the heart of a romantic science. > > Leading to ... > > semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation [the > psychological orientation *being* the semantic code orientation] of the > speaker towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards > his or her context of culture. > Offering us this *key* > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: August 16, 2017 4:18 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science > > Really interesting, David. I wonder what romantic science looks like for > us who drew our way to Quebec using Google Flights. I am afraid one might > find that there is neither rigour nor freehand in the google operation... > which may have quite worrying implications if one considers digital > technology at the service of capitalism. > > I was very interested in Hasan's remarks on psychological orientation; > would you direct us to a particular text or fragment to get more of that? > Thanks, > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 16 August 2017 00:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Heart of Romantic Science > > In Melbourne, here in Australia, there is a stone cottage in the gardens of > the treasury where the first huge gold deposits were winkled from the > miners (by way of licencing fees) and kept. It's a very small cottage--just > a sitting room and a bedroom on top of each other, like a two-storey, > two-room flat in a modern housing project, except that there is a stable > attached where animals lived cheek by jowl with human neighbors. It is not > a replica--it's the exact house where Captain James Cook lived as little > boy, bought up by the city of Melbourne for reasons better understood by > Australians, and transported, stone by stone, from rural Yorkshire in > England, about a century and a half after the man himself had set foot on > Australia. > > Cook was a man a bit above his class (not much, because the glass ceiling > for the son of an agricultural laborer was thick and low) and a bit ahead > of his timet: his ideas about anthropology were an unstable emulsion of > Rousseau and rationalism, and his erratic behavior to the more realist > Hawaiians eventually cost him his life. But there were two ways in which he > far outstripped his age, and perhaps they are both worth thinking about as > we go to Quebec City for ISCAR, because that was where his breakthrough to > romantic science really occurred. > > It was on the banks of the Saint Lawrence, during the "Guerre de Sept Ans" > (the French and Indian War, for Americans), that Cook learned to use a > plane table: to take two known distances with exact precision, and compute, > using the angle between them and a bit of basic trig, the third segment of > the triangle. He then freehanded the third segment and obtained a map of > the approaches to Quebec City. Unlike rigorously surveyed maps and unlike > purely freehanded maps, this one could be made as rigorous or as free as > you liked, and that's what made it possible for Cook to jiffy-chart the > "traversee" leading to Quebec City and to jerry-rig, overnight, a system of > moored lifeboats to show the way for British man o' wars. > > This is actually quite similar to what we do in a lot of romantic science, > including in text analysis. Say, for example, you want to understand how > capitalism has, in our time, managed to produce an education system that > enables working class navy men like Cook to operate a gun and even a plane > table but somehow disables comprehension of the Communist Manifesto. Using > a system-network, you can show the exact choices made by the author of the > operating manual and the authors of the manifesto to any degree of delicacy > you choose (clause type, indicative type, declarative type, process type, > etc.) and derive the semantics and then the context from that. You can also > "freehand" it by working backwards, from the context to the semantics to > the lexicogrammar. > > It seems to me that it's THIS combination of rigor and freehanding, of > verbal science and verbal art, that is the real heart of a romantic > science, not some unsteady amalgam of Rousseau and rationalism. And when we > bring this resource to bear upon our two texts, we find what Ruqaiya Hasan > found: the difference between the operating manual and the manifesto lies > not so much with the lexico-grammar as with what Bernstein called the > semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation of the speaker > towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards his or > her context of culture. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 16 21:35:47 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 21:35:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science In-Reply-To: References: <1502882159837.44658@iped.uio.no> <59943dca.49ce620a.5103c.35f8@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <59951d25.445b650a.67110.8e8a@mx.google.com> David, Fascinating to follow your trajectory when I lack the background to notice particular sign posts of where you are leading. However, I followed one of your links posted that links us to the ?Polyphonic Autobiography? Here was the opening expression to chapter 2 of this polyphonic autobiography: Chapter 2: Confronting the Challenge of Bringing Cross Cultural Research Home ?Poverty, whatever can justify the designation of ?the poor,? ought to be a transitional state to which no man ought to admit himself to belong, tho? he may find himself in it because he is passing thro? it, in the effort to leave it. Poor men we must always have, till the redemption is fulfilled, but The Poor, as consisting of the same Individuals! O this is a sore accusation against society.? David, you are weaving a narrative that distinguishes ?poor men? from ?THE poor? [THE poor consisting of the SAME -the identical ? individuals]. I sense when engaging with your responses I have to stay in the ?margins? of your compositions [searching for numbered notes to clarify] A wonderful place to be but recognizing my finitude within historical *consciousness* Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: David Kellogg Sent: August 16, 2017 6:13 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science One of the songs Cook's men must have sung here in Australia is ?Heart of Oak? (the hard center of the oak tree that keels were made of). In 1760, it was part of an opera penned by the Shakespearean actor David Garrick (yes, that David Garrick--pupil of Samuel Johnson, friend of William Hogarth). The "wonderful year" it refers to was 1759--the battle for Quebec. It is still sung as a kind of unofficial anthem in the Australian navy--you sometimes hear it on Lady Beach, which is a nude beach much favoured by gay people and sailors here in Sydney. You can see why--the first verse goes like this: Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer, To add something more to this wonderful year; To honour we call you, as freemen not slaves, For who are so free as the sons of the waves? But it must have been sung with a more bitter shade of irony back in the day. A lot of Cook?s sailors had been press-ganged, and in fact even when Cook turned down an appointment as master to serve before the mast, his destitute father was given a pension by the lord of the manor, and there is some suspicion that his enlistment, which probably deterred the press gangs from the lord's estate, might have had something to do with it. Ruqaiya Hasan writes a lot about how bourgeois educational systems have tried and failed to inculcate ?glibspeak?, a faux-scientific register which uses the abstract nominalizations of scientific language in order to blur and obscure concrete realities. Here are two of her best hits on the subject. Hasan, R. (2003). Globalization, literacy, and ideology. World Englishes 22 (4) 433-448. Hasan, R. (2006). Literacy, pedagogy, and social change: directions from Bernstein?s sociology. In Knowledge, Power, and Education Reform: Applying the sociology of Basil Bernstein. R. Moore, M. Artnot, J. Beck, and H. Daniels (eds). 211-241. London: Routledge. Empirically, though, her most important work was the ten year survey she did here in Australia that showed a recognizable difference in the way that parents talked to preschoolers in working class families and the way that parents talked to preschoolers in middle class ones?and a recognizable similarity between the latter and the way that teachers talk to kids in school. As Mike has pointed out, the ?Polyphonic Autobiography? includes a good account of the debate between Labov and Bernstein on this issue, but for me it is essentially an empirical and not a political question, and these studies settles it: Hasan, R. (1991). Questions as a mode of learning in everyday talk. Language Education, Interaction and Developm,ent: Proceedings of the International Conference (Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam). Hasan, R. (2002). Semiotic mediation and mental development in pluralistic societies: Some implications for tomorrow?s schooling. In Wells and Claxton (eds). Learning for Life in the 21st Century, Blackwell: London. Probably the best place to get this stuff is in her Collected Works: Hasan, R. (2005). Language, Society, and Consciousness. London: Equinox. (This contains her critical readings of Vygotsky.) Hasan, R. (2009). Semantic Variation. London: Equinox. (These are where you find the empirical studies.) Hasan, R. (2011). Language and Education. London: Equinox. (These are the socio-political works.) There was also a good study by Marilyn Fleer and Mariane Hedegaard in MCA back in 2010?we discussed it here: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749030903222760 But when I suggested that Marilyn?s and Mariane?s results were consistent with Bernstein?s view of how some codes restrict working class children to operating machinery and other codes are more consistent with criticizing or reinforcing social structures, the suggestion was rejected for reasons I have never really understood. Perhaps it has to do with the Labov/Bernstein debate that the Polyphonic Autobiography of LCHC serves to sociohistorically contextualize so well: http://lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/polyphonic-autobiography/section-1/chapter-2/ The Polyphonic Autobiography makes it clear that in the context of the ?War on Poverty? and the beginnings of the cultural wars, it was easy to miss the point that Ruqaiya Hasan and Basil Bernstein were making. There?s a difference between being able to express a complex idea in complex DISCOURSE (as a child does when arguing with a parent) and being able to express it in complex GRAMMAR, just as there is a difference between being able to express a complex idea in complex grammar (as an older child does in telling a story) and being able to express it in complex vocabulary (as we see at university). Because human life and leisure are both finite, there is a real difference in the meaning potential of these different modes of expression. Yes, the POTENTIAL meaning potential of all human languages is equal?that is, all human languages will EVENTUALLY be able to express the whole of the relevant experience of their speakers, and since humans are equal, languages are equal in that sense. But no, the ACTUAL meaning potential of languages is not equal, because the semiotic orientation of language changes?sociohistorically as well as ontogenetically?and for that reason that meaning-potential-potential equality lies in the future, not the present. Langston Hughes makes the same point, in language that seems particularly relevant these days: Say, who are you that mumbles in the dark? And who are you that draws your veil across the stars? I am the poor white, fooled and pushed apart, I am the Negro bearing slavery?s scars. I am the red man driven from the land, I am the immigrant clutching the hope I seek? And finding only the same old stupid plan Of dog eat dog, of mighty crush the weak. (?) O, let America be America again? The land that never has been yet? And yet must be?the land where every man is free. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 10:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > David, > Very powerful particular example of how Cook used a combination of rigor > and freehanding :: the heart of a romantic science. > > Leading to ... > > semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation [the > psychological orientation *being* the semantic code orientation] of the > speaker towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards > his or her context of culture. > Offering us this *key* > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: August 16, 2017 4:18 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science > > Really interesting, David. I wonder what romantic science looks like for > us who drew our way to Quebec using Google Flights. I am afraid one might > find that there is neither rigour nor freehand in the google operation... > which may have quite worrying implications if one considers digital > technology at the service of capitalism. > > I was very interested in Hasan's remarks on psychological orientation; > would you direct us to a particular text or fragment to get more of that? > Thanks, > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 16 August 2017 00:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Heart of Romantic Science > > In Melbourne, here in Australia, there is a stone cottage in the gardens of > the treasury where the first huge gold deposits were winkled from the > miners (by way of licencing fees) and kept. It's a very small cottage--just > a sitting room and a bedroom on top of each other, like a two-storey, > two-room flat in a modern housing project, except that there is a stable > attached where animals lived cheek by jowl with human neighbors. It is not > a replica--it's the exact house where Captain James Cook lived as little > boy, bought up by the city of Melbourne for reasons better understood by > Australians, and transported, stone by stone, from rural Yorkshire in > England, about a century and a half after the man himself had set foot on > Australia. > > Cook was a man a bit above his class (not much, because the glass ceiling > for the son of an agricultural laborer was thick and low) and a bit ahead > of his timet: his ideas about anthropology were an unstable emulsion of > Rousseau and rationalism, and his erratic behavior to the more realist > Hawaiians eventually cost him his life. But there were two ways in which he > far outstripped his age, and perhaps they are both worth thinking about as > we go to Quebec City for ISCAR, because that was where his breakthrough to > romantic science really occurred. > > It was on the banks of the Saint Lawrence, during the "Guerre de Sept Ans" > (the French and Indian War, for Americans), that Cook learned to use a > plane table: to take two known distances with exact precision, and compute, > using the angle between them and a bit of basic trig, the third segment of > the triangle. He then freehanded the third segment and obtained a map of > the approaches to Quebec City. Unlike rigorously surveyed maps and unlike > purely freehanded maps, this one could be made as rigorous or as free as > you liked, and that's what made it possible for Cook to jiffy-chart the > "traversee" leading to Quebec City and to jerry-rig, overnight, a system of > moored lifeboats to show the way for British man o' wars. > > This is actually quite similar to what we do in a lot of romantic science, > including in text analysis. Say, for example, you want to understand how > capitalism has, in our time, managed to produce an education system that > enables working class navy men like Cook to operate a gun and even a plane > table but somehow disables comprehension of the Communist Manifesto. Using > a system-network, you can show the exact choices made by the author of the > operating manual and the authors of the manifesto to any degree of delicacy > you choose (clause type, indicative type, declarative type, process type, > etc.) and derive the semantics and then the context from that. You can also > "freehand" it by working backwards, from the context to the semantics to > the lexicogrammar. > > It seems to me that it's THIS combination of rigor and freehanding, of > verbal science and verbal art, that is the real heart of a romantic > science, not some unsteady amalgam of Rousseau and rationalism. And when we > bring this resource to bear upon our two texts, we find what Ruqaiya Hasan > found: the difference between the operating manual and the manifesto lies > not so much with the lexico-grammar as with what Bernstein called the > semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation of the speaker > towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards his or > her context of culture. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Thu Aug 17 07:54:31 2017 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 10:54:31 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Vygotsky and Marx: more summer reading Message-ID: Dear colleagues, Before heading off to Quebec City, Canada for ISCAR 2017, you may want to wrap up your summer reading on Vygotsky with Carl Ratner and Daniele Nunes' latest book: *Vygotsky and Marx*. https://www.routledge.com/Vygotsky-and-Marx-Toward-a-Marxist-Psychology/Ratner-Silva/p/book/9781138244818 ?If you enjoyed the article about Hegel that Andy shared earlier this summer, you'll be dazzled by his chapter in this book on The Germ Cell in Marx and Vygotsky. It's delightful and insightful! Jim Lantolf also presents some intriguing new ideas in his chapter on Materialist Dialectics in Vygotsky?s Methodological Framework. It's must reading for those interested in second language education research. But ?Carl Ratner's in-depth analysis of the role of cultural psychology in CHAT and in Marx (and his attempt at a synthesis) will no doubt steal your attention because he discusses the work of several prominent members on this listserv. In my opinion, Carl made a concerted attempt to avoid polemics and to offer constructive comments. I'm curious to know how others will react. Oh . . . I, too, wrote a chapter that draws parallels between Vygotsky's and Marx's theory around the issues of use value and exchange value, and commodities and word meanings -- topics that have come up earlier this summer (when I was too distracted by work to participate). Looking forward to meeting many of you face-to-face at ISCAR! Cheers, and best wishes to all, Peter -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Aug 17 08:22:32 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 15:22:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and Marx: more summer reading In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1502983354470.76293@iped.uio.no> Thanks so much for sharing, Peter. The title had circulated on this list already, though it has not yet been much discussed yet. I've read several of the chapters, including Andy's and yours, and, as you note, they should be of much interest given recent discussions. Peter's chapter does nothing less than assessing "the Marxist character of Vygotsky's theory of the development of verbal thinking in childhood". Surely a treat for xmca. Andy's writings on unit analysis have been of great help for me during my phd and current postdoc studies, since he first called my attention as to the way we were using such words as 'unity' and 'unit'. His chapter summarises lots of what he had already written elsewhere, plus it identifies, in a single text, five different domains of psychological research in which Vygotsky did apply the method of analysis by units. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] Sent: 17 August 2017 16:54 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Vygotsky and Marx: more summer reading Dear colleagues, Before heading off to Quebec City, Canada for ISCAR 2017, you may want to wrap up your summer reading on Vygotsky with Carl Ratner and Daniele Nunes' latest book: *Vygotsky and Marx*. https://www.routledge.com/Vygotsky-and-Marx-Toward-a-Marxist-Psychology/Ratner-Silva/p/book/9781138244818 ?If you enjoyed the article about Hegel that Andy shared earlier this summer, you'll be dazzled by his chapter in this book on The Germ Cell in Marx and Vygotsky. It's delightful and insightful! Jim Lantolf also presents some intriguing new ideas in his chapter on Materialist Dialectics in Vygotsky?s Methodological Framework. It's must reading for those interested in second language education research. But ?Carl Ratner's in-depth analysis of the role of cultural psychology in CHAT and in Marx (and his attempt at a synthesis) will no doubt steal your attention because he discusses the work of several prominent members on this listserv. In my opinion, Carl made a concerted attempt to avoid polemics and to offer constructive comments. I'm curious to know how others will react. Oh . . . I, too, wrote a chapter that draws parallels between Vygotsky's and Marx's theory around the issues of use value and exchange value, and commodities and word meanings -- topics that have come up earlier this summer (when I was too distracted by work to participate). Looking forward to meeting many of you face-to-face at ISCAR! Cheers, and best wishes to all, Peter -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Aug 17 20:12:10 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 13:12:10 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science In-Reply-To: <59951d25.445b650a.67110.8e8a@mx.google.com> References: <1502882159837.44658@iped.uio.no> <59943dca.49ce620a.5103c.35f8@mx.google.com> <59951d25.445b650a.67110.8e8a@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry: I think that verbal art differs from verbal science most in this: in verbal science, we tend to see the concrete instance as a product of general laws, but in verbal art we tend to see the general law as made up of concrete instances. So for example Langston Hughes' poem gives us the general mumbling in the dark and the veiled stars, but then lists concrete instances: the poor white pushed away from the fellowship of labor by his or her own prejudice, the black scarred to the very semantic system of his or her speech by slavery, the red man pushed off the red land because iron has been discovered, etc. We know how to find general laws from a multitude of data points in verbal science, but selecting the best instance from a generality is a matter of freehanding verbal art. I am not very good at it, which is why I have to rely on a master like Langston Hughes. But I will try. When I was in my early twenties, I quit my job teaching English at a cancer hospital in Beijing and travelled, illegally, to Tibet (there were only a handful of cities open to foreigners at that time). Arriving in Lhasa by a truck in the middle of the night, I had to stumble around the streets until the sun rose. I slept in a large cement drainpipe that was being installed to try to do away with the open sewers. The next day I went around trying to find a cheap hotel that didn't know about the rules against foreigners. Nothing was open except a cinema and for some reason they were showing a Charlie Chaplin movie in the main theatre. It was City Lights: the Tramp meets a blind flower girl, is mistaken by her for a millionaire passing by, he saves the millionaire from suicide and then uses the millionaire's car and money to buy all the flowers and drive the girl home.Now, the dwelling that the girl shared with her grandmother wasn't just cozy--it was a really materially more comfortable than all the cheap hotels I'd looked at, better than ninety percent of the dwellings in Lhasa. There was water, for example, and a toilet inside instead of just a hole that emptied on the street, and there was a fire instead of just a heap of quilts and scratchy sheep skins to keep warm when you went to bed. And yet--we all knew that this girl was poor, and so was the tramp--he was only pretending to be rich. No one felt that the girl and the tramp were really rich, or that they were passing through poverty--they were poor and they were going to stay poor, even when the girl gets her eyesight back, opens a flower shop, and meets her secret benefactor and admirer in the last scene (with them both pinching a coin). Contrary to what Coleridge says, poverty is a stable culture; as Chaplin shows us, it can even be a very rich one. It isn't the kind of transient state that Coleridge envisions, like pregnancy. It's more like the age periods that Vygotsky envisions--a relationship between you and your environment. It's the relationship between the tramp and the millionaire that gives us the poverty of the tramp. That--and only that--explains the relationship between Bernstein's restricted and elaborated codes: we all have the restricted one, because that's the everyday code we use in the living of life. But in addition, there exists this highly valued code, which precisely because it is highly valued is denied to the poor. It doesn't do any good to celebrate the undoubted richness of the restricted code if your very eyesight and health depends on getting your hands on the elaborated one. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Thu, Aug 17, 2017 at 2:35 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > David, > > Fascinating to follow your trajectory when I lack the background to notice > particular sign posts of where you are leading. > However, I followed one of your links posted that links us to the > ?Polyphonic Autobiography? > > Here was the opening expression to chapter 2 of this polyphonic > autobiography: > > Chapter 2: Confronting the Challenge of Bringing Cross Cultural Research > Home > ?Poverty, whatever can justify the designation of ?the poor,? ought to be > a transitional state to which no man ought to admit himself to belong, tho? > he may find himself in it because he is passing thro? it, in the effort to > leave it. Poor men we must always have, till the redemption is fulfilled, > but The Poor, as consisting of the same Individuals! O this is a sore > accusation against society.? > > David, you are weaving a narrative that distinguishes ?poor men? from ?THE > poor? [THE poor consisting of the SAME -the identical ? individuals]. > > I sense when engaging with your responses I have to stay in the ?margins? > of your compositions [searching for numbered notes to clarify] > > A wonderful place to be but recognizing my finitude within historical > *consciousness* > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: David Kellogg > Sent: August 16, 2017 6:13 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science > > One of the songs Cook's men must have sung here in Australia is ?Heart of > Oak? (the hard center of the oak tree that keels were made of). In 1760, it > was part of an opera penned by the Shakespearean actor David Garrick (yes, > that David Garrick--pupil of Samuel Johnson, friend of William Hogarth). > The "wonderful year" it refers to was 1759--the battle for Quebec. > > It is still sung as a kind of unofficial anthem in the Australian navy--you > sometimes hear it on Lady Beach, which is a nude beach much favoured by gay > people and sailors here in Sydney. You can see why--the first verse goes > like this: > > Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer, > > To add something more to this wonderful year; > > To honour we call you, as freemen not slaves, > > For who are so free as the sons of the waves? > > But it must have been sung with a more bitter shade of irony back in the > day. A lot of Cook?s sailors had been press-ganged, and in fact even when > Cook turned down an appointment as master to serve before the mast, his > destitute father was given a pension by the lord of the manor, and there is > some suspicion that his enlistment, which probably deterred the press gangs > from the lord's estate, might have had something to do with it. > > Ruqaiya Hasan writes a lot about how bourgeois educational systems have > tried and failed to inculcate ?glibspeak?, a faux-scientific register which > uses the abstract nominalizations of scientific language in order to blur > and obscure concrete realities. Here are two of her best hits on the > subject. > > Hasan, R. (2003). Globalization, literacy, and ideology. World Englishes 22 > (4) 433-448. > > Hasan, R. (2006). Literacy, pedagogy, and social change: directions from > Bernstein?s sociology. In Knowledge, Power, and Education Reform: Applying > the sociology of Basil Bernstein. R. Moore, M. Artnot, J. Beck, and H. > Daniels (eds). 211-241. London: Routledge. > > Empirically, though, her most important work was the ten year survey she > did here in Australia that showed a recognizable difference in the way that > parents talked to preschoolers in working class families and the way that > parents talked to preschoolers in middle class ones?and a recognizable > similarity between the latter and the way that teachers talk to kids in > school. As Mike has pointed out, the ?Polyphonic Autobiography? includes a > good account of the debate between Labov and Bernstein on this issue, but > for me it is essentially an empirical and not a political question, and > these studies settles it: > > Hasan, R. (1991). Questions as a mode of learning in everyday talk. > Language > Education, Interaction and Developm,ent: Proceedings of the International > Conference (Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam). > > Hasan, R. (2002). Semiotic mediation and mental development in pluralistic > societies: Some implications for tomorrow?s schooling. In Wells and Claxton > (eds). Learning for Life in the 21st Century, Blackwell: London. > > Probably the best place to get this stuff is in her Collected Works: > > Hasan, R. (2005). Language, Society, and Consciousness. London: Equinox. > (This contains her critical readings of Vygotsky.) > > Hasan, R. (2009). Semantic Variation. London: Equinox. (These are where you > find the empirical studies.) > > Hasan, R. (2011). Language and Education. London: Equinox. (These are the > socio-political works.) > > There was also a good study by Marilyn Fleer and Mariane Hedegaard in MCA > back in 2010?we discussed it here: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749030903222760 > > But when I suggested that Marilyn?s and Mariane?s results were consistent > with Bernstein?s view of how some codes restrict working class children to > operating machinery and other codes are more consistent with criticizing or > reinforcing social structures, the suggestion was rejected for reasons I > have never really understood. Perhaps it has to do with the Labov/Bernstein > debate that the Polyphonic Autobiography of LCHC serves to > sociohistorically contextualize so well: > > http://lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/polyphonic-autobiography/section-1/chapter-2/ > > The Polyphonic Autobiography makes it clear that in the context of the ?War > on Poverty? and the beginnings of the cultural wars, it was easy to miss > the point that Ruqaiya Hasan and Basil Bernstein were making. There?s a > difference between being able to express a complex idea in complex > DISCOURSE (as a child does when arguing with a parent) and being able to > express it in complex GRAMMAR, just as there is a difference between being > able to express a complex idea in complex grammar (as an older child does > in telling a story) and being able to express it in complex vocabulary (as > we see at university). Because human life and leisure are both finite, > there is a real difference in the meaning potential of these different > modes of expression. > > Yes, the POTENTIAL meaning potential of all human languages is equal?that > is, all human languages will EVENTUALLY be able to express the whole of the > relevant experience of their speakers, and since humans are equal, > languages are equal in that sense. But no, the ACTUAL meaning potential of > languages is not equal, because the semiotic orientation of language > changes?sociohistorically as well as ontogenetically?and for that reason > that meaning-potential-potential equality lies in the future, not the > present. > > Langston Hughes makes the same point, in language that seems particularly > relevant these days: > > Say, who are you that mumbles in the dark? > > And who are you that draws your veil across the stars? > > I am the poor white, fooled and pushed apart, > > I am the Negro bearing slavery?s scars. > > I am the red man driven from the land, > > I am the immigrant clutching the hope I seek? > > And finding only the same old stupid plan > > Of dog eat dog, of mighty crush the weak. (?) > > O, let America be America again? > > The land that never has been yet? > And yet must be?the land where every man is free. > > > > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 10:42 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > David, > > Very powerful particular example of how Cook used a combination of rigor > > and freehanding :: the heart of a romantic science. > > > > Leading to ... > > > > semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation [the > > psychological orientation *being* the semantic code orientation] of the > > speaker towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards > > his or her context of culture. > > Offering us this *key* > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: August 16, 2017 4:18 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Heart of Romantic Science > > > > Really interesting, David. I wonder what romantic science looks like for > > us who drew our way to Quebec using Google Flights. I am afraid one might > > find that there is neither rigour nor freehand in the google operation... > > which may have quite worrying implications if one considers digital > > technology at the service of capitalism. > > > > I was very interested in Hasan's remarks on psychological orientation; > > would you direct us to a particular text or fragment to get more of that? > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > Sent: 16 August 2017 00:48 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Heart of Romantic Science > > > > In Melbourne, here in Australia, there is a stone cottage in the gardens > of > > the treasury where the first huge gold deposits were winkled from the > > miners (by way of licencing fees) and kept. It's a very small > cottage--just > > a sitting room and a bedroom on top of each other, like a two-storey, > > two-room flat in a modern housing project, except that there is a stable > > attached where animals lived cheek by jowl with human neighbors. It is > not > > a replica--it's the exact house where Captain James Cook lived as little > > boy, bought up by the city of Melbourne for reasons better understood by > > Australians, and transported, stone by stone, from rural Yorkshire in > > England, about a century and a half after the man himself had set foot on > > Australia. > > > > Cook was a man a bit above his class (not much, because the glass ceiling > > for the son of an agricultural laborer was thick and low) and a bit ahead > > of his timet: his ideas about anthropology were an unstable emulsion of > > Rousseau and rationalism, and his erratic behavior to the more realist > > Hawaiians eventually cost him his life. But there were two ways in which > he > > far outstripped his age, and perhaps they are both worth thinking about > as > > we go to Quebec City for ISCAR, because that was where his breakthrough > to > > romantic science really occurred. > > > > It was on the banks of the Saint Lawrence, during the "Guerre de Sept > Ans" > > (the French and Indian War, for Americans), that Cook learned to use a > > plane table: to take two known distances with exact precision, and > compute, > > using the angle between them and a bit of basic trig, the third segment > of > > the triangle. He then freehanded the third segment and obtained a map of > > the approaches to Quebec City. Unlike rigorously surveyed maps and unlike > > purely freehanded maps, this one could be made as rigorous or as free as > > you liked, and that's what made it possible for Cook to jiffy-chart the > > "traversee" leading to Quebec City and to jerry-rig, overnight, a system > of > > moored lifeboats to show the way for British man o' wars. > > > > This is actually quite similar to what we do in a lot of romantic > science, > > including in text analysis. Say, for example, you want to understand how > > capitalism has, in our time, managed to produce an education system that > > enables working class navy men like Cook to operate a gun and even a > plane > > table but somehow disables comprehension of the Communist Manifesto. > Using > > a system-network, you can show the exact choices made by the author of > the > > operating manual and the authors of the manifesto to any degree of > delicacy > > you choose (clause type, indicative type, declarative type, process type, > > etc.) and derive the semantics and then the context from that. You can > also > > "freehand" it by working backwards, from the context to the semantics to > > the lexicogrammar. > > > > It seems to me that it's THIS combination of rigor and freehanding, of > > verbal science and verbal art, that is the real heart of a romantic > > science, not some unsteady amalgam of Rousseau and rationalism. And when > we > > bring this resource to bear upon our two texts, we find what Ruqaiya > Hasan > > found: the difference between the operating manual and the manifesto lies > > not so much with the lexico-grammar as with what Bernstein called the > > semantic code orientation--the psychological orientation of the speaker > > towards her or his context of situation, and beyond that, towards his or > > her context of culture. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > > Complementarity > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Aug 18 05:16:08 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 12:16:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Message-ID: Peter, Alfredo Et al - It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview review of the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the idea to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, Alfredo!). Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could follow Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of analysis is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around the world would not be excluded from the discussion. Mike Happy travels summer readers. :-) From ddirlam@changingwisdoms.com Fri Aug 18 10:08:01 2017 From: ddirlam@changingwisdoms.com (ddirlam@changingwisdoms.com) Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 10:08:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Message-ID: <20170818100801.8baa08539fb3f284c5d64728aac1124e.8409275fd3.wbe@email02.godaddy.com> From ablunden@mira.net Fri Aug 18 19:07:11 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2017 12:07:11 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsky-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - maybe elsewhere? Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV has given us! But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a very good candidate to review this book. Beth? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > Peter, Alfredo Et al - > > It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview review of > the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the idea > to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, > Alfredo!). > > Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could follow > Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of analysis > is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around the > world would not be excluded from the discussion. > > Mike > Happy travels summer readers. :-) > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Aug 19 05:47:48 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2017 12:47:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> Message-ID: <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> What are the five, Andy? Martin > On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsky-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. > > My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - maybe elsewhere? > > Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV has given us! > > But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a very good candidate to review this book. Beth? > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >> >> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview review of >> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the idea >> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >> Alfredo!). >> >> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could follow >> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of analysis >> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around the >> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >> >> Mike >> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 19 06:37:46 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2017 23:37:46 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of activity Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever Social Situations of Development for the study of child development See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > What are the five, Andy? > > Martin > >> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsky-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >> >> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - maybe elsewhere? >> >> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV has given us! >> >> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>> >>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview review of >>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the idea >>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>> Alfredo!). >>> >>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could follow >>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of analysis >>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around the >>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>> >>> Mike >>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>> >>> > > > From bodrozic@web.de Sat Aug 19 06:52:48 2017 From: bodrozic@web.de (Zlatko Bodrozic) Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2017 15:52:48 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] An article on the evolution of organizational paradigms you might find interesting Message-ID: Dear colleagues, some of you might find our paper (co-authored with Paul Adler) on the historical evolution of management models and organizational paradigms interesting. We published it this year in Administrative Science Quarterly. While it is based on a Neo-Schumpeterian framework (Schumpeter, Freeman, Perez), it was equally informed by cultural-historical activity theory. You can download a copy by using the link below, and we would be delighted to get any reactions to it that you might share with us. Best wishes, Zlatko Bodro?i? and Paul Adler Bodrozic, Z., and P.S. Adler (forthcoming) The Evolution of Management Models: A Neo-Schumpeterian Theory. /Administrative Science Quarterly/ Download From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Aug 19 14:01:30 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 06:01:30 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> Message-ID: I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from biology, political economy, and music, are my own. a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani as well as a piano. b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to form its coda. c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: Beethoven did. Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of > activity > Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever > Social Situations of Development for the study of child development > > See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> What are the five, Andy? >> >> Martin >> >> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>> >>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>> maybe elsewhere? >>> >>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>> has given us! >>> >>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>> >>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>> review of >>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>> idea >>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>> Alfredo!). >>>> >>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>> follow >>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>> analysis >>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>> the >>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>> >>>> Mike >>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Aug 19 14:20:57 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2017 15:20:57 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> Message-ID: Backing up a bit, I have an ignorant question here: what does the "germ" of "germ cell" refer to? I'm caught up in English germs and can't think of what else the term might imply (e.g., in Germ-an...). Sorry, this is a CHAT 101 question but perhaps some others on the list might appreciate getting a better sense of what is meant by "germ". -greg On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 3:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They > are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from > biology, political economy, and music, are my own. > > a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be > manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using > "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual > stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri > dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be > provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted > from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and > exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of > that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani > as well as a piano. > > b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning > analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For > example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and > equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, > potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and > capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is > complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to > form its coda. > > c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the > properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell > metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of > the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest > itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in > anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical > process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. > Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: > Beethoven did. > > Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, > number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: > > 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't > contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, > statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, > e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. > > 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not > maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the > child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of > actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an > experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the > functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > > 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as > far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from > the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > > Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development > of > > activity > > Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > > (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever > > Social Situations of Development for the study of child development > > > > See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > >> What are the five, Andy? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk > >>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. > >>> > >>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so > >>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu > - > >>> maybe elsewhere? > >>> > >>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different > >>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by > units." > >>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological > innovations > >>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and > >>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of > >>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method > in an > >>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room > trying > >>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. > >>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. > How > >>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still > >>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift > LSV > >>> has given us! > >>> > >>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a > >>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> Andy Blunden > >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - > >>>> > >>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview > >>>> review of > >>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the > >>>> idea > >>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, > >>>> Alfredo!). > >>>> > >>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could > >>>> follow > >>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of > >>>> analysis > >>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around > >>>> the > >>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. > >>>> > >>>> Mike > >>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Aug 19 16:39:09 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2017 16:39:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> Message-ID: <5998cc3d.485a650a.a52aa.46f7@mx.google.com> I wonder if the term (germ) is related to germinate as indicating developing? That is, approaching a *genetic* model indicating cells that are germinating? This is my guess as I was reading and following Andy?s article on unit & Unity. Greg, On the first page of Andy?s article, in the first section titled (Origins of ?cell? as METHOD of Analysis) Andy is outlining the germinating development of the notion of the ?cell? that is ?as though light of a particular hue were cast upon everything, tingling all other colors and MODIFYING their specific features?. This image seems significant as a genetic origin. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Greg Thompson Sent: August 19, 2017 2:22 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Backing up a bit, I have an ignorant question here: what does the "germ" of "germ cell" refer to? I'm caught up in English germs and can't think of what else the term might imply (e.g., in Germ-an...). Sorry, this is a CHAT 101 question but perhaps some others on the list might appreciate getting a better sense of what is meant by "germ". -greg On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 3:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They > are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from > biology, political economy, and music, are my own. > > a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be > manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using > "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual > stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri > dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be > provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted > from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and > exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of > that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani > as well as a piano. > > b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning > analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For > example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and > equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, > potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and > capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is > complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to > form its coda. > > c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the > properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell > metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of > the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest > itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in > anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical > process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. > Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: > Beethoven did. > > Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, > number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: > > 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't > contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, > statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, > e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. > > 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not > maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the > child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of > actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an > experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the > functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > > 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as > far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from > the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > > Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development > of > > activity > > Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > > (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever > > Social Situations of Development for the study of child development > > > > See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > >> What are the five, Andy? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk > >>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. > >>> > >>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so > >>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu > - > >>> maybe elsewhere? > >>> > >>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different > >>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by > units." > >>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological > innovations > >>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and > >>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of > >>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method > in an > >>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room > trying > >>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. > >>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. > How > >>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still > >>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift > LSV > >>> has given us! > >>> > >>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a > >>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> Andy Blunden > >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - > >>>> > >>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview > >>>> review of > >>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the > >>>> idea > >>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, > >>>> Alfredo!). > >>>> > >>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could > >>>> follow > >>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of > >>>> analysis > >>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around > >>>> the > >>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. > >>>> > >>>> Mike > >>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 19 17:59:01 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 10:59:01 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> Message-ID: Greg, I apologise if I express irritation rather than joy in responding to your questions. I must be fulfilling my destiny to be a grumpy old man. But I think a good scholar is often well advised to ignore what comes into their peripheral vision and keep focused on their task ... especially if they are struggling to complete their PhD. But as to your questions. "Child development" I take to be the passage through that series of culturally-specific identities (or roles) through which a new born child makes its way to becoming an adult citizen of the community in the given cultural formation. Vygotsky deals with it in the articles collected in v. 5 of his CW like "The Problem of Age." Vygotsky's work on "Personality development" is known to English speakers through the lecture "The problem of the Environment" and is concerned with the unique way in which an individual person deals with the world around them. Actually, Chapter 5 of A N Leontyev's "Activity, Consciousness and Personality" rather imperfectly continues this work. It is self-evident that these two domains of research overlap and the two units mentioned are likewise closely interlocked. The concepts dealt with in "child development" cease to be relevant as the person reaches adulthood, whereas personality development (thank goodness) goes on throughout life. There is no requirement that different "germ cells" mark out mutually exclusive domains of research. As to your second message, on list, The "germ" in "germ cell" seems to have entered discourse with the Activity Theorists; I'm not sure whether it was Davydov or Engestrom, maybe someone else can tell us. But it is "germ" as in "germinate", simply emphasising the biological origins of this concept, anticipated by Goethe prior to the "cell" being discovered by the use of powerful microscopes in 1839 - that simple piece from which the whole organism can re-grow itself. Marx used the expression: "economic cell-form" for example. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 5:31 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > > I know my questions tend to irritate you more than > accomplishing much, but might you be willing to expand on > what is meant by "personality development"? "Child > development" is something I can understand, but I'm not > quite sure what "personality development" means. > > Yes, I apologize that I am being such a bear, but this > isn't on my agenda right now and so I don't have time to > dig through what you and others have written on it to > figure out what parts I might find most useful (and yes, I > know that as a good scholar and intellectual I should > recognize that everything on this listserve is useful - > its just don't have time for everything - I barely have > time for my wife and (4!) kids...). > > Feel free to respond on or off list. > > -greg > > > > > On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 7:37 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study > of the development of activity > Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or > whatever > Social Situations of Development for the study of > child development > > See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > What are the five, Andy? > > Martin > > On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > Amazon have it for $38.21: > https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsky-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 > > which is not too bad. > > My chapter is available at > https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > but so > far as I can see other authors have not posted > theirs on academia.edu - > maybe elsewhere? > > Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I > have pointed to 5 different domains in which > Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis > by units." To me, it seems useless to identify > a writer's methodological innovations unless > you can transport that methodology to a > different context, and pointing to five > applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good > way of showing how portable the method is. > More recently, I used this method in an > approach to political science, taking a group > of people in the room trying to decide on what > they are going to do together as a unit of > analysis. Personally, I think this method has > proved very fruitful and original. How lucky > we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's > brilliant insights, still generally so unknown > to the general scientific audience. What a > gift LSV has given us! > > But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, > I think you would be a very good candidate to > review this book. Beth? > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Peter, Alfredo Et al - > > It seems that the readers of MCA would > appreciate a good overview review of > the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I > know, no one has proposed the idea > to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem > to have a jump on the task, > Alfredo!). > > Also, given the cost of the book, it would > be nice if authors could follow > Andy's lead and make a draft available. > Andy's article on units of analysis > is on Academia, a click away. That way the > many readers of XMCA around the > world would not be excluded from the > discussion. > > Mike > Happy travels summer readers. :-) > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Aug 19 18:28:45 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2017 18:28:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: An article on the evolution of organizational paradigms you might find interesting In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you for this paper, Zlato. We have not heard from Paul on this list for years, but his work has remained on the horizon. Now you have brought it back to us in an interesting formulation. I was struck by the parallels between the way you framed your question and the question that developmental psychologists (perhaps pedologists, David?): we argue that technology is a powerful factor shaping the evolution of management models? contents a couple of months ago Roy Pea gave a talk at the Piaget society meetings in which we made a very similar point with respect to the role of culture in human development. Simplifying brutally, we argued that new technologies entail changes in social relations that subsequently change the environment of development for the en-culturating organism. This formulation, we suggested provided piagetians to reconcile contradictions between the biological and the social sides of Piaget. The similarity of the arguments raises a question for me about principles of development that appear non-accidently related at different levels of analysis: 'individual organism, individual organism as constituitive of a social group, the institutional structure of the organism's environment, the structure of that proximal society and its relation to the organization of the species of which it is a part. Does some sort of "orthogenetic principle" apply across different scales of social processes? Short of that, what are we to make of the "limited" differences we see in the dynamics of different levels of the system in relative sychrony, perhaps a crisis, perhaps an opportunity? David has been point toward a sociology and linguistics to bring together various apparently combinable mode of theorizing a CHAT account of development that generalizes across scales (themselves differentially mutable from the perspective of a single human organism). This work, and that part of Yrjo's work focused on organisms seems to be pointing in similarly directions. If that it correct, it extends the links to the study of social institutions, a topic currently of general interest in the CHAT community. In any events, thanks. mike On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 6:52 AM, Zlatko Bodrozic wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > some of you might find our paper (co-authored with Paul Adler) on the > historical evolution of management models and organizational paradigms > interesting. We published it this year in Administrative Science Quarterly. > While it is based on a Neo-Schumpeterian framework (Schumpeter, Freeman, > Perez), it was equally informed by cultural-historical activity theory. > You can download a copy by using the link below, and we would be delighted > to get any reactions to it that you might share with us. > > Best wishes, > Zlatko Bodro?i? and Paul Adler > > Bodrozic, Z., and P.S. Adler (forthcoming) The Evolution of Management > Models: A Neo-Schumpeterian Theory. /Administrative Science Quarterly/ > Download > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sat Aug 19 21:27:39 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 11:27:39 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> Message-ID: <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? Thanks -- H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They > are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from > biology, political economy, and music, are my own. > > a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be > manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using > "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual > stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri > dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be > provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted > from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and > exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of > that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani > as well as a piano. > > b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning > analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For > example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and > equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, > potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and > capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is > complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to > form its coda. > > c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the > properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell > metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of > the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest > itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in > anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical > process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. > Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: > Beethoven did. > > Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, > number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: > > 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't > contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, > statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, > e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. > > 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not > maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the > child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of > actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an > experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the > functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > > 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as > far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from > the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of >> activity >> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >> >> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> What are the five, Andy? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>>> >>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>> >>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>>> has given us! >>>> >>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>> >>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>> review of >>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>>> idea >>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>> >>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>>> follow >>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>>> analysis >>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>>> the >>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 19 22:23:16 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 15:23:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> Message-ID: <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions. Do you see a problem here, Helena? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? > > Thanks -- H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They >> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from >> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. >> >> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be >> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using >> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual >> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri >> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be >> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted >> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and >> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of >> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani >> as well as a piano. >> >> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning >> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For >> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and >> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, >> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and >> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is >> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to >> form its coda. >> >> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the >> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell >> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of >> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest >> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in >> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical >> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. >> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: >> Beethoven did. >> >> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, >> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: >> >> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't >> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, >> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, >> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. >> >> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not >> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the >> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of >> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an >> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the >> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. >> >> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as >> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from >> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >> Complementarity >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >> >> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of >>> activity >>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >>> >>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> What are the five, Andy? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>>>> >>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>>>> has given us! >>>>> >>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>>> review of >>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>>>> idea >>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>>> >>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>>>> follow >>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>>>> analysis >>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>>>> the >>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 20 01:38:27 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 08:38:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com>, <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> Message-ID: <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete and real relation between people? Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. Lots of wondering here! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions. Do you see a problem here, Helena? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? > > Thanks -- H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They >> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from >> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. >> >> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be >> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using >> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual >> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri >> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be >> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted >> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and >> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of >> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani >> as well as a piano. >> >> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning >> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For >> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and >> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, >> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and >> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is >> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to >> form its coda. >> >> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the >> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell >> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of >> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest >> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in >> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical >> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. >> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: >> Beethoven did. >> >> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, >> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: >> >> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't >> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, >> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, >> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. >> >> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not >> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the >> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of >> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an >> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the >> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. >> >> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as >> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from >> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >> Complementarity >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >> >> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of >>> activity >>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >>> >>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> What are the five, Andy? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>>>> >>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>>>> has given us! >>>>> >>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>>> review of >>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>>>> idea >>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>>> >>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>>>> follow >>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>>>> analysis >>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>>>> the >>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Aug 20 02:27:47 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 19:27:47 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: What do you mean by "key", Alfredo? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 6:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? > > In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no longer is the *key*, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? > > David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete and real relation between people? > > Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. > > Lots of wondering here! > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of > Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the > conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it > was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his > work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense > without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. > But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He > was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech > as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping > tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions > qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis > of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a > system of artefact-mediated actions. > > Do you see a problem here, Helena? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? >> >> Thanks -- H >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They >>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from >>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. >>> >>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be >>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using >>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual >>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri >>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be >>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted >>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and >>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of >>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani >>> as well as a piano. >>> >>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning >>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For >>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and >>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, >>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and >>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is >>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to >>> form its coda. >>> >>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the >>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell >>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of >>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest >>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in >>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical >>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. >>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: >>> Beethoven did. >>> >>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, >>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: >>> >>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't >>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, >>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, >>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. >>> >>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not >>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the >>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of >>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an >>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the >>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. >>> >>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as >>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from >>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >>> Complementarity >>> >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >>> >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of >>>> activity >>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >>>> >>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>>> What are the five, Andy? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>>>>> >>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>>>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>>>>> has given us! >>>>>> >>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>>>> review of >>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>>>>> idea >>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>>>>> follow >>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >> > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 20 02:44:12 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 09:44:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com>, <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net>, <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of the situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool use, if you will). Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete and real relation between people? Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. Lots of wondering here! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions. Do you see a problem here, Helena? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? > > Thanks -- H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They >> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from >> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. >> >> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be >> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using >> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual >> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri >> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be >> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted >> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and >> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of >> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani >> as well as a piano. >> >> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning >> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For >> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and >> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, >> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and >> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is >> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to >> form its coda. >> >> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the >> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell >> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of >> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest >> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in >> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical >> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. >> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: >> Beethoven did. >> >> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, >> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: >> >> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't >> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, >> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, >> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. >> >> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not >> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the >> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of >> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an >> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the >> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. >> >> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as >> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from >> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >> Complementarity >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >> >> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of >>> activity >>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >>> >>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> What are the five, Andy? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>>>> >>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>>>> has given us! >>>>> >>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>>> review of >>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>>>> idea >>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>>> >>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>>>> follow >>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>>>> analysis >>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>>>> the >>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Aug 20 03:03:23 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 20:03:23 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of the situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool use, if you will). > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? > > In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? > > David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete and real relation between people? > > Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. > > Lots of wondering here! > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of > Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the > conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it > was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his > work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense > without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. > But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He > was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech > as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping > tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions > qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis > of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a > system of artefact-mediated actions. > > Do you see a problem here, Helena? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? >> >> Thanks -- H >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They >>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from >>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. >>> >>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be >>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using >>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual >>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri >>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be >>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted >>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and >>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of >>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani >>> as well as a piano. >>> >>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning >>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For >>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and >>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, >>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and >>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is >>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to >>> form its coda. >>> >>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the >>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell >>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of >>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest >>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in >>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical >>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. >>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: >>> Beethoven did. >>> >>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, >>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: >>> >>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't >>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, >>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, >>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. >>> >>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not >>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the >>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of >>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an >>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the >>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. >>> >>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as >>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from >>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >>> Complementarity >>> >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >>> >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of >>>> activity >>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >>>> >>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>>> What are the five, Andy? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>>>>> >>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>>>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>>>>> has given us! >>>>>> >>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>>>> review of >>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>>>>> idea >>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>>>>> follow >>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >> > From bodrozic@web.de Sun Aug 20 03:07:55 2017 From: bodrozic@web.de (Zlatko Bodrozic) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 12:07:55 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: An article on the evolution of organizational paradigms you might find interesting In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <02c7ffe1-5f3c-7cf0-0a28-2d6d2e51eaed@web.de> Many thanks for your comments, Mike. Since I was a PhD student I was fascinated by Scribner's (1985) analysis of "Vygotsky's Uses of History,". One could say that our paper (and my PhD) was inspired by her article. We study the connection between (1) the long-term evolution of technologies (2) the long-term evolution of organizational paradigms (3) the long-term evolution of management models (4) micro processes of organizational and managerial innovation (see the attached figure for a visualization) For the long-term technological processes, relying on a neo-Schumpeterian framework (Carlota Perez), we study subsequent technological revolutions (railway, steel &electricity, automobile, ICT). We argue that the emergence of a technological revolution in leading industries generates radically new organizational and management problems. The solution to these problems takes the form of a new organizational paradigm (professionally-managed firm, factory, corporation, network). This new paradigm emerges in two cycles. In a first cycle, we see the emergence of a new management model that represents a revolutionary break with the prevailing organizational paradigm (Line-and-staff, Scientific management, Strategy-and-structure, Business process). The appearance of this model typically generates unintended consequences (often related to human problems), which in turn prompt a second cycle that generates another management model that rectifies those dysfunctions and thereby rebalances and stabilizes the new organizational paradigm (Industrial betterment, Human relations, Quality management/organizational culture and learning, Knowledge management). (The connection to individual human development would be: An organizational expert working in the early 19th century, time-traveling into the present, would first need to master many of the lessons accumulated by the successive paradigms and models of the last century and a half. Each of the models that has left its mark on the overall evolution of management and organization offers a lesson for the individual.) We clearly see connections between this four processes, and?coming now to your question?we would also argue that there should be connections to the the longer-term evolution of social institutions. Actually, Paul Adler and I currently study the evolution of workplace communities?the fabric of workplace social relations?, and we are confident that we can make a connection to the 4 processes mentioned above. Regarding the question of an "orthogenetic principle": I need to think about this more. What we say in our paper is that the we see indicators of growing complexity of the division of labor, growing interdependence among actors, and increasing scope of the corresponding integration and control efforts. These indicators might be read as related to what Paul Adler (2012) calls the ?socialization of production?, but we have to explore this more. Kind regards, Zlatko > Thank you for this paper, Zlato. We have not heard from Paul on this list > for years, but > his work has remained on the horizon. Now you have brought it back to us in > an interesting formulation. > > I was struck by the parallels between the way you framed your question and > the question that developmental psychologists (perhaps pedologists, > David?): > > we argue that technology is a powerful factor shaping the evolution of > management models? contents > > a couple of months ago Roy Pea gave a talk at the Piaget society meetings > in which we made a very similar point with respect to the role of culture > in human development. Simplifying brutally, we argued that new technologies > entail changes in social relations that subsequently change the environment > of development for the en-culturating organism. This formulation, we > suggested provided piagetians to reconcile contradictions between the > biological and the social sides of Piaget. > > The similarity of the arguments raises a question for me about principles > of development that appear non-accidently related at different levels of > analysis: > 'individual organism, individual organism as constituitive of a social > group, the institutional structure of the organism's environment, the > structure of that proximal society and its relation to the organization of > the species of which it is a part. Does some sort of "orthogenetic > principle" apply across different scales of social processes? > > Short of that, what are we to make of the "limited" differences we see in > the dynamics of different levels of the system in relative sychrony, > perhaps a crisis, perhaps an opportunity? > > David has been point toward a sociology and linguistics to bring together > various apparently combinable mode of theorizing a CHAT account of > development that generalizes across scales (themselves differentially > mutable from the perspective of a single human organism). This work, and > that part of Yrjo's work focused on organisms seems to be pointing in > similarly directions. If that it correct, it extends the links to the study > of social institutions, a topic currently of general interest in the CHAT > community. > > In any events, thanks. > > mike > > On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 6:52 AM, Zlatko Bodrozic wrote: > >> Dear colleagues, >> >> some of you might find our paper (co-authored with Paul Adler) on the >> historical evolution of management models and organizational paradigms >> interesting. We published it this year in Administrative Science Quarterly. >> While it is based on a Neo-Schumpeterian framework (Schumpeter, Freeman, >> Perez), it was equally informed by cultural-historical activity theory. >> You can download a copy by using the link below, and we would be delighted >> to get any reactions to it that you might share with us. >> >> Best wishes, >> Zlatko Bodro?i? and Paul Adler >> >> Bodrozic, Z., and P.S. Adler (forthcoming) The Evolution of Management >> Models: A Neo-Schumpeterian Theory. /Administrative Science Quarterly/ >> Download >> >> >> -- ----------------------------------------------------- Dr. Zlatko Bodro?i? Email: bodrozic@web.de Tel.: +381-62-1769594 Tel.: +49-172-4712341 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Fig A1 portrait.pdf Type: application/download Size: 227409 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170820/cb34880c/attachment.bin From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 20 03:16:18 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 10:16:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no>, <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> Message-ID: <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> Yes, I guess, they are different concepts. But, in a way, the two are being mobilised here to do a similar job, namely to establish a field of inquiry and its methodology. As you've written somewhere else, for a unit to be such it has to be a unit of something, right? So, what was that something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing 'tool mediated action' as unit? And, was there a unit Vygotsky was envisioning to account for the semantics of action? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 20 August 2017 12:03 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of the situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool use, if you will). > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? > > In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? > > David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete and real relation between people? > > Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. > > Lots of wondering here! > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of > Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the > conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it > was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his > work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense > without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. > But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He > was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech > as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping > tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions > qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis > of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a > system of artefact-mediated actions. > > Do you see a problem here, Helena? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? >> >> Thanks -- H >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They >>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from >>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. >>> >>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be >>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using >>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual >>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri >>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be >>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted >>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and >>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of >>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani >>> as well as a piano. >>> >>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning >>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For >>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and >>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, >>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and >>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is >>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to >>> form its coda. >>> >>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the >>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell >>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of >>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest >>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in >>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical >>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. >>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: >>> Beethoven did. >>> >>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, >>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: >>> >>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't >>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, >>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, >>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. >>> >>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not >>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the >>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of >>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an >>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the >>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. >>> >>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as >>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from >>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >>> Complementarity >>> >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >>> >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of >>>> activity >>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >>>> >>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>>> What are the five, Andy? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>>>>> >>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>>>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>>>>> has given us! >>>>>> >>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>>>> review of >>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>>>>> idea >>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>>>>> follow >>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >> > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Aug 20 03:19:24 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 13:19:24 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] University of Aristotles Thessaloniki Message-ID: Dear all I am looking for a contact for a little help about a book at this university's any department. Thank you. Ulvi From ablunden@mira.net Sun Aug 20 03:26:05 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 20:26:05 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> Message-ID: <4d3522c6-7936-3769-460d-b3baf3cdf788@mira.net> David, I was going to let this go, but after dwelling on it for a while I think I cannot. You are doing exactly what the various writers who were endeavouring to reconstruct Vygotsky's tradition in the 1980s did: looking at various instances of unit of analysis and listing out what you think are the essential features of this object. This is the approach which Vygotsky criticised in "The Problem of Age" in which researchers would try to define a child's environment by listing out the features - father's occupation, number of siblings, housing conditions, etc., etc., but (to use Hegel's phrase) missing the concept. I took a different approach. Somewhat bewildered and rendered incredulous by these various lists of arbitrary features of the unit of analysis, I asked myself where it all came from. Having identified the origins of the idea in Goethe through Hegel and Marx to Vygotsky, it became possible to trace the development of the concept from one writer to the next and see what was essential in the idea even to the extent of seeing that the great writers who used it could be mistaken in this or that respect. It was to avoid this method of comparison of features that the method of analysis by units was invented. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 7:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of > analysis. They are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in > the pedology.The examples, from biology, political > economy, and music, are my own. > > a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small > enough to be manageable in experiments, clinical settings, > and observable using "objectivizing" methods of research > such as the functional method of dual stimulation or the > Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri dish, > drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis > may be provoked and observed with a microscope: the > commodity can be abstracted from an exchange for analysis, > observed as it arises in production and exchange, and > elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" > of that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough > to play on a timpani as well as a piano. > > b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain > functioning analogues of all the properties which are the > object of investigation. For example, cells have > functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and > equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a > coded, potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social > relations of labor and capital we find in a mature > capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is complex enough > to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and > to form its coda. > > c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized > "recapitulations" of the properties which are the object > of investigation. The mechanisms of cell metabolism, > reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the > metabolism of the human organism. A commodity cannot > produce or exchange or invest itself; it does not contain > productive labour or finance capital in anything but a > coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical > process and that historical process is not infallibly > predictable. Beethoven's "theme" did not create its > variations and permutations: Beethoven did. > > Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with > one exception, number three below, they are also based on > Vygotsky!) we find: > > 1.Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally > complex. It doesn't contain analogues of interpersonal > meanings, e.g. questions, commands, statements, requests. > It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, e.g. > hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New > information. > > 2.The social situation of development is minimally complex > but not maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of > relations between the child and the environment at a given > age stage, including the whole of actual and potential > language, but these cannot be managed in an experimental > or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using > the functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > > 3.Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally > complex, but not, as far as I can see, structurally, > functionally or genetically different from the phenomena > of activity they purport to explain. > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards > Conceptual Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > > On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study > of the development of activity > Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or > whatever > Social Situations of Development for the study of > child development > > See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > What are the five, Andy? > > Martin > > On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > Amazon have it for $38.21: > https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsky-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 > > which is not too bad. > > My chapter is available at > https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > but so > far as I can see other authors have not posted > theirs on academia.edu - > maybe elsewhere? > > Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I > have pointed to 5 different domains in which > Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis > by units." To me, it seems useless to identify > a writer's methodological innovations unless > you can transport that methodology to a > different context, and pointing to five > applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good > way of showing how portable the method is. > More recently, I used this method in an > approach to political science, taking a group > of people in the room trying to decide on what > they are going to do together as a unit of > analysis. Personally, I think this method has > proved very fruitful and original. How lucky > we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's > brilliant insights, still generally so unknown > to the general scientific audience. What a > gift LSV has given us! > > But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, > I think you would be a very good candidate to > review this book. Beth? > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Peter, Alfredo Et al - > > It seems that the readers of MCA would > appreciate a good overview review of > the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I > know, no one has proposed the idea > to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem > to have a jump on the task, > Alfredo!). > > Also, given the cost of the book, it would > be nice if authors could follow > Andy's lead and make a draft available. > Andy's article on units of analysis > is on Academia, a click away. That way the > many readers of XMCA around the > world would not be excluded from the > discussion. > > Mike > Happy travels summer readers. :-) > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Aug 20 03:41:50 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 20:41:50 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Good question, Alfredo. The "artefact-mediated action," as I suggested, was read back into Vygotsky's work, partly, possibly, in mistaken effort to find a *single* unit of analysis for Vygotsky. It is a unit of *activity*, and so it makes perfect sense in Activity Theory, whether in the Leontyev version or Engestrom's version. Vygotsky was focused on Psychology and so far as I know had no ambitions in relation to social theory. He did not like idea of a concept which grouped "tool mediated actions" and "sign mediated actions" together as sub-species of "artefact mediated actions." As you remarked, Alfredo, these two modes of action are developmentally distinct. I think the unit remains useful as a unit of social theory however, and *consequently*, retains its value for Psychology. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/08/2017 8:16 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Yes, I guess, they are different concepts. But, in a way, the two are being mobilised here to do a similar job, namely to establish a field of inquiry and its methodology. As you've written somewhere else, for a unit to be such it has to be a unit of something, right? So, what was that something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing 'tool mediated action' as unit? And, was there a unit Vygotsky was envisioning to account for the semantics of action? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 20 August 2017 12:03 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different > concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of the situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool use, if you will). >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading >> >> Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? >> >> In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? >> >> David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete and real relation between people? >> >> Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. >> >> Lots of wondering here! >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading >> >> "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of >> Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the >> conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it >> was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his >> work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense >> without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. >> But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He >> was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech >> as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping >> tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions >> qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis >> of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a >> system of artefact-mediated actions. >> >> Do you see a problem here, Helena? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? >>> >>> Thanks -- H >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>> >>> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. They >>>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, from >>>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. >>>> >>>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be >>>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using >>>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of dual >>>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri >>>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be >>>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be abstracted >>>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and >>>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note "theme" of >>>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a timpani >>>> as well as a piano. >>>> >>>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning >>>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. For >>>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, reproduction, and >>>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, >>>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and >>>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is >>>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, and to >>>> form its coda. >>>> >>>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of the >>>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of cell >>>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the metabolism of >>>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest >>>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in >>>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the historical >>>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. >>>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: >>>> Beethoven did. >>>> >>>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one exception, >>>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: >>>> >>>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It doesn't >>>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, >>>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, >>>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New information. >>>> >>>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not >>>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between the >>>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of >>>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an >>>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using the >>>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. >>>> >>>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but not, as >>>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different from >>>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >>>> Complementarity >>>> >>>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>>> >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >>>> >>>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >>>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the development of >>>>> activity >>>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >>>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >>>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >>>>> >>>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> What are the five, Andy? >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too bad. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so >>>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - >>>>>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different >>>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." >>>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations >>>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and >>>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of >>>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an >>>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying >>>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. >>>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How >>>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still >>>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV >>>>>>> has given us! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a >>>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>>>>> review of >>>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the >>>>>>>> idea >>>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, >>>>>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could >>>>>>>> follow >>>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of >>>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Aug 20 10:09:07 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 10:09:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] germ cells Message-ID: Attached is a paper from MCA that explicitly uses the notion of a germ cell. mike -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: engestrom.cell.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 4401483 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170820/0f316744/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Aug 20 11:48:36 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 11:48:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: This is a question for Jim Wertsch, Alfredo: So, what was that something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing 'tool mediated action' as unit? Here is a copy of an early MCA article on the topic, but Jim's book on Mind as Action or his later writing with V.P. Zinchenko ought to be sources for seeing how the issue of units is dealt with there. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Journal/pdfs/01-4-wertsch.pdf mike On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 3:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Yes, I guess, they are different concepts. But, in a way, the two are > being mobilised here to do a similar job, namely to establish a field of > inquiry and its methodology. As you've written somewhere else, for a unit > to be such it has to be a unit of something, right? So, what was that > something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing 'tool > mediated action' as unit? And, was there a unit Vygotsky was envisioning to > account for the semantics of action? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 20 August 2017 12:03 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different > concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you > push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the anatomy > of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of the > situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool use, > if you will). > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not > phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech > and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are > not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two > developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? > > > > In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the > dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no > longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering > this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute > 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? > > > > David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning > would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not > contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that > psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make > sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete > and real relation between people? > > > > Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. > > > > Lots of wondering here! > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of > > Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the > > conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it > > was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his > > work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense > > without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. > > But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He > > was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech > > as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping > > tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions > > qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis > > of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a > > system of artefact-mediated actions. > > > > Do you see a problem here, Helena? > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? > >> > >> Thanks -- H > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >> > >> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. > They > >>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, > from > >>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. > >>> > >>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be > >>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using > >>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of > dual > >>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri > >>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be > >>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be > abstracted > >>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and > >>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note > "theme" of > >>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a > timpani > >>> as well as a piano. > >>> > >>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning > >>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. > For > >>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, > reproduction, and > >>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, > >>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and > >>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is > >>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, > and to > >>> form its coda. > >>> > >>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of > the > >>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of > cell > >>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the > metabolism of > >>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest > >>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in > >>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the > historical > >>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. > >>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: > >>> Beethoven did. > >>> > >>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one > exception, > >>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: > >>> > >>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It > doesn't > >>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, > >>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, > >>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New > information. > >>> > >>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not > >>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between > the > >>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of > >>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an > >>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using > the > >>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > >>> > >>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but > not, as > >>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different > from > >>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > >>> Complementarity > >>> > >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > >>> > >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > >>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the > development of > >>>> activity > >>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > >>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever > >>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development > >>>> > >>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> What are the five, Andy? > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk > >>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too > bad. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but > so > >>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on > academia.edu - > >>>>>> maybe elsewhere? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 > different > >>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by > units." > >>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological > innovations > >>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, > and > >>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way > of > >>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this > method in an > >>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room > trying > >>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of > analysis. > >>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and > original. How > >>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, > still > >>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a > gift LSV > >>>>>> has given us! > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a > >>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview > >>>>>>> review of > >>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed > the > >>>>>>> idea > >>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the > task, > >>>>>>> Alfredo!). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could > >>>>>>> follow > >>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of > >>>>>>> analysis > >>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA > around > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >> > > > > From modesofpractice@gmail.com Sun Aug 20 12:56:25 2017 From: modesofpractice@gmail.com (David Dirlam) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 15:56:25 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Units of Analysis Message-ID: It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to Andy's kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and add some to it. I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis to be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, even after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this discussion of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of our age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca might find most useful from that work and invite comments. One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in response to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's job, sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a tendency that I have been fighting for decades. Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter from my book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining for a decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about what people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the bottom, which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up (the cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested fashion up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the chapter, they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology where competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts of brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed are modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing modes of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language has changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were there. Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate (growth in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern is especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest levels of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from one mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some friends of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that Mezirow's 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and modes of commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it lays out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for student writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might fit with the modes and phases of commitment. We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and asked them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over 99% readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions of their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a quarter billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions with 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also have the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job placement and graduation rates. Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped dimensions together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of 60 rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So the level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to biosphere. I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that many on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he would be nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful objects and social environments they imply. I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful for progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's paper next. All the best, David Dirlam From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Aug 20 13:36:33 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 05:36:33 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: My dear Andy--It's already been donkeys' ears since Greg finished his PhD: I saw him do a presentation on it in Seoul and it was stunning. He did a postdoc with Mike, and he's solidly on the tenure track now. I am the only one out here who was struggling to finish a PhD, but the struggle is pretty much over now, so long as the reviewers agree to agree. Nevertheless, I apologize if this response is unseemly with joy rather than with the irritation that befits a late in life doctor of philosophy--my PhD was, after all, a kind of afterthought to a busy practitioner's career rather than the usual licence to explore (or ignore). Let me begin by saying (not to you, but to any bystanders who don't know the back history) what Andy's contribution really is. Yes, he is the one who gave us a genetic account of "analysis into units" going back to Goethe, and yes, that was why I supplied an example (an example, and not a defining trait) from his contemporary and quandom collaborator Beethoven. This is important stuff--I would say it is way more important to know this GENETIC account of the concept than to read Wertsch's very confusing account of pole vaulting (!) in "Mind as Action". The only really useful thing about Wertsch's example of pole vaulting is that it explains perfectly why Wertsch can't get his head around the concept of internalization. But long before that Andy was warning us that activity theory was ignoring the Subject and become "objectivist", and that "object oriented action" was part of this problem. When we read Andy's work carefully, we see that a lot of it is devoted to overcoming this weakness, through a careful reading of Hegel and through the idea of projects (which can "project" aims and goals that do not exist in the environment). I would say that this contribution is even more important than his genetic account of analysis into units, and more than gives Andy the right to growl and be growchy towards squirrels like me who would disturb his hibernation (it's winter here in Australia, and Melbourne, where Andy dwells, is much colder than Sydney). Having paidgranted that, I can't agree with his characterization of my tests. The examples I gave were examples, just like Wertsch's valuting pole and John Stuart Mill's water molecule. They were not supposed to be bundles of essential traits.The tests I gave were not essential traits either: they were functional aspects which define the structure of a unit of analysis on the one and and are defined by the very history that Andy charted on the other. So for example the maximal simplicity is not simply anchored in Vygotsky's writing (although the precise phrase is Vygotsky's and not my own): it is a practical demand of the experimental and teaching work he proposes to do. To take another example from history, Bichat, who was the doctor who was looking for cells during Goethe's own time, thought of it as a "primary tissue"--a tissue that gave rise to other tissues, which in turn gave rise to organs, which, linked up, gave rise to the human anatomy (which linked up gave rise to social structures, etc.). This turned out to lack maximal simplicity: today we know that stem cells are cells and not tissues. Helena--yes,and no. I think that mediated action passes the first two tests, but it fails the third. That is, mediated action is maximally simple and minimally complex (for explaining certain things, such as pole vaulting, or hunting). But it is molar--that is, it has exactly the same structure as the larger whole it purports to explain. So the explanation becomes circular: activity is made up of action, and action constitutes activity. The reason why the "scaffolding" interpretation of the ZPD that Jerome Bruner proposed has collapsed is very similar: the ZPD is defined by the child's ability to do stuff with help, and the child's ability to do stuff with help is how we know he has entered the ZPD. This reduces the content of the ZPD to "the child is ready to learn whatever the child is ready to learn". This problem with mediated action has been raised before by Kozulin, and is also commented on by Bakhurst: the explanans and the explanadum are one and the same thing. In fact, the general inflationary trend which attaches to any explanatory principle is predicted (and amusingly illustrated with one of Krylov's fables, about a bullfrog that tries to be as big as a bull) in one of Vygotsky's earliest methodological essays, "The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology" with respect to a wide range of explanatory "units": the libido, the stimulus-response unit, the morbid unconscious, and the personality. Martin Packer did a wonderful exegesis of this in MCA. There is another problem with mediated action that nobody has raised. If we look at this unit the way Andy does, historically, it is not hard to see that it is derived from language, and in particular from the supposedly "universal" structure which English shares with many languages: "Subject-(Verb)-Object". This is the sort of structure we see in The man (speared) the auroch. The women (gathered) fruit. But even English has another form of transitivity: "The auroch ran away", "the fruit ripened". Here the participant is simply a medium through which the process seems to unfold. In many languages, this is actually the main way in which processes and their participants are represented, and over the last few centuries it has become increasingly dominant even in English (especially scientific English). The S(V)O model includes a confusion of categories (because "Subject" and "Object" are at a different level of abstraction than "verb"). And of course the whole of transitivity, if you are Hallidayan, is only one type of meaning. Which brings me to Alfredo's question (and then it is time for breakfast). Compare: Spear the auroch! Let's gather berries! Did you spear the auroch, dear? What berries did you gather, mother? I speared the auroch. I have gathered huckleberries, darling. You can see that the interpersonal nature of the exchange isn't a matter of "dear" or "mother" or "darling": we can get rid of all those words, and we still understand that the giver of a bald command has one interpersonal relation to the receiver of the command and the asker of a question (and even the giver of a different command, like "Let's...") has another. The statements seem more neutral as to interpersonal relations. But this is not a matter of words--it's a matter of wordings. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 7:16 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Yes, I guess, they are different concepts. But, in a way, the two are > being mobilised here to do a similar job, namely to establish a field of > inquiry and its methodology. As you've written somewhere else, for a unit > to be such it has to be a unit of something, right? So, what was that > something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing 'tool > mediated action' as unit? And, was there a unit Vygotsky was envisioning to > account for the semantics of action? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 20 August 2017 12:03 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different > concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you > push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the anatomy > of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of the > situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool use, > if you will). > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not > phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech > and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are > not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two > developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? > > > > In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the > dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no > longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering > this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute > 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? > > > > David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning > would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not > contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that > psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make > sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete > and real relation between people? > > > > Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. > > > > Lots of wondering here! > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of > > Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the > > conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it > > was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his > > work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense > > without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. > > But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He > > was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech > > as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping > > tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions > > qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis > > of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a > > system of artefact-mediated actions. > > > > Do you see a problem here, Helena? > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? > >> > >> Thanks -- H > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >> > >> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. > They > >>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, > from > >>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. > >>> > >>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be > >>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using > >>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of > dual > >>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri > >>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be > >>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be > abstracted > >>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and > >>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note > "theme" of > >>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a > timpani > >>> as well as a piano. > >>> > >>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning > >>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. > For > >>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, > reproduction, and > >>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, > >>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and > >>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is > >>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, > and to > >>> form its coda. > >>> > >>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of > the > >>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of > cell > >>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the > metabolism of > >>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest > >>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in > >>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the > historical > >>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. > >>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: > >>> Beethoven did. > >>> > >>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one > exception, > >>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: > >>> > >>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It > doesn't > >>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, > >>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, > >>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New > information. > >>> > >>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not > >>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between > the > >>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of > >>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an > >>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using > the > >>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > >>> > >>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but > not, as > >>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different > from > >>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > >>> Complementarity > >>> > >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > >>> > >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > >>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the > development of > >>>> activity > >>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > >>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever > >>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development > >>>> > >>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> What are the five, Andy? > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk > >>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too > bad. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but > so > >>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on > academia.edu - > >>>>>> maybe elsewhere? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 > different > >>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by > units." > >>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological > innovations > >>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, > and > >>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way > of > >>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this > method in an > >>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room > trying > >>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of > analysis. > >>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and > original. How > >>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, > still > >>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a > gift LSV > >>>>>> has given us! > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a > >>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview > >>>>>>> review of > >>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed > the > >>>>>>> idea > >>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the > task, > >>>>>>> Alfredo!). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could > >>>>>>> follow > >>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of > >>>>>>> analysis > >>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA > around > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >> > > > > From modesofpractice@gmail.com Sun Aug 20 14:38:19 2017 From: modesofpractice@gmail.com (David Dirlam) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 17:38:19 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Units of analysis Message-ID: It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to Andy's kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and add some to it. I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis to be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, even after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this discussion of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of our age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca might find most useful from that work and invite comments. One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in response to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's job, sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a tendency that I have been fighting for decades. Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter from my book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining for a decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about what people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the bottom, which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up (the cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested fashion up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the chapter, they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology where competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts of brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed are modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing modes of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language has changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were there. Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate (growth in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern is especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest levels of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from one mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some friends of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that Mezirow's 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and modes of commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it lays out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for student writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might fit with the modes and phases of commitment. We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and asked them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over 99% readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions of their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a quarter billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions with 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also have the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job placement and graduation rates. Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped dimensions together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of 60 rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So the level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to biosphere. I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that many on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he would be nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful objects and social environments they imply. I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful for progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's paper next. All the best, David Dirlam From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 20 15:15:45 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 22:15:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> David, considering that Wertsch is and has been a very important resource for those introducing themselves into cultural-historical psychology?it's been a must read during many years at my department?you might be kind enough to unpack a bit what is so confused about his account and understanding of internalisation? I got the wordings vs words point, which I can buy. On transitive vs intransitive, Tim Ingold, in his 2011 Being Alive, ponders on the Marxist problem of whether production or consumption is primary, and encourages to look at producing not as transitive verb but *intransitively*, which is, "to set the verb ?to produce? alongside other intransitive verbs such as to hope, to grow and to dwell, as against such transitive verbs as to plan, to make and to build". Michael Roth and colleagues have considered this with regard to design practice in a couple of papers (one is here: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15710882.2015.1127387 ; the other one is under review for Design Studies). Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 20 August 2017 22:36 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading My dear Andy--It's already been donkeys' ears since Greg finished his PhD: I saw him do a presentation on it in Seoul and it was stunning. He did a postdoc with Mike, and he's solidly on the tenure track now. I am the only one out here who was struggling to finish a PhD, but the struggle is pretty much over now, so long as the reviewers agree to agree. Nevertheless, I apologize if this response is unseemly with joy rather than with the irritation that befits a late in life doctor of philosophy--my PhD was, after all, a kind of afterthought to a busy practitioner's career rather than the usual licence to explore (or ignore). Let me begin by saying (not to you, but to any bystanders who don't know the back history) what Andy's contribution really is. Yes, he is the one who gave us a genetic account of "analysis into units" going back to Goethe, and yes, that was why I supplied an example (an example, and not a defining trait) from his contemporary and quandom collaborator Beethoven. This is important stuff--I would say it is way more important to know this GENETIC account of the concept than to read Wertsch's very confusing account of pole vaulting (!) in "Mind as Action". The only really useful thing about Wertsch's example of pole vaulting is that it explains perfectly why Wertsch can't get his head around the concept of internalization. But long before that Andy was warning us that activity theory was ignoring the Subject and become "objectivist", and that "object oriented action" was part of this problem. When we read Andy's work carefully, we see that a lot of it is devoted to overcoming this weakness, through a careful reading of Hegel and through the idea of projects (which can "project" aims and goals that do not exist in the environment). I would say that this contribution is even more important than his genetic account of analysis into units, and more than gives Andy the right to growl and be growchy towards squirrels like me who would disturb his hibernation (it's winter here in Australia, and Melbourne, where Andy dwells, is much colder than Sydney). Having paidgranted that, I can't agree with his characterization of my tests. The examples I gave were examples, just like Wertsch's valuting pole and John Stuart Mill's water molecule. They were not supposed to be bundles of essential traits.The tests I gave were not essential traits either: they were functional aspects which define the structure of a unit of analysis on the one and and are defined by the very history that Andy charted on the other. So for example the maximal simplicity is not simply anchored in Vygotsky's writing (although the precise phrase is Vygotsky's and not my own): it is a practical demand of the experimental and teaching work he proposes to do. To take another example from history, Bichat, who was the doctor who was looking for cells during Goethe's own time, thought of it as a "primary tissue"--a tissue that gave rise to other tissues, which in turn gave rise to organs, which, linked up, gave rise to the human anatomy (which linked up gave rise to social structures, etc.). This turned out to lack maximal simplicity: today we know that stem cells are cells and not tissues. Helena--yes,and no. I think that mediated action passes the first two tests, but it fails the third. That is, mediated action is maximally simple and minimally complex (for explaining certain things, such as pole vaulting, or hunting). But it is molar--that is, it has exactly the same structure as the larger whole it purports to explain. So the explanation becomes circular: activity is made up of action, and action constitutes activity. The reason why the "scaffolding" interpretation of the ZPD that Jerome Bruner proposed has collapsed is very similar: the ZPD is defined by the child's ability to do stuff with help, and the child's ability to do stuff with help is how we know he has entered the ZPD. This reduces the content of the ZPD to "the child is ready to learn whatever the child is ready to learn". This problem with mediated action has been raised before by Kozulin, and is also commented on by Bakhurst: the explanans and the explanadum are one and the same thing. In fact, the general inflationary trend which attaches to any explanatory principle is predicted (and amusingly illustrated with one of Krylov's fables, about a bullfrog that tries to be as big as a bull) in one of Vygotsky's earliest methodological essays, "The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology" with respect to a wide range of explanatory "units": the libido, the stimulus-response unit, the morbid unconscious, and the personality. Martin Packer did a wonderful exegesis of this in MCA. There is another problem with mediated action that nobody has raised. If we look at this unit the way Andy does, historically, it is not hard to see that it is derived from language, and in particular from the supposedly "universal" structure which English shares with many languages: "Subject-(Verb)-Object". This is the sort of structure we see in The man (speared) the auroch. The women (gathered) fruit. But even English has another form of transitivity: "The auroch ran away", "the fruit ripened". Here the participant is simply a medium through which the process seems to unfold. In many languages, this is actually the main way in which processes and their participants are represented, and over the last few centuries it has become increasingly dominant even in English (especially scientific English). The S(V)O model includes a confusion of categories (because "Subject" and "Object" are at a different level of abstraction than "verb"). And of course the whole of transitivity, if you are Hallidayan, is only one type of meaning. Which brings me to Alfredo's question (and then it is time for breakfast). Compare: Spear the auroch! Let's gather berries! Did you spear the auroch, dear? What berries did you gather, mother? I speared the auroch. I have gathered huckleberries, darling. You can see that the interpersonal nature of the exchange isn't a matter of "dear" or "mother" or "darling": we can get rid of all those words, and we still understand that the giver of a bald command has one interpersonal relation to the receiver of the command and the asker of a question (and even the giver of a different command, like "Let's...") has another. The statements seem more neutral as to interpersonal relations. But this is not a matter of words--it's a matter of wordings. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 7:16 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Yes, I guess, they are different concepts. But, in a way, the two are > being mobilised here to do a similar job, namely to establish a field of > inquiry and its methodology. As you've written somewhere else, for a unit > to be such it has to be a unit of something, right? So, what was that > something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing 'tool > mediated action' as unit? And, was there a unit Vygotsky was envisioning to > account for the semantics of action? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 20 August 2017 12:03 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different > concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you > push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the anatomy > of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of the > situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool use, > if you will). > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not > phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as speech > and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? Are > not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two > developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? > > > > In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the > dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign no > longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering > this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute > 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not it? > > > > David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word meaning > would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not > contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that > psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make > sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a concrete > and real relation between people? > > > > Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) test. > > > > Lots of wondering here! > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of > > Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the > > conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it > > was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his > > work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense > > without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. > > But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He > > was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech > > as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping > > tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions > > qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis > > of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a > > system of artefact-mediated actions. > > > > Do you see a problem here, Helena? > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? > >> > >> Thanks -- H > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >> > >> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. > They > >>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, > from > >>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. > >>> > >>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to be > >>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using > >>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of > dual > >>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a petri > >>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may be > >>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be > abstracted > >>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production and > >>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note > "theme" of > >>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a > timpani > >>> as well as a piano. > >>> > >>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning > >>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of investigation. > For > >>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, > reproduction, and > >>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, > >>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and > >>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" is > >>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, > and to > >>> form its coda. > >>> > >>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" of > the > >>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of > cell > >>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the > metabolism of > >>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest > >>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in > >>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the > historical > >>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. > >>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: > >>> Beethoven did. > >>> > >>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one > exception, > >>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: > >>> > >>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It > doesn't > >>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, commands, > >>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual meanings, > >>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New > information. > >>> > >>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not > >>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between > the > >>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole of > >>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an > >>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using > the > >>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > >>> > >>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but > not, as > >>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different > from > >>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > >>> Complementarity > >>> > >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > >>> > >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > >>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the > development of > >>>> activity > >>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > >>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever > >>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development > >>>> > >>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> What are the five, Andy? > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk > >>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too > bad. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but > so > >>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on > academia.edu - > >>>>>> maybe elsewhere? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 > different > >>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by > units." > >>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological > innovations > >>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, > and > >>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way > of > >>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this > method in an > >>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room > trying > >>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of > analysis. > >>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and > original. How > >>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, > still > >>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a > gift LSV > >>>>>> has given us! > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a > >>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview > >>>>>>> review of > >>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed > the > >>>>>>> idea > >>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the > task, > >>>>>>> Alfredo!). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could > >>>>>>> follow > >>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of > >>>>>>> analysis > >>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA > around > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >> > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 20 15:30:37 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 22:30:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: germ cells In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1503268237037.287@iped.uio.no> Thanks for sharing, Mike. Engestr?m is always a relevant reading, and this one is ideal for discussing germ cell. It provides very specific definitions, such as the following: "The following four characteristics are essential qualities of a germ cell that may lead to an expansive theoretical concept: (a) the germ cell is the smallest and simplest initial unit of a complex totality; (b) it carries in itself the foundational contradiction of 100 the complex whole; (c) the germ cell is ubiquitous, so commonplace that it is often taken for granted and goes unnoticed; (d) the germ cell opens up a perspective for multiple applications, extensions, and future developments." And it offers an empirical illustration, examining "standing up from the chair" as a germ cell in home care activity. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 20 August 2017 19:09 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] germ cells Attached is a paper from MCA that explicitly uses the notion of a germ cell. mike From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 20 15:47:25 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 22:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of analysis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1503269245772.47596@iped.uio.no> Thanks so much David for bringing to the fore your ongoing chat with Andy. The levels you describe are interesting. You mention a chapter; any chance it could be shared with the list? I look at excerpts of your book online and the introductory chapter seems totally relevant to the unit of analysis discussion. Cheers, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Dirlam Sent: 20 August 2017 23:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Units of analysis It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to Andy's kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and add some to it. I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis to be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, even after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this discussion of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of our age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca might find most useful from that work and invite comments. One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in response to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's job, sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a tendency that I have been fighting for decades. Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter from my book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining for a decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about what people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the bottom, which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up (the cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested fashion up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the chapter, they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology where competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts of brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed are modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing modes of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language has changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were there. Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate (growth in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern is especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest levels of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from one mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some friends of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that Mezirow's 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and modes of commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it lays out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for student writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might fit with the modes and phases of commitment. We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and asked them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over 99% readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions of their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a quarter billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions with 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also have the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job placement and graduation rates. Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped dimensions together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of 60 rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So the level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to biosphere. I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that many on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he would be nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful objects and social environments they imply. I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful for progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's paper next. All the best, David Dirlam From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Aug 20 15:57:11 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 08:57:11 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Sure, Alfredo. Wertsch doesn't accept "internalization" or "interiorization". He says this implies dualism, even though Vygotsky specifies that "internal" only means psychological (individuated sociological) and "external" only means sociological (shared psychological). Wertsch's position makes sense if your model of learning is pole vaulting (which is the example he uses in "Mind as Action"). It is rather hard to get your mind around the idea of "internalizing" a fibreglass as opposed to a bamboo pole; much better to consider it, as Wertsch does, a case of "appropriation". Appropriation is indeed peculiarly appropriate to all kinds of "mediated" action under capitalism and particularly the peculiar form of competition that has developed around doping and sporting goods. It involves laying your hands on some piece of property which has been handily provided by the thoroughly commodified environment. But Vygotsky's model is not pole vaulting but word meaning (which is what Wertsch explicitly criticizes in "Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind"). Unlike pole vaulting, learning wording and learning meaning are culturally universal, historically contemporary with sociogenesis, and have deep roots in phylogenesis which are still observable in various parts of the human brain. For example, there is the fact that linguistic text tends to be processed in the left hemisphere while context is represented in the right, much as a bird focuses on the grain with one part of the brain and scans for predators with another. This isn't dualism: it's just a division of labor--or, to put it in a term that originally referred to a linguistic division of labor, it's dialectics. No Hallidayan ever speaks of the child "appropriating" or even "acquiring" language. Language isn't a tool of fibreglass or bamboo. Nor is it an auroch to be speared or a berry to be gathered from the environment; the ergative model is actually a better way to think about it than transitivity. Language is a process that unfolds within and without the child simultaneously but asymmetrically. It is undulating in the brain, the context of situation, and the context of culture at one and the same time. But the resonances the child finds in interpersonal relations and in social relations are never ready-made or ready-to-wear; the child's unique way of construing them can never be ignored. Helena: Bichat's theory of "primary tissues" is another example of failing the third test. For Bichat, primary tissues made up tissues proper in the same way that atomic numbers make up "moles" (hence Leontiev's use of the word "molar" to describe the relationship between actions and activity). In George Eliot's "Middlemarch", Tertius Lydgate fails in his quest to discover the germ theory of diseases because he cannot get over Bichat's notion that real tissues are made up of "primary tissues" and not of cells. In our field, the Lydgate fallacy is represented by activity made up of actions, and by various forms of the homuncular theory of consciousness: consciousness rests upon some secondary consciousness, and then it's turtles all the way down. dk David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David, considering that Wertsch is and has been a very important resource > for those introducing themselves into cultural-historical psychology?it's > been a must read during many years at my department?you might be kind > enough to unpack a bit what is so confused about his account and > understanding of internalisation? > > I got the wordings vs words point, which I can buy. > > On transitive vs intransitive, Tim Ingold, in his 2011 Being Alive, > ponders on the Marxist problem of whether production or consumption is > primary, and encourages to look at producing not as transitive verb but > *intransitively*, which is, > "to set the verb ?to produce? alongside other intransitive verbs such as > to hope, to grow and to dwell, as against such transitive verbs as to plan, > to make and to build". Michael Roth and colleagues have considered this > with regard to design practice in a couple of papers (one is here: > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15710882.2015.1127387 ; the > other one is under review for Design Studies). > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 20 August 2017 22:36 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > My dear Andy--It's already been donkeys' ears since Greg finished his PhD: > I saw him do a presentation on it in Seoul and it was stunning. He did a > postdoc with Mike, and he's solidly on the tenure track now. > > I am the only one out here who was struggling to finish a PhD, but the > struggle is pretty much over now, so long as the reviewers agree to agree. > Nevertheless, I apologize if this response is unseemly with joy rather than > with the irritation that befits a late in life doctor of philosophy--my PhD > was, after all, a kind of afterthought to a busy practitioner's career > rather than the usual licence to explore (or ignore). > > Let me begin by saying (not to you, but to any bystanders who don't know > the back history) what Andy's contribution really is. Yes, he is the one > who gave us a genetic account of "analysis into units" going back to > Goethe, and yes, that was why I supplied an example (an example, and not a > defining trait) from his contemporary and quandom collaborator Beethoven. > This is important stuff--I would say it is way more important to know this > GENETIC account of the concept than to read Wertsch's very confusing > account of pole vaulting (!) in "Mind as Action". The only really useful > thing about Wertsch's example of pole vaulting is that it explains > perfectly why Wertsch can't get his head around the concept of > internalization. > > But long before that Andy was warning us that activity theory was ignoring > the Subject and become "objectivist", and that "object oriented action" was > part of this problem. When we read Andy's work carefully, we see that a lot > of it is devoted to overcoming this weakness, through a careful reading of > Hegel and through the idea of projects (which can "project" aims and goals > that do not exist in the environment). I would say that this contribution > is even more important than his genetic account of analysis into units, and > more than gives Andy the right to growl and be growchy towards squirrels > like me who would disturb his hibernation (it's winter here in Australia, > and Melbourne, where Andy dwells, is much colder than Sydney). > > Having paidgranted that, I can't agree with his characterization of my > tests. The examples I gave were examples, just like Wertsch's valuting pole > and John Stuart Mill's water molecule. They were not supposed to be bundles > of essential traits.The tests I gave were not essential traits either: they > were functional aspects which define the structure of a unit of analysis on > the one and and are defined by the very history that Andy charted on the > other. So for example the maximal simplicity is not simply anchored in > Vygotsky's writing (although the precise phrase is Vygotsky's and not my > own): it is a practical demand of the experimental and teaching work he > proposes to do. To take another example from history, Bichat, who was the > doctor who was looking for cells during Goethe's own time, thought of it as > a "primary tissue"--a tissue that gave rise to other tissues, which in turn > gave rise to organs, which, linked up, gave rise to the human anatomy > (which linked up gave rise to social structures, etc.). This turned out to > lack maximal simplicity: today we know that stem cells are cells and not > tissues. > > Helena--yes,and no. I think that mediated action passes the first two > tests, but it fails the third. That is, mediated action is maximally simple > and minimally complex (for explaining certain things, such as pole > vaulting, or hunting). But it is molar--that is, it has exactly the same > structure as the larger whole it purports to explain. So the explanation > becomes circular: activity is made up of action, and action constitutes > activity. The reason why the "scaffolding" interpretation of the ZPD that > Jerome Bruner proposed has collapsed is very similar: the ZPD is defined by > the child's ability to do stuff with help, and the child's ability to do > stuff with help is how we know he has entered the ZPD. This reduces the > content of the ZPD to "the child is ready to learn whatever the child is > ready to learn". This problem with mediated action has been raised before > by Kozulin, and is also commented on by Bakhurst: the explanans and the > explanadum are one and the same thing. In fact, the general inflationary > trend which attaches to any explanatory principle is predicted (and > amusingly illustrated with one of Krylov's fables, about a bullfrog that > tries to be as big as a bull) in one of Vygotsky's earliest methodological > essays, "The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology" with respect > to a wide range of explanatory "units": the libido, the stimulus-response > unit, the morbid unconscious, and the personality. Martin Packer did a > wonderful exegesis of this in MCA. > > There is another problem with mediated action that nobody has raised. If we > look at this unit the way Andy does, historically, it is not hard to see > that it is derived from language, and in particular from the supposedly > "universal" structure which English shares with many languages: > "Subject-(Verb)-Object". This is the sort of structure we see in > > The man (speared) the auroch. > The women (gathered) fruit. > > But even English has another form of transitivity: "The auroch ran away", > "the fruit ripened". Here the participant is simply a medium through which > the process seems to unfold. In many languages, this is actually the main > way in which processes and their participants are represented, and over the > last few centuries it has become increasingly dominant even in English > (especially scientific English). The S(V)O model includes a confusion of > categories (because "Subject" and "Object" are at a different level of > abstraction than "verb"). And of course the whole of transitivity, if you > are Hallidayan, is only one type of meaning. > > Which brings me to Alfredo's question (and then it is time for breakfast). > Compare: > > Spear the auroch! Let's gather berries! > Did you spear the auroch, dear? What berries did you gather, mother? > I speared the auroch. I have gathered huckleberries, > darling. > > You can see that the interpersonal nature of the exchange isn't a matter of > "dear" or "mother" or "darling": we can get rid of all those words, and we > still understand that the giver of a bald command has one interpersonal > relation to the receiver of the command and the asker of a question (and > even the giver of a different command, like "Let's...") has another. The > statements seem more neutral as to interpersonal relations. But this is not > a matter of words--it's a matter of wordings. > > > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 7:16 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Yes, I guess, they are different concepts. But, in a way, the two are > > being mobilised here to do a similar job, namely to establish a field of > > inquiry and its methodology. As you've written somewhere else, for a unit > > to be such it has to be a unit of something, right? So, what was that > > something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing 'tool > > mediated action' as unit? And, was there a unit Vygotsky was envisioning > to > > account for the semantics of action? > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 20 August 2017 12:03 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different > > concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you > > push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the > anatomy > > of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of > the > > situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool > use, > > if you will). > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > > > Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not > > phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as > speech > > and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? > Are > > not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two > > developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? > > > > > > In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the > > dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign > no > > longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering > > this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute > > 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not > it? > > > > > > David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word > meaning > > would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not > > contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that > > psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make > > sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a > concrete > > and real relation between people? > > > > > > Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) > test. > > > > > > Lots of wondering here! > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > > > > > "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of > > > Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the > > > conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it > > > was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his > > > work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense > > > without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. > > > But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He > > > was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech > > > as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping > > > tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions > > > qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis > > > of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a > > > system of artefact-mediated actions. > > > > > > Do you see a problem here, Helena? > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > >> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? > > >> > > >> Thanks -- H > > >> > > >> Helena Worthen > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > >> > > >> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >> > > >>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. > > They > > >>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, > > from > > >>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. > > >>> > > >>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to > be > > >>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using > > >>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of > > dual > > >>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a > petri > > >>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may > be > > >>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be > > abstracted > > >>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production > and > > >>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note > > "theme" of > > >>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a > > timpani > > >>> as well as a piano. > > >>> > > >>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning > > >>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of > investigation. > > For > > >>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, > > reproduction, and > > >>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, > > >>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and > > >>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" > is > > >>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, > > and to > > >>> form its coda. > > >>> > > >>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" > of > > the > > >>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of > > cell > > >>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the > > metabolism of > > >>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest > > >>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in > > >>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the > > historical > > >>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. > > >>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: > > >>> Beethoven did. > > >>> > > >>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one > > exception, > > >>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: > > >>> > > >>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It > > doesn't > > >>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, > commands, > > >>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual > meanings, > > >>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New > > information. > > >>> > > >>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not > > >>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between > > the > > >>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole > of > > >>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an > > >>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using > > the > > >>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > > >>> > > >>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but > > not, as > > >>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different > > from > > >>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. > > >>> > > >>> David Kellogg > > >>> Macquarie University > > >>> > > >>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > > >>> Complementarity > > >>> > > >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: > > >>> > > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > >>> > > >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > > >>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the > > development of > > >>>> activity > > >>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > > >>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever > > >>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development > > >>>> > > >>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > >>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> What are the five, Andy? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Martin > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > >>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk > > >>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too > > bad. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but > > so > > >>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on > > academia.edu - > > >>>>>> maybe elsewhere? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 > > different > > >>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by > > units." > > >>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological > > innovations > > >>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, > > and > > >>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good > way > > of > > >>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this > > method in an > > >>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the > room > > trying > > >>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of > > analysis. > > >>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and > > original. How > > >>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, > > still > > >>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a > > gift LSV > > >>>>>> has given us! > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would > be a > > >>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > >>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview > > >>>>>>> review of > > >>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed > > the > > >>>>>>> idea > > >>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the > > task, > > >>>>>>> Alfredo!). > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors > could > > >>>>>>> follow > > >>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units > of > > >>>>>>> analysis > > >>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA > > around > > >>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Mike > > >>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >> > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Aug 20 17:19:22 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 17:19:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of Analysis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I agree with Alfredo that it would be easier for people to interpret your note, David D, if you included either the relevant chapter or a written precis of the material in it. As you can see, the range of sources of peoples' ideas here exceeds the limits of all mortals here present, so starting with a Topic 101 summary locating the ideas is never a bad idea. mike On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 12:56 PM, David Dirlam wrote: > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to Andy's > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and add > some to it. > > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis to > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, even > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this discussion > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of our > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. > > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in response > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's job, > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a tendency > that I have been fighting for decades. > > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter from my > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining for a > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about what > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the bottom, > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up (the > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested fashion > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. > > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the chapter, > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology where > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts of > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. > > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed are > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing modes > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language has > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were there. > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate (growth > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern is > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest levels > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from one > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some friends > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that Mezirow's > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and modes of > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. > > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it lays > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for student > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might fit > with the modes and phases of commitment. > > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, > when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and asked > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over 99% > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions of > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a quarter > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions with > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also have > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job > placement and graduation rates. > > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped dimensions > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of 60 > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So the > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to > biosphere. > > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that many > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he would be > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful objects > and social environments they imply. > > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful for > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's paper > next. > > All the best, > > David Dirlam > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Aug 20 21:02:05 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 21:02:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? Message-ID: <599a5b40.0435620a.b7645.1fdf@mx.google.com> On page 204 of the Wertsch article : ?The Primacy of Mediated Action in Sociocultural Studies? is the notion of broadening the concept of *Settings* On page 204 is this paragraph: ?Vygotsky?s analysis of mediation is central to understanding his contribution to psychology. Indeed, it is the key in his approach to understanding how human mental functioning is tied to cultural [settings], institutional [settings], and historical [settings] since these settings shape and provide the cultural tools that are mastered by individuals to form this functioning. In this approach the mediational means are what might be termed the *carriers* of sociocultural patterns and knowledge.? I notice that other traditions posit the notion of {worlds] that come into existence with human approaches to [worlds]. Is it ok to consider that Wertsch who is exploring linking human mental functioning to human settings is indicating the same realm as others who are exploring human mental functioning linking to human *worlds*. In particular the author John William Miller posits the actuality of *midworlds* that resemble or have a family semblance to the notion of *settings*. Also Continental Philosophy explores *worlds* that exist as human dwelling places? The notions of [settings] and [worlds] seem to be linked? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From ablunden@mira.net Sun Aug 20 21:56:43 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 14:56:43 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? In-Reply-To: <599a5b40.0435620a.b7645.1fdf@mx.google.com> References: <599a5b40.0435620a.b7645.1fdf@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5f2b4360-8020-cd0c-7be1-a2ba5c22d9c5@mira.net> Larry, all notions are linked, I am sure. The idea of "settings" is a powerful one, used not only by Wertsch but others such as Hedegaard. The trouble I have with it is that it can function to blur some important distinctions. Is the setting an artefact (e.g. a type of building and related furniture and signage, etc., for example marking it as a school) or is it an activity (such as doing schoolwork). Extending this (example) what is the setting on a school field trip? - the ambiguity is of course a real one, not just an artefact of theory - on a field trip, in the absence of all the physical markers of the classroom, kids can mistakenly behave in a way inappropriate to school work. On the other hand, extending the same (example) in the other direction, if a child is acting as a stand-over man in the classroom in order to extort pocket money from other children is this deemed to be taking place in a "school setting"? That is, it tends to blur the mediating artefact with the activity, albeit in ways which mirror real ambiguity. Expressions like "cultural [settings], institutional [settings], and historical [settings]" seem in turn to merge activity and tool/sign with context in the broadest sense. Such settings do indeed "provide and shape the cultural tools" insofar as they are deemed to imply collaborating with other people. The next sentence talks about "mediational means"; these are indeed "carriers" of patterns of activity, etc. But artefacts (tools and signs) are not the only mediational means. Does the author mean artefacts, or are theories and practices (such as for example would characterise a specific institution) also intended to be included? If so, what does this mean for the idea of a "setting." How does setting differ from frame, or context, or discourse, or activity or genre or field, or ...? So there are some powerful ideas in this mixture, but the blurring going on disturbs me. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 21/08/2017 2:02 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > On page 204 of the Wertsch article : ?The Primacy of Mediated Action in Sociocultural Studies? is the notion of broadening the concept of *Settings* On page 204 is this paragraph: > > ?Vygotsky?s analysis of mediation is central to understanding his contribution to psychology. Indeed, it is the key in his approach to understanding how human mental functioning is tied to cultural [settings], institutional [settings], and historical [settings] since these settings shape and provide the cultural tools that are mastered by individuals to form this functioning. In this approach the mediational means are what might be termed the *carriers* of sociocultural patterns and knowledge.? > > I notice that other traditions posit the notion of {worlds] that come into existence with human approaches to [worlds]. > > Is it ok to consider that Wertsch who is exploring linking human mental functioning to human settings is indicating the same realm as others who are exploring human mental functioning linking to human *worlds*. > > In particular the author John William Miller posits the actuality of *midworlds* that resemble or have a family semblance to the notion of *settings*. > Also Continental Philosophy explores *worlds* that exist as human dwelling places? > > The notions of [settings] and [worlds] seem to be linked? > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Mon Aug 21 02:55:47 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 16:55:47 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> David, I was with you right up to the last sentence. Do you simply mean, ?the idea that activity is made up of actions?? I smile that you take your example for me from Middlemarch. Good guess. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Berkeley, CA 9470 Phone VN 0168 4628562 Blog US/ Viet Nam: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > On Aug 21, 2017, at 5:57 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Sure, Alfredo. Wertsch doesn't accept "internalization" or > "interiorization". He says this implies dualism, even though Vygotsky > specifies that "internal" only means psychological (individuated > sociological) and "external" only means sociological (shared > psychological). > > Wertsch's position makes sense if your model of learning is pole vaulting > (which is the example he uses in "Mind as Action"). It is rather hard to > get your mind around the idea of "internalizing" a fibreglass as opposed to > a bamboo pole; much better to consider it, as Wertsch does, a case of > "appropriation". Appropriation is indeed peculiarly appropriate to all > kinds of "mediated" action under capitalism and particularly the peculiar > form of competition that has developed around doping and sporting goods. It > involves laying your hands on some piece of property which has been handily > provided by the thoroughly commodified environment. > > But Vygotsky's model is not pole vaulting but word meaning (which is what > Wertsch explicitly criticizes in "Vygotsky and the Social Formation of > Mind"). Unlike pole vaulting, learning wording and learning meaning are > culturally universal, historically contemporary with sociogenesis, and have > deep roots in phylogenesis which are still observable in various parts of > the human brain. For example, there is the fact that linguistic text tends > to be processed in the left hemisphere while context is represented in the > right, much as a bird focuses on the grain with one part of the brain and > scans for predators with another. This isn't dualism: it's just a division > of labor--or, to put it in a term that originally referred to a linguistic > division of labor, it's dialectics. > > No Hallidayan ever speaks of the child "appropriating" or even "acquiring" > language. Language isn't a tool of fibreglass or bamboo. Nor is it an > auroch to be speared or a berry to be gathered from the environment; the > ergative model is actually a better way to think about it than > transitivity. Language is a process that unfolds within and without the > child simultaneously but asymmetrically. It is undulating in the brain, the > context of situation, and the context of culture at one and the same time. > But the resonances the child finds in interpersonal relations and in social > relations are never ready-made or ready-to-wear; the child's unique way of > construing them can never be ignored. > > Helena: Bichat's theory of "primary tissues" is another example of failing > the third test. For Bichat, primary tissues made up tissues proper in the > same way that atomic numbers make up "moles" (hence Leontiev's use of the > word "molar" to describe the relationship between actions and activity). In > George Eliot's "Middlemarch", Tertius Lydgate fails in his quest to > discover the germ theory of diseases because he cannot get over Bichat's > notion that real tissues are made up of "primary tissues" and not of cells. > In our field, the Lydgate fallacy is represented by activity made up of > actions, and by various forms of the homuncular theory of consciousness: > consciousness rests upon some secondary consciousness, and then it's > turtles all the way down. > > dk > > > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> David, considering that Wertsch is and has been a very important resource >> for those introducing themselves into cultural-historical psychology?it's >> been a must read during many years at my department?you might be kind >> enough to unpack a bit what is so confused about his account and >> understanding of internalisation? >> >> I got the wordings vs words point, which I can buy. >> >> On transitive vs intransitive, Tim Ingold, in his 2011 Being Alive, >> ponders on the Marxist problem of whether production or consumption is >> primary, and encourages to look at producing not as transitive verb but >> *intransitively*, which is, >> "to set the verb ?to produce? alongside other intransitive verbs such as >> to hope, to grow and to dwell, as against such transitive verbs as to plan, >> to make and to build". Michael Roth and colleagues have considered this >> with regard to design practice in a couple of papers (one is here: >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15710882.2015.1127387 ; the >> other one is under review for Design Studies). >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: 20 August 2017 22:36 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading >> >> My dear Andy--It's already been donkeys' ears since Greg finished his PhD: >> I saw him do a presentation on it in Seoul and it was stunning. He did a >> postdoc with Mike, and he's solidly on the tenure track now. >> >> I am the only one out here who was struggling to finish a PhD, but the >> struggle is pretty much over now, so long as the reviewers agree to agree. >> Nevertheless, I apologize if this response is unseemly with joy rather than >> with the irritation that befits a late in life doctor of philosophy--my PhD >> was, after all, a kind of afterthought to a busy practitioner's career >> rather than the usual licence to explore (or ignore). >> >> Let me begin by saying (not to you, but to any bystanders who don't know >> the back history) what Andy's contribution really is. Yes, he is the one >> who gave us a genetic account of "analysis into units" going back to >> Goethe, and yes, that was why I supplied an example (an example, and not a >> defining trait) from his contemporary and quandom collaborator Beethoven. >> This is important stuff--I would say it is way more important to know this >> GENETIC account of the concept than to read Wertsch's very confusing >> account of pole vaulting (!) in "Mind as Action". The only really useful >> thing about Wertsch's example of pole vaulting is that it explains >> perfectly why Wertsch can't get his head around the concept of >> internalization. >> >> But long before that Andy was warning us that activity theory was ignoring >> the Subject and become "objectivist", and that "object oriented action" was >> part of this problem. When we read Andy's work carefully, we see that a lot >> of it is devoted to overcoming this weakness, through a careful reading of >> Hegel and through the idea of projects (which can "project" aims and goals >> that do not exist in the environment). I would say that this contribution >> is even more important than his genetic account of analysis into units, and >> more than gives Andy the right to growl and be growchy towards squirrels >> like me who would disturb his hibernation (it's winter here in Australia, >> and Melbourne, where Andy dwells, is much colder than Sydney). >> >> Having paidgranted that, I can't agree with his characterization of my >> tests. The examples I gave were examples, just like Wertsch's valuting pole >> and John Stuart Mill's water molecule. They were not supposed to be bundles >> of essential traits.The tests I gave were not essential traits either: they >> were functional aspects which define the structure of a unit of analysis on >> the one and and are defined by the very history that Andy charted on the >> other. So for example the maximal simplicity is not simply anchored in >> Vygotsky's writing (although the precise phrase is Vygotsky's and not my >> own): it is a practical demand of the experimental and teaching work he >> proposes to do. To take another example from history, Bichat, who was the >> doctor who was looking for cells during Goethe's own time, thought of it as >> a "primary tissue"--a tissue that gave rise to other tissues, which in turn >> gave rise to organs, which, linked up, gave rise to the human anatomy >> (which linked up gave rise to social structures, etc.). This turned out to >> lack maximal simplicity: today we know that stem cells are cells and not >> tissues. >> >> Helena--yes,and no. I think that mediated action passes the first two >> tests, but it fails the third. That is, mediated action is maximally simple >> and minimally complex (for explaining certain things, such as pole >> vaulting, or hunting). But it is molar--that is, it has exactly the same >> structure as the larger whole it purports to explain. So the explanation >> becomes circular: activity is made up of action, and action constitutes >> activity. The reason why the "scaffolding" interpretation of the ZPD that >> Jerome Bruner proposed has collapsed is very similar: the ZPD is defined by >> the child's ability to do stuff with help, and the child's ability to do >> stuff with help is how we know he has entered the ZPD. This reduces the >> content of the ZPD to "the child is ready to learn whatever the child is >> ready to learn". This problem with mediated action has been raised before >> by Kozulin, and is also commented on by Bakhurst: the explanans and the >> explanadum are one and the same thing. In fact, the general inflationary >> trend which attaches to any explanatory principle is predicted (and >> amusingly illustrated with one of Krylov's fables, about a bullfrog that >> tries to be as big as a bull) in one of Vygotsky's earliest methodological >> essays, "The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology" with respect >> to a wide range of explanatory "units": the libido, the stimulus-response >> unit, the morbid unconscious, and the personality. Martin Packer did a >> wonderful exegesis of this in MCA. >> >> There is another problem with mediated action that nobody has raised. If we >> look at this unit the way Andy does, historically, it is not hard to see >> that it is derived from language, and in particular from the supposedly >> "universal" structure which English shares with many languages: >> "Subject-(Verb)-Object". This is the sort of structure we see in >> >> The man (speared) the auroch. >> The women (gathered) fruit. >> >> But even English has another form of transitivity: "The auroch ran away", >> "the fruit ripened". Here the participant is simply a medium through which >> the process seems to unfold. In many languages, this is actually the main >> way in which processes and their participants are represented, and over the >> last few centuries it has become increasingly dominant even in English >> (especially scientific English). The S(V)O model includes a confusion of >> categories (because "Subject" and "Object" are at a different level of >> abstraction than "verb"). And of course the whole of transitivity, if you >> are Hallidayan, is only one type of meaning. >> >> Which brings me to Alfredo's question (and then it is time for breakfast). >> Compare: >> >> Spear the auroch! Let's gather berries! >> Did you spear the auroch, dear? What berries did you gather, mother? >> I speared the auroch. I have gathered huckleberries, >> darling. >> >> You can see that the interpersonal nature of the exchange isn't a matter of >> "dear" or "mother" or "darling": we can get rid of all those words, and we >> still understand that the giver of a bald command has one interpersonal >> relation to the receiver of the command and the asker of a question (and >> even the giver of a different command, like "Let's...") has another. The >> statements seem more neutral as to interpersonal relations. But this is not >> a matter of words--it's a matter of wordings. >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >> Complementarity >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >> >> On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 7:16 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >> >>> Yes, I guess, they are different concepts. But, in a way, the two are >>> being mobilised here to do a similar job, namely to establish a field of >>> inquiry and its methodology. As you've written somewhere else, for a unit >>> to be such it has to be a unit of something, right? So, what was that >>> something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing 'tool >>> mediated action' as unit? And, was there a unit Vygotsky was envisioning >> to >>> account for the semantics of action? >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: 20 August 2017 12:03 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading >>> >>> Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different >>> concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>> In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you >>> push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the >> anatomy >>> of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of >> the >>> situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool >> use, >>> if you will). >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>> on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading >>>> >>>> Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not >>> phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as >> speech >>> and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? >> Are >>> not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two >>> developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? >>>> >>>> In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the >>> dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the sign >> no >>> longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering >>> this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can attribute >>> 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does not >> it? >>>> >>>> David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word >> meaning >>> would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does not >>> contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that >>> psychological functions are relations between people first, could it make >>> sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a >> concrete >>> and real relation between people? >>>> >>>> Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) >> test. >>>> >>>> Lots of wondering here! >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading >>>> >>>> "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of >>>> Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the >>>> conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it >>>> was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his >>>> work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense >>>> without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. >>>> But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He >>>> was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech >>>> as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping >>>> tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions >>>> qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis >>>> of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a >>>> system of artefact-mediated actions. >>>> >>>> Do you see a problem here, Helena? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> >>>> On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>>>> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? >>>>> >>>>> Thanks -- H >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>>>> >>>>> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. >>> They >>>>>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, >>> from >>>>>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. >>>>>> >>>>>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to >> be >>>>>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using >>>>>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of >>> dual >>>>>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a >> petri >>>>>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may >> be >>>>>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be >>> abstracted >>>>>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production >> and >>>>>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note >>> "theme" of >>>>>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a >>> timpani >>>>>> as well as a piano. >>>>>> >>>>>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain functioning >>>>>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of >> investigation. >>> For >>>>>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, >>> reproduction, and >>>>>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, >>>>>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor and >>>>>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" >> is >>>>>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, >>> and to >>>>>> form its coda. >>>>>> >>>>>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" >> of >>> the >>>>>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of >>> cell >>>>>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the >>> metabolism of >>>>>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest >>>>>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in >>>>>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the >>> historical >>>>>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. >>>>>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: >>>>>> Beethoven did. >>>>>> >>>>>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one >>> exception, >>>>>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It >>> doesn't >>>>>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, >> commands, >>>>>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual >> meanings, >>>>>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New >>> information. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not >>>>>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between >>> the >>>>>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole >> of >>>>>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an >>>>>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using >>> the >>>>>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. >>>>>> >>>>>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but >>> not, as >>>>>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically different >>> from >>>>>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual >>>>>> Complementarity >>>>>> >>>>>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect >>>>>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the >>> development of >>>>>>> activity >>>>>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development >>>>>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever >>>>>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development >>>>>>> >>>>>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- >> decision-making >>>>>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What are the five, Andy? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk >>>>>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too >>> bad. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but >>> so >>>>>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on >>> academia.edu - >>>>>>>>> maybe elsewhere? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 >>> different >>>>>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by >>> units." >>>>>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological >>> innovations >>>>>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, >>> and >>>>>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good >> way >>> of >>>>>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this >>> method in an >>>>>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the >> room >>> trying >>>>>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of >>> analysis. >>>>>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and >>> original. How >>>>>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, >>> still >>>>>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a >>> gift LSV >>>>>>>>> has given us! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would >> be a >>>>>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- >>> decision-making >>>>>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview >>>>>>>>>> review of >>>>>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed >>> the >>>>>>>>>> idea >>>>>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the >>> task, >>>>>>>>>> Alfredo!). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors >> could >>>>>>>>>> follow >>>>>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units >> of >>>>>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA >>> around >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> From modesofpractice@gmail.com Mon Aug 21 04:17:47 2017 From: modesofpractice@gmail.com (David Dirlam) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 07:17:47 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of Analysis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks Alfredo and Mike for suggesting the Chapter. I've written to my editor at Routledge / Taylor & Francis for permission to make it available to xmca. I should know about that in a few days. I have some shorter versions for different audiences, but that chapter was written for scholars and the whole book is more complete than anything else I've written on the unit of analysis in the last few decades. Even with the introductory chapter on units, the work on the 11 level nested hierarchy for the Chapter 11 of the book greatly expanded my thinking in ways I didn't expect before I wrote the chapter. So there is also a relatively inexpensive e-edition of the whole book at https://www.routledge.com/Teachers-Learners-Modes-of-Practice-Theory-and-Methodology-for-Identifying/Dirlam/p/book/9781138641181 David On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 8:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > I agree with Alfredo that it would be easier for people to interpret your > note, David D, > if you included either the relevant chapter or a written precis of the > material in it. > > As you can see, the range of sources of peoples' ideas here exceeds the > limits of all mortals here present, so starting with a Topic 101 summary > locating the ideas is never a bad idea. > > mike > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 12:56 PM, David Dirlam > wrote: > > > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to > Andy's > > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line > > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and > add > > some to it. > > > > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis > to > > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, > even > > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this > discussion > > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of > our > > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca > > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. > > > > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in > response > > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's > job, > > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher > > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a > tendency > > that I have been fighting for decades. > > > > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter from > my > > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested > > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining for > a > > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for > > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles > > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a > > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about > what > > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the > bottom, > > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it > > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up > (the > > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the > > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many > > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like > > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested > fashion > > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. > > > > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In > > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social > > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the > chapter, > > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology > where > > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to > > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to > > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of > > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts > of > > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. > > > > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed are > > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing > modes > > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental > > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the > > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language has > > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were > there. > > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of > > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four > > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate > (growth > > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource > > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern > is > > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are > > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow > > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest > levels > > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the > > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but > > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole > > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from > one > > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept > > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some > friends > > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that > Mezirow's > > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and modes > of > > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. > > > > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it > lays > > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers > > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for > student > > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me > > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might > fit > > with the modes and phases of commitment. > > > > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of > > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of > > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, > > when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and > asked > > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over 99% > > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions of > > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to > > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each > > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a > quarter > > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. > > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and > > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions with > > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are > > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and > > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also have > > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of > > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job > > placement and graduation rates. > > > > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at > > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped dimensions > > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological > > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The > > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different > > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of > > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews > > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in > > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of > 60 > > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that > > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So > the > > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive > > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to > > biosphere. > > > > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that > many > > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he would > be > > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's > > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. > > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I > > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful objects > > and social environments they imply. > > > > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful > for > > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic > > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's > paper > > next. > > > > All the best, > > > > David Dirlam > > > From ajrajala@gmail.com Mon Aug 21 10:02:13 2017 From: ajrajala@gmail.com (Antti Rajala) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 02:02:13 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? In-Reply-To: <5f2b4360-8020-cd0c-7be1-a2ba5c22d9c5@mira.net> References: <599a5b40.0435620a.b7645.1fdf@mx.google.com> <5f2b4360-8020-cd0c-7be1-a2ba5c22d9c5@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Larry and Andy and all, I agree with Andy that there is a risk of blurring the distinctions. Moreover, I would like to consider the context of activity as dynamic in the sense that Mike meant it in his book in 1996. Andy's example of a fieldtrip resonates so much with a paper that I recently wrote with Sanne Akkerman that I could not resist sharing it here. It will soon be published in a special issue on dialogical approaches to learning, in the journal Learning Culture and Social Interaction. In the paper, we analyze how the forest during a fieldtrip is produced in varied ways as the context of the activity through the different participants' interpretations (teacher, children, nature school educators). We also illuminate how these different interpretations are negotiated and hybridized in the dialogic interactions during the fieldtrip. Hopefully our uses of the terms contribute in small part to the increased clarity of these discussions. https://www.academia.edu/34293982/Rajala_Akkerman_Researching_reinterpretations_of_educational_activity_in_dialogic_interactions_during_a_fieldtrip Antti On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 1:56 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Larry, all notions are linked, I am sure. > > The idea of "settings" is a powerful one, used not only by Wertsch but > others such as Hedegaard. The trouble I have with it is that it can > function to blur some important distinctions. Is the setting an artefact > (e.g. a type of building and related furniture and signage, etc., for > example marking it as a school) or is it an activity (such as doing > schoolwork). Extending this (example) what is the setting on a school field > trip? - the ambiguity is of course a real one, not just an artefact of > theory - on a field trip, in the absence of all the physical markers of the > classroom, kids can mistakenly behave in a way inappropriate to school > work. On the other hand, extending the same (example) in the other > direction, if a child is acting as a stand-over man in the classroom in > order to extort pocket money from other children is this deemed to be > taking place in a "school setting"? That is, it tends to blur the mediating > artefact with the activity, albeit in ways which mirror real ambiguity. > Expressions like "cultural [settings], institutional [settings], and > historical [settings]" seem in turn to merge activity and tool/sign with > context in the broadest sense. Such settings do indeed "provide and shape > the cultural tools" insofar as they are deemed to imply collaborating with > other people. The next sentence talks about "mediational means"; these are > indeed "carriers" of patterns of activity, etc. But artefacts (tools and > signs) are not the only mediational means. Does the author mean artefacts, > or are theories and practices (such as for example would characterise a > specific institution) also intended to be included? If so, what does this > mean for the idea of a "setting." How does setting differ from frame, or > context, or discourse, or activity or genre or field, or ...? > > So there are some powerful ideas in this mixture, but the blurring going > on disturbs me. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 21/08/2017 2:02 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> On page 204 of the Wertsch article : ?The Primacy of Mediated Action in >> Sociocultural Studies? is the notion of broadening the concept of >> *Settings* On page 204 is this paragraph: >> >> ?Vygotsky?s analysis of mediation is central to understanding his >> contribution to psychology. Indeed, it is the key in his approach to >> understanding how human mental functioning is tied to cultural [settings], >> institutional [settings], and historical [settings] since these settings >> shape and provide the cultural tools that are mastered by individuals to >> form this functioning. In this approach the mediational means are what >> might be termed the *carriers* of sociocultural patterns and knowledge.? >> >> I notice that other traditions posit the notion of {worlds] that come >> into existence with human approaches to [worlds]. >> >> Is it ok to consider that Wertsch who is exploring linking human mental >> functioning to human settings is indicating the same realm as others who >> are exploring human mental functioning linking to human *worlds*. >> >> In particular the author John William Miller posits the actuality of >> *midworlds* that resemble or have a family semblance to the notion of >> *settings*. >> Also Continental Philosophy explores *worlds* that exist as human >> dwelling places? >> >> The notions of [settings] and [worlds] seem to be linked? >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> >> >> > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Aug 21 12:10:48 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 19:10:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? In-Reply-To: References: <599a5b40.0435620a.b7645.1fdf@mx.google.com> <5f2b4360-8020-cd0c-7be1-a2ba5c22d9c5@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1503342648639.25217@iped.uio.no> Hi Antti, thanks so much for sharing your work! The case you present is definitely interesting with regard to Andy's example of the problematic of field trips as 'settings'. And congratulations for the recent publication! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Antti Rajala Sent: 21 August 2017 19:02 To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? Dear Larry and Andy and all, I agree with Andy that there is a risk of blurring the distinctions. Moreover, I would like to consider the context of activity as dynamic in the sense that Mike meant it in his book in 1996. Andy's example of a fieldtrip resonates so much with a paper that I recently wrote with Sanne Akkerman that I could not resist sharing it here. It will soon be published in a special issue on dialogical approaches to learning, in the journal Learning Culture and Social Interaction. In the paper, we analyze how the forest during a fieldtrip is produced in varied ways as the context of the activity through the different participants' interpretations (teacher, children, nature school educators). We also illuminate how these different interpretations are negotiated and hybridized in the dialogic interactions during the fieldtrip. Hopefully our uses of the terms contribute in small part to the increased clarity of these discussions. https://www.academia.edu/34293982/Rajala_Akkerman_Researching_reinterpretations_of_educational_activity_in_dialogic_interactions_during_a_fieldtrip Antti On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 1:56 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Larry, all notions are linked, I am sure. > > The idea of "settings" is a powerful one, used not only by Wertsch but > others such as Hedegaard. The trouble I have with it is that it can > function to blur some important distinctions. Is the setting an artefact > (e.g. a type of building and related furniture and signage, etc., for > example marking it as a school) or is it an activity (such as doing > schoolwork). Extending this (example) what is the setting on a school field > trip? - the ambiguity is of course a real one, not just an artefact of > theory - on a field trip, in the absence of all the physical markers of the > classroom, kids can mistakenly behave in a way inappropriate to school > work. On the other hand, extending the same (example) in the other > direction, if a child is acting as a stand-over man in the classroom in > order to extort pocket money from other children is this deemed to be > taking place in a "school setting"? That is, it tends to blur the mediating > artefact with the activity, albeit in ways which mirror real ambiguity. > Expressions like "cultural [settings], institutional [settings], and > historical [settings]" seem in turn to merge activity and tool/sign with > context in the broadest sense. Such settings do indeed "provide and shape > the cultural tools" insofar as they are deemed to imply collaborating with > other people. The next sentence talks about "mediational means"; these are > indeed "carriers" of patterns of activity, etc. But artefacts (tools and > signs) are not the only mediational means. Does the author mean artefacts, > or are theories and practices (such as for example would characterise a > specific institution) also intended to be included? If so, what does this > mean for the idea of a "setting." How does setting differ from frame, or > context, or discourse, or activity or genre or field, or ...? > > So there are some powerful ideas in this mixture, but the blurring going > on disturbs me. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 21/08/2017 2:02 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> On page 204 of the Wertsch article : ?The Primacy of Mediated Action in >> Sociocultural Studies? is the notion of broadening the concept of >> *Settings* On page 204 is this paragraph: >> >> ?Vygotsky?s analysis of mediation is central to understanding his >> contribution to psychology. Indeed, it is the key in his approach to >> understanding how human mental functioning is tied to cultural [settings], >> institutional [settings], and historical [settings] since these settings >> shape and provide the cultural tools that are mastered by individuals to >> form this functioning. In this approach the mediational means are what >> might be termed the *carriers* of sociocultural patterns and knowledge.? >> >> I notice that other traditions posit the notion of {worlds] that come >> into existence with human approaches to [worlds]. >> >> Is it ok to consider that Wertsch who is exploring linking human mental >> functioning to human settings is indicating the same realm as others who >> are exploring human mental functioning linking to human *worlds*. >> >> In particular the author John William Miller posits the actuality of >> *midworlds* that resemble or have a family semblance to the notion of >> *settings*. >> Also Continental Philosophy explores *worlds* that exist as human >> dwelling places? >> >> The notions of [settings] and [worlds] seem to be linked? >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> >> >> > From rbeach@umn.edu Mon Aug 21 13:07:15 2017 From: rbeach@umn.edu (Richard Beach) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 15:07:15 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? In-Reply-To: <1503342648639.25217@iped.uio.no> References: <599a5b40.0435620a.b7645.1fdf@mx.google.com> <5f2b4360-8020-cd0c-7be1-a2ba5c22d9c5@mira.net> <1503342648639.25217@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <936467D4-7612-4F1A-823C-4CE50D7B6CA7@umn.edu> Related to Andy?s discussion of ?settings? as a unit of analysis, based on her work on use of language as a Medium for constituting ?in-between? meanings, Bertau (2014) posits use of ?situations? and ?traditions?: Thus, the two basic aspects of communication are ?situations? and ?traditions.? The link between situations (1) and traditions (2) is given by the fact that participants in (1) contribute over time to the sustaining/changing of the long-term practices of (2). A simple chaining in time? Not for Linell, whose dialogical stance allows him to go right beyond a pure sequential-temporal chaining of (1)-(2)-(1)- (2) that would amount to a simple accumulation in time. Rather, for Linell, there is dialogue between (1) and (2). This is grasped by the very term of double dialogicality: the fact that participants ?engage in both situated interaction and sociocultural praxis? (2009, p. 52). So, by their actual language activity, subjects both engage and perform a situated, unique verbal interaction and enact the sociocultural praxis the verbal forms they perform belong to (e.g., they perform the conversation belonging to a first date in a restaurant, to a family dinner, to an academic reception). But what is really interesting is that this dialogical link makes (2), the tradition, perceivable : ?Double dialogicality makes us see an ? utterance both in its singularity and in its wider sociocultural and historical belongingness? (Linell, 2009, p. 53). There are interdependencies between (1) and (2), interactions (= 1) have situation-transcending aspects (= 2). The examples Linell gives are the case of a speaker who refers to his own words in other occasions, the case of a speaker who breaks out of the current genre (giving a lecture) and shifts into another one (narrating a personal anecdote): dialogues with own, past utterances, and dialogues with framings of genres. That kind of referencing and indexing leads to Linell?s term of ?recontextualization,? addressing the traveling of utterances through texts and contexts. Linell (2009, pp. 248?249) distinguishes three types of recontextualizations, operating on different time scales, where the first two types correspond to the token level, the third type to the type level: (a) within the same conversation (participants make use of the same expressions several times), (b) to other texts or discourses (re-using or alluding to elements of other specific discourses/texts), and (c) borrowing/importing of other genres or discourse orders or routines. So, we can see these types of recontextualizations as possibilities of indexing (2), the tradition, in (1), the interaction. The following brief analysis is now possible. According to our temporal being-ness, we experience the situation, the actual interaction (= 1) now . And we also experience the tradition of practices (= 2) now : exactly through these strategies of referencing and indexing, of borrowing and importing, quoting ourselves, others, genres, discourses, by performing reprises and variations, re-invoicements and re-listenings according to formats we reiterate countless times in a great (although not unending) diversity of speech and-listening practices. All these language activities call in, and thereby construct, our tradition. We ?have? our tradition only in this mode of calling-in, so we experience our tradition again and again by way of performance of language practices, in our forms, or better: our formations according to conventionalized, public patterns?we hear the tradition for instance in certain intonatory and syntactic patterns, in ways of asking a question. Cases like migration coupled with the forced use of an alien language, or the isolation from one?s speaker community (in prison), but also common bilingualism shows how painful it can be to not ?have a language?: on the contrary, it is obvious that language can disappear, that it can get thinner and lose contact to reality, which is nothing but others? reality we could share. So, the socio-historically transmitted tradition is a present practice. Bertau, M-C. (2014). Exploring language as the ?in-between.? Theory & Psychology, 24(4), 524 ?541. Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishers. Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota rbeach@umn.edu Websites: Digital writing , Media?literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core?State Standards , Apps for literacy?learning , Teaching about climate change > On Aug 21, 2017, at 2:10 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Hi Antti, > > thanks so much for sharing your work! The case you present is definitely interesting with regard to Andy's example of the problematic of field trips as 'settings'. And congratulations for the recent publication! > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Antti Rajala > Sent: 21 August 2017 19:02 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? > > Dear Larry and Andy and all, > > I agree with Andy that there is a risk of blurring the distinctions. > Moreover, I would like to consider the context of activity as dynamic in > the sense that Mike meant it in his book in 1996. > > Andy's example of a fieldtrip resonates so much with a paper that I > recently wrote with Sanne Akkerman that I could not resist sharing it here. > It will soon be published in a special issue on dialogical approaches to > learning, in the journal Learning Culture and Social Interaction. In the > paper, we analyze how the forest during a fieldtrip is produced in varied > ways as the context of the activity through the different participants' > interpretations (teacher, children, nature school educators). We also > illuminate how these different interpretations are negotiated and > hybridized in the dialogic interactions during the fieldtrip. > > Hopefully our uses of the terms contribute in small part to the increased > clarity of these discussions. > > https://www.academia.edu/34293982/Rajala_Akkerman_Researching_reinterpretations_of_educational_activity_in_dialogic_interactions_during_a_fieldtrip > > Antti > > On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 1:56 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Larry, all notions are linked, I am sure. >> >> The idea of "settings" is a powerful one, used not only by Wertsch but >> others such as Hedegaard. The trouble I have with it is that it can >> function to blur some important distinctions. Is the setting an artefact >> (e.g. a type of building and related furniture and signage, etc., for >> example marking it as a school) or is it an activity (such as doing >> schoolwork). Extending this (example) what is the setting on a school field >> trip? - the ambiguity is of course a real one, not just an artefact of >> theory - on a field trip, in the absence of all the physical markers of the >> classroom, kids can mistakenly behave in a way inappropriate to school >> work. On the other hand, extending the same (example) in the other >> direction, if a child is acting as a stand-over man in the classroom in >> order to extort pocket money from other children is this deemed to be >> taking place in a "school setting"? That is, it tends to blur the mediating >> artefact with the activity, albeit in ways which mirror real ambiguity. >> Expressions like "cultural [settings], institutional [settings], and >> historical [settings]" seem in turn to merge activity and tool/sign with >> context in the broadest sense. Such settings do indeed "provide and shape >> the cultural tools" insofar as they are deemed to imply collaborating with >> other people. The next sentence talks about "mediational means"; these are >> indeed "carriers" of patterns of activity, etc. But artefacts (tools and >> signs) are not the only mediational means. Does the author mean artefacts, >> or are theories and practices (such as for example would characterise a >> specific institution) also intended to be included? If so, what does this >> mean for the idea of a "setting." How does setting differ from frame, or >> context, or discourse, or activity or genre or field, or ...? >> >> So there are some powerful ideas in this mixture, but the blurring going >> on disturbs me. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 21/08/2017 2:02 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>> On page 204 of the Wertsch article : ?The Primacy of Mediated Action in >>> Sociocultural Studies? is the notion of broadening the concept of >>> *Settings* On page 204 is this paragraph: >>> >>> ?Vygotsky?s analysis of mediation is central to understanding his >>> contribution to psychology. Indeed, it is the key in his approach to >>> understanding how human mental functioning is tied to cultural [settings], >>> institutional [settings], and historical [settings] since these settings >>> shape and provide the cultural tools that are mastered by individuals to >>> form this functioning. In this approach the mediational means are what >>> might be termed the *carriers* of sociocultural patterns and knowledge.? >>> >>> I notice that other traditions posit the notion of {worlds] that come >>> into existence with human approaches to [worlds]. >>> >>> Is it ok to consider that Wertsch who is exploring linking human mental >>> functioning to human settings is indicating the same realm as others who >>> are exploring human mental functioning linking to human *worlds*. >>> >>> In particular the author John William Miller posits the actuality of >>> *midworlds* that resemble or have a family semblance to the notion of >>> *settings*. >>> Also Continental Philosophy explores *worlds* that exist as human >>> dwelling places? >>> >>> The notions of [settings] and [worlds] seem to be linked? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> >>> >>> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Aug 21 13:21:24 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 05:21:24 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helena: Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions, and that if we take away actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev). To me, this is an admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts. Compare Vygotsky's thought experiment of structuring a game in such a way that we take away all the roles and we see that abstract rules remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind in Society")*. Similarly, the idea that consciousness is thought into existence by something called personality (Stern). We are just saying that the earth is flat, and rests on the back of four elephants, and that these elephants stand on the back of a turtle, and the turtle is on the back of another turtle, and it's turtles all the way down. Compare Halliday's distinction between context of situation (not a material situational setting but a potential text) and a semantics (the context of situation as processed into meaning in an actual human mind). My wife is busy doing a texual analysis of "Middlemarch" these days: she wants to find the precise moment when authors figured out that not only do characters speak differently from narrators, and speak differently from each other, the same character will speak differently to different interlocutors. What holds the character together is that the differences are not random, but patterned and motivated, and one of the most first and most obvious instances is that working class characters speak diffeerntly to their employers than they do to their mates in the novels of Gaskell (Mary Barton; North and South, which are both about labor organizing). It's harder to see in "Middlemarch", because everybody is middle class, but there are strongly gendered ways of speaking (Dorothea talks one way to her sister and very differently to Casaubon), as well as interesting exceptions (the way she talks to Will and to Rosamond). Apparently, when Eliot started publishing novels, everybody assumed that "George Eliot" was just a pseudonym for Elizabeth Gaskell. There is even an amusing letter from Gaskell to Eliot where Gaskell signs herself "George Eliot". David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 6:55 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > David, I was with you right up to the last sentence. Do you simply mean, > ?the idea that activity is made up of actions?? > > I smile that you take your example for me from Middlemarch. Good guess. > > H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Berkeley, CA 9470 Phone VN 0168 4628562 > Blog US/ Viet Nam: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > > > > > On Aug 21, 2017, at 5:57 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Sure, Alfredo. Wertsch doesn't accept "internalization" or > > "interiorization". He says this implies dualism, even though Vygotsky > > specifies that "internal" only means psychological (individuated > > sociological) and "external" only means sociological (shared > > psychological). > > > > Wertsch's position makes sense if your model of learning is pole vaulting > > (which is the example he uses in "Mind as Action"). It is rather hard to > > get your mind around the idea of "internalizing" a fibreglass as opposed > to > > a bamboo pole; much better to consider it, as Wertsch does, a case of > > "appropriation". Appropriation is indeed peculiarly appropriate to all > > kinds of "mediated" action under capitalism and particularly the peculiar > > form of competition that has developed around doping and sporting goods. > It > > involves laying your hands on some piece of property which has been > handily > > provided by the thoroughly commodified environment. > > > > But Vygotsky's model is not pole vaulting but word meaning (which is what > > Wertsch explicitly criticizes in "Vygotsky and the Social Formation of > > Mind"). Unlike pole vaulting, learning wording and learning meaning are > > culturally universal, historically contemporary with sociogenesis, and > have > > deep roots in phylogenesis which are still observable in various parts of > > the human brain. For example, there is the fact that linguistic text > tends > > to be processed in the left hemisphere while context is represented in > the > > right, much as a bird focuses on the grain with one part of the brain and > > scans for predators with another. This isn't dualism: it's just a > division > > of labor--or, to put it in a term that originally referred to a > linguistic > > division of labor, it's dialectics. > > > > No Hallidayan ever speaks of the child "appropriating" or even > "acquiring" > > language. Language isn't a tool of fibreglass or bamboo. Nor is it an > > auroch to be speared or a berry to be gathered from the environment; the > > ergative model is actually a better way to think about it than > > transitivity. Language is a process that unfolds within and without the > > child simultaneously but asymmetrically. It is undulating in the brain, > the > > context of situation, and the context of culture at one and the same > time. > > But the resonances the child finds in interpersonal relations and in > social > > relations are never ready-made or ready-to-wear; the child's unique way > of > > construing them can never be ignored. > > > > Helena: Bichat's theory of "primary tissues" is another example of > failing > > the third test. For Bichat, primary tissues made up tissues proper in the > > same way that atomic numbers make up "moles" (hence Leontiev's use of the > > word "molar" to describe the relationship between actions and activity). > In > > George Eliot's "Middlemarch", Tertius Lydgate fails in his quest to > > discover the germ theory of diseases because he cannot get over Bichat's > > notion that real tissues are made up of "primary tissues" and not of > cells. > > In our field, the Lydgate fallacy is represented by activity made up of > > actions, and by various forms of the homuncular theory of consciousness: > > consciousness rests upon some secondary consciousness, and then it's > > turtles all the way down. > > > > dk > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > > Complementarity > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > > > On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > >> David, considering that Wertsch is and has been a very important > resource > >> for those introducing themselves into cultural-historical > psychology?it's > >> been a must read during many years at my department?you might be kind > >> enough to unpack a bit what is so confused about his account and > >> understanding of internalisation? > >> > >> I got the wordings vs words point, which I can buy. > >> > >> On transitive vs intransitive, Tim Ingold, in his 2011 Being Alive, > >> ponders on the Marxist problem of whether production or consumption is > >> primary, and encourages to look at producing not as transitive verb but > >> *intransitively*, which is, > >> "to set the verb ?to produce? alongside other intransitive verbs such as > >> to hope, to grow and to dwell, as against such transitive verbs as to > plan, > >> to make and to build". Michael Roth and colleagues have considered this > >> with regard to design practice in a couple of papers (one is here: > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15710882.2015.1127387 ; the > >> other one is under review for Design Studies). > >> > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> on behalf of David Kellogg > >> Sent: 20 August 2017 22:36 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > >> > >> My dear Andy--It's already been donkeys' ears since Greg finished his > PhD: > >> I saw him do a presentation on it in Seoul and it was stunning. He did a > >> postdoc with Mike, and he's solidly on the tenure track now. > >> > >> I am the only one out here who was struggling to finish a PhD, but the > >> struggle is pretty much over now, so long as the reviewers agree to > agree. > >> Nevertheless, I apologize if this response is unseemly with joy rather > than > >> with the irritation that befits a late in life doctor of philosophy--my > PhD > >> was, after all, a kind of afterthought to a busy practitioner's career > >> rather than the usual licence to explore (or ignore). > >> > >> Let me begin by saying (not to you, but to any bystanders who don't know > >> the back history) what Andy's contribution really is. Yes, he is the one > >> who gave us a genetic account of "analysis into units" going back to > >> Goethe, and yes, that was why I supplied an example (an example, and > not a > >> defining trait) from his contemporary and quandom collaborator > Beethoven. > >> This is important stuff--I would say it is way more important to know > this > >> GENETIC account of the concept than to read Wertsch's very confusing > >> account of pole vaulting (!) in "Mind as Action". The only really useful > >> thing about Wertsch's example of pole vaulting is that it explains > >> perfectly why Wertsch can't get his head around the concept of > >> internalization. > >> > >> But long before that Andy was warning us that activity theory was > ignoring > >> the Subject and become "objectivist", and that "object oriented action" > was > >> part of this problem. When we read Andy's work carefully, we see that a > lot > >> of it is devoted to overcoming this weakness, through a careful reading > of > >> Hegel and through the idea of projects (which can "project" aims and > goals > >> that do not exist in the environment). I would say that this > contribution > >> is even more important than his genetic account of analysis into units, > and > >> more than gives Andy the right to growl and be growchy towards squirrels > >> like me who would disturb his hibernation (it's winter here in > Australia, > >> and Melbourne, where Andy dwells, is much colder than Sydney). > >> > >> Having paidgranted that, I can't agree with his characterization of my > >> tests. The examples I gave were examples, just like Wertsch's valuting > pole > >> and John Stuart Mill's water molecule. They were not supposed to be > bundles > >> of essential traits.The tests I gave were not essential traits either: > they > >> were functional aspects which define the structure of a unit of > analysis on > >> the one and and are defined by the very history that Andy charted on the > >> other. So for example the maximal simplicity is not simply anchored in > >> Vygotsky's writing (although the precise phrase is Vygotsky's and not my > >> own): it is a practical demand of the experimental and teaching work he > >> proposes to do. To take another example from history, Bichat, who was > the > >> doctor who was looking for cells during Goethe's own time, thought of > it as > >> a "primary tissue"--a tissue that gave rise to other tissues, which in > turn > >> gave rise to organs, which, linked up, gave rise to the human anatomy > >> (which linked up gave rise to social structures, etc.). This turned out > to > >> lack maximal simplicity: today we know that stem cells are cells and not > >> tissues. > >> > >> Helena--yes,and no. I think that mediated action passes the first two > >> tests, but it fails the third. That is, mediated action is maximally > simple > >> and minimally complex (for explaining certain things, such as pole > >> vaulting, or hunting). But it is molar--that is, it has exactly the same > >> structure as the larger whole it purports to explain. So the explanation > >> becomes circular: activity is made up of action, and action constitutes > >> activity. The reason why the "scaffolding" interpretation of the ZPD > that > >> Jerome Bruner proposed has collapsed is very similar: the ZPD is > defined by > >> the child's ability to do stuff with help, and the child's ability to do > >> stuff with help is how we know he has entered the ZPD. This reduces the > >> content of the ZPD to "the child is ready to learn whatever the child is > >> ready to learn". This problem with mediated action has been raised > before > >> by Kozulin, and is also commented on by Bakhurst: the explanans and the > >> explanadum are one and the same thing. In fact, the general inflationary > >> trend which attaches to any explanatory principle is predicted (and > >> amusingly illustrated with one of Krylov's fables, about a bullfrog that > >> tries to be as big as a bull) in one of Vygotsky's earliest > methodological > >> essays, "The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology" with > respect > >> to a wide range of explanatory "units": the libido, the > stimulus-response > >> unit, the morbid unconscious, and the personality. Martin Packer did a > >> wonderful exegesis of this in MCA. > >> > >> There is another problem with mediated action that nobody has raised. > If we > >> look at this unit the way Andy does, historically, it is not hard to see > >> that it is derived from language, and in particular from the supposedly > >> "universal" structure which English shares with many languages: > >> "Subject-(Verb)-Object". This is the sort of structure we see in > >> > >> The man (speared) the auroch. > >> The women (gathered) fruit. > >> > >> But even English has another form of transitivity: "The auroch ran > away", > >> "the fruit ripened". Here the participant is simply a medium through > which > >> the process seems to unfold. In many languages, this is actually the > main > >> way in which processes and their participants are represented, and over > the > >> last few centuries it has become increasingly dominant even in English > >> (especially scientific English). The S(V)O model includes a confusion of > >> categories (because "Subject" and "Object" are at a different level of > >> abstraction than "verb"). And of course the whole of transitivity, if > you > >> are Hallidayan, is only one type of meaning. > >> > >> Which brings me to Alfredo's question (and then it is time for > breakfast). > >> Compare: > >> > >> Spear the auroch! Let's gather berries! > >> Did you spear the auroch, dear? What berries did you gather, mother? > >> I speared the auroch. I have gathered huckleberries, > >> darling. > >> > >> You can see that the interpersonal nature of the exchange isn't a > matter of > >> "dear" or "mother" or "darling": we can get rid of all those words, and > we > >> still understand that the giver of a bald command has one interpersonal > >> relation to the receiver of the command and the asker of a question (and > >> even the giver of a different command, like "Let's...") has another. The > >> statements seem more neutral as to interpersonal relations. But this is > not > >> a matter of words--it's a matter of wordings. > >> > >> > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > >> Complementarity > >> > >> Free E-print Downloadable at: > >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > >> > >> On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 7:16 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Yes, I guess, they are different concepts. But, in a way, the two are > >>> being mobilised here to do a similar job, namely to establish a field > of > >>> inquiry and its methodology. As you've written somewhere else, for a > unit > >>> to be such it has to be a unit of something, right? So, what was that > >>> something for which Vygotsky or his Western readers were developing > 'tool > >>> mediated action' as unit? And, was there a unit Vygotsky was > envisioning > >> to > >>> account for the semantics of action? > >>> > >>> Alfredo > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: 20 August 2017 12:03 > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > >>> > >>> Nicely put, Alfredo. But "key" then is quite a different > >>> concept from "germ cell" or "unit of analysis", isn't it? > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> Andy Blunden > >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>> > >>> On 20/08/2017 7:44 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >>>> In my e-mail, 'key' was loosely used as 'central aspect'; but if you > >>> push me a bit, I could also entertain the idea of 'key' as in 'the > >> anatomy > >>> of man is the key to the anatomy of ape' (the anatomy of the meaning of > >> the > >>> situation, or semantic field, is the key to the anatomy of human tool > >> use, > >>> if you will). > >>>> > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu > >>> > >>> on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>>> Sent: 20 August 2017 10:38 > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > >>>> > >>>> Was not the early Vygotsky already arguing that, in ontogenesis (not > >>> phylogenesis) 'properly human forms of using tools' emerge only 'as > >> speech > >>> and the use of symbolic signs are included' (From 'Tool and Sign ...')? > >> Are > >>> not these then not just 'two distinct forms of activity', abut also two > >>> developmentally different strata (for a lack of a better word)? > >>>> > >>>> In the late Vygotsky, we find the argument of a 'transition from the > >>> dynamics of thought to the dynamics of action, and back', where the > sign > >> no > >>> longer is the key, but 'the meaning of the situation' is. Considering > >>> this,a good deal of exegesis seems to be needed before one can > attribute > >>> 'tool mediated action' as a unit implicit in Vygotsky's legacy, does > not > >> it? > >>>> > >>>> David, would your assessment of word meaning be the same if word > >> meaning > >>> would stand for the 'interpersonal meanings' that you suggest it does > not > >>> contain? For, if we were to follow Vygotsky's own remarks that > >>> psychological functions are relations between people first, could it > make > >>> sense to pursue 'word meaning' as actual speech, which always is a > >> concrete > >>> and real relation between people? > >>>> > >>>> Also, I wonder how Perezhivanie would fare your (or Vygotsky's own) > >> test. > >>>> > >>>> Lots of wondering here! > >>>> > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu > >>> > >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > >>>> Sent: 20 August 2017 07:23 > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > >>>> > >>>> "Artefact Mediated Action" was a product of the exegesis of > >>>> Vygotsky especially in the West; people came to the > >>>> conclusion that it was implicit in Vygotsky's work. But it > >>>> was also recognised and incorporated by A N Leontyev in his > >>>> work - indeed, Leontyev's Activity Theory makes no sense > >>>> without the artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis. > >>>> But I don't think Vygotsky never said as much, did he? He > >>>> was more concerned to counter the tendency to subsume speech > >>>> as a subtype of artefact-mediated action, and keeping > >>>> tool-mediated actions and sign-mediated actions > >>>> qualitatively distinct forms of activity. But his analysis > >>>> of Sakharov's experiments takes as given that a concept is a > >>>> system of artefact-mediated actions. > >>>> > >>>> Do you see a problem here, Helena? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>> > >>>> On 20/08/2017 2:27 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >>>>> So "mediated action" works as a unit of analysis? > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks -- H > >>>>> > >>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >>>>> > >>>>> On Aug 20, 2017, at 4:01 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I would like to propose the following tests for a unit of analysis. > >>> They > >>>>>> are all based on things Vygotsky wrote in the pedology.The examples, > >>> from > >>>>>> biology, political economy, and music, are my own. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> a) It must be maximally simple. That is, it must be small enough to > >> be > >>>>>> manageable in experiments, clinical settings, and observable using > >>>>>> "objectivizing" methods of research such as the functional method of > >>> dual > >>>>>> stimulation or the Zoped. For example, cells can be managed in a > >> petri > >>>>>> dish, drawn from patients during examinations, and their genesis may > >> be > >>>>>> provoked and observed with a microscope: the commodity can be > >>> abstracted > >>>>>> from an exchange for analysis, observed as it arises in production > >> and > >>>>>> exchange, and elicited through barter and markets. The four note > >>> "theme" of > >>>>>> that opens Beethoven's fifth symphony is simple enough to play on a > >>> timpani > >>>>>> as well as a piano. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> b) It must be minimally complex. That is, it must contain > functioning > >>>>>> analogues of all the properties which are the object of > >> investigation. > >>> For > >>>>>> example, cells have functioning analogues for metabolism, > >>> reproduction, and > >>>>>> equilibrium with the environment.Commodities contain, in a coded, > >>>>>> potential, or "embryonic" form, all the social relations of labor > and > >>>>>> capital we find in a mature capitalist economy. Beethoven's "theme" > >> is > >>>>>> complex enough to describe the structure of the symphony as a whole, > >>> and to > >>>>>> form its coda. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> c) These analogues cannot be simple, miniaturized "recapitulations" > >> of > >>> the > >>>>>> properties which are the object of investigation. The mechanisms of > >>> cell > >>>>>> metabolism, reproduction, homeostasis are not the same as the > >>> metabolism of > >>>>>> the human organism. A commodity cannot produce or exchange or invest > >>>>>> itself; it does not contain productive labour or finance capital in > >>>>>> anything but a coded form; these must be unfolded through the > >>> historical > >>>>>> process and that historical process is not infallibly predictable. > >>>>>> Beethoven's "theme" did not create its variations and permutations: > >>>>>> Beethoven did. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Applying these tests to the units that Andy proposes (with one > >>> exception, > >>>>>> number three below, they are also based on Vygotsky!) we find: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> 1. Word meaning is maximally simple but not minimally complex. It > >>> doesn't > >>>>>> contain analogues of interpersonal meanings, e.g. questions, > >> commands, > >>>>>> statements, requests. It doesn?t contain analogues of textual > >> meanings, > >>>>>> e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis, Theme and Rheme, Given and New > >>> information. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> 2. The social situation of development is minimally complex but not > >>>>>> maximally simple: it does construe the ensemble of relations between > >>> the > >>>>>> child and the environment at a given age stage, including the whole > >> of > >>>>>> actual and potential language, but these cannot be managed in an > >>>>>> experimental or clinical setting, or elicited in complete form using > >>> the > >>>>>> functional method of dual stimulation or the Zoped. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> 3. Mediated actions are maximally simple and minimally complex, but > >>> not, as > >>>>>> far as I can see, structurally, functionally or genetically > different > >>> from > >>>>>> the phenomena of activity they purport to explain. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual > >>>>>> Complementarity > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Free E-print Downloadable at: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 10:37 PM, Andy Blunden > >>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Word meanings for the study of (verbal) intellect > >>>>>>> Artefact-mediated actions for the more general study of the > >>> development of > >>>>>>> activity > >>>>>>> Perezhivaniya for the study of personality development > >>>>>>> (Defect-Compensation) for the study of disability or whatever > >>>>>>> Social Situations of Development for the study of child development > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> See page 9 on https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > >> decision-making > >>>>>>> On 19/08/2017 10:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> What are the five, Andy? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Aug 18, 2017, at 9:07 PM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/Vygotsk > >>>>>>>>> y-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too > >>> bad. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ > but > >>> so > >>>>>>>>> far as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on > >>> academia.edu - > >>>>>>>>> maybe elsewhere? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 > >>> different > >>>>>>>>> domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by > >>> units." > >>>>>>>>> To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological > >>> innovations > >>>>>>>>> unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, > >>> and > >>>>>>>>> pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good > >> way > >>> of > >>>>>>>>> showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this > >>> method in an > >>>>>>>>> approach to political science, taking a group of people in the > >> room > >>> trying > >>>>>>>>> to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of > >>> analysis. > >>>>>>>>> Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and > >>> original. How > >>>>>>>>> lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, > >>> still > >>>>>>>>> generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a > >>> gift LSV > >>>>>>>>> has given us! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would > >> be a > >>>>>>>>> very good candidate to review this book. Beth? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > >>> decision-making > >>>>>>>>> On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Peter, Alfredo Et al - > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good > overview > >>>>>>>>>> review of > >>>>>>>>>> the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>> idea > >>>>>>>>>> to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the > >>> task, > >>>>>>>>>> Alfredo!). > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors > >> could > >>>>>>>>>> follow > >>>>>>>>>> Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units > >> of > >>>>>>>>>> analysis > >>>>>>>>>> is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA > >>> around > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> world would not be excluded from the discussion. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>>>> Happy travels summer readers. :-) > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Aug 21 13:45:34 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 20:45:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? In-Reply-To: <936467D4-7612-4F1A-823C-4CE50D7B6CA7@umn.edu> References: <599a5b40.0435620a.b7645.1fdf@mx.google.com> <5f2b4360-8020-cd0c-7be1-a2ba5c22d9c5@mira.net> <1503342648639.25217@iped.uio.no>, <936467D4-7612-4F1A-823C-4CE50D7B6CA7@umn.edu> Message-ID: <1503348334354.52@iped.uio.no> Thanks for adding Bertau (who I discover now) and Linell. This begins to sound like polyphony! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Richard Beach Sent: 21 August 2017 22:07 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? Related to Andy?s discussion of ?settings? as a unit of analysis, based on her work on use of language as a Medium for constituting ?in-between? meanings, Bertau (2014) posits use of ?situations? and ?traditions?: Thus, the two basic aspects of communication are ?situations? and ?traditions.? The link between situations (1) and traditions (2) is given by the fact that participants in (1) contribute over time to the sustaining/changing of the long-term practices of (2). A simple chaining in time? Not for Linell, whose dialogical stance allows him to go right beyond a pure sequential-temporal chaining of (1)-(2)-(1)- (2) that would amount to a simple accumulation in time. Rather, for Linell, there is dialogue between (1) and (2). This is grasped by the very term of double dialogicality: the fact that participants ?engage in both situated interaction and sociocultural praxis? (2009, p. 52). So, by their actual language activity, subjects both engage and perform a situated, unique verbal interaction and enact the sociocultural praxis the verbal forms they perform belong to (e.g., they perform the conversation belonging to a first date in a restaurant, to a family dinner, to an academic reception). But what is really interesting is that this dialogical link makes (2), the tradition, perceivable : ?Double dialogicality makes us see an ? utterance both in its singularity and in its wider sociocultural and historical belongingness? (Linell, 2009, p. 53). There are interdependencies between (1) and (2), interactions (= 1) have situation-transcending aspects (= 2). The examples Linell gives are the case of a speaker who refers to his own words in other occasions, the case of a speaker who breaks out of the current genre (giving a lecture) and shifts into another one (narrating a personal anecdote): dialogues with own, past utterances, and dialogues with framings of genres. That kind of referencing and indexing leads to Linell?s term of ?recontextualization,? addressing the traveling of utterances through texts and contexts. Linell (2009, pp. 248?249) distinguishes three types of recontextualizations, operating on different time scales, where the first two types correspond to the token level, the third type to the type level: (a) within the same conversation (participants make use of the same expressions several times), (b) to other texts or discourses (re-using or alluding to elements of other specific discourses/texts), and (c) borrowing/importing of other genres or discourse orders or routines. So, we can see these types of recontextualizations as possibilities of indexing (2), the tradition, in (1), the interaction. The following brief analysis is now possible. According to our temporal being-ness, we experience the situation, the actual interaction (= 1) now . And we also experience the tradition of practices (= 2) now : exactly through these strategies of referencing and indexing, of borrowing and importing, quoting ourselves, others, genres, discourses, by performing reprises and variations, re-invoicements and re-listenings according to formats we reiterate countless times in a great (although not unending) diversity of speech and-listening practices. All these language activities call in, and thereby construct, our tradition. We ?have? our tradition only in this mode of calling-in, so we experience our tradition again and again by way of performance of language practices, in our forms, or better: our formations according to conventionalized, public patterns?we hear the tradition for instance in certain intonatory and syntactic patterns, in ways of asking a question. Cases like migration coupled with the forced use of an alien language, or the isolation from one?s speaker community (in prison), but also common bilingualism shows how painful it can be to not ?have a language?: on the contrary, it is obvious that language can disappear, that it can get thinner and lose contact to reality, which is nothing but others? reality we could share. So, the socio-historically transmitted tradition is a present practice. Bertau, M-C. (2014). Exploring language as the ?in-between.? Theory & Psychology, 24(4), 524 ?541. Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishers. Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota rbeach@umn.edu Websites: Digital writing , Media literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core State Standards , Apps for literacy learning , Teaching about climate change > On Aug 21, 2017, at 2:10 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Hi Antti, > > thanks so much for sharing your work! The case you present is definitely interesting with regard to Andy's example of the problematic of field trips as 'settings'. And congratulations for the recent publication! > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Antti Rajala > Sent: 21 August 2017 19:02 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wertsch is focusing on the concept of *settings* and I wonder if the notion of *human worlds* is considered equivalent to this notion of *settings* ? > > Dear Larry and Andy and all, > > I agree with Andy that there is a risk of blurring the distinctions. > Moreover, I would like to consider the context of activity as dynamic in > the sense that Mike meant it in his book in 1996. > > Andy's example of a fieldtrip resonates so much with a paper that I > recently wrote with Sanne Akkerman that I could not resist sharing it here. > It will soon be published in a special issue on dialogical approaches to > learning, in the journal Learning Culture and Social Interaction. In the > paper, we analyze how the forest during a fieldtrip is produced in varied > ways as the context of the activity through the different participants' > interpretations (teacher, children, nature school educators). We also > illuminate how these different interpretations are negotiated and > hybridized in the dialogic interactions during the fieldtrip. > > Hopefully our uses of the terms contribute in small part to the increased > clarity of these discussions. > > https://www.academia.edu/34293982/Rajala_Akkerman_Researching_reinterpretations_of_educational_activity_in_dialogic_interactions_during_a_fieldtrip > > Antti > > On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 1:56 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Larry, all notions are linked, I am sure. >> >> The idea of "settings" is a powerful one, used not only by Wertsch but >> others such as Hedegaard. The trouble I have with it is that it can >> function to blur some important distinctions. Is the setting an artefact >> (e.g. a type of building and related furniture and signage, etc., for >> example marking it as a school) or is it an activity (such as doing >> schoolwork). Extending this (example) what is the setting on a school field >> trip? - the ambiguity is of course a real one, not just an artefact of >> theory - on a field trip, in the absence of all the physical markers of the >> classroom, kids can mistakenly behave in a way inappropriate to school >> work. On the other hand, extending the same (example) in the other >> direction, if a child is acting as a stand-over man in the classroom in >> order to extort pocket money from other children is this deemed to be >> taking place in a "school setting"? That is, it tends to blur the mediating >> artefact with the activity, albeit in ways which mirror real ambiguity. >> Expressions like "cultural [settings], institutional [settings], and >> historical [settings]" seem in turn to merge activity and tool/sign with >> context in the broadest sense. Such settings do indeed "provide and shape >> the cultural tools" insofar as they are deemed to imply collaborating with >> other people. The next sentence talks about "mediational means"; these are >> indeed "carriers" of patterns of activity, etc. But artefacts (tools and >> signs) are not the only mediational means. Does the author mean artefacts, >> or are theories and practices (such as for example would characterise a >> specific institution) also intended to be included? If so, what does this >> mean for the idea of a "setting." How does setting differ from frame, or >> context, or discourse, or activity or genre or field, or ...? >> >> So there are some powerful ideas in this mixture, but the blurring going >> on disturbs me. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 21/08/2017 2:02 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>> On page 204 of the Wertsch article : ?The Primacy of Mediated Action in >>> Sociocultural Studies? is the notion of broadening the concept of >>> *Settings* On page 204 is this paragraph: >>> >>> ?Vygotsky?s analysis of mediation is central to understanding his >>> contribution to psychology. Indeed, it is the key in his approach to >>> understanding how human mental functioning is tied to cultural [settings], >>> institutional [settings], and historical [settings] since these settings >>> shape and provide the cultural tools that are mastered by individuals to >>> form this functioning. In this approach the mediational means are what >>> might be termed the *carriers* of sociocultural patterns and knowledge.? >>> >>> I notice that other traditions posit the notion of {worlds] that come >>> into existence with human approaches to [worlds]. >>> >>> Is it ok to consider that Wertsch who is exploring linking human mental >>> functioning to human settings is indicating the same realm as others who >>> are exploring human mental functioning linking to human *worlds*. >>> >>> In particular the author John William Miller posits the actuality of >>> *midworlds* that resemble or have a family semblance to the notion of >>> *settings*. >>> Also Continental Philosophy explores *worlds* that exist as human >>> dwelling places? >>> >>> The notions of [settings] and [worlds] seem to be linked? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> >>> >>> >> From bferholt@gmail.com Mon Aug 21 14:37:15 2017 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 17:37:15 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> Message-ID: Great idea, Andy, so just let me know if you'd like to write the review, Alfredo -- Beth On Fri, Aug 18, 2017 at 10:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Amazon have it for $38.21: https://www.amazon.com/ > Vygotsky-Marx-Toward-Marxist-Psychology/dp/1138244813 which is not too > bad. > > My chapter is available at https://www.academia.edu/11387923/ but so far > as I can see other authors have not posted theirs on academia.edu - maybe > elsewhere? > > Thank you, Alfredo, for highlighting how I have pointed to 5 different > domains in which Vygotsky demonstrated the "method of analysis by units." > To me, it seems useless to identify a writer's methodological innovations > unless you can transport that methodology to a different context, and > pointing to five applications by Vygotsky himself seemed a good way of > showing how portable the method is. More recently, I used this method in an > approach to political science, taking a group of people in the room trying > to decide on what they are going to do together as a unit of analysis. > Personally, I think this method has proved very fruitful and original. How > lucky we are to be inheritors of Vygotsky's brilliant insights, still > generally so unknown to the general scientific audience. What a gift LSV > has given us! > > But legacies are always problematic. Alfredo, I think you would be a very > good candidate to review this book. Beth? > > Andy > > > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 18/08/2017 10:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Peter, Alfredo Et al - > > It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview review of > the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the idea > to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, > Alfredo!). > > Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could follow > Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of analysis > is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around the > world would not be excluded from the discussion. > > Mike > Happy travels summer readers. :-) > > > > > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From modesofpractice@gmail.com Mon Aug 21 15:00:23 2017 From: modesofpractice@gmail.com (David Dirlam) Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 18:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of Analysis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Alfredo, Mike and others interested in the discussion of units of analysis in my recent book on Modes of Practice. I just heard from my Routledge editor. They will make the first chapter of my book available to me to put on the listserv in two weeks. In between time, there are some very interesting synergies between the transformative learning discussion of Jack Mezirow and the article by Yrjo Engestrom that Mike sent out yesterday. In particular, I am especially interested in what people think about relaxing the criterion that the unit be the most elementary simple possible. David Dirlam Author of *Teachers, learners, modes of practice: Theory and methodology for identifying knowledge development. *New York: Routledge, 2017. On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 7:17 AM, David Dirlam wrote: > Thanks Alfredo and Mike for suggesting the Chapter. I've written to my > editor at Routledge / Taylor & Francis for permission to make it available > to xmca. I should know about that in a few days. I have some shorter > versions for different audiences, but that chapter was written for scholars > and the whole book is more complete than anything else I've written on the > unit of analysis in the last few decades. Even with the introductory > chapter on units, the work on the 11 level nested hierarchy for the Chapter > 11 of the book greatly expanded my thinking in ways I didn't expect before > I wrote the chapter. So there is also a relatively inexpensive e-edition of > the whole book at https://www.routledge.com/Teachers-Learners-Modes-of- > Practice-Theory-and-Methodology-for-Identifying/ > Dirlam/p/book/9781138641181 > > David > > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 8:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> I agree with Alfredo that it would be easier for people to interpret your >> note, David D, >> if you included either the relevant chapter or a written precis of the >> material in it. >> >> As you can see, the range of sources of peoples' ideas here exceeds the >> limits of all mortals here present, so starting with a Topic 101 summary >> locating the ideas is never a bad idea. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 12:56 PM, David Dirlam > > >> wrote: >> >> > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to >> Andy's >> > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line >> > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and >> add >> > some to it. >> > >> > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis >> to >> > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, >> even >> > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this >> discussion >> > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of >> our >> > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca >> > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. >> > >> > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in >> response >> > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's >> job, >> > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher >> > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a >> tendency >> > that I have been fighting for decades. >> > >> > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter >> from my >> > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested >> > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining >> for a >> > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for >> > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles >> > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a >> > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about >> what >> > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the >> bottom, >> > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it >> > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up >> (the >> > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the >> > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many >> > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like >> > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested >> fashion >> > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. >> > >> > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In >> > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social >> > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the >> chapter, >> > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology >> where >> > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to >> > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to >> > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of >> > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts >> of >> > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. >> > >> > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed >> are >> > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing >> modes >> > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental >> > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the >> > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language >> has >> > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were >> there. >> > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of >> > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four >> > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate >> (growth >> > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource >> > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern >> is >> > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are >> > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow >> > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest >> levels >> > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the >> > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but >> > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole >> > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from >> one >> > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept >> > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some >> friends >> > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that >> Mezirow's >> > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and >> modes of >> > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. >> > >> > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it >> lays >> > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers >> > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for >> student >> > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me >> > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might >> fit >> > with the modes and phases of commitment. >> > >> > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of >> > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of >> > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, >> > when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and >> asked >> > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over >> 99% >> > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions >> of >> > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to >> > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each >> > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a >> quarter >> > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. >> > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and >> > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions >> with >> > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are >> > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and >> > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also >> have >> > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of >> > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job >> > placement and graduation rates. >> > >> > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at >> > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped >> dimensions >> > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological >> > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The >> > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different >> > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of >> > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews >> > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in >> > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of >> 60 >> > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that >> > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So >> the >> > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive >> > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to >> > biosphere. >> > >> > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that >> many >> > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he >> would be >> > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's >> > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. >> > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I >> > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful >> objects >> > and social environments they imply. >> > >> > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful >> for >> > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic >> > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's >> paper >> > next. >> > >> > All the best, >> > >> > David Dirlam >> > >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Aug 21 16:37:16 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 09:37:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things (or events) are activities composed of?? And while you're at it, what other than commodities are units of capital composed of? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Helena: > > Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions, and that if we take away > actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev). To me, this is an > admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts. Compare Vygotsky's > thought experiment of structuring a game in such a way that we take away > all the roles and we see that abstract rules remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind > in Society")*. > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Aug 21 18:48:20 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 11:48:20 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> Message-ID: What other than commodities are the units of capital composed of? That's easy. Commodities are human relations in a congealed form. Ergo, units of capital are made of human relations in an uncongealed form. You are not a fetishist, are you? My point about actions and activities was precisely that activities are NOT made up of anything more than actions; that's why activity fails the third test. I think that Engestrom tries to show some of the abstract rules, the community relations and the division of labor that subtends all this activity, but the distinctions between (e.g.) rules and division of labor, or division of labor and community, are not too clear. As you say, blurring is a problem, if our goal is analysis, and an analysis that shows the heterogeneity (the distinctiveness) of parts. dk David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things (or events) are > activities composed of?? > > And while you're at it, what other than commodities are units of capital > composed of? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Helena: >> >> Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions, and that if we take >> away >> actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev). To me, this is an >> admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts. Compare Vygotsky's >> thought experiment of structuring a game in such a way that we take away >> all the roles and we see that abstract rules remain (Chapter Seven in* >> "Mind >> in Society")*. >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Aug 21 21:21:31 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 14:21:31 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> Message-ID: I think it's more a case that the Kellogg Test#c fails the Activity Theory test, just as the Kellogg Test#a fails Marx's Capital. The whole is greater than the part (if it is a genuine whole) not because there are some additional parts you forgot to add up but precisely because it is a whole despite being not made up of anything other than the parts. I am reminded of A N Leontyev's "accusation" that taking /perezhivniya /a units of personality set up a logical circle: "... / perezhivanie/, as the specific form through which the whole personality manifests itself, now occupies the place that formerly belonged to the whole personality of the child,? that is, determining the child?s / perezhivanie/?... a logical vicious circle." Leontyev seems to think that teh only genuine form of science is reductionism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 22/08/2017 11:48 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > What other than commodities are the units of capital > composed of? That's easy. Commodities are human relations > in a congealed form. Ergo, units of capital are made of > human relations in an uncongealed form. You are not a > fetishist, are you? > > My point about actions and activities was precisely that > activities are NOT made up of anything more than actions; > that's why activity fails the third test. > > I think that Engestrom tries to show some of the abstract > rules, the community relations and the division of labor > that subtends all this activity, but the distinctions > between (e.g.) rules and division of labor, or division of > labor and community, are not too clear. As you say, > blurring is a problem, if our goal is analysis, and an > analysis that shows the heterogeneity (the > distinctiveness) of parts. > > dk > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards > Conceptual Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things > (or events) are activities composed of?? > > And while you're at it, what other than commodities > are units of capital composed of? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Helena: > > Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions, > and that if we take away > actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev). > To me, this is an > admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts. > Compare Vygotsky's > thought experiment of structuring a game in such a > way that we take away > all the roles and we see that abstract rules > remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind > in Society")*. > > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Aug 22 04:53:47 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 11:53:47 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of Analysis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1275611036.3682098.1503402827423@mail.yahoo.com> Dear all, We have two weeks to have David D.'s 'Modes of Practice and Commitment' apparently synonymous with 'units of analysis' . In between time , he'd like to hear of the synergies between ... but there's no trace of Jack Mezirow's Transformative Learning Discussion either. David does not determine which of Mezirow's articles might be closer to Engestrom's . In my confusion with everything generally , I'm sending a random article which might help. If this is not so relevant , David might be kind enough to provide another one themself or name a particular one for which I'll be accountable. Thanks him so much! Best Haydi From: David Dirlam To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 2:32:25 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of Analysis Alfredo, Mike and others interested in the discussion of units of analysis in my recent book on Modes of Practice. I just heard from my Routledge editor. They will make the first chapter of my book available to me to put on the listserv in two weeks. In between time, there are some very interesting synergies between the transformative learning discussion of Jack Mezirow and the article by Yrjo Engestrom that Mike sent out yesterday. In particular, I am especially interested in what people think about relaxing the criterion that the unit be the most elementary simple possible. David Dirlam Author of *Teachers, learners, modes of practice: Theory and methodology for identifying knowledge development. *New York: Routledge, 2017. On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 7:17 AM, David Dirlam wrote: > Thanks Alfredo and Mike for suggesting the Chapter. I've written to my > editor at Routledge / Taylor & Francis for permission to make it available > to xmca. I should know about that in a few days. I have some shorter > versions for different audiences, but that chapter was written for scholars > and the whole book is more complete than anything else I've written on the > unit of analysis in the last few decades. Even with the introductory > chapter on units, the work on the 11 level nested hierarchy for the Chapter > 11 of the book greatly expanded my thinking in ways I didn't expect before > I wrote the chapter. So there is also a relatively inexpensive e-edition of > the whole book at https://www.routledge.com/Teachers-Learners-Modes-of- > Practice-Theory-and-Methodology-for-Identifying/ > Dirlam/p/book/9781138641181 > > David > > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 8:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> I agree with Alfredo that it would be easier for people to interpret your >> note, David D, >> if you included either the relevant chapter or a written precis of the >> material in it. >> >> As you can see, the range of sources of peoples' ideas here exceeds the >> limits of all mortals here present, so starting with a Topic 101 summary >> locating the ideas is never a bad idea. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 12:56 PM, David Dirlam > > >> wrote: >> >> > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to >> Andy's >> > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line >> > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and >> add >> > some to it. >> > >> > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis >> to >> > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, >> even >> > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this >> discussion >> > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of >> our >> > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca >> > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. >> > >> > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in >> response >> > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's >> job, >> > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher >> > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a >> tendency >> > that I have been fighting for decades. >> > >> > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter >> from my >> > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested >> > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining >> for a >> > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for >> > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles >> > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a >> > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about >> what >> > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the >> bottom, >> > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it >> > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up >> (the >> > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the >> > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many >> > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like >> > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested >> fashion >> > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. >> > >> > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In >> > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social >> > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the >> chapter, >> > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology >> where >> > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to >> > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to >> > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of >> > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts >> of >> > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. >> > >> > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed >> are >> > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing >> modes >> > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental >> > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the >> > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language >> has >> > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were >> there. >> > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of >> > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four >> > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate >> (growth >> > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource >> > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern >> is >> > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are >> > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow >> > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest >> levels >> > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the >> > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but >> > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole >> > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from >> one >> > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept >> > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some >> friends >> > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that >> Mezirow's >> > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and >> modes of >> > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. >> > >> > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it >> lays >> > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers >> > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for >> student >> > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me >> > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might >> fit >> > with the modes and phases of commitment. >> > >> > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of >> > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of >> > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, >> > when I have given this model to experts (300? altogether so far) and >> asked >> > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over >> 99% >> > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions >> of >> > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to >> > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each >> > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a >> quarter >> > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. >> > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and >> > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions >> with >> > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are >> > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and >> > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also >> have >> > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of >> > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job >> > placement and graduation rates. >> > >> > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at >> > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped >> dimensions >> > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological >> > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The >> > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different >> > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of >> > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews >> > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in >> > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of >> 60 >> > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that >> > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So >> the >> > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive >> > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to >> > biosphere. >> > >> > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that >> many >> > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he >> would be >> > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's >> > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. >> > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I >> > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful >> objects >> > and social environments they imply. >> > >> > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful >> for >> > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic >> > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's >> paper >> > next. >> > >> > All the best, >> > >> > David Dirlam >> > >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JACK MEZIROW Musings and Reflections on the Meaning, Context, and Process of Transformative Learning.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 276882 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170822/68debe34/attachment.pdf From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Aug 22 07:14:51 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 14:14:51 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <745a9332-7830-6d67-d3f1-d2d729d82706@mira.net> <91FF1B86-1F6F-40EC-9D89-DDEA5ABA198A@uniandes.edu.co> <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> Message-ID: <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> Andy, First I confess my limits in discussion. David , Excuse me for intrusion. I really have questions to ask Andy to be understood. Andy--to your saying "but precisely because it is a whole despite?being not made up of anything other than the parts." What is the difference between 'moment' and 'part' 'component'. And what is the realm of each? You have not discriminated between wholes generally ; I'd like to ask if 'finites' are parts of the 'infinite' .? Does 'determinate being' enter the realm of 'actuality' ? If yes , who affirms who rejects? In what way? If yes , is the 'actuality' a whole? Do we have hierarchies of actual wholes ? In what way do they interact? How do we determine thought from action , actuality from corpus? Which of the two does Lenin affirm , determinate being as empty or Being as empty? Nothing is actual? Is Spinoza for Being as empty or Hegel? Please don't think I'm muddying anything , No! I was dragged to this point. I do want to get cleared. Is this a good definition for matter ? General Monistic substance which gives birth to the whole Universe. Does such Universe accept partioning? If yes , is Hegel for it or against it? What about Marx? 'Notion' comes everywhere in Hegel . Is it a neglect of translation for 'concept' or what Hegel really means is just Notion? Is Notion 'matter' for Hegel?? I sincerely hope I will not receive the type of response one of our dearest friends received .? Still student Haydi? ----- Forwarded Message ----- From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 8:53:44 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading I think it's more a case that the Kellogg Test#c fails the Activity Theory test, just as the Kellogg Test#a fails Marx's Capital. The whole is greater than the part (if it is a genuine whole) not because there are some additional parts you forgot to add up but precisely because it is a whole despite being not made up of anything other than the parts. I am reminded of A N Leontyev's "accusation" that taking /perezhivniya /a units of personality set up a logical circle: "... / perezhivanie/, as the specific form through which the whole personality manifests itself, now occupies the place that formerly belonged to the whole personality of the child,? that is, determining the child?s / perezhivanie/?... a logical vicious circle." Leontyev seems to think that teh only genuine form of science is reductionism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 22/08/2017 11:48 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > What other than commodities are the units of capital > composed of? That's easy. Commodities are human relations > in a congealed form. Ergo, units of capital are made of > human relations in an uncongealed form. You are not a > fetishist, are you? > > My point about actions and activities was precisely that > activities are NOT made up of anything more than actions; > that's why activity fails the third test. > > I think that Engestrom tries to show some of the abstract > rules, the community relations and the division of labor > that subtends all this activity, but the distinctions > between (e.g.) rules and division of labor, or division of > labor and community, are not too clear. As you say, > blurring is a problem, if our goal is analysis, and an > analysis that shows the heterogeneity (the > distinctiveness) of parts. > > dk > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards > Conceptual Complementarity > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full > > On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >? ? Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things >? ? (or events) are activities composed of?? > >? ? And while you're at it, what other than commodities >? ? are units of capital composed of? > >? ? Andy > >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? Andy Blunden >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >? ? > >? ? On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >? ? ? ? Helena: > >? ? ? ? Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions, >? ? ? ? and that if we take away >? ? ? ? actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev). >? ? ? ? To me, this is an >? ? ? ? admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts. >? ? ? ? Compare Vygotsky's >? ? ? ? thought experiment of structuring a game in such a >? ? ? ? way that we take away >? ? ? ? all the roles and we see that abstract rules >? ? ? ? remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind >? ? ? ? in Society")*. > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 22 07:52:29 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 00:52:29 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> References: <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Haydi, you know that is far too many questions at once for me. But I will try some quick-fire answers and see how far I can get. 'Moment' has a special meaning in Hegel, not unrelated to its mathematical meaning: each moment is the whole, but at a different level of generality. 'Part' and 'component' are not really scienific words, but I would say that 'components' are implicitly mutually exclusive parts that add up to the whole, whereas 'part' has not such connotation, but could be overlapping, but in "the sum of the parts etc ..." parts means components. Don't really know what you mean by "realm". Are we talking Hegelian categories here? "Determinate Being" (Dasein) is part of Being, whereas Actuality is part of Reflection. "Who affirms?" Don't see how "who comes in here. "Whole" is a relative term, so yes, we can hierachies of wholes. "How do we determine thought from action?" We have to figure out what is mediating between actions, so as to make sense of actions. Lenin was fully aware of the different senses in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage. I think "Being is Nothing" is Hegel's idea, though he is recapitulating early Greek thought. SPinoza did not see it that way. I follow Lenin for a definition of "Matter" - "a philosophical category denoting everything that exists outside of consciousness." But yes, it is a Substance. ... time for me to go to bed. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 12:14 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Andy, > First I confess my limits in discussion. > David , Excuse me for intrusion. I really have questions to ask Andy to be understood. > Andy--to your saying "but precisely because it is a whole despite being not made up of anything other than the parts." > > > > What is the difference between 'moment' and 'part' 'component'. And what is the realm of each? > You have not discriminated between wholes generally ; I'd like to ask if 'finites' are parts of the 'infinite' . > Does 'determinate being' enter the realm of 'actuality' ? If yes , who affirms who rejects? In what way? If yes , is the 'actuality' a whole? Do we have hierarchies of actual wholes ? In what way do they interact? How do we determine thought from action , actuality from corpus? > Which of the two does Lenin affirm , determinate being as empty or Being as empty? Nothing is actual? Is Spinoza for Being as empty or Hegel? > Please don't think I'm muddying anything , No! I was dragged to this point. I do want to get cleared. > Is this a good definition for matter ? General Monistic substance which gives birth to the whole Universe. Does such Universe accept partioning? If yes , is Hegel for it or against it? What about Marx? 'Notion' comes everywhere in Hegel . Is it a neglect of translation for 'concept' or what Hegel really means is just Notion? Is Notion 'matter' for Hegel? > I sincerely hope I will not receive the type of response one of our dearest friends received . > Still student > Haydi > > > ----- Forwarded Message ----- > From: Andy Blunden > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 8:53:44 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > I think it's more a case that the Kellogg Test#c fails the > Activity Theory test, just as the Kellogg Test#a fails > Marx's Capital. > > The whole is greater than the part (if it is a genuine > whole) not because there are some additional parts you > forgot to add up but precisely because it is a whole despite > being not made up of anything other than the parts. > > I am reminded of A N Leontyev's "accusation" that taking > /perezhivniya /a units of personality set up a logical > circle: "... / perezhivanie/, as the specific form through > which the whole personality manifests itself, now occupies > the place that formerly belonged to the whole personality of > the child,? that is, determining the child?s > / perezhivanie/?... a logical vicious circle." Leontyev > seems to think that teh only genuine form of science is > reductionism. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 22/08/2017 11:48 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> What other than commodities are the units of capital >> composed of? That's easy. Commodities are human relations >> in a congealed form. Ergo, units of capital are made of >> human relations in an uncongealed form. You are not a >> fetishist, are you? >> >> My point about actions and activities was precisely that >> activities are NOT made up of anything more than actions; >> that's why activity fails the third test. >> >> I think that Engestrom tries to show some of the abstract >> rules, the community relations and the division of labor >> that subtends all this activity, but the distinctions >> between (e.g.) rules and division of labor, or division of >> labor and community, are not too clear. As you say, >> blurring is a problem, if our goal is analysis, and an >> analysis that shows the heterogeneity (the >> distinctiveness) of parts. >> >> dk >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards >> Conceptual Complementarity >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full >> >> On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things >> (or events) are activities composed of?? >> >> And while you're at it, what other than commodities >> are units of capital composed of? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> >> On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Helena: >> >> Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions, >> and that if we take away >> actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev). >> To me, this is an >> admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts. >> Compare Vygotsky's >> thought experiment of structuring a game in such a >> way that we take away >> all the roles and we see that abstract rules >> remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind >> in Society")*. >> >> >> >> > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Aug 22 10:07:54 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 17:07:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of Analysis In-Reply-To: <1275611036.3682098.1503402827423@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1275611036.3682098.1503402827423@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1503421674422.84854@iped.uio.no> Haydi, thanks so much for sending this, which as you say, was needed to follow up on David's comment. Mezirow's work, as well as transformative learning as a distinctive theory, are new to me and probably others in this list. Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ?Haydi Zulfei? ?? Sent: 22 August 2017 13:53 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of Analysis Dear all, We have two weeks to have David D.'s 'Modes of Practice and Commitment' apparently synonymous with 'units of analysis' . In between time , he'd like to hear of the synergies between ... but there's no trace of Jack Mezirow's Transformative Learning Discussion either. David does not determine which of Mezirow's articles might be closer to Engestrom's . In my confusion with everything generally , I'm sending a random article which might help. If this is not so relevant , David might be kind enough to provide another one themself or name a particular one for which I'll be accountable. Thanks him so much! Best Haydi From: David Dirlam To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 2:32:25 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of Analysis Alfredo, Mike and others interested in the discussion of units of analysis in my recent book on Modes of Practice. I just heard from my Routledge editor. They will make the first chapter of my book available to me to put on the listserv in two weeks. In between time, there are some very interesting synergies between the transformative learning discussion of Jack Mezirow and the article by Yrjo Engestrom that Mike sent out yesterday. In particular, I am especially interested in what people think about relaxing the criterion that the unit be the most elementary simple possible. David Dirlam Author of *Teachers, learners, modes of practice: Theory and methodology for identifying knowledge development. *New York: Routledge, 2017. On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 7:17 AM, David Dirlam wrote: > Thanks Alfredo and Mike for suggesting the Chapter. I've written to my > editor at Routledge / Taylor & Francis for permission to make it available > to xmca. I should know about that in a few days. I have some shorter > versions for different audiences, but that chapter was written for scholars > and the whole book is more complete than anything else I've written on the > unit of analysis in the last few decades. Even with the introductory > chapter on units, the work on the 11 level nested hierarchy for the Chapter > 11 of the book greatly expanded my thinking in ways I didn't expect before > I wrote the chapter. So there is also a relatively inexpensive e-edition of > the whole book at https://www.routledge.com/Teachers-Learners-Modes-of- > Practice-Theory-and-Methodology-for-Identifying/ > Dirlam/p/book/9781138641181 > > David > > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 8:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> I agree with Alfredo that it would be easier for people to interpret your >> note, David D, >> if you included either the relevant chapter or a written precis of the >> material in it. >> >> As you can see, the range of sources of peoples' ideas here exceeds the >> limits of all mortals here present, so starting with a Topic 101 summary >> locating the ideas is never a bad idea. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 12:56 PM, David Dirlam > > >> wrote: >> >> > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to >> Andy's >> > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line >> > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and >> add >> > some to it. >> > >> > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis >> to >> > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, >> even >> > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this >> discussion >> > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of >> our >> > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca >> > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. >> > >> > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in >> response >> > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's >> job, >> > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher >> > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a >> tendency >> > that I have been fighting for decades. >> > >> > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter >> from my >> > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested >> > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining >> for a >> > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for >> > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles >> > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a >> > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about >> what >> > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the >> bottom, >> > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it >> > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up >> (the >> > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the >> > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many >> > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like >> > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested >> fashion >> > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. >> > >> > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In >> > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social >> > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the >> chapter, >> > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology >> where >> > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to >> > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to >> > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of >> > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts >> of >> > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. >> > >> > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed >> are >> > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing >> modes >> > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental >> > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the >> > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language >> has >> > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were >> there. >> > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of >> > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four >> > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate >> (growth >> > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource >> > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern >> is >> > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are >> > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow >> > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest >> levels >> > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the >> > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but >> > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole >> > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from >> one >> > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept >> > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some >> friends >> > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that >> Mezirow's >> > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and >> modes of >> > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. >> > >> > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it >> lays >> > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers >> > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for >> student >> > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me >> > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might >> fit >> > with the modes and phases of commitment. >> > >> > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of >> > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of >> > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, >> > when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and >> asked >> > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over >> 99% >> > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions >> of >> > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to >> > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each >> > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a >> quarter >> > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. >> > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and >> > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions >> with >> > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are >> > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and >> > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also >> have >> > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of >> > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job >> > placement and graduation rates. >> > >> > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at >> > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped >> dimensions >> > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological >> > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The >> > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different >> > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of >> > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews >> > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in >> > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of >> 60 >> > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that >> > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So >> the >> > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive >> > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to >> > biosphere. >> > >> > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that >> many >> > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he >> would be >> > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's >> > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. >> > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I >> > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful >> objects >> > and social environments they imply. >> > >> > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful >> for >> > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic >> > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's >> paper >> > next. >> > >> > All the best, >> > >> > David Dirlam >> > >> > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Aug 22 11:10:47 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 18:10:47 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.yahoo.com> Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many questions but they are related at least for me. I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , determinate being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? Could we say parts of a clock are moments of its wholeness ? Surely No. Does its wholeness refer to its functioning as measuring of time ? I would not enter topic of activity. But David's 'uncongealed relations' could be a case in point. Could say phenomena and processes if looked at in their unified oneness , contiguous cosmos/world/universe , are wholes and thencefrom moments in each angle of visioning . Right with 'sum of the parts etc. part=component yet 'exclusive' does not work. In the entity or body of the clock , parts/components find a meaning not in their disparity and separateness/discreteness . A matter of 'inclusion' . This takes us right to the Theses in regard to objects not dealt with sensually and the very congealed human relations in 'commodities' . I wonder if so far 'realm' is elucidated. Again with permission , if determinate being is 'emptiness' as for Hegel , nothingness also emptiness for him , 'becoming' attained out of their interaction . Am I mistaken with these terms in Hegel. He repeatedly returns to these terms and I cannot understand or imagine such mechanism with 'material' and 'ideal' in Mind. In our previous discussion I talked of Hegel as the Master of Categories and Concepts (Notion) but not of 'matter' as Marx was ; Such argumentation in the body of the Logic puts me in doubt again as to the very small difference you mentioned. I do confirm your sagacity in such matters but the fact is that I really struggle with the complications . Determinate being 'part' of Being as nothing? Being=Notion , not least close to 'matter' ? Actuality part of 'reflection' ? What reflection? Reflection of Nothingness ? I still continue to understand , Andy. With 'who' I meant types of philosophers . This I should pursue to know myself. I'm still bound to materialism vs idealism as this latter one as taking us to nowhere where nothing is full of everything not the idea emanating from complex matter. Thank you ! Whole is a Relative term ! That's it ! Figuring out what IS mediating between actions , as you strongly grasp to it and teach us , is , artefacts as signs . Either I'm erring or artefacts ARE NOT thoughts. Evidence is 'Thinking and Speech' . Many thanks for this : [Lenin was fully aware of the 'different senses' in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage.] Today I should repeatedly give my thanks to you , Andy , because I feel so close to you in understanding. Of course Hegel does not stop at criticizing Spinoza maybe because Spinoza is not a man of Notion as he himself is or maybe for some Spinoza is more idealistic than Hegel is . I'd like to quote just one reference in this respect. But it needs another post. Thank you you were so patient as to be ready and willing to answer my questions . It's very good to learn from others in an appropriate manner. I'll be back to learn more when necessary. Have a sweet good night! Best wishes Haydi? From: Andy Blunden To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 19:22:39 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, you know that is far too many questions at once for me. But I will try some quick-fire answers and see how far I can get. 'Moment' has a special meaning in Hegel, not unrelated to its mathematical meaning: each moment is the whole, but at a different level of generality. 'Part' and 'component' are not really scienific words, but I would say that 'components' are implicitly mutually exclusive parts that add up to the whole, whereas 'part' has not such connotation, but could be overlapping, but in "the sum of the parts etc ..." parts means components. Don't really know what you mean by "realm". Are we talking Hegelian categories here? "Determinate Being" (Dasein) is part of Being, whereas Actuality is part of Reflection. "Who affirms?" Don't see how "who comes in here. "Whole" is a relative term, so yes, we can hierachies of wholes. "How do we determine thought from action?" We have to figure out what is mediating between actions, so as to make sense of actions. Lenin was fully aware of the different senses in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage. I think "Being is Nothing" is Hegel's idea, though he is recapitulating early Greek thought. SPinoza did not see it that way. I follow Lenin for a definition of "Matter" - "a philosophical category denoting everything that exists outside of consciousness." But yes, it is a Substance. ... time for me to go to bed. Andy Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 12:14 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: Andy, First I confess my limits in discussion. David , Excuse me for intrusion. I really have questions to ask Andy to be understood. Andy--to your saying "but precisely because it is a whole despite?being not made up of anything other than the parts." What is the difference between 'moment' and 'part' 'component'. And what is the realm of each? You have not discriminated between wholes generally ; I'd like to ask if 'finites' are parts of the 'infinite' .? Does 'determinate being' enter the realm of 'actuality' ? If yes , who affirms who rejects? In what way? If yes , is the 'actuality' a whole? Do we have hierarchies of actual wholes ? In what way do they interact? How do we determine thought from action , actuality from corpus? Which of the two does Lenin affirm , determinate being as empty or Being as empty? Nothing is actual? Is Spinoza for Being as empty or Hegel? Please don't think I'm muddying anything , No! I was dragged to this point. I do want to get cleared. Is this a good definition for matter ? General Monistic substance which gives birth to the whole Universe. Does such Universe accept partioning? If yes , is Hegel for it or against it? What about Marx? 'Notion' comes everywhere in Hegel . Is it a neglect of translation for 'concept' or what Hegel really means is just Notion? Is Notion 'matter' for Hegel?? I sincerely hope I will not receive the type of response one of our dearest friends received .? Still student Haydi? ----- Forwarded Message ----- From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 8:53:44 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading I think it's more a case that the Kellogg Test#c fails the Activity Theory test, just as the Kellogg Test#a fails Marx's Capital. The whole is greater than the part (if it is a genuine whole) not because there are some additional parts you forgot to add up but precisely because it is a whole despite being not made up of anything other than the parts. I am reminded of A N Leontyev's "accusation" that taking /perezhivniya /a units of personality set up a logical circle: "... / perezhivanie/, as the specific form through which the whole personality manifests itself, now occupies the place that formerly belonged to the whole personality of the child,? that is, determining the child?s / perezhivanie/?... a logical vicious circle." Leontyev seems to think that teh only genuine form of science is reductionism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 22/08/2017 11:48 AM, David Kellogg wrote: What other than commodities are the units of capital composed of? That's easy. Commodities are human relations in a congealed form. Ergo, units of capital are made of human relations in an uncongealed form. You are not a fetishist, are you? My point about actions and activities was precisely that activities are NOT made up of anything more than actions; that's why activity fails the third test. I think that Engestrom tries to show some of the abstract rules, the community relations and the division of labor that subtends all this activity, but the distinctions between (e.g.) rules and division of labor, or division of labor and community, are not too clear. As you say, blurring is a problem, if our goal is analysis, and an analysis that shows the heterogeneity (the distinctiveness) of parts. dk David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: ? ? Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things ? ? (or events) are activities composed of?? ? ? And while you're at it, what other than commodities ? ? are units of capital composed of? ? ? Andy ? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ ? ? Andy Blunden ? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy ? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making ? ? ? ? On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: ? ? ? ? Helena: ? ? ? ? Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions, ? ? ? ? and that if we take away ? ? ? ? actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev). ? ? ? ? To me, this is an ? ? ? ? admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts. ? ? ? ? Compare Vygotsky's ? ? ? ? thought experiment of structuring a game in such a ? ? ? ? way that we take away ? ? ? ? all the roles and we see that abstract rules ? ? ? ? remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind ? ? ? ? in Society")*. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Aug 22 11:26:01 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 11:26:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Job Announcement: Psychology Tenure Track Positions at Clark University In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Relevant jobs ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Ana Kamille Marcelo Date: Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 11:23 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Job Announcement: Psychology Tenure Track Positions at Clark University To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org ??Dear Colleagues, Clark University?s Psychology Department invites applications for two tenure-track positions at the Assistant Professor level (Clinical and Developmental) to begin in August 2018. With programs in Clinical, Social, and Developmental Psychology, and noted for its rich history in Psychology (e.g., APA was founded at Clark; the Clinical Psychology program has been fully accredited by the APA since 1948), Clark offers the advantages of both a distinguished research university and a small liberal arts college ( http://www2.clarku.edu/~psydept/). The department has a strong focus on research that considers the influence of sociocultural context on psychological processes. Successful candidates should have a clear research program, excellent teaching skills, and a commitment to success in securing extramural funding. The ideal candidates will be competent in a variety of methods and will contribute effectively to graduate/undergraduate teaching, advising, and research mentoring, as well as to service in the Department and University. ?https://www2.clarku.edu/offices/hr/jobopportunities/jobsdb. cfm?id=1407&viewjob=1&grouping=F Please circulate widely!? Thank you! -- Ana Kamille Marcelo, PhD Assistant Professor Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology Clark University Phone: (508) 793-7261 _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Aug 22 11:36:27 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 18:36:27 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Fw: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.yahoo.com> References: <27339eb1-dd83-4d24-1cde-668cd344fea4@mira.net> <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1121052154.4164463.1503426987958@mail.yahoo.com> ----- Forwarded Message ----- From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? To: "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 22:40:47 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many questions but they are related at least for me. I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , determinate being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? Could we say parts of a clock are moments of its wholeness ? Surely No. Does its wholeness refer to its functioning as measuring of time ? I would not enter topic of activity. But David's 'uncongealed relations' could be a case in point. Could say phenomena and processes if looked at in their unified oneness , contiguous cosmos/world/universe , are wholes and thencefrom moments in each angle of visioning . Right with 'sum of the parts etc. part=component yet 'exclusive' does not work. In the entity or body of the clock , parts/components find a meaning not in their disparity and separateness/discreteness . A matter of 'inclusion' . This takes us right to the Theses in regard to objects not dealt with sensually and the very congealed human relations in 'commodities' . I wonder if so far 'realm' is elucidated. Again with permission , if determinate being is 'emptiness' as for Hegel , nothingness also emptiness for him , 'becoming' attained out of their interaction . Am I mistaken with these terms in Hegel. He repeatedly returns to these terms and I cannot understand or imagine such mechanism with 'material' and 'ideal' in Mind. In our previous discussion I talked of Hegel as the Master of Categories and Concepts (Notion) but not of 'matter' as Marx was ; Such argumentation in the body of the Logic puts me in doubt again as to the very small difference you mentioned. I do confirm your sagacity in such matters but the fact is that I really struggle with the complications . Determinate being 'part' of Being as nothing? Being=Notion , not least close to 'matter' ? Actuality part of 'reflection' ? What reflection? Reflection of Nothingness ? I still continue to understand , Andy. With 'who' I meant types of philosophers . This I should pursue to know myself. I'm still bound to materialism vs idealism as this latter one as taking us to nowhere where nothing is full of everything not the idea emanating from complex matter. Thank you ! Whole is a Relative term ! That's it ! Figuring out what IS mediating between actions , as you strongly grasp to it and teach us , is , artefacts as signs . Either I'm erring or artefacts ARE NOT thoughts. Evidence is 'Thinking and Speech' . Many thanks for this : [Lenin was fully aware of the 'different senses' in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage.] Today I should repeatedly give my thanks to you , Andy , because I feel so close to you in understanding. Of course Hegel does not stop at criticizing Spinoza maybe because Spinoza is not a man of Notion as he himself is or maybe for some Spinoza is more idealistic than Hegel is . I'd like to quote just one reference in this respect. But it needs another post. Thank you you were so patient as to be ready and willing to answer my questions . It's very good to learn from others in an appropriate manner. I'll be back to learn more when necessary. Have a sweet good night! Best wishes Haydi? P.S. thought will not apply itself to finding out what is impliedin the Notion, then it can be directed to the world of actuality where suchproportions show themselves to be completely unreal. just because thought is supposed to be superiorto actuality, to dwell apart from it in higher regions and therefore to beitself determined as an ought-to-be, on the one hand, it does not advance to the Notion, and, onthe other hand, it stands in just as untrue a relation to actuality as it doesto the Notion.?If, however, an existence contains the Notion not merely asan abstract in-itself, but as an explicit, self-determined totality, asinstinct, life, ideation, etc., then in its own strength it overcomes thelimitation and attains a being beyond it.?What, however, the thing-in-itself is in truth, what trulyis in itself, of this logic is the exposition, in which however somethingbetter than an abstraction is understood by 'in-itself', namely, what somethingis in its Notion; but the Notion is concrete within itself, is comprehensiblesimply as Notion, and as determined within itself and the connected whole ofits determinations, is cognisable.?the first was only an implicit (ansich seiende) alteration belonging to theinner Notion?or rather, since in fact they are directlyconnected, that is in their Notion?We must observe the development of this Notion, which manifests itself, however, rather as anentanglement and a contradiction. This contradiction is atonce to be found in the circumstance that the limit, as something's negationreflected into itself, contains ideally in it the moments of something and other, and these,as distinguished moments, are at the same time posited in the sphere ofdeterminate being as really, qualitatively distinct.?It is in accordance with this difference of something fromits limit that the line appears as line only outside its limit, the point; theplane as plane outside the line; the solid as solid only outside its limitingsurface. It is primarily this aspect of limit which is seized bypictorial thought ? the self-externality of the Notion ? and especially, too,in reference to spatial objects.?just as one, for example as hundredth, is the limit, butalso the element, of the whole hundred.?so that the point, through its Notion, passes out of itselfinto the line, moves in itself and gives rise to the line, and so on, lies in the Notionof limit which is immanent in the something.? From: Andy Blunden To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 19:22:39 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, you know that is far too many questions at once for me. But I will try some quick-fire answers and see how far I can get. 'Moment' has a special meaning in Hegel, not unrelated to its mathematical meaning: each moment is the whole, but at a different level of generality. 'Part' and 'component' are not really scienific words, but I would say that 'components' are implicitly mutually exclusive parts that add up to the whole, whereas 'part' has not such connotation, but could be overlapping, but in "the sum of the parts etc ..." parts means components. Don't really know what you mean by "realm". Are we talking Hegelian categories here? "Determinate Being" (Dasein) is part of Being, whereas Actuality is part of Reflection. "Who affirms?" Don't see how "who comes in here. "Whole" is a relative term, so yes, we can hierachies of wholes. "How do we determine thought from action?" We have to figure out what is mediating between actions, so as to make sense of actions. Lenin was fully aware of the different senses in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage. I think "Being is Nothing" is Hegel's idea, though he is recapitulating early Greek thought. SPinoza did not see it that way. I follow Lenin for a definition of "Matter" - "a philosophical category denoting everything that exists outside of consciousness." But yes, it is a Substance. ... time for me to go to bed. Andy Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 12:14 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: Andy, First I confess my limits in discussion. David , Excuse me for intrusion. I really have questions to ask Andy to be understood. Andy--to your saying "but precisely because it is a whole despite?being not made up of anything other than the parts." What is the difference between 'moment' and 'part' 'component'. And what is the realm of each? You have not discriminated between wholes generally ; I'd like to ask if 'finites' are parts of the 'infinite' .? Does 'determinate being' enter the realm of 'actuality' ? If yes , who affirms who rejects? In what way? If yes , is the 'actuality' a whole? Do we have hierarchies of actual wholes ? In what way do they interact? How do we determine thought from action , actuality from corpus? Which of the two does Lenin affirm , determinate being as empty or Being as empty? Nothing is actual? Is Spinoza for Being as empty or Hegel? Please don't think I'm muddying anything , No! I was dragged to this point. I do want to get cleared. Is this a good definition for matter ? General Monistic substance which gives birth to the whole Universe. Does such Universe accept partioning? If yes , is Hegel for it or against it? What about Marx? 'Notion' comes everywhere in Hegel . Is it a neglect of translation for 'concept' or what Hegel really means is just Notion? Is Notion 'matter' for Hegel?? I sincerely hope I will not receive the type of response one of our dearest friends received .? Still student Haydi? ----- Forwarded Message ----- From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 8:53:44 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading I think it's more a case that the Kellogg Test#c fails the Activity Theory test, just as the Kellogg Test#a fails Marx's Capital. The whole is greater than the part (if it is a genuine whole) not because there are some additional parts you forgot to add up but precisely because it is a whole despite being not made up of anything other than the parts. I am reminded of A N Leontyev's "accusation" that taking /perezhivniya /a units of personality set up a logical circle: "... / perezhivanie/, as the specific form through which the whole personality manifests itself, now occupies the place that formerly belonged to the whole personality of the child,? that is, determining the child?s / perezhivanie/?... a logical vicious circle." Leontyev seems to think that teh only genuine form of science is reductionism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 22/08/2017 11:48 AM, David Kellogg wrote: What other than commodities are the units of capital composed of? That's easy. Commodities are human relations in a congealed form. Ergo, units of capital are made of human relations in an uncongealed form. You are not a fetishist, are you? My point about actions and activities was precisely that activities are NOT made up of anything more than actions; that's why activity fails the third test. I think that Engestrom tries to show some of the abstract rules, the community relations and the division of labor that subtends all this activity, but the distinctions between (e.g.) rules and division of labor, or division of labor and community, are not too clear. As you say, blurring is a problem, if our goal is analysis, and an analysis that shows the heterogeneity (the distinctiveness) of parts. dk David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: ? ? Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things ? ? (or events) are activities composed of?? ? ? And while you're at it, what other than commodities ? ? are units of capital composed of? ? ? Andy ? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ ? ? Andy Blunden ? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy ? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making ? ? ? ? On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: ? ? ? ? Helena: ? ? ? ? Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions, ? ? ? ? and that if we take away ? ? ? ? actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev). ? ? ? ? To me, this is an ? ? ? ? admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts. ? ? ? ? Compare Vygotsky's ? ? ? ? thought experiment of structuring a game in such a ? ? ? ? way that we take away ? ? ? ? all the roles and we see that abstract rules ? ? ? ? remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind ? ? ? ? in Society")*. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Aug 22 15:40:43 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 15:40:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: An article on the evolution of organizational paradigms you might find interesting In-Reply-To: <02c7ffe1-5f3c-7cf0-0a28-2d6d2e51eaed@web.de> References: <02c7ffe1-5f3c-7cf0-0a28-2d6d2e51eaed@web.de> Message-ID: Hi Zlatko-- Thanks for the additional information about the line of work on evolution of management models you are engaged in with Paul Adler. Notions like neo-Schumperterian models of organizational and management change are a novelty for me but the apparent analogies between processes evoked in the developmental progression your diagrams depict are strongly reminiscent of similar diagrams in the literature I know about various stage theories of ontogeny and process of change. I am not sure you checked out the earlier discussion of socio-technical systems in the work of Naoki Ueno and his colleagues caught your attention, but that line of inquiry might provide a bridge between the organizational/management evolution literature and the lines of reseach more familiar to xmca readers. I hope there is followup to the connections your work points to. mike On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 3:07 AM, Zlatko Bodrozic wrote: > Many thanks for your comments, Mike. > > Since I was a PhD student I was fascinated by Scribner's (1985) analysis > of "Vygotsky's Uses of History,". > One could say that our paper (and my PhD) was inspired by her article. We > study the connection between > (1) the long-term evolution of technologies > (2) the long-term evolution of organizational paradigms > (3) the long-term evolution of management models > (4) micro processes of organizational and managerial innovation > (see the attached figure for a visualization) > > For the long-term technological processes, relying on a neo-Schumpeterian > framework (Carlota Perez), we study subsequent technological revolutions > (railway, steel &electricity, automobile, ICT). We argue that the emergence > of a technological revolution in leading industries generates radically new > organizational and management problems. The solution to these problems > takes the form of a new organizational paradigm (professionally-managed > firm, factory, corporation, network). This new paradigm emerges in two > cycles. In a first cycle, we see the emergence of a new management model > that represents a revolutionary break with the prevailing organizational > paradigm (Line-and-staff, Scientific management, Strategy-and-structure, > Business process). The appearance of this model typically generates > unintended consequences (often related to human problems), which in turn > prompt a second cycle that generates another management model that > rectifies those dysfunctions and thereby rebalances and stabilizes the new > organizational paradigm (Industrial betterment, Human relations, Quality > management/organizational culture and learning, Knowledge management). > > (The connection to individual human development would be: An > organizational expert working in the early 19th century, time-traveling > into the present, would first need to master many of the lessons > accumulated by the successive paradigms and models of the last century and > a half. Each of the models that has left its mark on the overall evolution > of management and organization offers a lesson for the individual.) > > We clearly see connections between this four processes, and?coming now to > your question?we would also argue that there should be connections to the > the longer-term evolution of social institutions. Actually, Paul Adler and > I currently study the evolution of workplace communities?the fabric of > workplace social relations?, and we are confident that we can make a > connection to the 4 processes mentioned above. > > Regarding the question of an "orthogenetic principle": I need to think > about this more. What we say in our paper is that the we see indicators of > growing complexity of the division of labor, growing interdependence among > actors, and increasing scope of the corresponding integration and control > efforts. These indicators might be read as related to what Paul Adler > (2012) calls the ?socialization of production?, but we have to explore this > more. > > Kind regards, Zlatko > > > > Thank you for this paper, Zlato. We have not heard from Paul on this list >> for years, but >> his work has remained on the horizon. Now you have brought it back to us >> in >> an interesting formulation. >> >> I was struck by the parallels between the way you framed your question and >> the question that developmental psychologists (perhaps pedologists, >> David?): >> >> we argue that technology is a powerful factor shaping the evolution of >> management models? contents >> >> a couple of months ago Roy Pea gave a talk at the Piaget society meetings >> in which we made a very similar point with respect to the role of culture >> in human development. Simplifying brutally, we argued that new >> technologies >> entail changes in social relations that subsequently change the >> environment >> of development for the en-culturating organism. This formulation, we >> suggested provided piagetians to reconcile contradictions between the >> biological and the social sides of Piaget. >> >> The similarity of the arguments raises a question for me about principles >> of development that appear non-accidently related at different levels of >> analysis: >> 'individual organism, individual organism as constituitive of a social >> group, the institutional structure of the organism's environment, the >> structure of that proximal society and its relation to the organization of >> the species of which it is a part. Does some sort of "orthogenetic >> principle" apply across different scales of social processes? >> >> Short of that, what are we to make of the "limited" differences we see in >> the dynamics of different levels of the system in relative sychrony, >> perhaps a crisis, perhaps an opportunity? >> >> David has been point toward a sociology and linguistics to bring together >> various apparently combinable mode of theorizing a CHAT account of >> development that generalizes across scales (themselves differentially >> mutable from the perspective of a single human organism). This work, and >> that part of Yrjo's work focused on organisms seems to be pointing in >> similarly directions. If that it correct, it extends the links to the >> study >> of social institutions, a topic currently of general interest in the CHAT >> community. >> >> In any events, thanks. >> >> mike >> >> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 6:52 AM, Zlatko Bodrozic wrote: >> >> Dear colleagues, >>> >>> some of you might find our paper (co-authored with Paul Adler) on the >>> historical evolution of management models and organizational paradigms >>> interesting. We published it this year in Administrative Science >>> Quarterly. >>> While it is based on a Neo-Schumpeterian framework (Schumpeter, Freeman, >>> Perez), it was equally informed by cultural-historical activity theory. >>> You can download a copy by using the link below, and we would be >>> delighted >>> to get any reactions to it that you might share with us. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Zlatko Bodro?i? and Paul Adler >>> >>> Bodrozic, Z., and P.S. Adler (forthcoming) The Evolution of Management >>> Models: A Neo-Schumpeterian Theory. /Administrative Science Quarterly/ >>> Download >>> >>> >>> >>> > -- > ----------------------------------------------------- > Dr. Zlatko Bodro?i? > > Email: bodrozic@web.de > Tel.: +381-62-1769594 > Tel.: +49-172-4712341 > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 22 17:07:50 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 10:07:50 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.yahoo.com> References: <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. Here is Hegel on moments: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 . It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is only with the formation of a concept of the whole that moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person unless they participate in some human community ("community" in this sense = particular). And every person is an individual, born at some time and place and dying in some time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all simultaneously the whole? All the various communities are parts of the whole of humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. But we can equally say that the various demographic groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the whole is conceived. Here is Hegel on whole and parts: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 . Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part of the same social formation which creates the object we think about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" has in the material world or in activity. For example, when a science first begins it orients to an object which is an Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes (including pedology) while other sciences studied the general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - different wholes, different units, different problems, different insights, different remedies. That's more than enough! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > questions but they are related at least for me. > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > determinate > being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 22 18:48:09 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 11:48:09 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: An article on the evolution of organizational paradigms you might find interesting In-Reply-To: <02c7ffe1-5f3c-7cf0-0a28-2d6d2e51eaed@web.de> References: <02c7ffe1-5f3c-7cf0-0a28-2d6d2e51eaed@web.de> Message-ID: <4ac135d1-fa88-57f9-2399-af8e67f24c27@mira.net> These are fascinating questions, Zlatko. There are lot of theories, too, about how the changing technology of communication affects psychology, from speech-only, to laborious writing techniques like clay tablets and vellum, to pen-and-paper, to the printing press, the telephone, the email, etc. The impact at the mezo-level, i.e., organisations - half way between Psychology and Social Theory, is also evident. Artefacts are the material bearers of culture after all. Also, I have noticed that the evolution of management forms mirrors or more likely, is mirrored by, forms of social and political organisation. This is a very rich field for cultural psychological research! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 20/08/2017 8:07 PM, Zlatko Bodrozic wrote: > Many thanks for your comments, Mike. > > Since I was a PhD student I was fascinated by Scribner's > (1985) analysis of "Vygotsky's Uses of History,". > One could say that our paper (and my PhD) was inspired by > her article. We study the connection between > (1) the long-term evolution of technologies > (2) the long-term evolution of organizational paradigms > (3) the long-term evolution of management models > (4) micro processes of organizational and managerial > innovation > (see the attached figure for a visualization) > > For the long-term technological processes, relying on a > neo-Schumpeterian framework (Carlota Perez), we study > subsequent technological revolutions (railway, steel > &electricity, automobile, ICT). We argue that the > emergence of a technological revolution in leading > industries generates radically new organizational and > management problems. The solution to these problems takes > the form of a new organizational paradigm > (professionally-managed firm, factory, corporation, > network). This new paradigm emerges in two cycles. In a > first cycle, we see the emergence of a new management > model that represents a revolutionary break with the > prevailing organizational paradigm (Line-and-staff, > Scientific management, Strategy-and-structure, Business > process). The appearance of this model typically generates > unintended consequences (often related to human problems), > which in turn prompt a second cycle that generates another > management model that rectifies those dysfunctions and > thereby rebalances and stabilizes the new organizational > paradigm (Industrial betterment, Human relations, Quality > management/organizational culture and learning, Knowledge > management). > > (The connection to individual human development would be: > An organizational expert working in the early 19th > century, time-traveling into the present, would first need > to master many of the lessons accumulated by the > successive paradigms and models of the last century and a > half. Each of the models that has left its mark on the > overall evolution of management and organization offers a > lesson for the individual.) > > We clearly see connections between this four processes, > and?coming now to your question?we would also argue that > there should be connections to the the longer-term > evolution of social institutions. Actually, Paul Adler and > I currently study the evolution of workplace > communities?the fabric of workplace social relations?, and > we are confident that we can make a connection to the 4 > processes mentioned above. > > Regarding the question of an "orthogenetic principle": I > need to think about this more. What we say in our paper is > that the we see indicators of growing complexity of the > division of labor, growing interdependence among actors, > and increasing scope of the corresponding integration and > control efforts. These indicators might be read as related > to what Paul Adler (2012) calls the ?socialization of > production?, but we have to explore this more. > > Kind regards, Zlatko > > >> Thank you for this paper, Zlato. We have not heard from >> Paul on this list >> for years, but >> his work has remained on the horizon. Now you have >> brought it back to us in >> an interesting formulation. >> >> I was struck by the parallels between the way you framed >> your question and >> the question that developmental psychologists (perhaps >> pedologists, >> David?): >> >> we argue that technology is a powerful factor shaping >> the evolution of >> management models? contents >> >> a couple of months ago Roy Pea gave a talk at the Piaget >> society meetings >> in which we made a very similar point with respect to the >> role of culture >> in human development. Simplifying brutally, we argued >> that new technologies >> entail changes in social relations that subsequently >> change the environment >> of development for the en-culturating organism. This >> formulation, we >> suggested provided piagetians to reconcile >> contradictions between the >> biological and the social sides of Piaget. >> >> The similarity of the arguments raises a question for me >> about principles >> of development that appear non-accidently related at >> different levels of >> analysis: >> 'individual organism, individual organism as >> constituitive of a social >> group, the institutional structure of the organism's >> environment, the >> structure of that proximal society and its relation to >> the organization of >> the species of which it is a part. Does some sort of >> "orthogenetic >> principle" apply across different scales of social >> processes? >> >> Short of that, what are we to make of the "limited" >> differences we see in >> the dynamics of different levels of the system in >> relative sychrony, >> perhaps a crisis, perhaps an opportunity? >> >> David has been point toward a sociology and linguistics >> to bring together >> various apparently combinable mode of theorizing a CHAT >> account of >> development that generalizes across scales (themselves >> differentially >> mutable from the perspective of a single human organism). >> This work, and >> that part of Yrjo's work focused on organisms seems to be >> pointing in >> similarly directions. If that it correct, it extends the >> links to the study >> of social institutions, a topic currently of general >> interest in the CHAT >> community. >> >> In any events, thanks. >> >> mike >> >> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 6:52 AM, Zlatko Bodrozic >> wrote: >> >>> Dear colleagues, >>> >>> some of you might find our paper (co-authored with Paul >>> Adler) on the >>> historical evolution of management models and >>> organizational paradigms >>> interesting. We published it this year in Administrative >>> Science Quarterly. >>> While it is based on a Neo-Schumpeterian framework >>> (Schumpeter, Freeman, >>> Perez), it was equally informed by cultural-historical >>> activity theory. >>> You can download a copy by using the link below, and we >>> would be delighted >>> to get any reactions to it that you might share with us. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Zlatko Bodro?i? and Paul Adler >>> >>> Bodrozic, Z., and P.S. Adler (forthcoming) The Evolution >>> of Management >>> Models: A Neo-Schumpeterian Theory. /Administrative >>> Science Quarterly/ >>> Download >>> >>> >>> >>> > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Aug 22 23:50:55 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:50:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> References: <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.yahoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> Message-ID: <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> Andy, Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on a Forum is not always beneficial ; it should be an exception rather than the rule. It is good you warn us against that! Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling responsible for what passes on the Forum collectively and communicatively ; thank goodness we have good-willed moderators! Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on finding responses to the posed questions . On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , as you now say , we are bound to be clear with our circumlocutor as we expect him/her to thusly be ! Our rightful challenges should not take the form of testing especially when our addressee is a full intelligent researcher himself! No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to conceptually scan the Cosmos and the daily chores as well. This point is all running all through your novel response. There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all dependencies and relations . The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes and parts in their static features in any domain as you come with some but not in their unified oneness in motion ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not partially but momentarily and any outright intervention (based on miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to a halt and our mystics see the high manifestations of these spectacular momentary visions in God as abstractions but scientists also have their own visions in turn . You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . Many thanks for your co-operation. Best wishes Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. Here is Hegel on moments: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 . It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is only with the formation of a concept of the whole that moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person unless they participate in some human community ("community" in this sense = particular). And every person is an individual, born at some time and place and dying in some time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all simultaneously the whole? All the various communities are parts of the whole of humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. But we can equally say that the various demographic groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the whole is conceived. Here is Hegel on whole and parts: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 . Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part? of the same social formation which creates the object we think about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" has in the material world or in activity. For example, when a science first begins it orients to an object which is an Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes (including pedology) while other sciences studied the general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - different wholes, different units, different problems, different insights, different remedies. That's more than enough! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > questions but they are related at least for me. > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > determinate > being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Aug 22 23:50:55 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:50:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> References: <2DB36616-7D51-4B7E-B4FA-38ADB8EA5A08@gmail.com> <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.yahoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> Message-ID: <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> Andy, Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on a Forum is not always beneficial ; it should be an exception rather than the rule. It is good you warn us against that! Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling responsible for what passes on the Forum collectively and communicatively ; thank goodness we have good-willed moderators! Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on finding responses to the posed questions . On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , as you now say , we are bound to be clear with our circumlocutor as we expect him/her to thusly be ! Our rightful challenges should not take the form of testing especially when our addressee is a full intelligent researcher himself! No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to conceptually scan the Cosmos and the daily chores as well. This point is all running all through your novel response. There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all dependencies and relations . The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes and parts in their static features in any domain as you come with some but not in their unified oneness in motion ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not partially but momentarily and any outright intervention (based on miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to a halt and our mystics see the high manifestations of these spectacular momentary visions in God as abstractions but scientists also have their own visions in turn . You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . Many thanks for your co-operation. Best wishes Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. Here is Hegel on moments: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 . It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is only with the formation of a concept of the whole that moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person unless they participate in some human community ("community" in this sense = particular). And every person is an individual, born at some time and place and dying in some time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all simultaneously the whole? All the various communities are parts of the whole of humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. But we can equally say that the various demographic groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the whole is conceived. Here is Hegel on whole and parts: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 . Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part? of the same social formation which creates the object we think about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" has in the material world or in activity. For example, when a science first begins it orients to an object which is an Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes (including pedology) while other sciences studied the general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - different wholes, different units, different problems, different insights, different remedies. That's more than enough! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > questions but they are related at least for me. > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > determinate > being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > From bodrozic@web.de Wed Aug 23 02:54:47 2017 From: bodrozic@web.de (Zlatko Bodrozic) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 11:54:47 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: An article on the evolution of organizational paradigms you might find interesting In-Reply-To: References: <02c7ffe1-5f3c-7cf0-0a28-2d6d2e51eaed@web.de> Message-ID: <218a87bb-c58e-148d-aa83-18230fd9211b@web.de> Hi Mike, Thanks. Yes, many analogies can be found here. Naoki Ueno's work is an important contribution to understanding the connections between social and technical processes. MCA's special issue on his work was very helpful to get familiar with it. There is also a close connection between our paper and Yrj? Engestr?m's work & Developmental Work Research. I work on a paper to elaborate on that connection. Kind regards, Zlatko > Hi Zlatko-- > > Thanks for the additional information about the line of work on evolution > of management models you are engaged in with Paul Adler. Notions like > neo-Schumperterian models of organizational and management change are a > novelty for me but the apparent analogies between processes evoked in the > developmental progression your diagrams depict are strongly reminiscent of > similar diagrams in the literature I know about various stage theories of > ontogeny and process of change. > > I am not sure you checked out the earlier discussion of socio-technical > systems in the work of Naoki Ueno and his colleagues caught your attention, > but that line of inquiry might provide a bridge between the > organizational/management evolution literature and the lines of reseach > more familiar to xmca readers. > > I hope there is followup to the connections your work points to. > > mike > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 3:07 AM, Zlatko Bodrozic wrote: > >> Many thanks for your comments, Mike. >> >> Since I was a PhD student I was fascinated by Scribner's (1985) analysis >> of "Vygotsky's Uses of History,". >> One could say that our paper (and my PhD) was inspired by her article. We >> study the connection between >> (1) the long-term evolution of technologies >> (2) the long-term evolution of organizational paradigms >> (3) the long-term evolution of management models >> (4) micro processes of organizational and managerial innovation >> (see the attached figure for a visualization) >> >> For the long-term technological processes, relying on a neo-Schumpeterian >> framework (Carlota Perez), we study subsequent technological revolutions >> (railway, steel &electricity, automobile, ICT). We argue that the emergence >> of a technological revolution in leading industries generates radically new >> organizational and management problems. The solution to these problems >> takes the form of a new organizational paradigm (professionally-managed >> firm, factory, corporation, network). This new paradigm emerges in two >> cycles. In a first cycle, we see the emergence of a new management model >> that represents a revolutionary break with the prevailing organizational >> paradigm (Line-and-staff, Scientific management, Strategy-and-structure, >> Business process). The appearance of this model typically generates >> unintended consequences (often related to human problems), which in turn >> prompt a second cycle that generates another management model that >> rectifies those dysfunctions and thereby rebalances and stabilizes the new >> organizational paradigm (Industrial betterment, Human relations, Quality >> management/organizational culture and learning, Knowledge management). >> >> (The connection to individual human development would be: An >> organizational expert working in the early 19th century, time-traveling >> into the present, would first need to master many of the lessons >> accumulated by the successive paradigms and models of the last century and >> a half. Each of the models that has left its mark on the overall evolution >> of management and organization offers a lesson for the individual.) >> >> We clearly see connections between this four processes, and?coming now to >> your question?we would also argue that there should be connections to the >> the longer-term evolution of social institutions. Actually, Paul Adler and >> I currently study the evolution of workplace communities?the fabric of >> workplace social relations?, and we are confident that we can make a >> connection to the 4 processes mentioned above. >> >> Regarding the question of an "orthogenetic principle": I need to think >> about this more. What we say in our paper is that the we see indicators of >> growing complexity of the division of labor, growing interdependence among >> actors, and increasing scope of the corresponding integration and control >> efforts. These indicators might be read as related to what Paul Adler >> (2012) calls the ?socialization of production?, but we have to explore this >> more. >> >> Kind regards, Zlatko >> >> >> >> Thank you for this paper, Zlato. We have not heard from Paul on this list >>> for years, but >>> his work has remained on the horizon. Now you have brought it back to us >>> in >>> an interesting formulation. >>> >>> I was struck by the parallels between the way you framed your question and >>> the question that developmental psychologists (perhaps pedologists, >>> David?): >>> >>> we argue that technology is a powerful factor shaping the evolution of >>> management models? contents >>> >>> a couple of months ago Roy Pea gave a talk at the Piaget society meetings >>> in which we made a very similar point with respect to the role of culture >>> in human development. Simplifying brutally, we argued that new >>> technologies >>> entail changes in social relations that subsequently change the >>> environment >>> of development for the en-culturating organism. This formulation, we >>> suggested provided piagetians to reconcile contradictions between the >>> biological and the social sides of Piaget. >>> >>> The similarity of the arguments raises a question for me about principles >>> of development that appear non-accidently related at different levels of >>> analysis: >>> 'individual organism, individual organism as constituitive of a social >>> group, the institutional structure of the organism's environment, the >>> structure of that proximal society and its relation to the organization of >>> the species of which it is a part. Does some sort of "orthogenetic >>> principle" apply across different scales of social processes? >>> >>> Short of that, what are we to make of the "limited" differences we see in >>> the dynamics of different levels of the system in relative sychrony, >>> perhaps a crisis, perhaps an opportunity? >>> >>> David has been point toward a sociology and linguistics to bring together >>> various apparently combinable mode of theorizing a CHAT account of >>> development that generalizes across scales (themselves differentially >>> mutable from the perspective of a single human organism). This work, and >>> that part of Yrjo's work focused on organisms seems to be pointing in >>> similarly directions. If that it correct, it extends the links to the >>> study >>> of social institutions, a topic currently of general interest in the CHAT >>> community. >>> >>> In any events, thanks. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 6:52 AM, Zlatko Bodrozic wrote: >>> >>> Dear colleagues, >>>> some of you might find our paper (co-authored with Paul Adler) on the >>>> historical evolution of management models and organizational paradigms >>>> interesting. We published it this year in Administrative Science >>>> Quarterly. >>>> While it is based on a Neo-Schumpeterian framework (Schumpeter, Freeman, >>>> Perez), it was equally informed by cultural-historical activity theory. >>>> You can download a copy by using the link below, and we would be >>>> delighted >>>> to get any reactions to it that you might share with us. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Zlatko Bodro?i? and Paul Adler >>>> >>>> Bodrozic, Z., and P.S. Adler (forthcoming) The Evolution of Management >>>> Models: A Neo-Schumpeterian Theory. /Administrative Science Quarterly/ >>>> Download >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> -- >> ----------------------------------------------------- >> Dr. Zlatko Bodro?i? >> >> Email: bodrozic@web.de >> Tel.: +381-62-1769594 >> Tel.: +49-172-4712341 >> >> -- ----------------------------------------------------- Dr. Zlatko Bodro?i? Email: bodrozic@web.de Tel.: +381-62-1769594 Tel.: +49-172-4712341 From bodrozic@web.de Wed Aug 23 04:00:03 2017 From: bodrozic@web.de (Zlatko Bodrozic) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 13:00:03 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: An article on the evolution of organizational paradigms you might find interesting In-Reply-To: <4ac135d1-fa88-57f9-2399-af8e67f24c27@mira.net> References: <02c7ffe1-5f3c-7cf0-0a28-2d6d2e51eaed@web.de> <4ac135d1-fa88-57f9-2399-af8e67f24c27@mira.net> Message-ID: <726adee9-4683-ca69-a04e-233aa81136ad@web.de> Thanks Andy! Indeed! The great contribution of Neo-Schumpeterians such as Carlota Perez is that they systematize the history of changing technologies (of communication etc). (Nikolai Kondratiev, the pioneer of the Neo-Schumpeterian tradition, was a contemporary of Vygotsky; they share the focus on historical processes, possibly also the focus on complexity-capturing units of analysis. In a sense, Neo-Schumpeterian economic theory is to traditional neoliberal economic theory, what CHAT is to traditional psychology). For all who are interested, I attach an article of Perez and a link to her current work: http://beyondthetechrevolution.com/research-project/ As you say Andy, in our paper, we address organisations - half way between Psychology and Social Theory. And I agree, there is a connection to social and political organisation: New public management is, in my opinion, connected to what we call the Business process model (inaugurated by Business Process Reengineering). Finnish initiatives to move from ?teaching by subject? to ?teaching by topic? are possibly connected to efforts to overcome boundaries and create communities of practice (what we subsume under the new "Knowledge Management" model). Kind regards, Zlatko > These are fascinating questions, Zlatko. There are lot of theories, > too, about how the changing technology of communication affects > psychology, from speech-only, to laborious writing techniques like > clay tablets and vellum, to pen-and-paper, to the printing press, the > telephone, the email, etc. The impact at the mezo-level, i.e., > organisations - half way between Psychology and Social Theory, is also > evident. Artefacts are the material bearers of culture after all. > Also, I have noticed that the evolution of management forms mirrors or > more likely, is mirrored by, forms of social and political > organisation. This is a very rich field for cultural psychological > research! > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research > On 20/08/2017 8:07 PM, Zlatko Bodrozic wrote: >> Many thanks for your comments, Mike. >> >> Since I was a PhD student I was fascinated by Scribner's (1985) >> analysis of "Vygotsky's Uses of History,". >> One could say that our paper (and my PhD) was inspired by her >> article. We study the connection between >> (1) the long-term evolution of technologies >> (2) the long-term evolution of organizational paradigms >> (3) the long-term evolution of management models >> (4) micro processes of organizational and managerial innovation >> (see the attached figure for a visualization) >> >> For the long-term technological processes, relying on a >> neo-Schumpeterian framework (Carlota Perez), we study subsequent >> technological revolutions (railway, steel &electricity, automobile, >> ICT). We argue that the emergence of a technological revolution in >> leading industries generates radically new organizational and >> management problems. The solution to these problems takes the form of >> a new organizational paradigm (professionally-managed firm, factory, >> corporation, network). This new paradigm emerges in two cycles. In a >> first cycle, we see the emergence of a new management model that >> represents a revolutionary break with the prevailing organizational >> paradigm (Line-and-staff, Scientific management, >> Strategy-and-structure, Business process). The appearance of this >> model typically generates unintended consequences (often related to >> human problems), which in turn prompt a second cycle that generates >> another management model that rectifies those dysfunctions and >> thereby rebalances and stabilizes the new organizational paradigm >> (Industrial betterment, Human relations, Quality >> management/organizational culture and learning, Knowledge management). >> >> (The connection to individual human development would be: An >> organizational expert working in the early 19th century, >> time-traveling into the present, would first need to master many of >> the lessons accumulated by the successive paradigms and models of the >> last century and a half. Each of the models that has left its mark on >> the overall evolution of management and organization offers a lesson >> for the individual.) >> >> We clearly see connections between this four processes, and?coming >> now to your question?we would also argue that there should be >> connections to the the longer-term evolution of social institutions. >> Actually, Paul Adler and I currently study the evolution of workplace >> communities?the fabric of workplace social relations?, and we are >> confident that we can make a connection to the 4 processes mentioned >> above. >> >> Regarding the question of an "orthogenetic principle": I need to >> think about this more. What we say in our paper is that the we see >> indicators of growing complexity of the division of labor, growing >> interdependence among actors, and increasing scope of the >> corresponding integration and control efforts. These indicators might >> be read as related to what Paul Adler (2012) calls the ?socialization >> of production?, but we have to explore this more. >> >> Kind regards, Zlatko >> >> >>> Thank you for this paper, Zlato. We have not heard from Paul on this >>> list >>> for years, but >>> his work has remained on the horizon. Now you have brought it back >>> to us in >>> an interesting formulation. >>> >>> I was struck by the parallels between the way you framed your >>> question and >>> the question that developmental psychologists (perhaps pedologists, >>> David?): >>> >>> we argue that technology is a powerful factor shaping the >>> evolution of >>> management models? contents >>> >>> a couple of months ago Roy Pea gave a talk at the Piaget society >>> meetings >>> in which we made a very similar point with respect to the role of >>> culture >>> in human development. Simplifying brutally, we argued that new >>> technologies >>> entail changes in social relations that subsequently change the >>> environment >>> of development for the en-culturating organism. This formulation, we >>> suggested provided piagetians to reconcile contradictions between the >>> biological and the social sides of Piaget. >>> >>> The similarity of the arguments raises a question for me about >>> principles >>> of development that appear non-accidently related at different >>> levels of >>> analysis: >>> 'individual organism, individual organism as constituitive of a social >>> group, the institutional structure of the organism's environment, the >>> structure of that proximal society and its relation to the >>> organization of >>> the species of which it is a part. Does some sort of "orthogenetic >>> principle" apply across different scales of social processes? >>> >>> Short of that, what are we to make of the "limited" differences we >>> see in >>> the dynamics of different levels of the system in relative sychrony, >>> perhaps a crisis, perhaps an opportunity? >>> >>> David has been point toward a sociology and linguistics to bring >>> together >>> various apparently combinable mode of theorizing a CHAT account of >>> development that generalizes across scales (themselves differentially >>> mutable from the perspective of a single human organism). This work, >>> and >>> that part of Yrjo's work focused on organisms seems to be pointing in >>> similarly directions. If that it correct, it extends the links to >>> the study >>> of social institutions, a topic currently of general interest in the >>> CHAT >>> community. >>> >>> In any events, thanks. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Sat, Aug 19, 2017 at 6:52 AM, Zlatko Bodrozic >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Dear colleagues, >>>> >>>> some of you might find our paper (co-authored with Paul Adler) on the >>>> historical evolution of management models and organizational paradigms >>>> interesting. We published it this year in Administrative Science >>>> Quarterly. >>>> While it is based on a Neo-Schumpeterian framework (Schumpeter, >>>> Freeman, >>>> Perez), it was equally informed by cultural-historical activity >>>> theory. >>>> You can download a copy by using the link below, and we would be >>>> delighted >>>> to get any reactions to it that you might share with us. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Zlatko Bodro?i? and Paul Adler >>>> >>>> Bodrozic, Z., and P.S. Adler (forthcoming) The Evolution of Management >>>> Models: A Neo-Schumpeterian Theory. /Administrative Science Quarterly/ >>>> Download >>>> >>>> >>>> >> > > -- ----------------------------------------------------- Dr. Zlatko Bodro?i? Email: bodrozic@web.de Tel.: +381-62-1769594 Tel.: +49-172-4712341 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Camb. J. Econ.-2010-Perez-185-202.pdf Type: application/download Size: 131914 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170823/7497dd1a/attachment-0001.bin From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Thu Aug 24 07:11:56 2017 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 10:11:56 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear colleagues, I'm happy to make my chapter available to all. But I'm afraid it will have to wait a bit, until after I return home from ISCAR. (At present, my wife and I are taking a travelling vacation from New York City to Quebec City, spending time in locations with little electronic connection to the world). I'm happy to see the book has already sparked much discussion! Best wishes to all, Peter On Fri, Aug 18, 2017 at 8:16 AM, mike cole wrote: > Peter, Alfredo Et al - > > It seems that the readers of MCA would appreciate a good overview review of > the LSV and Marx book, but so far as I know, no one has proposed the idea > to Beth, the book review editor. (You seem to have a jump on the task, > Alfredo!). > > Also, given the cost of the book, it would be nice if authors could follow > Andy's lead and make a draft available. Andy's article on units of analysis > is on Academia, a click away. That way the many readers of XMCA around the > world would not be excluded from the discussion. > > Mike > Happy travels summer readers. :-) > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Thu Aug 24 08:58:48 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 18:58:48 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Any friend in Italian and Egyptian University please? Message-ID: For a little help on a book. Photos of a few pages. Thanks Ulvi From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Aug 25 08:48:45 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 08:48:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] The non-effects of affirmative action?? Message-ID: The trends documented in this recent NY Times article ought to be of interest/concern to this discourse community. mike https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/24/us/affirmative-action.html?hpw&rref=education&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=well-region®ion=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well And look where the explanation is to be found --- Affirmative action increases the numbers of black and Hispanic students at many colleges and universities, but experts say that persistent underrepresentation often stems from equity issues that begin earlier. Elementary and secondary schools with large numbers of black and Hispanic students are less likely to have experienced teachers, advanced courses, high-quality instructional materials and adequate facilities, according to the United States Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights . Surprise! The explanation stops there. :-( mike From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 26 19:07:34 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 27 Aug 2017 12:07:34 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> References: <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.ya hoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net> Haydi, since this list has discussed the difference between 'moments' and 'parts' before, I will beg the patience of the list by pointing to this passage in Hegel's Philosophy of Right which we are reading in our reading group today: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate1.htm#PR278 Hegel is talking about states and organisms at the same time here. An organism is called an "organism" because it is made up of organs (which are moments) not parts. The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. The interesting thing to me is that he contrasts the modern state (which is an organism, and whose various organs are 'moments') with the medieval state in which the monarch collected taxes and made war with other monarchs, while civil society was run by corporations and guilds, and the whole state was simply an "aggregate" of these "parts" not an organic whole, not yet conforming to the concept of a state. So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the development of an aggregate into an integral whole. Hope this is of interest. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:50 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Andy, > > Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on > a Forum is not always beneficial ; it should be an > exception rather than the rule. It is good you warn us > against that! > > Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling > responsible for what passes on the Forum collectively and > communicatively ; thank goodness we have good-willed > moderators! > > Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on > finding responses to the posed questions . > > On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , > as you now say , we are bound to be clear with our > circumlocutor as we expect him/her to thusly be ! Our > rightful challenges should not take the form of testing > especially when our addressee is a full intelligent > researcher himself! > > No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to > conceptually scan the Cosmos and the daily chores as well. > This point is all running all through your novel response. > There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all > dependencies and relations . > > The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes > and parts in their static features in any domain as you > come with some but not in their unified oneness in motion > ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not > partially but momentarily and any outright intervention > (based on miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to > a halt and our mystics see the high manifestations of > these spectacular momentary visions in God as abstractions > but scientists also have their own visions in turn . > > You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . > Many thanks for your co-operation. > > Best wishes > > Haydi > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > *Sent:* Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer > reading > > Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly > not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the > two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. > > Here is Hegel on moments: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 > > . > It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is > only with the formation of a concept of the whole that > moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and > Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he > also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) > and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. > The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person > ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up > communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person > unless they participate in some human community ("community" > in this sense = particular). And every person is an > individual, born at some time and place and dying in some > time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). > Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all > simultaneously the whole? > > All the various communities are parts of the whole of > humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. > But we can equally say that the various demographic > groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the > whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the > whole is conceived. > > Here is Hegel on whole and parts: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 > > . > > Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part of > the same social formation which creates the object we think > about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is > always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" > has in the material world or in activity. For example, when > a science first begins it orients to an object which is an > Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye > and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young > man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in > Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the > peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a > different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made > the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that > some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes > (including pedology) while other sciences studied the > general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, > Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - > different wholes, different units, different problems, > different insights, different remedies. > > That's more than enough! > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research > On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > > questions but they are related at least for me. > > > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > > determinate > > > being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > > > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Aug 26 22:45:38 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 22:45:38 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net> References: <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.ya hoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net> Message-ID: <59a25c83.154e620a.8887c.7342@mx.google.com> Andy, Thanks for keeping this thread *alive* which seems to be the approach for my taking a reference. Living in contrast to not living. You are clarifying that *organisms* are living states. An *organism* involves *moments* that are also living animations. What does this living phenomena exclude? The answer is *not living* For example *parts* is a coinage of a not living form. You are clarifying the point that NONE of the living [organs & moments] can *live* other than AS [parts of the whole]. AND also vice versa: [Parts of the whole] cannot exist without living [organs & moments]. Wholes therefore require living animations. Alan, with this above generality, you are approaching the coinage of *the modern state* in contrast with the coinage of *the medieval state*. So... medieval states were *wholes* as *aggregating parts* which means this was NOT an *organic animated whole* as a living *state* This implies that *parts* can BECOME *living moments* as the whole becomes an organism as a living organizing. THIS movement [historical movement] is actually *the development* when an *aggregate of parts* moves into an *integral* modern *state*. This is coining the word *integral* as significant within living organizing *states* that are developmental. Moving from [medieval states] towards [modern states]. Alan, I am not sure if I have garbled your intent or if my reading followed your clarity? I am out on a branch or limb at this moment. This theme or narrative is informative Larry Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Andy Blunden Sent: August 26, 2017 7:09 PM To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ?; ?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, since this list has discussed the difference between 'moments' and 'parts' before, I will beg the patience of the list by pointing to this passage in Hegel's Philosophy of Right which we are reading in our reading group today: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate1.htm#PR278 Hegel is talking about states and organisms at the same time here. An organism is called an "organism" because it is made up of organs (which are moments) not parts. The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. The interesting thing to me is that he contrasts the modern state (which is an organism, and whose various organs are 'moments') with the medieval state in which the monarch collected taxes and made war with other monarchs, while civil society was run by corporations and guilds, and the whole state was simply an "aggregate" of these "parts" not an organic whole, not yet conforming to the concept of a state. So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the development of an aggregate into an integral whole. Hope this is of interest. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:50 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Andy, > > Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on > a Forum is not always beneficial ; it should be an > exception rather than the rule. It is good you warn us > against that! > > Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling > responsible for what passes on the Forum collectively and > communicatively ; thank goodness we have good-willed > moderators! > > Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on > finding responses to the posed questions . > > On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , > as you now say , we are bound to be clear with our > circumlocutor as we expect him/her to thusly be ! Our > rightful challenges should not take the form of testing > especially when our addressee is a full intelligent > researcher himself! > > No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to > conceptually scan the Cosmos and the daily chores as well. > This point is all running all through your novel response. > There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all > dependencies and relations . > > The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes > and parts in their static features in any domain as you > come with some but not in their unified oneness in motion > ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not > partially but momentarily and any outright intervention > (based on miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to > a halt and our mystics see the high manifestations of > these spectacular momentary visions in God as abstractions > but scientists also have their own visions in turn . > > You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . > Many thanks for your co-operation. > > Best wishes > > Haydi > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > *Sent:* Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer > reading > > Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly > not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the > two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. > > Here is Hegel on moments: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 > > . > It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is > only with the formation of a concept of the whole that > moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and > Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he > also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) > and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. > The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person > ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up > communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person > unless they participate in some human community ("community" > in this sense = particular). And every person is an > individual, born at some time and place and dying in some > time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). > Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all > simultaneously the whole? > > All the various communities are parts of the whole of > humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. > But we can equally say that the various demographic > groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the > whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the > whole is conceived. > > Here is Hegel on whole and parts: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 > > . > > Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part of > the same social formation which creates the object we think > about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is > always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" > has in the material world or in activity. For example, when > a science first begins it orients to an object which is an > Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye > and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young > man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in > Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the > peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a > different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made > the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that > some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes > (including pedology) while other sciences studied the > general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, > Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - > different wholes, different units, different problems, > different insights, different remedies. > > That's more than enough! > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research > On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > > questions but they are related at least for me. > > > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > > determinate > > > being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > > > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 26 23:03:30 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 27 Aug 2017 16:03:30 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <59a25c83.154e620a.8887c.7342@mx.google.com> References: <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.ya hoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net> <59a25c83.154e620a.8887c.7342@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1fec4180-d2d3-3e02-4041-a084d0835ab3@mira.net> Larry, just think of Vygotsky's summary of the development of thinking and speech, each having separate roots, with "a prelinguistic phase in the development of thought and a preintellectual phase in the development of speech." The "modern state" is "when these lines meet," and the different powers (each having their own roots) are transformed and "thought becomes verbal and speech rational." https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/ch04.htm#s2a In the medieval state (as Hegel knew it) the institutions of civil society were not dependent on the King except for protection from other Kings, and the King was independent of the institutions of civil society (except for raising taxes). So the medieval state was just an aggregate of distinct powers. This mutual independence in what Hegel called the modern state - he had something like the British constitutional monarchy in mind. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 27/08/2017 3:45 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Andy, > > Thanks for keeping this thread **alive** which seems to be > the approach for my taking a reference. Living in contrast > to not living. > > You are clarifying that **organisms** are living states. > An **organism** involves **moments** that are also living > animations. > > What does this living phenomena exclude? The answer is > **not living** For example **parts** is a coinage of a not > living form. > > You are clarifying the point that NONE of the living > [organs & moments] can **live** other than AS [parts of > the whole]. > > AND also vice versa: [Parts of the whole] cannot exist > without living [organs & moments]. Wholes therefore > require living animations. > > Alan, with this above generality, you are approaching the > coinage of **the modern state** in contrast with the > coinage of **the medieval state**. > > So... medieval states were **wholes** as **aggregating > parts** which means this was NOT an **organic animated > whole** as a living **state** > > This implies that **parts** can BECOME **living moments** > as the whole becomes an organism as a living organizing. > > THIS movement [historical movement] is actually **the > development** when an **aggregate of parts** moves into an > **integral** modern **state**. This is coining the word > **integral** as significant within living organizing > **states** that are developmental. Moving from [medieval > states] towards [modern states]. > > Alan, > > I am not sure if I have garbled your intent or if my > reading followed your clarity? I am out on a branch or > limb at this moment. > > This theme or narrative is informative > > Larry > > Sent from Mail > for > Windows 10 > > *From: *Andy Blunden > *Sent: *August 26, 2017 7:09 PM > *To: *?Haydi Zulfei ? ; > ?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer > reading > > Haydi, since this list has discussed the difference between > > 'moments' and 'parts' before, I will beg the patience of the > > list by pointing to this passage in Hegel's Philosophy of > > Right which we are reading in our reading group today: > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate1.htm#PR278 > > Hegel is talking about states and organisms at the same time > > here. An organism is called an "organism" because it is made > > up of organs (which are moments) not parts. The point is > > that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as > > parts of the whole, and vice versa. The interesting thing to > > me is that he contrasts the modern state (which is an > > organism, and whose various organs are 'moments') with the > > medieval state in which the monarch collected taxes and made > > war with other monarchs, while civil society was run by > > corporations and guilds, and the whole state was simply an > > "aggregate" of these "parts" not an organic whole, not yet > > conforming to the concept of a state. So the relation > > between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments > > through the development of an aggregate into an integral > whole. > > Hope this is of interest. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research > > On 23/08/2017 4:50 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei ? wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > > > Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on > > > a Forum is not always beneficial ; it should be an > > > exception rather than the rule. It is good you warn us > > > against that! > > > > > > Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling > > > responsible for what passes on the Forum collectively and > > > communicatively ; thank goodness we have good-willed > > > moderators! > > > > > > Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on > > > finding responses to the posed questions . > > > > > > On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , > > > as you now say , we are bound to be clear with our > > > circumlocutor as we expect him/her to thusly be ! Our > > > rightful challenges should not take the form of testing > > > especially when our addressee is a full intelligent > > > researcher himself! > > > > > > No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to > > > conceptually scan the Cosmos and the daily chores as well. > > > This point is all running all through your novel response. > > > There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all > > > dependencies and relations . > > > > > > The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes > > > and parts in their static features in any domain as you > > > come with some but not in their unified oneness in motion > > > ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not > > > partially but momentarily and any outright intervention > > > (based on miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to > > > a halt and our mystics see the high manifestations of > > > these spectacular momentary visions in God as abstractions > > > but scientists also have their own visions in turn . > > > > > > You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . > > > Many thanks for your co-operation. > > > > > > Best wishes > > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *From:* Andy Blunden > > > *To:* "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > > > *Sent:* Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 > > > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer > > > reading > > > > > > Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly > > > not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the > > > two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. > > > > > > Here is Hegel on moments: > > > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 > > > > > > > . > > > It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is > > > only with the formation of a concept of the whole that > > > moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and > > > Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he > > > also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) > > > and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. > > > The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person > > > ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up > > > communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person > > > unless they participate in some human community ("community" > > > in this sense = particular). And every person is an > > > individual, born at some time and place and dying in some > > > time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). > > > Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all > > > simultaneously the whole? > > > > > > All the various communities are parts of the whole of > > > humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. > > > But we can equally say that the various demographic > > > groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the > > > whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the > > > whole is conceived. > > > > > > Here is Hegel on whole and parts: > > > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 > > > > > > > . > > > > > > Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part of > > > the same social formation which creates the object we think > > > about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is > > > always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" > > > has in the material world or in activity. For example, when > > > a science first begins it orients to an object which is an > > > Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye > > > and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young > > > man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in > > > Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the > > > peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a > > > different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made > > > the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that > > > some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes > > > (including pedology) while other sciences studied the > > > general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, > > > Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - > > > different wholes, different units, different problems, > > > different insights, different remedies. > > > > > > That's more than enough! > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research > > > On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei ? wrote: > > > > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > > > > > > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > > > > questions but they are related at least for me. > > > > > > > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > > > > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > > > > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > > > > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > > > > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > > > > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > > > > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > > > > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > > > > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > > > > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > > > > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > > > > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > > > > determinate > > > > > > > > being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > > > > > > > > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sun Aug 27 03:45:01 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Sun, 27 Aug 2017 10:45:01 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net> References: <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.ya hoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net> Message-ID: <1662725260.3876509.1503830701564@mail.yahoo.com> Andy, I'm just checking an article by my son who's a doctorate in linguistics in Farsi. It's urgent . But just ... As far as I see Hegel sees nothing in static states . As soon as he uses a philosophical term , he goes to its not-being as proof of the former's Being. This goes also with Finites. Nothing does he pose or posit without simultaneously uprooting it with a contradiction . In addition to Lenin's highlights , I've highlighted many other things for myself not for you and not for those who insisted me deal with Hegel in firsthand reading. But when happily you see it worth dealing with in collective debates , I'll be a participant , too. The more I read/think of Hegel's Notion as sort of 'matter' , I see no bit of a trace of it being such. Everything returns to Notion as God,Spirit, Absolute,Idea. Aside from your mentioning part as a non-scientific term , I didn't say I won't believe in parts and wholes . What I just meant was that it's not enough to say 'a whole is a whole despite its containing parts' ; it was about 'activity' and you do know of Leontiev's (Leontiev is not my concern here) firm belief in the molarity , integralness , unity in diversity of activity. David in particular stressed that there is nothing in activity save action and he was right but you demanded other parts sort of ridiculously. Considering such a concept , definitely and absolutely there's no part here and no OTHER parts for that matter. There're 'moments'. Because what counts is the angle of your visioning and relations and dependencies not 'exclusive' parts you mentioned. Exclusive means something unrelated to an other. We do know activity for Leontiev is VIEWED as an integral whole (in motion not laid there) instigated by a motive required by a division of labour participants in it eying the resultant portion ; action viewed as something to be performed consciously in accordance with a GOAL ; and OPERATIONS again viewed as the conditioned way of achieving the very action in the direction of Goal. Reaching a village through mountains or a flat paved asphalt track does not divide action in two. And now there's talk of 'organism' not a piece of wood and we know of organismic links and relations. Though with the very wood in its state of being burnt we could have the moment of sending smoke to the air. Hegel has his example of stone. With the State Hegel sees it as living and moving and approaching an end , manipulating and being manipulated .? ? ? You say :The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. Right! Because a living body does not know rest ; parts here act as moments ; compare living limbs with dead amputated decayed ones ; could you significantly use the same utterance with them as such? Sure ! This is of much interest! Especially you concluding ... "So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the [[development]] of an 'aggregate' into an "integral whole." Excuse me if there are redundancies. This last utterance of yours convinced me of agreeing to agree! Cheers ! Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, 27 August 2017, 6:37:43 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, since this list has discussed the difference between 'moments' and 'parts' before, I will beg the patience of the list by pointing to this passage in Hegel's Philosophy of Right which we are reading in our reading group today:https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate1.htm#PR278 Hegel is talking about states and organisms at the same time here. An organism is called an "organism" because it is made up of organs (which are moments) not parts. The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. The interesting thing to me is that he contrasts the modern state (which is an organism, and whose various organs are 'moments') with the medieval state in which the monarch collected taxes and made war with other monarchs, while civil society was run by corporations and guilds, and the whole state was simply an "aggregate" of these "parts" not an organic whole, not yet conforming to the concept of a state. So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the development of an aggregate into an integral whole. Hope this is of interest. Andy Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:50 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: Andy, Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on a Forum is not always beneficial ; it should be an exception rather than the rule. It is good you warn us against that! Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling responsible for what passes on the Forum collectively and communicatively ; thank goodness we have good-willed moderators! Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on finding responses to the posed questions . On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , as you now say , we are bound to be clear with our circumlocutor as we expect him/her to thusly be ! Our rightful challenges should not take the form of testing especially when our addressee is a full intelligent researcher himself! No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to conceptually scan the Cosmos and the daily chores as well. This point is all running all through your novel response. There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all dependencies and relations . The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes and parts in their static features in any domain as you come with some but not in their unified oneness in motion ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not partially but momentarily and any outright intervention (based on miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to a halt and our mystics see the high manifestations of these spectacular momentary visions in God as abstractions but scientists also have their own visions in turn . You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . Many thanks for your co-operation. Best wishes Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. Here is Hegel on moments: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 . It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is only with the formation of a concept of the whole that moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person unless they participate in some human community ("community" in this sense = particular). And every person is an individual, born at some time and place and dying in some time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all simultaneously the whole? All the various communities are parts of the whole of humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. But we can equally say that the various demographic groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the whole is conceived. Here is Hegel on whole and parts: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 . Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part? of the same social formation which creates the object we think about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" has in the material world or in activity. For example, when a science first begins it orients to an object which is an Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes (including pedology) while other sciences studied the general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - different wholes, different units, different problems, different insights, different remedies. That's more than enough! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > questions but they are related at least for me. > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > determinate >being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Aug 27 04:03:59 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 27 Aug 2017 11:03:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1662725260.3876509.1503830701564@mail.yahoo.com> References: <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.ya hoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net>, <1662725260.3876509.1503830701564@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1503831838580.96340@iped.uio.no> Andy, Haidy, and Larry, this is a very interesting discussion, and I think the list is not only patient but happy enough to have discussion between 2, with the 'n' number not mattering at all, as long as it is generative dialogue, and generative of good. I, as probably many others, are travelling these days to conferences, including ISCAR, so people will probably have limited time for actively joining, but all these materials are important to generate. Haidy, best of lucks to your son! By the way, I thought your formulation that he "Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not partially but momentarily" was very illuminating. Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ?Haydi Zulfei? ?? Sent: 27 August 2017 12:45 To: ablunden@mira.net; ?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity? Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Andy, I'm just checking an article by my son who's a doctorate in linguistics in Farsi. It's urgent . But just ... As far as I see Hegel sees nothing in static states . As soon as he uses a philosophical term , he goes to its not-being as proof of the former's Being. This goes also with Finites. Nothing does he pose or posit without simultaneously uprooting it with a contradiction . In addition to Lenin's highlights , I've highlighted many other things for myself not for you and not for those who insisted me deal with Hegel in firsthand reading. But when happily you see it worth dealing with in collective debates , I'll be a participant , too. The more I read/think of Hegel's Notion as sort of 'matter' , I see no bit of a trace of it being such. Everything returns to Notion as God,Spirit, Absolute,Idea. Aside from your mentioning part as a non-scientific term , I didn't say I won't believe in parts and wholes . What I just meant was that it's not enough to say 'a whole is a whole despite its containing parts' ; it was about 'activity' and you do know of Leontiev's (Leontiev is not my concern here) firm belief in the molarity , integralness , unity in diversity of activity. David in particular stressed that there is nothing in activity save action and he was right but you demanded other parts sort of ridiculously. Considering such a concept , definitely and absolutely there's no part here and no OTHER parts for that matter. There're 'moments'. Because what counts is the angle of your visioning and relations and dependencies not 'exclusive' parts you mentioned. Exclusive means something unrelated to an other. We do know activity for Leontiev is VIEWED as an integral whole (in motion not laid there) instigated by a motive required by a division of labour participants in it eying the resultant portion ; action viewed as something to be performed consciously in accordance with a GOAL ; and OPERATIONS again viewed as the conditioned way of achieving the very action in the direction of Goal. Reaching a village through mountains or a flat paved asphalt track does not divide action in two. And now there's talk of 'organism' not a piece of wood and we know of organismic links and relations. Though with the very wood in its state of being burnt we could have the moment of sending smoke to the air. Hegel has his example of stone. With the State Hegel sees it as living and moving and approaching an end , manipulating and being manipulated . You say :The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. Right! Because a living body does not know rest ; parts here act as moments ; compare living limbs with dead amputated decayed ones ; could you significantly use the same utterance with them as such? Sure ! This is of much interest! Especially you concluding ... "So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the [[development]] of an 'aggregate' into an "integral whole." Excuse me if there are redundancies. This last utterance of yours convinced me of agreeing to agree! Cheers ! Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, 27 August 2017, 6:37:43 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, since this list has discussed the difference between 'moments' and 'parts' before, I will beg the patience of the list by pointing to this passage in Hegel's Philosophy of Right which we are reading in our reading group today:https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate1.htm#PR278 Hegel is talking about states and organisms at the same time here. An organism is called an "organism" because it is made up of organs (which are moments) not parts. The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. The interesting thing to me is that he contrasts the modern state (which is an organism, and whose various organs are 'moments') with the medieval state in which the monarch collected taxes and made war with other monarchs, while civil society was run by corporations and guilds, and the whole state was simply an "aggregate" of these "parts" not an organic whole, not yet conforming to the concept of a state. So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the development of an aggregate into an integral whole. Hope this is of interest. Andy Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:50 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: Andy, Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on a Forum is not always beneficial ; it should be an exception rather than the rule. It is good you warn us against that! Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling responsible for what passes on the Forum collectively and communicatively ; thank goodness we have good-willed moderators! Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on finding responses to the posed questions . On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , as you now say , we are bound to be clear with our circumlocutor as we expect him/her to thusly be ! Our rightful challenges should not take the form of testing especially when our addressee is a full intelligent researcher himself! No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to conceptually scan the Cosmos and the daily chores as well. This point is all running all through your novel response. There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all dependencies and relations . The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes and parts in their static features in any domain as you come with some but not in their unified oneness in motion ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not partially but momentarily and any outright intervention (based on miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to a halt and our mystics see the high manifestations of these spectacular momentary visions in God as abstractions but scientists also have their own visions in turn . You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . Many thanks for your co-operation. Best wishes Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. Here is Hegel on moments: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 . It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is only with the formation of a concept of the whole that moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person unless they participate in some human community ("community" in this sense = particular). And every person is an individual, born at some time and place and dying in some time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all simultaneously the whole? All the various communities are parts of the whole of humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. But we can equally say that the various demographic groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the whole is conceived. Here is Hegel on whole and parts: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 . Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part of the same social formation which creates the object we think about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" has in the material world or in activity. For example, when a science first begins it orients to an object which is an Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes (including pedology) while other sciences studied the general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - different wholes, different units, different problems, different insights, different remedies. That's more than enough! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > questions but they are related at least for me. > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > determinate >being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Aug 27 08:41:04 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 27 Aug 2017 08:41:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <1503831838580.96340@iped.uio.no> References: <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <479731126.4131872.1503425447370@mail.ya hoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net>, <1662725260.3876509.1503830701564@mail.yahoo.com> <1503831838580.96340@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <59a2e833.48cc620a.88969.a82f@mx.google.com> Alfredo & Haydi, The mention of (cosmos) is a voiced word and I am wondering of the way this vioced word also is related to the (word): *cosmopolitan* Cosmopolitan is often closely familiar when exploring (cities) as living cosmos. Since Andy refers to living (states) as moments, are we living through cosmopolitan (moments) as the place of cities forming. I will pause with this moment as a living conversation. I am considering the Farsi language and the modernity of cosmopolitan aggregates becoming (living) forms .... (pause) Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: August 27, 2017 4:06 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; ?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity?; ?Haydi Zulfei? ?? Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Andy, Haidy, and Larry, this is a very interesting discussion, and I think the list is not only patient but happy enough to have discussion between 2, with the 'n' number not mattering at all, as long as it is generative dialogue, and generative of good. I, as probably many others, are travelling these days to conferences, including ISCAR, so people will probably have limited time for actively joining, but all these materials are important to generate. Haidy, best of lucks to your son! By the way, I thought your formulation that he "Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not partially but momentarily" was very illuminating. Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ?Haydi Zulfei? ?? Sent: 27 August 2017 12:45 To: ablunden@mira.net; ?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity? Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Andy, I'm just checking an article by my son who's a doctorate in linguistics in Farsi. It's urgent . But just ... As far as I see Hegel sees nothing in static states . As soon as he uses a philosophical term , he goes to its not-being as proof of the former's Being. This goes also with Finites. Nothing does he pose or posit without simultaneously uprooting it with a contradiction . In addition to Lenin's highlights , I've highlighted many other things for myself not for you and not for those who insisted me deal with Hegel in firsthand reading. But when happily you see it worth dealing with in collective debates , I'll be a participant , too. The more I read/think of Hegel's Notion as sort of 'matter' , I see no bit of a trace of it being such. Everything returns to Notion as God,Spirit, Absolute,Idea. Aside from your mentioning part as a non-scientific term , I didn't say I won't believe in parts and wholes . What I just meant was that it's not enough to say 'a whole is a whole despite its containing parts' ; it was about 'activity' and you do know of Leontiev's (Leontiev is not my concern here) firm belief in the molarity , integralness , unity in diversity of activity. David in particular stressed that there is nothing in activity save action and he was right but you demanded other parts sort of ridiculously. Considering such a concept , definitely and absolutely there's no part here and no OTHER parts for that matter. There're 'moments'. Because what counts is the angle of your visioning and relations and dependencies not 'exclusive' parts you mentioned. Exclusive means something unrelated to an other. We do know activity for Leontiev is VIEWED as an integral whole (in motion not laid there) instigated by a motive required by a division of labour participants in it eying the resultant portion ; action viewed as something to be performed consciously in accordance with a GOAL ; and OPERATIONS again viewed as the conditioned way of achieving the very action in the direction of Goal. Reaching a village through mountains or a flat paved asphalt track does not divide action in two. And now there's talk of 'organism' not a piece of wood and we know of organismic links and relations. Though with the very wood in its state of being burnt we could have the moment of sending smoke to the air. Hegel has his example of stone. With the State Hegel sees it as living and moving and approaching an end , manipulating and being manipulated . You say :The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. Right! Because a living body does not know rest ; parts here act as moments ; compare living limbs with dead amputated decayed ones ; could you significantly use the same utterance with them as such? Sure ! This is of much interest! Especially you concluding ... "So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the [[development]] of an 'aggregate' into an "integral whole." Excuse me if there are redundancies. This last utterance of yours convinced me of agreeing to agree! Cheers ! Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, 27 August 2017, 6:37:43 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, since this list has discussed the difference between 'moments' and 'parts' before, I will beg the patience of the list by pointing to this passage in Hegel's Philosophy of Right which we are reading in our reading group today:https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate1.htm#PR278 Hegel is talking about states and organisms at the same time here. An organism is called an "organism" because it is made up of organs (which are moments) not parts. The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. The interesting thing to me is that he contrasts the modern state (which is an organism, and whose various organs are 'moments') with the medieval state in which the monarch collected taxes and made war with other monarchs, while civil society was run by corporations and guilds, and the whole state was simply an "aggregate" of these "parts" not an organic whole, not yet conforming to the concept of a state. So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the development of an aggregate into an integral whole. Hope this is of interest. Andy Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:50 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: Andy, Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on a Forum is not always beneficial ; it should be an exception rather than the rule. It is good you warn us against that! Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling responsible for what passes on the Forum collectively and communicatively ; thank goodness we have good-willed moderators! Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on finding responses to the posed questions . On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , as you now say , we are bound to be clear with our circumlocutor as we expect him/her to thusly be ! Our rightful challenges should not take the form of testing especially when our addressee is a full intelligent researcher himself! No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to conceptually scan the Cosmos and the daily chores as well. This point is all running all through your novel response. There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all dependencies and relations . The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes and parts in their static features in any domain as you come with some but not in their unified oneness in motion ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not partially but momentarily and any outright intervention (based on miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to a halt and our mystics see the high manifestations of these spectacular momentary visions in God as abstractions but scientists also have their own visions in turn . You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . Many thanks for your co-operation. Best wishes Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. Here is Hegel on moments: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 . It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is only with the formation of a concept of the whole that moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person unless they participate in some human community ("community" in this sense = particular). And every person is an individual, born at some time and place and dying in some time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all simultaneously the whole? All the various communities are parts of the whole of humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. But we can equally say that the various demographic groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the whole is conceived. Here is Hegel on whole and parts: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL135 . Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part of the same social formation which creates the object we think about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" has in the material world or in activity. For example, when a science first begins it orients to an object which is an Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes (including pedology) while other sciences studied the general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - different wholes, different units, different problems, different insights, different remedies. That's more than enough! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > questions but they are related at least for me. > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > determinate >being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Aug 27 09:03:06 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 01:03:06 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading In-Reply-To: <59a2e833.48cc620a.88969.a82f@mx.google.com> References: <0e46e2fb-b74e-f89f-a1a4-537bc3954276@mira.net> <1503218308054.50723@iped.uio.no> <1503222253604.91908@iped.uio.no> <6965a45b-5e09-9214-550e-5179360dfbcf@mira.net> <1503224179002.4159@iped.uio.no> <1503267345037.77243@iped.uio.no> <5266C524-C3AA-4AFD-93AB-C2FDBF6C3F4A@gmail.com> <3c64a9ea-f095-114a-1c88-2f67aeb72315@mira.net> <1621223269.3865466.1503411291377@mail.yahoo.com> <5637927b-1982-33ab-64f1-124a56e8cfe7@mira.net> <336359864.203766.1503471055955@mail.yahoo.com> <1a1e29e4-493c-496f-179f-d566b8b665af@mira.net> <1662725260.3876509.1503830701564@mail.yahoo.com> <1503831838580.96340@iped.uio.no> <59a2e833.48cc620a.88969.a82f@mx.google.com> Message-ID: The idea of a "segmentary state" (that is, a state which is organized around the principle of "me against my brother", "me and my brother against my cousin", "me, my brother, and my cousin against the world") was taken by my stepfather, Burton Stein, from Aidan Southall, who had developed it in the context of traditional African societies. Burt used it to explain medieval Indian history, especially under the Chollas. At the same time, Perry Anderson (brother of Benedict) was using something fairly similar to explain the transition from European feudalisms where the reigning prince was simply the strongest of peers to the kind of absolutist state we see under Frederick the Great, Phillip the Second, and of course Elizabeth the First in England. This absolutist state is seen as the political realization of a modern nation state. Burt was heavily criticized for his notion of the segmentary state, and he eventually modified it a lot. I think that what critics didn't know about Burt was that he started out as a historian of China, and his real contrast was always not between India and Europe/Japan but rather between India and China. He saw both India and China as "petty bourgeois states"--that is, states where peasants were really the ruling class--but he was confounded by the difference between a highly unified political state in China and the much looser political organization of medieval South India. I think his explanation was wrong, because I don't think that peasants formed a self-conscious ruling class in either place, and because I think Burt ignored the role of language in unifying a nation state. But I also think that Burt recognized that Marx's explanation of an "Asiatic mode of production" based on water works and a centralized system of public works was simply an algebraic way of saying that it was not feudal, and I agree with that. The problem is that I don't see that replacing a wrong historico-cultural analysis with a political one is workable: it's like saying that medieval France and medieval Germany were utterly different just because one had a unified state and the other did not. David Kellogg Macquarie University Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards Conceptual Complementarity Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full On Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 12:41 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Alfredo & Haydi, > > The mention of (cosmos) is a voiced word and I am wondering of the way > this vioced word also is related to the (word): *cosmopolitan* > Cosmopolitan is often closely familiar when exploring (cities) as living > cosmos. > Since Andy refers to living (states) as moments, are we living through > cosmopolitan (moments) as the place of cities forming. > > I will pause with this moment as a living conversation. I am considering > the Farsi language and the modernity of cosmopolitan aggregates becoming > (living) forms .... (pause) > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: August 27, 2017 4:06 AM > To: ablunden@mira.net; ?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity?; ?Haydi Zulfei? > ?? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Andy, Haidy, and Larry, > > this is a very interesting discussion, and I think the list is not only > patient but happy enough to have discussion between 2, with the 'n' number > not mattering at all, as long as it is generative dialogue, and generative > of good. > > I, as probably many others, are travelling these days to conferences, > including ISCAR, so people will probably have limited time for actively > joining, but all these materials are important to generate. > > Haidy, best of lucks to your son! By the way, I thought your formulation > that he "Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs not partially but > momentarily" was very illuminating. > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of ?Haydi Zulfei? ?? > Sent: 27 August 2017 12:45 > To: ablunden@mira.net; ?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Andy, > I'm just checking an article by my son who's a doctorate in linguistics in > Farsi. It's urgent . > > But just ... > As far as I see Hegel sees nothing in static states . As soon as he uses a > philosophical term , he goes to its not-being as proof of the former's > Being. This goes also with Finites. Nothing does he pose or posit without > simultaneously uprooting it with a contradiction . In addition to Lenin's > highlights , I've highlighted many other things for myself not for you and > not for those who insisted me deal with Hegel in firsthand reading. But > when happily you see it worth dealing with in collective debates , I'll be > a participant , too. > > The more I read/think of Hegel's Notion as sort of 'matter' , I see no > bit of a trace of it being such. Everything returns to Notion as > God,Spirit, Absolute,Idea. > > Aside from your mentioning part as a non-scientific term , I didn't say I > won't believe in parts and wholes . What I just meant was that it's not > enough to say 'a whole is a whole despite its containing parts' ; it was > about 'activity' and you do know of Leontiev's (Leontiev is not my concern > here) firm belief in the molarity , integralness , unity in diversity of > activity. David in particular stressed that there is nothing in activity > save action and he was right but you demanded other parts sort of > ridiculously. Considering such a concept , definitely and absolutely > there's no part here and no OTHER parts for that matter. There're > 'moments'. Because what counts is the angle of your visioning and relations > and dependencies not 'exclusive' parts you mentioned. Exclusive means > something unrelated to an other. We do know activity for Leontiev is VIEWED > as an integral whole (in motion not laid there) instigated by a motive > required by a division of labour participants in it eying the resultant > portion ; action viewed as something to be performed consciously in > accordance with a GOAL ; and OPERATIONS again viewed as the conditioned way > of achieving the very action in the direction of Goal. Reaching a village > through mountains or a flat paved asphalt track does not divide action in > two. > > And now there's talk of 'organism' not a piece of wood and we know of > organismic links and relations. Though with the very wood in its state of > being burnt we could have the moment of sending smoke to the air. Hegel has > his example of stone. > > With the State Hegel sees it as living and moving and approaching an end , > manipulating and being manipulated . > You say :The point is that none of the organs (or moments) can live other > than as parts of the whole, and vice versa. Right! Because a living body > does not know rest ; parts here act as moments ; compare living limbs with > dead amputated decayed ones ; could you significantly use the same > utterance with them as such? > > Sure ! This is of much interest! Especially you concluding ... > "So the relation between a part and a moment is that parts can become > moments through the [[development]] of an 'aggregate' into an "integral > whole." > Excuse me if there are redundancies. This last utterance of yours > convinced me of agreeing to agree! > Cheers ! > Haydi > > From: Andy Blunden > To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "?eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity" > Sent: Sunday, 27 August 2017, 6:37:43 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Haydi, since this list has discussed the difference between 'moments' and > 'parts' before, I will beg the patience of the list by pointing to this > passage in Hegel's Philosophy of Right which we are reading in our reading > group today:https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/ > works/pr/prstate1.htm#PR278 Hegel is talking about states and organisms > at the same time here. An organism is called an "organism" because it is > made up of organs (which are moments) not parts. The point is that none of > the organs (or moments) can live other than as parts of the whole, and vice > versa. The interesting thing to me is that he contrasts the modern state > (which is an organism, and whose various organs are 'moments') with the > medieval state in which the monarch collected taxes and made war with other > monarchs, while civil society was run by corporations and guilds, and the > whole state was simply an "aggregate" of these "parts" not an organic > whole, not yet conforming to the concept of a state. So the relation > between a part and a moment is that parts can become moments through the > development of an aggregate into an integral whole. Hope this is of > interest. Andy > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 4:50 PM, ?Haydi > Zulfei? ? wrote: > > Andy, > Right! A discussion being run just between two persons on a Forum is not > always beneficial ; it should be an exception rather than the rule. It is > good you warn us against that! > Additionally , each of us are reacting and feeling responsible for what > passes on the Forum collectively and communicatively ; thank goodness we > have good-willed moderators! > > Though me a lesser student , I co-operated with you on finding responses > to the posed questions . > > On 'moments' I begged the information to the effect that , as you now > say , we are bound to be clear with our circumlocutor as we expect him/her > to thusly be ! Our rightful challenges should not take the form of testing > especially when our addressee is a full intelligent researcher himself! > > No , much of a headache inflicts us when we aim to conceptually scan the > Cosmos and the daily chores as well. This point is all running all through > your novel response. There are lots of 'if's and 'in case of's and all > dependencies and relations . > > The gist of the matter was that we could speak of wholes and parts in > their static features in any domain as you come with some but not in their > unified oneness in motion ; the Cosmos IS of all parts but the Cosmos runs > not partially but momentarily and any outright intervention (based on > miscalculations in our conceptions) brings it to a halt and our mystics see > the high manifestations of these spectacular momentary visions in God as > abstractions but scientists also have their own visions in turn . > You then will agree to be finished with the debate now . Many thanks for > your co-operation. > Best wishes > Haydi > > > > From: Andy Blunden > To: "?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Wednesday, 23 August 2017, 4:39:33 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading > > Haydi, I really can't deal with so many questions, certainly > not if we want this to be more than a dialogue between the > two of us. So I will respond to your first paragraph only. > > Here is Hegel on moments: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ > sl/slsubjec.htm#SL163 > . > It comes at the beginning of "The Concept" because it is > only with the formation of a concept of the whole that > moments of the whole can arise. Universal, Particular and > Individual are the archetypes of "moments" for Hegel, but he > also sees the Legislature, the Executive (public service) > and the Crown (or President) as three moments of the state. > The name of a thing is a whole -everyone is a person > ("person" = Universal). But humanity is also made up > communities, it being taken that a person cannot be a person > unless they participate in some human community ("community" > in this sense = particular). And every person is an > individual, born at some time and place and dying in some > time and place, with their own unique mind ("individual"). > Do you see the sense in which these 3 moments are all > simultaneously the whole? > > All the various communities are parts of the whole of > humanity, just as each individual is a part of a community. > But we can equally say that the various demographic > groupings (age, gender, employment, etc.) are parts of the > whole. It depends on the units chosen, that is, of how the > whole is conceived. > > Here is Hegel on whole and parts: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ > sl/slappear.htm#SL135 > . > > Our mind does not create the problem; our minds are part of > the same social formation which creates the object we think > about and reproduce in our activity. Nonetheless, it is > always legitimate to ask how much of a basis a given "whole" > has in the material world or in activity. For example, when > a science first begins it orients to an object which is an > Appearance (or Phenomenon) - some problem strikes the eye > and people address themselves to it. For example, as a young > man Marx was outraged by the injustices he saw around him in > Germany - censorship, autocracy, persecution of the > peasantry, etc - but after 20 years of study he formed a > different conception of the whole - capitalism. David made > the same point last week pointing to how Vygotsky said that > some sciences addressed themselves to natural wholes > (including pedology) while other sciences studied the > general processes underlying phenomena (Psychology, > Medicine, Biology, ...). So the whole is not arbitrary - > different wholes, different units, different problems, > different insights, different remedies. > > That's more than enough! > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research > On 23/08/2017 4:10 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > > Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy. > > > > I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many > > questions but they are related at least for me. > > > > I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was > > Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and > > ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I > > may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a > > little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of > > wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite > > containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments > > and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say > > if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena > > or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , > > ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that > > whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , > > determinate > >being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/ > becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality > > vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Aug 28 07:34:27 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 17:34:27 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Any friend in Portuguese or Brazilian University please? Message-ID: For a little help on a book. Photos of a few pages. Thanks Ulvi From jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br Mon Aug 28 07:41:22 2017 From: jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br (jbmartin) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 11:41:22 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Any friend in Portuguese or Brazilian University please? Message-ID: <20170828144143.F2AAD240012@smtps-2.sercomtel.com.br> Ulvi. I can help you? Joao Enviado do meu smartphone Samsung Galaxy. -------- Mensagem original --------De: Ulvi ??il Data: 28/08/17 11:34 (GMT-03:00) Para: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Assunto: [Xmca-l]? Any friend in Portuguese or Brazilian University please? For a little help on a book. Photos of a few pages. Thanks Ulvi From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Aug 28 07:49:45 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 17:49:45 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Any friend in Portuguese or Brazilian University please? In-Reply-To: <20170828144143.F2AAD240012@smtps-2.sercomtel.com.br> References: <20170828144143.F2AAD240012@smtps-2.sercomtel.com.br> Message-ID: Thank you! I will write to you. Best wishes Ulvi 28 A?u 2017 17:43 tarihinde "jbmartin" yazd?: > Ulvi. I can help you? > Joao > > > > > Enviado do meu smartphone Samsung Galaxy. > -------- Mensagem original --------De: Ulvi ??il > Data: 28/08/17 11:34 (GMT-03:00) Para: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Any friend in Portuguese or > Brazilian University please? > For a little help on a book. > Photos of a few pages. > > Thanks > > Ulvi > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Aug 28 08:27:52 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 15:27:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Any friend in Portuguese or Brazilian University please? In-Reply-To: References: <20170828144143.F2AAD240012@smtps-2.sercomtel.com.br>, Message-ID: <1503934072757.36137@iped.uio.no> NIce! ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: 28 August 2017 16:49 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Any friend in Portuguese or Brazilian University please? Thank you! I will write to you. Best wishes Ulvi 28 A?u 2017 17:43 tarihinde "jbmartin" yazd?: > Ulvi. I can help you? > Joao > > > > > Enviado do meu smartphone Samsung Galaxy. > -------- Mensagem original --------De: Ulvi ??il > Data: 28/08/17 11:34 (GMT-03:00) Para: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Any friend in Portuguese or > Brazilian University please? > For a little help on a book. > Photos of a few pages. > > Thanks > > Ulvi > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Aug 28 09:40:22 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 16:40:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant professor position in Developmental Psychology at UC Berkeley In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A job Mike ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Fei Xu Date: Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 9:25 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant professor position in Developmental Psychology at UC Berkeley To: *University of California, Berkeley * *Department of Psychology ? Developmental Psychology* The Department of Psychology is seeking to fill a tenure-track faculty position at the level of Assistant Professor, with an anticipated start date of July 1, 2018. We are interested in candidates studying social development, broadly construed, with an emphasis on links between social development and other areas such as cognition, morality, affect, or neuroscience. Use or development of new experimental or computational methods is highly desirable. The department is interested in candidates who will contribute to diversity and equal opportunity in higher education through their teaching, research, and service. A Ph.D. or equivalent degree is required by date of hire. Candidates must have completed all degree requirements except the dissertation at the time of application. To apply, please go to the following link: https://aprecruit.berkeley.edu/apply/JPF01429 Applicants should submit a cover letter, curriculum vitae, research statement, summary of teaching experience and interests, a brief statement addressing past and/or potential contributions to diversity through research, teaching, and/or service, and two to five reprints or preprints. Applicants should also arrange for the online submission of three to five letters of recommendation. All letters will be treated as confidential per University of California policy and California state law. Please refer potential referees, including when letters are provided via a third party (i.e., dossier service or career center), to the UC Berkeley statement of confidentiality (http://apo.berkeley.edu/evalltr.html) prior to submitting their letters. *Applications must be received by October 31, 2017. *Please direct questions to psychsearch@berkeley.edu, and include ?Developmental search? in the subject line. The University of California is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability, age or protected veteran status. For the complete University of California nondiscrimination and affirmative action policy see: http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/4000376/NondiscrimAffirmAct. The University is committed to addressing the family needs of faculty, including dual career couples and single parents. For information about potential relocation to Berkeley, or career needs of accompanying partners and spouses, please visit: http://ofew.berkeley.edu/new-faculty. --------------------------------------------- Fei Xu, Ph.D. Professor Dept of Psychology UC Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720 Email: fei_xu@berkeley.edu Phone: 510-642-3344 Website: babylab.berkeley.edu ---------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org From laires11@gmail.com Mon Aug 28 09:41:10 2017 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 17:41:10 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Any friend in Portuguese or Brazilian University please? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I can help you, too, Ulvi. Best Luisa A. 2017-08-28 15:34 GMT+01:00 Ulvi ??il : > For a little help on a book. > Photos of a few pages. > > Thanks > > Ulvi > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From modesofpractice@gmail.com Mon Aug 28 10:11:01 2017 From: modesofpractice@gmail.com (David Dirlam) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 13:11:01 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of analysis In-Reply-To: <1503269245772.47596@iped.uio.no> References: <1503269245772.47596@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo, Andy and others interested in the unit of analysis question. I'm working on getting a downloadable version of Chapter 1 of my book. In the meantime, Routledge has added a link that will be open until September 15 to my whole book, which is free on line but not downloadable. http://rdcu.be/tPjV That first chapter has a well-developed and reliable definition of unit ("mode of practice") that has worked in over 300 interviews of people in roughly 100 different disciplines. That's not to say it couldn't be improved. For example it complements Engestrom et al.'s concept of "germ cell" in at least some very interesting ways. For one, ascending from the abstract to the concrete (from sit-to-stand to household mobility actions like table setting) complements Mezirow's (1991) phases of transformative learning, so that the results looks more like collaboration between the two than competition. In addition to that chapter the link above also gives an opportunity for a free look at the rest of the book, including another chapter on unis. Chapter 11 provides a nested hierarchy of units that was defined from "modes of practice" at the middle down to the kinds of "germ-cell" units that have been discussed in the last few weeks and up to extremely broad scale units. The broad end is somewhat reminiscent of Mike Cole's description of context based on Bronfrenbrenner's *Ecology of Human Development, *as that which surrounds." Mike goes on to enrich this view as a unit of culture. In ecology, the "surround" of a species is a community, but communities are studied as units of ecosystems, much like cells are studied as units of organ systems. Biology has made enduringly effective use of its rich number of levels of units. The aim of the chapter is to show some of the potential that such a rich conception of units might have for research on practices. David Dirlam Author of Teachers, Learners, Modes of Practice: Theory and Methodology for Identifying Knowledge Development (see www.routledge.com/9781138641181) On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 6:47 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks so much David for bringing to the fore your ongoing chat with Andy. > The levels you describe are interesting. You mention a chapter; any chance > it could be shared with the list? I look at excerpts of your book online > and the introductory chapter seems totally relevant to the unit of analysis > discussion. > > Cheers, > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Dirlam > Sent: 20 August 2017 23:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Units of analysis > > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to Andy's > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and add > some to it. > > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis to > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, even > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this discussion > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of our > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. > > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in response > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's job, > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a tendency > that I have been fighting for decades. > > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter from my > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining for a > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about what > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the bottom, > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up (the > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested fashion > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. > > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the chapter, > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology where > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts of > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. > > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed are > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing modes > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language has > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were there. > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate (growth > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern is > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest levels > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from one > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some friends > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that Mezirow's > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and modes of > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. > > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it lays > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for student > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might fit > with the modes and phases of commitment. > > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, > when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and asked > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over 99% > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions of > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a quarter > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions with > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also have > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job > placement and graduation rates. > > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped dimensions > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of 60 > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So the > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to > biosphere. > > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that many > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he would be > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful objects > and social environments they imply. > > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful for > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's paper > next. > > All the best, > > David Dirlam > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Aug 28 14:23:05 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 21:23:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of analysis In-Reply-To: References: <1503269245772.47596@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi David Alfredo and a number of potentially interested people are in Quebec City or on their way there to attend ISCAR. FYI Mike On Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 10:15 AM David Dirlam wrote: > Alfredo, Andy and others interested in the unit of analysis question. > > I'm working on getting a downloadable version of Chapter 1 of my book. In > the meantime, Routledge has added a link that will be open until September > 15 to my whole book, which is free on line but not downloadable. > > http://rdcu.be/tPjV > < > http://em.rdcu.be/wf/click?upn=KP7O1RED-2BlD0F9LDqGVeSKtaE-2Fqou1Q11U-2FYg5cc50Q-3D_m4a-2BVtvVL0JudawDiUq5qdCZb5YjXonCfC9-2F5OH6Lwi46jfFdV3eRXJoQnltaofLVswp4xfHbra6-2Bk4-2FzC3ZWpOvYevDOzjaOyCqTG9ZJ-2ByPLdCGS0mIToo9PWMYPvsz4kJBEMe48mHE8Z1TJeexp-2BVu9LE5LGVesjGGQqEiP-2BY6Rz8y-2BhIGYF3fb9H4E5XH6DA8HkH2dAUze1hR81LEotVxE6l6JtNqAkckzIxG3is6fG0S2COgNgBLtvDXsWZ-2FbqVosOKnHpflMyrUIeVsJzefjOywqItXYZ-2B9dMGIRi4-3D > > > > That first chapter has a well-developed and reliable definition of unit > ("mode of practice") that has worked in over 300 interviews of people in > roughly 100 different disciplines. That's not to say it couldn't be > improved. For example it complements Engestrom et al.'s concept of "germ > cell" in at least some very interesting ways. For one, ascending from the > abstract to the concrete (from sit-to-stand to household mobility actions > like table setting) complements Mezirow's (1991) phases of transformative > learning, so that the results looks more like collaboration between the two > than competition. > > In addition to that chapter the link above also gives an opportunity for a > free look at the rest of the book, including another chapter on unis. > Chapter 11 provides a nested hierarchy of units that was defined from > "modes of practice" at the middle down to the kinds of "germ-cell" units > that have been discussed in the last few weeks and up to extremely broad > scale units. The broad end is somewhat reminiscent of Mike Cole's > description of context based on Bronfrenbrenner's *Ecology of Human > Development, *as that which surrounds." Mike goes on to enrich this view as > a unit of culture. In ecology, the "surround" of a species is a community, > but communities are studied as units of ecosystems, much like cells are > studied as units of organ systems. Biology has made enduringly effective > use of its rich number of levels of units. The aim of the chapter is to > show some of the potential that such a rich conception of units might have > for research on practices. > > David Dirlam > > Author of Teachers, Learners, Modes of Practice: Theory and Methodology for > Identifying Knowledge Development (see www.routledge.com/9781138641181) > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 6:47 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Thanks so much David for bringing to the fore your ongoing chat with > Andy. > > The levels you describe are interesting. You mention a chapter; any > chance > > it could be shared with the list? I look at excerpts of your book online > > and the introductory chapter seems totally relevant to the unit of > analysis > > discussion. > > > > Cheers, > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of David Dirlam > > Sent: 20 August 2017 23:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Units of analysis > > > > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to > Andy's > > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line > > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and > add > > some to it. > > > > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis > to > > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, > even > > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this > discussion > > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of > our > > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca > > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. > > > > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in > response > > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's > job, > > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher > > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a > tendency > > that I have been fighting for decades. > > > > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter from > my > > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested > > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining for > a > > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for > > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles > > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a > > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about > what > > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the > bottom, > > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it > > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up > (the > > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the > > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many > > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like > > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested > fashion > > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. > > > > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In > > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social > > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the > chapter, > > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology > where > > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to > > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to > > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of > > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts > of > > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. > > > > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed are > > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing > modes > > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental > > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the > > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language has > > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were > there. > > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of > > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four > > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate > (growth > > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource > > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern > is > > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are > > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow > > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest > levels > > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the > > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but > > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole > > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from > one > > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept > > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some > friends > > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that > Mezirow's > > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and modes > of > > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. > > > > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it > lays > > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers > > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for > student > > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me > > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might > fit > > with the modes and phases of commitment. > > > > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of > > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of > > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, > > when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and > asked > > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over 99% > > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions of > > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to > > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each > > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a > quarter > > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. > > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and > > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions with > > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are > > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and > > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also have > > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of > > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job > > placement and graduation rates. > > > > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at > > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped dimensions > > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological > > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The > > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different > > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of > > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews > > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in > > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of > 60 > > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that > > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So > the > > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive > > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to > > biosphere. > > > > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that > many > > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he would > be > > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's > > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. > > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I > > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful objects > > and social environments they imply. > > > > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful > for > > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic > > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's > paper > > next. > > > > All the best, > > > > David Dirlam > > > > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Aug 28 14:40:44 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 00:40:44 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] In Defense of Communism: Legendary composer Mikis Theodorakis blasts anti-communists and anti-Stalin slanderers Message-ID: https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary-composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Aug 28 18:03:53 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 01:03:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of analysis In-Reply-To: References: <1503269245772.47596@iped.uio.no> , Message-ID: <1503968633324.76843@iped.uio.no> Hi David, that's so cool that you got to share your whole book open, even if only for a limited time. As Mike notes, many xmca'ers may be busy at ISCAR, but there will be time to get to your book/chapter in the aftermath. Unit of analysis is sure popping up here and there in each presentation, so we will come back with much material to contrast. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 28 August 2017 23:23 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of analysis Hi David Alfredo and a number of potentially interested people are in Quebec City or on their way there to attend ISCAR. FYI Mike On Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 10:15 AM David Dirlam wrote: > Alfredo, Andy and others interested in the unit of analysis question. > > I'm working on getting a downloadable version of Chapter 1 of my book. In > the meantime, Routledge has added a link that will be open until September > 15 to my whole book, which is free on line but not downloadable. > > http://rdcu.be/tPjV > < > http://em.rdcu.be/wf/click?upn=KP7O1RED-2BlD0F9LDqGVeSKtaE-2Fqou1Q11U-2FYg5cc50Q-3D_m4a-2BVtvVL0JudawDiUq5qdCZb5YjXonCfC9-2F5OH6Lwi46jfFdV3eRXJoQnltaofLVswp4xfHbra6-2Bk4-2FzC3ZWpOvYevDOzjaOyCqTG9ZJ-2ByPLdCGS0mIToo9PWMYPvsz4kJBEMe48mHE8Z1TJeexp-2BVu9LE5LGVesjGGQqEiP-2BY6Rz8y-2BhIGYF3fb9H4E5XH6DA8HkH2dAUze1hR81LEotVxE6l6JtNqAkckzIxG3is6fG0S2COgNgBLtvDXsWZ-2FbqVosOKnHpflMyrUIeVsJzefjOywqItXYZ-2B9dMGIRi4-3D > > > > That first chapter has a well-developed and reliable definition of unit > ("mode of practice") that has worked in over 300 interviews of people in > roughly 100 different disciplines. That's not to say it couldn't be > improved. For example it complements Engestrom et al.'s concept of "germ > cell" in at least some very interesting ways. For one, ascending from the > abstract to the concrete (from sit-to-stand to household mobility actions > like table setting) complements Mezirow's (1991) phases of transformative > learning, so that the results looks more like collaboration between the two > than competition. > > In addition to that chapter the link above also gives an opportunity for a > free look at the rest of the book, including another chapter on unis. > Chapter 11 provides a nested hierarchy of units that was defined from > "modes of practice" at the middle down to the kinds of "germ-cell" units > that have been discussed in the last few weeks and up to extremely broad > scale units. The broad end is somewhat reminiscent of Mike Cole's > description of context based on Bronfrenbrenner's *Ecology of Human > Development, *as that which surrounds." Mike goes on to enrich this view as > a unit of culture. In ecology, the "surround" of a species is a community, > but communities are studied as units of ecosystems, much like cells are > studied as units of organ systems. Biology has made enduringly effective > use of its rich number of levels of units. The aim of the chapter is to > show some of the potential that such a rich conception of units might have > for research on practices. > > David Dirlam > > Author of Teachers, Learners, Modes of Practice: Theory and Methodology for > Identifying Knowledge Development (see www.routledge.com/9781138641181) > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 6:47 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Thanks so much David for bringing to the fore your ongoing chat with > Andy. > > The levels you describe are interesting. You mention a chapter; any > chance > > it could be shared with the list? I look at excerpts of your book online > > and the introductory chapter seems totally relevant to the unit of > analysis > > discussion. > > > > Cheers, > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of David Dirlam > > Sent: 20 August 2017 23:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Units of analysis > > > > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to > Andy's > > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line > > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and > add > > some to it. > > > > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis > to > > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, > even > > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this > discussion > > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of > our > > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca > > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. > > > > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in > response > > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's > job, > > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher > > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a > tendency > > that I have been fighting for decades. > > > > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter from > my > > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested > > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining for > a > > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful for > > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles > > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even a > > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about > what > > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the > bottom, > > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it > > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up > (the > > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the > > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many > > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like > > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested > fashion > > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. > > > > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In > > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social > > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the > chapter, > > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology > where > > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells to > > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to > > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of > > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts > of > > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. > > > > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed are > > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing > modes > > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental > > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of the > > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language has > > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were > there. > > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of > > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four > > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate > (growth > > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their resource > > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern > is > > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are > > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow > > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest > levels > > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the > > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but > > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole > > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from > one > > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a concept > > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some > friends > > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that > Mezirow's > > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and modes > of > > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. > > > > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it > lays > > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched teachers > > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for > student > > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me > > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might > fit > > with the modes and phases of commitment. > > > > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of > > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of > > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). So, > > when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and > asked > > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over 99% > > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions of > > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to > > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each > > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a > quarter > > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. > > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and > > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions with > > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are > > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and > > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also have > > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of > > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job > > placement and graduation rates. > > > > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at > > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped dimensions > > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological > > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The > > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different > > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of > > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews > > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress in > > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of > 60 > > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that > > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So > the > > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive > > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog to > > biosphere. > > > > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that > many > > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he would > be > > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's > > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. > > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I > > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful objects > > and social environments they imply. > > > > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful > for > > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic > > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's > paper > > next. > > > > All the best, > > > > David Dirlam > > > > > From modesofpractice@gmail.com Mon Aug 28 18:23:27 2017 From: modesofpractice@gmail.com (David Dirlam) Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 21:23:27 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of analysis In-Reply-To: <1503968633324.76843@iped.uio.no> References: <1503269245772.47596@iped.uio.no> <1503968633324.76843@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thanks for the updates Mike and Alfredo. I very much look forward to the contrasts. David On Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 9:03 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi David, > that's so cool that you got to share your whole book open, even if only > for a limited time. As Mike notes, many xmca'ers may be busy at ISCAR, but > there will be time to get to your book/chapter in the aftermath. Unit of > analysis is sure popping up here and there in each presentation, so we will > come back with much material to contrast. > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: 28 August 2017 23:23 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units of analysis > > Hi David > > Alfredo and a number of potentially interested people are in Quebec City or > on their way there to attend ISCAR. > FYI > Mike > > On Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 10:15 AM David Dirlam > wrote: > > > Alfredo, Andy and others interested in the unit of analysis question. > > > > I'm working on getting a downloadable version of Chapter 1 of my book. In > > the meantime, Routledge has added a link that will be open until > September > > 15 to my whole book, which is free on line but not downloadable. > > > > http://rdcu.be/tPjV > > < > > http://em.rdcu.be/wf/click?upn=KP7O1RED-2BlD0F9LDqGVeSKtaE-2Fqou1Q11U- > 2FYg5cc50Q-3D_m4a-2BVtvVL0JudawDiUq5qdCZb5YjXonCfC9- > 2F5OH6Lwi46jfFdV3eRXJoQnltaofLVswp4xfHbra6-2Bk4- > 2FzC3ZWpOvYevDOzjaOyCqTG9ZJ-2ByPLdCGS0mIToo9PWMYPvsz4kJBEMe48mHE8Z1TJeexp- > 2BVu9LE5LGVesjGGQqEiP-2BY6Rz8y-2BhIGYF3fb9H4E5XH6DA8HkH2dAUze > 1hR81LEotVxE6l6JtNqAkckzIxG3is6fG0S2COgNgBLtvDXsWZ- > 2FbqVosOKnHpflMyrUIeVsJzefjOywqItXYZ-2B9dMGIRi4-3D > > > > > > > That first chapter has a well-developed and reliable definition of unit > > ("mode of practice") that has worked in over 300 interviews of people in > > roughly 100 different disciplines. That's not to say it couldn't be > > improved. For example it complements Engestrom et al.'s concept of "germ > > cell" in at least some very interesting ways. For one, ascending from the > > abstract to the concrete (from sit-to-stand to household mobility actions > > like table setting) complements Mezirow's (1991) phases of transformative > > learning, so that the results looks more like collaboration between the > two > > than competition. > > > > In addition to that chapter the link above also gives an opportunity for > a > > free look at the rest of the book, including another chapter on unis. > > Chapter 11 provides a nested hierarchy of units that was defined from > > "modes of practice" at the middle down to the kinds of "germ-cell" units > > that have been discussed in the last few weeks and up to extremely broad > > scale units. The broad end is somewhat reminiscent of Mike Cole's > > description of context based on Bronfrenbrenner's *Ecology of Human > > Development, *as that which surrounds." Mike goes on to enrich this view > as > > a unit of culture. In ecology, the "surround" of a species is a > community, > > but communities are studied as units of ecosystems, much like cells are > > studied as units of organ systems. Biology has made enduringly effective > > use of its rich number of levels of units. The aim of the chapter is to > > show some of the potential that such a rich conception of units might > have > > for research on practices. > > > > David Dirlam > > > > Author of Teachers, Learners, Modes of Practice: Theory and Methodology > for > > Identifying Knowledge Development (see www.routledge.com/9781138641181) > > > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 6:47 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > > Thanks so much David for bringing to the fore your ongoing chat with > > Andy. > > > The levels you describe are interesting. You mention a chapter; any > > chance > > > it could be shared with the list? I look at excerpts of your book > online > > > and the introductory chapter seems totally relevant to the unit of > > analysis > > > discussion. > > > > > > Cheers, > > > Alfredo > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of David Dirlam > > > Sent: 20 August 2017 23:38 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Units of analysis > > > > > > It looks like I finally got my blank-emails problem fixed, thanks to > > Andy's > > > kind notification of what was the cause. I did a little off-line > > > corresponding with him in the meantime and plan to share some of it and > > add > > > some to it. > > > > > > I found Andy's current and 2010 articles on Vygotsky's unit of analysis > > to > > > be fascinating and his comments during my xmca blackout very helpful, > > even > > > after spending 50 years work on the problem. I hope to join this > > discussion > > > of what I believe is one of the most central social science problems of > > our > > > age. So below I've put a brief synopsis of what I think people on xmca > > > might find most useful from that work and invite comments. > > > > > > One of Andy's useful comments about units came through an xmca in > > response > > > to David Kellogg's suggestions. The introduction of features (father's > > job, > > > sibling number, etc.) reminded me of the attempts to evaluate higher > > > education in the U.S. using graduation rates and job placements, a > > tendency > > > that I have been fighting for decades. > > > > > > Also, during my offline discussion with Andy, I mentioned a chapter > from > > my > > > book that used biology as an analogy to define 11 levels of a nested > > > hierarchy of practices. That was a project that I had been imagining > for > > a > > > decade by tagging articles in Science that I thought would be useful > for > > > the purpose, especially in the context of many additional articles > > > generated from library databases (though I wrote this chapter not even > a > > > year ago, it has had much value in helping to identify and talk about > > what > > > people do). The 11 levels ranged from an analog to the gene at the > > bottom, > > > which was quite similar to Vygotsky's sign-mediated action, since it > > > combined activity with artifacts and social context. The next level up > > (the > > > cell analog), I called actuations, which add short-term memory to the > > > bottom level, Luria's *Human Brain and Psychological Process *has many > > > examples of both levels. Procedures that use several actuations (like > > > recipes) were the next level. The units continue in similar nested > > fashion > > > up to the biosphere analog, that I called praxosphere. > > > > > > Andy replied that units do not have to be nested, and I fully agree. In > > > fact nearly all the units I discussed have both defectology and social > > > situation aspects. Since they are not nested like the ones in the > > chapter, > > > they need to be different sorts of units. The same occurs in biology > > where > > > competition and pathology occur at least at levels ranging from cells > to > > > biomes. Actually, Luria's book just mentioned would be a great place to > > > identify examples of the first two or three levels of the hierarchy of > > > practice I proposed in my book. His amazing observations of simple acts > > of > > > brain-damaged patients have been an inspiration to me for decades. > > > > > > The mid-level units (the analog to biology's species) that I proposed > are > > > modes of practice. I found these by studying dimensions of competing > > modes > > > of practices in children's drawing, student writing, and developmental > > > researchers' methods. The first publication of a dynamic analysis of > the > > > drawing study was in *Mind Culture and Activity *in 1997. My language > has > > > changed during two decades of use of the ideas, but the kernels were > > there. > > > Dimension is the next more complex level of units above the modes of > > > practice. The modes of practice in each dimension get sequenced by four > > > parameters: their endemicity (initial prevalence), acquisition rate > > (growth > > > in frequency), and commitment (competitive strength), and their > resource > > > level (social acceptance or limited artifact availability). One pattern > > is > > > especially common: *beginning* modes are endemic, *exploring *modes are > > > acquired very quickly but are not competitive, *sustaining *modes grow > > > slower with more commitment, and *inspiring *modes have the highest > > levels > > > of commitment. Sometimes a *destructive *mode appears instead of the > > > sustaining or inspiring mode -- these grow faster than exploration, but > > > overshoot the resource level so much that they eliminate the whole > > > dimension (drug use is a good example for persons). To transition from > > one > > > mode of practice to the next requires transformative learning, a > concept > > > that has benefited much from Mezirow's writings. A study with some > > friends > > > of 500 hour long sessions with individual students revealed that > > Mezirow's > > > 10 phases occurred in 4 time periods. The phases of commitment and > modes > > of > > > commitment, therefore, became the fourth and fifth levels. > > > > > > An interesting aspect of the sequence for modes of practice is that it > > lays > > > out zones of proximal development for each dimension. I watched > teachers > > > use them that way 40 years ago with amazing results, especially for > > student > > > writing. I've had a harder time getting academics to do so. It makes me > > > wonder how Vygotsky's discussion of zone of proximal development might > > fit > > > with the modes and phases of commitment. > > > > > > We can tell when we have two different dimensions, because all modes of > > > practice within one dimension can occur simultaneously with any mode of > > > practice in all others (i.e., there is no competition between them). > So, > > > when I have given this model to experts (300 altogether so far) and > > asked > > > them what people do who are learning in their area of expertise, over > 99% > > > readily describe the four or five modes of practice in 6-12 dimensions > of > > > their expertise. They often comment that it is an interesting way to > > > organize their thinking about their field. My interest is that each > > > interview results in somewhere between 15,000 (6 dimensions) and a > > quarter > > > billion (12 dimensions) patterns of practice but uses only 24-48 terms. > > > When I did this for the entire faculty of a liberal arts college and > > > combined dimensions that were similar, I ended up with 25 dimensions > with > > > 100 terms (these are detailed in the appendix of my book). They are > > > incredibly more interesting and meaningful than graduation and > > > job-placement rates. But, and this is what keeps me at it, they also > have > > > the potential to emancipate teachers and learners from the sort of > > > bureaucratic hegemony that demands simple minded measures like job > > > placement and graduation rates. > > > > > > Text analysis of the 25 dimensions (a technique I started working on at > > > Mike's suggestion during my 1997-98 year at LCHC) also grouped > dimensions > > > together into clusters that resembled specialties (analog to biological > > > communities) and these into disciplines (the analog to ecosystems). The > > > next levels came from interviews of some 80 designers in 20 different > > > disciplines at the Savannah College of Art Design. I never thought of > > > design as a methodology as progressive as science, but those interviews > > > convinced me. Now, it seems obvious: scientists record their progress > in > > > papers and equipment, designers in services and products. Interviews of > > 60 > > > rabbinical scholars at Hebrew Union College then convinced me that > > > interpretation was also progressive, but now recorded in precedents. So > > the > > > level above discipline (the analog to biome) became progressive > > > methodology. Human knowledge, then, becomes the praxosphere or analog > to > > > biosphere. > > > > > > I'm not sure what Vygotsky would think about all this (I am sure that > > many > > > on this list know better than me about that), but I don't think he > would > > be > > > nearly as upset as he seems to have been with reducing a child's > > > environment to parent occupation, age, housing, sibling numbers, etc. > > > Thinking about Vygotsky and Andy's papers does give me the idea that I > > > should look back through all my interviews to see what meaningful > objects > > > and social environments they imply. > > > > > > I hope this adds to the discussion, and even more that it proves useful > > for > > > progress in studying what people do in ways that thwart simplistic > > > reductions to graduation and employment rates. I'm off to read Yrjo's > > paper > > > next. > > > > > > All the best, > > > > > > David Dirlam > > > > > > > > > > From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Tue Aug 29 14:10:46 2017 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 22:10:46 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In Defense of Communism: Legendary composer Mikis Theodorakis blasts anti-communists and anti-Stalin slanderers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello Ulvi It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the article's defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for posting it. I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB torture of the present. Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory and practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete rejection, I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a nationalist diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. Tom Richardson Middlesbrough UK [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > From avramus@gmail.com Tue Aug 29 15:47:51 2017 From: avramus@gmail.com (Alexandre Sourmava) Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 22:47:51 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IEluIERlZmVuc2Ugb2YgQ29tbXVuaXNtOiBM?= =?utf-8?q?egendary_composer_Mikis_Theodorakis_blasts_anti-communists_and_?= =?utf-8?q?anti-Stalin_slanderers?= References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> Hi, Tom As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own back I can only agree with your post. The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. Sasha ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson ?????(?): Hello Ulvi It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the article's defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for posting it. I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous intervention),? whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB torture of the present. Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory and practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete rejection, I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a nationalist diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. Tom Richardson Middlesbrough UK [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Tue Aug 29 18:58:58 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 04:58:58 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSW4gRGVmZW5zZSBvZiBDb21tdW5pc206?= =?utf-8?q?_Legendary_composer_Mikis_Theodorakis_blasts_anti-commun?= =?utf-8?q?ists_and_anti-Stalin_slanderers?= In-Reply-To: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I think today stalin, after 65 years of his death, is used to demonize socialism and communism. We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre. It is useful. Especially to discuss Robespierre to see how humanity is condemned to a deep degenerated bourgeois politics since nearly 250 years after Robespierre. About crimes against humanity, oppression... For this latter, I think nobody can compete not only with Truman, Bushs and Trump but also Clinton husband and wife and Obama. Nor Merkel. Nor Churchill, Blair, Thatcher and queen. And spanish king. And also socialist Hollande. Tsipras' crimes against Greek working people for managing the capitalist crisis on behalf of Greek and German capital is obvious. What to discuss Stalin when we have such a criminal like Tsipras? Are not almost all of these bourgeois politicians, like Felipe Gonzalez, Javier Solana mere criminals? Why we do not discuss their crimes? Felipe's crimes for instance. Killings by his government. If we have to look for crimes against humanity, imperialism is a Bolt, a champion. Then why again and again, we are reminded of Stalin? And why we are not reminded of Hitler? Because Stalin is used to close the exit from capitalism towards socialist and communist society. This is a mere fact. I am ready to discuss crimes of Stalin in depth. With whom? Not with those people who emphasize Stalin's crimes more than Truman's. I can discuss this with people who admits that capitalism and imperialism, in its crimes, can not be compared to socialism, even to Stalin. There is an ideological struggle here. A fierce stuggle. Is capitalism and imperialism able to carry humanity? No. But socialism was. I can enlist many questions here. This Stalin. Did his planes bomb civilian people in cities? No. British did. Did Ibm provide support to Nazis for carting system? Yes. Did Usa after 1945 use nazis to build cia and today's german intelligence services? Why Americans and Germans do not know these but stalin's name by heart? This is a self-defence for imperialism. So did imperialism really condemn nazism? Or it unherited it? And when I ask these questions I do no aim at relieving stalin from the complete responsibility. But what imperialist media is doing, it is doing this because they are against crimes against humanity? This is a wrong universe. This is anti communism. It has nothing to do with a healthy evaluation of Stalin. Can imperialist media do such a healthy evaluation? No. Who will do it? Those who work to open the way to socialism. They are responsible to not repeat past mistakes. Is there any body in the communist movement saying Stalin has done everything very well and without slightest mistake? No. Why then is this discussion? Not because there is a risk of a new Stalin and a Greek one this time. To close the exit to socialism. To obstruct Kke. This is obvious. Kke is gaining ground within the Greek working class and Ta Nea discusses stalin. In a Europe where there are still imbecile queens and kings without republics, poor masses should believe that stalin was very very bad and there is no alternative to capitalism other than a new stalin. Sorry, those who prefer may opt to believe that stalin is still the greatest danger against the salvation of human species and that we should admit imperialist world order, this barbarity, I do not opt for this. Mikis is completely right when he raises this objection and unmasks its true purpose. Humans can be murdered not only by terror. Capitalism does this daily. Millions are killed, assassinated, murdered due to the sole fact that capitalist mechanisms are in application in this society. This is occurring without Stalin. People can be killed also by their souls. I have recently read that Russian people does not love Pushkin as in Soviet period. Unbelivable. Russian people does not read Pushkin and does not love him anymore. If Russian people does not read Pushkin, then what he or she reads is nonsense. If russian people does not love Pushkin, then he or she can not be in love. Is there and may there be any greater crime to russian youth than taking from them pushkin and giving them mcdonalds? This is counter revolution against humanity. Down with Lenin and Stalin and long live Mcdonalds. Fidel is not Stalin. They can not label him as they do for Stalin. But he is labeled as dictator. Who went to his funeral? Nobody. Not a single social democrat from Europe. Tsipras who does not have any problem with fascist Israel state and capitalism went there. Because he is for socialism? No just to take fresh blood. Why imperialist media does not blame Israel instead of Stalin? We can and should discuss stalin, ussr etc but not as Ta Nea does. We can not discuss it with and within and together with imperialist media. Mikis is absolutely right. Because via Stalin they try to liquidate communist legacy of the past and try to close the way to an actual socialist revolution. 30 A?u 2017 01:51 tarihinde "Alexandre Sourmava" yazd?: > Hi, Tom > As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own back I > can only agree with your post. > The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. > Sasha > > ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson < > tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> ?????(?): > > > > > Hello Ulvi > > It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the article's > defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for posting > it. > > > I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the > occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous > intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB torture of > the present. > Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory and > practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete rejection, > I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a nationalist > diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. > > Tom Richardson > Middlesbrough UK > [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] > > On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > > > > > From ivan@llaisdy.com Tue Aug 29 23:43:26 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 07:43:26 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?gb2312?b?p7Cn5KfTOiBSZTogSW4gRGVmZW5zZSBvZiBDb21tdW5pc206?= =?gb2312?b?IExlZ2VuZGFyeSBjb21wb3NlciBNaWtpcyBUaGVvZG9yYWtpcyBibGFzdHMg?= =?gb2312?b?YW50aS1jb21tdW5pc3RzIGFuZCBhbnRpLVN0YWxpbiBzbGFuZGVyZXJz?= In-Reply-To: References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <053F5A09-E4AC-435E-AEA2-DEDA9DE99B04@llaisdy.com> Stalin was a pragmatist and, from the 20s, a conservative. Confusing Stalinism and Marxism will certainly handicap anyone who wants to understand Vygotsky or Ilyenkov. Ivan -- festina lente > On 30 Aug 2017, at 02:58, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > I think today stalin, after 65 years of his death, is used to demonize > socialism and communism. > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre. > > It is useful. > > Especially to discuss Robespierre to see how humanity is condemned to a > deep degenerated bourgeois politics since nearly 250 years after > Robespierre. > > About crimes against humanity, oppression... > > For this latter, I think nobody can compete not only with Truman, Bushs and > Trump but also Clinton husband and wife and Obama. Nor Merkel. Nor > Churchill, Blair, Thatcher and queen. And spanish king. And also socialist > Hollande. Tsipras' crimes against Greek working people for managing the > capitalist crisis on behalf of Greek and German capital is obvious. What to > discuss Stalin when we have such a criminal like Tsipras? Are not almost > all of these bourgeois politicians, like Felipe Gonzalez, Javier Solana > mere criminals? Why we do not discuss their crimes? Felipe's crimes for > instance. Killings by his government. > > If we have to look for crimes against humanity, imperialism is a Bolt, a > champion. > > Then why again and again, we are reminded of Stalin? And why we are not > reminded of Hitler? > > Because Stalin is used to close the exit from capitalism towards socialist > and communist society. This is a mere fact. > > I am ready to discuss crimes of Stalin in depth. With whom? > > Not with those people who emphasize Stalin's crimes more than Truman's. > > I can discuss this with people who admits that capitalism and imperialism, > in its crimes, can not be compared to socialism, even to Stalin. > > There is an ideological struggle here. A fierce stuggle. > > Is capitalism and imperialism able to carry humanity? No. But socialism was. > > I can enlist many questions here. > > This Stalin. Did his planes bomb civilian people in cities? No. British did. > > Did Ibm provide support to Nazis for carting system? Yes. Did Usa after > 1945 use nazis to build cia and today's german intelligence services? Why > Americans and Germans do not know these but stalin's name by heart? > > This is a self-defence for imperialism. > > So did imperialism really condemn nazism? Or it unherited it? > > And when I ask these questions I do no aim at relieving stalin from the > complete responsibility. > > But what imperialist media is doing, it is doing this because they are > against crimes against humanity? > > This is a wrong universe. > > This is anti communism. It has nothing to do with a healthy evaluation of > Stalin. > > Can imperialist media do such a healthy evaluation? No. > > Who will do it? Those who work to open the way to socialism. They are > responsible to not repeat past mistakes. > > Is there any body in the communist movement saying Stalin has done > everything very well and without slightest mistake? No. > > Why then is this discussion? Not because there is a risk of a new Stalin > and a Greek one this time. > > To close the exit to socialism. To obstruct Kke. This is obvious. Kke is > gaining ground within the Greek working class and Ta Nea discusses stalin. > > In a Europe where there are still imbecile queens and kings without > republics, poor masses should believe that stalin was very very bad and > there is no alternative to capitalism other than a new stalin. > > Sorry, those who prefer may opt to believe that stalin is still the > greatest danger against the salvation of human species and that we should > admit imperialist world order, this barbarity, I do not opt for this. > > Mikis is completely right when he raises this objection and unmasks its > true purpose. > > Humans can be murdered not only by terror. Capitalism does this daily. > Millions are killed, assassinated, murdered due to the sole fact that > capitalist mechanisms are in application in this society. This is occurring > without Stalin. > > People can be killed also by their souls. > > I have recently read that Russian people does not love Pushkin as in Soviet > period. > Unbelivable. Russian people does not read Pushkin and does not love him > anymore. If Russian people does not read Pushkin, then what he or she reads > is nonsense. If russian people does not love Pushkin, then he or she can > not be in love. > > Is there and may there be any greater crime to russian youth than taking > from them pushkin and giving them mcdonalds? > > This is counter revolution against humanity. > > Down with Lenin and Stalin and long live Mcdonalds. > > Fidel is not Stalin. They can not label him as they do for Stalin. > > But he is labeled as dictator. Who went to his funeral? Nobody. Not a > single social democrat from Europe. > Tsipras who does not have any problem with fascist Israel state and > capitalism went there. Because he is for socialism? No just to take fresh > blood. > > Why imperialist media does not blame Israel instead of Stalin? > > We can and should discuss stalin, ussr etc but not as Ta Nea does. > > We can not discuss it with and within and together with imperialist media. > > Mikis is absolutely right. Because via Stalin they try to liquidate > communist legacy of the past and try to close the way to an actual > socialist revolution. > > > > > > > > 30 A?u 2017 01:51 tarihinde "Alexandre Sourmava" yazd?: > >> Hi, Tom >> As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own back I >> can only agree with your post. >> The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. >> Sasha >> >> ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson < >> tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> ?????(?): >> >> >> >> >> Hello Ulvi >> >> It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the article's >> defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for posting >> it. >> >> >> I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the >> occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous >> intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB torture of >> the present. >> Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory and >> practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete rejection, >> I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a nationalist >> diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. >> >> Tom Richardson >> Middlesbrough UK >> [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] >> >>> On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>> >>> https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- >>> composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 >>> >> >> >> From bella.kotik@gmail.com Wed Aug 30 03:19:36 2017 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 13:19:36 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSW4gRGVmZW5zZSBvZiBDb21tdW5pc206?= =?utf-8?q?_Legendary_composer_Mikis_Theodorakis_blasts_anti-commun?= =?utf-8?q?ists_and_anti-Stalin_slanderers?= In-Reply-To: References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre.????? The generations suffered from communists who failed to build Communism and Stalinism are still alive, so you can not impose them (us) Robespierre for discussion. Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 4:58 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > I think today stalin, after 65 years of his death, is used to demonize > socialism and communism. > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre. > > It is useful. > > Especially to discuss Robespierre to see how humanity is condemned to a > deep degenerated bourgeois politics since nearly 250 years after > Robespierre. > > About crimes against humanity, oppression... > > For this latter, I think nobody can compete not only with Truman, Bushs and > Trump but also Clinton husband and wife and Obama. Nor Merkel. Nor > Churchill, Blair, Thatcher and queen. And spanish king. And also socialist > Hollande. Tsipras' crimes against Greek working people for managing the > capitalist crisis on behalf of Greek and German capital is obvious. What to > discuss Stalin when we have such a criminal like Tsipras? Are not almost > all of these bourgeois politicians, like Felipe Gonzalez, Javier Solana > mere criminals? Why we do not discuss their crimes? Felipe's crimes for > instance. Killings by his government. > > If we have to look for crimes against humanity, imperialism is a Bolt, a > champion. > > Then why again and again, we are reminded of Stalin? And why we are not > reminded of Hitler? > > Because Stalin is used to close the exit from capitalism towards socialist > and communist society. This is a mere fact. > > I am ready to discuss crimes of Stalin in depth. With whom? > > Not with those people who emphasize Stalin's crimes more than Truman's. > > I can discuss this with people who admits that capitalism and imperialism, > in its crimes, can not be compared to socialism, even to Stalin. > > There is an ideological struggle here. A fierce stuggle. > > Is capitalism and imperialism able to carry humanity? No. But socialism > was. > > I can enlist many questions here. > > This Stalin. Did his planes bomb civilian people in cities? No. British > did. > > Did Ibm provide support to Nazis for carting system? Yes. Did Usa after > 1945 use nazis to build cia and today's german intelligence services? Why > Americans and Germans do not know these but stalin's name by heart? > > This is a self-defence for imperialism. > > So did imperialism really condemn nazism? Or it unherited it? > > And when I ask these questions I do no aim at relieving stalin from the > complete responsibility. > > But what imperialist media is doing, it is doing this because they are > against crimes against humanity? > > This is a wrong universe. > > This is anti communism. It has nothing to do with a healthy evaluation of > Stalin. > > Can imperialist media do such a healthy evaluation? No. > > Who will do it? Those who work to open the way to socialism. They are > responsible to not repeat past mistakes. > > Is there any body in the communist movement saying Stalin has done > everything very well and without slightest mistake? No. > > Why then is this discussion? Not because there is a risk of a new Stalin > and a Greek one this time. > > To close the exit to socialism. To obstruct Kke. This is obvious. Kke is > gaining ground within the Greek working class and Ta Nea discusses stalin. > > In a Europe where there are still imbecile queens and kings without > republics, poor masses should believe that stalin was very very bad and > there is no alternative to capitalism other than a new stalin. > > Sorry, those who prefer may opt to believe that stalin is still the > greatest danger against the salvation of human species and that we should > admit imperialist world order, this barbarity, I do not opt for this. > > Mikis is completely right when he raises this objection and unmasks its > true purpose. > > Humans can be murdered not only by terror. Capitalism does this daily. > Millions are killed, assassinated, murdered due to the sole fact that > capitalist mechanisms are in application in this society. This is occurring > without Stalin. > > People can be killed also by their souls. > > I have recently read that Russian people does not love Pushkin as in Soviet > period. > Unbelivable. Russian people does not read Pushkin and does not love him > anymore. If Russian people does not read Pushkin, then what he or she reads > is nonsense. If russian people does not love Pushkin, then he or she can > not be in love. > > Is there and may there be any greater crime to russian youth than taking > from them pushkin and giving them mcdonalds? > > This is counter revolution against humanity. > > Down with Lenin and Stalin and long live Mcdonalds. > > Fidel is not Stalin. They can not label him as they do for Stalin. > > But he is labeled as dictator. Who went to his funeral? Nobody. Not a > single social democrat from Europe. > Tsipras who does not have any problem with fascist Israel state and > capitalism went there. Because he is for socialism? No just to take fresh > blood. > > Why imperialist media does not blame Israel instead of Stalin? > > We can and should discuss stalin, ussr etc but not as Ta Nea does. > > We can not discuss it with and within and together with imperialist media. > > Mikis is absolutely right. Because via Stalin they try to liquidate > communist legacy of the past and try to close the way to an actual > socialist revolution. > > > > > > > > 30 A?u 2017 01:51 tarihinde "Alexandre Sourmava" > yazd?: > > > Hi, Tom > > As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own back I > > can only agree with your post. > > The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. > > Sasha > > > > ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson < > > tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > Hello Ulvi > > > > It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the > article's > > defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for > posting > > it. > > > > > > I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the > > occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous > > intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB torture > of > > the present. > > Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory and > > practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete > rejection, > > I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a nationalist > > diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. > > > > Tom Richardson > > Middlesbrough UK > > [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] > > > > On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > > > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > > > > > > > > > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Wed Aug 30 03:32:20 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 13:32:20 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSW4gRGVmZW5zZSBvZiBDb21tdW5pc206?= =?utf-8?q?_Legendary_composer_Mikis_Theodorakis_blasts_anti-commun?= =?utf-8?q?ists_and_anti-Stalin_slanderers?= In-Reply-To: References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: What does this mean dear Bella? I gave this example because the same applies to Robespierre's legacy. What is imposing here? I personally do not want that I am imposed Trump, Obama and alike. And generations are not killed by imperialism in world wars. And this Islamic state is not created by US imperialism. Iraq is not invaded. Yugoslavia not bombed. Thousands of migrants are not sinking in the depths of Aegean and Med. because of the policies of EU and Germany. All is fine under the sky nowadays. This good bourgeois democracy gives birth again to fascism and neo-nazism. But we should not be worried. A better capitalism and imperialism is always possible. What is impossible is better socialism. Regards Ulvi 30 A?u 2017 13:22 tarihinde "Bella Kotik-Friedgut" yazd?: > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre.????? > The generations suffered from communists who failed to build Communism and > Stalinism are still alive, so you can not impose them (us) Robespierre for > discussion. > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 4:58 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > I think today stalin, after 65 years of his death, is used to demonize > > socialism and communism. > > > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre. > > > > It is useful. > > > > Especially to discuss Robespierre to see how humanity is condemned to a > > deep degenerated bourgeois politics since nearly 250 years after > > Robespierre. > > > > About crimes against humanity, oppression... > > > > For this latter, I think nobody can compete not only with Truman, Bushs > and > > Trump but also Clinton husband and wife and Obama. Nor Merkel. Nor > > Churchill, Blair, Thatcher and queen. And spanish king. And also > socialist > > Hollande. Tsipras' crimes against Greek working people for managing the > > capitalist crisis on behalf of Greek and German capital is obvious. What > to > > discuss Stalin when we have such a criminal like Tsipras? Are not almost > > all of these bourgeois politicians, like Felipe Gonzalez, Javier Solana > > mere criminals? Why we do not discuss their crimes? Felipe's crimes for > > instance. Killings by his government. > > > > If we have to look for crimes against humanity, imperialism is a Bolt, a > > champion. > > > > Then why again and again, we are reminded of Stalin? And why we are not > > reminded of Hitler? > > > > Because Stalin is used to close the exit from capitalism towards > socialist > > and communist society. This is a mere fact. > > > > I am ready to discuss crimes of Stalin in depth. With whom? > > > > Not with those people who emphasize Stalin's crimes more than Truman's. > > > > I can discuss this with people who admits that capitalism and > imperialism, > > in its crimes, can not be compared to socialism, even to Stalin. > > > > There is an ideological struggle here. A fierce stuggle. > > > > Is capitalism and imperialism able to carry humanity? No. But socialism > > was. > > > > I can enlist many questions here. > > > > This Stalin. Did his planes bomb civilian people in cities? No. British > > did. > > > > Did Ibm provide support to Nazis for carting system? Yes. Did Usa after > > 1945 use nazis to build cia and today's german intelligence services? Why > > Americans and Germans do not know these but stalin's name by heart? > > > > This is a self-defence for imperialism. > > > > So did imperialism really condemn nazism? Or it unherited it? > > > > And when I ask these questions I do no aim at relieving stalin from the > > complete responsibility. > > > > But what imperialist media is doing, it is doing this because they are > > against crimes against humanity? > > > > This is a wrong universe. > > > > This is anti communism. It has nothing to do with a healthy evaluation of > > Stalin. > > > > Can imperialist media do such a healthy evaluation? No. > > > > Who will do it? Those who work to open the way to socialism. They are > > responsible to not repeat past mistakes. > > > > Is there any body in the communist movement saying Stalin has done > > everything very well and without slightest mistake? No. > > > > Why then is this discussion? Not because there is a risk of a new Stalin > > and a Greek one this time. > > > > To close the exit to socialism. To obstruct Kke. This is obvious. Kke is > > gaining ground within the Greek working class and Ta Nea discusses > stalin. > > > > In a Europe where there are still imbecile queens and kings without > > republics, poor masses should believe that stalin was very very bad and > > there is no alternative to capitalism other than a new stalin. > > > > Sorry, those who prefer may opt to believe that stalin is still the > > greatest danger against the salvation of human species and that we should > > admit imperialist world order, this barbarity, I do not opt for this. > > > > Mikis is completely right when he raises this objection and unmasks its > > true purpose. > > > > Humans can be murdered not only by terror. Capitalism does this daily. > > Millions are killed, assassinated, murdered due to the sole fact that > > capitalist mechanisms are in application in this society. This is > occurring > > without Stalin. > > > > People can be killed also by their souls. > > > > I have recently read that Russian people does not love Pushkin as in > Soviet > > period. > > Unbelivable. Russian people does not read Pushkin and does not love him > > anymore. If Russian people does not read Pushkin, then what he or she > reads > > is nonsense. If russian people does not love Pushkin, then he or she can > > not be in love. > > > > Is there and may there be any greater crime to russian youth than taking > > from them pushkin and giving them mcdonalds? > > > > This is counter revolution against humanity. > > > > Down with Lenin and Stalin and long live Mcdonalds. > > > > Fidel is not Stalin. They can not label him as they do for Stalin. > > > > But he is labeled as dictator. Who went to his funeral? Nobody. Not a > > single social democrat from Europe. > > Tsipras who does not have any problem with fascist Israel state and > > capitalism went there. Because he is for socialism? No just to take fresh > > blood. > > > > Why imperialist media does not blame Israel instead of Stalin? > > > > We can and should discuss stalin, ussr etc but not as Ta Nea does. > > > > We can not discuss it with and within and together with imperialist > media. > > > > Mikis is absolutely right. Because via Stalin they try to liquidate > > communist legacy of the past and try to close the way to an actual > > socialist revolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 30 A?u 2017 01:51 tarihinde "Alexandre Sourmava" > > yazd?: > > > > > Hi, Tom > > > As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own > back I > > > can only agree with your post. > > > The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. > > > Sasha > > > > > > ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson < > > > tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Ulvi > > > > > > It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the > > article's > > > defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for > > posting > > > it. > > > > > > > > > I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the > > > occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous > > > intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB > torture > > of > > > the present. > > > Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory and > > > practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete > > rejection, > > > I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a nationalist > > > diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. > > > > > > Tom Richardson > > > Middlesbrough UK > > > [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] > > > > > > On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > > > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > > > > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 30 03:44:11 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 03:44:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?IFJFOiAgUmU60J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSW4gRGVmZW5zZSBvZiBDb21t?= =?utf-8?q?unism=3A_Legendary_composer_Mikis_Theodorakis_blasts_anti-commu?= =?utf-8?q?nists_and_anti-Stalin_slanderers?= In-Reply-To: References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <59a696fd.4949650a.2e789.3cdc@mx.google.com> Bella, Your opening response [utterance] begins with : ?We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre.?????? You emphasized five ????? And I also had a similar response as I noticed my internal conversation as I followed the [living] organic thread of this theme as a *helix* turning thread with circling turns following this thread unfolding. Turning and uttering an [open] pause with focusing on Stalin and Robespierre with five ? [marks] Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Bella Kotik-Friedgut Sent: August 30, 2017 3:22 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: In Defense of Communism: Legendary composer Mikis Theodorakis blasts anti-communists and anti-Stalin slanderers We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre.????? The generations suffered from communists who failed to build Communism and Stalinism are still alive, so you can not impose them (us) Robespierre for discussion. Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 4:58 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > I think today stalin, after 65 years of his death, is used to demonize > socialism and communism. > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre. > > It is useful. > > Especially to discuss Robespierre to see how humanity is condemned to a > deep degenerated bourgeois politics since nearly 250 years after > Robespierre. > > About crimes against humanity, oppression... > > For this latter, I think nobody can compete not only with Truman, Bushs and > Trump but also Clinton husband and wife and Obama. Nor Merkel. Nor > Churchill, Blair, Thatcher and queen. And spanish king. And also socialist > Hollande. Tsipras' crimes against Greek working people for managing the > capitalist crisis on behalf of Greek and German capital is obvious. What to > discuss Stalin when we have such a criminal like Tsipras? Are not almost > all of these bourgeois politicians, like Felipe Gonzalez, Javier Solana > mere criminals? Why we do not discuss their crimes? Felipe's crimes for > instance. Killings by his government. > > If we have to look for crimes against humanity, imperialism is a Bolt, a > champion. > > Then why again and again, we are reminded of Stalin? And why we are not > reminded of Hitler? > > Because Stalin is used to close the exit from capitalism towards socialist > and communist society. This is a mere fact. > > I am ready to discuss crimes of Stalin in depth. With whom? > > Not with those people who emphasize Stalin's crimes more than Truman's. > > I can discuss this with people who admits that capitalism and imperialism, > in its crimes, can not be compared to socialism, even to Stalin. > > There is an ideological struggle here. A fierce stuggle. > > Is capitalism and imperialism able to carry humanity? No. But socialism > was. > > I can enlist many questions here. > > This Stalin. Did his planes bomb civilian people in cities? No. British > did. > > Did Ibm provide support to Nazis for carting system? Yes. Did Usa after > 1945 use nazis to build cia and today's german intelligence services? Why > Americans and Germans do not know these but stalin's name by heart? > > This is a self-defence for imperialism. > > So did imperialism really condemn nazism? Or it unherited it? > > And when I ask these questions I do no aim at relieving stalin from the > complete responsibility. > > But what imperialist media is doing, it is doing this because they are > against crimes against humanity? > > This is a wrong universe. > > This is anti communism. It has nothing to do with a healthy evaluation of > Stalin. > > Can imperialist media do such a healthy evaluation? No. > > Who will do it? Those who work to open the way to socialism. They are > responsible to not repeat past mistakes. > > Is there any body in the communist movement saying Stalin has done > everything very well and without slightest mistake? No. > > Why then is this discussion? Not because there is a risk of a new Stalin > and a Greek one this time. > > To close the exit to socialism. To obstruct Kke. This is obvious. Kke is > gaining ground within the Greek working class and Ta Nea discusses stalin. > > In a Europe where there are still imbecile queens and kings without > republics, poor masses should believe that stalin was very very bad and > there is no alternative to capitalism other than a new stalin. > > Sorry, those who prefer may opt to believe that stalin is still the > greatest danger against the salvation of human species and that we should > admit imperialist world order, this barbarity, I do not opt for this. > > Mikis is completely right when he raises this objection and unmasks its > true purpose. > > Humans can be murdered not only by terror. Capitalism does this daily. > Millions are killed, assassinated, murdered due to the sole fact that > capitalist mechanisms are in application in this society. This is occurring > without Stalin. > > People can be killed also by their souls. > > I have recently read that Russian people does not love Pushkin as in Soviet > period. > Unbelivable. Russian people does not read Pushkin and does not love him > anymore. If Russian people does not read Pushkin, then what he or she reads > is nonsense. If russian people does not love Pushkin, then he or she can > not be in love. > > Is there and may there be any greater crime to russian youth than taking > from them pushkin and giving them mcdonalds? > > This is counter revolution against humanity. > > Down with Lenin and Stalin and long live Mcdonalds. > > Fidel is not Stalin. They can not label him as they do for Stalin. > > But he is labeled as dictator. Who went to his funeral? Nobody. Not a > single social democrat from Europe. > Tsipras who does not have any problem with fascist Israel state and > capitalism went there. Because he is for socialism? No just to take fresh > blood. > > Why imperialist media does not blame Israel instead of Stalin? > > We can and should discuss stalin, ussr etc but not as Ta Nea does. > > We can not discuss it with and within and together with imperialist media. > > Mikis is absolutely right. Because via Stalin they try to liquidate > communist legacy of the past and try to close the way to an actual > socialist revolution. > > > > > > > > 30 A?u 2017 01:51 tarihinde "Alexandre Sourmava" > yazd?: > > > Hi, Tom > > As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own back I > > can only agree with your post. > > The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. > > Sasha > > > > ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson < > > tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > Hello Ulvi > > > > It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the > article's > > defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for > posting > > it. > > > > > > I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the > > occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous > > intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB torture > of > > the present. > > Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory and > > practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete > rejection, > > I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a nationalist > > diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. > > > > Tom Richardson > > Middlesbrough UK > > [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] > > > > On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > > > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > > > > > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Aug 30 04:52:18 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 11:52:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSW4gRGVmZW5zZSBvZiBDb21tdW5pc206?= =?utf-8?q?_Legendary_composer_Mikis_Theodorakis_blasts_anti-communists_an?= =?utf-8?q?d_anti-Stalin_slanderers?= In-Reply-To: References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> , Message-ID: <1504093938265.31487@iped.uio.no> Ulvi, it seems that no one so far has disagreed with your notes on the crimes of capitalism, and the need for socialism. I think, however, that it can be hard for many of us to accept that, because capitalism is a much more criminal machine than Robespierre or Stalin were, we should praise them and be teaching them to people. If the point is that Obama, Felipe, Merkel ... are criminals, in the sense that they deliberately perpetuate the neoliberal machine that consumes humanity, that seems easy to get. But in a forum where many of us are educators, and believe that *education* (in the deepest sense of the word) is the key to socialism and revolution, I think it is natural that we try to take other figures as models. So, I wonder whether there would be better ways to get that message and debate through here. This is my humble opinion, and I am talking while admitting my deep ignorance with respect to these matters, most particularly with respect to others here who have lived and grown under the regimes of being discussed. Respectfully, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: 30 August 2017 12:32 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: In Defense of Communism: Legendary composer Mikis Theodorakis blasts anti-communists and anti-Stalin slanderers What does this mean dear Bella? I gave this example because the same applies to Robespierre's legacy. What is imposing here? I personally do not want that I am imposed Trump, Obama and alike. And generations are not killed by imperialism in world wars. And this Islamic state is not created by US imperialism. Iraq is not invaded. Yugoslavia not bombed. Thousands of migrants are not sinking in the depths of Aegean and Med. because of the policies of EU and Germany. All is fine under the sky nowadays. This good bourgeois democracy gives birth again to fascism and neo-nazism. But we should not be worried. A better capitalism and imperialism is always possible. What is impossible is better socialism. Regards Ulvi 30 A?u 2017 13:22 tarihinde "Bella Kotik-Friedgut" yazd?: > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre.????? > The generations suffered from communists who failed to build Communism and > Stalinism are still alive, so you can not impose them (us) Robespierre for > discussion. > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 4:58 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > I think today stalin, after 65 years of his death, is used to demonize > > socialism and communism. > > > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre. > > > > It is useful. > > > > Especially to discuss Robespierre to see how humanity is condemned to a > > deep degenerated bourgeois politics since nearly 250 years after > > Robespierre. > > > > About crimes against humanity, oppression... > > > > For this latter, I think nobody can compete not only with Truman, Bushs > and > > Trump but also Clinton husband and wife and Obama. Nor Merkel. Nor > > Churchill, Blair, Thatcher and queen. And spanish king. And also > socialist > > Hollande. Tsipras' crimes against Greek working people for managing the > > capitalist crisis on behalf of Greek and German capital is obvious. What > to > > discuss Stalin when we have such a criminal like Tsipras? Are not almost > > all of these bourgeois politicians, like Felipe Gonzalez, Javier Solana > > mere criminals? Why we do not discuss their crimes? Felipe's crimes for > > instance. Killings by his government. > > > > If we have to look for crimes against humanity, imperialism is a Bolt, a > > champion. > > > > Then why again and again, we are reminded of Stalin? And why we are not > > reminded of Hitler? > > > > Because Stalin is used to close the exit from capitalism towards > socialist > > and communist society. This is a mere fact. > > > > I am ready to discuss crimes of Stalin in depth. With whom? > > > > Not with those people who emphasize Stalin's crimes more than Truman's. > > > > I can discuss this with people who admits that capitalism and > imperialism, > > in its crimes, can not be compared to socialism, even to Stalin. > > > > There is an ideological struggle here. A fierce stuggle. > > > > Is capitalism and imperialism able to carry humanity? No. But socialism > > was. > > > > I can enlist many questions here. > > > > This Stalin. Did his planes bomb civilian people in cities? No. British > > did. > > > > Did Ibm provide support to Nazis for carting system? Yes. Did Usa after > > 1945 use nazis to build cia and today's german intelligence services? Why > > Americans and Germans do not know these but stalin's name by heart? > > > > This is a self-defence for imperialism. > > > > So did imperialism really condemn nazism? Or it unherited it? > > > > And when I ask these questions I do no aim at relieving stalin from the > > complete responsibility. > > > > But what imperialist media is doing, it is doing this because they are > > against crimes against humanity? > > > > This is a wrong universe. > > > > This is anti communism. It has nothing to do with a healthy evaluation of > > Stalin. > > > > Can imperialist media do such a healthy evaluation? No. > > > > Who will do it? Those who work to open the way to socialism. They are > > responsible to not repeat past mistakes. > > > > Is there any body in the communist movement saying Stalin has done > > everything very well and without slightest mistake? No. > > > > Why then is this discussion? Not because there is a risk of a new Stalin > > and a Greek one this time. > > > > To close the exit to socialism. To obstruct Kke. This is obvious. Kke is > > gaining ground within the Greek working class and Ta Nea discusses > stalin. > > > > In a Europe where there are still imbecile queens and kings without > > republics, poor masses should believe that stalin was very very bad and > > there is no alternative to capitalism other than a new stalin. > > > > Sorry, those who prefer may opt to believe that stalin is still the > > greatest danger against the salvation of human species and that we should > > admit imperialist world order, this barbarity, I do not opt for this. > > > > Mikis is completely right when he raises this objection and unmasks its > > true purpose. > > > > Humans can be murdered not only by terror. Capitalism does this daily. > > Millions are killed, assassinated, murdered due to the sole fact that > > capitalist mechanisms are in application in this society. This is > occurring > > without Stalin. > > > > People can be killed also by their souls. > > > > I have recently read that Russian people does not love Pushkin as in > Soviet > > period. > > Unbelivable. Russian people does not read Pushkin and does not love him > > anymore. If Russian people does not read Pushkin, then what he or she > reads > > is nonsense. If russian people does not love Pushkin, then he or she can > > not be in love. > > > > Is there and may there be any greater crime to russian youth than taking > > from them pushkin and giving them mcdonalds? > > > > This is counter revolution against humanity. > > > > Down with Lenin and Stalin and long live Mcdonalds. > > > > Fidel is not Stalin. They can not label him as they do for Stalin. > > > > But he is labeled as dictator. Who went to his funeral? Nobody. Not a > > single social democrat from Europe. > > Tsipras who does not have any problem with fascist Israel state and > > capitalism went there. Because he is for socialism? No just to take fresh > > blood. > > > > Why imperialist media does not blame Israel instead of Stalin? > > > > We can and should discuss stalin, ussr etc but not as Ta Nea does. > > > > We can not discuss it with and within and together with imperialist > media. > > > > Mikis is absolutely right. Because via Stalin they try to liquidate > > communist legacy of the past and try to close the way to an actual > > socialist revolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 30 A?u 2017 01:51 tarihinde "Alexandre Sourmava" > > yazd?: > > > > > Hi, Tom > > > As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own > back I > > > can only agree with your post. > > > The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. > > > Sasha > > > > > > ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson < > > > tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Ulvi > > > > > > It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the > > article's > > > defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for > > posting > > > it. > > > > > > > > > I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the > > > occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous > > > intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB > torture > > of > > > the present. > > > Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory and > > > practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete > > rejection, > > > I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a nationalist > > > diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. > > > > > > Tom Richardson > > > Middlesbrough UK > > > [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] > > > > > > On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > > > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > > > > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Wed Aug 30 12:00:44 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 22:00:44 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSW4gRGVmZW5zZSBvZiBDb21tdW5pc206?= =?utf-8?q?_Legendary_composer_Mikis_Theodorakis_blasts_anti-commun?= =?utf-8?q?ists_and_anti-Stalin_slanderers?= In-Reply-To: <1504093938265.31487@iped.uio.no> References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> <1504093938265.31487@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo, thank you for your valuable response. Can I kindly ask: That what is easy to get, that Obama, Felipe, Merkel are criminals. Is this at the same time easily taught by educators in our age? Unfortunately, I think that the fact that they are criminals is easily hidden and difficult to teach. I heard very few people who say that Obama is a criminal. I do not know if Joan Baez changed her opinion after she sang to Obama "we shall overcome" at White House. I think that what we discuss here is not the taking of model of some historical figures. It seems to me that we discuss here an ideological mechanism which, in the name of negating these historical figures, in fact negates socialism, revolution. At least for myself, I do not like to make people idols, even Lenin or Nazim Hikmet. But I feel myself to unmask what is being done using their figures. In the history of French Revolution, there are probably other people who are much more criminal than Robespierre. But why his name is so much pronounced? I think that, because he is the unique revolutionary figure in the French Revolution, he symbolizes radicalism and even opposing bourgeoisie. It is for this reason that he is never forgiven nor built a statue. The same is for Stalin and Fidel. They are never forgiven. Do we teach US blockade against Cuba easily? Much easier than Stalin and Robespierre? So it seems that the problem is not that these people used violence excessively but the anti capitalist content of their thinking and action. It is for this reason that they are not forgiven and slandered continuously. I think 1793 and 1917 were gigantic historical steps forward and it seems impossible to me that such huge, gigantic steps can be without blood. Unfortunately. To my great regret. But I think that all the blood of the French Revolution and October Revolution can not be greater than the blood of imperialist world wars, imperialist invasions. Is this true? Can we teach this as a historical fact instead of difficult historical figures? I think no, it will not be easy to teach such a thing in capitalism's schools. Is fascism, nazism independent, alien to capitalism and imperialism. This is another ideological argument to show Nazism as independent of capitalism and imperialism. Perhaps we can think that these latter are themes for our students to think about to initiate questioning capitalism and imperialism. For me, education should be above all a correct awareness, a consciousness, about the social reality our students live in. Apart from the difficulty such historical figures present, it is not easy to teach that capitalism is a criminal social order by its very nature whereas being criminal is contrary to the nature of socialism. On 30 August 2017 at 14:52, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Ulvi, > > it seems that no one so far has disagreed with your notes on the crimes of > capitalism, and the need for socialism. I think, however, that it can be > hard for many of us to accept that, because capitalism is a much more > criminal machine than Robespierre or Stalin were, we should praise them and > be teaching them to people. If the point is that Obama, Felipe, Merkel ... > are criminals, in the sense that they deliberately perpetuate the > neoliberal machine that consumes humanity, that seems easy to get. But in a > forum where many of us are educators, and believe that *education* (in the > deepest sense of the word) is the key to socialism and revolution, I think > it is natural that we try to take other figures as models. So, I wonder > whether there would be better ways to get that message and debate through > here. > > This is my humble opinion, and I am talking while admitting my deep > ignorance with respect to these matters, most particularly with respect to > others here who have lived and grown under the regimes of being discussed. > > Respectfully, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > Sent: 30 August 2017 12:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: In Defense of Communism: Legendary > composer Mikis Theodorakis blasts anti-communists and anti-Stalin slanderers > > What does this mean dear Bella? > I gave this example because the same applies to Robespierre's legacy. What > is imposing here? > I personally do not want that I am imposed Trump, Obama and alike. > And generations are not killed by imperialism in world wars. > And this Islamic state is not created by US imperialism. > Iraq is not invaded. Yugoslavia not bombed. Thousands of migrants are not > sinking in the depths of Aegean and Med. because of the policies of EU and > Germany. > All is fine under the sky nowadays. > > This good bourgeois democracy gives birth again to fascism and neo-nazism. > > But we should not be worried. > > A better capitalism and imperialism is always possible. > > What is impossible is better socialism. > > Regards > > Ulvi > > 30 A?u 2017 13:22 tarihinde "Bella Kotik-Friedgut" > yazd?: > > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre.????? > > The generations suffered from communists who failed to build Communism > and > > Stalinism are still alive, so you can not impose them (us) Robespierre > for > > discussion. > > > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > > > On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 4:58 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > I think today stalin, after 65 years of his death, is used to demonize > > > socialism and communism. > > > > > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre. > > > > > > It is useful. > > > > > > Especially to discuss Robespierre to see how humanity is condemned to a > > > deep degenerated bourgeois politics since nearly 250 years after > > > Robespierre. > > > > > > About crimes against humanity, oppression... > > > > > > For this latter, I think nobody can compete not only with Truman, Bushs > > and > > > Trump but also Clinton husband and wife and Obama. Nor Merkel. Nor > > > Churchill, Blair, Thatcher and queen. And spanish king. And also > > socialist > > > Hollande. Tsipras' crimes against Greek working people for managing the > > > capitalist crisis on behalf of Greek and German capital is obvious. > What > > to > > > discuss Stalin when we have such a criminal like Tsipras? Are not > almost > > > all of these bourgeois politicians, like Felipe Gonzalez, Javier Solana > > > mere criminals? Why we do not discuss their crimes? Felipe's crimes for > > > instance. Killings by his government. > > > > > > If we have to look for crimes against humanity, imperialism is a Bolt, > a > > > champion. > > > > > > Then why again and again, we are reminded of Stalin? And why we are not > > > reminded of Hitler? > > > > > > Because Stalin is used to close the exit from capitalism towards > > socialist > > > and communist society. This is a mere fact. > > > > > > I am ready to discuss crimes of Stalin in depth. With whom? > > > > > > Not with those people who emphasize Stalin's crimes more than Truman's. > > > > > > I can discuss this with people who admits that capitalism and > > imperialism, > > > in its crimes, can not be compared to socialism, even to Stalin. > > > > > > There is an ideological struggle here. A fierce stuggle. > > > > > > Is capitalism and imperialism able to carry humanity? No. But socialism > > > was. > > > > > > I can enlist many questions here. > > > > > > This Stalin. Did his planes bomb civilian people in cities? No. British > > > did. > > > > > > Did Ibm provide support to Nazis for carting system? Yes. Did Usa > after > > > 1945 use nazis to build cia and today's german intelligence services? > Why > > > Americans and Germans do not know these but stalin's name by heart? > > > > > > This is a self-defence for imperialism. > > > > > > So did imperialism really condemn nazism? Or it unherited it? > > > > > > And when I ask these questions I do no aim at relieving stalin from the > > > complete responsibility. > > > > > > But what imperialist media is doing, it is doing this because they are > > > against crimes against humanity? > > > > > > This is a wrong universe. > > > > > > This is anti communism. It has nothing to do with a healthy evaluation > of > > > Stalin. > > > > > > Can imperialist media do such a healthy evaluation? No. > > > > > > Who will do it? Those who work to open the way to socialism. They are > > > responsible to not repeat past mistakes. > > > > > > Is there any body in the communist movement saying Stalin has done > > > everything very well and without slightest mistake? No. > > > > > > Why then is this discussion? Not because there is a risk of a new > Stalin > > > and a Greek one this time. > > > > > > To close the exit to socialism. To obstruct Kke. This is obvious. Kke > is > > > gaining ground within the Greek working class and Ta Nea discusses > > stalin. > > > > > > In a Europe where there are still imbecile queens and kings without > > > republics, poor masses should believe that stalin was very very bad and > > > there is no alternative to capitalism other than a new stalin. > > > > > > Sorry, those who prefer may opt to believe that stalin is still the > > > greatest danger against the salvation of human species and that we > should > > > admit imperialist world order, this barbarity, I do not opt for this. > > > > > > Mikis is completely right when he raises this objection and unmasks > its > > > true purpose. > > > > > > Humans can be murdered not only by terror. Capitalism does this daily. > > > Millions are killed, assassinated, murdered due to the sole fact that > > > capitalist mechanisms are in application in this society. This is > > occurring > > > without Stalin. > > > > > > People can be killed also by their souls. > > > > > > I have recently read that Russian people does not love Pushkin as in > > Soviet > > > period. > > > Unbelivable. Russian people does not read Pushkin and does not love him > > > anymore. If Russian people does not read Pushkin, then what he or she > > reads > > > is nonsense. If russian people does not love Pushkin, then he or she > can > > > not be in love. > > > > > > Is there and may there be any greater crime to russian youth than > taking > > > from them pushkin and giving them mcdonalds? > > > > > > This is counter revolution against humanity. > > > > > > Down with Lenin and Stalin and long live Mcdonalds. > > > > > > Fidel is not Stalin. They can not label him as they do for Stalin. > > > > > > But he is labeled as dictator. Who went to his funeral? Nobody. Not a > > > single social democrat from Europe. > > > Tsipras who does not have any problem with fascist Israel state and > > > capitalism went there. Because he is for socialism? No just to take > fresh > > > blood. > > > > > > Why imperialist media does not blame Israel instead of Stalin? > > > > > > We can and should discuss stalin, ussr etc but not as Ta Nea does. > > > > > > We can not discuss it with and within and together with imperialist > > media. > > > > > > Mikis is absolutely right. Because via Stalin they try to liquidate > > > communist legacy of the past and try to close the way to an actual > > > socialist revolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 30 A?u 2017 01:51 tarihinde "Alexandre Sourmava" > > > yazd?: > > > > > > > Hi, Tom > > > > As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own > > back I > > > > can only agree with your post. > > > > The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. > > > > Sasha > > > > > > > > ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson < > > > > tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Ulvi > > > > > > > > It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the > > > article's > > > > defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for > > > posting > > > > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the > > > > occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous > > > > intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB > > torture > > > of > > > > the present. > > > > Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory > and > > > > practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete > > > rejection, > > > > I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a > nationalist > > > > diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. > > > > > > > > Tom Richardson > > > > Middlesbrough UK > > > > [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] > > > > > > > > On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > > > > > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > > > > > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Aug 30 12:16:39 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 19:16:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSW4gRGVmZW5zZSBvZiBDb21tdW5pc206?= =?utf-8?q?_Legendary_composer_Mikis_Theodorakis_blasts_anti-communists_an?= =?utf-8?q?d_anti-Stalin_slanderers?= In-Reply-To: References: <323859914.6551267.1504046871417.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <323859914.6551267.1504046871417@mail.yahoo.com> <1504093938265.31487@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1504120599878.92967@iped.uio.no> Yes, for many it might not be all so evident how capitalism can be thought of as a crime against human rights; even though it seems to be boldly clearer day after day. So, no, it is not that easy, not at all! Though I've seen some fellows in ISCAR working in that direction. I think your point concerning historical figures is clearer now, thanks. Though I would also raise the question, who's free from the crime now? No, I don't have the key to initiate or stop trade agreements, or military actions over civil people. But I may have my share in every step I take; or steps I do not take. Alfredo From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: 30 August 2017 21:00 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: In Defense of Communism: Legendary composer Mikis Theodorakis blasts anti-communists and anti-Stalin slanderers Alfredo, thank you for your valuable response. Can I kindly ask: That what is easy to get, that Obama, Felipe, Merkel are criminals. Is this at the same time easily taught by educators in our age? Unfortunately, I think that the fact that they are criminals is easily hidden and difficult to teach. I heard very few people who say that Obama is a criminal. I do not know if Joan Baez changed her opinion after she sang to Obama "we shall overcome" at White House. I think that what we discuss here is not the taking of model of some historical figures. It seems to me that we discuss here an ideological mechanism which, in the name of negating these historical figures, in fact negates socialism, revolution. At least for myself, I do not like to make people idols, even Lenin or Nazim Hikmet. But I feel myself to unmask what is being done using their figures. In the history of French Revolution, there are probably other people who are much more criminal than Robespierre. But why his name is so much pronounced? I think that, because he is the unique revolutionary figure in the French Revolution, he symbolizes radicalism and even opposing bourgeoisie. It is for this reason that he is never forgiven nor built a statue. The same is for Stalin and Fidel. They are never forgiven. Do we teach US blockade against Cuba easily? Much easier than Stalin and Robespierre? So it seems that the problem is not that these people used violence excessively but the anti capitalist content of their thinking and action. It is for this reason that they are not forgiven and slandered continuously. I think 1793 and 1917 were gigantic historical steps forward and it seems impossible to me that such huge, gigantic steps can be without blood. Unfortunately. To my great regret. But I think that all the blood of the French Revolution and October Revolution can not be greater than the blood of imperialist world wars, imperialist invasions. Is this true? Can we teach this as a historical fact instead of difficult historical figures? I think no, it will not be easy to teach such a thing in capitalism's schools. Is fascism, nazism independent, alien to capitalism and imperialism. This is another ideological argument to show Nazism as independent of capitalism and imperialism. Perhaps we can think that these latter are themes for our students to think about to initiate questioning capitalism and imperialism. For me, education should be above all a correct awareness, a consciousness, about the social reality our students live in. Apart from the difficulty such historical figures present, it is not easy to teach that capitalism is a criminal social order by its very nature whereas being criminal is contrary to the nature of socialism. On 30 August 2017 at 14:52, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Ulvi, > > it seems that no one so far has disagreed with your notes on the crimes of > capitalism, and the need for socialism. I think, however, that it can be > hard for many of us to accept that, because capitalism is a much more > criminal machine than Robespierre or Stalin were, we should praise them and > be teaching them to people. If the point is that Obama, Felipe, Merkel ... > are criminals, in the sense that they deliberately perpetuate the > neoliberal machine that consumes humanity, that seems easy to get. But in a > forum where many of us are educators, and believe that *education* (in the > deepest sense of the word) is the key to socialism and revolution, I think > it is natural that we try to take other figures as models. So, I wonder > whether there would be better ways to get that message and debate through > here. > > This is my humble opinion, and I am talking while admitting my deep > ignorance with respect to these matters, most particularly with respect to > others here who have lived and grown under the regimes of being discussed. > > Respectfully, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > Sent: 30 August 2017 12:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: In Defense of Communism: Legendary > composer Mikis Theodorakis blasts anti-communists and anti-Stalin slanderers > > What does this mean dear Bella? > I gave this example because the same applies to Robespierre's legacy. What > is imposing here? > I personally do not want that I am imposed Trump, Obama and alike. > And generations are not killed by imperialism in world wars. > And this Islamic state is not created by US imperialism. > Iraq is not invaded. Yugoslavia not bombed. Thousands of migrants are not > sinking in the depths of Aegean and Med. because of the policies of EU and > Germany. > All is fine under the sky nowadays. > > This good bourgeois democracy gives birth again to fascism and neo-nazism. > > But we should not be worried. > > A better capitalism and imperialism is always possible. > > What is impossible is better socialism. > > Regards > > Ulvi > > 30 A?u 2017 13:22 tarihinde "Bella Kotik-Friedgut" > yazd?: > > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre.????? > > The generations suffered from communists who failed to build Communism > and > > Stalinism are still alive, so you can not impose them (us) Robespierre > for > > discussion. > > > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > > > On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 4:58 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > I think today stalin, after 65 years of his death, is used to demonize > > > socialism and communism. > > > > > > We can and should discuss not only Stalin but also Robespierre. > > > > > > It is useful. > > > > > > Especially to discuss Robespierre to see how humanity is condemned to a > > > deep degenerated bourgeois politics since nearly 250 years after > > > Robespierre. > > > > > > About crimes against humanity, oppression... > > > > > > For this latter, I think nobody can compete not only with Truman, Bushs > > and > > > Trump but also Clinton husband and wife and Obama. Nor Merkel. Nor > > > Churchill, Blair, Thatcher and queen. And spanish king. And also > > socialist > > > Hollande. Tsipras' crimes against Greek working people for managing the > > > capitalist crisis on behalf of Greek and German capital is obvious. > What > > to > > > discuss Stalin when we have such a criminal like Tsipras? Are not > almost > > > all of these bourgeois politicians, like Felipe Gonzalez, Javier Solana > > > mere criminals? Why we do not discuss their crimes? Felipe's crimes for > > > instance. Killings by his government. > > > > > > If we have to look for crimes against humanity, imperialism is a Bolt, > a > > > champion. > > > > > > Then why again and again, we are reminded of Stalin? And why we are not > > > reminded of Hitler? > > > > > > Because Stalin is used to close the exit from capitalism towards > > socialist > > > and communist society. This is a mere fact. > > > > > > I am ready to discuss crimes of Stalin in depth. With whom? > > > > > > Not with those people who emphasize Stalin's crimes more than Truman's. > > > > > > I can discuss this with people who admits that capitalism and > > imperialism, > > > in its crimes, can not be compared to socialism, even to Stalin. > > > > > > There is an ideological struggle here. A fierce stuggle. > > > > > > Is capitalism and imperialism able to carry humanity? No. But socialism > > > was. > > > > > > I can enlist many questions here. > > > > > > This Stalin. Did his planes bomb civilian people in cities? No. British > > > did. > > > > > > Did Ibm provide support to Nazis for carting system? Yes. Did Usa > after > > > 1945 use nazis to build cia and today's german intelligence services? > Why > > > Americans and Germans do not know these but stalin's name by heart? > > > > > > This is a self-defence for imperialism. > > > > > > So did imperialism really condemn nazism? Or it unherited it? > > > > > > And when I ask these questions I do no aim at relieving stalin from the > > > complete responsibility. > > > > > > But what imperialist media is doing, it is doing this because they are > > > against crimes against humanity? > > > > > > This is a wrong universe. > > > > > > This is anti communism. It has nothing to do with a healthy evaluation > of > > > Stalin. > > > > > > Can imperialist media do such a healthy evaluation? No. > > > > > > Who will do it? Those who work to open the way to socialism. They are > > > responsible to not repeat past mistakes. > > > > > > Is there any body in the communist movement saying Stalin has done > > > everything very well and without slightest mistake? No. > > > > > > Why then is this discussion? Not because there is a risk of a new > Stalin > > > and a Greek one this time. > > > > > > To close the exit to socialism. To obstruct Kke. This is obvious. Kke > is > > > gaining ground within the Greek working class and Ta Nea discusses > > stalin. > > > > > > In a Europe where there are still imbecile queens and kings without > > > republics, poor masses should believe that stalin was very very bad and > > > there is no alternative to capitalism other than a new stalin. > > > > > > Sorry, those who prefer may opt to believe that stalin is still the > > > greatest danger against the salvation of human species and that we > should > > > admit imperialist world order, this barbarity, I do not opt for this. > > > > > > Mikis is completely right when he raises this objection and unmasks > its > > > true purpose. > > > > > > Humans can be murdered not only by terror. Capitalism does this daily. > > > Millions are killed, assassinated, murdered due to the sole fact that > > > capitalist mechanisms are in application in this society. This is > > occurring > > > without Stalin. > > > > > > People can be killed also by their souls. > > > > > > I have recently read that Russian people does not love Pushkin as in > > Soviet > > > period. > > > Unbelivable. Russian people does not read Pushkin and does not love him > > > anymore. If Russian people does not read Pushkin, then what he or she > > reads > > > is nonsense. If russian people does not love Pushkin, then he or she > can > > > not be in love. > > > > > > Is there and may there be any greater crime to russian youth than > taking > > > from them pushkin and giving them mcdonalds? > > > > > > This is counter revolution against humanity. > > > > > > Down with Lenin and Stalin and long live Mcdonalds. > > > > > > Fidel is not Stalin. They can not label him as they do for Stalin. > > > > > > But he is labeled as dictator. Who went to his funeral? Nobody. Not a > > > single social democrat from Europe. > > > Tsipras who does not have any problem with fascist Israel state and > > > capitalism went there. Because he is for socialism? No just to take > fresh > > > blood. > > > > > > Why imperialist media does not blame Israel instead of Stalin? > > > > > > We can and should discuss stalin, ussr etc but not as Ta Nea does. > > > > > > We can not discuss it with and within and together with imperialist > > media. > > > > > > Mikis is absolutely right. Because via Stalin they try to liquidate > > > communist legacy of the past and try to close the way to an actual > > > socialist revolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 30 A?u 2017 01:51 tarihinde "Alexandre Sourmava" > > > yazd?: > > > > > > > Hi, Tom > > > > As borne in the USSR person who have felt Soviet regime on his own > > back I > > > > can only agree with your post. > > > > The most dangerous was to be a marxist in this country. > > > > Sasha > > > > > > > > ?????, 30 ??????? 2017 0:12 Tom Richardson < > > > > tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Ulvi > > > > > > > > It will be a help towards understanding your attitude towards the > > > article's > > > > defence of 'Stalinism', if you will provide your own reason(s) for > > > posting > > > > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > I really wish to acknowledge the lethal horror and inhumanity of the > > > > occupation, post-war /civil war period in Greece (with UK's murderous > > > > intervention), whose agonies continued, followed by the IMF/ECB > > torture > > > of > > > > the present. > > > > Nevertheless, as a committed communist whose analysis of the theory > and > > > > practice of Soviet Russia after 1925-6 is agonised but complete > > > rejection, > > > > I regret very much to say that I find the actual article a > nationalist > > > > diatribe defending an indefensible personality and system. > > > > > > > > Tom Richardson > > > > Middlesbrough UK > > > > [a follower of xmca threads and occasional commentator] > > > > > > > > On 28 August 2017 at 22:40, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > > > > > https://communismgr.blogspot.com.tr/2017/08/legendary- > > > > > composer-mikis-theodorakis.html?m=1 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Aug 31 03:30:39 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 03:30:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Australian schools turn spotlight on wellbeing in bid to tackle student anxiety Message-ID: <59a7e574.958d620a.1e165.ccbb@mx.google.com> This article i am sending not to endorse this particular (model) but to highlight a (model) that must be considered as being influential in school settings. Many articles strongly question and challenge this particular model indicating (school well-being). Food for thought but move cautiously Larry http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-27/school-system-turns-spotlight-on-wellbeing-mental-health/8846596?pfmredir=sm Sent from my Windows 10 phone From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Thu Aug 31 12:25:32 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 22:25:32 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] YouTube'da "Soviet song - Wondrous Future (english subtitles)" videosunu izleyin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: https://youtu.be/3oWqXudgWJc I think we should get rid of this ideological pressure imperialism exercises on socialism, communism via stalin and soviet union. when we succeed in this, we will be like a white sail, belayut parus. From bella.kotik@gmail.com Thu Aug 31 13:25:33 2017 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 23:25:33 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: YouTube'da "Soviet song - Wondrous Future (english subtitles)" videosunu izleyin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If it would be possible...That is exactly the main psychological problem of soviet regime- beautiful phantoms, hard reality. this contradiction may be was the main factor of its collapse. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P5NvnPVuuD8 Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:25 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > https://youtu.be/3oWqXudgWJc > > I think we should get rid of this ideological pressure imperialism > exercises on socialism, communism via stalin and soviet union. when we > succeed in this, we will be like a > white sail, belayut parus. > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Thu Aug 31 14:05:27 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 00:05:27 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: YouTube'da "Soviet song - Wondrous Future (english subtitles)" videosunu izleyin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you very much Bella. Yes, exactly, if it would be possible. It is for this reason, I hope we would say: Possible or not, humanity deserves this wondrous future in which we believe as did Alexander Romanovitch. Best wishes Ulvi 31 A?u 2017 23:28 tarihinde "Bella Kotik-Friedgut" yazd?: If it would be possible...That is exactly the main psychological problem of soviet regime- beautiful phantoms, hard reality. this contradiction may be was the main factor of its collapse. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P5NvnPVuuD8 Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:25 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > https://youtu.be/3oWqXudgWJc > > I think we should get rid of this ideological pressure imperialism > exercises on socialism, communism via stalin and soviet union. when we > succeed in this, we will be like a > white sail, belayut parus. > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Thu Aug 31 14:20:08 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 00:20:08 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?WW91VHViZSdkYSAi0J/RgNC10LrRgNCw0YHQvdC+0LUg0LTQsNC7?= =?utf-8?b?0LXQutC+IiB2aWRlb3N1bnUgaXpsZXlpbg==?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: https://youtu.be/m7A4uy6Nw0k please tell me bella. did it reserve this dissolution and collapse which was mainly its own fault? if you will say that it deserved, i will admit it without any reserve, objection. thanks From bella.kotik@gmail.com Thu Aug 31 15:49:10 2017 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 01:49:10 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?WW91VHViZSdkYSAi0J/RgNC10LrRgNCw0YHQvdC+0LUg0LQ=?= =?utf-8?b?0LDQu9C10LrQviIgdmlkZW9zdW51IGl6bGV5aW4=?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It happened as it is. Deserve? is it a proper category? If you listen carefully this song "?????????? ??????, *?? ???? ?? ??? ???????*!" Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 12:20 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > https://youtu.be/m7A4uy6Nw0k > > please tell me bella. > > did it reserve this dissolution and collapse which was mainly its own > fault? > > if you will say that it deserved, i will admit it without any reserve, > objection. > > thanks > From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Thu Aug 31 16:32:39 2017 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 23:32:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAJWW91VHViZSdkYSAi0J/RgNC10LrRgNCw0YHQvdC+?= =?utf-8?b?0LUg0LTQsNC70LXQutC+IiB2aWRlb3N1bnUgaXpsZXlpbg==?= References: <1029896179.1168867.1504222359940.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1029896179.1168867.1504222359940@mail.yahoo.com> Dear Ulvi ??il, I appresheate your passionate defence of socialist (communist) idea and your straight-out criticism of capitalism and so called imperialism and so on and so forth.But I am afraid that your efforts can brought about the exact opposite of the intended results. You defend USSR and Stalin as a sybol of communism. But in fact Stalin can symbolise only the greatest and the ?most bloody counter revolution in the history. If we want to find a historical person slightly similar to Josef Djugashvili that will be Napoleon Bonaparte rather then Robespier. A person who killed the majority of Bolsheviks who were Lenin's closest associates and who made the Revolution, who in XX century restore?serfdom?under the pretext of struggle against "kulak's", a person who establish the most brutal system of exploitation of workers who were?deprived even of the right ?to freely choose their employment, a person who launched WW2 as Hitler's ally, a criminal that expels many peopels and killed millions of soviet citisens, this person is very bad?personification of communism as real humanism. He looks more like a personification of?bloody counter-revolution. Altogether I rather think that to judge what was the socio-economical nature of so called soviet "real socialism" to examin real socio-economis relations in this epoch is much more useful than to appeal to soviet mawkish songs. Best wishes Sasha ???????, 1 ???????? 2017 0:22 Ulvi ??il ?????(?): https://youtu.be/m7A4uy6Nw0k please tell me bella. did it reserve this dissolution and collapse which was mainly its own fault? if you will say that it deserved, i will admit it without any reserve, objection. thanks