[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'

mike cole mcole@ucsd.edu
Sat Apr 22 09:03:04 PDT 2017


I didn't understand all of that David, but I gather that wording is
somewhere "in between" statement and utterance. I see that others have
chipped in to the discussion, so will follow along as best I can.

Thanks for taking the time to respond.
mike

On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 10:38 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
wrote:

> I think that "statement" is too tight, and "utterance" is too loose. A
> statement is an indicative-declarative wording of some kind: we don't
> usually refer to commands (imperatives), questions
> (indicative-interrogatives), or exclamations as "statements" because their
> primary purpose is not to state facts (that is, if there are facts, they
> are ancillary, and not constitutive: we can have a command, a question, or
> an exclamation without any statement of any state of affairs, e.g. "Look
> out!" "Why?" "Oh, no!"). So "statement" is too narrow.
>
> An utterance, as Bakhtin defines it, is simply the stretch of language we
> find between two changes in speaker (this is why a book is a single
> utterance). This is an entirely descriptive unit: if I give you a tape of
> listening test dialogues for the Test of Proficiency in Korean, you will be
> able to tell me exactly how many utterances there are in each dialogue, and
> even whether the speakers are men or women, without understanding any of
> the language. As a link between thinking and speech, such a unit is beside
> the point. So "utterance" is too broad.
>
> And linking thinking and speech IS the point. I think you and Vygotsky are
> using the word "holophrase" somewhat teleologically, like a fond, but
> expectant, grandpa. You both think that the baby who says "mama" really
> means a holophrase like "Mama, put me in the high chair". It's not the case
> that "Mama" is a reduction of a full sentence (like "Fine, thanks, and
> you?"). It's more like the Ur Wir, or "Grandwe", the "we" that pre-exists
> "me" and "you" the way that my grandpa pre-existed me. I am also using the
> word "wording" teleologically, you notice: "Mama" is, from the child's
> point of view, meaning and sounding, but not wording at all. But teleology
> is very useful here; indeed, I think that teleology in speech ontogenesis
> is a more useful principle than evolution: there is, after all, a "complete
> form" right there in the environment.
>
> The problem with Thinking and Speech is that, unlike Capital, the author
> died in the middle of writing it, and it had to be eked out with his old
> articles. So although Chapter One and Chapter Seven really do use wording
> and not word as a unit of analysis (and the "phoneme" is really the
> morpho-phoneme, e.g. a Russian case ending, something Vygotsky probably
> learned all about from his old professor Trubetskoy and his classmate at
> Moscow University Jakobson). you also have Chapter Five, which our late,
> beloved friend Paula Towsey loved so much.
>
> She had reason: Chapter Five is Vygotsky, and so it's brilliant. But it's
> OLD Vygotsky, 1928-1929 Vygotsky (that was the year that Trubetskoy and
> Jakobson left Moscow for Prague and set up the Prague Linguistic Circle
> which eventually became systemic-functional linguistics). Chapter 5
> is based on something from the German idealist psychologists Reimat and
> Ach, who really DID believe in one-word concepts. And so we have this weird
> block-like model of word meaning. Vygotsky tries to disenchant and
> de-fetishize the blocks by saying the concept is really the process of
> relating the word meaning to the block, but that still means that a concept
> is an abstraction and a generalization of some block-like quality.
>
> Chapter Six is better, because here the "model" of word meaning is a
> RELATOR, like "because" or "although". Notice that these are the kinds of
> words that preliterate children do not consider words. And in fact that's
> why Piaget got the results he did--the kids really couldn't figure out what
> he meant when he asked them to explain what the word "because" meant in a
> particular sentence--they assumed he wanted to know what the sentence
> meant, because asking what a word like "because" means in a sentence
> without the rest of the sentence is really a little like asking if there
> are more white flowers or more flowers in a bouquet of red and white
> flowers. But suppose (over a period of some years) we give the kid the
> following
> utterances-cum-statement/wordings-cum-wordgroup/wordings-cum-words.
>
> a) A rational, designed, and planned economy is possible in the USSR. (Why
> is that, Teacher?) Oh, it is just because all the means of production
> belong to the workers and peasants.
> b) Planned economy is possible in the USSR because all the means of
> production belong to the workers and peasants.
> c) All the means of production belong to the workers and peasants so
> economic planning is possible in the USSR.
> d) Workers and peasant's ownership of the means of production means
> socialist construction is possible.
> e) Public ownership of production enables social construction.
> f) the proprietary preconditions of construction
> g) socialist property forms
> h) socialist property
> i) socialism
>
> By the time the child is the age when children beget other children,
> this child will see that the clause wording "all the means of production
> belong to the workers and peasants" has become a nominal group wording
> "public ownership", and the nominal group wording "a rational, designed,
> and planned economy" has become a single, block-like word "socialism". And
> because for Vygotsky the "internal" really means the psychological, while
> the "external" really just means the interpersonal, and because wording is
> inversely proportional to the internalization of inner speech, I think we
> can see that e) is a kind of internalization of a) and I) is an
> internalization of e).
>
> But neither tight knickers nor baggy trousers will show this. We will need
> a theory of grammar that can make fine distinctions between clause-level
> wording, group-level wording, and word-level wording in order to describe
> and explain it, much less intervene in it and promote it. Otherwise, not
> only will our model of the concept look like a wooden block, our model of
> "internalization" will look like a "suture" or  an "ingrowing" (c.f. end of
> HDHMF Chapter Five). No fond, expectant, grandpa wants a grandchild's
> mind covered with scars.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 10:47 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
> > Choosing your wording carefully, David, you come up with "wording" to
> > describe what I think of as the holophrases in question. To help me
> clarify
> > your point for myself, and to use your way of communicating about it,
> how
> > does the wording "wording" relate to the wordings "statement" or
> > "utterance" offered by Michael in the first case and by others in the
> group
> > on behalf of Bakhtin?
> >
> > is there a holphorastic rendering/wording that might help us out here?
> >
> > Mike
> >
> > PS- As an afterthought, the examples feel like an utterance to me. But
> that
> > might make a liar out of me too :-)
> >
> > On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 4:33 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > In English, the number of syllables or morphemes in a word is often
> > > unclear, while the number of words in a sentence is always fairly
> clear.
> > > This isn't true for preliterate children, who have a hard time
> > > understanding that "a" and "of" are actually words. It's true enough
> for
> > > people who can read and write, but its really an accident of
> > > orthography (notice that "it's" appears to be one syllable but two
> > > morphemes, and it's not really clear, even to the normally quite
> > > overwheening "wordcount" function in Word, how many words are
> > > actually there.
> > >
> > > Other languages are not like English. So for example in Chinese (a
> > > non-alphabetic language), the number of syllables and morphemes is
> > > always clear, but the number of words in a sentence is quite unclear
> > (when
> > > you read a page of Chinese, there are no spaces between
> morpho-syllables
> > > that mark out "words". Chinese poetry, and classical Chinese, plays
> with
> > > this a lot: the unit is the morpheme rather than the word, and the
> > overall
> > > effect (at least on me) is a stream of syllables and morphemes and
> > meanings
> > > but not words.
> > >
> > > So I think the place to look for Vygotsky's unit of analysis is not in
> > the
> > > actual word "word" or "word meaning" (slovo or znachenie slova).
> Holbrook
> > > Mahn has proposed translating "znachenie slova" as "verbal meaning",
> and
> > > although this isn't exactly an accurate way of presenting how Russian
> > > grammar really works, it IS a good way of getting around the trap set
> for
> > > those who are only going by the English word meaning of "word meaning".
> > >
> > > I think the place to look is in Vygotsky's examples. In the first part
> of
> > > Thinking and Speech, for example, Vygotsky agrees with Stern that the
> > > child's first "word" has to be construed as not a word but a whole
> > wording.
> > > He goes even further: he says it's a whole "wording-in-context", that
> > is, a
> > > meaning. (And remember, Vygotsky NEVER agrees with Stern about ANYTHING
> > > unless he absolutely has to!) And in the LAST part of Thinking and
> > Speech,
> > > Vygotsky gives many examples: 'the clock fell", "the tram B is
> arriving",
> > > "Would you like some tea"? What all of these examples have in common is
> > > that they are not single words but they are single wordings.
> > >
> > > Remember that Russian has no articles; this is something that Andy
> > himself
> > > points out with respect to whether "perezhivanie" should be "a
> > > perizhivanie" or just "perizhivanie". I think Andy's observation is
> > > essentially correct (although of course we undo part of his insight
> when
> > we
> > > insist that all languages must "really" have an article of some kind).
> > But
> > > it needs to be generalized: Vygotsky could NOT have ever written that
> > > the unit of analysis is "a" word meaning, simply because "a", as any
> > > preliterate child will tell you, is not a word (and certainly not a
> > Russian
> > > word).
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Macquarie University
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 5:19 PM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. <
> > > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk
> > > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Re the development of punctuation and the origin of 'words' see
> > > > http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?3.61
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
> > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
> > > > Sent: 20 April 2017 01:45
> > > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
> > > >
> > > > "the word" in Russian, Andy, has shades of meaning tending toward the
> > > > biblical from current common understandings of the term as a sort
> > > "lexical
> > > > object."  The Vai didnotmakethesamedistinction when writing and
> neithr
> > > did
> > > > the Greeks.
> > > > I believe there are those who would include the utterance in its
> > meaning
> > > > as used by Vygotsky. Slippery these translation problems! But
> > discussion
> > > of
> > > > them often reveals clarification of the various concepts involved as
> > they
> > > > appear in different peoples' vocabularies. Mediation has some of
> those
> > > > properties.
> > > >
> > > > The polysemy of just one language is enough for one poor translator
> to
> > > > deal with! The polsyemic playing field when you cross
> language/cultural
> > > > systems is what gives academics something to do.  :-)
> > > >
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > and as a further note of caution, the unit in "Thinking and Speech"
> > is
> > > > > a word, not an utterance, and yet it is utterance which seems to be
> > > > > analogous to "commodity."
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy
> > > > >
> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > Andy Blunden
> > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy
> > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> > decision-making
> > > > > On 20/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >> Michael/all
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I  go back a few posts (as ever being a bit slower than this
> > > > >> list-serve demands - let me do this before the discussion moves to
> > > > >> 'binocular
> > > > >> vision') and challenge the metaphor of commodity/utterance: I can
> > see
> > > > >> it has merit but also I want to look at the limitations.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> You say: 'the sign is to the verbal exchange what the commodity is
> > to
> > > > >> the Commodity-exchange' … But I think I was asking for a
> > > > >> characterisation of the larger totality involved - e.g. The
> > > > >> 'economy/mode of production and its contradictions/collapse' and
> > 'what
> > > > - dialogue?'
> > > > >>
> > > > >> And I think Andy B agrees with you when he says 'both take an
> > > > >> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the unit'… But
> > > > >> suggests he recognises my problem when he refers to 'its language'
> > > > >> (or I might say 'consciousness', 'discourse'  or maybe
> > 'intercourse').
> > > > >>
> > > > >> But - as I argued in critique of the metaphor 'labour = learning',
> > > > >> this mapping only goes so far, and has certain dangers. The
> relation
> > > > >> between commodity/economy (and the mode of production) and
> > > > >> utterance/discourse (and the ideological super/infra-structure) is
> > > > >> much more interesting in the concrete relations of history. I
> refer
> > > > >> to Marx (the German ideology) and Volosinov.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> In reality the relation between commodity production and
> > > > >> 'sign-related/mediated' discourse (Marx calls 'intercourse') is
> > > > >> dialectical. Each 'mediates' the other in historical development,
> > and
> > > > >> even in collective production-and-dialogue.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an utterance/dialogic
> > > > >> exchange maybe ought to be examined in the ideological context of
> > its
> > > > >> relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production where class
> > > > >> power becomes visible. I don't know how to do this, but the
> argument
> > > > >> is there in
> > > > >> Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part of the
> > > > >> capital-mediated structure of relations in a field (including the
> > > > >> field of opinion/discourse), and this explains the forms of
> > discourse
> > > > >> that express these power relationships and help to hold powerful
> > > > >> positions in place in the field. In this view it is not possible
> to
> > > > >> identify the 'value' of an utterance or a sign outside of this
> wider
> > > > >> analysis… and an analysis of the particular discursive/cultural
> > field
> > > > within its wider sociality.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Sorry this is a bit prolix and so likely to provoke tangential
> > > > responses:
> > > > >> I did not have time tonight to write a shorter more focussed post.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Best wishes
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Julian
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Ps The separate discussion on mediation: this might be another
> > > > >> thread. I only want to note here that the mediation of the
> > > > >> 'intercourse' through its 'other' in the material form of
> > > > >> 'production' (I call the economy above) and vice versa does not
> > > > >> involve a mediator 'between' the two, but is purely hegelian in
> > > > >> seeing the mediation of 'x' through 'not x' in a totality.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> On 18/04/2017 16:34, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
> of
> > > > >> Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
> > > > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Larry, do not be confused. Take it with Bateson (Mind and Nature),
> > > > >> and see
> > > > >>> Andy and Michael as two eyes. You then get this:
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> It is correct (and a great improvement) to begin to think of the
> > two
> > > > >>> parties to the interaction as two eyes , each giving a monocular
> > > > >>> view of what goes on and , together , giving a binocular view in
> > > > >>> depth. This double view is the relationship . (p.133)
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> What is gained by comparing the data collected by one eye with
> the
> > > > >>> data collected by the other? Typically , both eyes are aimed at
> the
> > > > >>> same region of the surrounding universe, and this might seem to
> be
> > a
> > > > >>> wasteful use of the sense organs. But the anatomy indicates that
> > > > >>> very considerable advantage must accrue from this usage. The
> > > > >>> innervation of the two retinas and the creation at the optic
> > chiasma
> > > > >>> of pathways for the redistribution of information is such an
> > > > >>> extraordinary feat of morphogenesis as must surely denote great
> > > > >>> evolutionary advantage . (p.69)
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> Michael
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >>> --------------
> > > > >>> ------
> > > > >>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive Science
> > > > >>> MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P
> > 5C2
> > > > >>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/
> > faculty/mroth/>
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
> > > > >>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
> > > > >>> ections-in-mat
> > > > >>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> different trajectories, Larry.
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> a
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >>>> Andy Blunden
> > > > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> > > > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> > decision-maki
> > > > >>>> ng On 18/04/2017 11:44 PM, lpscholar2@gmail.com wrote:
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> Andy, Julian, Michael,
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> My learning curve at this moment is in the way of Michael
> > > > >>>>> describing the back and forth double movement. That is both
> > > > >>>>> giving/receiving, both
> > > > >>>>> (expressing/listening) occurring WITHIN our relationship. This
> > > > >>>>> prior to or more primordial then taking the individual stance
> as
> > > > >>>>> primary and the relation as derivative.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> So... In this ‘spirit’ I will pose a question?
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Andy says: ‘artefact mediated relation BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS as a
> > > unit.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Michael says: You remain with back-and-forth movement that is
> > > > >>>>> NEVER action but IS transcation. Here the back-and-forth
> > > > >>>>> ‘relation’ is the UNIT, and the individuals emerge from WITHIN
> > > > >>>>> this primordial double relation.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Are Andy and Michael on the same trajectory, shifting the
> accent,
> > > > >>>>> or are imdividuals situated differently in the comtrasting
> > notions
> > > > >>>>> of units.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> In particular does Andy ‘figure’ bridges whereas Michael
> > ‘figures’
> > > > >>>>> gaps in the notion of BETWEEN.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Pursuing my growing edge, going out on a limb
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > >>>>> *Sent: *April 17, 2017 11:54 PM
> > > > >>>>> *To: *xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > > >>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Julian/Michael,
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> I remember getting very excited back in the early '80s when
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> I spotted the symmetry between the first chapters of Capital
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> and Marx's critique of algebra in his Mathematical
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Manuscripts. That lasted about a week. The symmetry between
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's analysis of speech and Marx's analysis of
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> production is a strong one because both take an
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the unit.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> There is a symmetry at the level of the molar unit as well,
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> which, so far as I know has been neglected. But this
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> structural symmetry cannot usefully be taken too far. The
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> "point" is that the unit is a unit of a whole, and the
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> productive activity of a community is not the same as its
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> language, which as Marx said "the philosophers are bound to
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> make into an independent realm." Concretely, speaking is not
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> producing. But like all human activities, both are subject
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> to analysis by units of artefact-mediated actions.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Andy
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Andy Blunden
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
> > decision-mak
> > > > >>>>> ing
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> On 18/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Michael
> > > > >>>>>> In principle I am Ok with the idea of the unit that contains
> the
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>> essential
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> contradictions… but of what?
> > > > >>>>>> For Marx the whole point of commodity exchange/value is that
> it
> > > > >>>>>> is
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> beginning of an explanation of the 'economy', capitalism, and
> the
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>> labour
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> theory of value is the key to its collapse …
> > > > >>>>>> What is the equivalent 'point' of sign exchange in dialogue?
> And
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>> where
> > > > >>>>> is
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> the equivalent of the theory of value? I think the
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>> sensuous/supersensuous
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> is a distraction from the 'point'.
> > > > >>>>>> That’s my puzzle.
> > > > >>>>>> Julian
> > > > >>>>>> On 17/04/2017 21:49, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
> behalf
> > > > >>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
> > behalf
> > > > >>>>>> of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> Hi Julian,
> > > > >>>>>>> the sign is to the verbal exchange what the commodity is to
> the
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> commodity
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> exchange--both the sensuous and supersensuous parts are there
> > that
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> Marx
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky are writing about. :-)
> > > > >>>>>>> Michael
> > > > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> --------------
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> ------
> > > > >>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive
> > > > >>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
> > Victoria,
> > > > >>>>>>> BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
> > > > >>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
> > > > >>>>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
> > > > >>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> ections-in-mat
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
> mathematics/>*
> > > > >>>>>>> On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 12:11 PM, Julian Williams <
> > > > >>>>>>> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> Michael and all
> > > > >>>>>>>> I am coming late to this discussion and maybe have been
> > missing
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> some
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> important thingsŠ but I want to see a few issues addressed by
> the
> > > > >>>>>>>> Functor:
> > > > >>>>>>>> Commodity => Sign: my skepticism follows to some extent the
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> critique I
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> wrote of the mapping 'labor = learning' that you are familiar
> > with:
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> but
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> in
> > > > >>>>>>>> some ways I am even more skeptical of this metaphor. So:
> > > > >>>>>>>> Commodity to sign, is a unit of a totality as in 'economy'
> to
> > ..
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> 'Š?
> > > > >>>>> Š '
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> What ? Maybe 'dialogue/discourse'?
> > > > >>>>>>>> What is the 'value' that is exchanged in discourse, and how
> > > > >>>>>>>> does it ultimately realise its 'use value' in some sort of
> > > > >>>>>>>> dialogic 'consumption'
> > > > >>>>>>>> of useful understanding?
> > > > >>>>>>>> How does the producer of value 'labour' to produce it, and
> how
> > > > >>>>>>>> is
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> 'labour time' related to the 'exchange value' of the sign that
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> results?
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> [Bearing in mind that the labour theory of value is Marx's
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> essential
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> contribution.]
> > > > >>>>>>>> Then how does this work relate to devious studies: we
> already
> > > > >>>>>>>> have
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> work of Bourdieu who assigns cultural capital/value to symbolic
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> power
> > > > >>>>> in
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> the cultural fieldŠ is there a connection here?
> > > > >>>>>>>> Best regards as ever
> > > > >>>>>>>> Julian
> > > > >>>>>>>> Ps I need to come back to you about Hegel (I am far from
> happy
> > > > >>>>>>>> with reading the 'Ideal' as a straightforward negation of
> the
> > > > 'Real'
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> implicit
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> in what you sayŠ) when I have thought about this a bit more -
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> maybe in
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> 2018Š we should pick up!   :-)
> > > > >>>>>>>> On 17/04/2017 18:22, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
> > behalf
> > > > >>>>>>>> of Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
> > > > >>>>>>>> behalf of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry,
> > > > >>>>>>>>> things become easier to think through if you do not take an
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> individualist
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> starting point but a relational one---not "she has to
> produce
> > > . .
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> ."
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> but
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> look at what is happening in the exchange, where each
> giving
> > > > >>>>>>>>> also
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> is
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> taking, such that in a commodity exchange, you have double
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> giving-taking;
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> in a verbal exchange, each speaking also involves listening
> > > > >>>>>>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> receiving,
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> and the receiving is for the purpose of giving (speaking,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> replying).
> > > > >>>>> As
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> soon as you do this, you remain with back-and-forth movement,
> no
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> longer
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> action but transaction.
> > > > >>>>>>>>> The other interesting thing is that the Russian word
> > > > >>>>>>>>> znachenie,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> translated
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> as "meaning" (really, signification) also translates as
> > "value"
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> "magnitude," and Il'enkov (2009) parenthetically adds
> "function"
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> "rôle". I am quoting from p. 178:
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Marx joins Hegel as regards terminology, and not Kant or
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Fichte, who tried to solve the problem of Œideality¹ (i.e.,
> > > > >>>>>>>>> activity)
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> while
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> remaining Œinside
> > > > >>>>>>>>> consciousness¹, without venturing into the external
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> sensuously-perceptible
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> corporeal
> > > > >>>>>>>>> world, the world of the palpable-corporeal forms and
> > relations
> > > > >>>>>>>>> of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> things.
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>       This Hegelian definition of the term Œideality¹ takes
> > in
> > > > >>>>>>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> whole
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> range of phenomena
> > > > >>>>>>>>> within which the Œideal¹, understood as the corporeally
> > > > >>>>>>>>> embodied
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> form
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> of
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> the activity of
> > > > >>>>>>>>> social man, really exists ­ as activity in the form of the
> > > > >>>>>>>>> thing,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> or
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> conversely, as the thing
> > > > >>>>>>>>> in the form of activity, as a Œmoment¹ of this activity, as
> > > > >>>>>>>>> its
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> fleeting
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> metamorphoses.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>       Without an understanding of this state of affairs it
> > > > >>>>>>>>> would be
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> totally
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> impossible to fathom
> > > > >>>>>>>>> the miracles performed by the commodity before people¹s
> eyes,
> > > > >>>>>>>>> the commodity-form of the product, particularly in its
> > > > >>>>>>>>> dazzling money-form, in the form
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> of
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> notorious Œreal
> > > > >>>>>>>>> talers¹, Œreal roubles¹, or Œreal dollars¹, things which,
> as
> > > > >>>>>>>>> soon
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> as
> > > > >>>>> we
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> have the slightest
> > > > >>>>>>>>> theoretical understanding of them, immediately turn out to
> be
> > > > >>>>>>>>> not
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> Œreal¹
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> at
> > > > >>>>>>>>> all, but Œideal¹
> > > > >>>>>>>>> through and through, things whose category quite
> > unambiguously
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> includes
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> words, the
> > > > >>>>>>>>> units of language, and many other Œthings¹. Things that,
> > while
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> being
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> wholly
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Œmaterial¹,
> > > > >>>>>>>>> palpable-corporeal formations, acquire all their Œmeaning¹
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> (function
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> rôle) from Œspirit¹,
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> >from Œthought¹ and even owe to it their specific corporeal
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> existence.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Outside spirit and
> > > > >>>>>>>>> without it there cannot even be words; there is merely a
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> vibration of
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> air.
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Michael
> > > > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
> -----------------------------
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> ---------------
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> ------
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
> > > > >>>>>>>>> <https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>> directions-in-mat
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
> > mathematics/
> > > > >>>>>>>>> >* On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 8:31 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I am attempting to follow Wolff-Michael¹s trajectory as
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> presented in
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> his
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> article (A Dialectical Materialist Reading of the Sign). On
> > > > >>>>>>>>> page
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> 149
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> he
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> attempts to clarify the difference between sign complex
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹
> > > > >>>>> &
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> sign
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> complex Œvalue¹.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> His methodology is to read Marx Œsubstituting¹ the word
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> ŒSIGN¹
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> (implying
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> sign complex) FOR Œcommodity¹ and intuites this method will
> > be
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> generative.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Here is his realization through the method of re-reading
> as
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> (trading,
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> translation, transposition) as I am carried along.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> a) USE-VALUE: Œnatural signs¹ such as animal footprints
> are
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> useful/functional to the hunter inherently; they do NOT
> have
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Œvalue¹
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> (exchangeble value) though they do have use-value for the
> hunter
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> or
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> hunting
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> party in finding game.  Similarly a sign complex can be
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> useful
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> and
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> the
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> product of human labour without being Œvalue¹
> (exchangeable).
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Someone
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> who
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> satisfies HER needs through her product produces
> Œuse-value¹
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> but
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> NOT
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> Œvalue¹.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> b) VALUE: (exchangeable). To produce SIGNS (complexes),
> she
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> has
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> to
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> produce
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> not only Œuse-value¹ but use-value FOR others. She has to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> produce Œsocietal¹ use-values.... To be/come
> (exchangeable)
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> SIGN, the
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> product
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> HAS
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> TO BE TRANSFERRED to another, FOR whom the SIGN complex
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> Œconstitutes¹
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> use-value.
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> The production of signs that produce no Œvalue¹ that is
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> exchangeable
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> FOR
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> others leads to personal notes often having NO use-value to
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> others.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> To
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> trans/form use-value to BE come Œvalue¹ requires
> > > > >>>>>>>>> exchangeability
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> under
> > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> lighting various forms of SIGN (complexes).
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Apologies to Wolff-Michael if my echoing his re-reading
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>> methodology
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> garrbled the trans/mission?
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I offer this because it helps clarify my reading of
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Œuse-value¹ & Œvalue¹
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> (exchangeable)
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> My morning musement
> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>


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