From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 1 17:25:41 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 17:25:41 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System In-Reply-To: <57c06939.4e16620a.55377.c832@mx.google.com> References: <57bddcb8.874a620a.6504e.e09e@mx.google.com> <57bf5fd2.0757420a.75dc3.f5c9@mx.google.com> <57c06939.4e16620a.55377.c832@mx.google.com> Message-ID: That is a very difficult meshwork of ideas to think about, Larry. In so far as I follow the bidirectional path you are on, the overall idea seems plausible enough. Its parsing the parts that is bothering me. In particular, i am trying to parse the use of constitution and institution in the system of human experience you describe. Institution is at the crystalized end of bits of structure in the flow of experience. It would seem reasonable to think about constitution as its heglian other, the fluid, "becoming" part. It seems, however, that constitution gets a bad rap in the conversation because it is linked to agency and agency to individual agency. Is that the rap on M-P's uses of the term? There were some 260+ uses of the term in Phenomenology of Perception, and I am reading it in English, so the task of disambiguating is a tad beyond my reach. Constitution also has an interesting linkage to events. If you go to a central square of Athens you discover that it is called Syntagma Square. Constitution Square. But syntagma is also the root of the word syntagmatic which contrasts with paradigmatic in descriptions of language. As the google dictionary puts it, syntagmatic means "the relationship between two or more linguistic units used sequentially to make well-formed structures." Which leads people like Catherine Nelson to talk about "event schemas" which in turn she relates to acquistion of culture. Anyway, I am still finding the distinction of constitution and institution difficult to work with. I lean strongly to the both/and line of reasoning in such matters, but one still has to be able to specify various objects that can be both/and! mike On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 9:07 AM, wrote: > Mike, Alfredo, > > > > I also am dipping my toe into this topic or theme so will explore with you > what this means and where this meaning leads us as we walk along the path > that Kym Maclaren opens before us. > > > > Vygotsky said, the word is the direct manifestation of the historical > nature of consciousness. > > What if Vygotsky had said, > > Human consciousness is the direct manifestation of the historical nature > of the word. > > There seems to be 3 parts or elements here in the way or arrangement or > combination that are determining the actual existing order. > > 1) The word > > 2) Human consciousness' > > 3) The in-between > > We can post that human consciousness is the direct manifestation of the > nature of the word > > OR > > We can post that the word is the direct manifestation of the nature of > human consciousness > > OR > > We can post that both the word and human consciousness manifest (arise) > simultaneously within the **in-between** > > > > Each of these frameworks shifts what is primary and where we focus > attention. > > > > > > The next question: thinking life defines **itself** through consciousness. > > Is **thinking life** itself -life itself? > > > > OR is thinking life itself emerging from somewhere that is subterranean. > Life itself may **exceed** thinking life itself. > > The thinking life **defines** itself, gives definition to itself through > frameworks that are instituted ( a word used I think to go beyond thinking > life defining **itself**). Events must also be considered and events > occur in happenings not of our own choosing. > > > > The actual existing order and the way in which anything is **made up** > determine the things nature and character. Merleau Ponty and Kym Maclaren > are inviting us to use the model of institution to become clearer on the > distinctions with other Models of **made up**. Now the tension between **made > up** and **making up** (the coming to be and the overcoming of the limits > of the currently available **made up** are also central to Merleau > Ponty?s model. > > > > The actual existing order (of meaning) is in tension with meaning * > *potential** that is over the horizon but coming to be. It is only > retrospectively that we come to see the newly instituted order and we > arrive at this new order **through** the old order. > > This is a language of frame/works and trans/form/ation of meanings in > which we dwell. > > > > The emotional institutions that are being realized (coming to > consciousness) are becoming realized/instituted within a subterranean > process which come to fruition within events beyond the purview of the **I > think**. To have this transformation come to consciousness occurs after > the happening of the event. > > However, the arising of the new institution arises **through** the older > crystallized institution that is overcome. > > > > The dialectic that these emotional institutions **undergo** is driven not > by self-reflection (which is retrospective) but by events (contingency, > back and forth repetion, the living indeterminate ambiguous relations of > being in the world with actual others within the older frame/work of > habituated meaning AND this **movement** occurs in a subterranean way > (beyond) I think -itself. This movement beyond the I think -itself is a > back and forth movement of regression to older frameworks and anticipation > of newer frameworks which arise/arrive when events happen that crystallize > a new emotional institution on it's way to becoming overcome. > > > > Mike, Alfredo, > > Within M-P?s model meaning **cores** and meaning **potential** shift > within **events**. > > Meaning is also central to perezhivanie and therefore the paths of > institution and perezhivanie may possibly interweave as occurring in the > realm of the **in-between** where both objectiv/ity and subjectiv/ity > arise simultaneously. > > > > Through dialogue both the meaning of institution and perezhivanie ( > meanings which we come to inhabit) may become clearer > > Possibly? > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > *From: *mike cole > *Sent: *August 25, 2016 4:38 PM > *To: *Larry Purss > *Cc: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject: *Re: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System > > > > Thanks very much for that extended discussion of constitution and > institution, Larry. Unfortunately, I am not as versed as you or Alfredo in > phenomenology so I can only keep asking my xmca101-style questions. > > > > I have the *Phenomenology of Perception*, but not those lectures you > refer to which I gather are titled *Institution and Passivity. *I also > downloaded the Maclaren article which I have read through, but remain stuck > back near the starting gate. > > > > I can see several ideas that I recognize and perhaps appreciate to a small > extent. The idea of entre-deux is strongly reminiscent of Vygotsky's > comment at the end of the *Thinking and Speech:* > > > > ?In consciousness, the word is what *?? *in Feuerbach?s words *?? *is > absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the > most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness? > (Coll. Works, Vol. 1, p. 285). > > > > I still have not put my mind around connecting this thought with the > thought quoted by Alfredo: > > > > "Consciousness arises out of life and forms only one of its features. But > once awakened, thought itself defines life. Or more accurately, a thinking > life defines itself through consciousness" (Vygotsky, 1993, p. 237). > > > > In trying to understand your, M-P's, and Maclearen's ideas I struggle with > the definition (theory) of constitution which it seems I have to understand > well in order to understand how the term institution is being used. > > > > You and Maclearen spend more time talking about institution and I am > getting hung up on what is mean there. I gather what is being critiqued is > a notion of constitution that has an individual agent making something up. > This is what I take away from > > > > A focus for M-P in all his work is a critique of the philosophy of > consciousness with it's central theme of a constituting subject and the > language of constitution to express **coming to be**. In his earlier work > he is still using the same term **constituting** to express these two > distinct meanings. The intellectualist notion of coming to be AND also > using **constitution** when speaking of a new way of coming to perceive > a perceptual object. > > > > My own history of experience of the word constitution does not have the > strong "intellectualist bias" of assuming a constituting subject. Rather, > it seems closer to this definition cadged from the OED: > > > The way in which anything is constituted or made up; the arrangement or > combination of its parts or elements, as determining its nature and > character; make, frame, composition. *constitution of nature*, *constitution > of the world*, *constitution of the universe*, *constitution of things* (the > actual existing order); so *constitution of society*, etc. > > In this sort of definition, there is no claim about a constituting > subject. Rather, it seems compatible, at least, with Maclearen's account > when she writes: > > > > This account of emotion proposes itself as a refutation of a philosophy of > consciousness and the idea of a constituting subject. *For the emotional > institutions that are realized in our lives constitute us as much as or > more than we constitute them;* > > > > I have not been able to figure out what it means when Maclearen writes > that *the dialectic that these institutions undergo *is a process driven > not by self-reflection and the subject?s unilateral constitution of > meaning, but by contingency, repetition, and the indeterminate but > fundamental question that our being in the world with others both poses and > secretly, implicitly, ambiguously strives to work out. > > > > I'll try to resolve these questions so that I can link up more effectively > with a lot in your message and the discussion of the centrality of events > along with Alfredo's invocation of > > Politzer that I have long thought important. Any help you can offer with > respect to constituting gratefully accepted. > > > > mike > > > > > > On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 2:14 PM, wrote: > > Mike, > > The question: > > What is Merleau-Panty's notion of institution versus constitution? > > My answer will go through Kym Maclaren and how she developed an answer to > this question. > > Kym Maclaren wrote a paper *The Entre-Deux of Emotions: Emotions As > Institutions (available at academia.edu) that explores the way M-P in his > book (The Phenomenology of Perception) used the term **constitution** to > mean two different things ( two different meanings or relational notions). > As his philosophy developed he came to distinguish the meaning of * > *constitution** from the meaning of **institution**. He elaborated this > distinction in his lecture course on **institution**. (referred to as the > **Institution Lectures**. > > Kym takes the meaning of institution developed in these lectures and turns > back to the Phenomenology to show how M-P was at this earlier period using > the same term **constitution** with two distinct meanings. He had not > yet found the vocabulary to make a clear distinction between constitution > and institution. > > I believe this distinction may be relevant in the coming conversation on > the meaning of perezhevanie. > > > > Kym and M-P are moving away from a focus on either consciousness as > primary or of the objective world as primary to refocus on the * > *entre-deux** (the in-between) as primary. This shift of focus where NOT > a subject, but events, endow experience with **durable** or * > *crystallized** or **instituted** forms of meaning in relation to which > (as themes) a whole series of other experiences will make sense (will form > a thinkable sequel (a history). > > This institution is the creative endowment of meaningful dimensions that > provide frameworks for further sense-making and this movement allows new > perceptual objects to emerge/arise within experience. It is this creative > movement M-P comes to call institution in his later Institution Lectures. > > > > The question then becomes: > > > > How do events do this work of instituting? Kym says M-P?s lectures on > institution explicitly and clearly express the subterranean logic of > institution at work in events. This logic is subterranean because it > operates outside the knowledge & intentions of the subject. > > > > When institution occurs -when a new dimension of meaning (that sets the > terms) for future development occurs ? we can then and only then see * > *retrospectively** how the past anticipated the future, anticipated this > development, and answered the question posed by the past. When the question > is posed the answer?s meaning is only potential, in the realm of the > not-yet but could-be. > > What is central is that this perspective is **accessible** only from the > standpoint of the new institution. ? only retrospectively.. The past did > not contain it's own answer. The answer **exceeds** the past, transforms > the very terms with which the past functioned and this answer could never > have been predicted or forseen ? from THAT past. (even though it answers to > THAT past). > > In other words, it is only retrospectively that it is even clear what we > were asking (what question was being posed). > > > > In exchange for what we had imagined, life gives us something else (that > M-P says was secretly wanted and subterranean). REALIZATION is not what was > forseen, but all the same, was wanted or desired. > > > > THIS IS THE PLACE TO PAUSE AND STOP READING AS THE OPENING ANSWER TO > MIKE?S QUESTION. Institution goes through events, not subjects or objects. > To read on is my attempt to summarize Kym?s way of developing the notion > of emotion as institution. I believe her approach has merit but I may be > saying more than was asked. > > > > > > In Kym?s paper she 1st turns to two other forms of institution (artistic > expression) and (perception) in order to show concretely how the logic of > institution is distinct from the logic of constitution. I will not get to > these concrete examples but will introduce the topic. > > > > Kym shows how this logic is already at work in the Phenomenology as a > central theme. However, at this earlier point he referred to both logics as > constituting logic. It is his quest to clarify these two distinct meanings > of constitution that are worked out in the Institution lectures and > institution is given its own vocabulary as distinct from the vocabulary of > constitution > > > > I will give an outline of the points Kym Maclaren develops in her > reflections on emotion as institution that critiques emotion as > constitution: > > The notion of institution is the way in which M-P seeks to criticize > intellectualism with it's idea of a constituting subject and offer an > alternative account of subjectiv/ity that may be a resource for > understanding perezhivanie and **ity**. > > Kym is asking us to think about emotion as institution. Emotional > transformation on this institutional account needs to be understood as > coming from **beyond** the subject, rather than being the result of the > subject?s own autonomous powers.. > > > > For the constituting subject the meaning of its object comes into being on > the basis of the subject?s own powers. The object is only a reflection of > the powers and acts of that autonomous consciousness. > > > > In the place of this notion of a constituting subject M-P argues for a > conception of a subject who animates him/her self with another meaning and > this other meaning coming into form as transcendent meaning transforms the > person who comes to dwell within this meaning. > > To dwell within the person?s **I think** and in his/her body is analogous > to the way meaning dwells in a book or dwells in a cultural object. > > M-P is positing **meaningful cores** (themes?) that transcend and > transfigure the persons natural powers and becoming powers of institution. > These meaningful cores outstrip or overflow or **exceed** the subject and > the subject is (caught up in) (dispossessed) or (exposed) by these > transcendent meanings (beyond the self itself) > > However what is central, is that as this is occurring, the person is also > taking up or resuming those transcendent meanings that help **realize** > new ways of making sense of the world and others. > > > > A focus for M-P in all his work is a crtique of the philosophy of > consciousness with it's central theme of a constituting subject and the > language of constitution to express **coming to be**. In his earlier work > he is still using the same term **constituting** to express these two > distinct meanings. The intellectualist notion of coming to be AND also > using **constitution** when speaking of a new way of coming to perceive > a perceptual object. > > In the Institutional Lectures M-P develops a new language to speak of the > coming to be of the institution of new meanings. > > Institutions occur within both public history & personal/intersubjective > history as two sides of the same coin. Kym stays within the > personal/intersubjective side in her paper and limits her reflections to > the personal/intersubjective. > > > > There is a similar logic of institution at work in aesthetic expression, > in perception, and in emotion as ways of creative expression. > > Institutions are those transformative moments in our lives when a new > configuration of meaning and a new form of agency is developing. M-P is > exploring the **subterranean** movement of this logic of institution. > > Key terms for M-P are **expression** and **perception** which involve not > the constitution of a meaning by a subject but rather the institution of a * > *form** in the **in-between** of embodied being and environment. > > The institution of a form simultaneously transforms the situation and the > embodied being rather than the form being simply constituted by that being. > > Kym Maclaren shows that the commonly held belief that an emotional subject > is constituting others and situations in terms of the subjects own > conscious emotions is suspect. > > In contrast Kym argues the emotional situation comes to be in the * > *in-between** (entre-deux) and is not the result of the subject?s own > projection. > > > > An inherent feature of institution of forms is there own overcoming. So > emotional institution of new emotions are transformations forming new > emotions in response to the older crystallized emotions. > > Therefore the development of one?s emotional life is not primarily the > result of an autonomous subject?s reflections and constitutions. Emotional > institution rather emerges out of the subterranean logic worked out in the > repetition and reiteration of the tension experienced within **old** > institutions. The back and forth to earlier forms and emerging > forms..Emotional transformation comes largely from beyond the subject, the > situation of the event facilitating the subject to develop her > subjectiv/ITY rather than being the result of her own autonomous > constituting powers. > > M-P speaks of a subject investing and animating subjectiv/ity with another > meaning that transforms the subject and which is transcendent to this > person?s current subjectivi/ity. (i.e. Succeeds in making a meaning which > dwells in her **I Think** and in her body as a meaning dwells in a book > and a meaning dwells in a cultural object. > > > > In the Institution Lectures M-P develops a language that better emphasizes > and clarifies the **passivity** of the subject and the ways in which the > meaning that the subject realizes always **exceeds** the embodied subject. > > M-P is contrasting the inseparability of the instituting and instituted > subject and contrasts this subject with the constituting subject. M-P by > the time of the institution lectures has developed a systematic language > for making the distinction between constitution and institution. The > institution of the subject is the **coming to be** of a new form of > subjectivity in the way we can talk of new forms **coming to be** such > as (new perception, new emotion, new aesthetic expression, new object) > that are becoming crystallized. > > > > In M-P?s earlier work (the Phenomenology of Perception) he is still > conceiving the two ways of understanding the **emergence of meaning** as > constitution. Institution remains more an operative concept as institution > has not yet acquired a central core univocal voice (not yet a thematic > voice in terms of which other concepts are measured). With the benefit of > the Institution Lectures in hand, Kym Maclaren is able to go back to the > Phenomenology of Perception book to show the logic of institution at work > in this earlier book. > > > > To repeat: The constituting subject is the subject of (and conceived by) > intellectualism who constitutes objects. > > In the Phenomenology book M-P is arguing for a different kind of * > *constitution** which in later works he refers to as **institution** > because the sense of meaning achieved is not given by consciousness. The > meaning **comes to be** in the embodied exchange between a > self-in-the-making & an object-in-the-making. The coming-to-be of the > subject is inseparable from the coming-to-be of the object. > > > > We are moving away from a focus on consciousness as primary or of the > objective world as primary to a focus on the **in-between** (the > entre-deux) as primary. > > > > Not a subject but **events** endow experience with durable dimensions in > relation to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense. > > > > To repeat institution is: > > This endowment of a meaningful dimension that provides a framework for > further sense-making and this allows new perceptual objects to emerge **within > experience** is what in M-P?s later works he come to call **institution** > > > > The logic of institution is subterranean as events do this work of > instituting meanings unforseen (repeat unforseen) by the subject involved > because this logic operates outside the knowledge and intentions of that > subject. > > When institution occurs ? when a new dimension of meaning that sets the > terms for future developments occurs ? we can see **retrospectively** how > the past **anticipated** this development, how this development responded > to the past and **answered a question** posed by this past. > > > > An interesting note is where M-P places **errors** and **failures**. In > exchange for what we imagined life gives us something else that was > secretly wanted. Such realization (or epiphany) comes about through errors > and failures. By means of a kind of blind groping on the part of a living > subject, the subject is diverted through various impasses arrived at > through various investigations. And it is only retrospectively (once again) > that these inquiries REVEAL their common **theme** > > > > Somehow, and this is the marvel of institution ? all these errors and > failures open up a space for a new realization, a new meaning. Errors open > up a new space for a new realization can be put another way: > > Caught up in old crystallized institutions, we respond to the problems > that present themselves by **repeating** in varios ways, those old ways > of making sense. These repetitions disclose their own inadequacies, thereby > opening up a space where something else, something new, something > unknowingly awaited can announce itself. > > > > The event is that moment in which the openess that constitutes seeking > without ever really knowing what the question is, something contingent > arises as an occurence or an event ushering in a new way of life, a new way > of seeing, a new configuration of meaning, a new institution. > > > > Thus, any particular institution tends or inclines (with the help of > contingent happenings) towards the institutions own overcoming. Though an > expression of the past, institution is inherently anticipating the future, > which cannot be grasped except retrospectively. > > > > I will STOP here. Kym in her paper turns to concrete examples of human > experiences to elaborate the notion of institution within artistic > expression and perception. This in preparation for an understanding of > emotion that follows this same logic of institution. > > I will just add that a logic of Eros can be explored through a logic of > institution. > > To explore the somethings we love that becomes instituted in our deepest > meanings. > > > > This proceeding extended think aloud also can be intertwined with Dewey?s > (having an experience). What I have left unsaid is the relation of > institution to perezhivanie. M-P may have something to contribute to that > notion that is now coming into form > > To be continued .... > > The question of constitution versus institution is a topic for conversation > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > *From: *mike cole > *Sent: *August 24, 2016 5:29 PM > *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System > > > > What is MP's idea of institution versus constitution, Larry? > > Mike > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > From: > > Date: Wednesday, 24 August 2016 > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System > > To: eXtended Activity > > > > > > This is an extension to the engagement with Rein Raud and the mention of > > various ways to approach identity, subjectivity, selfhood, and personhood. > > >From that conversation, one of the sources to consider (but not the > > preferred choice) was Vincent Colapietro?s book *Peirce?s Theory of the > > self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity* > > > > Vincent Colapietro draws attention to the *ambiguity* and tension in > > Peirce?s desire to be BOTH scientific and systematic. Dispositions that are > > out of step with many current ways of philosophizing. > > > > Peirce in correspondence with James confessed: > > Pluralism does not satisfy either my head or my heart. > > Yet in another letter to James he acknowledged his debt to Schelling > noting: > > One thing I admire about him (Schelling) is his freedom from the trammels > > of system, and his holding himself UNCOMMITTED to any previous utterance. > > In that, he is like a scientific man. > > > > Vincent notices it is all too easy for those who have studied intensively > > the writings of Peirce to get so caught up in his *system* that they come > > to see it as a PLACE TO DWELL rather than a point from which to proceed. > > > > I share this as an expression (a creative expression) of the way the places > > where we dwell *institute* us. These ambiguous places from which we move > > back and forth (repetition) in order to DEVELOP our self, subjectivity, > > identity, personhood. > > This circles back to perizhevanie, ity, and I will add Merleau Ponty?s > > notion of *institution* (in contrast to constituting). > > The relation of subjectivity and objectivity and the (in between) > > > > This is the limit for a single post. I send this in anticipation of the > > next theme emerging - perezhivanie > > > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ablunden@mira.net Thu Sep 1 19:31:35 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 12:31:35 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System In-Reply-To: References: <57bddcb8.874a620a.6504e.e09e@mx.google.com> <57bf5fd2.0757420a.75dc3.f5c9@mx.google.com> <57c06939.4e16620a.55377.c832@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <69ac668c-d8b7-183d-1de1-3bac09f3d4ca@mira.net> Mike, I have not followed this thread or focussed on your earlier posts on this topic, but I do use both these words, so I guess this is an opportune moment to see if I know what I'm talking about. Constitution According to the 20 volume Oxford English Dictionary, the verb 'to constitute' comes first, dating from 1477. Constitute: Originally to set in a specified place or situation or appoint, then to set in an office or position of authority but in more recent times (e.g. Grottius) to found or establish, give legal or official shape to, to frame, make (by combining elements) or to make some existing thing what it is, and then to make up, compose etc. So it seems to have begun much like 'institute'. When I use it I think I mean that specific elements or relations which independently come to exist and voila! we have this new thing which is constituted by this conjuncture. Maybe the thing already existed, but you have analytically pulled them apart to find what was essential to the thing. So it's about the relation of a complex thing to its "constituent" parts. But it's nothing particular to do with a wider situation. Institution Again, the verb 'to institute' came first, in 1475. Institute: To set up, establish, found, ordain; to introduce, bring into use or practice. To set in operation, set on foot, initiate, ?start? (a search, inquiry, comparison, etc.). As you suggest, Mike, "institute" has this connotation of "launching" something, so to me it's more a relation of a thing to the larger whole. So something may exist, but as you say it is just "in the flow" of things, but then it is "instituted" so it becomes something solid, part of the whole. It remains what it is, but it is now official, so to speak. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/09/2016 10:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > That is a very difficult meshwork of ideas to think about, Larry. In so far > as I follow the bidirectional path you are on, the overall idea seems > plausible enough. Its parsing the parts that is bothering me. In > particular, i am trying to parse the use of constitution and institution in > the system of human experience you describe. > > Institution is at the crystalized end of bits of structure in the flow of > experience. It would seem reasonable to think about constitution as its > heglian other, the fluid, "becoming" part. > > It seems, however, that constitution gets a bad rap in the conversation > because it is linked to agency and agency to individual agency. Is that the > rap on M-P's uses of the term? There were some 260+ uses of the term in > Phenomenology of Perception, and I am reading it in English, so the task of > disambiguating is a tad beyond my reach. > > Constitution also has an interesting linkage to events. If you go to a > central square of Athens you discover that it is called Syntagma Square. > Constitution Square. But syntagma is also the root of the word syntagmatic > which contrasts with paradigmatic in descriptions of language. As the > google dictionary puts it, syntagmatic means "the relationship between two > or more linguistic units used sequentially to make well-formed structures." > Which leads people like Catherine Nelson to talk about "event schemas" > which in turn she relates to acquistion of culture. > > Anyway, I am still finding the distinction of constitution and institution > difficult to work with. I lean strongly to the both/and line of reasoning > in such matters, but one still has to be able to specify various objects > that can be both/and! > > mike > > On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 9:07 AM, wrote: > >> Mike, Alfredo, >> >> >> >> I also am dipping my toe into this topic or theme so will explore with you >> what this means and where this meaning leads us as we walk along the path >> that Kym Maclaren opens before us. >> >> >> >> Vygotsky said, the word is the direct manifestation of the historical >> nature of consciousness. >> >> What if Vygotsky had said, >> >> Human consciousness is the direct manifestation of the historical nature >> of the word. >> >> There seems to be 3 parts or elements here in the way or arrangement or >> combination that are determining the actual existing order. >> >> 1) The word >> >> 2) Human consciousness' >> >> 3) The in-between >> >> We can post that human consciousness is the direct manifestation of the >> nature of the word >> >> OR >> >> We can post that the word is the direct manifestation of the nature of >> human consciousness >> >> OR >> >> We can post that both the word and human consciousness manifest (arise) >> simultaneously within the **in-between** >> >> >> >> Each of these frameworks shifts what is primary and where we focus >> attention. >> >> >> >> >> >> The next question: thinking life defines **itself** through consciousness. >> >> Is **thinking life** itself -life itself? >> >> >> >> OR is thinking life itself emerging from somewhere that is subterranean. >> Life itself may **exceed** thinking life itself. >> >> The thinking life **defines** itself, gives definition to itself through >> frameworks that are instituted ( a word used I think to go beyond thinking >> life defining **itself**). Events must also be considered and events >> occur in happenings not of our own choosing. >> >> >> >> The actual existing order and the way in which anything is **made up** >> determine the things nature and character. Merleau Ponty and Kym Maclaren >> are inviting us to use the model of institution to become clearer on the >> distinctions with other Models of **made up**. Now the tension between **made >> up** and **making up** (the coming to be and the overcoming of the limits >> of the currently available **made up** are also central to Merleau >> Ponty?s model. >> >> >> >> The actual existing order (of meaning) is in tension with meaning * >> *potential** that is over the horizon but coming to be. It is only >> retrospectively that we come to see the newly instituted order and we >> arrive at this new order **through** the old order. >> >> This is a language of frame/works and trans/form/ation of meanings in >> which we dwell. >> >> >> >> The emotional institutions that are being realized (coming to >> consciousness) are becoming realized/instituted within a subterranean >> process which come to fruition within events beyond the purview of the **I >> think**. To have this transformation come to consciousness occurs after >> the happening of the event. >> >> However, the arising of the new institution arises **through** the older >> crystallized institution that is overcome. >> >> >> >> The dialectic that these emotional institutions **undergo** is driven not >> by self-reflection (which is retrospective) but by events (contingency, >> back and forth repetion, the living indeterminate ambiguous relations of >> being in the world with actual others within the older frame/work of >> habituated meaning AND this **movement** occurs in a subterranean way >> (beyond) I think -itself. This movement beyond the I think -itself is a >> back and forth movement of regression to older frameworks and anticipation >> of newer frameworks which arise/arrive when events happen that crystallize >> a new emotional institution on it's way to becoming overcome. >> >> >> >> Mike, Alfredo, >> >> Within M-P?s model meaning **cores** and meaning **potential** shift >> within **events**. >> >> Meaning is also central to perezhivanie and therefore the paths of >> institution and perezhivanie may possibly interweave as occurring in the >> realm of the **in-between** where both objectiv/ity and subjectiv/ity >> arise simultaneously. >> >> >> >> Through dialogue both the meaning of institution and perezhivanie ( >> meanings which we come to inhabit) may become clearer >> >> Possibly? >> >> >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> >> >> *From: *mike cole >> *Sent: *August 25, 2016 4:38 PM >> *To: *Larry Purss >> *Cc: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> *Subject: *Re: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >> >> >> >> Thanks very much for that extended discussion of constitution and >> institution, Larry. Unfortunately, I am not as versed as you or Alfredo in >> phenomenology so I can only keep asking my xmca101-style questions. >> >> >> >> I have the *Phenomenology of Perception*, but not those lectures you >> refer to which I gather are titled *Institution and Passivity. *I also >> downloaded the Maclaren article which I have read through, but remain stuck >> back near the starting gate. >> >> >> >> I can see several ideas that I recognize and perhaps appreciate to a small >> extent. The idea of entre-deux is strongly reminiscent of Vygotsky's >> comment at the end of the *Thinking and Speech:* >> >> >> >> ?In consciousness, the word is what *?? *in Feuerbach?s words *?? *is >> absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the >> most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness? >> (Coll. Works, Vol. 1, p. 285). >> >> >> >> I still have not put my mind around connecting this thought with the >> thought quoted by Alfredo: >> >> >> >> "Consciousness arises out of life and forms only one of its features. But >> once awakened, thought itself defines life. Or more accurately, a thinking >> life defines itself through consciousness" (Vygotsky, 1993, p. 237). >> >> >> >> In trying to understand your, M-P's, and Maclearen's ideas I struggle with >> the definition (theory) of constitution which it seems I have to understand >> well in order to understand how the term institution is being used. >> >> >> >> You and Maclearen spend more time talking about institution and I am >> getting hung up on what is mean there. I gather what is being critiqued is >> a notion of constitution that has an individual agent making something up. >> This is what I take away from >> >> >> >> A focus for M-P in all his work is a critique of the philosophy of >> consciousness with it's central theme of a constituting subject and the >> language of constitution to express **coming to be**. In his earlier work >> he is still using the same term **constituting** to express these two >> distinct meanings. The intellectualist notion of coming to be AND also >> using **constitution** when speaking of a new way of coming to perceive >> a perceptual object. >> >> >> >> My own history of experience of the word constitution does not have the >> strong "intellectualist bias" of assuming a constituting subject. Rather, >> it seems closer to this definition cadged from the OED: >> >> >> The way in which anything is constituted or made up; the arrangement or >> combination of its parts or elements, as determining its nature and >> character; make, frame, composition. *constitution of nature*, *constitution >> of the world*, *constitution of the universe*, *constitution of things* (the >> actual existing order); so *constitution of society*, etc. >> >> In this sort of definition, there is no claim about a constituting >> subject. Rather, it seems compatible, at least, with Maclearen's account >> when she writes: >> >> >> >> This account of emotion proposes itself as a refutation of a philosophy of >> consciousness and the idea of a constituting subject. *For the emotional >> institutions that are realized in our lives constitute us as much as or >> more than we constitute them;* >> >> >> >> I have not been able to figure out what it means when Maclearen writes >> that *the dialectic that these institutions undergo *is a process driven >> not by self-reflection and the subject?s unilateral constitution of >> meaning, but by contingency, repetition, and the indeterminate but >> fundamental question that our being in the world with others both poses and >> secretly, implicitly, ambiguously strives to work out. >> >> >> >> I'll try to resolve these questions so that I can link up more effectively >> with a lot in your message and the discussion of the centrality of events >> along with Alfredo's invocation of >> >> Politzer that I have long thought important. Any help you can offer with >> respect to constituting gratefully accepted. >> >> >> >> mike >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 2:14 PM, wrote: >> >> Mike, >> >> The question: >> >> What is Merleau-Panty's notion of institution versus constitution? >> >> My answer will go through Kym Maclaren and how she developed an answer to >> this question. >> >> Kym Maclaren wrote a paper *The Entre-Deux of Emotions: Emotions As >> Institutions (available at academia.edu) that explores the way M-P in his >> book (The Phenomenology of Perception) used the term **constitution** to >> mean two different things ( two different meanings or relational notions). >> As his philosophy developed he came to distinguish the meaning of * >> *constitution** from the meaning of **institution**. He elaborated this >> distinction in his lecture course on **institution**. (referred to as the >> **Institution Lectures**. >> >> Kym takes the meaning of institution developed in these lectures and turns >> back to the Phenomenology to show how M-P was at this earlier period using >> the same term **constitution** with two distinct meanings. He had not >> yet found the vocabulary to make a clear distinction between constitution >> and institution. >> >> I believe this distinction may be relevant in the coming conversation on >> the meaning of perezhevanie. >> >> >> >> Kym and M-P are moving away from a focus on either consciousness as >> primary or of the objective world as primary to refocus on the * >> *entre-deux** (the in-between) as primary. This shift of focus where NOT >> a subject, but events, endow experience with **durable** or * >> *crystallized** or **instituted** forms of meaning in relation to which >> (as themes) a whole series of other experiences will make sense (will form >> a thinkable sequel (a history). >> >> This institution is the creative endowment of meaningful dimensions that >> provide frameworks for further sense-making and this movement allows new >> perceptual objects to emerge/arise within experience. It is this creative >> movement M-P comes to call institution in his later Institution Lectures. >> >> >> >> The question then becomes: >> >> >> >> How do events do this work of instituting? Kym says M-P?s lectures on >> institution explicitly and clearly express the subterranean logic of >> institution at work in events. This logic is subterranean because it >> operates outside the knowledge & intentions of the subject. >> >> >> >> When institution occurs -when a new dimension of meaning (that sets the >> terms) for future development occurs ? we can then and only then see * >> *retrospectively** how the past anticipated the future, anticipated this >> development, and answered the question posed by the past. When the question >> is posed the answer?s meaning is only potential, in the realm of the >> not-yet but could-be. >> >> What is central is that this perspective is **accessible** only from the >> standpoint of the new institution. ? only retrospectively.. The past did >> not contain it's own answer. The answer **exceeds** the past, transforms >> the very terms with which the past functioned and this answer could never >> have been predicted or forseen ? from THAT past. (even though it answers to >> THAT past). >> >> In other words, it is only retrospectively that it is even clear what we >> were asking (what question was being posed). >> >> >> >> In exchange for what we had imagined, life gives us something else (that >> M-P says was secretly wanted and subterranean). REALIZATION is not what was >> forseen, but all the same, was wanted or desired. >> >> >> >> THIS IS THE PLACE TO PAUSE AND STOP READING AS THE OPENING ANSWER TO >> MIKE?S QUESTION. Institution goes through events, not subjects or objects. >> To read on is my attempt to summarize Kym?s way of developing the notion >> of emotion as institution. I believe her approach has merit but I may be >> saying more than was asked. >> >> >> >> >> >> In Kym?s paper she 1st turns to two other forms of institution (artistic >> expression) and (perception) in order to show concretely how the logic of >> institution is distinct from the logic of constitution. I will not get to >> these concrete examples but will introduce the topic. >> >> >> >> Kym shows how this logic is already at work in the Phenomenology as a >> central theme. However, at this earlier point he referred to both logics as >> constituting logic. It is his quest to clarify these two distinct meanings >> of constitution that are worked out in the Institution lectures and >> institution is given its own vocabulary as distinct from the vocabulary of >> constitution >> >> >> >> I will give an outline of the points Kym Maclaren develops in her >> reflections on emotion as institution that critiques emotion as >> constitution: >> >> The notion of institution is the way in which M-P seeks to criticize >> intellectualism with it's idea of a constituting subject and offer an >> alternative account of subjectiv/ity that may be a resource for >> understanding perezhivanie and **ity**. >> >> Kym is asking us to think about emotion as institution. Emotional >> transformation on this institutional account needs to be understood as >> coming from **beyond** the subject, rather than being the result of the >> subject?s own autonomous powers.. >> >> >> >> For the constituting subject the meaning of its object comes into being on >> the basis of the subject?s own powers. The object is only a reflection of >> the powers and acts of that autonomous consciousness. >> >> >> >> In the place of this notion of a constituting subject M-P argues for a >> conception of a subject who animates him/her self with another meaning and >> this other meaning coming into form as transcendent meaning transforms the >> person who comes to dwell within this meaning. >> >> To dwell within the person?s **I think** and in his/her body is analogous >> to the way meaning dwells in a book or dwells in a cultural object. >> >> M-P is positing **meaningful cores** (themes?) that transcend and >> transfigure the persons natural powers and becoming powers of institution. >> These meaningful cores outstrip or overflow or **exceed** the subject and >> the subject is (caught up in) (dispossessed) or (exposed) by these >> transcendent meanings (beyond the self itself) >> >> However what is central, is that as this is occurring, the person is also >> taking up or resuming those transcendent meanings that help **realize** >> new ways of making sense of the world and others. >> >> >> >> A focus for M-P in all his work is a crtique of the philosophy of >> consciousness with it's central theme of a constituting subject and the >> language of constitution to express **coming to be**. In his earlier work >> he is still using the same term **constituting** to express these two >> distinct meanings. The intellectualist notion of coming to be AND also >> using **constitution** when speaking of a new way of coming to perceive >> a perceptual object. >> >> In the Institutional Lectures M-P develops a new language to speak of the >> coming to be of the institution of new meanings. >> >> Institutions occur within both public history & personal/intersubjective >> history as two sides of the same coin. Kym stays within the >> personal/intersubjective side in her paper and limits her reflections to >> the personal/intersubjective. >> >> >> >> There is a similar logic of institution at work in aesthetic expression, >> in perception, and in emotion as ways of creative expression. >> >> Institutions are those transformative moments in our lives when a new >> configuration of meaning and a new form of agency is developing. M-P is >> exploring the **subterranean** movement of this logic of institution. >> >> Key terms for M-P are **expression** and **perception** which involve not >> the constitution of a meaning by a subject but rather the institution of a * >> *form** in the **in-between** of embodied being and environment. >> >> The institution of a form simultaneously transforms the situation and the >> embodied being rather than the form being simply constituted by that being. >> >> Kym Maclaren shows that the commonly held belief that an emotional subject >> is constituting others and situations in terms of the subjects own >> conscious emotions is suspect. >> >> In contrast Kym argues the emotional situation comes to be in the * >> *in-between** (entre-deux) and is not the result of the subject?s own >> projection. >> >> >> >> An inherent feature of institution of forms is there own overcoming. So >> emotional institution of new emotions are transformations forming new >> emotions in response to the older crystallized emotions. >> >> Therefore the development of one?s emotional life is not primarily the >> result of an autonomous subject?s reflections and constitutions. Emotional >> institution rather emerges out of the subterranean logic worked out in the >> repetition and reiteration of the tension experienced within **old** >> institutions. The back and forth to earlier forms and emerging >> forms..Emotional transformation comes largely from beyond the subject, the >> situation of the event facilitating the subject to develop her >> subjectiv/ITY rather than being the result of her own autonomous >> constituting powers. >> >> M-P speaks of a subject investing and animating subjectiv/ity with another >> meaning that transforms the subject and which is transcendent to this >> person?s current subjectivi/ity. (i.e. Succeeds in making a meaning which >> dwells in her **I Think** and in her body as a meaning dwells in a book >> and a meaning dwells in a cultural object. >> >> >> >> In the Institution Lectures M-P develops a language that better emphasizes >> and clarifies the **passivity** of the subject and the ways in which the >> meaning that the subject realizes always **exceeds** the embodied subject. >> >> M-P is contrasting the inseparability of the instituting and instituted >> subject and contrasts this subject with the constituting subject. M-P by >> the time of the institution lectures has developed a systematic language >> for making the distinction between constitution and institution. The >> institution of the subject is the **coming to be** of a new form of >> subjectivity in the way we can talk of new forms **coming to be** such >> as (new perception, new emotion, new aesthetic expression, new object) >> that are becoming crystallized. >> >> >> >> In M-P?s earlier work (the Phenomenology of Perception) he is still >> conceiving the two ways of understanding the **emergence of meaning** as >> constitution. Institution remains more an operative concept as institution >> has not yet acquired a central core univocal voice (not yet a thematic >> voice in terms of which other concepts are measured). With the benefit of >> the Institution Lectures in hand, Kym Maclaren is able to go back to the >> Phenomenology of Perception book to show the logic of institution at work >> in this earlier book. >> >> >> >> To repeat: The constituting subject is the subject of (and conceived by) >> intellectualism who constitutes objects. >> >> In the Phenomenology book M-P is arguing for a different kind of * >> *constitution** which in later works he refers to as **institution** >> because the sense of meaning achieved is not given by consciousness. The >> meaning **comes to be** in the embodied exchange between a >> self-in-the-making & an object-in-the-making. The coming-to-be of the >> subject is inseparable from the coming-to-be of the object. >> >> >> >> We are moving away from a focus on consciousness as primary or of the >> objective world as primary to a focus on the **in-between** (the >> entre-deux) as primary. >> >> >> >> Not a subject but **events** endow experience with durable dimensions in >> relation to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense. >> >> >> >> To repeat institution is: >> >> This endowment of a meaningful dimension that provides a framework for >> further sense-making and this allows new perceptual objects to emerge **within >> experience** is what in M-P?s later works he come to call **institution** >> >> >> >> The logic of institution is subterranean as events do this work of >> instituting meanings unforseen (repeat unforseen) by the subject involved >> because this logic operates outside the knowledge and intentions of that >> subject. >> >> When institution occurs ? when a new dimension of meaning that sets the >> terms for future developments occurs ? we can see **retrospectively** how >> the past **anticipated** this development, how this development responded >> to the past and **answered a question** posed by this past. >> >> >> >> An interesting note is where M-P places **errors** and **failures**. In >> exchange for what we imagined life gives us something else that was >> secretly wanted. Such realization (or epiphany) comes about through errors >> and failures. By means of a kind of blind groping on the part of a living >> subject, the subject is diverted through various impasses arrived at >> through various investigations. And it is only retrospectively (once again) >> that these inquiries REVEAL their common **theme** >> >> >> >> Somehow, and this is the marvel of institution ? all these errors and >> failures open up a space for a new realization, a new meaning. Errors open >> up a new space for a new realization can be put another way: >> >> Caught up in old crystallized institutions, we respond to the problems >> that present themselves by **repeating** in varios ways, those old ways >> of making sense. These repetitions disclose their own inadequacies, thereby >> opening up a space where something else, something new, something >> unknowingly awaited can announce itself. >> >> >> >> The event is that moment in which the openess that constitutes seeking >> without ever really knowing what the question is, something contingent >> arises as an occurence or an event ushering in a new way of life, a new way >> of seeing, a new configuration of meaning, a new institution. >> >> >> >> Thus, any particular institution tends or inclines (with the help of >> contingent happenings) towards the institutions own overcoming. Though an >> expression of the past, institution is inherently anticipating the future, >> which cannot be grasped except retrospectively. >> >> >> >> I will STOP here. Kym in her paper turns to concrete examples of human >> experiences to elaborate the notion of institution within artistic >> expression and perception. This in preparation for an understanding of >> emotion that follows this same logic of institution. >> >> I will just add that a logic of Eros can be explored through a logic of >> institution. >> >> To explore the somethings we love that becomes instituted in our deepest >> meanings. >> >> >> >> This proceeding extended think aloud also can be intertwined with Dewey?s >> (having an experience). What I have left unsaid is the relation of >> institution to perezhivanie. M-P may have something to contribute to that >> notion that is now coming into form >> >> To be continued .... >> >> The question of constitution versus institution is a topic for conversation >> >> >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> >> >> *From: *mike cole >> *Sent: *August 24, 2016 5:29 PM >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >> >> >> >> What is MP's idea of institution versus constitution, Larry? >> >> Mike >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> >> From: >> >> Date: Wednesday, 24 August 2016 >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >> >> To: eXtended Activity >> >> >> >> >> >> This is an extension to the engagement with Rein Raud and the mention of >> >> various ways to approach identity, subjectivity, selfhood, and personhood. >> >> >From that conversation, one of the sources to consider (but not the >> >> preferred choice) was Vincent Colapietro?s book *Peirce?s Theory of the >> >> self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity* >> >> >> >> Vincent Colapietro draws attention to the *ambiguity* and tension in >> >> Peirce?s desire to be BOTH scientific and systematic. Dispositions that are >> >> out of step with many current ways of philosophizing. >> >> >> >> Peirce in correspondence with James confessed: >> >> Pluralism does not satisfy either my head or my heart. >> >> Yet in another letter to James he acknowledged his debt to Schelling >> noting: >> >> One thing I admire about him (Schelling) is his freedom from the trammels >> >> of system, and his holding himself UNCOMMITTED to any previous utterance. >> >> In that, he is like a scientific man. >> >> >> >> Vincent notices it is all too easy for those who have studied intensively >> >> the writings of Peirce to get so caught up in his *system* that they come >> >> to see it as a PLACE TO DWELL rather than a point from which to proceed. >> >> >> >> I share this as an expression (a creative expression) of the way the places >> >> where we dwell *institute* us. These ambiguous places from which we move >> >> back and forth (repetition) in order to DEVELOP our self, subjectivity, >> >> identity, personhood. >> >> This circles back to perizhevanie, ity, and I will add Merleau Ponty?s >> >> notion of *institution* (in contrast to constituting). >> >> The relation of subjectivity and objectivity and the (in between) >> >> >> >> This is the limit for a single post. I send this in anticipation of the >> >> next theme emerging - perezhivanie >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object >> >> that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with >> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> >> > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 1 19:51:37 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 19:51:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Parts and wholes Message-ID: >From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between Marco Polo and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting and instituting? mike Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai Khan asks. "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," Marco answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: "Why do you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Sep 1 20:59:23 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 13:59:23 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It's a beautiful structuralist parable, and the Westerner has the last word, of course. But Kublai's question really isn't so stupid from an engineering point of view. During the Sui dynasty, that is, about five hundred years before Kublai Khan, the Chinese engineer Li Chun wondered how many stones you could take away from an arched bridge before it would fall. His reasoning was that the more stones you could take away, the less risk there would be of floods washing away the bridge. The result was the Zhaozhou Bridge (also called the bridge at Anji) which as far as we know what the first open spandrel bridge built anywhere--it is still standing, and still in use, after 1400 years. Yet perhaps both parables are beside the constitutive/institutive point. It seems to me that one of the differences between building something out of semiotic material (that is, a constitution) or out of historico-cultural material (that is, an institution) and building something out of material material (e.g. an arched bridge, in the advanced Chinese version of which Kublai is speaking or in the crude Roman version that Marco so prides himself on) is that the former are self-renewing, generation after generation. That's why Gary Snyder writes: One afternoon the last week in April Showing Kai how to throw a hatchet One-half turn and it sticks in a stump. He recalls the hatchet-head Without a handle, in the shop And go gets it, and wants it for his own. A broken-off axe handle behind the door Is long enough for a hatchet, We cut it to length and take it With the hatchet head And working hatchet, to wood block. There I begin to shape the old handle With the hatchet, and the phrase First learned from Ezra Pound Rings in my ears! "When making an axe handle the pattern is not far off.? And I say this to Kai "Look: We'll shape the handle By checking the handle Of the axe we cut with-" And he sees. And I hear it again: It's in Lu Ji's Wen Fu, fourth century A.D. "Essay on Literature"-in the Preface: "In making the handle Of an axe By cutting wood with an axe The model is indeed near at hand." My teacher Shih-hsiang Chen Translated that and taught it years ago And I see: Pound was an axe, Chen was an axe, I am an axe And my son a handle, soon To be shaping again, model And tool, craft of culture, How we go on. David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: The evidence is that Marco Polo never went to China. I always wondered, when I was a kid, why he never mentioned a wall. On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > >From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between Marco > Polo > and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting and > instituting? > > mike > > > Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. > > "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai Khan > asks. > > "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," Marco > answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." > > Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: "Why do > you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." > > Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Sep 1 21:05:09 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 14:05:09 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: without people travelling across it, it is not a bridge. A ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/09/2016 12:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > >From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between Marco Polo > and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting and > instituting? > > mike > > > Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. > > "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai Khan > asks. > > "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," Marco > answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." > > Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: "Why do > you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." > > Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." > > > From smago@uga.edu Thu Sep 1 21:33:54 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 04:33:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Actually some bridges are constructed over highways specifically to enable herds of animals to migrate. That's a bridge to me. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Friday, September 02, 2016 12:05 AM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes without people travelling across it, it is not a bridge. A ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/09/2016 12:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > >From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between > >Marco Polo > and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting > and instituting? > > mike > > > Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. > > "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai > Khan asks. > > "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," > Marco answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." > > Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: > "Why do you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." > > Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." > > > From schuckcschuck@gmail.com Thu Sep 1 21:40:47 2016 From: schuckcschuck@gmail.com (Christopher Schuck) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 00:40:47 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System In-Reply-To: <69ac668c-d8b7-183d-1de1-3bac09f3d4ca@mira.net> References: <57bddcb8.874a620a.6504e.e09e@mx.google.com> <57bf5fd2.0757420a.75dc3.f5c9@mx.google.com> <57c06939.4e16620a.55377.c832@mx.google.com> <69ac668c-d8b7-183d-1de1-3bac09f3d4ca@mira.net> Message-ID: Perhaps three additional ways (or small pieces of the puzzle) for interpreting the distinctions between these two concepts as discussed in the last two posts: 1) With "institute," the introduction of something *new* (or transformation of something such that something new is brought into the world) seems like an essential part of what has solidified or formalized its relationship to the whole. So the emphasis would not be on the part-whole relationship so much as the element of introduction, its being *new* and qualitatively different than before. As Oxford put it, to "start" or initiate something. 2) "Constitute," despite having possible social or procedural applications, sounds ultimately more metaphysical ("make (by combining elements) or to make some existing thing what it is..."), whereas "institute" seems more expressly connected to a social practice, in formally connecting something with a larger project or teleological kind of activity. This would speak to the "official" aspect Andy mentioned. 3) Although this is probably not faithful to the etymology, I can't help but think of an ongoing self-regulating or self-maintaining process, whereby something once instituted has been *activated *such that it continues to maintain and perpetuate itself. So it is not only new, but living and active in some way. Just brainstorming here. Chris On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mike, I have not followed this thread or focussed on your earlier posts on > this topic, but I do use both these words, so I guess this is an opportune > moment to see if I know what I'm talking about. > > Constitution > According to the 20 volume Oxford English Dictionary, the verb 'to > constitute' comes first, dating from 1477. > Constitute: Originally to set in a specified place or situation or > appoint, then to set in an office or position of authority but in more > recent times (e.g. Grottius) to found or establish, give legal or official > shape to, to frame, make (by combining elements) or to make some existing > thing what it is, and then to make up, compose etc. So it seems to have > begun much like 'institute'. > > When I use it I think I mean that specific elements or relations which > independently come to exist and voila! we have this new thing which is > constituted by this conjuncture. Maybe the thing already existed, but you > have analytically pulled them apart to find what was essential to the > thing. So it's about the relation of a complex thing to its "constituent" > parts. But it's nothing particular to do with a wider situation. > > Institution > Again, the verb 'to institute' came first, in 1475. > Institute: To set up, establish, found, ordain; to introduce, bring into > use or practice. To set in operation, set on foot, initiate, ?start? (a > search, inquiry, comparison, etc.). > > As you suggest, Mike, "institute" has this connotation of "launching" > something, so to me it's more a relation of a thing to the larger whole. So > something may exist, but as you say it is just "in the flow" of things, but > then it is "instituted" so it becomes something solid, part of the whole. > It remains what it is, but it is now official, so to speak. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 2/09/2016 10:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> That is a very difficult meshwork of ideas to think about, Larry. In so >> far >> as I follow the bidirectional path you are on, the overall idea seems >> plausible enough. Its parsing the parts that is bothering me. In >> particular, i am trying to parse the use of constitution and institution >> in >> the system of human experience you describe. >> >> Institution is at the crystalized end of bits of structure in the flow of >> experience. It would seem reasonable to think about constitution as its >> heglian other, the fluid, "becoming" part. >> >> It seems, however, that constitution gets a bad rap in the conversation >> because it is linked to agency and agency to individual agency. Is that >> the >> rap on M-P's uses of the term? There were some 260+ uses of the term in >> Phenomenology of Perception, and I am reading it in English, so the task >> of >> disambiguating is a tad beyond my reach. >> >> Constitution also has an interesting linkage to events. If you go to a >> central square of Athens you discover that it is called Syntagma Square. >> Constitution Square. But syntagma is also the root of the word syntagmatic >> which contrasts with paradigmatic in descriptions of language. As the >> google dictionary puts it, syntagmatic means "the relationship between two >> or more linguistic units used sequentially to make well-formed >> structures." >> Which leads people like Catherine Nelson to talk about "event schemas" >> which in turn she relates to acquistion of culture. >> >> Anyway, I am still finding the distinction of constitution and institution >> difficult to work with. I lean strongly to the both/and line of reasoning >> in such matters, but one still has to be able to specify various objects >> that can be both/and! >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 9:07 AM, wrote: >> >> Mike, Alfredo, >>> >>> >>> >>> I also am dipping my toe into this topic or theme so will explore with >>> you >>> what this means and where this meaning leads us as we walk along the path >>> that Kym Maclaren opens before us. >>> >>> >>> >>> Vygotsky said, the word is the direct manifestation of the historical >>> nature of consciousness. >>> >>> What if Vygotsky had said, >>> >>> Human consciousness is the direct manifestation of the historical nature >>> of the word. >>> >>> There seems to be 3 parts or elements here in the way or arrangement or >>> combination that are determining the actual existing order. >>> >>> 1) The word >>> >>> 2) Human consciousness' >>> >>> 3) The in-between >>> >>> We can post that human consciousness is the direct manifestation of the >>> nature of the word >>> >>> OR >>> >>> We can post that the word is the direct manifestation of the nature of >>> human consciousness >>> >>> OR >>> >>> We can post that both the word and human consciousness manifest (arise) >>> simultaneously within the **in-between** >>> >>> >>> >>> Each of these frameworks shifts what is primary and where we focus >>> attention. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The next question: thinking life defines **itself** through >>> consciousness. >>> >>> Is **thinking life** itself -life itself? >>> >>> >>> >>> OR is thinking life itself emerging from somewhere that is subterranean. >>> Life itself may **exceed** thinking life itself. >>> >>> The thinking life **defines** itself, gives definition to itself through >>> frameworks that are instituted ( a word used I think to go beyond >>> thinking >>> life defining **itself**). Events must also be considered and events >>> occur in happenings not of our own choosing. >>> >>> >>> >>> The actual existing order and the way in which anything is **made up** >>> determine the things nature and character. Merleau Ponty and Kym Maclaren >>> are inviting us to use the model of institution to become clearer on the >>> distinctions with other Models of **made up**. Now the tension between >>> **made >>> up** and **making up** (the coming to be and the overcoming of the limits >>> of the currently available **made up** are also central to Merleau >>> Ponty?s model. >>> >>> >>> >>> The actual existing order (of meaning) is in tension with meaning * >>> *potential** that is over the horizon but coming to be. It is only >>> retrospectively that we come to see the newly instituted order and we >>> arrive at this new order **through** the old order. >>> >>> This is a language of frame/works and trans/form/ation of meanings in >>> which we dwell. >>> >>> >>> >>> The emotional institutions that are being realized (coming to >>> consciousness) are becoming realized/instituted within a subterranean >>> process which come to fruition within events beyond the purview of the >>> **I >>> think**. To have this transformation come to consciousness occurs after >>> the happening of the event. >>> >>> However, the arising of the new institution arises **through** the older >>> crystallized institution that is overcome. >>> >>> >>> >>> The dialectic that these emotional institutions **undergo** is driven not >>> by self-reflection (which is retrospective) but by events (contingency, >>> back and forth repetion, the living indeterminate ambiguous relations of >>> being in the world with actual others within the older frame/work of >>> habituated meaning AND this **movement** occurs in a subterranean way >>> (beyond) I think -itself. This movement beyond the I think -itself is a >>> back and forth movement of regression to older frameworks and >>> anticipation >>> of newer frameworks which arise/arrive when events happen that >>> crystallize >>> a new emotional institution on it's way to becoming overcome. >>> >>> >>> >>> Mike, Alfredo, >>> >>> Within M-P?s model meaning **cores** and meaning **potential** shift >>> within **events**. >>> >>> Meaning is also central to perezhivanie and therefore the paths of >>> institution and perezhivanie may possibly interweave as occurring in the >>> realm of the **in-between** where both objectiv/ity and subjectiv/ity >>> arise simultaneously. >>> >>> >>> >>> Through dialogue both the meaning of institution and perezhivanie ( >>> meanings which we come to inhabit) may become clearer >>> >>> Possibly? >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> >>> >>> *From: *mike cole >>> *Sent: *August 25, 2016 4:38 PM >>> *To: *Larry Purss >>> *Cc: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> *Subject: *Re: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >>> >>> >>> >>> Thanks very much for that extended discussion of constitution and >>> institution, Larry. Unfortunately, I am not as versed as you or Alfredo >>> in >>> phenomenology so I can only keep asking my xmca101-style questions. >>> >>> >>> >>> I have the *Phenomenology of Perception*, but not those lectures you >>> refer to which I gather are titled *Institution and Passivity. *I also >>> downloaded the Maclaren article which I have read through, but remain >>> stuck >>> back near the starting gate. >>> >>> >>> >>> I can see several ideas that I recognize and perhaps appreciate to a >>> small >>> extent. The idea of entre-deux is strongly reminiscent of Vygotsky's >>> comment at the end of the *Thinking and Speech:* >>> >>> >>> >>> ?In consciousness, the word is what *?? *in Feuerbach?s words *?? *is >>> absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is >>> the >>> most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human >>> consciousness? >>> (Coll. Works, Vol. 1, p. 285). >>> >>> >>> >>> I still have not put my mind around connecting this thought with the >>> thought quoted by Alfredo: >>> >>> >>> >>> "Consciousness arises out of life and forms only one of its features. But >>> once awakened, thought itself defines life. Or more accurately, a >>> thinking >>> life defines itself through consciousness" (Vygotsky, 1993, p. 237). >>> >>> >>> >>> In trying to understand your, M-P's, and Maclearen's ideas I struggle >>> with >>> the definition (theory) of constitution which it seems I have to >>> understand >>> well in order to understand how the term institution is being used. >>> >>> >>> >>> You and Maclearen spend more time talking about institution and I am >>> getting hung up on what is mean there. I gather what is being critiqued >>> is >>> a notion of constitution that has an individual agent making something >>> up. >>> This is what I take away from >>> >>> >>> >>> A focus for M-P in all his work is a critique of the philosophy of >>> consciousness with it's central theme of a constituting subject and the >>> language of constitution to express **coming to be**. In his earlier work >>> he is still using the same term **constituting** to express these two >>> distinct meanings. The intellectualist notion of coming to be AND also >>> using **constitution** when speaking of a new way of coming to perceive >>> a perceptual object. >>> >>> >>> >>> My own history of experience of the word constitution does not have the >>> strong "intellectualist bias" of assuming a constituting subject. Rather, >>> it seems closer to this definition cadged from the OED: >>> >>> >>> The way in which anything is constituted or made up; the arrangement or >>> combination of its parts or elements, as determining its nature and >>> character; make, frame, composition. *constitution of nature*, >>> *constitution >>> of the world*, *constitution of the universe*, *constitution of things* >>> (the >>> actual existing order); so *constitution of society*, etc. >>> >>> In this sort of definition, there is no claim about a constituting >>> subject. Rather, it seems compatible, at least, with Maclearen's account >>> when she writes: >>> >>> >>> >>> This account of emotion proposes itself as a refutation of a philosophy >>> of >>> consciousness and the idea of a constituting subject. *For the emotional >>> institutions that are realized in our lives constitute us as much as or >>> more than we constitute them;* >>> >>> >>> >>> I have not been able to figure out what it means when Maclearen writes >>> that *the dialectic that these institutions undergo *is a process driven >>> not by self-reflection and the subject?s unilateral constitution of >>> meaning, but by contingency, repetition, and the indeterminate but >>> fundamental question that our being in the world with others both poses >>> and >>> secretly, implicitly, ambiguously strives to work out. >>> >>> >>> >>> I'll try to resolve these questions so that I can link up more >>> effectively >>> with a lot in your message and the discussion of the centrality of events >>> along with Alfredo's invocation of >>> >>> Politzer that I have long thought important. Any help you can offer with >>> respect to constituting gratefully accepted. >>> >>> >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 2:14 PM, wrote: >>> >>> Mike, >>> >>> The question: >>> >>> What is Merleau-Panty's notion of institution versus constitution? >>> >>> My answer will go through Kym Maclaren and how she developed an answer to >>> this question. >>> >>> Kym Maclaren wrote a paper *The Entre-Deux of Emotions: Emotions As >>> Institutions (available at academia.edu) that explores the way M-P in >>> his >>> book (The Phenomenology of Perception) used the term **constitution** to >>> mean two different things ( two different meanings or relational >>> notions). >>> As his philosophy developed he came to distinguish the meaning of * >>> *constitution** from the meaning of **institution**. He elaborated this >>> distinction in his lecture course on **institution**. (referred to as the >>> **Institution Lectures**. >>> >>> Kym takes the meaning of institution developed in these lectures and >>> turns >>> back to the Phenomenology to show how M-P was at this earlier period >>> using >>> the same term **constitution** with two distinct meanings. He had not >>> yet found the vocabulary to make a clear distinction between constitution >>> and institution. >>> >>> I believe this distinction may be relevant in the coming conversation on >>> the meaning of perezhevanie. >>> >>> >>> >>> Kym and M-P are moving away from a focus on either consciousness as >>> primary or of the objective world as primary to refocus on the * >>> *entre-deux** (the in-between) as primary. This shift of focus where NOT >>> a subject, but events, endow experience with **durable** or * >>> *crystallized** or **instituted** forms of meaning in relation to which >>> (as themes) a whole series of other experiences will make sense (will >>> form >>> a thinkable sequel (a history). >>> >>> This institution is the creative endowment of meaningful dimensions that >>> provide frameworks for further sense-making and this movement allows new >>> perceptual objects to emerge/arise within experience. It is this creative >>> movement M-P comes to call institution in his later Institution Lectures. >>> >>> >>> >>> The question then becomes: >>> >>> >>> >>> How do events do this work of instituting? Kym says M-P?s lectures on >>> institution explicitly and clearly express the subterranean logic of >>> institution at work in events. This logic is subterranean because it >>> operates outside the knowledge & intentions of the subject. >>> >>> >>> >>> When institution occurs -when a new dimension of meaning (that sets the >>> terms) for future development occurs ? we can then and only then see * >>> *retrospectively** how the past anticipated the future, anticipated this >>> development, and answered the question posed by the past. When the >>> question >>> is posed the answer?s meaning is only potential, in the realm of the >>> not-yet but could-be. >>> >>> What is central is that this perspective is **accessible** only from the >>> standpoint of the new institution. ? only retrospectively.. The past did >>> not contain it's own answer. The answer **exceeds** the past, transforms >>> the very terms with which the past functioned and this answer could never >>> have been predicted or forseen ? from THAT past. (even though it answers >>> to >>> THAT past). >>> >>> In other words, it is only retrospectively that it is even clear what we >>> were asking (what question was being posed). >>> >>> >>> >>> In exchange for what we had imagined, life gives us something else (that >>> M-P says was secretly wanted and subterranean). REALIZATION is not what >>> was >>> forseen, but all the same, was wanted or desired. >>> >>> >>> >>> THIS IS THE PLACE TO PAUSE AND STOP READING AS THE OPENING ANSWER TO >>> MIKE?S QUESTION. Institution goes through events, not subjects or >>> objects. >>> To read on is my attempt to summarize Kym?s way of developing the notion >>> of emotion as institution. I believe her approach has merit but I may be >>> saying more than was asked. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> In Kym?s paper she 1st turns to two other forms of institution (artistic >>> expression) and (perception) in order to show concretely how the logic >>> of >>> institution is distinct from the logic of constitution. I will not get to >>> these concrete examples but will introduce the topic. >>> >>> >>> >>> Kym shows how this logic is already at work in the Phenomenology as a >>> central theme. However, at this earlier point he referred to both logics >>> as >>> constituting logic. It is his quest to clarify these two distinct >>> meanings >>> of constitution that are worked out in the Institution lectures and >>> institution is given its own vocabulary as distinct from the vocabulary >>> of >>> constitution >>> >>> >>> >>> I will give an outline of the points Kym Maclaren develops in her >>> reflections on emotion as institution that critiques emotion as >>> constitution: >>> >>> The notion of institution is the way in which M-P seeks to criticize >>> intellectualism with it's idea of a constituting subject and offer an >>> alternative account of subjectiv/ity that may be a resource for >>> understanding perezhivanie and **ity**. >>> >>> Kym is asking us to think about emotion as institution. Emotional >>> transformation on this institutional account needs to be understood as >>> coming from **beyond** the subject, rather than being the result of the >>> subject?s own autonomous powers.. >>> >>> >>> >>> For the constituting subject the meaning of its object comes into being >>> on >>> the basis of the subject?s own powers. The object is only a reflection of >>> the powers and acts of that autonomous consciousness. >>> >>> >>> >>> In the place of this notion of a constituting subject M-P argues for a >>> conception of a subject who animates him/her self with another meaning >>> and >>> this other meaning coming into form as transcendent meaning transforms >>> the >>> person who comes to dwell within this meaning. >>> >>> To dwell within the person?s **I think** and in his/her body is analogous >>> to the way meaning dwells in a book or dwells in a cultural object. >>> >>> M-P is positing **meaningful cores** (themes?) that transcend and >>> transfigure the persons natural powers and becoming powers of >>> institution. >>> These meaningful cores outstrip or overflow or **exceed** the subject and >>> the subject is (caught up in) (dispossessed) or (exposed) by these >>> transcendent meanings (beyond the self itself) >>> >>> However what is central, is that as this is occurring, the person is also >>> taking up or resuming those transcendent meanings that help **realize** >>> new ways of making sense of the world and others. >>> >>> >>> >>> A focus for M-P in all his work is a crtique of the philosophy of >>> consciousness with it's central theme of a constituting subject and the >>> language of constitution to express **coming to be**. In his earlier work >>> he is still using the same term **constituting** to express these two >>> distinct meanings. The intellectualist notion of coming to be AND also >>> using **constitution** when speaking of a new way of coming to perceive >>> a perceptual object. >>> >>> In the Institutional Lectures M-P develops a new language to speak of the >>> coming to be of the institution of new meanings. >>> >>> Institutions occur within both public history & personal/intersubjective >>> history as two sides of the same coin. Kym stays within the >>> personal/intersubjective side in her paper and limits her reflections to >>> the personal/intersubjective. >>> >>> >>> >>> There is a similar logic of institution at work in aesthetic expression, >>> in perception, and in emotion as ways of creative expression. >>> >>> Institutions are those transformative moments in our lives when a new >>> configuration of meaning and a new form of agency is developing. M-P is >>> exploring the **subterranean** movement of this logic of institution. >>> >>> Key terms for M-P are **expression** and **perception** which involve not >>> the constitution of a meaning by a subject but rather the institution of >>> a * >>> *form** in the **in-between** of embodied being and environment. >>> >>> The institution of a form simultaneously transforms the situation and the >>> embodied being rather than the form being simply constituted by that >>> being. >>> >>> Kym Maclaren shows that the commonly held belief that an emotional >>> subject >>> is constituting others and situations in terms of the subjects own >>> conscious emotions is suspect. >>> >>> In contrast Kym argues the emotional situation comes to be in the * >>> *in-between** (entre-deux) and is not the result of the subject?s own >>> projection. >>> >>> >>> >>> An inherent feature of institution of forms is there own overcoming. So >>> emotional institution of new emotions are transformations forming new >>> emotions in response to the older crystallized emotions. >>> >>> Therefore the development of one?s emotional life is not primarily the >>> result of an autonomous subject?s reflections and constitutions. >>> Emotional >>> institution rather emerges out of the subterranean logic worked out in >>> the >>> repetition and reiteration of the tension experienced within **old** >>> institutions. The back and forth to earlier forms and emerging >>> forms..Emotional transformation comes largely from beyond the subject, >>> the >>> situation of the event facilitating the subject to develop her >>> subjectiv/ITY rather than being the result of her own autonomous >>> constituting powers. >>> >>> M-P speaks of a subject investing and animating subjectiv/ity with >>> another >>> meaning that transforms the subject and which is transcendent to this >>> person?s current subjectivi/ity. (i.e. Succeeds in making a meaning >>> which >>> dwells in her **I Think** and in her body as a meaning dwells in a book >>> and a meaning dwells in a cultural object. >>> >>> >>> >>> In the Institution Lectures M-P develops a language that better >>> emphasizes >>> and clarifies the **passivity** of the subject and the ways in which the >>> meaning that the subject realizes always **exceeds** the embodied >>> subject. >>> >>> M-P is contrasting the inseparability of the instituting and instituted >>> subject and contrasts this subject with the constituting subject. M-P by >>> the time of the institution lectures has developed a systematic language >>> for making the distinction between constitution and institution. The >>> institution of the subject is the **coming to be** of a new form of >>> subjectivity in the way we can talk of new forms **coming to be** such >>> as (new perception, new emotion, new aesthetic expression, new object) >>> that are becoming crystallized. >>> >>> >>> >>> In M-P?s earlier work (the Phenomenology of Perception) he is still >>> conceiving the two ways of understanding the **emergence of meaning** as >>> constitution. Institution remains more an operative concept as >>> institution >>> has not yet acquired a central core univocal voice (not yet a thematic >>> voice in terms of which other concepts are measured). With the benefit >>> of >>> the Institution Lectures in hand, Kym Maclaren is able to go back to the >>> Phenomenology of Perception book to show the logic of institution at work >>> in this earlier book. >>> >>> >>> >>> To repeat: The constituting subject is the subject of (and conceived by) >>> intellectualism who constitutes objects. >>> >>> In the Phenomenology book M-P is arguing for a different kind of * >>> *constitution** which in later works he refers to as **institution** >>> because the sense of meaning achieved is not given by consciousness. The >>> meaning **comes to be** in the embodied exchange between a >>> self-in-the-making & an object-in-the-making. The coming-to-be of the >>> subject is inseparable from the coming-to-be of the object. >>> >>> >>> >>> We are moving away from a focus on consciousness as primary or of the >>> objective world as primary to a focus on the **in-between** (the >>> entre-deux) as primary. >>> >>> >>> >>> Not a subject but **events** endow experience with durable dimensions in >>> relation to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense. >>> >>> >>> >>> To repeat institution is: >>> >>> This endowment of a meaningful dimension that provides a framework for >>> further sense-making and this allows new perceptual objects to emerge >>> **within >>> experience** is what in M-P?s later works he come to call **institution** >>> >>> >>> >>> The logic of institution is subterranean as events do this work of >>> instituting meanings unforseen (repeat unforseen) by the subject >>> involved >>> because this logic operates outside the knowledge and intentions of that >>> subject. >>> >>> When institution occurs ? when a new dimension of meaning that sets the >>> terms for future developments occurs ? we can see **retrospectively** how >>> the past **anticipated** this development, how this development responded >>> to the past and **answered a question** posed by this past. >>> >>> >>> >>> An interesting note is where M-P places **errors** and **failures**. In >>> exchange for what we imagined life gives us something else that was >>> secretly wanted. Such realization (or epiphany) comes about through >>> errors >>> and failures. By means of a kind of blind groping on the part of a living >>> subject, the subject is diverted through various impasses arrived at >>> through various investigations. And it is only retrospectively (once >>> again) >>> that these inquiries REVEAL their common **theme** >>> >>> >>> >>> Somehow, and this is the marvel of institution ? all these errors and >>> failures open up a space for a new realization, a new meaning. Errors >>> open >>> up a new space for a new realization can be put another way: >>> >>> Caught up in old crystallized institutions, we respond to the problems >>> that present themselves by **repeating** in varios ways, those old ways >>> of making sense. These repetitions disclose their own inadequacies, >>> thereby >>> opening up a space where something else, something new, something >>> unknowingly awaited can announce itself. >>> >>> >>> >>> The event is that moment in which the openess that constitutes seeking >>> without ever really knowing what the question is, something contingent >>> arises as an occurence or an event ushering in a new way of life, a new >>> way >>> of seeing, a new configuration of meaning, a new institution. >>> >>> >>> >>> Thus, any particular institution tends or inclines (with the help of >>> contingent happenings) towards the institutions own overcoming. Though an >>> expression of the past, institution is inherently anticipating the >>> future, >>> which cannot be grasped except retrospectively. >>> >>> >>> >>> I will STOP here. Kym in her paper turns to concrete examples of human >>> experiences to elaborate the notion of institution within artistic >>> expression and perception. This in preparation for an understanding of >>> emotion that follows this same logic of institution. >>> >>> I will just add that a logic of Eros can be explored through a logic of >>> institution. >>> >>> To explore the somethings we love that becomes instituted in our deepest >>> meanings. >>> >>> >>> >>> This proceeding extended think aloud also can be intertwined with >>> Dewey?s >>> (having an experience). What I have left unsaid is the relation of >>> institution to perezhivanie. M-P may have something to contribute to that >>> notion that is now coming into form >>> >>> To be continued .... >>> >>> The question of constitution versus institution is a topic for >>> conversation >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> >>> >>> *From: *mike cole >>> *Sent: *August 24, 2016 5:29 PM >>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >>> >>> >>> >>> What is MP's idea of institution versus constitution, Larry? >>> >>> Mike >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> >>> From: >>> >>> Date: Wednesday, 24 August 2016 >>> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >>> >>> To: eXtended Activity >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> This is an extension to the engagement with Rein Raud and the mention of >>> >>> various ways to approach identity, subjectivity, selfhood, and >>> personhood. >>> >>> >From that conversation, one of the sources to consider (but not the >>> >>> preferred choice) was Vincent Colapietro?s book *Peirce?s Theory of the >>> >>> self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity* >>> >>> >>> >>> Vincent Colapietro draws attention to the *ambiguity* and tension in >>> >>> Peirce?s desire to be BOTH scientific and systematic. Dispositions that >>> are >>> >>> out of step with many current ways of philosophizing. >>> >>> >>> >>> Peirce in correspondence with James confessed: >>> >>> Pluralism does not satisfy either my head or my heart. >>> >>> Yet in another letter to James he acknowledged his debt to Schelling >>> noting: >>> >>> One thing I admire about him (Schelling) is his freedom from the trammels >>> >>> of system, and his holding himself UNCOMMITTED to any previous utterance. >>> >>> In that, he is like a scientific man. >>> >>> >>> >>> Vincent notices it is all too easy for those who have studied intensively >>> >>> the writings of Peirce to get so caught up in his *system* that they >>> come >>> >>> to see it as a PLACE TO DWELL rather than a point from which to proceed. >>> >>> >>> >>> I share this as an expression (a creative expression) of the way the >>> places >>> >>> where we dwell *institute* us. These ambiguous places from which we move >>> >>> back and forth (repetition) in order to DEVELOP our self, subjectivity, >>> >>> identity, personhood. >>> >>> This circles back to perizhevanie, ity, and I will add Merleau Ponty?s >>> >>> notion of *institution* (in contrast to constituting). >>> >>> The relation of subjectivity and objectivity and the (in between) >>> >>> >>> >>> This is the limit for a single post. I send this in anticipation of the >>> >>> next theme emerging - perezhivanie >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object >>> >>> that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with >>> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Sep 1 21:43:34 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 14:43:34 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: People, animals, it seems that when it is instituted as a bridge by perhaps having a road made up to it, it is only then constituted as a bridge. ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/09/2016 2:33 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Actually some bridges are constructed over highways specifically to enable herds of animals to migrate. That's a bridge to me. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Friday, September 02, 2016 12:05 AM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > without people travelling across it, it is not a bridge. > > A > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 2/09/2016 12:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between >>> Marco Polo >> and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting >> and instituting? >> >> mike >> >> >> Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. >> >> "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai >> Khan asks. >> >> "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," >> Marco answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." >> >> Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: >> "Why do you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." >> >> Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." >> >> >> From jkindred@cnr.edu Fri Sep 2 08:39:32 2016 From: jkindred@cnr.edu (Kindred, Jessica Dr.) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 15:39:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Read John Ciardi's whole poem Most Like an Arch This Marriage at Poetry Foundation's website. It is lovely. The line I always remember is, "Most like an arch--two weaknesses that lean into a strength." ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Thursday, September 1, 2016 10:51:37 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Parts and wholes >From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between Marco Polo and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting and instituting? mike Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai Khan asks. "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," Marco answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: "Why do you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Sep 2 11:26:45 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 18:26:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> Resonating with Chris' last post on institution and constitution, I was thinking that the part-whole relation being discussed has a temporal aspect to it that may relate to the distinctions that occupy us here (and I am here going to play with words, not that I have a definite understanding of where the game will become). For in human experience, it seems that the whole always is primary over the part. Obviously, for there to be a part, there needs to be a whole of which the part is but a constitutive aspect. But is the part institutive of the whole? The part may be institutive only in its relation to other parts and in its forming (constituting) the whole. So the part, in and of itself, cannot institute any whole. Returning to the bridge example, it seems to me that, and as David has already said (thanks David for bringing up the wonderful story!), for Li Chun to have seen the possibility of getting along without some of the stones, he needs to have seen the arch as primary over the stones that form it. Comparing the two stories as they have been told here, Marco Polo's comprehension of the bridge as a whole may have been qualitatively different from that of Li Chun (though whether that was the case is not important now). No study of the composition of stones would have led to the discovery of the open-spandrel segmental arch bridge. Only the study of stone arches, which already presuppose the stones as constitutive parts, could have been institutive of the new form. Not long ago we were discussing the notion of context in xmca, and the metaphor of context as rope, as a folding (or unfolding) of multiple threads, was opposed to the static (atemporal, abstract) notion of context as container where there is a part that is inside of the whole. The possibility of the open-spandred (my brief look at Wikipedia tells me that is the right name, but I may be wrong) was there from immemorial time, before anyone had stepped on the bridge (no animals, no humans). To discover it, however, was only possible by something like human consciousness. Following on the distinctions mentioned above between part and whole, where the functioning whole owes its institution to relations between aspects, and not to aspects in themselves, we may consider Bateson's argument that the mental has to do with difference, and not with sameness, with seeing things in their relations (wholes) and never first as things-in-themselves (parts). I am not sure then whether a right way to talk about instituting and constituting has to do with the primacy of the former over the latter in thought. Whatever the case, it is clear that the distinction matters to thought and thought alone, because if the existence of the bridge was physically possible from the beginning of the times, it became a fact of the times after Li Chun came to *imagine* it (I won't delve into imagination here). Of which whole is Li Chun a part? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 02 September 2016 06:43 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes People, animals, it seems that when it is instituted as a bridge by perhaps having a road made up to it, it is only then constituted as a bridge. ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/09/2016 2:33 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Actually some bridges are constructed over highways specifically to enable herds of animals to migrate. That's a bridge to me. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Friday, September 02, 2016 12:05 AM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > without people travelling across it, it is not a bridge. > > A > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 2/09/2016 12:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between >>> Marco Polo >> and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting >> and instituting? >> >> mike >> >> >> Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. >> >> "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai >> Khan asks. >> >> "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," >> Marco answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." >> >> Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: >> "Why do you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." >> >> Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." >> >> >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Sep 2 15:19:30 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 15:19:30 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System In-Reply-To: References: <57bddcb8.874a620a.6504e.e09e@mx.google.com> <57bf5fd2.0757420a.75dc3.f5c9@mx.google.com> <57c06939.4e16620a.55377.c832@mx.google.com> <69ac668c-d8b7-183d-1de1-3bac09f3d4ca@mira.net> Message-ID: <57c9faf4.aa57420a.71ad7.a0e3@mx.google.com> Alfredo, Christopher, Andy, Chuck, I will start where Christopher paused and add in additional commentary in a way similar to Alfredo?s additions. My comments will be read within brackets as response: With the terms institute (verb) & institution something new or something already instituted (Merleau-Ponty in particular is focusing on something as transformation of *meaning*) seems like an essential part (aspect) of what has solidified (crystallized) or *formalized* it's relationship to the whole. (Peirce, with whom we opened this thread focused on (inclined towards or accented formalized systematized logic). Perizhivanie accents or inclines towards emotional ways personality comes into being. It was this focus on emotion as institution in particular that drew me into Kym?s article. As she makes clear there are both public and personal aspects of institution and her article is limited to this side of the public/personal notion of institution. Mike mentions M-P uses the term *constitution* over 200 times in the Phenomenology of Perception. Kym?s article is drawing out that he was using the same word *constitution* to mean both *constitution* and *institution* and it was only in his later works he came to make a clear distinction in his *Institution & Passivity* lecture course. Kym is using the resources of this later work to go back and re-read *The Phenomenology of Perception* with this new way of seeing the two distinct ways M-P had previously used the one word *constitution*. In Kym?s own words: ? My aim in this essay is, drawing upon Merleau-Panty's mid-career writings, including the lectures on institution, to bring out the full force of the aphenomenology?s claim that passionate feelings and behaviors ? what I will call emotions ? are institutions.? Kym is using what she refers to as the *new organs of perception* (given the new resources of the Institution lectures to go back and re-read through M-P?s earlier works to better understand emotion as institution. There are personal, intersubjective, and public history forms of institution which M-P emphasizes cannot be separated. However, for the purposes of Kym?s more limited project of this essay the focus or weight is on the personal side. That is to say in her words, ?transformational moments within our personal and intersubjective lives where a new configuration of meaning and a new form of agency is inaugurated ? and on what M-P calls the *subterranean logic* of this development. The term (subterranean) implies that these transformational meanings and agentic shifts come from *beyond* the subject and are not the result of the subject?s own *constitutive powers*. My reading of the meaning of constitution is that it was doing double duty and M-P is gesturing to this subterranean process (a back and forth bi-directional movement of regression and anticipation) that requires something else termed an *event* that occurs beyond or in excess of the constituting subject. This excess is an *undergoing* event of happening that transforms *meaning* that does not yet exist but is coming into existence. Kym says many M-P scholars see a *break* in M-P?s earlier works focusing on the theme of the logic of *experience* and later works inclining towards the logic of *institution*. Kym rejects this understanding, seeing a continuity between *experience* and *institution* and that experience remains central in M-P?s later works. M-P?s central accounts of the experience of learning, creative expression, the acquisition of habit, the coming to be of color perception, and geometrical insights are explored in *The Phenomenology*. Kym is showing us the same logic of experience in these earlier accounts can be understood as putting together the same logic of institution elaborated in his later lectures. Here are some terms M-P uses in his earlier work inclining towards the meaning of *institution* but not yet explicitly: *establishment *foundation *everlasting acquisition And Husserl?s favourite word *Stiftung* In summary, M-P is focusing as Mike says on a bi-directional movement of regression to already instituted forms of meaning and anticipation of overcoming these anticipated forms by travelling THROUGH these received forms but sensing their limits. A key term for M-P is *excess* meaning that overflows (or permeates) received forms but must journey or travel through the received forms. Active consciousness is not enough, *events* that are unforseeable also happen leading to transformations of meaning (growing new sense organs). I am fascinated with Peirce and his displeasure with plural systems yet who admired Schelling who could start anew in the true spirit of science. Last comment: Kym 1st elaborates the institution of (artistic expression) then elaborates the institution of (perception) in preparing an understanding of *institution* With this understanding in place she turns toward *emotion* as institution. All this is preamble in anticipation of exploring perezhivanie in the upcoming journal as an extended and expanded focus on emotion and meaning potential. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Christopher Schuck Sent: September 1, 2016 9:42 PM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System Perhaps three additional ways (or small pieces of the puzzle) for interpreting the distinctions between these two concepts as discussed in the last two posts: 1) With "institute," the introduction of something *new* (or transformation of something such that something new is brought into the world) seems like an essential part of what has solidified or formalized its relationship to the whole. So the emphasis would not be on the part-whole relationship so much as the element of introduction, its being *new* and qualitatively different than before. As Oxford put it, to "start" or initiate something. 2) "Constitute," despite having possible social or procedural applications, sounds ultimately more metaphysical ("make (by combining elements) or to make some existing thing what it is..."), whereas "institute" seems more expressly connected to a social practice, in formally connecting something with a larger project or teleological kind of activity. This would speak to the "official" aspect Andy mentioned. 3) Although this is probably not faithful to the etymology, I can't help but think of an ongoing self-regulating or self-maintaining process, whereby something once instituted has been *activated *such that it continues to maintain and perpetuate itself. So it is not only new, but living and active in some way. Just brainstorming here. Chris On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mike, I have not followed this thread or focussed on your earlier posts on > this topic, but I do use both these words, so I guess this is an opportune > moment to see if I know what I'm talking about. > > Constitution > According to the 20 volume Oxford English Dictionary, the verb 'to > constitute' comes first, dating from 1477. > Constitute: Originally to set in a specified place or situation or > appoint, then to set in an office or position of authority but in more > recent times (e.g. Grottius) to found or establish, give legal or official > shape to, to frame, make (by combining elements) or to make some existing > thing what it is, and then to make up, compose etc. So it seems to have > begun much like 'institute'. > > When I use it I think I mean that specific elements or relations which > independently come to exist and voila! we have this new thing which is > constituted by this conjuncture. Maybe the thing already existed, but you > have analytically pulled them apart to find what was essential to the > thing. So it's about the relation of a complex thing to its "constituent" > parts. But it's nothing particular to do with a wider situation. > > Institution > Again, the verb 'to institute' came first, in 1475. > Institute: To set up, establish, found, ordain; to introduce, bring into > use or practice. To set in operation, set on foot, initiate, ?start? (a > search, inquiry, comparison, etc.). > > As you suggest, Mike, "institute" has this connotation of "launching" > something, so to me it's more a relation of a thing to the larger whole. So > something may exist, but as you say it is just "in the flow" of things, but > then it is "instituted" so it becomes something solid, part of the whole. > It remains what it is, but it is now official, so to speak. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 2/09/2016 10:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> That is a very difficult meshwork of ideas to think about, Larry. In so >> far >> as I follow the bidirectional path you are on, the overall idea seems >> plausible enough. Its parsing the parts that is bothering me. In >> particular, i am trying to parse the use of constitution and institution >> in >> the system of human experience you describe. >> >> Institution is at the crystalized end of bits of structure in the flow of >> experience. It would seem reasonable to think about constitution as its >> heglian other, the fluid, "becoming" part. >> >> It seems, however, that constitution gets a bad rap in the conversation >> because it is linked to agency and agency to individual agency. Is that >> the >> rap on M-P's uses of the term? There were some 260+ uses of the term in >> Phenomenology of Perception, and I am reading it in English, so the task >> of >> disambiguating is a tad beyond my reach. >> >> Constitution also has an interesting linkage to events. If you go to a >> central square of Athens you discover that it is called Syntagma Square. >> Constitution Square. But syntagma is also the root of the word syntagmatic >> which contrasts with paradigmatic in descriptions of language. As the >> google dictionary puts it, syntagmatic means "the relationship between two >> or more linguistic units used sequentially to make well-formed >> structures." >> Which leads people like Catherine Nelson to talk about "event schemas" >> which in turn she relates to acquistion of culture. >> >> Anyway, I am still finding the distinction of constitution and institution >> difficult to work with. I lean strongly to the both/and line of reasoning >> in such matters, but one still has to be able to specify various objects >> that can be both/and! >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 9:07 AM, wrote: >> >> Mike, Alfredo, >>> >>> >>> >>> I also am dipping my toe into this topic or theme so will explore with >>> you >>> what this means and where this meaning leads us as we walk along the path >>> that Kym Maclaren opens before us. >>> >>> >>> >>> Vygotsky said, the word is the direct manifestation of the historical >>> nature of consciousness. >>> >>> What if Vygotsky had said, >>> >>> Human consciousness is the direct manifestation of the historical nature >>> of the word. >>> >>> There seems to be 3 parts or elements here in the way or arrangement or >>> combination that are determining the actual existing order. >>> >>> 1) The word >>> >>> 2) Human consciousness' >>> >>> 3) The in-between >>> >>> We can post that human consciousness is the direct manifestation of the >>> nature of the word >>> >>> OR >>> >>> We can post that the word is the direct manifestation of the nature of >>> human consciousness >>> >>> OR >>> >>> We can post that both the word and human consciousness manifest (arise) >>> simultaneously within the **in-between** >>> >>> >>> >>> Each of these frameworks shifts what is primary and where we focus >>> attention. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The next question: thinking life defines **itself** through >>> consciousness. >>> >>> Is **thinking life** itself -life itself? >>> >>> >>> >>> OR is thinking life itself emerging from somewhere that is subterranean. >>> Life itself may **exceed** thinking life itself. >>> >>> The thinking life **defines** itself, gives definition to itself through >>> frameworks that are instituted ( a word used I think to go beyond >>> thinking >>> life defining **itself**). Events must also be considered and events >>> occur in happenings not of our own choosing. >>> >>> >>> >>> The actual existing order and the way in which anything is **made up** >>> determine the things nature and character. Merleau Ponty and Kym Maclaren >>> are inviting us to use the model of institution to become clearer on the >>> distinctions with other Models of **made up**. Now the tension between >>> **made >>> up** and **making up** (the coming to be and the overcoming of the limits >>> of the currently available **made up** are also central to Merleau >>> Ponty?s model. >>> >>> >>> >>> The actual existing order (of meaning) is in tension with meaning * >>> *potential** that is over the horizon but coming to be. It is only >>> retrospectively that we come to see the newly instituted order and we >>> arrive at this new order **through** the old order. >>> >>> This is a language of frame/works and trans/form/ation of meanings in >>> which we dwell. >>> >>> >>> >>> The emotional institutions that are being realized (coming to >>> consciousness) are becoming realized/instituted within a subterranean >>> process which come to fruition within events beyond the purview of the >>> **I >>> think**. To have this transformation come to consciousness occurs after >>> the happening of the event. >>> >>> However, the arising of the new institution arises **through** the older >>> crystallized institution that is overcome. >>> >>> >>> >>> The dialectic that these emotional institutions **undergo** is driven not >>> by self-reflection (which is retrospective) but by events (contingency, >>> back and forth repetion, the living indeterminate ambiguous relations of >>> being in the world with actual others within the older frame/work of >>> habituated meaning AND this **movement** occurs in a subterranean way >>> (beyond) I think -itself. This movement beyond the I think -itself is a >>> back and forth movement of regression to older frameworks and >>> anticipation >>> of newer frameworks which arise/arrive when events happen that >>> crystallize >>> a new emotional institution on it's way to becoming overcome. >>> >>> >>> >>> Mike, Alfredo, >>> >>> Within M-P?s model meaning **cores** and meaning **potential** shift >>> within **events**. >>> >>> Meaning is also central to perezhivanie and therefore the paths of >>> institution and perezhivanie may possibly interweave as occurring in the >>> realm of the **in-between** where both objectiv/ity and subjectiv/ity >>> arise simultaneously. >>> >>> >>> >>> Through dialogue both the meaning of institution and perezhivanie ( >>> meanings which we come to inhabit) may become clearer >>> >>> Possibly? >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> >>> >>> *From: *mike cole >>> *Sent: *August 25, 2016 4:38 PM >>> *To: *Larry Purss >>> *Cc: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> *Subject: *Re: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >>> >>> >>> >>> Thanks very much for that extended discussion of constitution and >>> institution, Larry. Unfortunately, I am not as versed as you or Alfredo >>> in >>> phenomenology so I can only keep asking my xmca101-style questions. >>> >>> >>> >>> I have the *Phenomenology of Perception*, but not those lectures you >>> refer to which I gather are titled *Institution and Passivity. *I also >>> downloaded the Maclaren article which I have read through, but remain >>> stuck >>> back near the starting gate. >>> >>> >>> >>> I can see several ideas that I recognize and perhaps appreciate to a >>> small >>> extent. The idea of entre-deux is strongly reminiscent of Vygotsky's >>> comment at the end of the *Thinking and Speech:* >>> >>> >>> >>> ?In consciousness, the word is what *?? *in Feuerbach?s words *?? *is >>> absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is >>> the >>> most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human >>> consciousness? >>> (Coll. Works, Vol. 1, p. 285). >>> >>> >>> >>> I still have not put my mind around connecting this thought with the >>> thought quoted by Alfredo: >>> >>> >>> >>> "Consciousness arises out of life and forms only one of its features. But >>> once awakened, thought itself defines life. Or more accurately, a >>> thinking >>> life defines itself through consciousness" (Vygotsky, 1993, p. 237). >>> >>> >>> >>> In trying to understand your, M-P's, and Maclearen's ideas I struggle >>> with >>> the definition (theory) of constitution which it seems I have to >>> understand >>> well in order to understand how the term institution is being used. >>> >>> >>> >>> You and Maclearen spend more time talking about institution and I am >>> getting hung up on what is mean there. I gather what is being critiqued >>> is >>> a notion of constitution that has an individual agent making something >>> up. >>> This is what I take away from >>> >>> >>> >>> A focus for M-P in all his work is a critique of the philosophy of >>> consciousness with it's central theme of a constituting subject and the >>> language of constitution to express **coming to be**. In his earlier work >>> he is still using the same term **constituting** to express these two >>> distinct meanings. The intellectualist notion of coming to be AND also >>> using **constitution** when speaking of a new way of coming to perceive >>> a perceptual object. >>> >>> >>> >>> My own history of experience of the word constitution does not have the >>> strong "intellectualist bias" of assuming a constituting subject. Rather, >>> it seems closer to this definition cadged from the OED: >>> >>> >>> The way in which anything is constituted or made up; the arrangement or >>> combination of its parts or elements, as determining its nature and >>> character; make, frame, composition. *constitution of nature*, >>> *constitution >>> of the world*, *constitution of the universe*, *constitution of things* >>> (the >>> actual existing order); so *constitution of society*, etc. >>> >>> In this sort of definition, there is no claim about a constituting >>> subject. Rather, it seems compatible, at least, with Maclearen's account >>> when she writes: >>> >>> >>> >>> This account of emotion proposes itself as a refutation of a philosophy >>> of >>> consciousness and the idea of a constituting subject. *For the emotional >>> institutions that are realized in our lives constitute us as much as or >>> more than we constitute them;* >>> >>> >>> >>> I have not been able to figure out what it means when Maclearen writes >>> that *the dialectic that these institutions undergo *is a process driven >>> not by self-reflection and the subject?s unilateral constitution of >>> meaning, but by contingency, repetition, and the indeterminate but >>> fundamental question that our being in the world with others both poses >>> and >>> secretly, implicitly, ambiguously strives to work out. >>> >>> >>> >>> I'll try to resolve these questions so that I can link up more >>> effectively >>> with a lot in your message and the discussion of the centrality of events >>> along with Alfredo's invocation of >>> >>> Politzer that I have long thought important. Any help you can offer with >>> respect to constituting gratefully accepted. >>> >>> >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 2:14 PM, wrote: >>> >>> Mike, >>> >>> The question: >>> >>> What is Merleau-Panty's notion of institution versus constitution? >>> >>> My answer will go through Kym Maclaren and how she developed an answer to >>> this question. >>> >>> Kym Maclaren wrote a paper *The Entre-Deux of Emotions: Emotions As >>> Institutions (available at academia.edu) that explores the way M-P in >>> his >>> book (The Phenomenology of Perception) used the term **constitution** to >>> mean two different things ( two different meanings or relational >>> notions). >>> As his philosophy developed he came to distinguish the meaning of * >>> *constitution** from the meaning of **institution**. He elaborated this >>> distinction in his lecture course on **institution**. (referred to as the >>> **Institution Lectures**. >>> >>> Kym takes the meaning of institution developed in these lectures and >>> turns >>> back to the Phenomenology to show how M-P was at this earlier period >>> using >>> the same term **constitution** with two distinct meanings. He had not >>> yet found the vocabulary to make a clear distinction between constitution >>> and institution. >>> >>> I believe this distinction may be relevant in the coming conversation on >>> the meaning of perezhevanie. >>> >>> >>> >>> Kym and M-P are moving away from a focus on either consciousness as >>> primary or of the objective world as primary to refocus on the * >>> *entre-deux** (the in-between) as primary. This shift of focus where NOT >>> a subject, but events, endow experience with **durable** or * >>> *crystallized** or **instituted** forms of meaning in relation to which >>> (as themes) a whole series of other experiences will make sense (will >>> form >>> a thinkable sequel (a history). >>> >>> This institution is the creative endowment of meaningful dimensions that >>> provide frameworks for further sense-making and this movement allows new >>> perceptual objects to emerge/arise within experience. It is this creative >>> movement M-P comes to call institution in his later Institution Lectures. >>> >>> >>> >>> The question then becomes: >>> >>> >>> >>> How do events do this work of instituting? Kym says M-P?s lectures on >>> institution explicitly and clearly express the subterranean logic of >>> institution at work in events. This logic is subterranean because it >>> operates outside the knowledge & intentions of the subject. >>> >>> >>> >>> When institution occurs -when a new dimension of meaning (that sets the >>> terms) for future development occurs ? we can then and only then see * >>> *retrospectively** how the past anticipated the future, anticipated this >>> development, and answered the question posed by the past. When the >>> question >>> is posed the answer?s meaning is only potential, in the realm of the >>> not-yet but could-be. >>> >>> What is central is that this perspective is **accessible** only from the >>> standpoint of the new institution. ? only retrospectively.. The past did >>> not contain it's own answer. The answer **exceeds** the past, transforms >>> the very terms with which the past functioned and this answer could never >>> have been predicted or forseen ? from THAT past. (even though it answers >>> to >>> THAT past). >>> >>> In other words, it is only retrospectively that it is even clear what we >>> were asking (what question was being posed). >>> >>> >>> >>> In exchange for what we had imagined, life gives us something else (that >>> M-P says was secretly wanted and subterranean). REALIZATION is not what >>> was >>> forseen, but all the same, was wanted or desired. >>> >>> >>> >>> THIS IS THE PLACE TO PAUSE AND STOP READING AS THE OPENING ANSWER TO >>> MIKE?S QUESTION. Institution goes through events, not subjects or >>> objects. >>> To read on is my attempt to summarize Kym?s way of developing the notion >>> of emotion as institution. I believe her approach has merit but I may be >>> saying more than was asked. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> In Kym?s paper she 1st turns to two other forms of institution (artistic >>> expression) and (perception) in order to show concretely how the logic >>> of >>> institution is distinct from the logic of constitution. I will not get to >>> these concrete examples but will introduce the topic. >>> >>> >>> >>> Kym shows how this logic is already at work in the Phenomenology as a >>> central theme. However, at this earlier point he referred to both logics >>> as >>> constituting logic. It is his quest to clarify these two distinct >>> meanings >>> of constitution that are worked out in the Institution lectures and >>> institution is given its own vocabulary as distinct from the vocabulary >>> of >>> constitution >>> >>> >>> >>> I will give an outline of the points Kym Maclaren develops in her >>> reflections on emotion as institution that critiques emotion as >>> constitution: >>> >>> The notion of institution is the way in which M-P seeks to criticize >>> intellectualism with it's idea of a constituting subject and offer an >>> alternative account of subjectiv/ity that may be a resource for >>> understanding perezhivanie and **ity**. >>> >>> Kym is asking us to think about emotion as institution. Emotional >>> transformation on this institutional account needs to be understood as >>> coming from **beyond** the subject, rather than being the result of the >>> subject?s own autonomous powers.. >>> >>> >>> >>> For the constituting subject the meaning of its object comes into being >>> on >>> the basis of the subject?s own powers. The object is only a reflection of >>> the powers and acts of that autonomous consciousness. >>> >>> >>> >>> In the place of this notion of a constituting subject M-P argues for a >>> conception of a subject who animates him/her self with another meaning >>> and >>> this other meaning coming into form as transcendent meaning transforms >>> the >>> person who comes to dwell within this meaning. >>> >>> To dwell within the person?s **I think** and in his/her body is analogous >>> to the way meaning dwells in a book or dwells in a cultural object. >>> >>> M-P is positing **meaningful cores** (themes?) that transcend and >>> transfigure the persons natural powers and becoming powers of >>> institution. >>> These meaningful cores outstrip or overflow or **exceed** the subject and >>> the subject is (caught up in) (dispossessed) or (exposed) by these >>> transcendent meanings (beyond the self itself) >>> >>> However what is central, is that as this is occurring, the person is also >>> taking up or resuming those transcendent meanings that help **realize** >>> new ways of making sense of the world and others. >>> >>> >>> >>> A focus for M-P in all his work is a crtique of the philosophy of >>> consciousness with it's central theme of a constituting subject and the >>> language of constitution to express **coming to be**. In his earlier work >>> he is still using the same term **constituting** to express these two >>> distinct meanings. The intellectualist notion of coming to be AND also >>> using **constitution** when speaking of a new way of coming to perceive >>> a perceptual object. >>> >>> In the Institutional Lectures M-P develops a new language to speak of the >>> coming to be of the institution of new meanings. >>> >>> Institutions occur within both public history & personal/intersubjective >>> history as two sides of the same coin. Kym stays within the >>> personal/intersubjective side in her paper and limits her reflections to >>> the personal/intersubjective. >>> >>> >>> >>> There is a similar logic of institution at work in aesthetic expression, >>> in perception, and in emotion as ways of creative expression. >>> >>> Institutions are those transformative moments in our lives when a new >>> configuration of meaning and a new form of agency is developing. M-P is >>> exploring the **subterranean** movement of this logic of institution. >>> >>> Key terms for M-P are **expression** and **perception** which involve not >>> the constitution of a meaning by a subject but rather the institution of >>> a * >>> *form** in the **in-between** of embodied being and environment. >>> >>> The institution of a form simultaneously transforms the situation and the >>> embodied being rather than the form being simply constituted by that >>> being. >>> >>> Kym Maclaren shows that the commonly held belief that an emotional >>> subject >>> is constituting others and situations in terms of the subjects own >>> conscious emotions is suspect. >>> >>> In contrast Kym argues the emotional situation comes to be in the * >>> *in-between** (entre-deux) and is not the result of the subject?s own >>> projection. >>> >>> >>> >>> An inherent feature of institution of forms is there own overcoming. So >>> emotional institution of new emotions are transformations forming new >>> emotions in response to the older crystallized emotions. >>> >>> Therefore the development of one?s emotional life is not primarily the >>> result of an autonomous subject?s reflections and constitutions. >>> Emotional >>> institution rather emerges out of the subterranean logic worked out in >>> the >>> repetition and reiteration of the tension experienced within **old** >>> institutions. The back and forth to earlier forms and emerging >>> forms..Emotional transformation comes largely from beyond the subject, >>> the >>> situation of the event facilitating the subject to develop her >>> subjectiv/ITY rather than being the result of her own autonomous >>> constituting powers. >>> >>> M-P speaks of a subject investing and animating subjectiv/ity with >>> another >>> meaning that transforms the subject and which is transcendent to this >>> person?s current subjectivi/ity. (i.e. Succeeds in making a meaning >>> which >>> dwells in her **I Think** and in her body as a meaning dwells in a book >>> and a meaning dwells in a cultural object. >>> >>> >>> >>> In the Institution Lectures M-P develops a language that better >>> emphasizes >>> and clarifies the **passivity** of the subject and the ways in which the >>> meaning that the subject realizes always **exceeds** the embodied >>> subject. >>> >>> M-P is contrasting the inseparability of the instituting and instituted >>> subject and contrasts this subject with the constituting subject. M-P by >>> the time of the institution lectures has developed a systematic language >>> for making the distinction between constitution and institution. The >>> institution of the subject is the **coming to be** of a new form of >>> subjectivity in the way we can talk of new forms **coming to be** such >>> as (new perception, new emotion, new aesthetic expression, new object) >>> that are becoming crystallized. >>> >>> >>> >>> In M-P?s earlier work (the Phenomenology of Perception) he is still >>> conceiving the two ways of understanding the **emergence of meaning** as >>> constitution. Institution remains more an operative concept as >>> institution >>> has not yet acquired a central core univocal voice (not yet a thematic >>> voice in terms of which other concepts are measured). With the benefit >>> of >>> the Institution Lectures in hand, Kym Maclaren is able to go back to the >>> Phenomenology of Perception book to show the logic of institution at work >>> in this earlier book. >>> >>> >>> >>> To repeat: The constituting subject is the subject of (and conceived by) >>> intellectualism who constitutes objects. >>> >>> In the Phenomenology book M-P is arguing for a different kind of * >>> *constitution** which in later works he refers to as **institution** >>> because the sense of meaning achieved is not given by consciousness. The >>> meaning **comes to be** in the embodied exchange between a >>> self-in-the-making & an object-in-the-making. The coming-to-be of the >>> subject is inseparable from the coming-to-be of the object. >>> >>> >>> >>> We are moving away from a focus on consciousness as primary or of the >>> objective world as primary to a focus on the **in-between** (the >>> entre-deux) as primary. >>> >>> >>> >>> Not a subject but **events** endow experience with durable dimensions in >>> relation to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense. >>> >>> >>> >>> To repeat institution is: >>> >>> This endowment of a meaningful dimension that provides a framework for >>> further sense-making and this allows new perceptual objects to emerge >>> **within >>> experience** is what in M-P?s later works he come to call **institution** >>> >>> >>> >>> The logic of institution is subterranean as events do this work of >>> instituting meanings unforseen (repeat unforseen) by the subject >>> involved >>> because this logic operates outside the knowledge and intentions of that >>> subject. >>> >>> When institution occurs ? when a new dimension of meaning that sets the >>> terms for future developments occurs ? we can see **retrospectively** how >>> the past **anticipated** this development, how this development responded >>> to the past and **answered a question** posed by this past. >>> >>> >>> >>> An interesting note is where M-P places **errors** and **failures**. In >>> exchange for what we imagined life gives us something else that was >>> secretly wanted. Such realization (or epiphany) comes about through >>> errors >>> and failures. By means of a kind of blind groping on the part of a living >>> subject, the subject is diverted through various impasses arrived at >>> through various investigations. And it is only retrospectively (once >>> again) >>> that these inquiries REVEAL their common **theme** >>> >>> >>> >>> Somehow, and this is the marvel of institution ? all these errors and >>> failures open up a space for a new realization, a new meaning. Errors >>> open >>> up a new space for a new realization can be put another way: >>> >>> Caught up in old crystallized institutions, we respond to the problems >>> that present themselves by **repeating** in varios ways, those old ways >>> of making sense. These repetitions disclose their own inadequacies, >>> thereby >>> opening up a space where something else, something new, something >>> unknowingly awaited can announce itself. >>> >>> >>> >>> The event is that moment in which the openess that constitutes seeking >>> without ever really knowing what the question is, something contingent >>> arises as an occurence or an event ushering in a new way of life, a new >>> way >>> of seeing, a new configuration of meaning, a new institution. >>> >>> >>> >>> Thus, any particular institution tends or inclines (with the help of >>> contingent happenings) towards the institutions own overcoming. Though an >>> expression of the past, institution is inherently anticipating the >>> future, >>> which cannot be grasped except retrospectively. >>> >>> >>> >>> I will STOP here. Kym in her paper turns to concrete examples of human >>> experiences to elaborate the notion of institution within artistic >>> expression and perception. This in preparation for an understanding of >>> emotion that follows this same logic of institution. >>> >>> I will just add that a logic of Eros can be explored through a logic of >>> institution. >>> >>> To explore the somethings we love that becomes instituted in our deepest >>> meanings. >>> >>> >>> >>> This proceeding extended think aloud also can be intertwined with >>> Dewey?s >>> (having an experience). What I have left unsaid is the relation of >>> institution to perezhivanie. M-P may have something to contribute to that >>> notion that is now coming into form >>> >>> To be continued .... >>> >>> The question of constitution versus institution is a topic for >>> conversation >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> >>> >>> *From: *mike cole >>> *Sent: *August 24, 2016 5:29 PM >>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Fwd: Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >>> >>> >>> >>> What is MP's idea of institution versus constitution, Larry? >>> >>> Mike >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> >>> From: >>> >>> Date: Wednesday, 24 August 2016 >>> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Peirce's Approach to Pluralism and System >>> >>> To: eXtended Activity >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> This is an extension to the engagement with Rein Raud and the mention of >>> >>> various ways to approach identity, subjectivity, selfhood, and >>> personhood. >>> >>> >From that conversation, one of the sources to consider (but not the >>> >>> preferred choice) was Vincent Colapietro?s book *Peirce?s Theory of the >>> >>> self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity* >>> >>> >>> >>> Vincent Colapietro draws attention to the *ambiguity* and tension in >>> >>> Peirce?s desire to be BOTH scientific and systematic. Dispositions that >>> are >>> >>> out of step with many current ways of philosophizing. >>> >>> >>> >>> Peirce in correspondence with James confessed: >>> >>> Pluralism does not satisfy either my head or my heart. >>> >>> Yet in another letter to James he acknowledged his debt to Schelling >>> noting: >>> >>> One thing I admire about him (Schelling) is his freedom from the trammels >>> >>> of system, and his holding himself UNCOMMITTED to any previous utterance. >>> >>> In that, he is like a scientific man. >>> >>> >>> >>> Vincent notices it is all too easy for those who have studied intensively >>> >>> the writings of Peirce to get so caught up in his *system* that they >>> come >>> >>> to see it as a PLACE TO DWELL rather than a point from which to proceed. >>> >>> >>> >>> I share this as an expression (a creative expression) of the way the >>> places >>> >>> where we dwell *institute* us. These ambiguous places from which we move >>> >>> back and forth (repetition) in order to DEVELOP our self, subjectivity, >>> >>> identity, personhood. >>> >>> This circles back to perizhevanie, ity, and I will add Merleau Ponty?s >>> >>> notion of *institution* (in contrast to constituting). >>> >>> The relation of subjectivity and objectivity and the (in between) >>> >>> >>> >>> This is the limit for a single post. I send this in anticipation of the >>> >>> next theme emerging - perezhivanie >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object >>> >>> that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with >>> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > From rein.raud@tlu.ee Fri Sep 2 19:30:40 2016 From: rein.raud@tlu.ee (Rein Raud) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 05:30:40 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Let me point out a basic ontological difference between the two levels of the arch and the stones. When we speak about stones, we refer to things the wholeness of which is closed and implicit, ie the molecular structure of the minerals that make these stones up is, for us, not really relevant in the context of their ?stoneness?. However, when we speak about the arch (as intended in Calvino?s parable) we are not actually referring to a similar ?thing?. The arch is nothing but the relation in which the stones are placed to each other. Its own ontological status is that of an idea, or a formula. (As soon as we begin to think of stones as molecular structures, the same difference is highlighted on a lower level, as it can be with molecules consisting of atoms etc.) When Li Chun is looking for a cleaner arch, from which superfluous stones are eliminated, he performs an analogical operation to what mathematicians do when they reduce 3/18 to 1/6. Thus, in order to formulate the problem clearly, we need to distinguish between the characters of a formula and an entity (the being of which is not contingent of the formula, as the stones can easily make up also something other than a bridge). With best wishes, Rein Raud From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Sep 2 19:56:19 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 02:56:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> Interesting proposal, Rein. Might one also say, do you think, that we could say that the ontological status of the arch is a function? In the mathematical sense. Martin > On Sep 2, 2016, at 9:30 PM, Rein Raud wrote: > > Let me point out a basic ontological difference between the two levels of the arch and the stones. When we speak about stones, we refer to things the wholeness of which is closed and implicit, ie the molecular structure of the minerals that make these stones up is, for us, not really relevant in the context of their ?stoneness?. However, when we speak about the arch (as intended in Calvino?s parable) we are not actually referring to a similar ?thing?. The arch is nothing but the relation in which the stones are placed to each other. Its own ontological status is that of an idea, or a formula. (As soon as we begin to think of stones as molecular structures, the same difference is highlighted on a lower level, as it can be with molecules consisting of atoms etc.) When Li Chun is looking for a cleaner arch, from which superfluous stones are eliminated, he performs an analogical operation to what mathematicians do when they reduce 3/18 to 1/6. Thus, in order to formulate the problem clearly, we need to distinguish between the characters of a formula and an entity (the being of which is not contingent of the formula, as the stones can easily make up also something other than a bridge). > > With best wishes, > > Rein Raud From rein.raud@tlu.ee Fri Sep 2 20:03:54 2016 From: rein.raud@tlu.ee (Rein Raud) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 06:03:54 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <4B753DDB-9AA1-4A82-B2A0-380E1711BEFB@tlu.ee> Well, this depends on which way of existence we take to be basic. RR > On 03 Sep 2016, at 05:56, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Interesting proposal, Rein. Might one also say, do you think, that we could say that the ontological status of the arch is a function? In the mathematical sense. > > Martin > >> On Sep 2, 2016, at 9:30 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >> >> Let me point out a basic ontological difference between the two levels of the arch and the stones. When we speak about stones, we refer to things the wholeness of which is closed and implicit, ie the molecular structure of the minerals that make these stones up is, for us, not really relevant in the context of their ?stoneness?. However, when we speak about the arch (as intended in Calvino?s parable) we are not actually referring to a similar ?thing?. The arch is nothing but the relation in which the stones are placed to each other. Its own ontological status is that of an idea, or a formula. (As soon as we begin to think of stones as molecular structures, the same difference is highlighted on a lower level, as it can be with molecules consisting of atoms etc.) When Li Chun is looking for a cleaner arch, from which superfluous stones are eliminated, he performs an analogical operation to what mathematicians do when they reduce 3/18 to 1/6. Thus, in order to formulate the pr > oblem clearly, we need to distinguish between the characters of a formula and an entity (the being of which is not contingent of the formula, as the stones can easily make up also something other than a bridge). >> >> With best wishes, >> >> Rein Raud > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Sep 2 20:09:16 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 03:09:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <4B753DDB-9AA1-4A82-B2A0-380E1711BEFB@tlu.ee> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <4B753DDB-9AA1-4A82-B2A0-380E1711BEFB@tlu.ee> Message-ID: <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> Which way we take to be basic? Martin > On Sep 2, 2016, at 10:03 PM, Rein Raud wrote: > > Well, this depends on which way of existence we take to be basic. RR > >> On 03 Sep 2016, at 05:56, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Interesting proposal, Rein. Might one also say, do you think, that we could say that the ontological status of the arch is a function? In the mathematical sense. >> >> Martin >> >>> On Sep 2, 2016, at 9:30 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >>> >>> Let me point out a basic ontological difference between the two levels of the arch and the stones. When we speak about stones, we refer to things the wholeness of which is closed and implicit, ie the molecular structure of the minerals that make these stones up is, for us, not really relevant in the context of their ?stoneness?. However, when we speak about the arch (as intended in Calvino?s parable) we are not actually referring to a similar ?thing?. The arch is nothing but the relation in which the stones are placed to each other. Its own ontological status is that of an idea, or a formula. (As soon as we begin to think of stones as molecular structures, the same difference is highlighted on a lower level, as it can be with molecules consisting of atoms etc.) When Li Chun is looking for a cleaner arch, from which superfluous stones are eliminated, he performs an analogical operation to what mathematicians do when they reduce 3/18 to 1/6. Thus, in order to formulate the pr >> oblem clearly, we need to distinguish between the characters of a formula and an entity (the being of which is not contingent of the formula, as the stones can easily make up also something other than a bridge). >>> >>> With best wishes, >>> >>> Rein Raud >> >> > > From rein.raud@tlu.ee Fri Sep 2 20:16:33 2016 From: rein.raud@tlu.ee (Rein Raud) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 06:16:33 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <4B753DDB-9AA1-4A 82-B2A0-380E1711BEFB@tlu.ee> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> Well, workable ontologies can be constructed out of both approaches - both the traditional way of thinking that self-identical continuous things are the basic constituents of what is, and that relations between them are contingent upon them, or that infinite division is possible unto the level of subatomic particles whose material self-identity and continuity cannot be determined, and that therefore we are safer with thinking of all existents as composites, in which case the formula-level is primary. RR > On 03 Sep 2016, at 06:09, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Which way we take to be basic? > > Martin > >> On Sep 2, 2016, at 10:03 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >> >> Well, this depends on which way of existence we take to be basic. RR >> >>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 05:56, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> Interesting proposal, Rein. Might one also say, do you think, that we could say that the ontological status of the arch is a function? In the mathematical sense. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>> On Sep 2, 2016, at 9:30 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >>>> >>>> Let me point out a basic ontological difference between the two levels of the arch and the stones. When we speak about stones, we refer to things the wholeness of which is closed and implicit, ie the molecular structure of the minerals that make these stones up is, for us, not really relevant in the context of their ?stoneness?. However, when we speak about the arch (as intended in Calvino?s parable) we are not actually referring to a similar ?thing?. The arch is nothing but the relation in which the stones are placed to each other. Its own ontological status is that of an idea, or a formula. (As soon as we begin to think of stones as molecular structures, the same difference is highlighted on a lower level, as it can be with molecules consisting of atoms etc.) When Li Chun is looking for a cleaner arch, from which superfluous stones are eliminated, he performs an analogical operation to what mathematicians do when they reduce 3/18 to 1/6. Thus, in order to formulate the > pr >>> oblem clearly, we need to distinguish between the characters of a formula and an entity (the being of which is not contingent of the formula, as the stones can easily make up also something other than a bridge). >>>> >>>> With best wishes, >>>> >>>> Rein Raud >>> >>> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Sep 2 20:27:02 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 03:27:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <4B753DDB-9AA1-4A 82-B2A0-380E1711BEFB@tlu.ee> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> Message-ID: <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> Okay, but I wasn?t exploring the issue of which one ? substance or formula -- is basic. You suggested that the arch should be thought of as, ontologically speaking, an idea or a formula. It struck me that we could extend the vocabulary a little and say that the arch is a function. I don?t want to hijack the thread, it?s just that I?ve been reflecting recently on Lewin?s distinction between Aristotelian and Galilean science, and the difference between substantial concepts and functional concepts. Your remarks seemed to me to point to something similar. > On Sep 2, 2016, at 10:16 PM, Rein Raud wrote: > > Well, workable ontologies can be constructed out of both approaches - both the traditional way of thinking that self-identical continuous things are the basic constituents of what is, and that relations between them are contingent upon them, or that infinite division is possible unto the level of subatomic particles whose material self-identity and continuity cannot be determined, and that therefore we are safer with thinking of all existents as composites, in which case the formula-level is primary. RR > >> On 03 Sep 2016, at 06:09, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Which way we take to be basic? >> >> Martin >> >>> On Sep 2, 2016, at 10:03 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >>> >>> Well, this depends on which way of existence we take to be basic. RR >>> >>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 05:56, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> Interesting proposal, Rein. Might one also say, do you think, that we could say that the ontological status of the arch is a function? In the mathematical sense. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On Sep 2, 2016, at 9:30 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Let me point out a basic ontological difference between the two levels of the arch and the stones. When we speak about stones, we refer to things the wholeness of which is closed and implicit, ie the molecular structure of the minerals that make these stones up is, for us, not really relevant in the context of their ?stoneness?. However, when we speak about the arch (as intended in Calvino?s parable) we are not actually referring to a similar ?thing?. The arch is nothing but the relation in which the stones are placed to each other. Its own ontological status is that of an idea, or a formula. (As soon as we begin to think of stones as molecular structures, the same difference is highlighted on a lower level, as it can be with molecules consisting of atoms etc.) When Li Chun is looking for a cleaner arch, from which superfluous stones are eliminated, he performs an analogical operation to what mathematicians do when they reduce 3/18 to 1/6. Thus, in order to formulate the >> pr >>>> oblem clearly, we need to distinguish between the characters of a formula and an entity (the being of which is not contingent of the formula, as the stones can easily make up also something other than a bridge). >>>>> >>>>> With best wishes, >>>>> >>>>> Rein Raud >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From rein.raud@tlu.ee Fri Sep 2 20:36:13 2016 From: rein.raud@tlu.ee (Rein Raud) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 06:36:13 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <4B753DDB-9AA1-4A 82-B2A0-380E1711BEFB@tlu.ee> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes .edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <4ACB559F-A913-4BF6-8471-52A0BB08EFA1@tlu.ee> Yes, in that context your suggestion certainly makes sense. RR > On 03 Sep 2016, at 06:27, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Okay, but I wasn?t exploring the issue of which one ? substance or formula -- is basic. You suggested that the arch should be thought of as, ontologically speaking, an idea or a formula. It struck me that we could extend the vocabulary a little and say that the arch is a function. > > I don?t want to hijack the thread, it?s just that I?ve been reflecting recently on Lewin?s distinction between Aristotelian and Galilean science, and the difference between substantial concepts and functional concepts. Your remarks seemed to me to point to something similar. > >> On Sep 2, 2016, at 10:16 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >> >> Well, workable ontologies can be constructed out of both approaches - both the traditional way of thinking that self-identical continuous things are the basic constituents of what is, and that relations between them are contingent upon them, or that infinite division is possible unto the level of subatomic particles whose material self-identity and continuity cannot be determined, and that therefore we are safer with thinking of all existents as composites, in which case the formula-level is primary. RR >> >>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 06:09, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> Which way we take to be basic? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>> On Sep 2, 2016, at 10:03 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, this depends on which way of existence we take to be basic. RR >>>> >>>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 05:56, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Interesting proposal, Rein. Might one also say, do you think, that we could say that the ontological status of the arch is a function? In the mathematical sense. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 2, 2016, at 9:30 PM, Rein Raud wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me point out a basic ontological difference between the two levels of the arch and the stones. When we speak about stones, we refer to things the wholeness of which is closed and implicit, ie the molecular structure of the minerals that make these stones up is, for us, not really relevant in the context of their ?stoneness?. However, when we speak about the arch (as intended in Calvino?s parable) we are not actually referring to a similar ?thing?. The arch is nothing but the relation in which the stones are placed to each other. Its own ontological status is that of an idea, or a formula. (As soon as we begin to think of stones as molecular structures, the same difference is highlighted on a lower level, as it can be with molecules consisting of atoms etc.) When Li Chun is looking for a cleaner arch, from which superfluous stones are eliminated, he performs an analogical operation to what mathematicians do when they reduce 3/18 to 1/6. Thus, in order to formulate th > e >>> pr >>>>> oblem clearly, we need to distinguish between the characters of a formula and an entity (the being of which is not contingent of the formula, as the stones can easily make up also something other than a bridge). >>>>>> >>>>>> With best wishes, >>>>>> >>>>>> Rein Raud >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Sep 2 20:47:06 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 13:47:06 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: It turns out that the bridge at Zhaozhou was probably not the first open spandrel bridge. Maybe Marco Polo was right to be a little arrogant--the Romans, his immediate neighbors back in old Italy, built open spandrel bridges, but they didn't really know what they were doing. They just used wood, and with wood, open spandrels make manufacturing sense in a way they don't with stone, because boards don't come in bricks, and they bend themselves to arches better. Li Chun's problem was similarly material at first: he wanted gaps in the bridge that would keep the spring floods from washing it away. And the best way to produce these gaps was to create "secondary rivers" above the main arch and then "secondary arches" above the secondary rivers, ad infinitum. The difference, I think, is that there is a mathematical insight that arises from Li Chun's way of thinking about the problem that doesn't arise if you just think about the problem in terms of what's easiest to do with your material. That's the mathematical insight (as an indefinitely repeatable function), which allows Li Chun to "re-ascend" to the concrete. There are a number of similar bridges nearby, which are almost as old. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 1:27 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Okay, but I wasn?t exploring the issue of which one ? substance or formula > -- is basic. You suggested that the arch should be thought of as, > ontologically speaking, an idea or a formula. It struck me that we could > extend the vocabulary a little and say that the arch is a function. > > I don?t want to hijack the thread, it?s just that I?ve been reflecting > recently on Lewin?s distinction between Aristotelian and Galilean science, > and the difference between substantial concepts and functional concepts. > Your remarks seemed to me to point to something similar. > > > On Sep 2, 2016, at 10:16 PM, Rein Raud wrote: > > > > Well, workable ontologies can be constructed out of both approaches - > both the traditional way of thinking that self-identical continuous things > are the basic constituents of what is, and that relations between them are > contingent upon them, or that infinite division is possible unto the level > of subatomic particles whose material self-identity and continuity cannot > be determined, and that therefore we are safer with thinking of all > existents as composites, in which case the formula-level is primary. RR > > > >> On 03 Sep 2016, at 06:09, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> > >> Which way we take to be basic? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >>> On Sep 2, 2016, at 10:03 PM, Rein Raud wrote: > >>> > >>> Well, this depends on which way of existence we take to be basic. RR > >>> > >>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 05:56, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Interesting proposal, Rein. Might one also say, do you think, that we > could say that the ontological status of the arch is a function? In the > mathematical sense. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>>> On Sep 2, 2016, at 9:30 PM, Rein Raud wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Let me point out a basic ontological difference between the two > levels of the arch and the stones. When we speak about stones, we refer to > things the wholeness of which is closed and implicit, ie the molecular > structure of the minerals that make these stones up is, for us, not really > relevant in the context of their ?stoneness?. However, when we speak about > the arch (as intended in Calvino?s parable) we are not actually referring > to a similar ?thing?. The arch is nothing but the relation in which the > stones are placed to each other. Its own ontological status is that of an > idea, or a formula. (As soon as we begin to think of stones as molecular > structures, the same difference is highlighted on a lower level, as it can > be with molecules consisting of atoms etc.) When Li Chun is looking for a > cleaner arch, from which superfluous stones are eliminated, he performs an > analogical operation to what mathematicians do when they reduce 3/18 to > 1/6. Thus, in order to formulate the > >> pr > >>>> oblem clearly, we need to distinguish between the characters of a > formula and an entity (the being of which is not contingent of the formula, > as the stones can easily make up also something other than a bridge). > >>>>> > >>>>> With best wishes, > >>>>> > >>>>> Rein Raud > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Sep 2 20:50:19 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 20:50:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <4B753DDB-9AA1-4A 82-B2A0-380E1711BEFB@tlu.ee> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <57ca487c.d367620a.57f0c.a3fc@mx.google.com> Martin, the theme of the thread is (parts and wholes). I have been hearing a counter beat of (aspects and relations). This turn in the conversation to types of ontologies and what is basic seems central to the topic of parts and wholes. Now the question of substantial concepts and functional concepts is an extension that is clearly on topic and I hear a deepening of the thread occuring Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Martin John Packer From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Sep 2 21:10:39 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 21:10:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> In this bi-directional back and forth I hear Rein exploring and expressing that it is preferable to imagine all existents as composites being the basic ontology and a response exploring and expressing *repeatable* functions that *re-ascend* to the concrete as a particular kind of bi-directional movement. The notion of *repeatable* functions as a particular logic of abstractions that next re-ascend to the concrete which is the basic material. And where is *meaning* is this back and forth which seems to be central for human *nature*? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: David Kellogg From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Sep 2 22:45:46 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 05:45:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> , <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> Rein, when you say that the arch is of the type of ideas, that's exactly what I meant when making reference to Bateson's notion of relations as pertaining to the "mental". Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: 03 September 2016 06:10 To: David Kellogg; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In this bi-directional back and forth I hear Rein exploring and expressing that it is preferable to imagine all existents as composites being the basic ontology and a response exploring and expressing *repeatable* functions that *re-ascend* to the concrete as a particular kind of bi-directional movement. The notion of *repeatable* functions as a particular logic of abstractions that next re-ascend to the concrete which is the basic material. And where is *meaning* is this back and forth which seems to be central for human *nature*? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: David Kellogg From dawnxhen@gmail.com Sat Sep 3 04:37:10 2016 From: dawnxhen@gmail.com (Dawn Henderson) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 07:37:10 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: UNSUBSCRIBE On Sep 1, 2016 10:54 PM, "mike cole" wrote: > >From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between Marco > Polo > and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting and > instituting? > > mike > > > Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. > > "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai Khan > asks. > > "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," Marco > answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." > > Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: "Why do > you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." > > Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Sep 3 06:21:11 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 06:21:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> , <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. Question? Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional movement adequately? I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new organs of sense?. The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but something is lacking? Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new organs of sense*? In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing Possibly, could be. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Sep 3 07:27:34 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 08:27:34 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Rein, I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are held together in time. And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the arch of the bridge. It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of "how it's made". But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? -greg On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, wrote: > Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This > reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? > as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. > In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems > of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going > deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. > Question? > Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional > movement adequately? > > I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new > organs of sense?. > The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To > repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but > something is lacking? > Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but > as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and > through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems > to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new > organs of sense*? > > In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may > be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing > Possibly, could be. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Sep 3 07:23:36 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 07:23:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> , <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <57cadce9.07a5420a.5a334.0faf@mx.google.com> A further reflection on what is the meaning of ?mental? going back to Kym MacLaren. She argues that expression (behaviour, conduct, action) & perception involve NOT the constitution of meaning by a subject, but rather the institution of a *form* in the in-between of embodied being and environment ? that expression and perception and emotion are institutions of forms which simultaneously ? transforms?, rather than simply being constituted by that embodied being. What comes more to the for ground is the way repetition (back and forth) are occurring ?within? the ?mental? but the ?mental? is not ?within? the constituting subject. & developing new sense organs involves *events* occurring *beyond* the purview of the reflective subject. It is only after the transformation occurs, only (retrospectively) after the new organs of sense have developed that we see clearly the movement of expression, perception, emotion instituting who we have now become. All this is referring to the personal side of the logic of institution. On the other side of the single coin is what M-P and Kym MacLaren refer to as ?public history?. Now what Kym and M-P are saying has been said in other ways, gesturing to the same focus on movement and perceiving ?aspects? of ?things? in their specific/ITY (nodding or inclining in gesture to Reim) but this language and logic of institution is another way to come into the clearing opening onto perezhivanie. Lewin is also central in this conversation Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: September 3, 2016 6:21 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. Question? Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional movement adequately? I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new organs of sense?. The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical.? To repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but something is lacking? Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and through regression to the known and ?anticipation of *something* new seems to be a ?particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new organs of sense*? In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing Possibly, could be. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: September 2, 2016 10:49 PM To: David Kellogg; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Rein, when you say that the arch is of the type of ideas, that's exactly what I meant when making reference to Bateson's notion of relations as pertaining to the "mental". Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: 03 September 2016 06:10 To: David Kellogg; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In this bi-directional back and forth I hear Rein exploring and expressing that it is preferable to imagine all existents as composites being? the basic ontology and a response exploring and expressing *repeatable* functions that *re-ascend* to the concrete as a particular kind of bi-directional movement. The notion of *repeatable* functions as a particular logic of abstractions that next re-ascend to the? concrete which is the basic material. And where is *meaning* is this back and forth which seems to be central for human *nature*? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: David Kellogg From rein.raud@tlu.ee Sat Sep 3 09:27:58 2016 From: rein.raud@tlu.ee (Rein Raud) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 19:27:58 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: <1472840840446.44 281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <0293 2BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7 CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40 .4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace 49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Greg: yes, this would also be my own ontological position: what we refer to as entities are bundles of relations between singular instances of being that are not continuous and self-identical. However, this view is not necessarily dominant, most people refer to things as complete-in-themselves entities. What is important is that if we adopt this position toward all entities, then the word ?stone? would have to refer only to the relations between its constituents and not, in any way, to these constituents themselves. I am not sure if most people would be comfortable with this move. The arch, however, would be easily conceivable as an arch also if it were to consist, say, of blocks of ice instead of stones. I may have referred to this before, but it is a good example: the Ise Shrine, the main Shinto shrine of the Sun Goddess, is torn down every 20 years and built anew, according to the same blueprint, from new wood, and yet the Japanese consider it to be the same shrine, not a copy, not a rebuilding, but the same, because its structure is (in fact, allegedly) the same. Alfredo: yes, there is an analogy, but in my understanding it would be incorrect to distinguish between ?mental? as opposed to ?real? or ?natural?, and allocate a great deal of reality to the latter domain because, as Greg just said, the ?natural? is just as relation-based as the material embodiment of a human idea. In that sense, all perceived objects are mental, because we prefer to see them as things in their own right rather than as more or less consistent bundles of relations between constituents that are divisible at least beyond the reach of our perceptual apparatus. With best wishes, Rein > On 03 Sep 2016, at 17:27, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Rein, > > I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the > arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts > in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The > stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of > atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the > stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are > held together in time. > > And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the > relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. > > Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the > relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the > arch of the bridge. > > It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with > "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed > (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... > > This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of > "how it's made". > > But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, wrote: > >> Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This >> reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? >> as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. >> In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems >> of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going >> deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. >> Question? >> Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional >> movement adequately? >> >> I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new >> organs of sense?. >> The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To >> repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but >> something is lacking? >> Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but >> as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and >> through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems >> to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new >> organs of sense*? >> >> In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may >> be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing >> Possibly, could be. >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Sep 3 09:33:24 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 16:33:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com>, Message-ID: <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no> Greg, Rein, Larry is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in the widest sense of the word") goes about? Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a particular epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but not with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way of seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not important to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, or function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the sense Andy and David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we may go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an epistemology, not of an ontology. Alfredo ________________________________ From: Greg Thompson Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Rein, I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are held together in time. And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the arch of the bridge. It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of "how it's made". But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? -greg On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, > wrote: Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. Question? Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional movement adequately? I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new organs of sense?. The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but something is lacking? Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new organs of sense*? In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing Possibly, could be. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Sep 3 10:56:09 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 10:56:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com>, <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> Alfredo, I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as *becoming* or *arising* into being. To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary but is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* becomes realized consciously. The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move through repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes *knowing*. The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough for one post Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Sep 3 13:21:31 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 20:21:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com>, <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no>, <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> Rein, Larry, when I cite "Mind in the widest sense of the word" I should have inserted a direct reference to Bateson's Mind and Nature (1979), where Epistemology is defined as the science of the mind in the sense of the world of in-formation. In both your comments, you seem to discuss epistemology as an issue of a knowing subject with respect to an known object. In that realm of thought, yes, you distinguish between ontology and epistemology, but you should be aware that that is well within a dualism perspective. From the Bostonian perspective that I pursue here, Epistemology, knowing, in-formation, is not a matter of (individual, mentalistic) subject-mind, but a matter of pattern and relationships that make a difference. Building on Jung, he distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep the bridge straight. This world includes not just humans, but more generally life, human consciousness being one of its aspects. There is no dualism here between matter and ideas in a Cartesian sense: everything in Creatura is made of Pleroma stuff. Alfredo ________________________________ From: lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: 03 September 2016 19:56 To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Alfredo, I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as *becoming* or *arising* into being. To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary but is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* becomes realized consciously. The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move through repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes *knowing*. The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough for one post Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: September 3, 2016 9:51 AM To: Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Greg, Rein, Larry is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in the widest sense of the word") goes about? Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a particular epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but not with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way of seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not important to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, or function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the sense Andy and David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we may go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an epistemology, not of an ontology. Alfredo ________________________________ From: Greg Thompson Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Rein, I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are held together in time. And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the arch of the bridge. It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of "how it's made". But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? -greg On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, > wrote: Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. Question? Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional movement adequately? I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new organs of sense?. The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but something is lacking? Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new organs of sense*? In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing Possibly, could be. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Sep 3 13:47:26 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 20:47:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com>, <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no>, <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com>, <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1472935645648.9131@iped.uio.no> The point is the same, I think, as when the term Consciousness is used in dialectical materialism: it definitely is not "the ideal" as opposed to the "material," or the opposition is not of a classical logic nature. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: 03 September 2016 22:21 To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Rein, Larry, when I cite "Mind in the widest sense of the word" I should have inserted a direct reference to Bateson's Mind and Nature (1979), where Epistemology is defined as the science of the mind in the sense of the world of in-formation. In both your comments, you seem to discuss epistemology as an issue of a knowing subject with respect to an known object. In that realm of thought, yes, you distinguish between ontology and epistemology, but you should be aware that that is well within a dualism perspective. From the Bostonian perspective that I pursue here, Epistemology, knowing, in-formation, is not a matter of (individual, mentalistic) subject-mind, but a matter of pattern and relationships that make a difference. Building on Jung, he distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep the bridge straight. This world includes not just humans, but more generally life, human consciousness being one of its aspects. There is no dualism here between matter and ideas in a Cartesian sense: everything in Creatura is made of Pleroma stuff. Alfredo ________________________________ From: lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: 03 September 2016 19:56 To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Alfredo, I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as *becoming* or *arising* into being. To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary but is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* becomes realized consciously. The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move through repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes *knowing*. The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough for one post Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: September 3, 2016 9:51 AM To: Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Greg, Rein, Larry is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in the widest sense of the word") goes about? Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a particular epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but not with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way of seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not important to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, or function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the sense Andy and David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we may go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an epistemology, not of an ontology. Alfredo ________________________________ From: Greg Thompson Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Rein, I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are held together in time. And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the arch of the bridge. It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of "how it's made". But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? -greg On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, > wrote: Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. Question? Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional movement adequately? I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new organs of sense?. The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but something is lacking? Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new organs of sense*? In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing Possibly, could be. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Sep 3 18:19:04 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 18:19:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com>, <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no>, <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <57cb768a.4e16620a.8ea5f.6a6c@mx.google.com> Alfredo, It has been awhile since I engaged with Bateson and his radical transformation of the meaning of *mind* I was approaching epistemology (ways of knowing) from my biased location immersed in reading through the logic of M-P?s institution. Mind in the way Bateson or Buddhism express this phenomena as you say are transforming the very meaning of (mind). When you mention the Bostonian perspective i am unfamiliar with this reference. The term *meaning* is core to M-P?s exploration of institution and his focus on the inseparability of the instituting & instituted subject *dwelling* within meaning. Meaning is also core to the exploration of perezhivanie and that is what drew me to Kym?s article. In her article she references a key moment in M-P?s Institution and Passivity that focuses on the centrality of meaning cores that develop and animate life & are inherently overcome. M-P speaks of a subject who: Invests itself, I.e., animates itself with another meaning, transforms itself ..., I.e., succeeds in making a meaning which is transcendent to him *dwell* in his I think, and (dwells) in his body AS a meaning dwells in the book and dwells in the cultural object. M-P is attempting to develop a language to express the way thinking, the body, books, and cultural objects all *dwell* within meaning & also the way the meaning the person realizes always *exceeds* the person. Rein mentions the tearing down and rebuilding of the temple every 20 years that is NOT a copy but expresses the continuation of the living form. There may be something relevant in these ways of expression that will add to our exploration of (perezhivanie). Bateson?s wider expression of epistemology seems to share a sense that may align with the notion of meaning that is being worked out in the notions of perezhivanie and institution My turn in this direction is pursuing a hunch that I share with our community of learners. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: September 3, 2016 1:21 PM To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Rein, Larry, when I cite "Mind in the widest sense of the word" I should have inserted a direct reference to Bateson's Mind and Nature (1979), where Epistemology is defined as the science of the mind in the sense of the world of in-formation. In both your comments, you seem to discuss epistemology as an issue of a knowing subject with respect to an known object. In that realm of thought, yes, you distinguish between ontology and epistemology, but you should be aware that that is well within a dualism perspective. From the Bostonian perspective that I pursue here, Epistemology, knowing, in-formation, is not a matter of (individual, mentalistic) subject-mind, but a matter of pattern and relationships that make a difference. Building on Jung, he distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of?physical forces and laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep the bridge straight. This world includes not just humans, but more generally life, human consciousness being one of its aspects. There is no dualism here between matter and ideas in a Cartesian sense: everything in Creatura is made of Pleroma stuff.? Alfredo From: lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: 03 September 2016 19:56 To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes ? Alfredo, I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as *becoming* or *arising* into being. To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary but is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* becomes realized consciously. The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move through repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes *knowing*. The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough for one post ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone ? From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: September 3, 2016 9:51 AM To: Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes ? Greg, Rein, Larry ? ? is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in the widest sense of the word") goes about? ? ? Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a particular epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but not with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way of seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not important to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, or function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the? sense Andy and David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we may go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an epistemology, not of an ontology. ? ? Alfredo ? ________________________________ From: Greg Thompson Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes ? Rein, ? I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are held together in time. ? And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. ? Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the arch of the bridge. ? It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"?? One was constructed (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... ? This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of "how it's made". ? But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? ? -greg ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, > wrote: Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. Question? Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional movement adequately? ? I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new organs of sense?. The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical.? To repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but something is lacking? Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and through regression to the known and? anticipation of *something* new seems to be a? particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new organs of sense*? ? In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing Possibly, could be. ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone ? From: Alfredo Jornet Gil ? ? ? -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson ? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 11C52FD0B1CB4CFDBE4A8AB76CC0D5A3.png Type: image/png Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160903/c02b4896/attachment.png From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Sep 3 18:25:46 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 4 Sep 2016 01:25:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <57cb768a.4e16620a.8ea5f.6a6c@mx.google.com> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com>, <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no>, <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no>, <57cb768a.4e16620a.8ea5f.6a6c@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1472952344828.22618@iped.uio.no> Thanks Larry for the reflections. Sorry, Bostonian was intended to be *Betsonian* (auto-correct often bothers) Alfredo ________________________________ From: lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: 04 September 2016 03:19 To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Alfredo, It has been awhile since I engaged with Bateson and his radical transformation of the meaning of *mind* I was approaching epistemology (ways of knowing) from my biased location immersed in reading through the logic of M-P?s institution. Mind in the way Bateson or Buddhism express this phenomena as you say are transforming the very meaning of (mind). When you mention the Bostonian perspective i am unfamiliar with this reference. The term *meaning* is core to M-P?s exploration of institution and his focus on the inseparability of the instituting & instituted subject *dwelling* within meaning. Meaning is also core to the exploration of perezhivanie and that is what drew me to Kym?s article. In her article she references a key moment in M-P?s Institution and Passivity that focuses on the centrality of meaning cores that develop and animate life & are inherently overcome. M-P speaks of a subject who: Invests itself, I.e., animates itself with another meaning, transforms itself ..., I.e., succeeds in making a meaning which is transcendent to him *dwell* in his I think, and (dwells) in his body AS a meaning dwells in the book and dwells in the cultural object. M-P is attempting to develop a language to express the way thinking, the body, books, and cultural objects all *dwell* within meaning & also the way the meaning the person realizes always *exceeds* the person. Rein mentions the tearing down and rebuilding of the temple every 20 years that is NOT a copy but expresses the continuation of the living form. There may be something relevant in these ways of expression that will add to our exploration of (perezhivanie). Bateson?s wider expression of epistemology seems to share a sense that may align with the notion of meaning that is being worked out in the notions of perezhivanie and institution My turn in this direction is pursuing a hunch that I share with our community of learners. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: September 3, 2016 1:21 PM To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Rein, Larry, when I cite "Mind in the widest sense of the word" I should have inserted a direct reference to Bateson's Mind and Nature (1979), where Epistemology is defined as the science of the mind in the sense of the world of in-formation. In both your comments, you seem to discuss epistemology as an issue of a knowing subject with respect to an known object. In that realm of thought, yes, you distinguish between ontology and epistemology, but you should be aware that that is well within a dualism perspective. From the Bostonian perspective that I pursue here, Epistemology, knowing, in-formation, is not a matter of (individual, mentalistic) subject-mind, but a matter of pattern and relationships that make a difference. Building on Jung, he distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep the bridge straight. This world includes not just humans, but more generally life, human consciousness being one of its aspects. There is no dualism here between matter and ideas in a Cartesian sense: everything in Creatura is made of Pleroma stuff. Alfredo From: lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: 03 September 2016 19:56 To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Alfredo, I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as *becoming* or *arising* into being. To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary but is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* becomes realized consciously. The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move through repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes *knowing*. The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough for one post Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: September 3, 2016 9:51 AM To: Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Greg, Rein, Larry is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in the widest sense of the word") goes about? Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a particular epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but not with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way of seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not important to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, or function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the sense Andy and David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we may go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an epistemology, not of an ontology. Alfredo ________________________________ From: Greg Thompson Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Rein, I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are held together in time. And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the arch of the bridge. It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of "how it's made". But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? -greg On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, > wrote: Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. Question? Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional movement adequately? I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new organs of sense?. The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but something is lacking? Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new organs of sense*? In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing Possibly, could be. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 11C52FD0B1CB4CFDBE4A8AB76CC0D5A3.png Type: image/png Size: 198 bytes Desc: 11C52FD0B1CB4CFDBE4A8AB76CC0D5A3.png Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160904/b89e45a1/attachment.png From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Sep 4 10:23:02 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 4 Sep 2016 10:23:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Big Uneasy - The New Yorker Message-ID: <57cc5878.8948620a.27877.d461@mx.google.com> The Big Uneasy - The New Yorker http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/letter-from-oberlin?mbid=nl_160904_Sunday&CNDID=40857424&spMailingID=9459752&spUserID=MTMzMTg0ODI3MDU3S0&spJobID=1000190546&spReportId=MTAwMDE5MDU0NgS2 Sent from my Windows 10 phone Here is an interesting article that I read through a lens of the pros and cons of creating places of *refuge* in a changing world. This is a theme to be explored over the next year at Simon Fraser University in the *Institute of Humanities* which brings the campus to the community. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Sep 4 12:50:55 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 4 Sep 2016 12:50:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Big Uneasy - The New Yorker In-Reply-To: <57cc5878.8948620a.27877.d461@mx.google.com> References: <57cc5878.8948620a.27877.d461@mx.google.com> Message-ID: The article about trigger warnings and the changing nature of academic discourse is certainly relevant to participants in this list, Larry. I am one of those people who went to Oberlin in the 1950's as a place of refuge for young people who wanted to be in a college that was internationally inclusive, a station on the underground railway and leader in the inclusion of women in higher education. Which only goes to show that if you live long enough, despite your good intentions, you are likely to end up on the wrong side of history, kaleidoscopes being as shifty as they are! (Or as Oberlin appears to be living/creating it). Super complicated issues. mike On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 10:23 AM, wrote: > > The Big Uneasy - The New Yorker > > > http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/letter-from-oberlin? > mbid=nl_160904_Sunday&CNDID=40857424&spMailingID=9459752& > spUserID=MTMzMTg0ODI3MDU3S0&spJobID=1000190546&spReportId=MTAwMDE5MDU0NgS2 > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > Here is an interesting article that I read through a lens of the pros and > cons of creating places of *refuge* in a changing world. This is a theme to > be explored over the next year at Simon Fraser University in the *Institute > of Humanities* which brings the campus to the community. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Sep 4 15:33:01 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 4 Sep 2016 15:33:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Big Uneasy - The New Yorker In-Reply-To: References: <57cc5878.8948620a.27877.d461@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <57cca0fb.8625620a.35928.205a@mx.google.com> Yes, as I read the article I felt the back and forth bi-directional shifting and flow and liquidity of the theme of (Identity) in forms of (recognition) as movements of instituting and instituted meanings in which we dwell. A concrete example of how forms of identity are rapidly changing with a sense of no particular direction home. In times such as we are living through should we be focusing on creating places of refuge to hold and contain a sense of identity through a sense of belonging (places with permeable boundaries) or should we accept the tension that is now playing out across academia as the back and forth movement of regression to the already formed and the anticipation of that flow to come that is overflowing the familiar boundaries? The sense I have is that we need to create places of refuge as liquid modernity is overwhelming our previously instituted meanings. Super complicated Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: mike cole From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Sep 4 22:58:59 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 4 Sep 2016 23:58:59 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Big Uneasy - The New Yorker In-Reply-To: <57cca0fb.8625620a.35928.205a@mx.google.com> References: <57cc5878.8948620a.27877.d461@mx.google.com> <57cca0fb.8625620a.35928.205a@mx.google.com> Message-ID: ?Interesting piece Larry. Relatedly, I've seen a lot of buzz about the University of Chicago's letter about no policy of "trigger warnings" or "safe spaces": http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/us/university-of-chicago-strikes-back-against-campus-political-correctness.html?_r=0 But then again, the U of C (thankfully) has this: https://csl.uchicago.edu/news/office-lgbtq-student-life%E2%80%99s-safe-space-program-launches-over-summer "Tough talk" about, well, tough talk? -greg? On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 4:33 PM, wrote: > Yes, as I read the article I felt the back and forth bi-directional > shifting and flow and liquidity of the theme of (Identity) in forms of > (recognition) as movements of instituting and instituted meanings in which > we dwell. A concrete example of how forms of identity are rapidly changing > with a sense of no particular direction home. In times such as we are > living through should we be focusing on creating places of refuge to hold > and contain a sense of identity through a sense of belonging (places with > permeable boundaries) or should we accept the tension that is now playing > out across academia as the back and forth movement of regression to the > already formed and the anticipation of that flow to come that is > overflowing the familiar boundaries? The sense I have is that we need to > create places of refuge as liquid modernity is overwhelming our previously > instituted meanings. > > Super complicated > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: mike cole -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Sep 5 07:52:02 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 07:52:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Trump, the University of Chicago, and the Collapse of Public Language - The New Yorker Message-ID: <57cd8695.d740620a.83bf.c93f@mx.google.com> Trump, the University of Chicago, and the Collapse of Public Language - The New Yorker Self-defining language has grown easy to pass around but hard to translate into social results. Here is another reflective moment from the same author who wrote (The Big Uneasy) article. These articles certainly open up a place for further reflection on the relationships of (words) (identity) (places of refuge) and meaningful (cores) in which we dwell. Super complicated and provocative http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/trump-the-university-of-chicago-and-the-collapse-of-public-language Sent from my Windows 10 phone From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Sep 6 09:43:24 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 09:43:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <54A917F5-087C-4685-8645-227B42AF3D89@gmail.com> Definitely as reported by an Italian. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Sep 1, 2016, at 7:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >> From Italo Calvino, "Invisible cities" -- a conversation between Marco Polo > and Kublai Khan, one of many. Some relationship here of constituting and > instituting? > > mike > > > Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. > > "But which is the stone that supports the bridge," Kublai Khan > asks. > > "The bridge is not supported by one stone or another," Marco > answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form." > > Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: "Why do > you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me." > > Polo answers. Without the stones, there is no arch." > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch From schuckthemonkey@gmail.com Tue Sep 6 11:06:42 2016 From: schuckthemonkey@gmail.com (Christopher Schuck) Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 14:06:42 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <1472952344828.22618@iped.uio.no> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no> <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> <57cb768a.4e16620a.8ea5f.6a6c@mx.google.com> <1472952344828.22618@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alberto, As a current Bostonian who appreciates your perspective, I would suggest that you were not entirely in error! Seriously, though, I have two questions about what you said in that post. "[H]e distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep the bridge straight." Did you mean to write "relations between wholes and parts are very different *than* in the case of the [relations between wholes and parts for] atoms...etc." (i.e. the relations between wholes and parts work differently in each realm)? Or, were you referring more to the relationship *between* wholes and parts similarly for both realms? Also, this might be a naive question, but if he is emphasizing a specific distinction between these two worlds, how can he sustain this without a dualism and what then is the meaningful difference if everything in Creatura is is made of Pleroma stuff? Sorry if I'm missing the boat here. Thanks, Chris On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 9:25 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks Larry for the reflections. Sorry, Bostonian was intended to be > *Betsonian* (auto-correct often bothers) > > Alfredo > > ________________________________ > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > Sent: 04 September 2016 03:19 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Alfredo, > It has been awhile since I engaged with Bateson and his radical > transformation of the meaning of *mind* > > I was approaching epistemology (ways of knowing) from my biased location > immersed in reading through the logic of M-P?s institution. > Mind in the way Bateson or Buddhism express this phenomena as you say are > transforming the very meaning of (mind). > When you mention the Bostonian perspective i am unfamiliar with this > reference. > > The term *meaning* is core to M-P?s exploration of institution and his > focus on the inseparability of the instituting & instituted subject > *dwelling* within meaning. > > Meaning is also core to the exploration of perezhivanie and that is what > drew me to Kym?s article. In her article she references a key moment in > M-P?s Institution and Passivity that focuses on the centrality of meaning > cores that develop and animate life & are inherently overcome. > M-P speaks of a subject who: > Invests itself, I.e., animates itself with another meaning, transforms > itself ..., I.e., succeeds in making a meaning which is transcendent to him > *dwell* in his I think, and (dwells) in his body AS a meaning dwells in the > book and dwells in the cultural object. > > M-P is attempting to develop a language to express the way thinking, the > body, books, and cultural objects all *dwell* within meaning & also the way > the meaning the person realizes always *exceeds* the person. > Rein mentions the tearing down and rebuilding of the temple every 20 years > that is NOT a copy but expresses the continuation of the living form. > There may be something relevant in these ways of expression that will add > to our exploration of (perezhivanie). > > Bateson?s wider expression of epistemology seems to share a sense that may > align with the notion of meaning that is being worked out in the notions of > perezhivanie and institution > My turn in this direction is pursuing a hunch that I share with our > community of learners. > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: September 3, 2016 1:21 PM > To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Greg > Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > Rein, Larry, > > > > when I cite "Mind in the widest sense of the word" I should have inserted > a direct reference to Bateson's Mind and Nature (1979), where Epistemology > is defined as the science of the mind in the sense of the world of > in-formation. In both your comments, you seem to discuss epistemology as an > issue of a knowing subject with respect to an known object. In that realm > of thought, yes, you distinguish between ontology and epistemology, but you > should be aware that that is well within a dualism perspective. From the > Bostonian perspective that I pursue here, Epistemology, knowing, > in-formation, is not a matter of (individual, mentalistic) subject-mind, > but a matter of pattern and relationships that make a difference. Building > on Jung, he distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and > laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where > relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the > case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep > the bridge straight. This world includes not just humans, but more > generally life, human consciousness being one of its aspects. There is no > dualism here between matter and ideas in a Cartesian sense: everything in > Creatura is made of Pleroma stuff. > > > > Alfredo > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > Sent: 03 September 2016 19:56 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Alfredo, > I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. > I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as > *becoming* or *arising* into being. > To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving > into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary but > is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* > becomes realized consciously. > The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. > This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. > Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are > in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. > For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move through > repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The > repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional > knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary > demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The > logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied > expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes > *knowing*. > The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ > of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. > The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough for > one post > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: September 3, 2016 9:51 AM > To: Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Greg, Rein, Larry > > > is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that > institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in > the widest sense of the word") goes about? > > > Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a particular > epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but not > with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way of > seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear > Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as > those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally > constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things > become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not important > to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, or > function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they > make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of > view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are > mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in > themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their > *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not > allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the sense Andy and > David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building > bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of > stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference > between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are > interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the > world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we may > go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. > Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an epistemology, > not of an ontology. > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________ > From: Greg Thompson > Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Rein, > > I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the > arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts > in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The > stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of > atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the > stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are > held together in time. > > And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the > relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. > > Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the > relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the > arch of the bridge. > > It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with > "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed > (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... > > This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of > "how it's made". > > But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This > reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? > as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. > In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems > of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going > deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. > Question? > Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional > movement adequately? > > I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new > organs of sense?. > The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To > repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but > something is lacking? > Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but > as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and > through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems > to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new > organs of sense*? > > In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may > be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing > Possibly, could be. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 6 14:55:00 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 14:55:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Tenure-Track position in cognitive or perceptual dev Bucknell University In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: --------- Title Open Rank, Tenure-Track Position in Cognitive or Perceptual Development Location Lewisburg, PA Position URL apply.interfolio.com/36702 Position Description Bucknell University, Department of Psychology, invites applications for an open-rank tenure-track position in Cognitive or Perceptual Development beginning in August 2017. We seek an outstanding teacher and scholar with a commitment to diversity, student learning, and inclusive pedagogy. The successful candidate will have an interest in integrating high-impact educational experiences into courses and have a strong or promising record of scholarship. An active research program that results in peer-reviewed publications and involves mentorship of undergraduates is expected. We are especially interested in candidates whose research involves children. As part of the five-course per year teaching load, the successful candidate will be expected to teach Cognitive Psychology, Research Methods in Developmental or Cognitive Psychology, and an advanced seminar in the candidate's area of interest. Depending on the background and interest of the candidate, there is also the opportunity to teach Developmental Psychology or Sensation and Perception. In addition, the successful candidate will be expected to teach either Introductory Psychology, or General Research Methods, or Psychological Statistics. Opportunity exists to supervise Master's degree students in Psychology. For an entry-level hire, a PhD is required by August 1, 2017. Appointment at a senior rank will be considered for outstanding candidates with demonstrated success in undergraduate mentorship and a record of leadership consistent with the teacher-scholar model. Bucknell University, an equal opportunity employer, believes that students learn best in a diverse, inclusive community and is therefore committed to academic excellence through diversity in its faculty, staff, and students. Thus, we seek candidates who will be committed to Bucknell?s efforts to create a climate that fosters the growth and development of a diverse student body. We welcome applications from members of groups that have been historically underrepresented in higher education. Applications must be completed online through Interfolio ByCommittee and should include a cover letter, vitae, reprints and preprints, descriptive teaching and research program statements, and materials demonstrating evidence of success or promise in teaching. In addition, 3 letters of reference should be submitted. Applications will be reviewed beginning September 15, 2016 and continue until the position is filled. Contact Department Chair J.T. Ptacek at 570-577-1200 or ptacek@bucknell.edu for more information. Visit www.departments.bucknell.edu/psychologyfor more information about the department. Bucknell University is a private, highly selective, unique national University where liberal arts and strong professional programs in engineering, business, education and music complement each other. We seek candidates who are committed to Bucknell?s efforts to create a climate that fosters the growth and development of a diverse student body, and we welcome applications from members of groups that have been historically underrepresented in higher education. Located in Central Pennsylvania along the Susquehanna River, Bucknell is nestled in the Borough of Lewisburg, an architectural gem that has been ranked as one of America?s best small towns. The Lewisburg area offers a unique combination of outdoor recreation opportunities, and appealing amenities such as art galleries, an art deco theater, historic museums, and charming independent boutiques and restaurants. In addition to the many cultural and athletic events offered by the University and the Borough, the surrounding region offers outstanding schools, medical facilities, and an affordable cost of living. For those who crave the city, Bucknell is within an easy three-hour drive to Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Sep 6 15:45:13 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 22:45:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no> <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> <57cb768a.4e16620a.8ea5f.6a6c@mx.google.com> <1472952344828.22618@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1473201911802.50625@iped.uio.no> Hi Chris, Bostonian Batsonians are twice as good! As I read Bateson, the difference is this: when relations between parts and wholes enter in the realm of Creatura, they are differences that make a difference. Once you come to see how a part relates to a whole, you (or knowing) no longer are the same; different levels of learning may take place, from zero learning to learning three or what Engestr?m calls expansive learning. Zero learning may take place within any physical system: systems change because of experience too. But they do not learn about their contexts of learning. Living creatures do. As an example, I can think of phase transitions of a gas (into liquid and solid states). For water (and any other material), you can change the context of this transitions by adjusting any of its criteria: you can dramatically drop pressure and boil water into gas at relatively low temperatures, below 100 celsius degrees. And you can change the contexts, and the principles will remain the same (at least within a certain range of materials/measures within newtonian physics, possibly non-newtonian patterns are observed, I am not a physicist, but I presume that whatever the model that may describe those non-newtonian systems best, they do not learn to discern their own contexts in the sense living creatures do. But I foresee that at least two objections may emerge from here, the first being whether we should include as living systems such as Gaia, which usually are not thought of as living and therefore not part of Creatura; and the second being the artificial intelligence, a possible thought weak example of which may be the text corrector that writes Bostonian when I type Bostonian, and which may at some point learn that I most likely mean Betsonian (not the case of my webmail, which keeps correcting me every time I write the word). In creatura, parts-whole relations may enter into the system's development so as to alter the system itself. This happens in evolution for all species, and in ontological development as well. The ways in which it happens differently in the former and the in latter respectively (in evolution and in ontological development) may be very important issues for a cultural-historical psychology, which needs to explain culture as a feature of biology, and not as something made of a different stuff (like the stuff of which dreams are made) that nonetheless expresses itself through biological stuff. In Pleroma, relations between part and whole do not become the object of descriptions within pleroma. A tree does know its context in the sense that its evolution as a species is attached to part-wholes relations in a very different way than the same can be said of stones. So how is there not a dualism? Well, yes, there is a dualism: there are part-whole relations as part of non-living systems, and part-whole relations as part of living systems. But the dualism is a taken to be an outcome of our analysis, not an ontological claim concerning of what sort of stuff is the world made. In Bateson, part-whole relations in the realm of Pleroma are a domain of the Creatura. All in Creatura develops out of the same stuff that we find in Pleroma: the firing of our neurons rests on physical laws. But the changes in the pattern of the firing are not accountable by those laws. This we all know; or perhaps should know; or maybe I am wrong. But the point is that, with all this, I don't think Bateson means that there is a dualism between things as such on the one hand, and relations between things on the other. That would be something like a Cartesian dualism: there are things in themselves, and then there are relations between them. The former are material, the latter immaterial. Things are stuff, and then somehow the psyche emerges out of it. No. What Bateson proposes is not a dualism of two substances (one material and one immaterial), but rather a way to understand how systems of things-in-context exist at qualitatively different levels of complexity depending on how their past comes to change their future. That is a genetic, historical account to me, though not directly grounded in dialectical materialism as Vygotsky's was. Things enter into relations differently. But there are not two sort of stuff, things, and then relations. I hope this is not a mess and I make some sense of Bateson here. Sorry for the length... Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Christopher Schuck Sent: 06 September 2016 20:06 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Alberto, As a current Bostonian who appreciates your perspective, I would suggest that you were not entirely in error! Seriously, though, I have two questions about what you said in that post. "[H]e distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep the bridge straight." Did you mean to write "relations between wholes and parts are very different *than* in the case of the [relations between wholes and parts for] atoms...etc." (i.e. the relations between wholes and parts work differently in each realm)? Or, were you referring more to the relationship *between* wholes and parts similarly for both realms? Also, this might be a naive question, but if he is emphasizing a specific distinction between these two worlds, how can he sustain this without a dualism and what then is the meaningful difference if everything in Creatura is is made of Pleroma stuff? Sorry if I'm missing the boat here. Thanks, Chris On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 9:25 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks Larry for the reflections. Sorry, Bostonian was intended to be > *Betsonian* (auto-correct often bothers) > > Alfredo > > ________________________________ > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > Sent: 04 September 2016 03:19 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Alfredo, > It has been awhile since I engaged with Bateson and his radical > transformation of the meaning of *mind* > > I was approaching epistemology (ways of knowing) from my biased location > immersed in reading through the logic of M-P?s institution. > Mind in the way Bateson or Buddhism express this phenomena as you say are > transforming the very meaning of (mind). > When you mention the Bostonian perspective i am unfamiliar with this > reference. > > The term *meaning* is core to M-P?s exploration of institution and his > focus on the inseparability of the instituting & instituted subject > *dwelling* within meaning. > > Meaning is also core to the exploration of perezhivanie and that is what > drew me to Kym?s article. In her article she references a key moment in > M-P?s Institution and Passivity that focuses on the centrality of meaning > cores that develop and animate life & are inherently overcome. > M-P speaks of a subject who: > Invests itself, I.e., animates itself with another meaning, transforms > itself ..., I.e., succeeds in making a meaning which is transcendent to him > *dwell* in his I think, and (dwells) in his body AS a meaning dwells in the > book and dwells in the cultural object. > > M-P is attempting to develop a language to express the way thinking, the > body, books, and cultural objects all *dwell* within meaning & also the way > the meaning the person realizes always *exceeds* the person. > Rein mentions the tearing down and rebuilding of the temple every 20 years > that is NOT a copy but expresses the continuation of the living form. > There may be something relevant in these ways of expression that will add > to our exploration of (perezhivanie). > > Bateson?s wider expression of epistemology seems to share a sense that may > align with the notion of meaning that is being worked out in the notions of > perezhivanie and institution > My turn in this direction is pursuing a hunch that I share with our > community of learners. > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: September 3, 2016 1:21 PM > To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Greg > Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > Rein, Larry, > > > > when I cite "Mind in the widest sense of the word" I should have inserted > a direct reference to Bateson's Mind and Nature (1979), where Epistemology > is defined as the science of the mind in the sense of the world of > in-formation. In both your comments, you seem to discuss epistemology as an > issue of a knowing subject with respect to an known object. In that realm > of thought, yes, you distinguish between ontology and epistemology, but you > should be aware that that is well within a dualism perspective. From the > Bostonian perspective that I pursue here, Epistemology, knowing, > in-formation, is not a matter of (individual, mentalistic) subject-mind, > but a matter of pattern and relationships that make a difference. Building > on Jung, he distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and > laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where > relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the > case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep > the bridge straight. This world includes not just humans, but more > generally life, human consciousness being one of its aspects. There is no > dualism here between matter and ideas in a Cartesian sense: everything in > Creatura is made of Pleroma stuff. > > > > Alfredo > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > Sent: 03 September 2016 19:56 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Alfredo, > I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. > I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as > *becoming* or *arising* into being. > To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving > into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary but > is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* > becomes realized consciously. > The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. > This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. > Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are > in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. > For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move through > repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The > repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional > knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary > demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The > logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied > expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes > *knowing*. > The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ > of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. > The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough for > one post > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: September 3, 2016 9:51 AM > To: Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Greg, Rein, Larry > > > is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that > institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in > the widest sense of the word") goes about? > > > Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a particular > epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but not > with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way of > seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear > Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as > those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally > constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things > become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not important > to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, or > function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they > make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of > view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are > mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in > themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their > *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not > allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the sense Andy and > David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building > bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of > stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference > between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are > interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the > world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we may > go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. > Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an epistemology, > not of an ontology. > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________ > From: Greg Thompson > Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Rein, > > I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the > arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between parts > in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The > stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of > atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the > stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are > held together in time. > > And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the > relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. > > Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the > relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the > arch of the bridge. > > It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with > "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed > (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... > > This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter of > "how it's made". > > But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This > reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the ?mental? > as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. > In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems > of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going > deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. > Question? > Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional > movement adequately? > > I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new > organs of sense?. > The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To > repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but > something is lacking? > Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but > as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and > through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new seems > to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new > organs of sense*? > > In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may > be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing > Possibly, could be. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 6 17:20:35 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 17:20:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: <1473201911802.50625@iped.uio.no> References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no> <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> <57cb768a.4e16620a.8ea5f.6a6c@mx.google.com> <1472952344828.22618@iped.uio.no> <1473201911802.50625@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo. In the paragraph below, do you mean ontological development or ontogenetic development? mike In creatura, parts-whole relations may enter into the system's development so as to alter the system itself. This happens in evolution for all species, and in ontological development as well. The ways in which it happens differently in the former and the in latter respectively (in evolution and in ontological development) may be very important issues for a cultural-historical psychology, which needs to explain culture as a feature of biology, and not as something made of a different stuff (like the stuff of which dreams are made) that nonetheless expresses itself through biological stuff. On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 3:45 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Chris, > Bostonian Batsonians are twice as good! > > As I read Bateson, the difference is this: when relations between parts > and wholes enter in the realm of Creatura, they are differences that make a > difference. Once you come to see how a part relates to a whole, you (or > knowing) no longer are the same; different levels of learning may take > place, from zero learning to learning three or what Engestr?m calls > expansive learning. Zero learning may take place within any physical > system: systems change because of experience too. But they do not learn > about their contexts of learning. Living creatures do. > > As an example, I can think of phase transitions of a gas (into liquid and > solid states). For water (and any other material), you can change the > context of this transitions by adjusting any of its criteria: you can > dramatically drop pressure and boil water into gas at relatively low > temperatures, below 100 celsius degrees. And you can change the contexts, > and the principles will remain the same (at least within a certain range of > materials/measures within newtonian physics, possibly non-newtonian > patterns are observed, I am not a physicist, but I presume that whatever > the model that may describe those non-newtonian systems best, they do not > learn to discern their own contexts in the sense living creatures do. But I > foresee that at least two objections may emerge from here, the first being > whether we should include as living systems such as Gaia, which usually are > not thought of as living and therefore not part of Creatura; and the second > being the artificial intelligence, a possible thought weak example of which > may be the text corrector that writes Bostonian when I type Bostonian, and > which may at some point learn that I most likely mean Betsonian (not the > case of my webmail, which keeps correcting me every time I write the word). > In creatura, parts-whole relations may enter into the system's development > so as to alter the system itself. This happens in evolution for all > species, and in ontological development as well. The ways in which it > happens differently in the former and the in latter respectively (in > evolution and in ontological development) may be very important issues for > a cultural-historical psychology, which needs to explain culture as a > feature of biology, and not as something made of a different stuff (like > the stuff of which dreams are made) that nonetheless expresses itself > through biological stuff. > > In Pleroma, relations between part and whole do not become the object of > descriptions within pleroma. A tree does know its context in the sense that > its evolution as a species is attached to part-wholes relations in a very > different way than the same can be said of stones. > > So how is there not a dualism? Well, yes, there is a dualism: there are > part-whole relations as part of non-living systems, and part-whole > relations as part of living systems. But the dualism is a taken to be an > outcome of our analysis, not an ontological claim concerning of what sort > of stuff is the world made. In Bateson, part-whole relations in the realm > of Pleroma are a domain of the Creatura. All in Creatura develops out of > the same stuff that we find in Pleroma: the firing of our neurons rests on > physical laws. But the changes in the pattern of the firing are not > accountable by those laws. This we all know; or perhaps should know; or > maybe I am wrong. But the point is that, with all this, I don't think > Bateson means that there is a dualism between things as such on the one > hand, and relations between things on the other. That would be something > like a Cartesian dualism: there are things in themselves, and then there > are relations between them. The former are material, the latter immaterial. > Things are stuff, and then somehow the psyche emerges out of it. No. > What Bateson proposes is not a dualism of two substances (one material and > one immaterial), but rather a way to understand how systems of > things-in-context exist at qualitatively different levels of complexity > depending on how their past comes to change their future. That is a > genetic, historical account to me, though not directly grounded in > dialectical materialism as Vygotsky's was. Things enter into relations > differently. But there are not two sort of stuff, things, and then > relations. > > I hope this is not a mess and I make some sense of Bateson here. Sorry for > the length... > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Christopher Schuck > Sent: 06 September 2016 20:06 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Alberto, > > As a current Bostonian who appreciates your perspective, I would suggest > that you were not entirely in error! > > Seriously, though, I have two questions about what you said in that post. > "[H]e distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and laws, > and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where relations > between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the case of the > atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep the bridge > straight." Did you mean to write "relations between wholes and parts are > very different *than* in the case of the [relations between wholes and > parts for] atoms...etc." (i.e. the relations between wholes and parts work > differently in each realm)? Or, were you referring more to the relationship > *between* wholes and parts similarly for both realms? > > Also, this might be a naive question, but if he is emphasizing a specific > distinction between these two worlds, how can he sustain this without a > dualism and what then is the meaningful difference if everything in > Creatura is is made of Pleroma stuff? > > Sorry if I'm missing the boat here. Thanks, Chris > > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 9:25 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Thanks Larry for the reflections. Sorry, Bostonian was intended to be > > *Betsonian* (auto-correct often bothers) > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________ > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > Sent: 04 September 2016 03:19 > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > Alfredo, > > It has been awhile since I engaged with Bateson and his radical > > transformation of the meaning of *mind* > > > > I was approaching epistemology (ways of knowing) from my biased location > > immersed in reading through the logic of M-P?s institution. > > Mind in the way Bateson or Buddhism express this phenomena as you say are > > transforming the very meaning of (mind). > > When you mention the Bostonian perspective i am unfamiliar with this > > reference. > > > > The term *meaning* is core to M-P?s exploration of institution and his > > focus on the inseparability of the instituting & instituted subject > > *dwelling* within meaning. > > > > Meaning is also core to the exploration of perezhivanie and that is what > > drew me to Kym?s article. In her article she references a key moment in > > M-P?s Institution and Passivity that focuses on the centrality of meaning > > cores that develop and animate life & are inherently overcome. > > M-P speaks of a subject who: > > Invests itself, I.e., animates itself with another meaning, transforms > > itself ..., I.e., succeeds in making a meaning which is transcendent to > him > > *dwell* in his I think, and (dwells) in his body AS a meaning dwells in > the > > book and dwells in the cultural object. > > > > M-P is attempting to develop a language to express the way thinking, the > > body, books, and cultural objects all *dwell* within meaning & also the > way > > the meaning the person realizes always *exceeds* the person. > > Rein mentions the tearing down and rebuilding of the temple every 20 > years > > that is NOT a copy but expresses the continuation of the living form. > > There may be something relevant in these ways of expression that will add > > to our exploration of (perezhivanie). > > > > Bateson?s wider expression of epistemology seems to share a sense that > may > > align with the notion of meaning that is being worked out in the notions > of > > perezhivanie and institution > > My turn in this direction is pursuing a hunch that I share with our > > community of learners. > > > > > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: September 3, 2016 1:21 PM > > To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Greg > > Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > > > Rein, Larry, > > > > > > > > when I cite "Mind in the widest sense of the word" I should have inserted > > a direct reference to Bateson's Mind and Nature (1979), where > Epistemology > > is defined as the science of the mind in the sense of the world of > > in-formation. In both your comments, you seem to discuss epistemology as > an > > issue of a knowing subject with respect to an known object. In that realm > > of thought, yes, you distinguish between ontology and epistemology, but > you > > should be aware that that is well within a dualism perspective. From the > > Bostonian perspective that I pursue here, Epistemology, knowing, > > in-formation, is not a matter of (individual, mentalistic) subject-mind, > > but a matter of pattern and relationships that make a difference. > Building > > on Jung, he distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces > and > > laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where > > relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the > > case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep > > the bridge straight. This world includes not just humans, but more > > generally life, human consciousness being one of its aspects. There is no > > dualism here between matter and ideas in a Cartesian sense: everything in > > Creatura is made of Pleroma stuff. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > Sent: 03 September 2016 19:56 > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > Alfredo, > > I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. > > I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as > > *becoming* or *arising* into being. > > To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving > > into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary > but > > is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* > > becomes realized consciously. > > The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. > > This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. > > Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are > > in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. > > For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move > through > > repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The > > repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional > > knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary > > demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The > > logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied > > expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes > > *knowing*. > > The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ > > of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. > > The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough > for > > one post > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: September 3, 2016 9:51 AM > > To: Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, > > Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > Greg, Rein, Larry > > > > > > is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that > > institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in > > the widest sense of the word") goes about? > > > > > > Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a > particular > > epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but > not > > with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way > of > > seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear > > Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as > > those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally > > constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things > > become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not > important > > to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, > or > > function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they > > make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of > > view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are > > mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in > > themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their > > *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not > > allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the sense Andy > and > > David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building > > bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of > > stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference > > between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are > > interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the > > world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we > may > > go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. > > Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an > epistemology, > > not of an ontology. > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________ > > From: Greg Thompson > > Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > Rein, > > > > I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the > > arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between > parts > > in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The > > stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of > > atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the > > stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are > > held together in time. > > > > And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the > > relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. > > > > Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the > > relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the > > arch of the bridge. > > > > It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with > > "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed > > (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... > > > > This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter > of > > "how it's made". > > > > But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, > pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This > > reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the > ?mental? > > as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. > > In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems > > of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going > > deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. > > Question? > > Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional > > movement adequately? > > > > I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new > > organs of sense?. > > The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To > > repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but > > something is lacking? > > Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but > > as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and > > through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new > seems > > to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new > > organs of sense*? > > > > In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may > > be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing > > Possibly, could be. > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Sep 6 17:55:55 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 00:55:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes In-Reply-To: References: <1472840840446.44281@iped.uio.no> <386B3E10-D8C2-421D-8ACD-AE2858087CEF@uniandes.edu.co> <02932BA6-E416-40B9-A95E-4BD32E925012@uniandes.edu.co> <7CF7A652-49AE-4C01-B0D7-7CE06628BC7D@tlu.ee> <0AFC2B9C-4B7A-4353-B473-960F3440AB84@uniandes.edu.co> <57ca4d40.4618620a.a1eda.dadc@mx.google.com> <1472881766302.59549@iped.uio.no> <57cace49.4563620a.34a26.02e7@mx.google.com> <1472920404210.50771@iped.uio.no> <57cb0eba.41e8420a.ccb00.2722@mx.google.com> <1472934090867.78597@iped.uio.no> <57cb768a.4e16620a.8ea5f.6a6c@mx.google.com> <1472952344828.22618@iped.uio.no> <1473201911802.50625@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1473209753626.25107@iped.uio.no> Ontogenetic, sorry, when it's not my computer is my clumsy brain... Also, when it says "thought weak example" means "though weak". Many more typos surely, I'll have to proofread before pressing the "send" button. Apologies, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 07 September 2016 02:20 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes Alfredo. In the paragraph below, do you mean ontological development or ontogenetic development? mike In creatura, parts-whole relations may enter into the system's development so as to alter the system itself. This happens in evolution for all species, and in ontological development as well. The ways in which it happens differently in the former and the in latter respectively (in evolution and in ontological development) may be very important issues for a cultural-historical psychology, which needs to explain culture as a feature of biology, and not as something made of a different stuff (like the stuff of which dreams are made) that nonetheless expresses itself through biological stuff. On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 3:45 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Chris, > Bostonian Batsonians are twice as good! > > As I read Bateson, the difference is this: when relations between parts > and wholes enter in the realm of Creatura, they are differences that make a > difference. Once you come to see how a part relates to a whole, you (or > knowing) no longer are the same; different levels of learning may take > place, from zero learning to learning three or what Engestr?m calls > expansive learning. Zero learning may take place within any physical > system: systems change because of experience too. But they do not learn > about their contexts of learning. Living creatures do. > > As an example, I can think of phase transitions of a gas (into liquid and > solid states). For water (and any other material), you can change the > context of this transitions by adjusting any of its criteria: you can > dramatically drop pressure and boil water into gas at relatively low > temperatures, below 100 celsius degrees. And you can change the contexts, > and the principles will remain the same (at least within a certain range of > materials/measures within newtonian physics, possibly non-newtonian > patterns are observed, I am not a physicist, but I presume that whatever > the model that may describe those non-newtonian systems best, they do not > learn to discern their own contexts in the sense living creatures do. But I > foresee that at least two objections may emerge from here, the first being > whether we should include as living systems such as Gaia, which usually are > not thought of as living and therefore not part of Creatura; and the second > being the artificial intelligence, a possible thought weak example of which > may be the text corrector that writes Bostonian when I type Bostonian, and > which may at some point learn that I most likely mean Betsonian (not the > case of my webmail, which keeps correcting me every time I write the word). > In creatura, parts-whole relations may enter into the system's development > so as to alter the system itself. This happens in evolution for all > species, and in ontological development as well. The ways in which it > happens differently in the former and the in latter respectively (in > evolution and in ontological development) may be very important issues for > a cultural-historical psychology, which needs to explain culture as a > feature of biology, and not as something made of a different stuff (like > the stuff of which dreams are made) that nonetheless expresses itself > through biological stuff. > > In Pleroma, relations between part and whole do not become the object of > descriptions within pleroma. A tree does know its context in the sense that > its evolution as a species is attached to part-wholes relations in a very > different way than the same can be said of stones. > > So how is there not a dualism? Well, yes, there is a dualism: there are > part-whole relations as part of non-living systems, and part-whole > relations as part of living systems. But the dualism is a taken to be an > outcome of our analysis, not an ontological claim concerning of what sort > of stuff is the world made. In Bateson, part-whole relations in the realm > of Pleroma are a domain of the Creatura. All in Creatura develops out of > the same stuff that we find in Pleroma: the firing of our neurons rests on > physical laws. But the changes in the pattern of the firing are not > accountable by those laws. This we all know; or perhaps should know; or > maybe I am wrong. But the point is that, with all this, I don't think > Bateson means that there is a dualism between things as such on the one > hand, and relations between things on the other. That would be something > like a Cartesian dualism: there are things in themselves, and then there > are relations between them. The former are material, the latter immaterial. > Things are stuff, and then somehow the psyche emerges out of it. No. > What Bateson proposes is not a dualism of two substances (one material and > one immaterial), but rather a way to understand how systems of > things-in-context exist at qualitatively different levels of complexity > depending on how their past comes to change their future. That is a > genetic, historical account to me, though not directly grounded in > dialectical materialism as Vygotsky's was. Things enter into relations > differently. But there are not two sort of stuff, things, and then > relations. > > I hope this is not a mess and I make some sense of Bateson here. Sorry for > the length... > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Christopher Schuck > Sent: 06 September 2016 20:06 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > Alberto, > > As a current Bostonian who appreciates your perspective, I would suggest > that you were not entirely in error! > > Seriously, though, I have two questions about what you said in that post. > "[H]e distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces and laws, > and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where relations > between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the case of the > atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep the bridge > straight." Did you mean to write "relations between wholes and parts are > very different *than* in the case of the [relations between wholes and > parts for] atoms...etc." (i.e. the relations between wholes and parts work > differently in each realm)? Or, were you referring more to the relationship > *between* wholes and parts similarly for both realms? > > Also, this might be a naive question, but if he is emphasizing a specific > distinction between these two worlds, how can he sustain this without a > dualism and what then is the meaningful difference if everything in > Creatura is is made of Pleroma stuff? > > Sorry if I'm missing the boat here. Thanks, Chris > > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 9:25 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Thanks Larry for the reflections. Sorry, Bostonian was intended to be > > *Betsonian* (auto-correct often bothers) > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________ > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > Sent: 04 September 2016 03:19 > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > Alfredo, > > It has been awhile since I engaged with Bateson and his radical > > transformation of the meaning of *mind* > > > > I was approaching epistemology (ways of knowing) from my biased location > > immersed in reading through the logic of M-P?s institution. > > Mind in the way Bateson or Buddhism express this phenomena as you say are > > transforming the very meaning of (mind). > > When you mention the Bostonian perspective i am unfamiliar with this > > reference. > > > > The term *meaning* is core to M-P?s exploration of institution and his > > focus on the inseparability of the instituting & instituted subject > > *dwelling* within meaning. > > > > Meaning is also core to the exploration of perezhivanie and that is what > > drew me to Kym?s article. In her article she references a key moment in > > M-P?s Institution and Passivity that focuses on the centrality of meaning > > cores that develop and animate life & are inherently overcome. > > M-P speaks of a subject who: > > Invests itself, I.e., animates itself with another meaning, transforms > > itself ..., I.e., succeeds in making a meaning which is transcendent to > him > > *dwell* in his I think, and (dwells) in his body AS a meaning dwells in > the > > book and dwells in the cultural object. > > > > M-P is attempting to develop a language to express the way thinking, the > > body, books, and cultural objects all *dwell* within meaning & also the > way > > the meaning the person realizes always *exceeds* the person. > > Rein mentions the tearing down and rebuilding of the temple every 20 > years > > that is NOT a copy but expresses the continuation of the living form. > > There may be something relevant in these ways of expression that will add > > to our exploration of (perezhivanie). > > > > Bateson?s wider expression of epistemology seems to share a sense that > may > > align with the notion of meaning that is being worked out in the notions > of > > perezhivanie and institution > > My turn in this direction is pursuing a hunch that I share with our > > community of learners. > > > > > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: September 3, 2016 1:21 PM > > To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Greg > > Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > > > Rein, Larry, > > > > > > > > when I cite "Mind in the widest sense of the word" I should have inserted > > a direct reference to Bateson's Mind and Nature (1979), where > Epistemology > > is defined as the science of the mind in the sense of the world of > > in-formation. In both your comments, you seem to discuss epistemology as > an > > issue of a knowing subject with respect to an known object. In that realm > > of thought, yes, you distinguish between ontology and epistemology, but > you > > should be aware that that is well within a dualism perspective. From the > > Bostonian perspective that I pursue here, Epistemology, knowing, > > in-formation, is not a matter of (individual, mentalistic) subject-mind, > > but a matter of pattern and relationships that make a difference. > Building > > on Jung, he distinguishes between Pleroma, the world of physical forces > and > > laws, and Creatura, the world of descriptions, of information, where > > relations between wholes and parts are very different as they are in the > > case of the atoms that compose the stone, or the physical laws that keep > > the bridge straight. This world includes not just humans, but more > > generally life, human consciousness being one of its aspects. There is no > > dualism here between matter and ideas in a Cartesian sense: everything in > > Creatura is made of Pleroma stuff. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > Sent: 03 September 2016 19:56 > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > Alfredo, > > I read epistemology as ways of *knowing* including knowing *being*. > > I hear ontology focused on *being* as more accurately depicted as > > *becoming* or *arising* into being. > > To *know* or to have knowledge of this arising phenomena (becoming moving > > into being as a particular ontology or working ontology) is not primary > but > > is more retrospective/ reflective occurring after the event that *then* > > becomes realized consciously. > > The entre deux is *inserting* a 3rd aspect into the relational meshwork. > > This insertion may be *mediation* that is bi-directional. > > Rein refers to *ity* and the relation of subjectiv/ITY & objectiv/ITY are > > in Buddhist terms co-dependent arisings. > > For M-P the institution of both subjectiv/ity and objectivity move > through > > repetition (but not repetition of the same or identical copies). The > > repetition is bi-directional regression to crystallized institutional > > knowing & the tendency for all forms to overcome their boundary > > demarcations transforming *beyond* the realm of conscious *knowing*. The > > logic of institution for M-P is a subterranean movement of embodied > > expression (gesture, inclination) through environments that precedes > > *knowing*. > > The relation of both epistemology and ontology shift with this new organ > > of sense *developing* through co-dependent arising. > > The word *passivity* will need to be inserted at some point but enough > for > > one post > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: September 3, 2016 9:51 AM > > To: Greg Thompson; eXtended Mind, > > Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > Greg, Rein, Larry > > > > > > is it not that Rein was talking about *working ontologies*, but that > > institution and constitution are about epistemology? about how Mind ("in > > the widest sense of the word") goes about? > > > > > > Ontology, seems to me, has not much to do with life, but with a > particular > > epistemology that concerns itself with either things or with life, but > not > > with their relation (which is what epistemology is about). And in my way > of > > seeing it, the interesting discussion is about epistemology. ??I hear > > Larry's comments on the bi-directionality of part and whole, as well as > > those comments from Greg about humanly constructed or naturally > > constructed, as being about epistemology, about History, about how things > > become, not just how they are. This is not to say that it is not > important > > to be clear about what one refers to when saying part, whole, or entity, > or > > function, etc, but that these questions are interesting as per how they > > make our epistemologies better or worst. From an epistemological point of > > view, that relations between stones rather than stones in themselves are > > mental (of the type of ideas) is not a comment about what they are in > > themselves (as opposed to what stones are in themselves) but about their > > *genetical* function with regard to Mind. A focus on stones alone did not > > allow the concept of arch to ascend to the concrete in the sense Andy > and > > David were commenting, to develop into a new cultural form of building > > bridges. Attending to the arch-like properties of some arrangements of > > stones (bridges) did. In that sense, Rein comments on the difference > > between treating stones as entities or as characters of a formula are > > interesting, in my view, not in that they better or worse describe the > > world as it is, but in that they describe two possible ways in which we > may > > go about stones and bridges in development of forms of (human) life. > > Institution and constitution are, in my view, elements of an > epistemology, > > not of an ontology. > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________ > > From: Greg Thompson > > Sent: 03 September 2016 16:27 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: Alfredo Jornet Gil; David Kellogg > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Parts and wholes > > > > Rein, > > > > I'm confused about the ontological distinction between the stone and the > > arch. Seems like the stone is just a collection of relations between > parts > > in the same way that the arch is a relation between parts of stones. The > > stone is made up of molecular relations that are subsequently made up of > > atomic relations. If you look at the atomic and molecular scale of the > > stone, it looks something like a bridge - a bundle of relations that are > > held together in time. > > > > And if you look across long enough scales of time, you could watch the > > relations of molecules begin to fall apart as the stones turn to dust. > > > > Thus if we look across longer timescales or smaller spacescales, the > > relational nature of the stone is no more "closed and implicit" than the > > arch of the bridge. > > > > It seems like the important difference between the two has to do with > > "humanly-constructed" vs. "naturally constructed"? One was constructed > > (instituted) by human ideas, the other by natural ones... > > > > This seems less of an ontological matter and more of a practical matter > of > > "how it's made". > > > > But, perhaps I've misunderstood the proposed ontological distinction? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:21 AM, > pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Alfredo, I notice you referred to the ?mental? in scare quotes. This > > reminds me of an earlier post where we explored the notion of the > ?mental? > > as an aspect of our ?folk? psychology. > > In the background I also hear David Kellogg moving from material problems > > of existential problems with flooding bridges, abstracting and going > > deeper, and then re/turning to the concrete. > > Question? > > Does the language of *parts and wholes* express this bi-directional > > movement adequately? > > > > I also hear in the background Merleau-Panty's notion of developing ?new > > organs of sense?. > > The word ?repetition* in relation to same/difference seems critical. To > > repeat the (identical) may be technology, mechanical, scientism, but > > something is lacking? > > Reading the movement of *repetition* not as (identical) or the (same) but > > as bidirectional *back and forth* through questions and answers, and > > through regression to the known and anticipation of *something* new > seems > > to be a particular notion of movement, moving towards developing *new > > organs of sense*? > > > > In anticipation of discussing the meaning of perezhivanie it seems we may > > be *setting the table* for a lovely chat by opening a clearing > > Possibly, could be. > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From smago@uga.edu Wed Sep 7 02:43:47 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 09:43:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] JoLLE 2017 Conference Call for Proposals Message-ID: https://www.smore.com/h0ned [https://d1zqayhc1yz6oo.cloudfront.net/57c9e1dab1e3290c4c4fdfea-screenshot-fb_wide.jpg?_v=1473166571] JoLLE 2017 Conference www.smore.com Keynote Speaker 1-2 p.m. Saturday, Feb. 4 Nick Sousanis is an assistant professor in the School of Humanities & Liberal Studies at San... From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Sep 9 10:25:51 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 11:25:51 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [AAA_ACYIG] Opening - Asst/Assoc Professor at CSULB In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Human Development position at CSU-Long Beach. Neat department they have there. -greg ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Lauren Heidbrink Date: Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 6:13 PM Subject: [AAA_ACYIG] Opening - Asst/Assoc Professor at CSULB To: ACYIG Dear Colleagues, The Department of Human Development at California State University, Long Beach is pleased to announce that we are hiring for Assistant/Associate Professor. Please find additional details below and by following this link: https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/jobs/7649 *CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, LONG BEACH* *College of Liberal Arts* *Department of Human Development* *Tenure-Track Position Opening* *RECRUITMENT NUMBER: *2399 *POSITION*: Assistant/Associate Professor of Human Development *EFFECTIVE DATE: *August 21, 2017 (Fall Semester) *SALARY RANGE: *Commensurate with qualifications and experience *MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS:* ? Ph. D. in Human Development or contributing discipline (e.g., Anthropology, Psychology, Public Health, or Sociology) ? Degree at time of application or official notification of the completion of the doctoral degree by August 1, 2017 ? Demonstrated ability or potential to effectively teach undergraduate courses in Human Development ? Demonstrated potential for successful research and publication ? Strong background in theories and research related to human development ? Demonstrated commitment to working successfully with a diverse student population *DESIRED/PREFERRED QUALIFICATIONS:* ? Demonstrated ability to teach specialized courses on race and ethnicity and/or adulthood and aging ? Demonstrated ability to teach lifespan development within the contexts of diverse communities ? Demonstrated ability to teach courses from an interdisciplinary perspective ? Demonstrated ability to mentor student research ? Specific area of research should focus on topics relevant to race/ethnicity and/or adulthood and aging ? Demonstrated ability to conduct research leading to publication in areas relevant to the department?s mission ? Experience working in an interdisciplinary context ? Evidence of or potential for department, college, university, and community service *DUTIES: * ? Teach courses in appropriate area(s) of expertise ? Supervise undergraduate students in research and fieldwork ? Engage in scholarly activities leading to publication ? Participate in service to department, college, university, and community CSULB seeks to recruit faculty who enthusiastically support the University?s strong commitment to the academic success of all of our students, including students of color, students with disabilities, students who are first generation to college, veterans, students with diverse socio-economic backgrounds, and students of diverse sexual orientations and gender expressions. CSULB seeks to recruit and retain a diverse workforce as a reflection of our commitment to serve the People of California, to maintain the excellence of the University, and to offer our students a rich variety of expertise, perspectives, and ways of knowing and learning. *REQUIRED **DOCUMENTATION: * - A Student Success Statement about your teaching or other experiences, successes, and challenges in working with a diverse student population (approximately one page, single-spaced) - Letter of application addressing the minimum and desired/preferred qualifications - CV (including current email address) - Teaching statement, sample syllabus, and student evaluations - Research statement and writing sample - Three current letters of recommendation - Copy of transcript from institution awarding highest degree - Finalists will also be required to submit a signed SC-1 form, three original letters of recommendation (if not already submitted), and an official transcript A background check (including a criminal records check) must be completed satisfactorily before any candidate can be offered a position with the CSU. Failure to satisfactorily complete the background check may affect the application status of applicants or continued employment of current CSU employees who apply for the position. Applications and required documentation should be submitted electronically through: *Academic Jobs Online* https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/jobs/7649 Requests for information should be addressed to: Dr. Christine El Ouardani, Search Committee Department of Human Development California State University, Long Beach 1250 Bellflower Boulevard Long Beach, CA 90840-0907 Christine.Elouardani@csulb.edu *APPLICATION DEADLINE*: Review of applications to begin November 4 Position open until filled (or recruitment canceled) CSULB is committed to creating a community in which a diverse population can learn, live, and work in an atmosphere of tolerance, civility and respect for the rights and sensibilities of each individual, without regard to race, color, national origin, ancestry, religious creed, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, marital status, disability, medical condition, age, Vietnam era veteran status, or any other veteran's status. CSULB is an Equal Opportunity Employer. Lauren Heidbrink, MA/MS, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Human Development California State University, Long Beach 1250 Bellflower Blvd., LA3-200G Long Beach, California 90840 Tel: 562.985.5290 Skype: laurenheidbrink Email: lauren.heidbrink@csulb.edu Website: www.youthcirculations.com Book: Migrant Youth, Transnational Families and the State: Care and Contested Interests. University of Pennsylvania Press.? _______________________________________________ American Anthropological Association's Anthropology of Children and Youth Interest Group Listserv. AAA_ACYIG@binhost.com To view the message archives, please visit: https://lists.capalon.com/pipermail/aaa_acyig/ For help with this list, please contact the List Administrator acyig.aaa AT gmail DOT com You may also manage your own subscription preferences at: https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/aaa_acyig Note: To stop receiving email from this list, please set your account to DISABLED. ACYIG hosts Collaborative Research Networks! Visit the sites for CRN Mobilities, CRN Lifecourse, and/or CRN Students to sign up for their listservs (http://acyig.americananthro.org/crns/). AAA_ACYIG mailing list AAA_ACYIG@binhost.com https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/aaa_acyig -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 13 08:59:02 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 08:59:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Tenure-track position in Developmental Science - York University In-Reply-To: <8AC309EE-8978-4B02-9FF7-2F84B7B70B93@yorku.ca> References: <8AC309EE-8978-4B02-9FF7-2F84B7B70B93@yorku.ca> Message-ID: Post-election employment.? mike Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Tenure-track position in Developmental Science - York University To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Developmental Science The Department of Psychology at York University (http://psyc.info.yorku.ca/) invites applications for a full-time tenure-track position at the rank of Assistant or Associate Professor in Developmental Science to commence July 1, 2017, subject to budgetary approval. Candidates with a PhD in Psychology (or related area) and a strong program of research in any area of Developmental Science are encouraged to apply. A priority research area is some aspect of cognitive development in childhood but all applicants with active research programs in developmental science will be given full consideration. The successful candidate must demonstrate excellence, or promise of excellence, in scholarly research and excellence in teaching. Pedagogical innovation in high priority areas such as experiential education and technology enhanced learning is an asset. The position will involve graduate teaching and supervision, as well as undergraduate teaching and supervision of honours students. Candidates must provide evidence of an ability to work collaboratively and will be expected to contribute through service to the department, faculty and university. The successful candidate must be eligible for prompt appointment to the Faculty of Graduate Studies. York University is known for championing new ways of thinking that drive teaching and research excellence. Through cross-discipline programming, innovative course design, diverse experiential learning and a supportive community environment, our students receive the education they need to create big ideas that make an impact on the world. Located in Toronto, York is the third largest university in Canada, with a strong community of 53,000 students, 7,000 faculty and administrative staff, and 295,000+ alumni. Our Psychology Department is ranked among the top 100 in the world according to 2016 QS World Rankings. York University is an Affirmative Action (AA) employer and strongly values diversity, including gender and sexual diversity, within its community. The AA program, which applies to Aboriginal people, visible minorities, people with disabilities, and women, can be found at www.yorku.ca/acadjobs or by calling the AA office at 416-736-5713. All qualified candidates are encouraged to apply; however, Canadian citizens and permanent residents will be given priority. A cover letter of application, an up-to-date curriculum vitae, a statement of research and teaching interests, three reprints or preprints, and teaching evaluations (if available) should be uploaded into a single .pdf file and sent by November 1, 2016 to email: psycjobs@yorku.ca. Arrangements should be made for three signed confidential letters of reference to be submitted by this deadline to the same email and addressed to Chair, Developmental Science Search Committee, 296 Behavioural Science Building, Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M3J 1P3. We thank all applicants for their interest, however, only those selected for an interview will be contacted. This ad can also be seen at: http://webapps.yorku.ca/academichiringviewer/ viewposition.jsp?positionnumber=1649 _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 13 10:34:27 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 10:34:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Open Rank Professor of Psychology Position - Stanford University In-Reply-To: <8067B9EB-D472-4B1D-B649-F00272DED5FE@stanford.edu> References: <8067B9EB-D472-4B1D-B649-F00272DED5FE@stanford.edu> Message-ID: Another good job for the right person. mike Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Open Rank Professor of Psychology Position - Stanford University To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" The Department of Psychology at Stanford University, in collaboration with the Center for the Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity, is seeking applicants at any rank for a tenure-track or tenured faculty position who do research that addresses issues of race, ethnicity, and social groups, broadly construed. This position is open to researchers who study these topics in all sub-disciplines of psychology represented in the department, including affective, cognitive, developmental, cognitive neuroscience, and social psychology. Applicants will be expected to teach courses at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Applicants should provide a curriculum vitae (including bibliography), a brief statement of research interests, a teaching statement, and copies of at most three scholarly papers. Junior candidates should request three letters of reference. For full consideration, materials must be received by October 31, 2016. Equal consideration will be given to promising junior scholars and more senior, tenured faculty. Please apply through AcademicJobsOnline.org at *https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/jobs/7438 *. Stanford University is an equal opportunity employer and is committed to increasing the diversity of its faculty. It welcomes nominations of, and applications from, women, members of minority groups, protected veterans and individuals with disabilities, as well as others who would bring additional dimensions to the university?s research, teaching and clinical missions. From vinorosa5@gmail.com Fri Sep 16 23:45:40 2016 From: vinorosa5@gmail.com (vinorosa5) Date: Sat, 17 Sep 2016 14:45:40 +0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Open Rank Professor of Psychology Position - Stanford University In-Reply-To: References: <8067B9EB-D472-4B1D-B649-F00272DED5FE@stanford.edu> Message-ID: To whom it may concern: Please unsubscribe me (vinorosa5@gmail.com) from this mailing list. Thanks! > mike cole ? 2016?9?14? ??1:34 ??? > > Another good job for the right person. > mike > > Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Open Rank Professor of Psychology Position - Stanford > University > To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" > > > The Department of Psychology at Stanford University, in collaboration with > the Center for the Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity, is seeking > applicants at any rank for a tenure-track or tenured faculty position who do > research that addresses issues of race, ethnicity, and social groups, > broadly construed. This position is open to researchers who study these > topics in all sub-disciplines of psychology represented in the department, > including affective, cognitive, developmental, cognitive neuroscience, and > social psychology. Applicants will be expected to teach courses at both the > graduate and undergraduate levels. > > > Applicants should provide a curriculum vitae (including bibliography), a > brief statement of research interests, a teaching statement, and copies of > at most three scholarly papers. > > Junior candidates should request three letters of reference. For full > consideration, materials must be received by October 31, 2016. Equal > consideration will be given to promising junior scholars and more senior, > tenured faculty. Please apply through AcademicJobsOnline.org at > *https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/jobs/7438 > *. > > > > Stanford University is an equal opportunity employer and is committed to > increasing the diversity of its faculty. It welcomes nominations of, and > applications from, women, members of minority groups, protected veterans > and individuals with disabilities, as well as others who would bring > additional dimensions to the university?s research, teaching and clinical > missions. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Sep 17 08:21:07 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 17 Sep 2016 08:21:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Four tenure-track positions at University of California Merced In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Jobs ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Rose Scott* Date: Friday, September 16, 2016 Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Four tenure-track positions at University of California Merced To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org The University of California, Merced is recruiting between one and four Assistant, Associate, or Full Professors as part of a cluster hire in the area of Inequality, Power, and Social Justice focused on issues related to 1) Identity, Experience, and Representation and 2) Structural and Institutional Inequality. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to: Identity and development; Individual, family, and community factors involved in the healthy development of children; and mechanisms of disparities in developmental outcomes. We are especially interested in applicants who examine issues involving diverse populations, including multiculturalism, multilingualism, health disparities, and cultural and socioeconomic influences on development. Full details are available at: https://aprecruit.ucmerced.edu/apply/JPF00389 -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From smago@uga.edu Wed Sep 21 06:45:55 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 13:45:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] JoLLE Conference In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello Friends, Please consider submitting a proposal to the Journal of Language and Literacy's 2017 Winter Conference. The theme of this year's conference and subsequent spring issue is Out of the Box and Into the Margins. This year JoLLE features educators and students who take risks, sometimes subversively, to employ and widen the spaces between the essentializing forces that we all face. We invite artists, gamers, remixers, techies, and fandoms. We invite all who experiment with the intertwining of identities and all who refuse to be labeled to share and explore how to exert agency within highly constrained contexts--or, in other words, how to move out of the box and into the margins. We invite national and international scholars with ranging research interests in language and literacy education to join us for a participatory conversation on various topics within our field. JoLLE understands literacy in broad terms and welcomes a range of research projects, approaches, and methods. A hallmark of the JoLLE Conference is the interactive and engaging presentations for both attendees and presenters. The deadline for conference proposal submissions is October 12, 2016 at 11:59pm EST. There is more information available both in the attached flyer and at http://jolle.coe.uga.edu/conference/. Feel free to share this information widely with others. Additionally, JoLLE, a peer-reviewed journal, welcomes manuscript submissions for its Spring 2016 issue based on the conference theme, and invites those who present at the conference to consider submitting papers for publication consideration. The deadline for manuscript submissions based on the conference theme is February 28, 2017. Direct any questions about the conference to the chair, Rachel Kaminski Sanders at rks76772@uga.edu. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JoLLE Winter 2017 Conference Flyer PRINT.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 912651 bytes Desc: JoLLE Winter 2017 Conference Flyer PRINT.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160921/2cb719f1/attachment-0003.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: JoLLE Winter 2017 Conference Flyer PRINT.pdf.html Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160921/2cb719f1/attachment-0001.pl -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JoLLE-2017-Conference-Call-for-Proposals-8.25.01-1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 3369302 bytes Desc: JoLLE-2017-Conference-Call-for-Proposals-8.25.01-1.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160921/2cb719f1/attachment-0004.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JoLLE-Winter-2017-Conference-Proposal-Rubric-2.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 274410 bytes Desc: JoLLE-Winter-2017-Conference-Proposal-Rubric-2.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160921/2cb719f1/attachment-0005.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JoLLE-Winter-2017-Conference-Proposal-Template-2.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 140257 bytes Desc: JoLLE-Winter-2017-Conference-Proposal-Template-2.docx Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160921/2cb719f1/attachment-0001.bin From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Sep 21 11:37:54 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 11:37:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor - Developmental Psychology (UofT) In-Reply-To: <015801d21411$3376a9e0$9a63fda0$@psych.utoronto.ca> References: <015801d21411$3376a9e0$9a63fda0$@psych.utoronto.ca> Message-ID: Another good job for the right person. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Psychology Chair Date: Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 7:05 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor - Developmental Psychology (UofT) To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org The Department of Psychology at the University of Toronto invites applications for a tenure-stream appointment at the rank of Assistant Professor in the area of developmental psychology. The appointment will commence on July 1, 2017. Applicants must have a Ph.D. in developmental psychology or a closely related field by the date of appointment or shortly thereafter. Evidence of excellence in teaching and programmatic research is necessary. Evidence of excellence in research will be demonstrated by, primarily, high-quality research papers in leading journals in the field and presentations at significant conferences, as well as through strong letters of reference of high international standing. Evidence of excellence in teaching will be demonstrated through teaching accomplishments and the teaching portfolio (including a statement of teaching philosophy and teaching evaluations, if available) submitted as part of the application, as well as strong reference letters. The appointee will join a strong group of research-oriented colleagues who are committed to teaching at both the undergraduate and graduate levels while conducting research at the highest level and supervising graduate students. We invite applications from outstanding scholars in all areas of developmental psychology, but priority will be given to candidates with areas of expertise in infant development or very early childhood which will bring a unique element to the developmental psychology group while complementing existing strengths. Postdoctoral experience will be considered an asset. The successful candidate will be expected to maintain an active, externally-funded program of research and be committed to both undergraduate and graduate education. Salary will be commensurate with qualifications and experience. All qualified applicants are invited to apply by visiting http://www.hrandequity.utoronto.ca/careers/co.htm#Academic. Click on ?Faculty Opportunities? and search for Job # 1601392. Applicants should submit a complete and current curriculum vitae, a research statement outlining their strong and programmatic research approach, and a teaching portfolio (including a statement of teaching philosophy and teaching evaluations, if available). All application materials should be submitted online. Submission guidelines can be found at: http://uoft.me/how-to-apply. Applicants should also ask at least three referees to send strong letters of recommendation (signed, scanned and on letterhead) directly to the department via e-mail to chair@psych.utoronto.ca by the review date of December 12, 2016. The committee will begin to consider applications as of December 12, 2016 and applications will be accepted until the position is filled. Inquiries should be directed to Professor Susanne Ferber, Chair of the Department of Psychology (chair@psych.utoronto.ca). For more information about the Department of Psychology, please visit our home page at http://home.psych.utoronto.ca/. The University of Toronto offers the opportunity to teach, conduct research, and live in one of the most diverse cities in the world. The University of Toronto is strongly committed to diversity within its community and especially welcomes applications from racialized persons/persons of colour, women, Indigenous/Aboriginal People of North America, persons with disabilities, LGBTQ persons, and others who may contribute to the further diversification of ideas. As part of your application, you will be asked to complete a brief Diversity Survey. This survey is voluntary. Any information directly related to you is confidential and cannot be accessed by search committees or human resources staff. Results will be aggregated for institutional planning purposes. For more information, please see http://uoft.me/UP. All qualified candidates are encouraged to apply; however, Canadians and permanent residents will be given priority. _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Sep 21 15:27:01 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 15:27:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] How 'Safe Spaces' Are Roiling British Higher Education - The Chronicle of Higher Education Message-ID: <57e30941.a80e420a.5b1ee.701c@mx.google.com> How 'Safe Spaces' Are Roiling British Higher Education As in the United States, the campus idea has become something of a political football in Britain, where even the prime minister has weighed in.? I THOUGHT THIS MAY BE AN INTERESTING ADDITION EXPLORING SAFE SPACES (OR REFUGE) THIS TIME FROM GREAT BRITAIN. ALSO IN LIGHT OF OBAMA?S LAST SPEECH TO THE UN WHICH OFFERED A VERY COHERENT NARRATIVE OF HOW OBAMA REPRESENTS A PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVE ON MODERNITY AND DEMOCRACY http://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Safe-Spaces-Are-Roiling/237833?cid=gn&utm_source=gn&utm_medium=en&elqTrackId=05ad1ea231134a9897b956095b2c04d0&elq=04d8ed06359b4bffbcad203acca06e24&elqaid=10805&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=4100 Sent from my Windows 10 phone From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 22 07:58:34 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 07:58:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Faculty Position (Developmental Science) at UMass Amherst In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: FYI ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Joonkoo Park* Date: Thursday, 22 September 2016 Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Faculty Position (Developmental Science) at UMass Amherst To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org My apologies. The link to the application website is now corrected in this new ad. ================================ The *Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences* at the University of Massachusetts Amherst (http://www.umass.edu/pbs/) invites applications for a *tenure-track faculty position in its Developmental Science* Division, starting fall, 2017. We are seeking talented applicants qualified for an assistant professor position. Under exceptional circumstances, highly qualified candidates at other ranks may receive consideration. We seek an outstanding scientist to join our Developmental Science program. We are expanding a robust multidisciplinary research and training program that approaches development with an integrative framework incorporating multiple domains and contexts. Program resources include a new developmental research center at the UMass Center in Springfield ( http://healthydevelopment.org), and new fMRI facility at UMass Amherst ( https://www.umass.edu/ials/hmrc). Candidates in any area of developmental psychology will be considered. However, special consideration will be given to candidates whose research interests create synergies with current faculty. Research areas could include: affective, social, cognitive, or cultural neuroscience; familial or cultural underpinnings of development; genetic or epigenetic processes and developmental trajectories; stress; and learning processes. For examples of potentially relevant connections, see the links at the end of this ad. Visit our website ( http://www.umass.edu/pbs/) for more information about the department. The Developmental Science program and the department are committed to sustaining a diverse, inclusive community of faculty, students, and staff with the conviction that such an environment catalyzes learning and cultivates ethical, informed, and prepared citizens. We are especially interested in qualified candidates whose research, teaching, and service reflect engagement with varied perspectives and constituencies. Applicants must have a Ph.D. in Developmental Psychology or a related discipline and have a record of innovative research, potential to attract extramural funding, and strong commitment to undergraduate and graduate education. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, statements of research interests and teaching philosophy, samples of representative research papers, and the names of at least three references. *We will begin reviewing applications on November 7, 2016*, and will continue until the position is filled. Please submit materials online to: http://umass.interviewexchange.com/jobofferdetails.jsp?JOBID=76828. *The University provides an intellectual environment committed to providing academic excellence and diversity, including mentoring programs for faculty. The College and Department are committed to increasing the diversity of the faculty, student body, and the curriculum. The University seeks to increase the diversity of its professoriate, workforce and undergraduate and graduate student populations because broad diversity is critical to achieving the University's mission of excellence in education, research, educational access and service in an increasingly diverse globalized society. Therefore, in holistically assessing many qualifications of each applicant of any race or gender we would factor favorably an individual?s record of conduct that includes students and colleagues with broadly diverse perspectives, experiences and backgrounds in educational, research or other work activities. Among other qualifications, we would also factor favorably experience overcoming or helping others overcome barriers to an academic career or degree. The University of Massachusetts Amherst is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer committed to equality in education and employment. Women and members of minority groups are encouraged to apply.* Developmental Science Division: http://www.umass.edu/pbs/ research/developmental-science Other Departmental Research Divisions: http://www.umass.edu/pbs/ research-areas Center for Research on Families: http://www.umass.edu/family/ Rudd Adoption Research Program: http://www.umass.edu/ruddchair/ University Neuroscience and Behavior program: http://www.umass.edu/neuro/ -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Sep 23 09:39:05 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 09:39:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Faculty position in Psychology (Aging), Brandeis University In-Reply-To: <564EBC07-DD81-4408-9785-45B4D74C40D6@brandeis.edu> References: <564EBC07-DD81-4408-9785-45B4D74C40D6@brandeis.edu> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Hannah Snyder Date: Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 7:07 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Faculty position in Psychology (Aging), Brandeis University To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Applicants in the area of cognitive aging are very welcome! *FACULTY POSITION IN PSYCHOLOGY, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY* The Psychology Department [http://www.brandeis.edu/departments/psych/] at Brandeis University invites applications for a tenure track appointment at the rank of Assistant Professor (entry-level or advanced), with a specialization in Aging. We seek an individual with an active research program employing a behavioral and neural/biological approach with humans, to start August 2017. Applicants should demonstrate evidence of scholarly productivity, outstanding promise to contribute to undergraduate and graduate training programs, and the ability to secure external funding for a program of research. The successful applicant will contribute to a vibrant research and graduate training department with NIH-supported training programs, entitled ?Cognitive Aging in a Social Context? and ?Brain-Body-Behavior Interface in Learning and Development Across the Lifespan?. Opportunities for collaboration and affiliation exist across campus including centers and programs in Neuroscience and Health, Science, Society and Policy. Teaching duties will include undergraduate service courses as well as advanced graduate-level seminars. Submit materials, including a letter of interest, CV, research statement, teaching statement, copies of relevant publications, and the names of three referees to Academic Jobs Online [ https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/jobs/8041]. First consideration will be given to candidates whose applications are complete by *October 20*, although we will accept applications until the position is filled. *Brandeis recognizes that diversity in its student body, staff and faculty is important to its primary mission of providing a quality education. The search committee is therefore particularly interested in candidates who, through their research, teaching and/or service experiences, will increase Brandeis? reputation for academic excellence and better prepare its students for a pluralistic society. Brandeis University is an equal opportunity employer, committed to building a diverse intellectual community, and strongly encourages applications from women and minority candidates.* Hannah R. Snyder, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Brandeis University Brown 125, 415 South St. Waltham, MA 02453 Phone: (781) 736-3272 Email: hrsnyder@brandeis.edu _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Sep 25 19:48:04 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 19:48:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Peter Jones bookmarked a fascinating article by Craig Brandist on Academia.edu. Message-ID: <57e88c66.d324620a.302b0.e759@mx.google.com> Today, I was alerted to a fascinating article that I believe may be interesting to others on this site. On the site academia.edu I *follow* Peter Jones and he bookmarked this article written by Craig Brandist. I downloaded this article and spent the day learning about the rise of Soviet Sociolinguistics from the ashes of Volkerpsychologie. As I was reading the article I was also reflecting on how volkerpsychologie also travelled to North America and influenced the Pragmatists. This article generates a context for the emergence of ?objective psychology* as a response to the *back and forth* of themes that are continuing to be explored today. I recommend reading this paper. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: SEPTEMBER 25 2016 The Rise of Russian Sociolinguistics from the ashes of Volkerpsychology.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 84849 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160925/1555ac97/attachment.bin From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 26 09:12:41 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 09:12:41 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: JPS 2017 Call for Proposals - "Technologies and Human Development" - open also to other topics In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Daiute, Colette Date: Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 8:50 AM Subject: JPS 2017 Call for Proposals - "Technologies and Human Development" - open also to other topics To: "Daiute, Colette" Dear Colleagues, In case you haven't already received this, I'm forwarding the latest version of our call. Please distribute it widely. Thank you and best, Colette Colette Daiute Professor Ph.D. Programs in Psychology/Developmental Psychology; Urban Education; Educational Psychology; Committee on Globalization & Social Change The Graduate Center, City University of New York http://www.colettedaiute.org http://www.sagepub.com/daiute http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/psychology/ developmental-psychology/human-development-and-political-violence?format=PB -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JPS2017-Call-for-Papers-3.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 864570 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160926/ce9c864b/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 26 10:27:51 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 10:27:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Peter Jones bookmarked a fascinating article by Craig Brandist on Academia.edu. In-Reply-To: <57e88c66.d324620a.302b0.e759@mx.google.com> References: <57e88c66.d324620a.302b0.e759@mx.google.com> Message-ID: ?Hi Larry -- I also recommend the article to which you point xmcaers. At an earlier time, exploration of volkerpsychologie in seeking to understand cultural-historical psychology origins was a living theme at LCHC. For those who want to know more about this line of work, which remains relevant as Larry notes, I recommend the special issue of the LCHC Newsletter for 1990. It does not substitute for the article Larry is pointing to. Rather, it provides an account of volkepsycholgie within the context of methodologies for the study of the role of culture in development. It is available here. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/ja90v12n1.PDF mike On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 7:48 PM, wrote: > > Today, I was alerted to a fascinating article that I believe may be > interesting to others on this site. On the site academia.edu I *follow* > Peter Jones and he bookmarked this article written by Craig Brandist. I > downloaded this article and spent the day learning about the rise of Soviet > Sociolinguistics from the ashes of Volkerpsychologie. > As I was reading the article I was also reflecting on how > volkerpsychologie also travelled to North America and influenced the > Pragmatists. > This article generates a context for the emergence of ?objective > psychology* as a response to the *back and forth* of themes that are > continuing to be explored today. > I recommend reading this paper. > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Sep 26 11:11:11 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 12:11:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Peter Jones bookmarked a fascinating article by Craig Brandist on Academia.edu. In-Reply-To: References: <57e88c66.d324620a.302b0.e759@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Volkerpsychologie also has a substantial influence with the field of anthropology proper - esp. in the early to mid- 20th century emphasis on Culture and Personality (e.g., Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, G. Gorer, Abram Kardiner, etc.). By some accounts this may have been taking up the less productive side of volkerpsychologie (i.e. the one that leads to stereotypes), but it was nonetheless a BIG part of 20th century anthropology. (and I suspect with some small tweaks, we could recover much of the work that was done in this vein). Here is another nice resource I found that might be helpful for recovering volkerpsychologie: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/19064/1/19064.pdf It traces volkerpsychologie back to the origins in Lazarus and Steinthal, and forward through Wundt, Simmel, Durkheim, and Boas. It also engages with the question of anti-semitism that plagued volkerpsychologie (since it got associated with the third reich). Thanks Larry! -greg On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 11:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > ?Hi Larry -- > > I also recommend the article to which you point xmcaers. At an earlier > time, exploration of volkerpsychologie in seeking to understand > cultural-historical psychology origins was a living theme at LCHC. For > those who want to know more about this line of work, which remains relevant > as Larry notes, I recommend the special issue of the LCHC Newsletter for > 1990. It does not substitute for the article Larry is pointing to. Rather, > it provides an account of volkepsycholgie within the context of > methodologies for the study of the role of culture in development. > > It is available here. > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/ja90v12n1.PDF > > mike > > On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 7:48 PM, wrote: > > > > > Today, I was alerted to a fascinating article that I believe may be > > interesting to others on this site. On the site academia.edu I *follow* > > Peter Jones and he bookmarked this article written by Craig Brandist. I > > downloaded this article and spent the day learning about the rise of > Soviet > > Sociolinguistics from the ashes of Volkerpsychologie. > > As I was reading the article I was also reflecting on how > > volkerpsychologie also travelled to North America and influenced the > > Pragmatists. > > This article generates a context for the emergence of ?objective > > psychology* as a response to the *back and forth* of themes that are > > continuing to be explored today. > > I recommend reading this paper. > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 26 18:58:49 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 18:58:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Open Faculty position, Boston University School of Education, Programs in Deaf Studies and Deaf Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Another good job for another right person. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Lieberman, Amy Date: Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:05 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Open Faculty position, Boston University School of Education, Programs in Deaf Studies and Deaf Education To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Dear colleagues, The Boston University School of Education is accepting applications for a tenure-track Assistant Professor to join the faculty of the Programs in Deaf Studies and Deaf Education. Please see the full job announcement below. Sincerely, Amy Lieberman ______________________________ Amy M. Lieberman, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Boston University School of Education Programs in Deaf Studies and Deaf Education 621 Commonwealth Avenue, Room 207 | Boston, MA 02215 Phone: (617) 353-3377 | VP: (617) 648-5115 | Email: alieber@bu.edu ______________________________ ************************************************************ ********************** Assistant Professor (tenure track), Deaf Studies and Deaf Education Job Description The School of Education at Boston University invites applications for the position of a full-time, tenure-track, Assistant Professor of Language and Literacy, with an emphasis in Deaf Studies and Deaf Education. The successful candidate will have an active research program with demonstrated potential to secure external grant funding to support their research. While the specific focus of research is open, the candidate should have expertise in an area related to language acquisition, literacy, or cognitive development of Deaf/Hard-of-Hearing (D/HH) children. The candidate should also have a background in the bilingual (ASL/English) philosophy as it applies to the education of D/HH students. The position will be housed in the Language and Literacy Education cluster in the School of Education. As a tenure track faculty member, the candidate is expected to participate in program and cluster meetings, conduct research, seek and implement external funding support, and engage in creative activity, write and present professionally, and provide service within and outside the School of Education. This position begins July 1, 2017. Salary is competitive and commensurate with experience. Applicants from diverse backgrounds are strongly encouraged to apply. Qualifications The candidate must hold an earned doctorate in Education, Human Development, Applied Linguistics, or a related field. Preference will be given to candidates who have at least three years of classroom experience teaching D/HH students. Responsibilities include teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in language and literacy, cognitive development, ASL/English bilingual education, and social development of D/HH children. In addition, the faculty member will be responsible for advising master?s and doctoral-level students and providing service to the university and the profession, including building positive relationships with local schools and other departments at Boston University. Application Instructions DO NOT APPLY THROUGH BOSTON UNIVERSITY HUMAN RESOURCES WEBSITE Applicants can apply for this position by submitting the following through https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/jobs/8010: ? Cover letter explaining suitability for position ? Current curriculum vitae ? Three letters of reference ? 1-3 Samples of scholarship ? Unofficial graduate transcripts Review of applications begins November 1, 2016 and will continue until position is filled. Questions may be directed to the Search Committee Chair, Amy Lieberman ( alieber@bu.edu). We are an equal opportunity employer and all qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability status, protected veteran status, or any other characteristic protected by law. We are a VEVRAA Federal Contractor. _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Sep 27 02:48:35 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 05:48:35 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Work, employment and society Seeks New Editors 2018-2020 Message-ID: Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Alison Danforth Date: 9/27/16 4:57 AM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: Work, employment and society Seeks New Editors 2018-2020 *Apologies for cross-posting*?Invitation to edit BSA Journal Work, employment and society 2018-2020?Dear colleagues,?The British Sociological Association would like to hear from Editorial Teams interested in editing the journal Work, employment and society (WES), for a 3 year period from January 2018 to December 2020. ?WES is currently in its 29th successful year and is a highly respected journal with an international profile. Strongly grounded in the sociological tradition, WES draws upon disciplines adjacent to sociology to make an original contribution to issues and debates in the sociology of work and employment worldwide.? It receives over 400 submissions a year, has an Impact Factor of 2.153 and is ranked 4 on the Chartered Association of Business Schools? Academic Journal Guide.?The BSA is looking for a strong, diverse team of Editors to shape and sustain the journal?s leading position in the field.? We particularly welcome expressions of interest from multi-institutional teams and also from sociology departments in partnership with business schools. Applicants must be based in the UK.?For further information on making an application visit our website to read the full call: https://www.britsoc.co.uk/opportunities/publications-opportunities/?? ?If you have any queries or would like to register an Expression of Interest please contact: Alison Danforth, Publications & Membership Manager: alison.danforth@britsoc.org.uk ??Deadline for Expressions of Interest: 01 November 2016, 17:00 GMTDeadline for Proposals: 10 January 2017, 17:00 GMT ______________________________________________________________________ This email has been scanned by TSG Cloud Based Mail Security. For more information please visit http://www.tsg.com/product/anti-virus-anti-spam ______________________________________________________________________ From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 27 08:50:27 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 08:50:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Peter Jones bookmarked a fascinating article by Craig Brandist on Academia.edu. In-Reply-To: References: <57e88c66.d324620a.302b0.e759@mx.google.com> Message-ID: The volker psychology of the 19th Century is very much a part of the issue of "the two psychologies" that get discussed in the various crises tracts of the 1920's. Here is part of what I wrote about these issues in the introduction to *Cultural Psychology. * *hit delete now if not interested! * mike *The V?lkerpsychologie movement*. Mill's ideas, along with those of von Humboldt, were seized upon by Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal, two German scholars. In 1860 Lazarus and Steinthal began to publish the *Zeitschrift fur V?lkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenshaft* (Journal of Cultural Psychology and Philology), a journal which presented itself as a forum for reconciling the natural and cultural/historical sciences (Jahoda, 1992; Jahoda and Krewer, 1991; Whitman, 1984). They were strongly influenced by von Humboldt and explicitly noted the similarity between their version of V?lkerpsychologie and Mill's concept of Ethology. The pages of the *Zeitschrift* contained articles by leading historical, philological and anthropological scholars of the day.[1] These contributions provided analyses of language ("Exclamation, question and negation in the Semitic languages") myth ("On the relation between myth and religion"), and other cultural phenomena (arithmetic systems, proverbs, calendrical devices, folk medicine, etc.). All were intended to contribute to explaining differences in "V?lksgeist" in a manner that was simultaneously scientific and historical. Lazarus and Steinthal's effort to reconcile the schism between the natural and cultural sciences was heavily criticized because they ignored the idea of mental chemistry and began to claim that it is possible to apply data obtained from the study of individual minds to the formulation of strict explanatory laws of culture and historical phenomena, precisely the move that Mill had shown to be flawed. *Descriptive Psychology*. Wilhelm Dilthey, whose work continues to influence a vast range of contemporary scholarship in what can be broadly characterized as cultural studies, sought to reconcile the natural and cultural sciences. Psychology, he believed, should serve as the foundational science for all of the human sciences (philosophy, linguistics, history, law, art, literature, etc). Without such a foundational science, he claimed, the human sciences could not be a true system (Dilthey, 1923/1988, 1977). Early in his career, Dilthey considered the possibility that experimental psychology might provide such a foundation science. However, he gradually came to reject this possibility because he felt that in attempting to satisfy the requirements of the *Naturwissenshaften* for formulating cause?effect laws between mental elements, psychologists had stripped mental processes of the real?life relationships between people that gave meaning to their elements. He did not mince words in his attack on the academic psychology of the late 19th century: Contemporary psychology is an expanded doctrine of sensation and association. The fundamental power of mental life falls outside the scope of psychology. Psychology has become only a doctrine of the forms of psychic processes; thus it grasps only a part of that which we actually experience as mental life (quoted in Ermath, 1978, p. 148) Dilthey proposed a different approach to the study of psychology, one which harks back to Vico's prescriptions for the study of human nature as an historically contingent phenomenon. Dilthey believed that since it encompasses only a part of mental life, explanatory psychology must be subordinated to a historical-social approach that studies individuals in relation to their cultural systems and communities (Dilthey, 1894/1977). He called this approach *descriptive psychology*. It was to be based on an analysis of real?life mental processes in real?life situations, including both the reciprocal processes between people and individuals' thoughts. As methods for carrying out this kind of analysis, Dilthey suggested the close study of the writings of such "life?philosophers" as Augustine, Montaigne, and Pascal, because they contained a deep understanding of full experiential reality. *Wundt's compromise*. The system of psychology proposed by Wundt adopted the strategy proposed by Mill: recognize the fact that two different order of reality are involved, and create two psychologies, one appropriate to each. On the one hand there is "physiological psychology," the experimental study of immediate experience. The goal of this half of the discipline was to explicate the laws by which elementary sensations arise in consciousness and the universal laws by which the elements of consciousness combine. The label "physiological" for this half of Wundt's enterprise is somewhat misleading because experiments carried out in its name rarely involved physiological measurement. Rather, it was believed that the verbal reports of subjects who were carefully trained in methods of self? observation (introspection) would yield results that could eventually be traced to physiological processes. Experiments conducted with this goal in mind concentrated on *elementary* psychological functions, meaning the qualities of sensory experience and the components of simple reactions. On the other hand, Wundt initiated a mammoth investigation of *higher* psychological functions, functions resulting from the fusing and concatenation of elementary functions. Higher functions include processes such as deliberate remembering, reasoning, and language. Wundt, following von Humboldt, called this second branch of psychology, *V?lkerpsychologie*. He argued that *V?lkerpsychologie* could not be studied using laboratory methods of trained introspection that focus on the contents of consciousness because the higher psychological functions extend beyond individual human consciousness. So, for example, one could not understand the psychology of language use because A language can never be created by an individual. True, individuals have invented Esperanto and other artificial languages. Unless, however, language had already existed, these inventions would have been impossible. Moreover, none of these has been able to maintain itself, and most of them owe their existence solely to elements borrowed from natural languages. (Wundt, 1921, p. 3) According to this view, higher psychological functions had to be studied by the methods of the descriptive sciences, such as ethnography, folklore, and linguistics. His volumes on this topic are full of data derived from a broad range of the historical and anthropological accounts about the languages and customs of the world's cultures (Jahoda, 1992; Wundt, 1921). This branch of psychology, he wrote, was supposed to combine into a unified whole the various results concerning the mental development of many as severally viewed by language, religion, and custom (Wundt, 1921, p. 2. Wundt believed that the two enterprises, physiological psychology and V?lkerpsychologie must supplement each other; only through a synthesis of their respective insights could a full psychology be achieved. To those who would claim that V?lkerpsychologie could be entirely subsumed under experimental psychology Wundt replied Its problem relates to those mental products which are created by a community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness, since they presuppose the reciprocal action of many. ... Individual consciousness is wholly incapable of giving us a history of the development of human thought, for it is conditioned by an earlier history concerning which it cannot of itself give us any knowledge. (Wundt, 1921, p. 3) In this connection, Wundt makes an additional methodological claim which is central to the history and current practice of the study of culture in mind: V?lkerpsychologie is, in an important sense of the word, genetic psychology (p. 3); that is, the study of higher psychological functions requires the use a developmental/historical methodology . For this reason he believed that V?lkerpsychologie must involve the methods of ethnology, conceived of as "the science of the origins of peoples." Wundt himself did not study ontogeny (the genesis of an individual life), sticking instead to the study of cultural history, so he had little to say about how these two levels of genetic analysis are related to each other. But he believed that the results of such historical research would yield evidence about "the various stages of mental development still exhibited by mankind" (p.4). In reaching such conclusions, Wundt was inheriting the German tradition of cultural-historical philosophy. V?lkerpsychologie, he declared, would "reveal well?defined primitive conditions, with transitions leading through an almost continuous series of intermediate steps to the more developed and higher civilizations (p.4)." Wundt adopted a cultural, not racial, theory of the perceived inequalities in mental products separating primitive and civilized peoples. He was convinced *both* of the superiority of European culture *and* that the intellectual endowment of primitive peoples is equal to that of Europeans. Like Spencer, Wundt believed that it is not intellectual endowment that differentiates primitive and civilized people, but the range of world experiences ("Primitive man merely exercises his ability in a more restricted field"). This narrow range of experiences coincided in Wundt's mind with the image of the primitive person living in the tropics where there is food and fun always at hand, so that the native peoples were not motivated to move outside of "a state of nature." ------------------------------ [1] I am indebted to Bernd Krewer and Gustav Jahoda (1990) for their summary of the contents and context of the work of Lazarus and Steinthal. My discussion is derived from their work (See also Jahoda, 1993). On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 11:11 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Volkerpsychologie also has a substantial influence with the field of > anthropology proper - esp. in the early to mid- 20th century emphasis on > Culture and Personality (e.g., Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Gregory > Bateson, G. Gorer, Abram Kardiner, etc.). By some accounts this may have > been taking up the less productive side of volkerpsychologie (i.e. the one > that leads to stereotypes), but it was nonetheless a BIG part of 20th > century anthropology. (and I suspect with some small tweaks, we could > recover much of the work that was done in this vein). > > Here is another nice resource I found that might be helpful for recovering > volkerpsychologie: > http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/19064/1/19064.pdf > > It traces volkerpsychologie back to the origins in Lazarus and Steinthal, > and forward through Wundt, Simmel, Durkheim, and Boas. It also engages with > the question of anti-semitism that plagued volkerpsychologie (since it got > associated with the third reich). > > Thanks Larry! > -greg > > > > On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 11:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > ?Hi Larry -- > > > > I also recommend the article to which you point xmcaers. At an earlier > > time, exploration of volkerpsychologie in seeking to understand > > cultural-historical psychology origins was a living theme at LCHC. For > > those who want to know more about this line of work, which remains > relevant > > as Larry notes, I recommend the special issue of the LCHC Newsletter for > > 1990. It does not substitute for the article Larry is pointing to. > Rather, > > it provides an account of volkepsycholgie within the context of > > methodologies for the study of the role of culture in development. > > > > It is available here. > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/ja90v12n1.PDF > > > > mike > > > > On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 7:48 PM, wrote: > > > > > > > > Today, I was alerted to a fascinating article that I believe may be > > > interesting to others on this site. On the site academia.edu I > *follow* > > > Peter Jones and he bookmarked this article written by Craig > Brandist. I > > > downloaded this article and spent the day learning about the rise of > > Soviet > > > Sociolinguistics from the ashes of Volkerpsychologie. > > > As I was reading the article I was also reflecting on how > > > volkerpsychologie also travelled to North America and influenced the > > > Pragmatists. > > > This article generates a context for the emergence of ?objective > > > psychology* as a response to the *back and forth* of themes that are > > > continuing to be explored today. > > > I recommend reading this paper. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Sep 28 06:51:51 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 13:51:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective Message-ID: I have a textbook currently in production with Sage, titled ?Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective.? It is my attempt to make sense of how children develop in cultural contexts, and to organize some of the exploding literature in developmental science. There are many flaws in the book, but hopefully it has some merits! Sage has asked me to identify colleagues who might be interested in adopting or recommending this text for courses they are teaching. I asked if they would receive a complementary copy of the book, and Sage?s reply is "We will review those contacts, and if they are teaching the right course, they will absolutely receive a copy.? Please contact me if you might adopt the book, or at least might like a free copy! :) The information requested by Sage is name, institution, course details, and email/telephone. I have uploaded the introductory chapter to Academia.edu: Martin From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Sep 28 07:08:46 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 16:08:46 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Martin Would you like anybody to review the book? I would be happy to do that for you. But I would need a copy of the book though. Carol On 28 September 2016 at 15:51, Martin John Packer wrote: > I have a textbook currently in production with Sage, titled ?Child > Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective.? It is my attempt to > make sense of how children develop in cultural contexts, and to organize > some of the exploding literature in developmental science. There are many > flaws in the book, but hopefully it has some merits! > > Sage has asked me to identify colleagues who might be interested in > adopting or recommending this text for courses they are teaching. I asked > if they would receive a complementary copy of the book, and Sage?s reply is > "We will review those contacts, and if they are teaching the right course, > they will absolutely receive a copy.? Please contact me if you might adopt > the book, or at least might like a free copy! :) > > The information requested by Sage is name, institution, course details, > and email/telephone. I have uploaded the introductory chapter to > Academia.edu: > > Understanding_a_Cultural_Perspective> > > Martin > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Sep 28 07:34:39 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 14:34:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <9A535997-18A3-451C-BB78-BDE485DB640A@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Carol, I think Sage will be looking for ?endorsements? soon, but I?m not sure how reviews will be handled: perhaps they?ll send review copies directly to journals once the book is printed, which will not be for several months. Of course, the difference between an endorsement and a review is somewhat slippery! I will pass along your contact details to Sage. thanks Martin > On Sep 28, 2016, at 9:08 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Martin > > Would you like anybody to review the book? I would be happy to do that for > you. But I would need a copy of the book though. > > Carol > > On 28 September 2016 at 15:51, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> I have a textbook currently in production with Sage, titled ?Child >> Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective.? It is my attempt to >> make sense of how children develop in cultural contexts, and to organize >> some of the exploding literature in developmental science. There are many >> flaws in the book, but hopefully it has some merits! >> >> Sage has asked me to identify colleagues who might be interested in >> adopting or recommending this text for courses they are teaching. I asked >> if they would receive a complementary copy of the book, and Sage?s reply is >> "We will review those contacts, and if they are teaching the right course, >> they will absolutely receive a copy.? Please contact me if you might adopt >> the book, or at least might like a free copy! :) >> >> The information requested by Sage is name, institution, course details, >> and email/telephone. I have uploaded the introductory chapter to >> Academia.edu: >> >> > Understanding_a_Cultural_Perspective> >> >> Martin >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Sep 28 07:41:18 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 16:41:18 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective In-Reply-To: <9A535997-18A3-451C-BB78-BDE485DB640A@uniandes.edu.co> References: <9A535997-18A3-451C-BB78-BDE485DB640A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Martin Peter Smagorinsky asked me to consider a review for the Journal of Language and Literacy Education. I am not sure what an endorsement is, but do do reviews. Do pass my details to Sage, and maybe mention JLLE to them. Carol On 28 September 2016 at 16:34, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Carol, > > I think Sage will be looking for ?endorsements? soon, but I?m not sure how > reviews will be handled: perhaps they?ll send review copies directly to > journals once the book is printed, which will not be for several months. Of > course, the difference between an endorsement and a review is somewhat > slippery! I will pass along your contact details to Sage. > > thanks > > Martin > > > > > > On Sep 28, 2016, at 9:08 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > > Martin > > > > Would you like anybody to review the book? I would be happy to do that > for > > you. But I would need a copy of the book though. > > > > Carol > > > > On 28 September 2016 at 15:51, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > >> I have a textbook currently in production with Sage, titled ?Child > >> Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective.? It is my attempt to > >> make sense of how children develop in cultural contexts, and to organize > >> some of the exploding literature in developmental science. There are > many > >> flaws in the book, but hopefully it has some merits! > >> > >> Sage has asked me to identify colleagues who might be interested in > >> adopting or recommending this text for courses they are teaching. I > asked > >> if they would receive a complementary copy of the book, and Sage?s > reply is > >> "We will review those contacts, and if they are teaching the right > course, > >> they will absolutely receive a copy.? Please contact me if you might > adopt > >> the book, or at least might like a free copy! :) > >> > >> The information requested by Sage is name, institution, course details, > >> and email/telephone. I have uploaded the introductory chapter to > >> Academia.edu: > >> > >> >> Understanding_a_Cultural_Perspective> > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Sep 28 07:58:59 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 14:58:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective In-Reply-To: References: <9A535997-18A3-451C-BB78-BDE485DB640A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Carol, An endorsement is some positive words that Sage can put on the back cover, or in publicity materials. I will ask them when and how they will be arranging reviews. Martin > On Sep 28, 2016, at 9:41 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Hi Martin > > Peter Smagorinsky asked me to consider a review for the Journal of Language > and Literacy Education. I am not sure what an endorsement is, but do do > reviews. Do pass my details to Sage, and maybe mention JLLE to them. > > Carol > > On 28 September 2016 at 16:34, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Hi Carol, >> >> I think Sage will be looking for ?endorsements? soon, but I?m not sure how >> reviews will be handled: perhaps they?ll send review copies directly to >> journals once the book is printed, which will not be for several months. Of >> course, the difference between an endorsement and a review is somewhat >> slippery! I will pass along your contact details to Sage. >> >> thanks >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >>> On Sep 28, 2016, at 9:08 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> Would you like anybody to review the book? I would be happy to do that >> for >>> you. But I would need a copy of the book though. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 28 September 2016 at 15:51, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I have a textbook currently in production with Sage, titled ?Child >>>> Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective.? It is my attempt to >>>> make sense of how children develop in cultural contexts, and to organize >>>> some of the exploding literature in developmental science. There are >> many >>>> flaws in the book, but hopefully it has some merits! >>>> >>>> Sage has asked me to identify colleagues who might be interested in >>>> adopting or recommending this text for courses they are teaching. I >> asked >>>> if they would receive a complementary copy of the book, and Sage?s >> reply is >>>> "We will review those contacts, and if they are teaching the right >> course, >>>> they will absolutely receive a copy.? Please contact me if you might >> adopt >>>> the book, or at least might like a free copy! :) >>>> >>>> The information requested by Sage is name, institution, course details, >>>> and email/telephone. I have uploaded the introductory chapter to >>>> Academia.edu: >>>> >>>> >>> Understanding_a_Cultural_Perspective> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Sep 28 08:39:07 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 08:39:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective In-Reply-To: References: <9A535997-18A3-451C-BB78-BDE485DB640A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <57ebe41d.4814620a.6a738.b585@mx.google.com> Martin, I just read the introductory chapter and kept thinking as I went through the chapter that the way you have organized the book and laid it out in front of the reader would have been such a valuable resource for trying to engender looking through a developmental lens that is also a cultural lens that some call *developmental science*. As an elementary school counsellor, I was continually trying to shift the other 33 elementary school counsellors to shift their focus from the currently dominant forms of school normativity [counselling psychology *as* clinical psychology for example] towards putting developmental language at the heart of all orientations to *schooling* but was not successful in positing a developmental/cultural lens as the most general framework from which to operate normatively [institutionally]. The clarity with which you navigate towards this new and deeper engagement with the centrality of developmental science as at the heart or core or foundation of how we could [possibly] engender new forms and models/modes of schooling would have been indispensable for arguing my case. I see the potential of this book as also used in a *book club* format and I will attempt to generate interest in this possibility occurring in the Vancouver school *system*. Martin, as an artifact this book has the potential to take us in new directions opening new *doors* of perception. [Georg Simmel?s metaphor of door] for a symbol that indicates travelling BOTH ways [back & forth or in & out. Moving beyond the hegemony of clinical accounts towards educational accounts. I am going to attempt to create a *book club* up here on the westcoast of Canada using your book as a catalyst for expanding our understanding of developmental science [expressing a more expansive notion than developmental psychology]. Your introduction creates an appetite for more and I look forward to engaging with your book when it arrives on the *scene* Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Carol Macdonald From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Sep 28 08:54:35 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 15:54:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective In-Reply-To: <57ebe41d.4814620a.6a738.b585@mx.google.com> References: <9A535997-18A3-451C-BB78-BDE485DB640A@uniandes.edu.co> <57ebe41d.4814620a.6a738.b585@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Thanks, Larry. The book would not have been possible without the years of discussion here on XMCA, with you and many other perceptive people. I will see what I can do to get a copy to you. It will take a little time, but I expect to be correcting the proofs later this month. Martin > On Sep 28, 2016, at 10:39 AM, lpscholar2@gmail.com wrote: > > Martin, > I just read the introductory chapter and kept thinking as I went through the chapter that the way you have organized the book and laid it out in front of the reader would have been such a valuable resource for trying to engender looking through a developmental lens that is also a cultural lens that some call *developmental science*. > As an elementary school counsellor, I was continually trying to shift the other 33 elementary school counsellors to shift their focus from the currently dominant forms of school normativity [counselling psychology *as* clinical psychology for example] towards putting developmental language at the heart of all orientations to *schooling* but was not successful in positing a developmental/cultural lens as the most general framework from which to operate normatively [institutionally]. > > The clarity with which you navigate towards this new and deeper engagement with the centrality of developmental science as at the heart or core or foundation of how we could [possibly] engender new forms and models/modes of schooling would have been indispensable for arguing my case. > I see the potential of this book as also used in a *book club* format and I will attempt to generate interest in this possibility occurring in the Vancouver school *system*. > > Martin, as an artifact this book has the potential to take us in new directions opening new *doors* of perception. [Georg Simmel?s metaphor of door] for a symbol that indicates travelling BOTH ways [back & forth or in & out. Moving beyond the hegemony of clinical accounts towards educational accounts. > I am going to attempt to create a *book club* up here on the westcoast of Canada using your book as a catalyst for expanding our understanding of developmental science [expressing a more expansive notion than developmental psychology]. > Your introduction creates an appetite for more and I look forward to engaging with your book when it arrives on the *scene* > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: Carol Macdonald From preiss.xmca@gmail.com Wed Sep 28 14:22:58 2016 From: preiss.xmca@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 18:22:58 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Faculty Positions in Chile Message-ID: Dear colleagues, Please see info about open positions in the School of Psychology at the Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile. Interested people can contact me at this email: davidpreiss@uc.cl for further information. David http://psicologia.uc.cl/Nuestra-Escuela/concurso-academico.html https://chroniclevitae.com/jobs/0000327707-01 https://chroniclevitae.com/jobs/0000327706-01 From babson@gse.upenn.edu Wed Sep 28 18:33:03 2016 From: babson@gse.upenn.edu (Andrew Babson) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 21:33:03 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Peter Jones bookmarked a fascinating article by Craig Brandist on Academia.edu. In-Reply-To: References: <57e88c66.d324620a.302b0.e759@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Thank you for sharing Larry, Mike and Greg, useful and welcome materials and discussion. That intro excerpt is very familiar to me, Mike, very influential as I was finding ways to connect philosophy, psychology and anthropology. I'm interested to know more about the V?lkerpsychologie influence on the Soviet thinkers so familiar to this discussion board (albeit only somewhat familiar to me). This thread reminds me of a similar one about a year ago. I'm trying to finish two current writing projects of mine on the legacy of JG Herder's thought in South Africa. Maybe of interest to those of you with a ken for intellectual history of anthropology, and the role of missionary practice in that history. I'll be glad to share once they are out. There's a good and very relevant book edited by Stocking about the lineage you mention, Greg, particularly a chapter by Matti Bunzl that discusses the tarnished legacy discussed in the article you link. Andrew ------------------------------------------- Andrew Babson, Ph.D. Lecturer Graduate School of Education University of Pennsylvania > On Tuesday, September 27, 2016, mike cole wrote: > >> The volker psychology of the 19th Century is very much a part of the issue >> of "the two psychologies" that get discussed in the various crises tracts >> of the 1920's. Here is part of what I wrote about these issues in the >> introduction to *Cultural Psychology. * >> >> *hit delete now if not interested! * >> >> mike >> >> *The V?lkerpsychologie movement*. Mill's ideas, along with those of von >> Humboldt, were seized upon by Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal, two >> German scholars. In 1860 Lazarus and Steinthal began to publish the >> *Zeitschrift >> fur V?lkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenshaft* (Journal of Cultural >> Psychology and Philology), a journal which presented itself as a forum for >> reconciling the natural and cultural/historical sciences (Jahoda, 1992; >> Jahoda and Krewer, 1991; Whitman, 1984). They were strongly influenced by >> von Humboldt and explicitly noted the similarity between their version of >> V?lkerpsychologie and Mill's concept of Ethology. The pages of the >> *Zeitschrift* contained articles by leading historical, philological and >> anthropological scholars of the day.[1] These contributions provided >> analyses of language ("Exclamation, question and negation in the Semitic >> languages") myth ("On the relation between myth and religion"), and other >> cultural phenomena (arithmetic systems, proverbs, calendrical devices, >> folk >> medicine, etc.). All were intended to contribute to explaining differences >> in "V?lksgeist" in a manner that was simultaneously scientific and >> historical. >> >> Lazarus and Steinthal's effort to reconcile the schism between the natural >> and cultural sciences was heavily criticized because they ignored the idea >> of mental chemistry and began to claim that it is possible to apply data >> obtained from the study of individual minds to the formulation of strict >> explanatory laws of culture and historical phenomena, precisely the move >> that Mill had shown to be flawed. >> >> *Descriptive Psychology*. Wilhelm Dilthey, whose work continues to >> influence a vast range of contemporary scholarship in what can be broadly >> characterized as cultural studies, sought to reconcile the natural and >> cultural sciences. Psychology, he believed, should serve as the >> foundational science for all of the human sciences (philosophy, >> linguistics, history, law, art, literature, etc). Without such a >> foundational science, he claimed, the human sciences could not be a true >> system (Dilthey, 1923/1988, 1977). >> >> Early in his career, Dilthey considered the possibility that >> experimental psychology might provide such a foundation science. However, >> he gradually came to reject this possibility because he felt that in >> attempting to satisfy the requirements of the *Naturwissenshaften* for >> formulating cause?effect laws between mental elements, psychologists had >> stripped mental processes of the real?life relationships between people >> that gave meaning to their elements. He did not mince words in his attack >> on the academic psychology of the late 19th century: >> >> Contemporary psychology is an expanded doctrine of sensation and >> association. The fundamental power of mental life falls outside the scope >> of psychology. Psychology has become only a doctrine of the forms of >> psychic processes; thus it grasps only a part of that which we actually >> experience as mental life (quoted in Ermath, 1978, p. 148) >> >> Dilthey proposed a different approach to the study of psychology, one >> which >> harks back to Vico's prescriptions for the study of human nature as an >> historically contingent phenomenon. Dilthey believed that since it >> encompasses only a part of mental life, explanatory psychology must be >> subordinated to a historical-social approach that studies individuals in >> relation to their cultural systems and communities (Dilthey, 1894/1977). >> He >> called this approach *descriptive psychology*. It was to be based on an >> analysis of real?life mental processes in real?life situations, including >> both the reciprocal processes between people and individuals' thoughts. As >> methods for carrying out this kind of analysis, Dilthey suggested the >> close >> study of the writings of such "life?philosophers" as Augustine, Montaigne, >> and Pascal, because they contained a deep understanding of full >> experiential reality. >> >> *Wundt's compromise*. The system of psychology proposed by Wundt adopted >> the strategy proposed by Mill: recognize the fact that two different order >> of reality are involved, and create two psychologies, one appropriate to >> each. On the one hand there is "physiological psychology," the >> experimental >> study of immediate experience. The goal of this half of the discipline was >> to explicate the laws by which elementary sensations arise in >> consciousness >> and the universal laws by which the elements of consciousness combine. The >> label "physiological" for this half of Wundt's enterprise is somewhat >> misleading because experiments carried out in its name rarely involved >> physiological measurement. Rather, it was believed that the verbal reports >> of subjects who were carefully trained in methods of self? observation >> (introspection) would yield results that could eventually be traced to >> physiological processes. Experiments conducted with this goal in mind >> concentrated on *elementary* psychological functions, meaning the >> qualities >> of sensory experience and the components of simple reactions. >> >> On the other hand, Wundt initiated a mammoth investigation of *higher* >> psychological functions, functions resulting from the fusing and >> concatenation of elementary functions. Higher functions include processes >> such as deliberate remembering, reasoning, and language. Wundt, following >> von Humboldt, called this second branch of psychology, >> *V?lkerpsychologie*. >> He argued that *V?lkerpsychologie* could not be studied using laboratory >> methods of trained introspection that focus on the contents of >> consciousness because the higher psychological functions extend beyond >> individual human consciousness. So, for example, one could not understand >> the psychology of language use because >> >> A language can never be created by an individual. True, individuals have >> invented Esperanto and other artificial languages. Unless, however, >> language had already existed, these inventions would have been impossible. >> Moreover, none of these has been able to maintain itself, and most of them >> owe their existence solely to elements borrowed from natural languages. >> (Wundt, 1921, p. 3) >> >> According to this view, higher psychological functions had to be studied >> by >> the methods of the descriptive sciences, such as ethnography, folklore, >> and >> linguistics. His volumes on this topic are full of data derived from a >> broad range of the historical and anthropological accounts about the >> languages and customs of the world's cultures (Jahoda, 1992; Wundt, 1921). >> This branch of psychology, he wrote, was supposed to combine >> >> into a unified whole the various results concerning the mental development >> of many as severally viewed by language, religion, and custom (Wundt, >> 1921, >> p. 2. >> >> >> >> Wundt believed that the two enterprises, physiological >> >> >> >> psychology and V?lkerpsychologie must supplement each other; only through >> a >> synthesis of their respective insights could a full psychology be >> achieved. >> To those who would claim that V?lkerpsychologie could be entirely subsumed >> under experimental psychology Wundt replied >> >> Its problem relates to those mental products which are created by a >> community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely >> of >> individual consciousness, since they presuppose the reciprocal action of >> many. >> >> ... >> >> Individual consciousness is wholly incapable of giving us a history of the >> development of human thought, for it is conditioned by an earlier history >> concerning which it cannot of itself give us any knowledge. (Wundt, 1921, >> p. 3) >> >> In this connection, Wundt makes an additional methodological claim which >> is >> central to the history and current practice of the study of culture in >> mind: V?lkerpsychologie is, in an important sense of the word, genetic >> psychology (p. 3); that is, the study of higher psychological functions >> requires the use a developmental/historical methodology . For this reason >> he believed that V?lkerpsychologie must involve the methods of ethnology, >> conceived of as "the science of the origins of peoples." >> >> Wundt himself did not study ontogeny (the genesis of an individual life), >> sticking instead to the study of cultural history, so he had little to say >> about how these two levels of genetic analysis are related to each other. >> But he believed that the results of such historical research would yield >> evidence about "the various stages of mental development still exhibited >> by >> mankind" (p.4). In reaching such conclusions, Wundt was inheriting the >> German tradition of cultural-historical philosophy. V?lkerpsychologie, he >> declared, would "reveal well?defined primitive conditions, with >> transitions >> leading through an almost continuous series of intermediate steps to the >> more developed and higher civilizations (p.4)." >> >> Wundt adopted a cultural, not racial, theory of the perceived inequalities >> in mental products separating primitive and civilized peoples. He was >> convinced *both* of the superiority of European culture *and* that the >> intellectual endowment of primitive peoples is equal to that of Europeans. >> Like Spencer, Wundt believed that it is not intellectual endowment that >> differentiates primitive and civilized people, but the range of world >> experiences ("Primitive man merely exercises his ability in a more >> restricted field"). This narrow range of experiences coincided in Wundt's >> mind with the image of the primitive person living in the tropics where >> there is food and fun always at hand, so that the native peoples were not >> motivated to move outside of "a state of nature." >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> [1] I am indebted to Bernd Krewer and Gustav Jahoda (1990) for their >> summary of the contents and context of the work of Lazarus and Steinthal. >> My discussion is derived from their work (See also Jahoda, 1993). >> >> >> >> On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 11:11 AM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> > Volkerpsychologie also has a substantial influence with the field of >> > anthropology proper - esp. in the early to mid- 20th century emphasis on >> > Culture and Personality (e.g., Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Gregory >> > Bateson, G. Gorer, Abram Kardiner, etc.). By some accounts this may have >> > been taking up the less productive side of volkerpsychologie (i.e. the >> one >> > that leads to stereotypes), but it was nonetheless a BIG part of 20th >> > century anthropology. (and I suspect with some small tweaks, we could >> > recover much of the work that was done in this vein). >> > >> > Here is another nice resource I found that might be helpful for >> recovering >> > volkerpsychologie: >> > http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/19064/1/19064.pdf >> > >> > It traces volkerpsychologie back to the origins in Lazarus and >> Steinthal, >> > and forward through Wundt, Simmel, Durkheim, and Boas. It also engages >> with >> > the question of anti-semitism that plagued volkerpsychologie (since it >> got >> > associated with the third reich). >> > >> > Thanks Larry! >> > -greg >> > >> > >> > >> > On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 11:27 AM, mike cole wrote: >> > >> > > ?Hi Larry -- >> > > >> > > I also recommend the article to which you point xmcaers. At an earlier >> > > time, exploration of volkerpsychologie in seeking to understand >> > > cultural-historical psychology origins was a living theme at LCHC. For >> > > those who want to know more about this line of work, which remains >> > relevant >> > > as Larry notes, I recommend the special issue of the LCHC Newsletter >> for >> > > 1990. It does not substitute for the article Larry is pointing to. >> > Rather, >> > > it provides an account of volkepsycholgie within the context of >> > > methodologies for the study of the role of culture in development. >> > > >> > > It is available here. >> > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/ja90v12n1.PDF >> > > >> > > mike >> > > >> > > On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 7:48 PM, wrote: >> > > >> > > > >> > > > Today, I was alerted to a fascinating article that I believe may be >> > > > interesting to others on this site. On the site academia.edu I >> > *follow* >> > > > Peter Jones and he bookmarked this article written by Craig >> > Brandist. I >> > > > downloaded this article and spent the day learning about the rise of >> > > Soviet >> > > > Sociolinguistics from the ashes of Volkerpsychologie. >> > > > As I was reading the article I was also reflecting on how >> > > > volkerpsychologie also travelled to North America and influenced the >> > > > Pragmatists. >> > > > This article generates a context for the emergence of ?objective >> > > > psychology* as a response to the *back and forth* of themes that >> are >> > > > continuing to be explored today. >> > > > I recommend reading this paper. >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -- >> > > >> > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> > object >> > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > Assistant Professor >> > Department of Anthropology >> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > Brigham Young University >> > Provo, UT 84602 >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object >> that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Sep 28 20:14:40 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 21:14:40 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Peter Jones bookmarked a fascinating article by Craig Brandist on Academia.edu. In-Reply-To: References: <57e88c66.d324620a.302b0.e759@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Andrew, I'd be interested in hearing more about the influence of JG Herder's thought in South Africa. I'm particularly wondering, does it end tragically? Yes, thanks for the Bunzl piece in the Stocking book. A good one for sure! Very best, Greg On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 7:33 PM, Andrew Babson wrote: > Thank you for sharing Larry, Mike and Greg, useful and welcome materials > and discussion. That intro excerpt is very familiar to me, Mike, very > influential as I was finding ways to connect philosophy, psychology and > anthropology. I'm interested to know more about the > V?lkerpsychologie influence on the Soviet thinkers so familiar to this > discussion board (albeit only somewhat familiar to me). This thread reminds > me of a similar one about a year ago. > > I'm trying to finish two current writing projects of mine on the legacy of > JG Herder's thought in South Africa. Maybe of interest to those of you with > a ken for intellectual history of anthropology, and the role of missionary > practice in that history. I'll be glad to share once they are out. > > There's a good and very relevant book edited by Stocking about the lineage > you mention, Greg, particularly a chapter by Matti Bunzl > PA17&dq=Volksgeist%20as%20Method%20and%20Ethic%3A%20Essays%20on%20Boasian% > 20Ethnography&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q=Volksgeist%20as%20Method%20and%20Ethic:% > 20Essays%20on%20Boasian%20Ethnography&f=false>that > discusses the tarnished legacy discussed in the article you link. > > Andrew > > ------------------------------------------- > Andrew Babson, Ph.D. > Lecturer > Graduate School of Education > University of Pennsylvania > > > > On Tuesday, September 27, 2016, mike cole wrote: > > > >> The volker psychology of the 19th Century is very much a part of the > issue > >> of "the two psychologies" that get discussed in the various crises > tracts > >> of the 1920's. Here is part of what I wrote about these issues in the > >> introduction to *Cultural Psychology. * > >> > >> *hit delete now if not interested! * > >> > >> mike > >> > >> *The V?lkerpsychologie movement*. Mill's ideas, along with those of von > >> Humboldt, were seized upon by Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal, two > >> German scholars. In 1860 Lazarus and Steinthal began to publish the > >> *Zeitschrift > >> fur V?lkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenshaft* (Journal of Cultural > >> Psychology and Philology), a journal which presented itself as a forum > for > >> reconciling the natural and cultural/historical sciences (Jahoda, 1992; > >> Jahoda and Krewer, 1991; Whitman, 1984). They were strongly influenced > by > >> von Humboldt and explicitly noted the similarity between their version > of > >> V?lkerpsychologie and Mill's concept of Ethology. The pages of the > >> *Zeitschrift* contained articles by leading historical, philological and > >> anthropological scholars of the day.[1] These contributions provided > >> analyses of language ("Exclamation, question and negation in the Semitic > >> languages") myth ("On the relation between myth and religion"), and > other > >> cultural phenomena (arithmetic systems, proverbs, calendrical devices, > >> folk > >> medicine, etc.). All were intended to contribute to explaining > differences > >> in "V?lksgeist" in a manner that was simultaneously scientific and > >> historical. > >> > >> Lazarus and Steinthal's effort to reconcile the schism between the > natural > >> and cultural sciences was heavily criticized because they ignored the > idea > >> of mental chemistry and began to claim that it is possible to apply data > >> obtained from the study of individual minds to the formulation of strict > >> explanatory laws of culture and historical phenomena, precisely the move > >> that Mill had shown to be flawed. > >> > >> *Descriptive Psychology*. Wilhelm Dilthey, whose work continues to > >> influence a vast range of contemporary scholarship in what can be > broadly > >> characterized as cultural studies, sought to reconcile the natural and > >> cultural sciences. Psychology, he believed, should serve as the > >> foundational science for all of the human sciences (philosophy, > >> linguistics, history, law, art, literature, etc). Without such a > >> foundational science, he claimed, the human sciences could not be a true > >> system (Dilthey, 1923/1988, 1977). > >> > >> Early in his career, Dilthey considered the possibility that > >> experimental psychology might provide such a foundation science. > However, > >> he gradually came to reject this possibility because he felt that in > >> attempting to satisfy the requirements of the *Naturwissenshaften* for > >> formulating cause?effect laws between mental elements, psychologists had > >> stripped mental processes of the real?life relationships between people > >> that gave meaning to their elements. He did not mince words in his > attack > >> on the academic psychology of the late 19th century: > >> > >> Contemporary psychology is an expanded doctrine of sensation and > >> association. The fundamental power of mental life falls outside the > scope > >> of psychology. Psychology has become only a doctrine of the forms of > >> psychic processes; thus it grasps only a part of that which we actually > >> experience as mental life (quoted in Ermath, 1978, p. 148) > >> > >> Dilthey proposed a different approach to the study of psychology, one > >> which > >> harks back to Vico's prescriptions for the study of human nature as an > >> historically contingent phenomenon. Dilthey believed that since it > >> encompasses only a part of mental life, explanatory psychology must be > >> subordinated to a historical-social approach that studies individuals in > >> relation to their cultural systems and communities (Dilthey, 1894/1977). > >> He > >> called this approach *descriptive psychology*. It was to be based on an > >> analysis of real?life mental processes in real?life situations, > including > >> both the reciprocal processes between people and individuals' thoughts. > As > >> methods for carrying out this kind of analysis, Dilthey suggested the > >> close > >> study of the writings of such "life?philosophers" as Augustine, > Montaigne, > >> and Pascal, because they contained a deep understanding of full > >> experiential reality. > >> > >> *Wundt's compromise*. The system of psychology proposed by Wundt adopted > >> the strategy proposed by Mill: recognize the fact that two different > order > >> of reality are involved, and create two psychologies, one appropriate to > >> each. On the one hand there is "physiological psychology," the > >> experimental > >> study of immediate experience. The goal of this half of the discipline > was > >> to explicate the laws by which elementary sensations arise in > >> consciousness > >> and the universal laws by which the elements of consciousness combine. > The > >> label "physiological" for this half of Wundt's enterprise is somewhat > >> misleading because experiments carried out in its name rarely involved > >> physiological measurement. Rather, it was believed that the verbal > reports > >> of subjects who were carefully trained in methods of self? observation > >> (introspection) would yield results that could eventually be traced to > >> physiological processes. Experiments conducted with this goal in mind > >> concentrated on *elementary* psychological functions, meaning the > >> qualities > >> of sensory experience and the components of simple reactions. > >> > >> On the other hand, Wundt initiated a mammoth investigation of *higher* > >> psychological functions, functions resulting from the fusing and > >> concatenation of elementary functions. Higher functions include > processes > >> such as deliberate remembering, reasoning, and language. Wundt, > following > >> von Humboldt, called this second branch of psychology, > >> *V?lkerpsychologie*. > >> He argued that *V?lkerpsychologie* could not be studied using laboratory > >> methods of trained introspection that focus on the contents of > >> consciousness because the higher psychological functions extend beyond > >> individual human consciousness. So, for example, one could not > understand > >> the psychology of language use because > >> > >> A language can never be created by an individual. True, individuals have > >> invented Esperanto and other artificial languages. Unless, however, > >> language had already existed, these inventions would have been > impossible. > >> Moreover, none of these has been able to maintain itself, and most of > them > >> owe their existence solely to elements borrowed from natural languages. > >> (Wundt, 1921, p. 3) > >> > >> According to this view, higher psychological functions had to be studied > >> by > >> the methods of the descriptive sciences, such as ethnography, folklore, > >> and > >> linguistics. His volumes on this topic are full of data derived from a > >> broad range of the historical and anthropological accounts about the > >> languages and customs of the world's cultures (Jahoda, 1992; Wundt, > 1921). > >> This branch of psychology, he wrote, was supposed to combine > >> > >> into a unified whole the various results concerning the mental > development > >> of many as severally viewed by language, religion, and custom (Wundt, > >> 1921, > >> p. 2. > >> > >> > >> > >> Wundt believed that the two enterprises, physiological > >> > >> > >> > >> psychology and V?lkerpsychologie must supplement each other; only > through > >> a > >> synthesis of their respective insights could a full psychology be > >> achieved. > >> To those who would claim that V?lkerpsychologie could be entirely > subsumed > >> under experimental psychology Wundt replied > >> > >> Its problem relates to those mental products which are created by a > >> community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely > >> of > >> individual consciousness, since they presuppose the reciprocal action of > >> many. > >> > >> ... > >> > >> Individual consciousness is wholly incapable of giving us a history of > the > >> development of human thought, for it is conditioned by an earlier > history > >> concerning which it cannot of itself give us any knowledge. (Wundt, > 1921, > >> p. 3) > >> > >> In this connection, Wundt makes an additional methodological claim which > >> is > >> central to the history and current practice of the study of culture in > >> mind: V?lkerpsychologie is, in an important sense of the word, genetic > >> psychology (p. 3); that is, the study of higher psychological functions > >> requires the use a developmental/historical methodology . For this > reason > >> he believed that V?lkerpsychologie must involve the methods of > ethnology, > >> conceived of as "the science of the origins of peoples." > >> > >> Wundt himself did not study ontogeny (the genesis of an individual > life), > >> sticking instead to the study of cultural history, so he had little to > say > >> about how these two levels of genetic analysis are related to each > other. > >> But he believed that the results of such historical research would yield > >> evidence about "the various stages of mental development still exhibited > >> by > >> mankind" (p.4). In reaching such conclusions, Wundt was inheriting the > >> German tradition of cultural-historical philosophy. V?lkerpsychologie, > he > >> declared, would "reveal well?defined primitive conditions, with > >> transitions > >> leading through an almost continuous series of intermediate steps to the > >> more developed and higher civilizations (p.4)." > >> > >> Wundt adopted a cultural, not racial, theory of the perceived > inequalities > >> in mental products separating primitive and civilized peoples. He was > >> convinced *both* of the superiority of European culture *and* that the > >> intellectual endowment of primitive peoples is equal to that of > Europeans. > >> Like Spencer, Wundt believed that it is not intellectual endowment that > >> differentiates primitive and civilized people, but the range of world > >> experiences ("Primitive man merely exercises his ability in a more > >> restricted field"). This narrow range of experiences coincided in > Wundt's > >> mind with the image of the primitive person living in the tropics where > >> there is food and fun always at hand, so that the native peoples were > not > >> motivated to move outside of "a state of nature." > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> [1] I am indebted to Bernd Krewer and Gustav Jahoda (1990) for > their > >> summary of the contents and context of the work of Lazarus and > Steinthal. > >> My discussion is derived from their work (See also Jahoda, 1993). > >> > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 11:11 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> wrote: > >> > >> > Volkerpsychologie also has a substantial influence with the field of > >> > anthropology proper - esp. in the early to mid- 20th century emphasis > on > >> > Culture and Personality (e.g., Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Gregory > >> > Bateson, G. Gorer, Abram Kardiner, etc.). By some accounts this may > have > >> > been taking up the less productive side of volkerpsychologie (i.e. the > >> one > >> > that leads to stereotypes), but it was nonetheless a BIG part of 20th > >> > century anthropology. (and I suspect with some small tweaks, we could > >> > recover much of the work that was done in this vein). > >> > > >> > Here is another nice resource I found that might be helpful for > >> recovering > >> > volkerpsychologie: > >> > http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/19064/1/19064.pdf > >> > > >> > It traces volkerpsychologie back to the origins in Lazarus and > >> Steinthal, > >> > and forward through Wundt, Simmel, Durkheim, and Boas. It also engages > >> with > >> > the question of anti-semitism that plagued volkerpsychologie (since it > >> got > >> > associated with the third reich). > >> > > >> > Thanks Larry! > >> > -greg > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 11:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> > > >> > > ?Hi Larry -- > >> > > > >> > > I also recommend the article to which you point xmcaers. At an > earlier > >> > > time, exploration of volkerpsychologie in seeking to understand > >> > > cultural-historical psychology origins was a living theme at LCHC. > For > >> > > those who want to know more about this line of work, which remains > >> > relevant > >> > > as Larry notes, I recommend the special issue of the LCHC > Newsletter > >> for > >> > > 1990. It does not substitute for the article Larry is pointing to. > >> > Rather, > >> > > it provides an account of volkepsycholgie within the context of > >> > > methodologies for the study of the role of culture in development. > >> > > > >> > > It is available here. > >> > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/ja90v12n1.PDF > >> > > > >> > > mike > >> > > > >> > > On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 7:48 PM, wrote: > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > Today, I was alerted to a fascinating article that I believe may > be > >> > > > interesting to others on this site. On the site academia.edu I > >> > *follow* > >> > > > Peter Jones and he bookmarked this article written by Craig > >> > Brandist. I > >> > > > downloaded this article and spent the day learning about the rise > of > >> > > Soviet > >> > > > Sociolinguistics from the ashes of Volkerpsychologie. > >> > > > As I was reading the article I was also reflecting on how > >> > > > volkerpsychologie also travelled to North America and influenced > the > >> > > > Pragmatists. > >> > > > This article generates a context for the emergence of ?objective > >> > > > psychology* as a response to the *back and forth* of themes that > >> are > >> > > > continuing to be explored today. > >> > > > I recommend reading this paper. > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > > >> > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >> > object > >> > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > Assistant Professor > >> > Department of Anthropology > >> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > Brigham Young University > >> > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >> object > >> that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From gordonucsc@gmail.com Thu Sep 29 09:24:45 2016 From: gordonucsc@gmail.com (Gordon Wells) Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 12:24:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Martin, I have just read your introductory chapter - thanks for posting it - and am in full agreement with your orientation. I will be interested to see how you treat public education. Thanks, Gordon Gordon Wells On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:51 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I have a textbook currently in production with Sage, titled ?Child > Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective.? It is my attempt to > make sense of how children develop in cultural contexts, and to organize > some of the exploding literature in developmental science. There are many > flaws in the book, but hopefully it has some merits! > > Sage has asked me to identify colleagues who might be interested in > adopting or recommending this text for courses they are teaching. I asked > if they would receive a complementary copy of the book, and Sage?s reply is > "We will review those contacts, and if they are teaching the right course, > they will absolutely receive a copy.? Please contact me if you might adopt > the book, or at least might like a free copy! :) > > The information requested by Sage is name, institution, course details, > and email/telephone. I have uploaded the introductory chapter to > Academia.edu: > > Understanding_a_Cultural_Perspective> > > Martin > > From smago@uga.edu Thu Sep 29 12:33:18 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 19:33:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] JoLLE Conference Registration is NOW OPEN! Presentation submissions will be accepted until October 12, 2016. Message-ID: https://www.smore.com/un0ex-jolle-newsletter [https://d1zqayhc1yz6oo.cloudfront.net/57ec1ef31984ad0204320cb1-screenshot-fb_wide.jpg?_v=1475093588] JoLLE Newsletter www.smore.com JoLLE Conference Registration is NOW OPEN! Presentation submissions will be accepted until October 12, 2016. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Sep 29 13:47:16 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 16:47:16 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Press Release-37th Annual Charles Thompson Lecture-Colloquium Message-ID: Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Journal of Negro Education Date: 9/29/16 1:59 PM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: Press Release-37th Annual Charles Thompson Lecture-Colloquium 29-Sep-2016 Greetings! Please find attached the Press Release for the 37th Annual Charles Thompson Lecture-Colloquium. The Press Release is also available on The Journal of Negro Education website within the "What's New or Planned" section. (http://www.journalnegroed.org) Thanks, Lenda P. Hill Associate Editor The Journal of Negro Education -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: * JNE-Press-Release-37th-Annual-Charles-Thompson-Lecture-Col Type: application/octet-stream Size: 30795 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160929/835d1f2a/attachment.obj From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Sep 29 16:26:00 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 23:26:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks, Gordon. That almost sounds like an endorsement! :) Martin > On Sep 29, 2016, at 11:24 AM, Gordon Wells wrote: > > Martin, > > I have just read your introductory chapter - thanks for posting it - and am > in full agreement with your orientation. I will be interested to see how > you treat public education. > > Thanks, > > Gordon > > > > Gordon Wells > > > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:51 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> I have a textbook currently in production with Sage, titled ?Child >> Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective.? It is my attempt to >> make sense of how children develop in cultural contexts, and to organize >> some of the exploding literature in developmental science. There are many >> flaws in the book, but hopefully it has some merits! >> >> Sage has asked me to identify colleagues who might be interested in >> adopting or recommending this text for courses they are teaching. I asked >> if they would receive a complementary copy of the book, and Sage?s reply is >> "We will review those contacts, and if they are teaching the right course, >> they will absolutely receive a copy.? Please contact me if you might adopt >> the book, or at least might like a free copy! :) >> >> The information requested by Sage is name, institution, course details, >> and email/telephone. I have uploaded the introductory chapter to >> Academia.edu: >> >> > Understanding_a_Cultural_Perspective> >> >> Martin >> >> From arturo.escandon@gmail.com Thu Sep 29 22:26:48 2016 From: arturo.escandon@gmail.com (Arturo Escandon) Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 14:26:48 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 3rd generation activity theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Mark, I do not see why you need to deploy a 3rd generation AT model to analyse the development of an idea in a single AT system. Most 3rd generation AT applications deal with "interdisciplinary systems". Let us say you have a patient that is being treated by medical doctors (hospital, public health) and social workers (social welfare), then you deploy a 3rd generation AT. Now consider what happens if the presentation your group is going to make is part of a project involving another community outside school (let us say work involving a group of elder in a residence for the elder). Then you may apply a 3rd generation AT. BTW, I dislike the "models". Best Arturo On 19 August 2016 at 08:03, Greg Thompson wrote: > Small point here Mark about the 5/6 transition, but as an American English > speaker, and given the further clarification that you just provided, I feel > like Student C's comment in 6 is lacking something about how to connect it > to what came before. I would have expected some kind of linking clause or > transition like "[to student B] that's a great idea. I am attaching a > poster..." > > I would suggest two possibilities for why this didn't happen: > 1a. this is a metapragmatic difference between their native tongue and > English. > 1b. they don't have the linguistic resources to accomplish this kind of > bridging (although "that's a great idea seems grammatically and > semantically simple enough that I would assume that, based on their other > utterances, would have been easy enough to produce). > 2. It is unnecessary given the medium in which they are working (i.e., the > collaborative nature of Student C's comment in 6 is obvious given what has > come before). > > Of course there may be others, but each of these options point to how > collaboration is mediated by the means of communication (whether the means > are metapragmatics, linguistic resources, or the medium of communication). > That doesn't get you to 3rd gen activity theory but it seems to be > something that is old school activity theory. It seems to be clearly there > in the data. What's more, it is this aspect of collaboration that is > entirely left out of many models of collaboration (see the virtual > communication system that Mike sent an email about shortly ago). > > Just one thought among many. > > -greg > > > > On Wed, Aug 17, 2016 at 11:00 PM, Mark de Boer > wrote: > >> Hello! >> Thank you for your replies. For some reason I did not get them in my >> mailbox, so I am consolidating >> >> the mail here from the XMCA archive site and replying to everyone >> below each of your messages. >> >> >> Hi Mark, >> >> I think the issue is really complex. >> Are the students using the open forum to make the poster better for >> presentation >> or to advance the thinking that the poster represents. >> If it is the first then I don't think you can think of it as the type of >> progressive thinking the Knowledge Forum for instance is looking to create >> through student interactions. It is instead the students looking to use >> the >> technology to advance their needs within the larger system (a good >> poster means a better grade). >> On the other hand if you can show that the students are really >> changing each other's >> thinking about what's on the poster (and I am not sure you can from >> the dialogue you >> presented here) then you can make an argument for augmented thinking, >> for progressive >> development of thinking, I am guessing for 3rd generation activity theory. >> >> I think Kai Hakkarainnen and Sammi Paavola have written some really >> interesting stuff on this. >> Take a look at some of their articles. >> >> Michael >> >> >> Hello Michael, >> >> The students are doing both. They use the forum to better the poster, >> but as they are doing this, >> >> the poster is evolving to change from data to 'a message', i.e. the >> data are facts concerning pet >> >> bottle manufacturing, recycling, and usage, which evolves into a >> message that pet bottles are harmful for >> >> the environment, harmful for our bodies, and that we should stop using >> them. So although the dialogue >> >> I showed here doesn't show this (there is a lot of dialogue that is >> not shown in my short example), >> >> the majority of the dialogue moves the process forward, what should be >> done, what message should be put in the poster, >> but the content in the posters provides the most evidence that there >> is influence of content, content added >> >> often has an influence on other content, and the message evolves. The >> issue is complex, it is a language learning classroom, >> >> and I am attempting to show that through the student interaction, they >> are dynamically assessing each other. >> >> >> >> Hi Mark >> >> It is not clear to me from your explication why you need 3rd gen AT. >> Mike >> I concur with Mike, Mark. There is not a *system *of activity being >> negotiated here as I see. Beliefs, motives, goals, division of labour, >> subject, object, outcomes. It's seems like overkill in your situation, >> where content is being negotiated and renegotiated. I am at a loss to >> offer you anything more than what you are dealing with in terms of >> dialogue, except you might like to see what Eugene Matusov might have to >> offer. >> >> Carol >> >> Hello Mike and Carol, >> >> Originally, my thoughts were to examine what the learners were doing >> in the forums, and came up >> >> with the conclusion that this was an object oriented activity. The >> thinking came from reading >> 'Toward overcoming the encapsulation of school learning' by Engestrom, >> as learners are working on their >> >> understanding of the different concepts of the topics they are going >> to present on. I showed division of labour, >> >> subject, object outcomes, tools. My dilemma, was that I wanted to show >> that on one side there was the language which was driving >> >> the process forward, this can be easily proven using different >> analytical tools, but I also wanted to show that as a result of >> >> collaboration, the students would develop content.(this can also >> easily be seen from the data). But as they developed content, >> they would discuss it, thus the content was also responsible for the >> collaboration. This would be done up to the point of where >> they would present. Thus the division of systems (in my mind). >> I also wanted to show that the object (poster) was not the end >> product, it was used as a tool for their presentation >> (tools-and-results activity). >> >> I am confused now, because I have written, submitted, and passed 2 >> literature reviews towards my PhD with these concepts in mind and >> now I am currently writing the final paper, showing the analysis of the >> data. >> >> >> >> >> >> > On Aug 16, 2016, at 9:04 AM, Mark de Boer wrote: >> > >> > I can understand what happens between 1 and 2. This is a simple case. But >> > between 2, 3, and 4 it becomes complicated. >> >> Mark, I don?t yet understand what happens between 1 and 2! >> >> > 1. Student A: 'Let's begin working on our poster' >> > 2. Student B: 'I made my poster, please check' (poster1 file an >> attachment >> > in the forum) >> >> How did ?our poster? become ?my poster?? >> >> Martin >> >> Dear Martin, >> >> Because this is a group of 4 students, even though they are developing >> a poster as a group, they >> (as is seen later on) end up dividing the work and each start to >> create 'their part of the poster', >> >> so the dialogue moves from 'let's make our poster' (as a group) to 'I >> made my poster' (contribution to the >> >> group's whole poster). Later on in the dialogue, the group leader >> divides the work of the poster into >> >> topics as I showed, but then after a number of days, he decides to >> assign these topics to the other >> >> students in the group. The dialogue moves from one poster being >> created - moving from student to >> >> student, to 4 sub posters being created by 4 students, and the >> dialogue shows evidence that the >> >> students are looking at each others posters, making suggestions about >> what gets written, and in >> >> some cases altering other student's posters. At the end the posters >> are printed and put on the wall >> >> ready for presenting. >> >> >> >> >> Mark, >> I don't understand what happens between 5 and 6: >> >> "5. Student B: 'I think that we should put the following contents in our >> poster (suggesting a list of topics concerning pet bottles and pet bottle >> use) Please give me your opinion. >> 6. Student C: 'I made a poster about (topic a), please check' (poster4 file >> an attachment in the forum, originally poster3)" >> >> How did poster3 get changed into poster4 that is "about topic a". Or was >> poster3 already about topic a? If so, then why the need to introduce to >> everyone with "I made a poster about (topic a)"? Was "topic a" something >> that was introduced by Student B in turn #5? Is this due to the students >> not having the resources in English to indicate how their turn relates to >> the previous turn? >> >> The continuity/discontinuity (aka "old/new information") is what is unclear >> to me. The fact that this poster4 is a revision of poster3 suggests >> continuity and old information. But the statement "I made a poster about >> (topic a)" suggests discontinuity and new information. >> >> -greg >> >> Dear Greg, >> >> I'm sorry I wasn't clear here. Even though the poster is starting to >> get developed, the leader of >> >> the group decides that there should be specific themes running though >> the poster, thus topics (a-d) are decided >> >> and written into the forum. Poster 3 file already contains some >> information, but now student C takes that poster >> >> and adds topic-a information. (Topic b information was already there). >> So the poster begins to get built by adding >> >> topic information. So although there is continuity and old >> information, there is discontinuity and new information added. >> >> Later some of the students also put information into the poster that >> begins to link the different topics together. >> >> At one point though the group leader decides that instead of listing >> topics and having a free-for-all, each student randomly >> >> adding information, he assigns the topics Student A gets topic a, etc, >> and then there is a discontinuity and new information. >> >> The poster that they have been sharing is somewhat abandoned (although >> some information is pulled) and each student begins to >> >> work on their own topic as a completely separate file, uploading it to >> the forum as changes are made. >> >> >> >> Thank you everyone for your replies. If it is at all possible, would >> someone be willing to skype about this? I promise not to >> >> take up much of your time. My skype handle is yomogi-cello. I would be >> very grateful for any help or advice after you have read this post. >> >> Warm regards, >> >> Mark >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson