[Xmca-l] Re: Why Doesn't Vygotsky Use "Microgenesis"?

David Kellogg dkellogg60@gmail.com
Thu Oct 20 14:26:16 PDT 2016


Huw: Welcome back! We missed you.  I keep trying to download your paper,
but academia.edu just sets up an account for me instead. I already have an
account, thank you very much, and I just want to see your paper. What do I
do?

Mike: I didn't mean to suggest that you were in any way trying to make
light of my mother's dementia;  I didn't even mean to suggest that her fate
was particularly tragic (I get carried away by it sometimes, but she
doesn't any more). Yet I think that the very fact that her fate evokes
those feelings in me and in others, whereas we would not feel this way
about a real two-year-old, does suggest that time's arrow is a very real
part of our interpersonal ontogenesis.

Yes, I think the "Angelus Novus" (both Klee and Benjamin) is apposite:
human progress is real, but it is very hard to believe that when you are in
the thick of it and you don't really have a clear sense of how it is all
going to come out. But that needn't be true of xmca postings, so let me try
to sort out some of the points I was trying to make.

a) I was comparing the deterioration of higher psychological functions to
Zaza's notion of disinheritance, not to prototyping. I see the two as
distinct, and it seems to me that the difference is precisely that the
former is retroleptic (it harkens back to a previous, less developed form)
and the latter is proleptic (it brings the future into the present). For
example, using a washing machine to store rice because there isn't any
power is an example of disinheritance: it is retroleptic, because it
harkens back to a non-electrified, subsistence agriculture past. But using
the contents of a rubbish bin to create a prosthetic device that allows men
to nurse their newborn children is an example of prototyping: it is
proleptic, because it enables a neo-formation: a function that is "newly
built and not previously present in the prior steps of development"
(Vygotsky's lecture on early childhood).

b) I was trying to show that sociogenesis and phylogenesis are different in
principle: they aren't just different in timescale (i.e. I think that
sociogenesis is not just a kind of fast-forward phylogenesis). The Nazi era
you evoke is a good example: the Nazis believed that their eugenic policies
(the extermination of the weak, the mentally ill, and of course
the racially inferior, i.e. you and me) were simply a way of speeding up a
natural process. Yes, human progress since the replacement of hunting and
gathering with herding and growing has been checkered: it has been, for the
most part, a natural process rather than a designed one. But public health
(I mean preventive rather than curative medicine) and universal literacy (I
mean compulsory primary education) are not equivocal in their nature
precisely because they are proleptic; I don't think it's possible to be
agnostic or ambivalent about the expansion of human potential that they
have brought about: more people live longer and get more done, and that is
the Spinozan definition of "good". These unequivocal human advances were
enabled, not by people trying to speed up the process of natural selection
and extinction, but rather by people trying to overcome them. Public health
and universal literacy benefit the very young and the very old
disproportionately at first, but we all benefit when the level of public
contagion and the level of ignorance in cultural and political discourse is
reduced. Besides, we were all once very young, even if some of us will
never be very old. So it seems to me that sociogenesis is never just a
concentration of phylogenesis.

c) I think that ontogenesis and sociogenesis are also different in
principle and not simply in timescale. Take a look at this (warning: people
with progressive, child-centred views on teaching children will find it
hard to watch!):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PwPPWnTrUs0

A Chinese family is teaching their four-year-old the multiplication tables.
She is pretty good at first, but she keeps getting stuck at "three times
five is fifteen". Her mother makes her repeat it three or four times. This
actually makes the problem a little worse because "three times five" gets
stuck in her head and she gets confused when she tries to talk about four,
five, and six times five. Finally, she decides that "three times five" is
too difficult, although of course using the method of rote memorization we
really cannot say that it is any more difficult than any of the others, and
her tears, barely suppressed throughout, overcome her. Now, at her age, my
niece (who is now college age) was already using an abacus (and she was not
good at rote memo as a result). But at that age, my wife (who is now nearly
fifty) was still playing jacks with the ankle bones of sheep; my
mother-in-law (who died three years ago) was herding cattle, and if we go
back further we get to the many generations of Chinese women for whom
education was unthinkable. It's not just that education has been speeded
up: it's that it has been in many ways reversed--initially a natural
process clearly related to production and reproduction, it then became a
process of using extra-mental signs (ankle bones and abacuses), and now an
attempt to proceed immediately to rote internalization. It's not just a
quantitative change; it's that the very path of development has changed,
precisely because of the previous paths of development (as Arturo would
say, the existence of the L1 ensures that L2 is not just a recapitulation).
It appears that with ontogenesis too is not a concentration of sociogenesis.

d) I think that learning and development are similarly different. That
is, learning is not just a distillation of pre-existing or of hypothetical
development but in some ways a negation and sublation of it. Learning and
development are different for all the reasons that Vygotsky argues in
Chapter Six of Thinking and Speech: learning is a more general notion, it
is more external, it is less volitional and less consciously aware;
development is age specific, it is part the structuration and
restructuration of a whole psychological system, it occurs at the
personality end of the pole connecting the child to the environment rather
than the environmental end, and it is the result of expansion of
personality. So when learning leads development (as in Franklin's
case) there is a certain clash: Franklin has to set aside a mode of
learning and a skill set that has become natural to him and develop a new
formation instead.

If we want comparisons with other timescales, this clash is where we should
look: it is comparable to when children grow up to be themselves rather
than their parents, or when humans learn to adapt the environment to
themselves rather than adapt to it. It's not simply the case that learning
is development writ small, or a development on a very short timescale:
there is a qualitative, structural difference between learning and
development, because one of them is led by others and tends to the
retroleptic (because others are often interested in social reproduction),
and the other led by the child (who has other things on her or his mind).
But if learning and development are as different in kind as evolution and
social progress, or social progress and child development--and I believe
that they truly are--we cannot say that learning is simply "microgenesis",
the microscopic study of development that the Leipzig school of
Ganzheitpsychologie school had in mind. It is interesting that the Leipzig
school was mostly interested in lower level psychological functions (e.g.
perception) and perhaps also non-coincidental that most of them became
ardent Nazis (Felix Krueger, Eric Jaensch, Hans Volkelt, Narziss Ach,
Oswald Kroh and others).

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 5:58 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Apropos of the wreckage of sense-making and development in relation to AT,
> the following may provide some historical clarification:
>
> https://www.academia.edu/24660665/A_Comparison_of_
> Seven_Historical_Research_Orientations_within_CHAT_up_to_2001_
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On 20 October 2016 at 01:27, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
> > I did not intend to demean your mother's situation, David.
> > And the following makes your examples concrete:
> >
> >  I think that the three
> > strategies I gave you (pronouns, delight that masks astonishment, and
> > avoiding explanations) really are rooted in the lower psychological
> > functions and not in higher functions:* pronominal meaning can be simply*
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > *indicative rather than nominative, delight is an example of her
> > inabilityto divide affect from will, and avoiding "why" is an example of
> > the loss ofsemantic meaning and reliance on the visual purview alone. The
> > last time Itook language samples from her, they were comparable to those
> of
> > a two yearold. *
> >
> > But if one adopts your view, why do you liken the deteriorization of her
> > higher psychological functions to the kind of work around
> > illustrated by prototyping under difficult conditions?
> >
> > *Perhaps its because you view sociogenesis as  "the very*
> > *opposite: public health, compulsory education, and the knowledge that
> > it​ is precisely our ability to provide circuitous ways of helping the
> > very​ young and the very old that will ultimately make life better for
> > everybody,and not simply the very young and very old.*
> >
> > *​*With respect to public health the evidence I know of indicate that the
> > agricultural revolution, and subsequent urbanization led to a
> > deteriorization of life expectancy and health for the population as a
> whole
> > (however much it benefited the elites). *​*(As a priveleged member of the
> > privileged classes I would have been dead several times in the last
> couple
> > of decades had it not been for modern medicine-- my younger brother died
> 40
> > years before me of pancreatitis which is now routinely treatable).
> >
> >
> > The high high and highest level of civilization of Germany in 1930 did
> > nothing to prevent the rise of Hitler and its aftermath -- and we can see
> > that scenario playing out daily in the US at present,,,, hopefully to a
> > different conclusion.
> >
> > With respect to the microgenesis/ontogeny issue, I gave yet to figure out
> > the source of your confidence in their dissimilarity. I brought up
> Franklin
> > in the blocks (again - its a part of your ontogeny but not that of most
> who
> > participate on xmca at present) because it seems to be an example of
> > microgenesis-as-developmental change.
> >
> > With respect to the idea that humans now exhibit the
> >  ability to provide circuitous ways of helping the very
> > ​
> > young and the very old that will ultimately make life better for
> > everybody,*and
> > not simply the very young and very old.*
> > *​ ​-- *I really am not sure
> > what you are referring to.
> >
> > As always, your ideas are interesting and enlightening, even when I do
> not
> > properly understand them. Exhibiting my ignorance has the virtue of
> > provoking the conditions for deeper understanding. My likening your
> > mother's loss of semantic meaning to my (so far normal) "senior moments"
> > did not envision an (almost) total loss of functions, higher and lower by
> > Vygotky's reckoning. It is as if the multiple layers of history to be
> seen
> > in Rome were reduced by war and weather to the bottom-most stratum of the
> > pre-Etruscan.
> >
> > ​mike​
> >
> > PS-- With regard to cultural-historical/societal genesis Benjamin's
> Angelus
> > Novus often comes to mind.
> >
> >  A Klee painting "Angelus Novus" shows an angel looking as though he is
> > about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes
> are
> > staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one
> pictures
> > the
> >
> > angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a
> > chain
> > ​
> > of events, he sees one single
> > ​
> > catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon
> > ​
> >
> > wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The an
> > ​ ​
> > gel would like to stay, awaken
> > ​
> > the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing
> > ​
> > from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the
> > angel
> > ​
> > can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the
> > future
> > ​
> > to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows
> > skyward.
> >
> > This storm is what we call progress. (pp. 257-58)
> >
> >
> >
> > ​​
> >
> >
> > PS--
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 3:15 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Mike:
> > >
> > > My mother was a psychologist too--like you, trained as a behaviourist,
> > but
> > > unlike you she got off into Piaget in the early sixties. Then she moved
> > on
> > > to other things: she wrote a biography of Ada, Countess of Lovelace,
> > which
> > > was published by MIT Press and got her some notoriety, mostly because
> she
> > > showed that Byron's daughter, who everyone has assumed to be a kind of
> > > feminist icon and the world's first computer programmer, didn't
> actually
> > > know any mathematics! She told me a lot about Piaget and Lawrence
> > Kohlberg
> > > (who she briefly studied with). But I was unable to interest her in
> > > Vygotsky or in cultural historical psychology: she saw it, perhaps
> > > correctly, as nothing more than an attempt to prolong what she
> considered
> > > the crazy Bolshevism of my youth.
> > >
> > > Herr first response to losing her higher mental functions (when we
> walked
> > > to the Tate Art Gallery near her home in London and she forgot her way
> > > home) was simply horror. She went through a difficult period of terrors
> > > (curiously, mostly concerned with money, of which she still has a great
> > > deal more than she needs). Now she has stabilized (and she is actually
> > much
> > > happier than I ever remember her). But she has completely forgotten
> that
> > > she ever had children, doesn't know her age or history, and also lacks
> > > control over basic physiological functions. I think that the three
> > > strategies I gave you (pronouns, delight that masks astonishment, and
> > > avoiding explanations) really are rooted in the lower psychological
> > > functions and not in higher functions: pronominal meaning can be simply
> > > indicative rather than nominative, delight is an example of her
> inability
> > > to divide affect from will, and avoiding "why" is an example of the
> loss
> > of
> > > semantic meaning and reliance on the visual purview alone. The last
> time
> > I
> > > took language samples from her, they were comparable to those of a two
> > year
> > > old.
> > >
> > > Unfortunately is the word! And yet...perhaps this is something else we
> > can
> > > all learn from Vygotsky. I don't just mean the way he faced death: he
> > died
> > > young, at the very height of his powers, and he had been practicing
> dying
> > > for the whole of his adult life, so the comparison with my mother is
> > > manifestly unfair. I mean first of all the way that Vygotsky really
> does
> > > use "pathogenesis", not as a new form of development but rather as a
> way
> > of
> > > examining the real prior processes of development (which, as a
> Spinozan,
> > he
> > > believed always involved the expansion of potential rather than its
> > > contraction). That's why Vygotsky ends almost every single chapter in
> the
> > > second part of HDHMF with a pathological example, why never gives up
> > > on "defektology", and I also think that is why he started studying
> > medicine
> > > even when he knew there was no hope for himself: it offers a way of
> > looking
> > > at the lower layers of development and how they subtend or fail to
> > subtend
> > > the higher ones.
> > >
> > > The second thing, though, was what I think he discovered through his
> > > pathogenetic analyses: that there is a very real difference between
> > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis, between sociogenesis and
> ontogenesis...and
> > > also, as I am now quite sure, between ontogenesis and microgenesis. In
> > > phylogenesis: descent through modification--i.e. through the ruthless
> > > destruction of individuals and whole species. In sociogenesis, the very
> > > opposite: public health, compulsory education, and the knowledge that
> it
> > > is precisely our ability to provide circuitous ways of helping the very
> > > young and the very old that will ultimately make life better for
> > everybody,
> > > and not simply the very young and very old. The end of ontogenesis is
> not
> > > simply death--it is the decline that it inevitable after roughly the
> age
> > > that Vygotsky died. But with literacy, we are able to pass on our very
> > best
> > > to the next generation. I don't know if Vygotsky really believed that
> > these
> > > last lectures of his would be translated and read by thousands of
> > teachers
> > > in some totally foreign land eight decades after his death--he believed
> > > in internationalism, so I think it's at least possible that he did. But
> > > whether he believed it or not, that is what is going to happen, and
> it's
> > > why I think that cultural-historical psychologists, unlike Piagetians,
> > can
> > > face decline and death with a certain equanimity and acceptance.
> > >
> > > But it is also why I'm not really sure that Dorothy Kellogg Stein's
> > > biography of Ada Lovelace was such a terrible mistake, Mike. When I
> take
> > it
> > > off the shelf and read it, I  can still hear her voice, feel her
> > razor-like
> > > intellect, and even remonstrate with her individualistic and
> biologizing
> > > psychology. When I go and actually visit her at Lord Wandsworth's Home
> > for
> > > Aging Jewry in Clapham I cannot.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Macquarie University
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 5:17 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > > David -
> > > >
> > > > I think it is unfortunate to link workarounds with a loss of higher
> > > > psychological functions. Again, it seems like ontogeny recapitulates
> > > > history. The end of ontogeny is death. Ditto history?
> > > >
> > > > By any account I can think of, your mother is using higher higher
> > > > psychological functions to work around the inability to retrieve
> > > vocabulary
> > > > at a conventional level of abstraction. I am of an age where the same
> > > > problem can be noticed. Nice that I can, for the time being,
> understand
> > > > enough to be able to study development in decline in real life in
> > > addition
> > > > to experiencing it. Hmm, that means I have some higher higher
> functions
> > > to
> > > > draw upon!
> > > >
> > > > In our own work, the workarounds needed to solve the failure of a
> > gifted,
> > > > "promising" technology under high pressure to succeed created both a
> > > > successful product and resulted in productive education for all
> > involved.
> > > >
> > > > To me, a great example of pathogenisis is the use of the highly
> > > developed,
> > > > highly admired, highly financed, digital technologies of cyberspace.
> > > > Clearly an advance over atomic bombs- cleaner, faster, more
> efficient.
> > > >
> > > > Where I think there is something distinctly unusual in Zaza's
> > prototyping
> > > > example is that the prototyping itself, even if it
> > > > had been accomplishable easily with strong technological/resource
> > > backing,
> > > > is a work around for the inability to confront directly the cultural
> > > > beliefs that make it shameful for a woman with HIV to bottle feed her
> > > baby.
> > > > We rarely discuss the power of cultural norms in constraining
> cultural
> > > > change even when the current practices threaten reproduction of the
> > > social
> > > > group. It seems, perhaps, an intractable problem. The US appears
> unable
> > > to
> > > > give up on putting water in disposable plastic bottles. Pathogenesis?
> > > >
> > > > I'll follow my habit of sorting things out by responding vis a vis
> > > > Franklin in Larry's note below. I will respond on a thread called
> > > > microgenesis/ontogenesis.
> > > >
> > > > Compensatorily yours.
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 1:15 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Mike likes a discussion to be, as Bernstein put it, well framed and
> > > well
> > > > > classified; or at least he likes the threads to be well
> disentangled
> > > and
> > > > > properly subject lined. But perhaps we shouldn't give up on the
> "The
> > > > > Prototyping Mind" too quickly! As you can see from Molly's careful
> > > > perusal
> > > > > and forceful restatement of Zaza's major themes, there is still a
> lot
> > > in
> > > > > Zaza's prototyping bin to talk about.
> > > > >
> > > > > The one that interests me, that I think is relevant to the
> > > "microgenesis"
> > > > > thread, is what learning means when it means adapting to
> > > > anti-development.
> > > > > For example, there are undoubtedly work-arounds that people use
> when
> > > > their
> > > > > higher psychological functions start to shut down (I watched my
> > mother
> > > do
> > > > > quite a few of these, addressing everyone as "you" instead of using
> > > > names,
> > > > > reacting to novel situations with a delight which effectively hides
> > her
> > > > > astonishment, and above all refraining from trying to understand
> the
> > > > > reasons for present situations).
> > > > >
> > > > > Similarly, there are ontogenetic work-arounds that people use when
> > > > > commodity production shuts down. But in both cases, we have a kind
> of
> > > > > development which forgoes time's arrow; we have a notion of
> > development
> > > > > that works backwards and forwards (like the laws of physics as
> > opposed
> > > to
> > > > > the laws of thermodynamics). I won't say that suggests relativism
> > (that
> > > > > would be, I think, too moralistic an argument, and it is a rabbit
> > hole
> > > we
> > > > > have been down already anyway). But it suggests an atomism that I
> > > > disagree
> > > > > with (in addition to eschewing time, the laws of physics don't
> > combine
> > > > > matter and meaning the way that the laws of thermodynamics do!)
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike has offered Franklin as an example of a Zoped before (I
> remember
> > > > once
> > > > > thinking that he directed it to ME as a way of getting ME to think
> a
> > > bit
> > > > > about listening to others on this list, but in fact he's used it in
> > > print
> > > > > on at least one occasion). Whenever he offers it, he does the exact
> > > > > opposite of what he usually does with xmca threads: instead of
> asking
> > > us
> > > > to
> > > > > disentangle threads, he invites us to combine them. Franklin is
> > > learning
> > > > > (to listen to others). But he is also developing, on at least three
> > > > counts:
> > > > > by learning to listen to others, he is acquiring new forms of
> meaning
> > > > > potential; by learning to recognize himself when it is "played
> back"
> > to
> > > > > him, he is acquiring a new form of reflecting on experience; and
> > (this
> > > is
> > > > > the one I really want to talk about) he is learning that play is
> not
> > > > simply
> > > > > the manipulation of objects but also the manipulation of social
> roles
> > > > > according to abstract rules (such as reciprocity and mutuality).
> > > > >
> > > > > Now, you can see that I'm trying to disentangle things that are not
> > > > really
> > > > > that distinct (reciprocity is really a form of serial mutuality,
> and
> > > both
> > > > > of them are simply abstract forms of listening to others). The
> > Vygotsky
> > > > > lectures I'm working with are a little similar: in his work on the
> > > Crisis
> > > > > at Three (Franklin's Crisis, I suspect), he is trying to
> disentangle
> > > the
> > > > > "seven stars" of bad behaviour (folk concepts that nursemaids and
> > > mothers
> > > > > use--I notice there is even a Russian Wikipedia page!) from what he
> > > > thinks
> > > > > is the key neoformation of Three, the separation of affect and
> will.
> > > > >
> > > > > For example, negativism is not just saying "no". It's saying "no"
> > when
> > > > the
> > > > > child really wants to say "yes", because although the child wants
> to
> > > say
> > > > > "yes", the others in the social milieu also want him to say "yes",
> > and
> > > > the
> > > > > child is more interested in self-assertion than in
> > self-gratification.
> > > > > Obstinacy is not just tenacity. It's actually the negation of
> > > negativism:
> > > > > saying "yes" when the child really wants to "no", or maybe "who
> > > cares?",
> > > > > simply because the child has already said "yes" and once again the
> > > child
> > > > is
> > > > > more interested in will than in affect. And so on.
> > > > >
> > > > > How is this connected with the next zone of development? Perhaps
> the
> > > next
> > > > > zone of development is preschool, and preschool depends on the
> > > separation
> > > > > of the semantic and the visio-graphic field of action in play. If
> so,
> > > > > Franklin's ability to interpret the teacher's imitation of his own
> > > > actions
> > > > > is a "trailer" of that next zone of development and no mere act of
> > > > > learning.  Or, maybe this is happening in a preschool, and the next
> > > zone
> > > > of
> > > > > development is actually the Crisis at Seven. If so, Franklin's
> > ability
> > > to
> > > > > recognize himself is a "trailer" of the next zone of development:
> > > acting
> > > > a
> > > > > role that is not really a role, but in fact a prototype self.
> > > > >
> > > > > But that's my problem, Molly. What do I do when the prototype self
> > > comes
> > > > to
> > > > > me from the past and not the future? Can we really call this
> > > development?
> > > > > Isn't it really a form of pathogenesis?
> > > > >
> > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > Macquarie University
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:29 AM, molly shea <mvshea@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Dear Zaza and Mike,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > My apologies for entering the conversation on Kukiya-kiya late,
> > > > however,
> > > > > > the article was so compelling I feel I should still enter. First,
> > to
> > > > > Zaza,
> > > > > > thank you for writing such a forceful analysis of learning
> through
> > > > > > prototyping. I especially like the ways in which your analytical
> > lens
> > > > > > included the political dimensions of problem solving and invoking
> > > > > > expertise. There are two ideas within the article that I hope to
> > use
> > > > and
> > > > > > extend in my work as well, and a question for Zaza, Mike, and
> > others
> > > at
> > > > > the
> > > > > > end of my second musing.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The first is your discussion of disinheritance as *an attention
> to
> > > > > > materials—a way of looking at materials that allows the beholder
> to
> > > > > > recognize transience, mutability, intermediateness—that allows
> > > > > Zimbabweans
> > > > > > to employ novel and unexpected ways to act within and around the
> > > > > > constraints of their material conditions.* By pointing out the
> > > separate
> > > > > > cognitive practice associated with seeing through disinheritance,
> > the
> > > > > > analysis draws attention to the political dimension of learning.
> > The
> > > > > > possible activities and therefore learning opportunities that
> arise
> > > > > through
> > > > > > this historical perception change and assumptions about designing
> > > > > learning
> > > > > > environments then shifts with these methods of seeing and using
> > > > > materials.
> > > > > > It also draws another potential distinction between the Maker
> > > Movement
> > > > > and
> > > > > > Kukiya—kiya. The Makers Movement doesn’t necessarily claim a
> > > political
> > > > > > agenda, however, by claiming something a-political or claiming an
> > > > agenda
> > > > > of
> > > > > > advancing technological skills in the name of progress, it has a
> > > > > historical
> > > > > > and political situated set of values that may be in opposition to
> > > those
> > > > > of
> > > > > > Kukiya—kiya that suffer the consequences of material
> disinheritance
> > > > > arising
> > > > > > in the context of economic crisis. Vossoughi, Hooper, and Escudé
> > > (2016)
> > > > > do
> > > > > > a wonderful job of pointing out many of the neoliberal
> consequences
> > > of
> > > > a
> > > > > > maker movement that does not see the lineage of prototyping
> > expertise
> > > > > > coming from many low-income communities living in “tight
> > > > circumstances”.
> > > > > > The power of the design of this prototyping project, for me,
> comes
> > > from
> > > > > > centering local expertise in the design of the learning
> > environment.
> > > > > > Although prototyping is at the center of both “making” and
> > > > “kukiya—kiya”
> > > > > > practices, it seems the political sense making between settings
> > > > couldn’t
> > > > > be
> > > > > > more different. Even within the Zaza paper, the participants
> > question
> > > > how
> > > > > > invention might or might not lead to liberation. I appreciate
> > Zaza's
> > > > > > attention to how participants questioned invention and business
> > > acumen
> > > > > as a
> > > > > > means to “extricate Zimbabwe from its economic quandary”. A
> lesser
> > > > > > researcher may have ignored this comment as outside of the design
> > > > process
> > > > > > and therefore the data set to be analyzed.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The second idea, related to the political dimensions of cognition
> > > that
> > > > > are
> > > > > > often overlooked, is your analysis of gender and expertise in the
> > > > design
> > > > > > process. I am struck by how the performance of gender and
> > > > > design-expertise
> > > > > > came in the form of whispers and informal conversations about
> > > > hand-bags.
> > > > > It
> > > > > > would be great to have more analysis like this one where gender
> > > > networks
> > > > > > inform design. In fact, it seems gender (man/woman/trans/other)
> is
> > > > always
> > > > > > informing design, but perhaps performance of expertise that is
> > > cis-male
> > > > > is
> > > > > > sometimes confused with having expertise at all. You analysis
> > offers
> > > > more
> > > > > > nuance about other kinds of performance of expertise. I wonder if
> > > > > > discussions about hand-bags creates the intimacy necessary to
> share
> > > > > > female-cis gendered understandings of design problems. I would
> love
> > > to
> > > > > hear
> > > > > > your thinking on this matter.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Again, thank you for your work and for the insights that this
> > article
> > > > has
> > > > > > provided me.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > - Molly Shea
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 5:46 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > ​Since it appears that people have completed discussion of
> Zaza's
> > > > paper
> > > > > > > (and of course, anyone is free to add to the discussion at any
> > > > time), I
> > > > > > > feel freer to engage the microgenesis/ontogenesis relationship.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I know too little about L1/L2 discussions to contribute there,
> > but
> > > as
> > > > > > life
> > > > > > > allows I will try to suggest that microgenesis can be shown, in
> > at
> > > > > least
> > > > > > > some circumstances, to involve both learning and development.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > So I attach an example from the work of Vivian Paley. It
> > addresses
> > > (I
> > > > > > > believe) Vygotsky's idea that play creates a Zoped in which a
> > child
> > > > is
> > > > > "a
> > > > > > > head taller than herself."
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Perhaps the example is inappropriate to the discussion or my
> > > > > > interpretation
> > > > > > > of it is bonkers. To me it illustrates both LSV's claim about
> the
> > > > zoped
> > > > > > and
> > > > > > > play and is a case of microgenesis with ontogenetic
> implications.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > See what you think. its 4 pages long.
> > > > > > > mike
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 5:33 PM, David Kellogg <
> > > dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > >
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Arturo:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Thanks for the very thoughtful reply. I think the only word I
> > > might
> > > > > > > > possibly disagree with is "unfortunately". I suppose there
> may
> > > also
> > > > > be
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > "zone of proximal learning", just as there is a zone of
> > proximal
> > > > > > > evolution
> > > > > > > > (I suspect, given the mass extinctions which are going on in
> > the
> > > > > > > > Anthropocene, that we are in one of these at present), and a
> > zone
> > > > of
> > > > > > > > proximal social progress (these have turned out to be far
> > longer
> > > > > than I
> > > > > > > > ever thought as a young person). But I think for now it's a
> > very
> > > > good
> > > > > > > idea
> > > > > > > > to focus on the D in ZPD, and not to forget that it's for
> > > > > "development"
> > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > not for learning.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Let me give three reasons. First of all, if we are interested
> > in
> > > > the
> > > > > > what
> > > > > > > > word value looks like when we remove the sound that realizes
> > it,
> > > we
> > > > > are
> > > > > > > > necessarily interested in a psychological rather than an
> > > > > interpersonal
> > > > > > > > phenomenon. Secondly, the focus on quick results in learning
> > very
> > > > > often
> > > > > > > > ends up victimizing teachers for problems in development that
> > > have
> > > > > > > nothing
> > > > > > > > to do with teaching methods and are really developmentally
> > > rooted.
> > > > > > > Thirdly,
> > > > > > > > just as we need to understand exactly what teachers are doing
> > > > before
> > > > > we
> > > > > > > go
> > > > > > > > about introducing interested changes, we also need to
> > understand
> > > > what
> > > > > > > > Vygotsky was trying to do before we decide it is irrelevant
> to
> > > our
> > > > > > > teaching
> > > > > > > > needs.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > This morning I was working on the beginning of the "Crisis at
> > > > Three",
> > > > > > > part
> > > > > > > > of which (but not the good part) can be read in Vol. Five of
> > the
> > > > > > > Collected
> > > > > > > > Works in English (Vol. Four in Russian):
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Во-первых, мы должны предположить, что все перемены, все
> > события,
> > > > > > > > совершающиеся в период этого кризиса, группируются вокруг
> > > > какого-либо
> > > > > > > > новообразования переходного типа. Следовательно, когда мы
> будем
> > > > > > > > анализировать симптомы кризиса, мы должны хотя бы
> > > предположительно
> > > > > > > ответить
> > > > > > > > на вопрос, что нового возникает в указанное время и какова
> > судьба
> > > > > > > > новообразования, которое исчезает после него. Затем мы должны
> > > > > > > рассмотреть,
> > > > > > > > какая смена центральных и побочных линий развития здесь
> > > > происходит. И
> > > > > > > > наконец, оценить критический возраст с точки зрения зоны его
> > > > > ближайшего
> > > > > > > > развития, т. е. отношения к следующему возрасту.
> > > > > > > > "Firstly, we must presume that all of the transformations,
> all
> > > the
> > > > > > > > happenings, that take place during the period of the crisis
> may
> > > be
> > > > > > > grouped
> > > > > > > > around some sort of neoformation of the transitional type.
> > > > > > Consequently,
> > > > > > > > when we analyse the symptoms of the crisis, we must at the
> very
> > > > least
> > > > > > > > presume to answer the question of what newness emerges at
> this
> > > > > > appointed
> > > > > > > > time and what the fate of these neoformations which disappear
> > > > > > afterwards
> > > > > > > > might be. Next, we should consider how the central and
> > peripheral
> > > > > lines
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > development here will unfold. And lastly, we ought to
> evaluate
> > > the
> > > > > > > critical
> > > > > > > > age from the point of view of the zone of its proximal
> > > development,
> > > > > > i.e.
> > > > > > > > its relationship to the subsequent age."
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > "The zone of its proximal development" is its relationship to
> > the
> > > > > > > > subsequent age! Almost by definition, if you present some
> > > > > > > > pedagogical intervention and it immediately becomes part of
> the
> > > > > child's
> > > > > > > > psychological system, you are looking at the zone of actual
> > > > > > development,
> > > > > > > > and not the zone of proximal development at all.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Years ago, I told Mike that I kept mixing up microgenesis and
> > > > > learning.
> > > > > > > He
> > > > > > > > told me "Don't do that!" but he didn't exactly spell out how
> to
> > > > avoid
> > > > > > it:
> > > > > > > > instead, he arranged for me to review a book on
> > > Ganzheitpsychologie
> > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > left me more confused than ever. So I think that's still what
> > we
> > > > need
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > > do
> > > > > > > > now: but one way to start is simply to kick learning out of
> the
> > > > ZPD.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Macquarie University
> > > > > > > > .
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 1:44 AM, Arturo Escandon <
> > > > > > > > arturo.escandon@gmail.com>
> > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Thank you for this David.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I agree with what you are saying at many levels.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Unfortunately, the kind of assessment I introduced did not
> > have
> > > > > > > > > significant learning components. So the evaluation part of
> > the
> > > > > > > > > assessment is not giving me much data about microgenesis
> but
> > > > about
> > > > > > > > > ontogenesis. The "outcome" is not the result of the
> learning
> > > > > > component
> > > > > > > > > for sure.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > My bet is that the links between L1 and L2 (which allow
> > > students
> > > > to
> > > > > > go
> > > > > > > > > beyond sound perception of words) are possible because of
> > > > > development
> > > > > > > > > in high school. More to do with L1 development. Again, the
> > kind
> > > > of
> > > > > > > > > interventions I am allowed to make in the classroom are
> very
> > > > narrow
> > > > > > > > > and the structure and shape of the study programme prevents
> > me
> > > > from
> > > > > > > > > doing large longitudinal studies.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I agree the notion of DA as it is used in the SLA
> literature
> > > > > presents
> > > > > > > > > many problems.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Arturo
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On 11 October 2016 at 05:17, David Kellogg <
> > > dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > >
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > Arturo:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Dynamic assessment is a really good example of what I'm
> > > talking
> > > > > > > about.
> > > > > > > > > > Dynamic assessment is supposedly based on the ZPD. But I
> > > think
> > > > > > there
> > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > > > > three linked ways in which it is actually based on a
> > > distortion
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > ZPD.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > a) Dynamic assessment looks at microgenesis, not
> > > ontogenesis. I
> > > > > > think
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > idea was originally that the microgenetic perturbations
> > that
> > > > were
> > > > > > > > picked
> > > > > > > > > up
> > > > > > > > > > in DA were, actually, predictive of the "next zone of
> > > > > development".
> > > > > > > But
> > > > > > > > > > there are two reasons why this has not happened. Firstly,
> > > there
> > > > > > > hasn't
> > > > > > > > > been
> > > > > > > > > > a clear demarcation between learning and development, and
> > the
> > > > > idea
> > > > > > > > > > that what the child can do today with assistance will be
> > done
> > > > by
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > child
> > > > > > > > > > independently tomorrow--literally, in twenty-four
> hours--is
> > > > just
> > > > > > too
> > > > > > > > > > attractive to people like Matt Poehner and Jim Lantolf.
> > > > Secondly,
> > > > > > > there
> > > > > > > > > > hasn't been a clear scheme for figuring out what the next
> > > zone
> > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > development really is (it's there in Vygotsky's
> pedological
> > > > > > lectures,
> > > > > > > > but
> > > > > > > > > > these haven't been translated yet).
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > b) Dynamic assessment is "dynamic" and not diagnostic.
> It's
> > > > > > > interesting
> > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > compare the two Russian versions of Vygotsky's
> pedological
> > > > > > lectures:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > https://www.marxists.org/russkij/vygotsky/pedologia/
> > > > > > > > > lektsii-po-pedologii.pdf
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > https://www.marxists.org/russkij/vygotsky/cw/pdf/vol4.
> pdf
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Compare 2001: 191 with 1984: 260 (and also the English
> > > version,
> > > > > > 1998:
> > > > > > > > > > 199!). It's not just that the Russian editors insist on
> > > > replacing
> > > > > > > > "test"
> > > > > > > > > > with "task"--it's that they consistently replace
> > "diagnostic"
> > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > > "dynamic", even where this leads to redundant headings
> and
> > > > total
> > > > > > > > > nonsense.
> > > > > > > > > > Why? Well, because in the Soviet scheme of things, the
> ZPD
> > is
> > > > NOT
> > > > > > > > > > diagnostic: it's dynamic. That means that a personality
> is
> > > > > > infinitely
> > > > > > > > > > malleable and tomorrow's development, with the right kind
> > of
> > > > > > > mediation,
> > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > become today's. This is something that DA has largely
> > adopted
> > > > > from
> > > > > > > its
> > > > > > > > > > Soviet roots....but it's not Vygotsky.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > c) As a result DA has to reject the core of Vygotsky's
> > > method:
> > > > > for
> > > > > > > > > > Vygotsky, structure is to be explained by function, but
> > > > function
> > > > > > MUST
> > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > > explained by history, by development. Suppose I have two
> > > > > children.
> > > > > > > One
> > > > > > > > > > learns, the other doesn't. The structural explanation is
> > > simply
> > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > first one has the right mental structures to learn and
> the
> > > > second
> > > > > > > does
> > > > > > > > > not.
> > > > > > > > > > The functional explanation is that the first has the
> right
> > > > > > functional
> > > > > > > > > > motivation (putative career, middle class aspirations,
> etc)
> > > > while
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > other
> > > > > > > > > > does not. But the sad truth is that the vast majority of
> > > > learning
> > > > > > > > > > difficulties really are developmental. I don't think that
> > > means
> > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > they
> > > > > > > > > > are destiny. But I do think it means that prevention is a
> > > whole
> > > > > lot
> > > > > > > > > easier
> > > > > > > > > > than cure. In DA, development is Markovian: the present
> and
> > > the
> > > > > > > future
> > > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > > > > linked causally--but not the past and the present: it's a
> > > weird
> > > > > > > > inversion
> > > > > > > > > > of Aristotle's belief that the past was determined but
> the
> > > > future
> > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > > intrinsically non-determinable.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > > > > > > Macquarie University
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 10, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Arturo Escandon <
> > > > > > > > > arturo.escandon@gmail.com>
> > > > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >> David,
> > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > > >> In my research about dynamic assessment I have been able
> > to
> > > > > spot a
> > > > > > > > > >> moment students reorganise L1 and L2 concepts (related
> to
> > > > > > urbanistic
> > > > > > > > > >> and architectural city features) in such a way that they
> > no
> > > > > longer
> > > > > > > > > >> "perceive" the sounds of words. Students who do not
> arrive
> > > to
> > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > >> reorganisation are not able to escape from the
> perceptual
> > > > > > challenge
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > >> oral utterances.
> > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > > >> The first group of students tend to mediate their
> > linguistic
> > > > > > > > > >> production either in ideograms or Spanish-alphabet
> written
> > > > words
> > > > > > > when
> > > > > > > > > >> asked to take notes. The second group tend to use the
> > > Japanese
> > > > > > > > > >> syllabic system to transliterate sounds.
> > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > > >> Best
> > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > > >> Arturo Escandón
> > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > > >> On 9 October 2016 at 07:21, David Kellogg <
> > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >> > When I read materials on Vygotsky, particularly in
> > applied
> > > > > > > > > linguistics or
> > > > > > > > > >> > TESOL, I always get the "four timescales"
> (phylogenetic,
> > > > > > > > sociogenetic,
> > > > > > > > > >> > ontogenetic, and microgenetic) from Mescharyakov's
> > > wonderful
> > > > > > > article
> > > > > > > > > on
> > > > > > > > > >> > Vygotsky's terminology. At first, in the vain hope
> that
> > it
> > > > > would
> > > > > > > > help
> > > > > > > > > us
> > > > > > > > > >> to
> > > > > > > > > >> > distinguish better between ontogenetic development and
> > > > > > > microgenetic
> > > > > > > > > >> > learning, I used this myself (see Song and Kellogg
> > 2011).
> > > > > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > > > > >> > Now I think that was a mistake. The term
> "microgenesis"
> > > was
> > > > > > around
> > > > > > > > > when
> > > > > > > > > >> > Vygotsky was alive and he certainly knew about it:
> it's
> > a
> > > > > > constant
> > > > > > > > > >> feature
> > > > > > > > > >> > of Gestaltist studies of perception. It's also
> strongly
> > > > > > associated
> > > > > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > >> the
> > > > > > > > > >> > Nazi psychology of Leipzig. Vygotsky knows about the
> > term
> > > > and
> > > > > > > > doesn't
> > > > > > > > > use
> > > > > > > > > >> > it, and I think he's got good reasons.
> > > > > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > > > > >> > Even where LSV agrees with the Gestaltists (Kohler,
> > > Koffka,
> > > > > > Lewin,
> > > > > > > > > >> > Wertheimer, Selz--they weren't all Nazis!) he doesn't
> > seem
> > > > to
> > > > > > use
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > >> term
> > > > > > > > > >> > microgenesis. And actually, he's quite interested in
> > Nazi
> > > > > > > psychology
> > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > >> > not afraid to quote it, although he bitterly,
> > scathingly,
> > > > > > > denounces
> > > > > > > > > >> > Jaensch, Krueger, Ach, Kroh and others in "Fascism in
> > > > > > > > > Psychoneurology". I
> > > > > > > > > >> > think he doesn't use "microgenesis" because it
> conflates
> > > > > > external
> > > > > > > > > >> > perception with perceiving meaning.
> > > > > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > > > > >> > Halliday, who also uses "phylogenetic" and
> > "ontogenetic",
> > > > > calls
> > > > > > > his
> > > > > > > > > >> "micro"
> > > > > > > > > >> > scale logogenesis: the creation of semantics (as
> opposed
> > > to
> > > > > > > > > biological,
> > > > > > > > > >> > social, or psychological semiosis). Take Zaza's
> article.
> > > At
> > > > a
> > > > > > > > > particular
> > > > > > > > > >> > point, the participants become uninterested in
> > perceptual
> > > > high
> > > > > > > > > fidelity
> > > > > > > > > >> and
> > > > > > > > > >> > much more interested in meaning--what will Gogo think
> if
> > > she
> > > > > > sees
> > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > >> her
> > > > > > > > > >> > daughter-in-law is using mechanical means for nursing?
> > > > > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > > > > >> > Of course, semantic meaning is always linked to
> > perceptual
> > > > > > > meaning.
> > > > > > > > > But
> > > > > > > > > >> > "linked" never means equal or mutual or fully
> > reciprocal:
> > > > the
> > > > > > > > specific
> > > > > > > > > >> > weight is first on one side and then on the other.
> > > > > Microgenesis
> > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > what
> > > > > > > > > >> you
> > > > > > > > > >> > get in eye tests, and logogenesis is what you get when
> > you
> > > > are
> > > > > > > > reading
> > > > > > > > > >> > Zaza's article (and when you are reading this post).
> > > > > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > > > > >> > David Kellogg
> > > > > > > > > >> > Macquarie University
> > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science
> with
> > > an
> > > > > > object
> > > > > > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > >
> > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> > > object
> > > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> object
> > that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> >
>


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