[Xmca-l] Re: Why Doesn't Vygotsky Use "Microgenesis"?

[David Kellogg]

Mike:

My mother was a psychologist too--like you, trained as a behaviourist, but
unlike you she got off into Piaget in the early sixties. Then she moved on
to other things: she wrote a biography of Ada, Countess of Lovelace, which
was published by MIT Press and got her some notoriety, mostly because she
showed that Byron's daughter, who everyone has assumed to be a kind of
feminist icon and the world's first computer programmer, didn't actually
know any mathematics! She told me a lot about Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg
(who she briefly studied with). But I was unable to interest her in
Vygotsky or in cultural historical psychology: she saw it, perhaps
correctly, as nothing more than an attempt to prolong what she considered
the crazy Bolshevism of my youth.

Herr first response to losing her higher mental functions (when we walked
to the Tate Art Gallery near her home in London and she forgot her way
home) was simply horror. She went through a difficult period of terrors
(curiously, mostly concerned with money, of which she still has a great
deal more than she needs). Now she has stabilized (and she is actually much
happier than I ever remember her). But she has completely forgotten that
she ever had children, doesn't know her age or history, and also lacks
control over basic physiological functions. I think that the three
strategies I gave you (pronouns, delight that masks astonishment, and
avoiding explanations) really are rooted in the lower psychological
functions and not in higher functions: pronominal meaning can be simply
indicative rather than nominative, delight is an example of her inability
to divide affect from will, and avoiding "why" is an example of the loss of
semantic meaning and reliance on the visual purview alone. The last time I
took language samples from her, they were comparable to those of a two year
old.

Unfortunately is the word! And yet...perhaps this is something else we can
all learn from Vygotsky. I don't just mean the way he faced death: he died
young, at the very height of his powers, and he had been practicing dying
for the whole of his adult life, so the comparison with my mother is
manifestly unfair. I mean first of all the way that Vygotsky really does
use "pathogenesis", not as a new form of development but rather as a way of
examining the real prior processes of development (which, as a Spinozan, he
believed always involved the expansion of potential rather than its
contraction). That's why Vygotsky ends almost every single chapter in the
second part of HDHMF with a pathological example, why never gives up
on "defektology", and I also think that is why he started studying medicine
even when he knew there was no hope for himself: it offers a way of looking
at the lower layers of development and how they subtend or fail to subtend
the higher ones.

The second thing, though, was what I think he discovered through his
pathogenetic analyses: that there is a very real difference between
phylogenesis and sociogenesis, between sociogenesis and ontogenesis...and
also, as I am now quite sure, between ontogenesis and microgenesis. In
phylogenesis: descent through modification--i.e. through the ruthless
destruction of individuals and whole species. In sociogenesis, the very
opposite: public health, compulsory education, and the knowledge that it
is precisely our ability to provide circuitous ways of helping the very
young and the very old that will ultimately make life better for everybody,
and not simply the very young and very old. The end of ontogenesis is not
simply death--it is the decline that it inevitable after roughly the age
that Vygotsky died. But with literacy, we are able to pass on our very best
to the next generation. I don't know if Vygotsky really believed that these
last lectures of his would be translated and read by thousands of teachers
in some totally foreign land eight decades after his death--he believed
in internationalism, so I think it's at least possible that he did. But
whether he believed it or not, that is what is going to happen, and it's
why I think that cultural-historical psychologists, unlike Piagetians, can
face decline and death with a certain equanimity and acceptance.

But it is also why I'm not really sure that Dorothy Kellogg Stein's
biography of Ada Lovelace was such a terrible mistake, Mike. When I take it
off the shelf and read it, I  can still hear her voice, feel her razor-like
intellect, and even remonstrate with her individualistic and biologizing
psychology. When I go and actually visit her at Lord Wandsworth's Home for
Aging Jewry in Clapham I cannot.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University





On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 5:17 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

> David -
>
> I think it is unfortunate to link workarounds with a loss of higher
> psychological functions. Again, it seems like ontogeny recapitulates
> history. The end of ontogeny is death. Ditto history?
>
> By any account I can think of, your mother is using higher higher
> psychological functions to work around the inability to retrieve vocabulary
> at a conventional level of abstraction. I am of an age where the same
> problem can be noticed. Nice that I can, for the time being, understand
> enough to be able to study development in decline in real life in addition
> to experiencing it. Hmm, that means I have some higher higher functions to
> draw upon!
>
> In our own work, the workarounds needed to solve the failure of a gifted,
> "promising" technology under high pressure to succeed created both a
> successful product and resulted in productive education for all involved.
>
> To me, a great example of pathogenisis is the use of the highly developed,
> highly admired, highly financed, digital technologies of cyberspace.
> Clearly an advance over atomic bombs- cleaner, faster, more efficient.
>
> Where I think there is something distinctly unusual in Zaza's prototyping
> example is that the prototyping itself, even if it
> had been accomplishable easily with strong technological/resource backing,
> is a work around for the inability to confront directly the cultural
> beliefs that make it shameful for a woman with HIV to bottle feed her baby.
> We rarely discuss the power of cultural norms in constraining cultural
> change even when the current practices threaten reproduction of the social
> group. It seems, perhaps, an intractable problem. The US appears unable to
> give up on putting water in disposable plastic bottles. Pathogenesis?
>
> I'll follow my habit of sorting things out by responding vis a vis
> Franklin in Larry's note below. I will respond on a thread called
> microgenesis/ontogenesis.
>
> Compensatorily yours.
> mike
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 1:15 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Mike likes a discussion to be, as Bernstein put it, well framed and well
> > classified; or at least he likes the threads to be well disentangled and
> > properly subject lined. But perhaps we shouldn't give up on the "The
> > Prototyping Mind" too quickly! As you can see from Molly's careful
> perusal
> > and forceful restatement of Zaza's major themes, there is still a lot in
> > Zaza's prototyping bin to talk about.
> >
> > The one that interests me, that I think is relevant to the "microgenesis"
> > thread, is what learning means when it means adapting to
> anti-development.
> > For example, there are undoubtedly work-arounds that people use when
> their
> > higher psychological functions start to shut down (I watched my mother do
> > quite a few of these, addressing everyone as "you" instead of using
> names,
> > reacting to novel situations with a delight which effectively hides her
> > astonishment, and above all refraining from trying to understand the
> > reasons for present situations).
> >
> > Similarly, there are ontogenetic work-arounds that people use when
> > commodity production shuts down. But in both cases, we have a kind of
> > development which forgoes time's arrow; we have a notion of development
> > that works backwards and forwards (like the laws of physics as opposed to
> > the laws of thermodynamics). I won't say that suggests relativism (that
> > would be, I think, too moralistic an argument, and it is a rabbit hole we
> > have been down already anyway). But it suggests an atomism that I
> disagree
> > with (in addition to eschewing time, the laws of physics don't combine
> > matter and meaning the way that the laws of thermodynamics do!)
> >
> > Mike has offered Franklin as an example of a Zoped before (I remember
> once
> > thinking that he directed it to ME as a way of getting ME to think a bit
> > about listening to others on this list, but in fact he's used it in print
> > on at least one occasion). Whenever he offers it, he does the exact
> > opposite of what he usually does with xmca threads: instead of asking us
> to
> > disentangle threads, he invites us to combine them. Franklin is learning
> > (to listen to others). But he is also developing, on at least three
> counts:
> > by learning to listen to others, he is acquiring new forms of meaning
> > potential; by learning to recognize himself when it is "played back" to
> > him, he is acquiring a new form of reflecting on experience; and (this is
> > the one I really want to talk about) he is learning that play is not
> simply
> > the manipulation of objects but also the manipulation of social roles
> > according to abstract rules (such as reciprocity and mutuality).
> >
> > Now, you can see that I'm trying to disentangle things that are not
> really
> > that distinct (reciprocity is really a form of serial mutuality, and both
> > of them are simply abstract forms of listening to others). The Vygotsky
> > lectures I'm working with are a little similar: in his work on the Crisis
> > at Three (Franklin's Crisis, I suspect), he is trying to disentangle the
> > "seven stars" of bad behaviour (folk concepts that nursemaids and mothers
> > use--I notice there is even a Russian Wikipedia page!) from what he
> thinks
> > is the key neoformation of Three, the separation of affect and will.
> >
> > For example, negativism is not just saying "no". It's saying "no" when
> the
> > child really wants to say "yes", because although the child wants to say
> > "yes", the others in the social milieu also want him to say "yes", and
> the
> > child is more interested in self-assertion than in self-gratification.
> > Obstinacy is not just tenacity. It's actually the negation of negativism:
> > saying "yes" when the child really wants to "no", or maybe "who cares?",
> > simply because the child has already said "yes" and once again the child
> is
> > more interested in will than in affect. And so on.
> >
> > How is this connected with the next zone of development? Perhaps the next
> > zone of development is preschool, and preschool depends on the separation
> > of the semantic and the visio-graphic field of action in play. If so,
> > Franklin's ability to interpret the teacher's imitation of his own
> actions
> > is a "trailer" of that next zone of development and no mere act of
> > learning.  Or, maybe this is happening in a preschool, and the next zone
> of
> > development is actually the Crisis at Seven. If so, Franklin's ability to
> > recognize himself is a "trailer" of the next zone of development: acting
> a
> > role that is not really a role, but in fact a prototype self.
> >
> > But that's my problem, Molly. What do I do when the prototype self comes
> to
> > me from the past and not the future? Can we really call this development?
> > Isn't it really a form of pathogenesis?
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Macquarie University
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:29 AM, molly shea <mvshea@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Dear Zaza and Mike,
> > >
> > > My apologies for entering the conversation on Kukiya-kiya late,
> however,
> > > the article was so compelling I feel I should still enter. First, to
> > Zaza,
> > > thank you for writing such a forceful analysis of learning through
> > > prototyping. I especially like the ways in which your analytical lens
> > > included the political dimensions of problem solving and invoking
> > > expertise. There are two ideas within the article that I hope to use
> and
> > > extend in my work as well, and a question for Zaza, Mike, and others at
> > the
> > > end of my second musing.
> > >
> > > The first is your discussion of disinheritance as *an attention to
> > > materials—a way of looking at materials that allows the beholder to
> > > recognize transience, mutability, intermediateness—that allows
> > Zimbabweans
> > > to employ novel and unexpected ways to act within and around the
> > > constraints of their material conditions.* By pointing out the separate
> > > cognitive practice associated with seeing through disinheritance, the
> > > analysis draws attention to the political dimension of learning. The
> > > possible activities and therefore learning opportunities that arise
> > through
> > > this historical perception change and assumptions about designing
> > learning
> > > environments then shifts with these methods of seeing and using
> > materials.
> > > It also draws another potential distinction between the Maker Movement
> > and
> > > Kukiya—kiya. The Makers Movement doesn’t necessarily claim a political
> > > agenda, however, by claiming something a-political or claiming an
> agenda
> > of
> > > advancing technological skills in the name of progress, it has a
> > historical
> > > and political situated set of values that may be in opposition to those
> > of
> > > Kukiya—kiya that suffer the consequences of material disinheritance
> > arising
> > > in the context of economic crisis. Vossoughi, Hooper, and Escudé (2016)
> > do
> > > a wonderful job of pointing out many of the neoliberal consequences of
> a
> > > maker movement that does not see the lineage of prototyping expertise
> > > coming from many low-income communities living in “tight
> circumstances”.
> > > The power of the design of this prototyping project, for me, comes from
> > > centering local expertise in the design of the learning environment.
> > > Although prototyping is at the center of both “making” and
> “kukiya—kiya”
> > > practices, it seems the political sense making between settings
> couldn’t
> > be
> > > more different. Even within the Zaza paper, the participants question
> how
> > > invention might or might not lead to liberation. I appreciate Zaza's
> > > attention to how participants questioned invention and business acumen
> > as a
> > > means to “extricate Zimbabwe from its economic quandary”. A lesser
> > > researcher may have ignored this comment as outside of the design
> process
> > > and therefore the data set to be analyzed.
> > >
> > > The second idea, related to the political dimensions of cognition that
> > are
> > > often overlooked, is your analysis of gender and expertise in the
> design
> > > process. I am struck by how the performance of gender and
> > design-expertise
> > > came in the form of whispers and informal conversations about
> hand-bags.
> > It
> > > would be great to have more analysis like this one where gender
> networks
> > > inform design. In fact, it seems gender (man/woman/trans/other) is
> always
> > > informing design, but perhaps performance of expertise that is cis-male
> > is
> > > sometimes confused with having expertise at all. You analysis offers
> more
> > > nuance about other kinds of performance of expertise. I wonder if
> > > discussions about hand-bags creates the intimacy necessary to share
> > > female-cis gendered understandings of design problems. I would love to
> > hear
> > > your thinking on this matter.
> > >
> > > Again, thank you for your work and for the insights that this article
> has
> > > provided me.
> > >
> > > - Molly Shea
> > >
> > > On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 5:46 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > > ​Since it appears that people have completed discussion of Zaza's
> paper
> > > > (and of course, anyone is free to add to the discussion at any
> time), I
> > > > feel freer to engage the microgenesis/ontogenesis relationship.
> > > >
> > > > I know too little about L1/L2 discussions to contribute there, but as
> > > life
> > > > allows I will try to suggest that microgenesis can be shown, in at
> > least
> > > > some circumstances, to involve both learning and development.
> > > >
> > > > So I attach an example from the work of Vivian Paley. It addresses (I
> > > > believe) Vygotsky's idea that play creates a Zoped in which a child
> is
> > "a
> > > > head taller than herself."
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps the example is inappropriate to the discussion or my
> > > interpretation
> > > > of it is bonkers. To me it illustrates both LSV's claim about the
> zoped
> > > and
> > > > play and is a case of microgenesis with ontogenetic implications.
> > > >
> > > > See what you think. its 4 pages long.
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 5:33 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Arturo:
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks for the very thoughtful reply. I think the only word I might
> > > > > possibly disagree with is "unfortunately". I suppose there may also
> > be
> > > a
> > > > > "zone of proximal learning", just as there is a zone of proximal
> > > > evolution
> > > > > (I suspect, given the mass extinctions which are going on in the
> > > > > Anthropocene, that we are in one of these at present), and a zone
> of
> > > > > proximal social progress (these have turned out to be far longer
> > than I
> > > > > ever thought as a young person). But I think for now it's a very
> good
> > > > idea
> > > > > to focus on the D in ZPD, and not to forget that it's for
> > "development"
> > > > and
> > > > > not for learning.
> > > > >
> > > > > Let me give three reasons. First of all, if we are interested in
> the
> > > what
> > > > > word value looks like when we remove the sound that realizes it, we
> > are
> > > > > necessarily interested in a psychological rather than an
> > interpersonal
> > > > > phenomenon. Secondly, the focus on quick results in learning very
> > often
> > > > > ends up victimizing teachers for problems in development that have
> > > > nothing
> > > > > to do with teaching methods and are really developmentally rooted.
> > > > Thirdly,
> > > > > just as we need to understand exactly what teachers are doing
> before
> > we
> > > > go
> > > > > about introducing interested changes, we also need to understand
> what
> > > > > Vygotsky was trying to do before we decide it is irrelevant to our
> > > > teaching
> > > > > needs.
> > > > >
> > > > > This morning I was working on the beginning of the "Crisis at
> Three",
> > > > part
> > > > > of which (but not the good part) can be read in Vol. Five of the
> > > > Collected
> > > > > Works in English (Vol. Four in Russian):
> > > > >
> > > > > Во-первых, мы должны предположить, что все перемены, все события,
> > > > > совершающиеся в период этого кризиса, группируются вокруг
> какого-либо
> > > > > новообразования переходного типа. Следовательно, когда мы будем
> > > > > анализировать симптомы кризиса, мы должны хотя бы предположительно
> > > > ответить
> > > > > на вопрос, что нового возникает в указанное время и какова судьба
> > > > > новообразования, которое исчезает после него. Затем мы должны
> > > > рассмотреть,
> > > > > какая смена центральных и побочных линий развития здесь
> происходит. И
> > > > > наконец, оценить критический возраст с точки зрения зоны его
> > ближайшего
> > > > > развития, т. е. отношения к следующему возрасту.
> > > > > "Firstly, we must presume that all of the transformations, all the
> > > > > happenings, that take place during the period of the crisis may be
> > > > grouped
> > > > > around some sort of neoformation of the transitional type.
> > > Consequently,
> > > > > when we analyse the symptoms of the crisis, we must at the very
> least
> > > > > presume to answer the question of what newness emerges at this
> > > appointed
> > > > > time and what the fate of these neoformations which disappear
> > > afterwards
> > > > > might be. Next, we should consider how the central and peripheral
> > lines
> > > > of
> > > > > development here will unfold. And lastly, we ought to evaluate the
> > > > critical
> > > > > age from the point of view of the zone of its proximal development,
> > > i.e.
> > > > > its relationship to the subsequent age."
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > "The zone of its proximal development" is its relationship to the
> > > > > subsequent age! Almost by definition, if you present some
> > > > > pedagogical intervention and it immediately becomes part of the
> > child's
> > > > > psychological system, you are looking at the zone of actual
> > > development,
> > > > > and not the zone of proximal development at all.
> > > > >
> > > > > Years ago, I told Mike that I kept mixing up microgenesis and
> > learning.
> > > > He
> > > > > told me "Don't do that!" but he didn't exactly spell out how to
> avoid
> > > it:
> > > > > instead, he arranged for me to review a book on Ganzheitpsychologie
> > > that
> > > > > left me more confused than ever. So I think that's still what we
> need
> > > to
> > > > do
> > > > > now: but one way to start is simply to kick learning out of the
> ZPD.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > >
> > > > > Macquarie University
> > > > > .
> > > > >
> > > > > On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 1:44 AM, Arturo Escandon <
> > > > > arturo.escandon@gmail.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Thank you for this David.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I agree with what you are saying at many levels.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Unfortunately, the kind of assessment I introduced did not have
> > > > > > significant learning components. So the evaluation part of the
> > > > > > assessment is not giving me much data about microgenesis but
> about
> > > > > > ontogenesis. The "outcome" is not the result of the learning
> > > component
> > > > > > for sure.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > My bet is that the links between L1 and L2 (which allow students
> to
> > > go
> > > > > > beyond sound perception of words) are possible because of
> > development
> > > > > > in high school. More to do with L1 development. Again, the kind
> of
> > > > > > interventions I am allowed to make in the classroom are very
> narrow
> > > > > > and the structure and shape of the study programme prevents me
> from
> > > > > > doing large longitudinal studies.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I agree the notion of DA as it is used in the SLA literature
> > presents
> > > > > > many problems.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Arturo
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On 11 October 2016 at 05:17, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > Arturo:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Dynamic assessment is a really good example of what I'm talking
> > > > about.
> > > > > > > Dynamic assessment is supposedly based on the ZPD. But I think
> > > there
> > > > > are
> > > > > > > three linked ways in which it is actually based on a distortion
> > of
> > > > the
> > > > > > ZPD.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > a) Dynamic assessment looks at microgenesis, not ontogenesis. I
> > > think
> > > > > the
> > > > > > > idea was originally that the microgenetic perturbations that
> were
> > > > > picked
> > > > > > up
> > > > > > > in DA were, actually, predictive of the "next zone of
> > development".
> > > > But
> > > > > > > there are two reasons why this has not happened. Firstly, there
> > > > hasn't
> > > > > > been
> > > > > > > a clear demarcation between learning and development, and the
> > idea
> > > > > > > that what the child can do today with assistance will be done
> by
> > > the
> > > > > > child
> > > > > > > independently tomorrow--literally, in twenty-four hours--is
> just
> > > too
> > > > > > > attractive to people like Matt Poehner and Jim Lantolf.
> Secondly,
> > > > there
> > > > > > > hasn't been a clear scheme for figuring out what the next zone
> of
> > > > > > > development really is (it's there in Vygotsky's pedological
> > > lectures,
> > > > > but
> > > > > > > these haven't been translated yet).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > b) Dynamic assessment is "dynamic" and not diagnostic. It's
> > > > interesting
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > > compare the two Russian versions of Vygotsky's pedological
> > > lectures:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > https://www.marxists.org/russkij/vygotsky/pedologia/
> > > > > > lektsii-po-pedologii.pdf
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > https://www.marxists.org/russkij/vygotsky/cw/pdf/vol4.pdf
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Compare 2001: 191 with 1984: 260 (and also the English version,
> > > 1998:
> > > > > > > 199!). It's not just that the Russian editors insist on
> replacing
> > > > > "test"
> > > > > > > with "task"--it's that they consistently replace "diagnostic"
> > with
> > > > > > > "dynamic", even where this leads to redundant headings and
> total
> > > > > > nonsense.
> > > > > > > Why? Well, because in the Soviet scheme of things, the ZPD is
> NOT
> > > > > > > diagnostic: it's dynamic. That means that a personality is
> > > infinitely
> > > > > > > malleable and tomorrow's development, with the right kind of
> > > > mediation,
> > > > > > can
> > > > > > > become today's. This is something that DA has largely adopted
> > from
> > > > its
> > > > > > > Soviet roots....but it's not Vygotsky.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > c) As a result DA has to reject the core of Vygotsky's method:
> > for
> > > > > > > Vygotsky, structure is to be explained by function, but
> function
> > > MUST
> > > > > be
> > > > > > > explained by history, by development. Suppose I have two
> > children.
> > > > One
> > > > > > > learns, the other doesn't. The structural explanation is simply
> > > that
> > > > > the
> > > > > > > first one has the right mental structures to learn and the
> second
> > > > does
> > > > > > not.
> > > > > > > The functional explanation is that the first has the right
> > > functional
> > > > > > > motivation (putative career, middle class aspirations, etc)
> while
> > > the
> > > > > > other
> > > > > > > does not. But the sad truth is that the vast majority of
> learning
> > > > > > > difficulties really are developmental. I don't think that means
> > > that
> > > > > they
> > > > > > > are destiny. But I do think it means that prevention is a whole
> > lot
> > > > > > easier
> > > > > > > than cure. In DA, development is Markovian: the present and the
> > > > future
> > > > > > are
> > > > > > > linked causally--but not the past and the present: it's a weird
> > > > > inversion
> > > > > > > of Aristotle's belief that the past was determined but the
> future
> > > is
> > > > > > > intrinsically non-determinable.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > > > Macquarie University
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 10, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Arturo Escandon <
> > > > > > arturo.escandon@gmail.com>
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >> David,
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> In my research about dynamic assessment I have been able to
> > spot a
> > > > > > >> moment students reorganise L1 and L2 concepts (related to
> > > urbanistic
> > > > > > >> and architectural city features) in such a way that they no
> > longer
> > > > > > >> "perceive" the sounds of words. Students who do not arrive to
> > that
> > > > > > >> reorganisation are not able to escape from the perceptual
> > > challenge
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> oral utterances.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> The first group of students tend to mediate their linguistic
> > > > > > >> production either in ideograms or Spanish-alphabet written
> words
> > > > when
> > > > > > >> asked to take notes. The second group tend to use the Japanese
> > > > > > >> syllabic system to transliterate sounds.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Best
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Arturo Escandón
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> On 9 October 2016 at 07:21, David Kellogg <
> dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > >
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >> > When I read materials on Vygotsky, particularly in applied
> > > > > > linguistics or
> > > > > > >> > TESOL, I always get the "four timescales" (phylogenetic,
> > > > > sociogenetic,
> > > > > > >> > ontogenetic, and microgenetic) from Mescharyakov's wonderful
> > > > article
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > >> > Vygotsky's terminology. At first, in the vain hope that it
> > would
> > > > > help
> > > > > > us
> > > > > > >> to
> > > > > > >> > distinguish better between ontogenetic development and
> > > > microgenetic
> > > > > > >> > learning, I used this myself (see Song and Kellogg 2011).
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > Now I think that was a mistake. The term "microgenesis" was
> > > around
> > > > > > when
> > > > > > >> > Vygotsky was alive and he certainly knew about it: it's a
> > > constant
> > > > > > >> feature
> > > > > > >> > of Gestaltist studies of perception. It's also strongly
> > > associated
> > > > > > with
> > > > > > >> the
> > > > > > >> > Nazi psychology of Leipzig. Vygotsky knows about the term
> and
> > > > > doesn't
> > > > > > use
> > > > > > >> > it, and I think he's got good reasons.
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > Even where LSV agrees with the Gestaltists (Kohler, Koffka,
> > > Lewin,
> > > > > > >> > Wertheimer, Selz--they weren't all Nazis!) he doesn't seem
> to
> > > use
> > > > > the
> > > > > > >> term
> > > > > > >> > microgenesis. And actually, he's quite interested in Nazi
> > > > psychology
> > > > > > and
> > > > > > >> > not afraid to quote it, although he bitterly, scathingly,
> > > > denounces
> > > > > > >> > Jaensch, Krueger, Ach, Kroh and others in "Fascism in
> > > > > > Psychoneurology". I
> > > > > > >> > think he doesn't use "microgenesis" because it conflates
> > > external
> > > > > > >> > perception with perceiving meaning.
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > Halliday, who also uses "phylogenetic" and "ontogenetic",
> > calls
> > > > his
> > > > > > >> "micro"
> > > > > > >> > scale logogenesis: the creation of semantics (as opposed to
> > > > > > biological,
> > > > > > >> > social, or psychological semiosis). Take Zaza's article. At
> a
> > > > > > particular
> > > > > > >> > point, the participants become uninterested in perceptual
> high
> > > > > > fidelity
> > > > > > >> and
> > > > > > >> > much more interested in meaning--what will Gogo think if she
> > > sees
> > > > > that
> > > > > > >> her
> > > > > > >> > daughter-in-law is using mechanical means for nursing?
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > Of course, semantic meaning is always linked to perceptual
> > > > meaning.
> > > > > > But
> > > > > > >> > "linked" never means equal or mutual or fully reciprocal:
> the
> > > > > specific
> > > > > > >> > weight is first on one side and then on the other.
> > Microgenesis
> > > is
> > > > > > what
> > > > > > >> you
> > > > > > >> > get in eye tests, and logogenesis is what you get when you
> are
> > > > > reading
> > > > > > >> > Zaza's article (and when you are reading this post).
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > David Kellogg
> > > > > > >> > Macquarie University
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > >
> > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> > > object
> > > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> > > >
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
>
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object
> that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>