[Xmca-l] Re: Help needed finding LSV references to *First*and *Second* Signal Systems

[Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]]

David,

I, too, want to thank you (in advance) for sharing your thoughts and
related writings on this topic.  I haven't had a moment all day to even
glance at the materials you provided, but I look forward eagerly to reading
them over the weekend.

Much obliged!

Cheers,
Peter

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 5:09 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
wrote:

> David, I am still reading, but I did not want to let it pass without a
> huge thank you for so generously sharing that text with us. It made my day!
> Alfredo
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> Sent: 04 November 2016 05:24
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help needed finding LSV references to *First*and
> *Second* Signal Systems
>
> Peter: (Maybe both Peters?)
>
> Sometimes I think the best we husbands, fathers, and political activists
> can really do to promote gender equality in intellectual discourse is
> not to maintain a respectful male silence but rather to use our own booming
> baritones to amplify outstanding thinkers whose voices are in danger of
> being lost precisely because they were more soprano, or because
> they belonged to women born on the wrong side of the planet, or both. I am
> thinking of Ruqaiya Hasan, who is in imminent danger of being lost, even to
> feminist writers, in the cacaphony of Bourdieu, Baudrillard, Lyotard,
> Habermas, Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and even Freud, none of whom had
> anything to say about Vygotsky (and, not coincidentally, all of whom are
> lesser sociolinguists than she was).
>
> Ruqaiya was an appreciative but also very critical reader of Vygotsky.
> Sometimes, when I am reading her thoughts on Vygotsky I feel like she is
> holding the book upside down, but then when I read it again I find that I
> am the one standing on my head. For example, one of the great advantages
> that Hasan finds in Vygotsky is not that he distinguishes between the
> higher and lower psychological functions. As far as Ruqaiya was concerned
> there was a bit too much of that around, and there still is. Instead,
> Ruqaiya finds that Vygotsky's strength is being able to link them together,
> precisely through his studies of children, including the biological and the
> social in a single complex unit of analysis (e.g. phonology AND
> lexicogrammar in a single dimension, which Vygotsky calls "phasal").
>
> Ruqaiya doesn't mean that "signalization" is tied to "signification"--she
> is too much of a linguist and too much of a dialectician not to see the
> huge gap between them. But she does think that the word values (or, as she
> would prefer it, the "wording values") that are the bases for signification
> are Whorfian, Sapirian social co-generalizations. These are biological in
> the sense that they are huntable, gatherable, herdable, farmable,
> reproducible. They are also, in materialized form, edible and wearable:
> they are often made out of economic interests: they are exchange values,
> like the exchange value of any commodity they evolve from use values based
> in adapting the environment to human needs.
>
> Take a look at this. I think it is probably literally the last public
> lecture Vygotsky ever gave, and as far as I know it's never been translated
> into any language (except now Korean). I'm including the Russian because my
> own Russian is...well, lousy, and I keep hoping some of the Russophones on
> the list may catch some errors before it goes to press in February. In it,
> Vygotsky is trying to show exactly what Ruqaiya was talking about: the way
> in which the child goes from "non-co-generalized" thinking to
> co-generalized thinking. It's not a step. It's not a leap. It's a whole set
> of leaps, some of which depend on parents, professionals, and political
> activists.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:04 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
>
> > Dear colleagues,
> >
> > As a representative of the category *Slow Responder* (I am a busy
> > professional, a husband, a father of two, and a political activist), I am
> > only now getting around to replying to those who responded to my earlier
> > request for help. My apologies if my pace is too slow for a satisfying
> > exchange.
> >
> > Because I was fairly vague about my reason for asking for a reference to
> > first and second signal systems in Vygotsky's writings, I unwittingly
> > opened the door to discussion of the differences between *signals* and
> > *signs*. In fact, my interest is in their *similarities*, in the
> properties
> > that are common to both. I am seeking the common denominator between
> animal
> > stimulus-response thinking and human initiation-response thinking.
> > Fortunately, that linkage exists precisely where David Kellogg pointed
> me:
> > in Vol. 4, on p.55 of HDHMF in Vygotsky's Collected Works in English.
> >
> > Vygotsky is very clear when he distinguishes between *natural* signals
> (or
> > signalization) and *artificial* signs (or signification). The former
> occurs
> > when animals interact with the environment and their brains form
> > conditioned reflexes, whereas the latter occurs when humans invent their
> > own conditioned reflexes (words) and then apply those reflexes to
> > themselves (or others) in order to master their own behavior. In essence,
> > Vygotsky considered *signification* a special case of *signalization*.
> >
> > One issue I had not counted on is the historical/political one. I was
> > unprepared for the possibility that the first and second signal systems
> may
> > have been a political problem of accommodation to the authorities rather
> > than an actual scientific problem. Thanks to Mike for pointing that out,
> > and for pointing out A.R. Luria's fairly substantial contribution to the
> > discussion--but especially for contacting (the wonderful and brilliant)
> > Tanya Akhutina!
> >
> > I'm not quite sure how to make good use of Huw's suggestion about serial
> > and parallel circuits, so I'll have to put that issue to the side for
> now.
> > But thanks for raising it.
> >
> > In light of the ongoing discussion about how to create a more
> > gender-sensitive and gender-balanced dialogue on this listserv, I would
> > like to invite anyone who is lurking (or very busy) to contribute any
> > useful information you may have about my request *in your own good time*.
> > These problems are complicated, and I'm learning to be patient.
> >
> > Thanks to all.
> >
> > In solidarity,
> > Peter
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 6:55 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >
> > > Peter -- Concerning your initial question. I obtained the following
> > answer
> > > from Tanya Akhutina.
> > >
> > > Майк,
> > > Павлов написал о второй сигнальной системе в 1932 г. Соответственно
> > > упоминаний о ней можно ждать только в 33 и 34 годах. Я таких
> упоминаний у
> > > Выготского не помню.
> > > АРЛ - другое дело, он обязан был так говорить. Об этом хорошо пишет
> Ольга
> > > Виноградова, ученица АРЛ, первая жена В.И.Лубовского. Ее воспоминания о
> > > времени после Павловской сессии Лена Лурия цитирует в своей книжке на
> > стр.
> > > 144: " А.Р. прекрасно знал Павловское учение, и в его лекциях
> изменилась
> > > лексика и красоты прямого психологического языка были заменены, но тем
> не
> > > менее знания, которые он нам давал, оставались на уровне настоящей
> > науки".
> > >
> > > Roughly,
> > > Mike,
> > > Pavlov wrote about the second signal system in 1932. Correspondingly,
> > > references/rememberances to it had to wait until 1933-34. Such
> > references/
> > > rememberances in Vygotsky I do not recall.
> > >
> > > ARL was another case, he was obligated to speak in this way. Olga
> > Sergeevna
> > > Vinogradova, a student of ARL's [with whom I conducted research in the
> > > winter of 1962/63-mc] is cited by Lena Luria [Luria's daughter] in her
> > book
> > > on p. 144 "A.R. new the teachings of Pavlov perfectly, and in his
> > lectures
> > > he changed the lexicon and the beauty of a straightforward
> psychological
> > > language was replaced, but none the less the knowledge which he gave us
> > > remained on the the level of real science."
> > >
> > > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 3:42 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > > It seems that side-by-side translations of the two documents merit
> > > > archival publication, David. JREEP is an obvious repository. In
> > addition
> > > to
> > > > which at present we have a good deal more evidence about children,
> > chess
> > > > boards, and the issues vexing Vygotsky than he had access to. The
> > > > non/difficult chronology of the texts complicates an already
> > complicated
> > > > process of interpretation as we have long witnessed here.
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps as a separate thread, it would be nice to put together a
> > > > discussion of the core linkages between Vygotsky and Halliday in your
> > > > work..... one of those chains of discussion that come and go.
> Perhaps a
> > > > mini-course devoted to the following, to me, essential idea:
> > > >
> > > >  It seems to me that ALL of these are signalization systems (not
> > > > signifying systems, because they do not have lexicogrammar and cannot
> > > > convey ideal values)
> > > >
> > > > Providing a "cheat sheet" for autodidacts, might it be possible to
> > create
> > > > some
> > > > "field of interest" in the xmca discussion for dealing with this
> idea?
> > > >
> > > > I have in no way forgotten the issue of the relation of microgenesis
> > and
> > > > ontogenesis. It seems another "key point" as most of us go about
> using
> > > CHAT
> > > > ideas in the course of the teaching/learning activities that pay the
> > > bread
> > > > and butter. As matters stand, I offer Franklin in the blocks as an
> > > example
> > > > of microgenesis in a preschool classroom involving play as an example
> > of
> > > a
> > > > zone of proximal development where childre are a head taller than
> > > > themselves. That discussion is for the microgenesis/ontogenesis
> thread
> > > if I
> > > > recall.
> > > >
> > > > I would be VERY interested to learn of ways that feminist, queer
> > theory,
> > > > critical disability studies theory, neurodiversity theory, and others
> > can
> > > > help me to understand these categories and the theories that purport
> to
> > > > account for them.
> > > >
> > > > If they need to be re-thought, might as well be here. Ain't goin
> > nowhere.
> > > >
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 2:28 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> I'm working with two versions of one of Vygotsky's last lectures
> (the
> > > >> second version is given exactly five days before he was brought home
> > > with
> > > >> a
> > > >> throat haemorrhage to die, the first about a year earlier). There
> are
> > > >> passages that are almost word for word repetitions. There are
> passages
> > > >> that
> > > >> are semantically the same and but quite differently worded (the
> > earlier
> > > >> Vygotsky is quite modest and tentative; the later Vygotsky is much
> > more
> > > >> critical and also more confident). Then there are passages that say
> > > pretty
> > > >> much the opposite of what was said a year earlier: for example, in
> the
> > > >> early lecture Vygotsky says that a child faced with a chessboard who
> > > >> doesn't know how to play will see it structurally and sort the
> pieces
> > by
> > > >> color (black pieces on black squares, white on white) but in the
> later
> > > >> lecture it is the child who does know how to play who sees it
> > > >> structurally,
> > > >> because the child sees a black knight in a "structure" with a white
> > > pawn.
> > > >> He's a genius, and geniuses tend to think things over a lot, turning
> > > them
> > > >> this way and that, and never looking at anything as final, not even
> > when
> > > >> they are about to die.
> > > >>
> > > >> HDHMF has to be read the same way. Vygotsky cannot quite seem to
> make
> > up
> > > >> his mind whether there are three stages of higher behavior
> (instinct,
> > > >> habit, intelligence) or four different stages of higher behavior
> > > >> (instinct,
> > > >> habit, intelligence, and freedom). In Chapter Four, he very clearly
> > > argues
> > > >> for four or more, but in Chapter Five, which may have been written
> > much
> > > >> earlier, he argues for three but then three paragraphs later
> considers
> > > it
> > > >> safer to begin as Thorndike does with two levels (unconditional and
> > > >> conditional responses). So "signal" vs. "signification" could just
> be
> > > seen
> > > >> as the difference between unconditional and conditional responses,
> or
> > it
> > > >> could be seen as the difference between instinct and intelligence,
> or
> > it
> > > >> could be seen as two poles with an almost infinite number of genetic
> > > >> variations in between. I prefer the latter view, but I recognize
> that
> > > >> Vygotsky has to package things pretty differently for different
> > > audiences,
> > > >> and we are not one of the audiences that he has foremost in his
> mind.
> > > >>
> > > >> Take bacteria. Bacteria are apparently capable of quorum sensing:
> that
> > > is,
> > > >> bacteria don't multiply when there are no other bacteria around,
> they
> > do
> > > >> when there are some but not too many, and they don't when there are
> > too
> > > >> many. Now, take ants. Ants have a system of finding new nests that
> > > >> involves
> > > >> scouting for potential sites. If the site is extremely good, they go
> > > back
> > > >> and take other ants there quickly, but if it is not so good they
> tend
> > to
> > > >> dawdle a little, with the result that the best site gets more ants,
> > and
> > > at
> > > >> a certain point the whole nest "decides" to move there. Now, take
> > > >> bees. Like ants, bees go scouting. The scouts come back and they
> > dance;
> > > >> the
> > > >> dances attract more or fewer onlookers, and when a quorum is
> reached,
> > > the
> > > >> hive moves. It seems to me that ALL of these are signalization
> systems
> > > >> (not
> > > >> signifying systems, because they do not have lexicogrammar and
> cannot
> > > >> convey ideal values) but the difference between the ant system  and
> > the
> > > >> bee
> > > >> system is as big as the difference between the bee system and early
> > > child
> > > >> language. For ants, the scouting and decision making are not
> > > >> differentiated, but for bees they are distinct moments--so the ant
> > > system
> > > >> involves a simple signal system and the bee system involves a second
> > > >> signal
> > > >> system.
> > > >>
> > > >> David Kellogg
> > > >> Macquarie University
> > > >>
> > > >> On Sun, Oct 30, 2016 at 3:45 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> > In this discussion The center of this relational exploration is
> > > between
> > > >> > signalization AND signification and my question goes back to the
> > place
> > > >> of
> > > >> > the general term *gesturing*.
> > > >> > Is this signalization or is this phenomena signification.
> > > >> > The act creating actual*ity (sens) which always includes tendency
> or
> > > >> > orientation towards or away from something.
> > > >> > The act is gestural acts and implies *each in the other*.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > The relation of gestural receiving and responding and this
> phenomena
> > > in
> > > >> > relation to signalization and signification.
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> > > >> >
> > > >> > From: Huw Lloyd
> > > >> > Sent: October 29, 2016 9:01 AM
> > > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA-ers: Help needed finding LSV references
> > to
> > > >> > *First*and *Second* Signal Systems
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Peter,
> > > >> >
> > > >> > If by signalisation you mean use of signs to influence behaviour
> in
> > > >> terms
> > > >> > of operational criteria and speech, then yes this is so.  It has
> > been
> > > >> > studied quite systematically, but is perhaps less well known. I
> can
> > > >> > elaborate on this if this is your drift.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Best,
> > > >> > Huw
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> > On 28 October 2016 at 22:43, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> > > >> > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> > > >> >
> > > >> > > David,
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > As usual, your suggestions are both helpful and erudite.  Thanks
> > for
> > > >> the
> > > >> > > poignant references to Vygotsky and to Marx.  Although Soviet
> > > academic
> > > >> > > politics may have complicated the issue, there does seem to be
> > some
> > > >> > > substance to the argument that the nervous systems of animals
> and
> > > the
> > > >> > > speech communication systems of humans share the common property
> > of
> > > >> > > *signalization*. Personally, I think there's a lot more to this
> > > topic
> > > >> > than
> > > >> > > meets the eye--or, better yet, there's a lot of opportunity here
> > for
> > > >> > > developing the problem further.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Once again, I owe an intellectual debt to the participants of
> this
> > > >> > > listserv!
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Cheers,
> > > >> > > Peter
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 5:10 PM, David Kellogg <
> > > dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > > >> > > wrote:
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > > Peter:
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > I think Mike's right. The "second signal system" was an
> attempt
> > to
> > > >> > > preserve
> > > >> > > > the idea of higher psychological functions in an atmosphere
> that
> > > was
> > > >> > not
> > > >> > > > that different from what was going on in America at the same
> > time
> > > >> (and
> > > >> > > > which Mike experienced first hand in both places). When I read
> > > >> > Belyayev's
> > > >> > > > work on foreign language teaching, he talks a lot about the
> > > "second
> > > >> > > signal
> > > >> > > > system". There, are, however, two places in Vygotsky which
> MIGHT
> > > >> > provide
> > > >> > > > some support, if you wanted to make the case that the "second
> > > signal
> > > >> > > > system" is not completely incompatible with Vygotsky.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > One is Chapter Two of the History of the Development of the
> > Higher
> > > >> > Mental
> > > >> > > > functions. See below. Starting around paragraph 142, Vygotsky
> > > likens
> > > >> > > > Pavlov's model of the brain as a telephone exchange. The
> > problem,
> > > of
> > > >> > > > course, is that back then telephone exchanges did require
> human
> > > >> > operators
> > > >> > > > to make the connection!
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > The other is the discussion of "second order symbolism" in the
> > > work
> > > >> of
> > > >> > > > Delacroix, which you can find in Chapter Six of Thinking and
> > > Speech
> > > >> and
> > > >> > > > also in Chapter 7 of HDHMF (fifth para). This is a very
> > different
> > > >> > > > notion--it's the idea that writing is a set of symbols for
> > > speaking.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > David Kellogg
> > > >> > > > Macquarie University
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > >From HDHMF, Chapter Two, Research Method
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > We know that, as Pavlov says, “the most general bases of
> higher
> > > >> nervous
> > > >> > > > activity are ascribed to the large hemispheres, the same in
> both
> > > >> higher
> > > >> > > > animals and in people, and for this reason even elementary
> > > >> phenomena of
> > > >> > > > this activity must be identical in the one and in the other in
> > > both
> > > >> > > normal
> > > >> > > > and pathological cases” (1951, p. 15). Actually, this can
> > scarcely
> > > >> be
> > > >> > > > disputed. But as soon as we go from the elementary phenomena
> of
> > > >> higher
> > > >> > > > nervous activity to the complex, to the higher phenomena
> within
> > > this
> > > >> > > higher
> > > >> > > > – in the physiological sense – activity, then two different
> > > >> > > methodological
> > > >> > > > paths for studying the specific uniqueness of human higher
> > > behavior
> > > >> > open
> > > >> > > > before us.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > One is the path to further study of complication, enrichment,
> > and
> > > >> > > > differentiation of the same phenomena that experimental study
> > > >> > ascertains
> > > >> > > in
> > > >> > > > animals. Here, on this path, the greatest restraint must be
> > > >> observed.
> > > >> > In
> > > >> > > > transferring information on higher nervous activity of animals
> > to
> > > >> > higher
> > > >> > > > activity of man, we must constantly check the factual
> > similarities
> > > >> in
> > > >> > the
> > > >> > > > function of organs in man and animals, but in general the
> > > principle
> > > >> > > itself
> > > >> > > > of the research remains the same as it was in the study of
> > > animals.
> > > >> > This
> > > >> > > is
> > > >> > > > the path of physiological study.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > True, this circumstance is of major significance and in the
> area
> > > of
> > > >> > > > physiological study of behavior, in a comparative study of man
> > and
> > > >> > > animals,
> > > >> > > > we must not put the function of the heart, stomach, and other
> > > organs
> > > >> > > which
> > > >> > > > are so similar to that of man on the same plane with higher
> > > nervous
> > > >> > > > activity. In the words of I. P. Pavlov, “It is specifically
> this
> > > >> > activity
> > > >> > > > that so strikingly sets man apart from the rank of animals,
> that
> > > >> places
> > > >> > > man
> > > >> > > > immeasurably above the whole animal world” (ibid. p. 414). And
> > we
> > > >> might
> > > >> > > > expect that along the path of physiological research we will
> > find
> > > a
> > > >> > > > specific qualitative difference in human activity. Let us
> recall
> > > the
> > > >> > > words
> > > >> > > > of Pavlov cited above on the quantitative and qualitative
> > > >> > incomparability
> > > >> > > > of the word with conditioned stimuli of animals. Even in the
> > plan
> > > of
> > > >> > > strict
> > > >> > > > physiological consideration, “the grandiose signalistics of
> > > speech”
> > > >> > > stands
> > > >> > > > outside the whole other mass of stimuli, the
> “multicapaciousness
> > > of
> > > >> the
> > > >> > > > word” places it in a unique position.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > The other path is the path of psychological research. From the
> > > very
> > > >> > > > beginning, it proposes to seek the specific uniqueness of
> human
> > > >> > behavior
> > > >> > > > which does take us beyond the initial point. The specific
> > > >> uniqueness is
> > > >> > > > considered not only in its subsequent complexity and
> > development,
> > > >> > > > quantitative and qualitative refinement of the cerebral
> > > hemispheres,
> > > >> > but
> > > >> > > > primarily in the social nature of man and in a new method of
> > > >> > adaptation,
> > > >> > > as
> > > >> > > > compared with animals, that sets man apart. The main
> difference
> > > >> between
> > > >> > > the
> > > >> > > > behavior of man and of animals consists not only in that the
> > human
> > > >> > brain
> > > >> > > is
> > > >> > > > immeasurably above the brain of the dog and that the higher
> > > nervous
> > > >> > > > activity “so strikingly sets man apart from the rank of
> > animals,”
> > > >> but
> > > >> > > most
> > > >> > > > of all, because it is the brain of a social being and because
> > the
> > > >> laws
> > > >> > of
> > > >> > > > higher nervous activity of man are manifested and act in the
> > human
> > > >> > > > personality.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > But let us return again to the “most general bases of higher
> > > nervous
> > > >> > > > activity, related to the cerebral hemispheres,” and identical
> in
> > > >> higher
> > > >> > > > animals and man. We think that it is in this point that we can
> > > >> disclose
> > > >> > > > with definitive clarity the difference of which we speak. The
> > most
> > > >> > > general
> > > >> > > > basis of behavior, identical in man and animals, is
> > > *signalization.*
> > > >> > > Pavlov
> > > >> > > > said, “So the basic and most general activity of the cerebral
> > > >> > hemispheres
> > > >> > > > is signaling with an infinite number of signals and with
> > > changeable
> > > >> > > > signalization” (ibid., p. 30). As is known, this is the most
> > > general
> > > >> > > > formulation of the whole idea of conditioned reflexes that
> lies
> > at
> > > >> the
> > > >> > > base
> > > >> > > > of the physiology of higher nervous activity.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > But human behavior is distinguished exactly in that it creates
> > > >> > artificial
> > > >> > > > signaling stimuli, primarily the grandiose signalization of
> > > speech,
> > > >> and
> > > >> > > in
> > > >> > > > this way masters the signaling activity of the cerebral
> > > >> hemispheres. If
> > > >> > > the
> > > >> > > > basic and most general activity of the cerebral hemispheres in
> > > >> animals
> > > >> > > and
> > > >> > > > in man is signalization, then the basic and most general
> > activity
> > > of
> > > >> > man
> > > >> > > > that differentiates man from animals in the first place, from
> > the
> > > >> > aspect
> > > >> > > of
> > > >> > > > psychology, is *signification,* that is, creation and use of
> > > signs.
> > > >> We
> > > >> > > are
> > > >> > > > using this word in its most literal sense and precise meaning.
> > > >> > > > Signification is the creation and use of signs, that is,
> > > artificial
> > > >> > > > signals.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > We will consider more closely this new principle of activity.
> It
> > > >> must
> > > >> > not
> > > >> > > > in any sense be contrasted with the principle of
> signalization.
> > > >> > > Changeable
> > > >> > > > signalization that results in the formation of temporary,
> > > >> conditional,
> > > >> > > > special connections between the organism and the environment
> is
> > an
> > > >> > > > indispensable, biological prerequisite of the higher activity
> > that
> > > >> we
> > > >> > > > arbitrarily call signification and is its base. The system of
> > > >> > connections
> > > >> > > > that is established in the brain of an animal is a copy or
> > > >> reflection
> > > >> > of
> > > >> > > > natural connections between “all kinds of agents of nature”
> that
> > > >> signal
> > > >> > > the
> > > >> > > > arrival of immediately favorable or destructive phenomena.
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > It is very obvious that such signalization – a reflection of
> the
> > > >> > natural
> > > >> > > > connection of phenomena, wholly created by natural conditions
> –
> > > >> cannot
> > > >> > be
> > > >> > > > an adequate basis of human behavior. For human adaptation, an
> > > active
> > > >> > > > *change
> > > >> > > > in the nature of man *is essential. It is the basis of all
> human
> > > >> > history.
> > > >> > > > It necessarily presupposes an active change in man’s behavior.
> > > >> > “Affecting
> > > >> > > > the environment by this movement and changing it, he changes
> his
> > > own
> > > >> > > nature
> > > >> > > > at the same time,” says Marx. “He develops forces asleep in it
> > and
> > > >> > > subjects
> > > >> > > > the play of these forces to his own will” (K. Marx and F.
> > Engels,
> > > >> > > > *Collected
> > > >> > > > Works,* Vol. 23, pp. 188-189
> > > >> > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-
> > > >> > > > 3A__www.marxists.org_archive_marx_works_1867-2Dc1_ch07.htm-
> > > >> > > > 23forces&d=DQIFaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURk
> > > cqADc2guUW8IM&r=
> > > >> > > > mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=
> > > >> > cxiDdHmIrHosSMq59vJlZ4j-S-
> > > >> > > > 4h5DSiLaMzqzi2yNA&s=J3sZBxFP1DTk3B8MLGJTyEw-
> > > RZmpA347cJfMSUrwSa4&e=
> > > >> >).
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 7:50 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> > > >> > > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > > > > Mike,
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > Thanks for the Luria references.  From a cursory reading of
> > the
> > > >> > > relevant
> > > >> > > > > passages in the Luria & Yudovich book, and judging by some
> of
> > > the
> > > >> > other
> > > >> > > > > sources you listed, I get the impression that there hasn't
> > been
> > > >> much
> > > >> > > > > theoretical *fleshing out* of the structures of the second
> > > signal
> > > >> > > system.
> > > >> > > > > I hope that the concept of a first and second signal system
> is
> > > not
> > > >> > > just a
> > > >> > > > > political argument, but instead has some real substance. I
> > find
> > > it
> > > >> > hard
> > > >> > > > to
> > > >> > > > > imagine that our *animal* (stimulus-response) system of
> > thinking
> > > >> is
> > > >> > > > > developmentally unrelated to our *human* (conversational
> > > >> > > > > initiation-response) system of thinking.
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > If anyone else knows of any passages from Vygotsky related
> to
> > > this
> > > >> > > topic,
> > > >> > > > > please don't hold back!
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > Much obliged.
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > In solidarity,
> > > >> > > > > Peter
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 1:56 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > >> wrote:
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > Peter-- If you google Luria "second signal system" you
> will
> > > >> come up
> > > >> > > > with
> > > >> > > > > > several references. There is a copy at luria.ucsd.edu of
> > his
> > > >> > little
> > > >> > > > book
> > > >> > > > > > with Yudovich on twins that uses that language.
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > It is not online (so far as i know), but Luria's article
> on
> > > >> "Speech
> > > >> > > > > > development and the formation of mental processes" in Cole
> > and
> > > >> > > > > > Maltzman, *Handbook
> > > >> > > > > > of Soviet Psychology. *Basic Books, 1969 uses this term a
> > lot.
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > I believe you will find an upsurge of usage associated
> with
> > > the
> > > >> > late
> > > >> > > > > > 1940's-50's when Vygotskians were under severe attack,
> there
> > > >> were
> > > >> > > > special
> > > >> > > > > > "Pavlov sessions" where they had to recant their errors,
> and
> > > the
> > > >> > use
> > > >> > > of
> > > >> > > > > > first and second signal system by Pavlov
> > > >> > > > > > allowed them a life line to orthodoxy.
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > mike
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 10:43 AM, Peter Feigenbaum
> [Staff] <
> > > >> > > > > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > Dear colleagues,
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > I don't wish to detract in any way from the very serious
> > and
> > > >> > > > absolutely
> > > >> > > > > > > necessary discussion about male sensitivity (or should I
> > say
> > > >> > > > > > insensitivity)
> > > >> > > > > > > to the voices of the women inhabiting this list, but I
> > sure
> > > >> could
> > > >> > > use
> > > >> > > > > > your
> > > >> > > > > > > collective help with a small matter of scholarship. I am
> > > >> trying
> > > >> > to
> > > >> > > > > locate
> > > >> > > > > > > any passages in LSV's Collected Works in English in
> which
> > he
> > > >> > refers
> > > >> > > > to
> > > >> > > > > > the
> > > >> > > > > > > *first* and *second* signal systems.
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > My understanding is that Vygotsky considers the first
> > signal
> > > >> > system
> > > >> > > > as
> > > >> > > > > > the
> > > >> > > > > > > biologically inherited stimulus-response (S-R) system of
> > > >> reflexes
> > > >> > > as
> > > >> > > > > > > described by Pavlov, whereas the second signal system
> > refers
> > > >> to
> > > >> > the
> > > >> > > > > > > culturally inherited system of initiation-response that
> is
> > > >> > > particular
> > > >> > > > > to
> > > >> > > > > > > human conversational activity. I am working with the
> > > >> hypothesis
> > > >> > > that,
> > > >> > > > > in
> > > >> > > > > > > ontogenetic development, the first signal system becomes
> > > >> > > > *domesticated*
> > > >> > > > > > by,
> > > >> > > > > > > and ultimately subordinated to, the second signal
> system.
> > > That
> > > >> > is,
> > > >> > > > the
> > > >> > > > > > S-R
> > > >> > > > > > > form of thinking becomes developmentally transformed
> into
> > > the
> > > >> > > > > > > Initiation-Response form of thinking that is
> > characteristic
> > > >> of a
> > > >> > > > person
> > > >> > > > > > > performing a listening-speaking turn in conversation.
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > If any of the wonderful scholars on this list could help
> > > point
> > > >> > this
> > > >> > > > > poor,
> > > >> > > > > > > stumbling colleague
> > > >> > > > > > > in the right direction, I would be most grateful.
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > Warm wishes to all,
> > > >> > > > > > > Peter
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > p.s. -- Let me take this opportunity to express my
> > heartfelt
> > > >> > thanks
> > > >> > > > to
> > > >> > > > > > Mike
> > > >> > > > > > > for creating this list in the first place, and with it
> the
> > > >> > > > opportunity
> > > >> > > > > > for
> > > >> > > > > > > Vygotskian scholars the world over to share and discuss
> > our
> > > >> ideas
> > > >> > > in
> > > >> > > > an
> > > >> > > > > > > open and honest forum. For my part, I pledge to do my
> > level
> > > >> best
> > > >> > to
> > > >> > > > > raise
> > > >> > > > > > > my own consciousness where it is deficient so that my
> > > >> > participation
> > > >> > > > in
> > > >> > > > > > this
> > > >> > > > > > > forum will be as inclusive and respectful to all of its
> > > >> > > participants
> > > >> > > > as
> > > >> > > > > > is
> > > >> > > > > > > humanly possible.
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > --
> > > >> > > > > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > >> > > > > > > Director,
> > > >> > > > > > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > >> > > > > > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_> > >
> > > >> > > > provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > > >> > > > > > > Fordham University
> > > >> > > > > > > Thebaud Hall-202
> > > >> > > > > > > Bronx, NY 10458
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > >> > > > > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > >> > > > > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > > >> > > > > > >
> > > >> > > > > >
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > --
> > > >> > > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > >> > > > > Director,
> > > >> > > > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > >> > > > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_>
> > > >> > > > provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > > >> > > > > Fordham University
> > > >> > > > > Thebaud Hall-202
> > > >> > > > > Bronx, NY 10458
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > >> > > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > >> > > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > > >> > > > >
> > > >> > > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > --
> > > >> > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > >> > > Director,
> > > >> > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > >> > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/
> > > >> > > office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > > >> > > Fordham University
> > > >> > > Thebaud Hall-202
> > > >> > > Bronx, NY 10458
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > >> > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > >> > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > > >> > >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > Director,
> > Office of Institutional Research
> > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_
> > provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > Fordham University
> > Thebaud Hall-202
> > Bronx, NY 10458
> >
> > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> >
>



-- 
Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
Director,
Office of Institutional Research
<http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
Fordham University
Thebaud Hall-202
Bronx, NY 10458

Phone: (718) 817-2243
Fax: (718) 817-3817
email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu