From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun May 1 16:03:47 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 2 May 2016 09:03:47 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity Message-ID: I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the collection "Vygotski maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary dialogue between Buhler and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language and the latter's criticisms thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH so that Friedrich doesn't have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of each or pretend that she knows the exact wording of each argument. Friedrich begins with Hegel's distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that I've never read) between mediating activity and mediated activity. Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about using the quote from Hegel in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is essentially bystanding, when you use one force of nature, more or less in the natural state, against another.For example, you arrange the downspout of your house roof gutters so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. Or you hang your wet laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it out instead of trying to wring it dry yourself.. Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in others completely opposite. It's the same in that you are using one natural force against another, but it's opposite in the sense that your role is not bystanding; you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For example, instead of arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a drill of some kind to bore a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into a flagstone or a tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree branch instead of just hanging it there. Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work (e.g. "The History of the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he is treating ALL activity as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, we know that he CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it equates the sign and the tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more like mediated activity and even less like mediating activity than the tool. After all, sign users are not bystanders; they are even more intimately and intensively and deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But that confuses the sign user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key difference between mediating activity and mediated activity--which is that in mediating activity the force of nature is allowed to act according to its own properties. When I use a word, I do not try to transform it from a sound into something else; or rather, if I do, then I get something that is less obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new album "Lemonade", which is an attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons of a husband's infidelity) and to transform it into something larger than life or twice as natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy cross between a mediating activity ("for colored girls who have considered suicide | when the rainbow is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used and Ntozake Shange simply stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and the Myth of Superwoman", where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own experiences alongside a traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't quite figure out whether she wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for an ineffable everywoman or as a mediated activity by the one and only Pasha Bey. David Kellogg Macquarie University From ablunden@mira.net Sun May 1 19:00:25 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 2 May 2016 12:00:25 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and social processes in general unfold according to their own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural objects act according to human purposes, not their material properties as such. I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not under conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and mediated activity, though given that all activity is mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the content which remains unchanged through all the three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the collection "Vygotski > maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary dialogue between Buhler > and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language and the latter's criticisms > thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH so that Friedrich doesn't > have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of each or pretend that she > knows the exact wording of each argument. Friedrich begins with Hegel's > distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that I've never read) between > mediating activity and mediated activity. > > Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about using the quote from Hegel > in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is essentially bystanding, when > you use one force of nature, more or less in the natural state, against > another.For example, you arrange the downspout of your house roof gutters > so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. Or you hang your wet > laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it out instead of trying to > wring it dry yourself.. > > Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in others completely > opposite. It's the same in that you are using one natural force against > another, but it's opposite in the sense that your role is not bystanding; > you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For example, instead of > arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a drill of some kind to bore > a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into a flagstone or a > tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree branch instead of just > hanging it there. > > Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work (e.g. "The History of > the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he is treating ALL activity > as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, we know that he > CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it equates the sign and the > tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more like mediated activity > and even less like mediating activity than the tool. After all, sign users > are not bystanders; they are even more intimately and intensively and > deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But that confuses the sign > user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key difference between > mediating activity and mediated activity--which is that in mediating > activity the force of nature is allowed to act according to its own > properties. When I use a word, I do not try to transform it from a sound > into something else; or rather, if I do, then I get something that is less > obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > > While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new album "Lemonade", which is an > attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons of a husband's > infidelity) and to transform it into something larger than life or twice as > natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy cross between a mediating > activity ("for colored girls who have considered suicide | when the rainbow > is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used and Ntozake Shange simply > stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and the Myth of Superwoman", > where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own experiences alongside a > traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't quite figure out whether she > wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for an ineffable everywoman > or as a mediated activity by the one and only Pasha Bey. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun May 1 13:22:48 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sun, 1 May 2016 23:22:48 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Pscyhoanalysis in USSR Message-ID: A friend of mine a clinical psychoanalyst is looking for references on the application of pscyhoanalysis in the USSR. If anyone can be of help, appreciated and thanks. Ulvi From leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com Mon May 2 08:00:44 2016 From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com (Leif Strandberg) Date: Mon, 2 May 2016 17:00:44 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Pscyhoanalysis in USSR In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: eros nevozmomozjnogo (1993) by Aleksandr Etkind goof luck Leif in Sweden 1 maj 2016 kl. 22:22 skrev Ulvi ??il : > A friend of mine a clinical psychoanalyst is looking for references on the > application of pscyhoanalysis in the USSR. > > If anyone can be of help, appreciated and thanks. > > Ulvi From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon May 2 08:07:48 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 2 May 2016 18:07:48 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Pscyhoanalysis in USSR In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: thanks. russian only? 2 May 2016 18:04 tarihinde "Leif Strandberg" yazd?: > eros nevozmomozjnogo (1993) by Aleksandr Etkind > > goof luck > > Leif in Sweden > > > 1 maj 2016 kl. 22:22 skrev Ulvi ??il : > > > A friend of mine a clinical psychoanalyst is looking for references on > the > > application of pscyhoanalysis in the USSR. > > > > If anyone can be of help, appreciated and thanks. > > > > Ulvi > > > From leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com Mon May 2 08:52:01 2016 From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com (Leif Strandberg) Date: Mon, 2 May 2016 17:52:01 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Pscyhoanalysis in USSR In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4B459858-25E0-4C5E-83B4-E13C1CF2F2FF@telia.com> I have read it in Swedish! A great book! Leif 2 maj 2016 kl. 17:07 skrev Ulvi ??il : > thanks. russian only? > 2 May 2016 18:04 tarihinde "Leif Strandberg" > yazd?: > >> eros nevozmomozjnogo (1993) by Aleksandr Etkind >> >> goof luck >> >> Leif in Sweden >> >> >> 1 maj 2016 kl. 22:22 skrev Ulvi ??il : >> >>> A friend of mine a clinical psychoanalyst is looking for references on >> the >>> application of pscyhoanalysis in the USSR. >>> >>> If anyone can be of help, appreciated and thanks. >>> >>> Ulvi >> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 2 16:00:01 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 3 May 2016 09:00:01 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Andy: You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we live in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely that tools were differentiated before signs, but ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. What really IS academic in the extreme is your own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for reasons of my own) > could I just note that Vygotsky is not really quoting Hegel, but rather > quoting Marx quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to > /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making in > the original. I think it is a twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it > is really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. > > By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and social processes in > general unfold according to their own logic, irrespective of the intentions > of their human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural > objects act according to human purposes, not their material properties as > such. > > I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, "Spirit" means > "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men > make history, only not under conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, > men are mere tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). > > I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and mediated > activity, though given that all activity is mediated and all activity is > mediating, the distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain > to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. > > The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in the Shorter > Logic is an interesting one: > > TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and objective. It is > however essentially characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and > objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the point of their > one-sidedness, while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the > End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End > maintains itself against and in the objective: for it is no mere one-sided > subjective or particular, it is also the concrete universal, the implicit > identity of both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the > content which remains unchanged through all the three/termini/of the > syllogism and their movement. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the collection "Vygotski >> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary dialogue between Buhler >> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language and the latter's >> criticisms >> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH so that Friedrich >> doesn't >> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of each or pretend that she >> knows the exact wording of each argument. Friedrich begins with Hegel's >> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that I've never read) between >> mediating activity and mediated activity. >> >> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about using the quote from Hegel >> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is essentially bystanding, when >> you use one force of nature, more or less in the natural state, against >> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of your house roof gutters >> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. Or you hang your wet >> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it out instead of trying to >> wring it dry yourself.. >> >> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in others completely >> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one natural force against >> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your role is not bystanding; >> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For example, instead of >> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a drill of some kind to bore >> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into a flagstone or a >> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree branch instead of just >> hanging it there. >> >> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work (e.g. "The History of >> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he is treating ALL activity >> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, we know that he >> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it equates the sign and >> the >> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more like mediated activity >> and even less like mediating activity than the tool. After all, sign users >> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately and intensively and >> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But that confuses the sign >> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key difference between >> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is that in mediating >> activity the force of nature is allowed to act according to its own >> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to transform it from a sound >> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I get something that is less >> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >> >> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new album "Lemonade", which is >> an >> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons of a husband's >> infidelity) and to transform it into something larger than life or twice >> as >> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy cross between a mediating >> activity ("for colored girls who have considered suicide | when the >> rainbow >> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used and Ntozake Shange simply >> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and the Myth of Superwoman", >> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own experiences alongside a >> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't quite figure out whether she >> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for an ineffable everywoman >> or as a mediated activity by the one and only Pasha Bey. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 2 17:42:49 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 3 May 2016 10:42:49 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. On my update to: https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, and that it had to be included with the one or two other allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his lifetime. Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Andy: > > You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and > we live in a country where socks are considered formal > apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to > start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > > I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's > conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and > tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a > super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and > for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating > and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of > view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > that tools were differentiated before signs, but > ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > > What really IS academic in the extreme is your > own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and > quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also > quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place > to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to > your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have > found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is > not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx > quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote > to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the > point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a > twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is > really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. > > By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > social processes in general unfold according to their > own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their > human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that > natural objects act according to human purposes, not > their material properties as such. > > I agree that when Hegel is talking about human > affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course > unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make > history, only not under conditions of their own > choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the > Weltgeist (world spirit). > > I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating > and mediated activity, though given that all activity > is mediated and all activity is mediating, the > distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I > remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such > distinction. > > The paragraph following the note on "cunning of > Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > > TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective > and objective. It is however essentially > characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and > objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the > point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is > subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free > notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End > maintains itself against and in the objective: for it > is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of > both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, > is the content which remains unchanged through all the > three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > collection "Vygotski > maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > dialogue between Buhler > and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > and the latter's criticisms > thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > so that Friedrich doesn't > have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > each or pretend that she > knows the exact wording of each argument. > Friedrich begins with Hegel's > distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > I've never read) between > mediating activity and mediated activity. > > Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > using the quote from Hegel > in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > essentially bystanding, when > you use one force of nature, more or less in the > natural state, against > another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > your house roof gutters > so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > Or you hang your wet > laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > out instead of trying to > wring it dry yourself.. > > Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > others completely > opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > natural force against > another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > role is not bystanding; > you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > example, instead of > arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > drill of some kind to bore > a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > a flagstone or a > tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > branch instead of just > hanging it there. > > Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > (e.g. "The History of > the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > is treating ALL activity > as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > we know that he > CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > equates the sign and the > tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > like mediated activity > and even less like mediating activity than the > tool. After all, sign users > are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > and intensively and > deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > that confuses the sign > user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > difference between > mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > that in mediating > activity the force of nature is allowed to act > according to its own > properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > transform it from a sound > into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > get something that is less > obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > > While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > album "Lemonade", which is an > attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > of a husband's > infidelity) and to transform it into something > larger than life or twice as > natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > cross between a mediating > activity ("for colored girls who have considered > suicide | when the rainbow > is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > and Ntozake Shange simply > stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > the Myth of Superwoman", > where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > experiences alongside a > traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > quite figure out whether she > wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > an ineffable everywoman > or as a mediated activity by the one and only > Pasha Bey. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Mon May 2 18:05:17 2016 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Tue, 03 May 2016 01:05:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems false. Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am not a cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a writing system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign systems and meaning makings. I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of the web the people building the web were also doing their own identity work. People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here is agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development could not be separated from his own ontological development: https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For those not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women of color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture deficit) but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how Hegel would think of something like the web where the culture is both affected by market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the web the world spirit? On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., > tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. > I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point > of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated > and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation > co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. > > On my update to: > > https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism > > I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through > Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number > of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably > Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction > you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew > my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, > and that it had to be included with the one or two other > allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the > section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". > Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. > There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which > would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would > certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, > but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied > Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, > which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his > lifetime. > > Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your > claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up > Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Andy: > > > > You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and > > we live in a country where socks are considered formal > > apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to > > start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > > > > I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > > useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's > > conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > > that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and > > tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > > relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a > > super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and > > for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating > > and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of > > view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > > differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > > that tools were differentiated before signs, but > > ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > > > > What really IS academic in the extreme is your > > own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and > > quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also > > quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place > > to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to > > your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have > > found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > > reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is > > not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx > > quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote > > to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the > > point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a > > twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is > > really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. > > > > By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > > social processes in general unfold according to their > > own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their > > human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that > > natural objects act according to human purposes, not > > their material properties as such. > > > > I agree that when Hegel is talking about human > > affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course > > unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make > > history, only not under conditions of their own > > choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the > > Weltgeist (world spirit). > > > > I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating > > and mediated activity, though given that all activity > > is mediated and all activity is mediating, the > > distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I > > remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such > > distinction. > > > > The paragraph following the note on "cunning of > > Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > > > > TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective > > and objective. It is however essentially > > characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and > > objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the > > point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is > > subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free > > notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End > > maintains itself against and in the objective: for it > > is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > > also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of > > both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, > > is the content which remains unchanged through all the > > three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > > collection "Vygotski > > maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > > dialogue between Buhler > > and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > > and the latter's criticisms > > thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > > so that Friedrich doesn't > > have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > > each or pretend that she > > knows the exact wording of each argument. > > Friedrich begins with Hegel's > > distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > > I've never read) between > > mediating activity and mediated activity. > > > > Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > > using the quote from Hegel > > in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > > essentially bystanding, when > > you use one force of nature, more or less in the > > natural state, against > > another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > > your house roof gutters > > so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > > Or you hang your wet > > laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > > out instead of trying to > > wring it dry yourself.. > > > > Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > > others completely > > opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > > natural force against > > another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > > role is not bystanding; > > you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > > example, instead of > > arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > > drill of some kind to bore > > a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > > a flagstone or a > > tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > > branch instead of just > > hanging it there. > > > > Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > > (e.g. "The History of > > the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > > is treating ALL activity > > as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > > we know that he > > CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > > equates the sign and the > > tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > > like mediated activity > > and even less like mediating activity than the > > tool. After all, sign users > > are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > > and intensively and > > deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > > that confuses the sign > > user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > > difference between > > mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > > that in mediating > > activity the force of nature is allowed to act > > according to its own > > properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > > transform it from a sound > > into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > > get something that is less > > obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > > > > While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > > album "Lemonade", which is an > > attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > > of a husband's > > infidelity) and to transform it into something > > larger than life or twice as > > natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > > cross between a mediating > > activity ("for colored girls who have considered > > suicide | when the rainbow > > is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > > and Ntozake Shange simply > > stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > > the Myth of Superwoman", > > where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > > experiences alongside a > > traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > > quite figure out whether she > > wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > > an ineffable everywoman > > or as a mediated activity by the one and only > > Pasha Bey. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue May 3 05:03:55 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 3 May 2016 12:03:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <72BEDB48-C242-4F7D-8712-8BB6D0CCAF52@uniandes.edu.co> Andy, as you know, LSV had contact over a number of years with Gustav Shpet. For example, according to V. Zinchenko, at the end of the 1920s, Shet and Vygotsky both taught in the Pedology Department of the Second Moscow University. In 1936-37 Shpet completed a Russian translation of Hegel?s Phenomenology, for which he had been awarded a contract by the State Socio-Economic Publishing House. Obviously this was after LSV?s death, but presumably Shpet was already very familiar with Hegel before starting work on the translation. Shpet was a scholar, he had around 30,000 books in his Moscow apartment. Equally significantly, in 1913 Ernest Radlov had translated the Phenomenology into Russian. Shpet drew upon this earlier translation, and I see no reason to assume that it would have been unavailable to LSV, or that it went unread by any Russian Marxist or psychologist. Martin > On May 2, 2016, at 7:42 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his lifetime. From ablunden@mira.net Tue May 3 05:16:00 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 3 May 2016 22:16:00 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <72BEDB48-C242-4F7D-8712-8BB6D0CCAF52@uniandes.edu.co> References: <72BEDB48-C242-4F7D-8712-8BB6D0CCAF52@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <7134ec2c-e11d-6855-027c-0cb8bf6d8235@mira.net> That's very interesting, Martin. I had confirmed that there was a Russian translation of the Phenomenology in LSV's lifetime. Still, I have not found a single remark by any Marxist of the time, or LSV, indicating specific interest in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Lenin, for example, who was actually the founder of Marxist-Hegelianism, made extensive analysis of both Logics and Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, but never mentioned the PhG. On the other hand, I know that in 1930 LSV collaborated with Finget and Shirvindt (two supporters of Abram Deborin who was regarded at the time as a Marxist-Hegelian) in some work on Psychology. Without any evidence other than the timing of this contact being coincident with Vygotsky's change in what he understood by "concept" from the positivist definition to the Hegelian definition. This time is also recognised as a major turning point in Vygotsky's thinking across a range of issues, reflected in HDHMF. That is my best bet, but maybe Shpet was a part of it too. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 3/05/2016 10:03 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Andy, as you know, LSV had contact over a number of years with Gustav Shpet. For example, according to V. Zinchenko, at the end of the 1920s, Shet and Vygotsky both taught in the Pedology Department of the Second Moscow University. > > In 1936-37 Shpet completed a Russian translation of Hegel?s Phenomenology, for which he had been awarded a contract by the State Socio-Economic Publishing House. Obviously this was after LSV?s death, but presumably Shpet was already very familiar with Hegel before starting work on the translation. Shpet was a scholar, he had around 30,000 books in his Moscow apartment. Equally significantly, in 1913 Ernest Radlov had translated the Phenomenology into Russian. Shpet drew upon this earlier translation, and I see no reason to assume that it would have been unavailable to LSV, or that it went unread by any Russian Marxist or psychologist. > > Martin > >> On May 2, 2016, at 7:42 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his lifetime. > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue May 3 07:04:11 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 03 May 2016 10:04:11 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: The Frankfurt School and Religion at the Left Forum Message-ID: Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: goldstein@criticaltheoryofreligion.org Date: 5/3/2016 8:50 AM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: The Frankfurt School and Religion at the Left Forum 03-May-2016 Dear Dr. Paul Mocombe: The Center for Critical Research on Religion (www.criticaltheoryofreligion.org) which publishes the journal Critical Research on Religion with SAGE Publications (crr.sagepub.com) and the book series ?Studies in Critical Research on Religion? with Brill Academic Publishers in hardcover (brill.com/scrr) and Haymarket Books in paperback (www.haymarketbooks.org/category/scrr-series) is pleased to sponsor the following session: The Frankfurt School and Religion Left Forum John Jay College of Criminal Justice 524 West 59th Street New York, NY Saturday, May 21, 2016 12:00pm-1:50pm Room 1.107 Presider and Discussant: Warren S. Goldstein (Center for Critical Research on Religion and Harvard University, USA) Panel: Eduardo Mendieta (Penn State University, USA), ?The Axial Age, Social Evolution, and Postsecular Consciousness? Christopher Craig Brittain (University of Aberdeen, UK), ?Elucidating Evangelical Support for Donald Trump: Adorno on Religion and Sectarian Movements? Matt Sheedy (University of Manitoba, Canada), ?"Habermas, Islam, and the Limits of Public Reason" Session and Conference Details: http://www.leftforum.org/content/frankfurt-school-and-religion Sincerely, Warren S. Goldstein, Jonathan Boyarin, and Rebekka King Critical Research on Religion Editorial Office goldstein@criticaltheoryofreligion.org From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue May 3 12:42:55 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 03 May 2016 15:42:55 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: The Frankfurt School and Religion at the Left Forum Message-ID: Fyi... Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: goldstein@criticaltheoryofreligion.org Date: 5/3/2016 8:50 AM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: The Frankfurt School and Religion at the Left Forum 03-May-2016 Dear Dr. Paul Mocombe: The Center for Critical Research on Religion (www.criticaltheoryofreligion.org) which publishes the journal Critical Research on Religion with SAGE Publications (crr.sagepub.com) and the book series ?Studies in Critical Research on Religion? with Brill Academic Publishers in hardcover (brill.com/scrr) and Haymarket Books in paperback (www.haymarketbooks.org/category/scrr-series) is pleased to sponsor the following session: The Frankfurt School and Religion Left Forum John Jay College of Criminal Justice 524 West 59th Street New York, NY Saturday, May 21, 2016 12:00pm-1:50pm Room 1.107 Presider and Discussant: Warren S. Goldstein (Center for Critical Research on Religion and Harvard University, USA) Panel: Eduardo Mendieta (Penn State University, USA), ?The Axial Age, Social Evolution, and Postsecular Consciousness? Christopher Craig Brittain (University of Aberdeen, UK), ?Elucidating Evangelical Support for Donald Trump: Adorno on Religion and Sectarian Movements? Matt Sheedy (University of Manitoba, Canada), ?"Habermas, Islam, and the Limits of Public Reason" Session and Conference Details: http://www.leftforum.org/content/frankfurt-school-and-religion Sincerely, Warren S. Goldstein, Jonathan Boyarin, and Rebekka King Critical Research on Religion Editorial Office goldstein@criticaltheoryofreligion.org From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue May 3 12:50:19 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 03 May 2016 15:50:19 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: The Frankfurt School and Religion at the Left Forum Message-ID: <38upfgwf8qhbcysqbuyygwu5.1462305019379@email.android.com> Fyi... Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: goldstein@criticaltheoryofreligion.org Date: 5/3/2016 8:50 AM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: The Frankfurt School and Religion at the Left Forum 03-May-2016 Dear Dr. Paul Mocombe: The Center for Critical Research on Religion (www.criticaltheoryofreligion.org) which publishes the journal Critical Research on Religion with SAGE Publications (crr.sagepub.com) and the book series ?Studies in Critical Research on Religion? with Brill Academic Publishers in hardcover (brill.com/scrr) and Haymarket Books in paperback (www.haymarketbooks.org/category/scrr-series) is pleased to sponsor the following session: The Frankfurt School and Religion Left Forum John Jay College of Criminal Justice 524 West 59th Street New York, NY Saturday, May 21, 2016 12:00pm-1:50pm Room 1.107 Presider and Discussant: Warren S. Goldstein (Center for Critical Research on Religion and Harvard University, USA) Panel: Eduardo Mendieta (Penn State University, USA), ?The Axial Age, Social Evolution, and Postsecular Consciousness? Christopher Craig Brittain (University of Aberdeen, UK), ?Elucidating Evangelical Support for Donald Trump: Adorno on Religion and Sectarian Movements? Matt Sheedy (University of Manitoba, Canada), ?"Habermas, Islam, and the Limits of Public Reason" Session and Conference Details: http://www.leftforum.org/content/frankfurt-school-and-religion Sincerely, Warren S. Goldstein, Jonathan Boyarin, and Rebekka King Critical Research on Religion Editorial Office goldstein@criticaltheoryofreligion.org From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue May 3 20:48:55 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 13:48:55 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg: Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over signs. I don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than they co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the one oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a day, which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord Alfred Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). But it was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in prison. He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in their bed It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ transforms blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood before Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into great art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" instead of "I". Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great art. But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the one and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at the same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth with incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words to convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky says, really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the individuation of social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for mass market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry wrote: > I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To > separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems false. > Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing systems > but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am not a > cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a writing > system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. > > Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign systems > and meaning makings. > > I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even more > stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of the > web the people building the web were also doing their own identity work. > People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca listservs, > etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here is > agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development could > not be separated from his own ontological development: > https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom > > In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a mediated > activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For those > not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women of > color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. > > I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture deficit) > but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how Hegel > would think of something like the web where the culture is both affected by > market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the web > the world spirit? > > On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > > > I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., > > tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. > > I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point > > of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated > > and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation > > co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. > > > > On my update to: > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism > > > > I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through > > Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number > > of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably > > Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction > > you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew > > my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, > > and that it had to be included with the one or two other > > allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the > > section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". > > Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. > > There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which > > would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would > > certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, > > but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied > > Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, > > which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his > > lifetime. > > > > Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your > > claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up > > Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Andy: > > > > > > You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and > > > we live in a country where socks are considered formal > > > apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to > > > start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > > > > > > I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > > > useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's > > > conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > > > that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and > > > tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > > > relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a > > > super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and > > > for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating > > > and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of > > > view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > > > differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > > > that tools were differentiated before signs, but > > > ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > > > > > > What really IS academic in the extreme is your > > > own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and > > > quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also > > > quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place > > > to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to > > > your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have > > > found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > > > reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is > > > not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx > > > quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote > > > to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the > > > point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a > > > twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is > > > really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. > > > > > > By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > > > social processes in general unfold according to their > > > own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their > > > human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that > > > natural objects act according to human purposes, not > > > their material properties as such. > > > > > > I agree that when Hegel is talking about human > > > affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course > > > unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make > > > history, only not under conditions of their own > > > choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the > > > Weltgeist (world spirit). > > > > > > I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating > > > and mediated activity, though given that all activity > > > is mediated and all activity is mediating, the > > > distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I > > > remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such > > > distinction. > > > > > > The paragraph following the note on "cunning of > > > Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > > > > > > TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective > > > and objective. It is however essentially > > > characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and > > > objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the > > > point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is > > > subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free > > > notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End > > > maintains itself against and in the objective: for it > > > is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > > > also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of > > > both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, > > > is the content which remains unchanged through all the > > > three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > > > collection "Vygotski > > > maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > > > dialogue between Buhler > > > and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > > > and the latter's criticisms > > > thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > > > so that Friedrich doesn't > > > have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > > > each or pretend that she > > > knows the exact wording of each argument. > > > Friedrich begins with Hegel's > > > distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > > > I've never read) between > > > mediating activity and mediated activity. > > > > > > Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > > > using the quote from Hegel > > > in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > > > essentially bystanding, when > > > you use one force of nature, more or less in the > > > natural state, against > > > another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > > > your house roof gutters > > > so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > > > Or you hang your wet > > > laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > > > out instead of trying to > > > wring it dry yourself.. > > > > > > Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > > > others completely > > > opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > > > natural force against > > > another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > > > role is not bystanding; > > > you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > > > example, instead of > > > arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > > > drill of some kind to bore > > > a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > > > a flagstone or a > > > tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > > > branch instead of just > > > hanging it there. > > > > > > Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > > > (e.g. "The History of > > > the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > > > is treating ALL activity > > > as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > > > we know that he > > > CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > > > equates the sign and the > > > tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > > > like mediated activity > > > and even less like mediating activity than the > > > tool. After all, sign users > > > are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > > > and intensively and > > > deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > > > that confuses the sign > > > user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > > > difference between > > > mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > > > that in mediating > > > activity the force of nature is allowed to act > > > according to its own > > > properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > > > transform it from a sound > > > into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > > > get something that is less > > > obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > > > > > > While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > > > album "Lemonade", which is an > > > attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > > > of a husband's > > > infidelity) and to transform it into something > > > larger than life or twice as > > > natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > > > cross between a mediating > > > activity ("for colored girls who have considered > > > suicide | when the rainbow > > > is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > > > and Ntozake Shange simply > > > stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > > > the Myth of Superwoman", > > > where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > > > experiences alongside a > > > traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > > > quite figure out whether she > > > wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > > > an ineffable everywoman > > > or as a mediated activity by the one and only > > > Pasha Bey. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue May 3 21:09:16 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 14:09:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar." In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," Vygotsky makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the key to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, at the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate peoples (those memory sticks and knots). For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. What he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they learnt to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for communicative purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in human cultural development. The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked *not* at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among humans (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the mediating activity which produced the change from one species to another. This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Greg: > > Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. > But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence > of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in that > sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over signs. I > don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than they > co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and > speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the one > oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. > > While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a day, > which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the > evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord Alfred > Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly > contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). But it > was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess > into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in > prison. > > He did not wear his scarlet coat > For blood and wine are red > And blood and wine were on his hands > When they found him with the dead > The poor dead woman that he loved > And murdered in their bed > > It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ transforms > blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood before > Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against > Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he loves > but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But the > very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into great > art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" instead of > "I". > > Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great art. > But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to > stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into > shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the one > and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at the > same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your > embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you > unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth with > incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words to > convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky says, > really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the individuation of > social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. > > The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, > i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for mass > market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry > wrote: > >> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems false. >> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing systems >> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am not a >> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a writing >> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >> >> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign systems >> and meaning makings. >> >> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even more >> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of the >> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity work. >> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca listservs, >> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here is >> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development could >> not be separated from his own ontological development: >> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >> >> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a mediated >> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For those >> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women of >> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >> >> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture deficit) >> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how Hegel >> would think of something like the web where the culture is both affected by >> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the web >> the world spirit? >> >> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>> >>> On my update to: >>> >>> >> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>> lifetime. >>> >>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> Andy: >>>> >>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>> >>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>> >>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>> >>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>> their material properties as such. >>>> >>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>> >>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>> distinction. >>>> >>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>> >>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>> collection "Vygotski >>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>> each or pretend that she >>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>> I've never read) between >>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>> >>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>> natural state, against >>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>> your house roof gutters >>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>> Or you hang your wet >>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>> out instead of trying to >>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>> >>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>> others completely >>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>> natural force against >>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>> role is not bystanding; >>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>> example, instead of >>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>> a flagstone or a >>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>> branch instead of just >>>> hanging it there. >>>> >>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>> is treating ALL activity >>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>> we know that he >>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>> equates the sign and the >>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>> like mediated activity >>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>> and intensively and >>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>> that confuses the sign >>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>> difference between >>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>> that in mediating >>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>> according to its own >>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>> transform it from a sound >>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>> get something that is less >>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>> >>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>> of a husband's >>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>> larger than life or twice as >>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>> cross between a mediating >>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>> experiences alongside a >>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>> quite figure out whether she >>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>> Pasha Bey. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> From l.woods@iicedu.org Wed May 4 04:29:26 2016 From: l.woods@iicedu.org (Linda Woods) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 12:29:26 +0100 (BST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Ireland International Conference on Education (IICE-2016): Call for Submissions! Message-ID: <153948402.133098.08b89f4f-72dc-430b-a370-c6d9f259d662.open-xchange@email.1and1.co.uk> From blantonwe@gmail.com Wed May 4 11:51:23 2016 From: blantonwe@gmail.com (William Blanton) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 11:51:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ireland International Conference on Education (IICE-2016): Call for Submissions! In-Reply-To: <153948402.133098.08b89f4f-72dc-430b-a370-c6d9f259d662.open-xchange@email.1and1.co.uk> References: <153948402.133098.08b89f4f-72dc-430b-a370-c6d9f259d662.open-xchange@email.1and1.co.uk> Message-ID: Please send me the information for sending a proposal for attending the conference. William E. Blanton On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 4:29 AM, Linda Woods wrote: > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed May 4 14:57:36 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 07:57:36 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> Message-ID: Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. And only in hindsight. Three problems with that. First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered the "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that matter the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view of co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear to be environment specific at all. Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in accidents, does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that we are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the idea of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite > common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use > gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything like > a lexicogrammar." > > In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," Vygotsky > makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human > animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the key > to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to > use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, at > the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate peoples > (those memory sticks and knots). > > For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. What > he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with > the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they learnt > to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word > was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for communicative > purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in > human cultural development. > > The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked *not* > at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among humans > (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the > mediating activity which produced the change from one species to another. > This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the > positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" > attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Greg: >> >> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. >> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence >> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >> that >> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over signs. I >> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than they >> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the one >> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >> >> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a day, >> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord Alfred >> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). But it >> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >> prison. >> >> He did not wear his scarlet coat >> For blood and wine are red >> And blood and wine were on his hands >> When they found him with the dead >> The poor dead woman that he loved >> And murdered in their bed >> >> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ transforms >> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood before >> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >> loves >> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >> the >> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into great >> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" instead >> of >> "I". >> >> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great art. >> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the one >> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at the >> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth with >> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words to >> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky says, >> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the individuation of >> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >> >> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for mass >> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >> wrote: >> >> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>> false. >>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>> systems >>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>> not a >>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a writing >>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>> >>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>> systems >>> and meaning makings. >>> >>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>> more >>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of the >>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity work. >>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>> listservs, >>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here is >>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>> could >>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>> >>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>> mediated >>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For those >>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women of >>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>> >>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture deficit) >>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how Hegel >>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both affected >>> by >>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the web >>> the world spirit? >>> >>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>> >>>> On my update to: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>> >>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>> lifetime. >>>> >>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> >>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy: >>>>> >>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>> >>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>> >>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>> >>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>> >>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>> >>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>> distinction. >>>>> >>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>> >>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> >>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>> I've never read) between >>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>> >>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>> natural state, against >>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>> >>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>> others completely >>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>> natural force against >>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>> example, instead of >>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>> branch instead of just >>>>> hanging it there. >>>>> >>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>> we know that he >>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>> like mediated activity >>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>> and intensively and >>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>> difference between >>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>> that in mediating >>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>> according to its own >>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>> get something that is less >>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>> >>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>> of a husband's >>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed May 4 16:04:23 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 17:04:23 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> Message-ID: <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> Gente, As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. Henry > On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. And > only in hindsight. Three problems with that. > > First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution > vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered the > "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that matter > the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages > predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with > mouths and ears and hands? > > Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view of > co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal > phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from > the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to > locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a > simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear to > be environment specific at all. > > Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in accidents, > does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that we > are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick > are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. > > Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, > the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the > tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve > at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even > exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing > together of organs which evolved with very different functions for > a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to > create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. > > The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the idea > of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to > consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into > development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to > an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human > whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one > adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to > create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of > meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope > of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common > collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite >> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use >> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything like >> a lexicogrammar." >> >> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," Vygotsky >> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human >> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the key >> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to >> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, at >> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate peoples >> (those memory sticks and knots). >> >> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. What >> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with >> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they learnt >> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word >> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for communicative >> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in >> human cultural development. >> >> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked *not* >> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among humans >> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the >> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to another. >> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the >> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Greg: >>> >>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. >>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence >>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >>> that >>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over signs. I >>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than they >>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the one >>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>> >>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a day, >>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord Alfred >>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). But it >>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >>> prison. >>> >>> He did not wear his scarlet coat >>> For blood and wine are red >>> And blood and wine were on his hands >>> When they found him with the dead >>> The poor dead woman that he loved >>> And murdered in their bed >>> >>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ transforms >>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood before >>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >>> loves >>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >>> the >>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into great >>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" instead >>> of >>> "I". >>> >>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great art. >>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the one >>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at the >>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth with >>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words to >>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky says, >>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the individuation of >>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>> >>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for mass >>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>> wrote: >>> >>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>>> false. >>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>>> systems >>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>>> not a >>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a writing >>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>> >>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>>> systems >>>> and meaning makings. >>>> >>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>>> more >>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of the >>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity work. >>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>>> listservs, >>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here is >>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>>> could >>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>>> >>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>>> mediated >>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For those >>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women of >>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>> >>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture deficit) >>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how Hegel >>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both affected >>>> by >>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the web >>>> the world spirit? >>>> >>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>> >>>>> On my update to: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>>> >>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>> lifetime. >>>>> >>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> >>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy: >>>>>> >>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>> >>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>>> >>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>> >>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>>> distinction. >>>>>> >>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>> >>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> >>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>> others completely >>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>> natural force against >>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>> >>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>> we know that he >>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>> difference between >>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>> according to its own >>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>> >>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >> From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed May 4 16:35:16 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 23:35:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> Message-ID: <08F045DB-5D55-4AB5-8849-7653695AC9BE@uniandes.edu.co> Henry, Study of the number of phonemes in a large sample of languages around the world suggests that phonetic language, at least, emerged only once, in Africa, and that all existing languages have descended from this root. Martin [cid:213D583E-43D0-41FE-BFA5-0C2180477283] On May 4, 2016, at 6:04 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: Gente, As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. Henry On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. And only in hindsight. Three problems with that. First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered the "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that matter the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view of co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear to be environment specific at all. Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in accidents, does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that we are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the idea of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar." In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," Vygotsky makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the key to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, at the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate peoples (those memory sticks and knots). For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. What he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they learnt to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for communicative purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in human cultural development. The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked *not* at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among humans (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the mediating activity which produced the change from one species to another. This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Greg: Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over signs. I don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than they co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the one oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a day, which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord Alfred Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). But it was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in prison. He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in their bed It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ transforms blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood before Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into great art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" instead of "I". Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great art. But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the one and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at the same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth with incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words to convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky says, really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the individuation of social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for mass market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry wrote: I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems false. Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am not a cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a writing system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign systems and meaning makings. I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of the web the people building the web were also doing their own identity work. People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here is agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development could not be separated from his own ontological development: https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For those not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women of color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture deficit) but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how Hegel would think of something like the web where the culture is both affected by market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the web the world spirit? On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden wrote: I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. On my update to: https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, and that it had to be included with the one or two other allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his lifetime. Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: Andy: You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we live in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely that tools were differentiated before signs, but ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. What really IS academic in the extreme is your own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and social processes in general unfold according to their own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural objects act according to human purposes, not their material properties as such. I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not under conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and mediated activity, though given that all activity is mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the content which remains unchanged through all the three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the collection "Vygotski maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary dialogue between Buhler and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language and the latter's criticisms thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH so that Friedrich doesn't have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of each or pretend that she knows the exact wording of each argument. Friedrich begins with Hegel's distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that I've never read) between mediating activity and mediated activity. Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about using the quote from Hegel in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is essentially bystanding, when you use one force of nature, more or less in the natural state, against another.For example, you arrange the downspout of your house roof gutters so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. Or you hang your wet laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it out instead of trying to wring it dry yourself.. Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in others completely opposite. It's the same in that you are using one natural force against another, but it's opposite in the sense that your role is not bystanding; you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For example, instead of arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a drill of some kind to bore a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into a flagstone or a tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree branch instead of just hanging it there. Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work (e.g. "The History of the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he is treating ALL activity as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, we know that he CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it equates the sign and the tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more like mediated activity and even less like mediating activity than the tool. After all, sign users are not bystanders; they are even more intimately and intensively and deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But that confuses the sign user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key difference between mediating activity and mediated activity--which is that in mediating activity the force of nature is allowed to act according to its own properties. When I use a word, I do not try to transform it from a sound into something else; or rather, if I do, then I get something that is less obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new album "Lemonade", which is an attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons of a husband's infidelity) and to transform it into something larger than life or twice as natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy cross between a mediating activity ("for colored girls who have considered suicide | when the rainbow is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used and Ntozake Shange simply stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and the Myth of Superwoman", where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own experiences alongside a traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't quite figure out whether she wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for an ineffable everywoman or as a mediated activity by the one and only Pasha Bey. David Kellogg Macquarie University -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Language origins 4.png Type: image/png Size: 113458 bytes Desc: Language origins 4.png Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160504/6adc9fb2/attachment.png From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed May 4 16:40:36 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 09:40:36 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry: Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes that you can trace the spread of language by studying mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not simply inherit languages. They learn them. I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, provides us with...the key to the origins of language. The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language gene" have led absolutely nowhere. Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first languages, which are still being invented right in front of our noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming things: matching sounds to objects. Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Gente, > As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do > we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we > humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these > questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re > my best shot. > Henry > > > On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. > And > > only in hindsight. Three problems with that. > > > > First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution > > vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered > the > > "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that > matter > > the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages > > predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with > > mouths and ears and hands? > > > > Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view > of > > co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal > > phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from > > the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to > > locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a > > simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear > to > > be environment specific at all. > > > > Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in > accidents, > > does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that > we > > are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick > > are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. > > > > Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, > > the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the > > tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve > > at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even > > exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing > > together of organs which evolved with very different functions for > > a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to > > create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. > > > > The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the > idea > > of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to > > consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into > > development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to > > an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human > > whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one > > adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to > > create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of > > meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope > > of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common > > collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite > >> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use > >> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything > like > >> a lexicogrammar." > >> > >> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," > Vygotsky > >> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human > >> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the > key > >> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to > >> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, > at > >> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate > peoples > >> (those memory sticks and knots). > >> > >> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. > What > >> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with > >> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they > learnt > >> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word > >> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for > communicative > >> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in > >> human cultural development. > >> > >> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked > *not* > >> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among > humans > >> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the > >> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to > another. > >> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the > >> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" > >> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> Andy Blunden > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> Greg: > >>> > >>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher > primates. > >>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no > evidence > >>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in > >>> that > >>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over > signs. I > >>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than > they > >>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and > >>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the > one > >>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. > >>> > >>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a > day, > >>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the > >>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord > Alfred > >>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly > >>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). > But it > >>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess > >>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in > >>> prison. > >>> > >>> He did not wear his scarlet coat > >>> For blood and wine are red > >>> And blood and wine were on his hands > >>> When they found him with the dead > >>> The poor dead woman that he loved > >>> And murdered in their bed > >>> > >>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ > transforms > >>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood > before > >>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against > >>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he > >>> loves > >>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But > >>> the > >>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into > great > >>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" > instead > >>> of > >>> "I". > >>> > >>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great > art. > >>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to > >>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into > >>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the > one > >>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at > the > >>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your > >>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you > >>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth > with > >>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words > to > >>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky > says, > >>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the > individuation of > >>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. > >>> > >>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, > >>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for > mass > >>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To > >>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems > >>>> false. > >>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing > >>>> systems > >>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am > >>>> not a > >>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a > writing > >>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. > >>>> > >>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign > >>>> systems > >>>> and meaning makings. > >>>> > >>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even > >>>> more > >>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of > the > >>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity > work. > >>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca > >>>> listservs, > >>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here > is > >>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development > >>>> could > >>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: > >>>> > https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom > >>>> > >>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a > >>>> mediated > >>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For > those > >>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women > of > >>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. > >>>> > >>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture > deficit) > >>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how > Hegel > >>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both > affected > >>>> by > >>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the > web > >>>> the world spirit? > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., > >>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. > >>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point > >>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated > >>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation > >>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. > >>>>> > >>>>> On my update to: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism > >>>> > >>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through > >>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number > >>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably > >>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction > >>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew > >>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, > >>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other > >>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the > >>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". > >>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. > >>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which > >>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would > >>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, > >>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied > >>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, > >>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his > >>>>> lifetime. > >>>>> > >>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your > >>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up > >>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>> > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>>> > >>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Andy: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and > >>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal > >>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to > >>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > >>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's > >>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > >>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and > >>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > >>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a > >>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and > >>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating > >>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of > >>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > >>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > >>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but > >>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your > >>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and > >>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also > >>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place > >>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to > >>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have > >>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > >>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is > >>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx > >>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote > >>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the > >>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a > >>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is > >>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > >>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their > >>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their > >>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that > >>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not > >>>>>> their material properties as such. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human > >>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course > >>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make > >>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own > >>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the > >>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating > >>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity > >>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the > >>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I > >>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such > >>>>>> distinction. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of > >>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective > >>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially > >>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and > >>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the > >>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is > >>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free > >>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End > >>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it > >>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > >>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of > >>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, > >>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the > >>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>>> > >>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > >>>>>> collection "Vygotski > >>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > >>>>>> dialogue between Buhler > >>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > >>>>>> and the latter's criticisms > >>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > >>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't > >>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > >>>>>> each or pretend that she > >>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. > >>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's > >>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > >>>>>> I've never read) between > >>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > >>>>>> using the quote from Hegel > >>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > >>>>>> essentially bystanding, when > >>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the > >>>>>> natural state, against > >>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > >>>>>> your house roof gutters > >>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > >>>>>> Or you hang your wet > >>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > >>>>>> out instead of trying to > >>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > >>>>>> others completely > >>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > >>>>>> natural force against > >>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > >>>>>> role is not bystanding; > >>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > >>>>>> example, instead of > >>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > >>>>>> drill of some kind to bore > >>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > >>>>>> a flagstone or a > >>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > >>>>>> branch instead of just > >>>>>> hanging it there. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > >>>>>> (e.g. "The History of > >>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > >>>>>> is treating ALL activity > >>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > >>>>>> we know that he > >>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > >>>>>> equates the sign and the > >>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > >>>>>> like mediated activity > >>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the > >>>>>> tool. After all, sign users > >>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > >>>>>> and intensively and > >>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > >>>>>> that confuses the sign > >>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > >>>>>> difference between > >>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > >>>>>> that in mediating > >>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act > >>>>>> according to its own > >>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > >>>>>> transform it from a sound > >>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > >>>>>> get something that is less > >>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > >>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an > >>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > >>>>>> of a husband's > >>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something > >>>>>> larger than life or twice as > >>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > >>>>>> cross between a mediating > >>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered > >>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow > >>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > >>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply > >>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > >>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", > >>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > >>>>>> experiences alongside a > >>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > >>>>>> quite figure out whether she > >>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > >>>>>> an ineffable everywoman > >>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only > >>>>>> Pasha Bey. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed May 4 16:47:58 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 23:47:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> Message-ID: David, No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. Martin > On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Henry: > > Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes that you > can trace the spread of language by studying mitochondrial DNA. This > overlooks the fact the people do not simply inherit languages. They learn > them. > > I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. > Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first two years > of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, provides us > with...the key to the origins of language. > > The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little > like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into > because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead speakers > tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, the only field > workers were amateur archaeologists seeking Biblical confirmation: a quest > for the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the > field became so speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie > des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. > It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to revive it > by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language gene" have led > absolutely nowhere. > > Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries to invent > it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate roots, and then > come together, what he means is that the first languages, which are still > being invented right in front of our noses, have separate two layers: a > semantics and a phonetics, and these are then linked. But that link is not > yet wording; it's not lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming > things: matching sounds to objects. > > Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar he sees > and hears being enacted around him to his own functional purposes, his own > semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big step, but it's a step that even > a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. > So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. Throughout > human history, the number of human languages has tended to diminish and not > increase, either through genocide or through literacy or both. Babel was > indeed our past, but the single language that supposedly preceded it is > really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Gente, >> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do >> we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we >> humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these >> questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re >> my best shot. >> Henry >> >>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >> And >>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>> >>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution >>> vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered >> the >>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that >> matter >>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages >>> predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with >>> mouths and ears and hands? >>> >>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view >> of >>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal >>> phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from >>> the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to >>> locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a >>> simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear >> to >>> be environment specific at all. >>> >>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >> accidents, >>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that >> we >>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick >>> are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>> >>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, >>> the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the >>> tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve >>> at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even >>> exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing >>> together of organs which evolved with very different functions for >>> a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>> >>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the >> idea >>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to >>> consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into >>> development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to >>> an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human >>> whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one >>> adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to >>> create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope >>> of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common >>> collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite >>>> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use >>>> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything >> like >>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>> >>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >> Vygotsky >>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human >>>> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the >> key >>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to >>>> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, >> at >>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate >> peoples >>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>> >>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >> What >>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with >>>> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they >> learnt >>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word >>>> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for >> communicative >>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in >>>> human cultural development. >>>> >>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked >> *not* >>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among >> humans >>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the >>>> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to >> another. >>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the >>>> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> Greg: >>>>> >>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >> primates. >>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no >> evidence >>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >>>>> that >>>>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over >> signs. I >>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than >> they >>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >>>>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the >> one >>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>> >>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a >> day, >>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >>>>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord >> Alfred >>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >>>>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >> But it >>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >>>>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >>>>> prison. >>>>> >>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat >>>>> For blood and wine are red >>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands >>>>> When they found him with the dead >>>>> The poor dead woman that he loved >>>>> And murdered in their bed >>>>> >>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ >> transforms >>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood >> before >>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >>>>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >>>>> loves >>>>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >>>>> the >>>>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >> great >>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >> instead >>>>> of >>>>> "I". >>>>> >>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great >> art. >>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >>>>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >>>>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the >> one >>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at >> the >>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >>>>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >>>>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth >> with >>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words >> to >>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky >> says, >>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >> individuation of >>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>> >>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >>>>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for >> mass >>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>>>>> false. >>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>>>>> systems >>>>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>>>>> not a >>>>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >> writing >>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>>>>> systems >>>>>> and meaning makings. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>>>>> more >>>>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of >> the >>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity >> work. >>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>>>>> listservs, >>>>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here >> is >>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>>>>> could >>>>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>>>>> >> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>>>>> >>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>>>>> mediated >>>>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For >> those >>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women >> of >>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>> >>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture >> deficit) >>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how >> Hegel >>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both >> affected >>>>>> by >>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the >> web >>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>>>>> >>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>>>>> distinction. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed May 4 17:23:58 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 17:23:58 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] XMCA Mail 2005_07: Re: [xmca] sense and meaning Message-ID: <572a926f.8715430a.7f65.66be@mx.google.com> XMCA Mail 2005_07: Re: [xmca] sense and meaning I happened to be reading this reflection on sense and meaning and thought it might be interesting in the context of the ongoing thread http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2005_07.dir/0160.html Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed May 4 19:02:42 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 02:02:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> Message-ID: <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> Martin > On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > David, > > No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: > > Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. > > I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. > > Martin > >> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Henry: >> >> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes that you >> can trace the spread of language by studying mitochondrial DNA. This >> overlooks the fact the people do not simply inherit languages. They learn >> them. >> >> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first two years >> of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, provides us >> with...the key to the origins of language. >> >> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead speakers >> tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, the only field >> workers were amateur archaeologists seeking Biblical confirmation: a quest >> for the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the >> field became so speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie >> des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to revive it >> by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language gene" have led >> absolutely nowhere. >> >> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries to invent >> it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate roots, and then >> come together, what he means is that the first languages, which are still >> being invented right in front of our noses, have separate two layers: a >> semantics and a phonetics, and these are then linked. But that link is not >> yet wording; it's not lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >> things: matching sounds to objects. >> >> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar he sees >> and hears being enacted around him to his own functional purposes, his own >> semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big step, but it's a step that even >> a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. >> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. Throughout >> human history, the number of human languages has tended to diminish and not >> increase, either through genocide or through literacy or both. Babel was >> indeed our past, but the single language that supposedly preceded it is >> really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Gente, >>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do >>> we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we >>> humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these >>> questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re >>> my best shot. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >>> And >>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>> >>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution >>>> vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered >>> the >>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that >>> matter >>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages >>>> predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with >>>> mouths and ears and hands? >>>> >>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view >>> of >>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal >>>> phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from >>>> the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to >>>> locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a >>>> simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear >>> to >>>> be environment specific at all. >>>> >>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>> accidents, >>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that >>> we >>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick >>>> are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>> >>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, >>>> the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the >>>> tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve >>>> at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even >>>> exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing >>>> together of organs which evolved with very different functions for >>>> a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >>>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>> >>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the >>> idea >>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to >>>> consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into >>>> development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to >>>> an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human >>>> whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one >>>> adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to >>>> create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope >>>> of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common >>>> collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite >>>>> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use >>>>> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything >>> like >>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>> >>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>> Vygotsky >>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human >>>>> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the >>> key >>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to >>>>> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, >>> at >>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate >>> peoples >>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>> >>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >>> What >>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with >>>>> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they >>> learnt >>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word >>>>> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for >>> communicative >>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in >>>>> human cultural development. >>>>> >>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked >>> *not* >>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among >>> humans >>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the >>>>> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to >>> another. >>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the >>>>> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Greg: >>>>>> >>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>> primates. >>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no >>> evidence >>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >>>>>> that >>>>>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over >>> signs. I >>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than >>> they >>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >>>>>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the >>> one >>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>>> >>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a >>> day, >>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >>>>>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord >>> Alfred >>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >>>>>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >>> But it >>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >>>>>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >>>>>> prison. >>>>>> >>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat >>>>>> For blood and wine are red >>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands >>>>>> When they found him with the dead >>>>>> The poor dead woman that he loved >>>>>> And murdered in their bed >>>>>> >>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ >>> transforms >>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood >>> before >>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >>>>>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >>>>>> loves >>>>>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >>>>>> the >>>>>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>> great >>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>> instead >>>>>> of >>>>>> "I". >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great >>> art. >>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >>>>>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >>>>>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the >>> one >>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at >>> the >>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >>>>>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >>>>>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth >>> with >>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words >>> to >>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky >>> says, >>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>> individuation of >>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>> >>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >>>>>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for >>> mass >>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>>>>>> false. >>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>>>>>> systems >>>>>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>>>>>> not a >>>>>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>> writing >>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>>>>>> systems >>>>>>> and meaning makings. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>>>>>> more >>>>>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of >>> the >>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity >>> work. >>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>>>>>> listservs, >>>>>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here >>> is >>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>>>>>> could >>>>>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>>>>>> >>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For >>> those >>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women >>> of >>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture >>> deficit) >>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how >>> Hegel >>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both >>> affected >>>>>>> by >>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the >>> web >>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>>>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>>>>>> distinction. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> > > From smago@uga.edu Wed May 4 13:02:12 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 20:02:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Announcing the 2016 Spring Issue of JoLLE! In-Reply-To: <6ca17b5328ae0c93191ece41bc061549e9b.20160504195400@mail206.atl81.rsgsv.net> References: <6ca17b5328ae0c93191ece41bc061549e9b.20160504195400@mail206.atl81.rsgsv.net> Message-ID: What's new with JoLLE@UGA? View this email in your browser [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/6ca17b5328ae0c93191ece41b/images/image001.png] [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/6ca17b5328ae0c93191ece41b/images/aad7caab-8e94-4b4a-b081-9c610a904a12.jpg] Announcing the Spring 2016 Issue of JoLLE! This issue, Community Engaged Literacies, extends the JoLLE@UGA 2016 Winter Conference's conversations by examining the importance of various forms of community in language and literacy education. You can check out the Research Articles, Academic Book Reviews, Children's and Young Adult Book Reviewers, and Poetry and Art sections on our website here or view the full issue here. [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/6ca17b5328ae0c93191ece41b/images/5d69fc63-47a2-42af-9a9c-e6cab110c3c0.jpg] Please join us in welcoming our NEW 2016-17 JoLLE Editorial Board! Co-Principal Editors: Nick Thompson & Jenn Whitley Managing Editor: Heidi Hadley Production Editor: Brad Robinson Communications Editor: Will Fassbender Conference Chair: Rachel Sanders Academic Book Review Editor: Kathleen McGovern Children & Young Adult Book Review Editor: Hunter Strickland Poetry & Arts Editor: Kuo Zhang SSO Editor: Lou Cardozo-Gaibisso JoLLE's new "Take 2" feature! [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/6ca17b5328ae0c93191ece41b/images/c5b03f00-e3b4-4d6a-bd10-dc3c39623b15.png] Erin Kearney?s 2008 article, "Culture Learning in a Changed World: Student Perspectives," provides a fascinating discussion on the role of culture in foreign language education. Even now in 2016, the inclusion of culture in the foreign language classroom is sparse and often stereotypical or taught through little blurbs spaced throughout the language textbook. Cultural knowledge intrinsically motivates students to want to learn more, to understand more, and become more involved with the language and all its facets. Learning a foreign language cannot be a robotic process of grammar and drills; students must be brought into the language in a way that interests them to pursue further education and understanding. Strong and authentic cultural inclusion and contextual instruction is the key. Find the Take 2 Feature here. [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/6ca17b5328ae0c93191ece41b/images/8b2821df-f1a5-4170-99e6-26aded3cd446.png] As we head into the summer, consider serving as a manuscript reviewer for JoLLE. Summer is actually one of our busiest times of the year! The experience is an important form of professional service and a great way to get a behind-the-scenes look at academic publishing. JoLLE accepts a variety of manuscripts, from empirical research reports to field-based practitioner articles. If you are interested in reviewing or would just like more information about the review process, email Heidi Hadley, the Managing Editor, at jollesubmissions@uga.edu. Copyright ? 2016 The University of Georgia, All rights reserved. You're receiving this email due to your position in the JoLLE Editorial Board. Our mailing address is: The University of Georgia 125 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30606 Add us to your address book unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences [Email Marketing Powered by MailChimp] From ablunden@mira.net Wed May 4 19:16:13 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 12:16:13 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> Remarkable and beautiful! andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > > > Martin > >> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> David, >> >> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >> >> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >> >> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. >> >> Martin >> >>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Henry: >>> >>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes that you >>> can trace the spread of language by studying mitochondrial DNA. This >>> overlooks the fact the people do not simply inherit languages. They learn >>> them. >>> >>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first two years >>> of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, provides us >>> with...the key to the origins of language. >>> >>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead speakers >>> tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, the only field >>> workers were amateur archaeologists seeking Biblical confirmation: a quest >>> for the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the >>> field became so speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie >>> des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to revive it >>> by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language gene" have led >>> absolutely nowhere. >>> >>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries to invent >>> it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate roots, and then >>> come together, what he means is that the first languages, which are still >>> being invented right in front of our noses, have separate two layers: a >>> semantics and a phonetics, and these are then linked. But that link is not >>> yet wording; it's not lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>> >>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar he sees >>> and hears being enacted around him to his own functional purposes, his own >>> semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big step, but it's a step that even >>> a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. Throughout >>> human history, the number of human languages has tended to diminish and not >>> increase, either through genocide or through literacy or both. Babel was >>> indeed our past, but the single language that supposedly preceded it is >>> really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >>>> Gente, >>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do >>>> we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we >>>> humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these >>>> questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re >>>> my best shot. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >>>> And >>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>> >>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution >>>>> vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered >>>> the >>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that >>>> matter >>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages >>>>> predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with >>>>> mouths and ears and hands? >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view >>>> of >>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal >>>>> phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from >>>>> the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to >>>>> locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a >>>>> simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear >>>> to >>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>> >>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>> accidents, >>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that >>>> we >>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick >>>>> are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, >>>>> the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the >>>>> tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve >>>>> at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even >>>>> exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing >>>>> together of organs which evolved with very different functions for >>>>> a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >>>>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>> >>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the >>>> idea >>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to >>>>> consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into >>>>> development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to >>>>> an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human >>>>> whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one >>>>> adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to >>>>> create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope >>>>> of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common >>>>> collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite >>>>>> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use >>>>>> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything >>>> like >>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>> >>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>> Vygotsky >>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human >>>>>> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the >>>> key >>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to >>>>>> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, >>>> at >>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate >>>> peoples >>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>> >>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >>>> What >>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with >>>>>> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they >>>> learnt >>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word >>>>>> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for >>>> communicative >>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in >>>>>> human cultural development. >>>>>> >>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked >>>> *not* >>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among >>>> humans >>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the >>>>>> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to >>>> another. >>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the >>>>>> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>> primates. >>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no >>>> evidence >>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over >>>> signs. I >>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than >>>> they >>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >>>>>>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the >>>> one >>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a >>>> day, >>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >>>>>>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord >>>> Alfred >>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >>>>>>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >>>> But it >>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >>>>>>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >>>>>>> prison. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat >>>>>>> For blood and wine are red >>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands >>>>>>> When they found him with the dead >>>>>>> The poor dead woman that he loved >>>>>>> And murdered in their bed >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ >>>> transforms >>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood >>>> before >>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >>>>>>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >>>>>>> loves >>>>>>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>> great >>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>> instead >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great >>>> art. >>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >>>>>>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >>>>>>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the >>>> one >>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at >>>> the >>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >>>>>>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >>>>>>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth >>>> with >>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words >>>> to >>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky >>>> says, >>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>> individuation of >>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >>>>>>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for >>>> mass >>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>>>>>>> false. >>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>>>>>>> systems >>>>>>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>>>>>>> not a >>>>>>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>> writing >>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>>>>>>> systems >>>>>>>> and meaning makings. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>>>>>>> more >>>>>>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of >>>> the >>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity >>>> work. >>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>>>>>>> listservs, >>>>>>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here >>>> is >>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>>>>>>> >>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For >>>> those >>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women >>>> of >>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture >>>> deficit) >>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how >>>> Hegel >>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both >>>> affected >>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the >>>> web >>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>>>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>>>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>>>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>>>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>>>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>>>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>>>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>>>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>>>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>>>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>>>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>>>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>>>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>>>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>>>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>>>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>>>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>>>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>>>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>>>>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>>>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>>>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>>>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>>>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>>>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>>>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>>>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>>>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>>>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>>>>>>> distinction. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>>>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>>>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>>>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>>>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>>>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>>>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>>>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>>>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>>>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>>>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>>>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed May 4 19:28:28 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 20:28:28 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8220CB6E-C6F3-4102-A904-3B633B37046C@gmail.com> David and Martin, Thank you for addressing my questions! I will definitely look into Atkinson and Cavalli-Sforza. I had heard about the shift from historical to synchronic linguistics at the end of the 19th Century. It got pugilistic, as I recall. No way XMCA does away with history of anything, am I right? When does speculation go too far? I believe there?s a real, material world out there, but I know my models of it are speculative to the max. String Theory is very speculative, but so was the General Theory that had to wait until last year (?) for strong empirical evidence of gravitational waves?A hundred years! In any case, my idea of science is that it is maximally skeptical: Models of reality are maps, not the terrain,, but I use them all the time in my travels, out there and in my head. I use them to get where I am going. Lately I have shifted almost completely from paper to maps on my devices. And, when I navigate the chat, the maps are mostly text and mostly digital. But I have to say: If I got lost in the material world as much as I do in the chat, I would give up on maps. It?s like I can?t get there from here. So, it?s about the journey, not the destination? Patiently, Henry > On May 4, 2016, at 5:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > David, > > No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: > > Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. > > I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. > > Martin > >> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Henry: >> >> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes that you >> can trace the spread of language by studying mitochondrial DNA. This >> overlooks the fact the people do not simply inherit languages. They learn >> them. >> >> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first two years >> of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, provides us >> with...the key to the origins of language. >> >> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead speakers >> tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, the only field >> workers were amateur archaeologists seeking Biblical confirmation: a quest >> for the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the >> field became so speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie >> des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to revive it >> by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language gene" have led >> absolutely nowhere. >> >> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries to invent >> it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate roots, and then >> come together, what he means is that the first languages, which are still >> being invented right in front of our noses, have separate two layers: a >> semantics and a phonetics, and these are then linked. But that link is not >> yet wording; it's not lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >> things: matching sounds to objects. >> >> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar he sees >> and hears being enacted around him to his own functional purposes, his own >> semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big step, but it's a step that even >> a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. >> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. Throughout >> human history, the number of human languages has tended to diminish and not >> increase, either through genocide or through literacy or both. Babel was >> indeed our past, but the single language that supposedly preceded it is >> really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Gente, >>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do >>> we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we >>> humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these >>> questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re >>> my best shot. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >>> And >>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>> >>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution >>>> vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered >>> the >>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that >>> matter >>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages >>>> predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with >>>> mouths and ears and hands? >>>> >>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view >>> of >>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal >>>> phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from >>>> the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to >>>> locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a >>>> simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear >>> to >>>> be environment specific at all. >>>> >>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>> accidents, >>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that >>> we >>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick >>>> are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>> >>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, >>>> the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the >>>> tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve >>>> at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even >>>> exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing >>>> together of organs which evolved with very different functions for >>>> a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >>>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>> >>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the >>> idea >>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to >>>> consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into >>>> development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to >>>> an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human >>>> whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one >>>> adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to >>>> create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope >>>> of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common >>>> collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite >>>>> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use >>>>> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything >>> like >>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>> >>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>> Vygotsky >>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human >>>>> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the >>> key >>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to >>>>> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, >>> at >>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate >>> peoples >>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>> >>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >>> What >>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with >>>>> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they >>> learnt >>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word >>>>> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for >>> communicative >>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in >>>>> human cultural development. >>>>> >>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked >>> *not* >>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among >>> humans >>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the >>>>> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to >>> another. >>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the >>>>> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Greg: >>>>>> >>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>> primates. >>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no >>> evidence >>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >>>>>> that >>>>>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over >>> signs. I >>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than >>> they >>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >>>>>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the >>> one >>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>>> >>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a >>> day, >>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >>>>>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord >>> Alfred >>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >>>>>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >>> But it >>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >>>>>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >>>>>> prison. >>>>>> >>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat >>>>>> For blood and wine are red >>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands >>>>>> When they found him with the dead >>>>>> The poor dead woman that he loved >>>>>> And murdered in their bed >>>>>> >>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ >>> transforms >>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood >>> before >>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >>>>>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >>>>>> loves >>>>>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >>>>>> the >>>>>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>> great >>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>> instead >>>>>> of >>>>>> "I". >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great >>> art. >>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >>>>>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >>>>>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the >>> one >>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at >>> the >>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >>>>>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >>>>>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth >>> with >>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words >>> to >>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky >>> says, >>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>> individuation of >>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>> >>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >>>>>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for >>> mass >>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>>>>>> false. >>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>>>>>> systems >>>>>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>>>>>> not a >>>>>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>> writing >>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>>>>>> systems >>>>>>> and meaning makings. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>>>>>> more >>>>>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of >>> the >>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity >>> work. >>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>>>>>> listservs, >>>>>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here >>> is >>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>>>>>> could >>>>>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>>>>>> >>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For >>> those >>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women >>> of >>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture >>> deficit) >>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how >>> Hegel >>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both >>> affected >>>>>>> by >>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the >>> web >>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>>>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>>>>>> distinction. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> > > From helen.harper@bigpond.com Wed May 4 22:11:41 2016 From: helen.harper@bigpond.com (Helen Harper) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 14:41:41 +0930 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> Message-ID: <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter argument: http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/quentin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion Helen > On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Remarkable and beautiful! > > andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >> >> >> Martin >> >>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> David, >>> >>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>> >>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >>> >>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Henry: >>>> >>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes that you >>>> can trace the spread of language by studying mitochondrial DNA. This >>>> overlooks the fact the people do not simply inherit languages. They learn >>>> them. >>>> >>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first two years >>>> of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, provides us >>>> with...the key to the origins of language. >>>> >>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead speakers >>>> tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, the only field >>>> workers were amateur archaeologists seeking Biblical confirmation: a quest >>>> for the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the >>>> field became so speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie >>>> des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to revive it >>>> by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language gene" have led >>>> absolutely nowhere. >>>> >>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries to invent >>>> it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate roots, and then >>>> come together, what he means is that the first languages, which are still >>>> being invented right in front of our noses, have separate two layers: a >>>> semantics and a phonetics, and these are then linked. But that link is not >>>> yet wording; it's not lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>> >>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar he sees >>>> and hears being enacted around him to his own functional purposes, his own >>>> semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big step, but it's a step that even >>>> a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. Throughout >>>> human history, the number of human languages has tended to diminish and not >>>> increase, either through genocide or through literacy or both. Babel was >>>> indeed our past, but the single language that supposedly preceded it is >>>> really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gente, >>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do >>>>> we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we >>>>> humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these >>>>> questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re >>>>> my best shot. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >>>>> And >>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>> >>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution >>>>>> vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered >>>>> the >>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that >>>>> matter >>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages >>>>>> predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with >>>>>> mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view >>>>> of >>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal >>>>>> phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from >>>>>> the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to >>>>>> locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a >>>>>> simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear >>>>> to >>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>>> accidents, >>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that >>>>> we >>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick >>>>>> are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, >>>>>> the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the >>>>>> tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve >>>>>> at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even >>>>>> exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing >>>>>> together of organs which evolved with very different functions for >>>>>> a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >>>>>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>>> >>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the >>>>> idea >>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to >>>>>> consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into >>>>>> development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to >>>>>> an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human >>>>>> whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one >>>>>> adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to >>>>>> create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope >>>>>> of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common >>>>>> collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite >>>>>>> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use >>>>>>> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything >>>>> like >>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human >>>>>>> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the >>>>> key >>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to >>>>>>> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, >>>>> at >>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate >>>>> peoples >>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >>>>> What >>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with >>>>>>> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they >>>>> learnt >>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word >>>>>>> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for >>>>> communicative >>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in >>>>>>> human cultural development. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked >>>>> *not* >>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among >>>>> humans >>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the >>>>>>> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to >>>>> another. >>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the >>>>>>> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>>> primates. >>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no >>>>> evidence >>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over >>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than >>>>> they >>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >>>>>>>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the >>>>> one >>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a >>>>> day, >>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >>>>>>>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord >>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >>>>>>>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >>>>> But it >>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >>>>>>>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >>>>>>>> prison. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat >>>>>>>> For blood and wine are red >>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands >>>>>>>> When they found him with the dead >>>>>>>> The poor dead woman that he loved >>>>>>>> And murdered in their bed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ >>>>> transforms >>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood >>>>> before >>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >>>>>>>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >>>>>>>> loves >>>>>>>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>> great >>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>>> instead >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great >>>>> art. >>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >>>>>>>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >>>>>>>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the >>>>> one >>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at >>>>> the >>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >>>>>>>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >>>>>>>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth >>>>> with >>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words >>>>> to >>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky >>>>> says, >>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >>>>>>>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for >>>>> mass >>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>>>>>>>> false. >>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>>>>>>>> systems >>>>>>>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>>>>>>>> not a >>>>>>>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>> writing >>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>>>>>>>> systems >>>>>>>>> and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>>>>>>>> more >>>>>>>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of >>>>> the >>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity >>>>> work. >>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>>>>>>>> listservs, >>>>>>>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here >>>>> is >>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>>>>>>>> >>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For >>>>> those >>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women >>>>> of >>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture >>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how >>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both >>>>> affected >>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the >>>>> web >>>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>>>>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>>>>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>>>>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>>>>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>>>>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>>>>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>>>>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>>>>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>>>>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>>>>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>>>>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>>>>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>>>>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>>>>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>>>>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>>>>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>>>>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>>>>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>>>>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>>>>>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>>>>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>>>>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>>>>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>>>>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>>>>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>>>>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>>>>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>>>>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>>>>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>>>>>>>> distinction. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>>>>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>>>>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>>>>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>>>>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>>>>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>>>>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>>>>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>>>>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>>>>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>>>>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>>>>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu May 5 05:43:09 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 12:43:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> Message-ID: Helen, This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. Martin > On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper wrote: > > > The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter argument: > > http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/quentin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion > > Helen > >> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Remarkable and beautiful! >> >> andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> David, >>>> >>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>>> >>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >>>> >>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Henry: >>>>> >>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes that you >>>>> can trace the spread of language by studying mitochondrial DNA. This >>>>> overlooks the fact the people do not simply inherit languages. They learn >>>>> them. >>>>> >>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first two years >>>>> of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, provides us >>>>> with...the key to the origins of language. >>>>> >>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead speakers >>>>> tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, the only field >>>>> workers were amateur archaeologists seeking Biblical confirmation: a quest >>>>> for the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the >>>>> field became so speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie >>>>> des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to revive it >>>>> by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language gene" have led >>>>> absolutely nowhere. >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries to invent >>>>> it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate roots, and then >>>>> come together, what he means is that the first languages, which are still >>>>> being invented right in front of our noses, have separate two layers: a >>>>> semantics and a phonetics, and these are then linked. But that link is not >>>>> yet wording; it's not lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>>> >>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar he sees >>>>> and hears being enacted around him to his own functional purposes, his own >>>>> semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big step, but it's a step that even >>>>> a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. Throughout >>>>> human history, the number of human languages has tended to diminish and not >>>>> increase, either through genocide or through literacy or both. Babel was >>>>> indeed our past, but the single language that supposedly preceded it is >>>>> really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Gente, >>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do >>>>>> we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we >>>>>> humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these >>>>>> questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re >>>>>> my best shot. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >>>>>> And >>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution >>>>>>> vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered >>>>>> the >>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that >>>>>> matter >>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages >>>>>>> predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with >>>>>>> mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view >>>>>> of >>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal >>>>>>> phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from >>>>>>> the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to >>>>>>> locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a >>>>>>> simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear >>>>>> to >>>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>>>> accidents, >>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that >>>>>> we >>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick >>>>>>> are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, >>>>>>> the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the >>>>>>> tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve >>>>>>> at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even >>>>>>> exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing >>>>>>> together of organs which evolved with very different functions for >>>>>>> a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >>>>>>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the >>>>>> idea >>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to >>>>>>> consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into >>>>>>> development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to >>>>>>> an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human >>>>>>> whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one >>>>>>> adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to >>>>>>> create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope >>>>>>> of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common >>>>>>> collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite >>>>>>>> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use >>>>>>>> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything >>>>>> like >>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human >>>>>>>> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the >>>>>> key >>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to >>>>>>>> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate >>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >>>>>> What >>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with >>>>>>>> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they >>>>>> learnt >>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word >>>>>>>> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for >>>>>> communicative >>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in >>>>>>>> human cultural development. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked >>>>>> *not* >>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among >>>>>> humans >>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the >>>>>>>> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to >>>>>> another. >>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the >>>>>>>> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>>>> primates. >>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no >>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over >>>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than >>>>>> they >>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >>>>>>>>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the >>>>>> one >>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a >>>>>> day, >>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >>>>>>>>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord >>>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >>>>>>>>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >>>>>> But it >>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >>>>>>>>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >>>>>>>>> prison. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat >>>>>>>>> For blood and wine are red >>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands >>>>>>>>> When they found him with the dead >>>>>>>>> The poor dead woman that he loved >>>>>>>>> And murdered in their bed >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ >>>>>> transforms >>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood >>>>>> before >>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >>>>>>>>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >>>>>>>>> loves >>>>>>>>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>>> great >>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>>>> instead >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great >>>>>> art. >>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >>>>>>>>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >>>>>>>>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the >>>>>> one >>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >>>>>>>>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >>>>>>>>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky >>>>>> says, >>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >>>>>>>>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for >>>>>> mass >>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>>>>>>>>> false. >>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>>>>>>>>> systems >>>>>>>>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>>>>>>>>> not a >>>>>>>>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>>> writing >>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>>>>>>>>> systems >>>>>>>>>> and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>>>>>>>>> more >>>>>>>>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity >>>>>> work. >>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>>>>>>>>> listservs, >>>>>>>>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>>>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For >>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture >>>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how >>>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both >>>>>> affected >>>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the >>>>>> web >>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>>>>>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>>>>>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>>>>>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>>>>>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>>>>>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>>>>>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>>>>>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>>>>>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>>>>>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>>>>>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>>>>>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>>>>>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>>>>>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>>>>>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>>>>>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>>>>>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>>>>>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>>>>>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>>>>>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>>>>>>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>>>>>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>>>>>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>>>>>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>>>>>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>>>>>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>>>>>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>>>>>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>>>>>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>>>>>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>>>>>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>>>>>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>>>>>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>>>>>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>>>>>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>>>>>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>>>>>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>>>>>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>>>>>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>>>>>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Thu May 5 06:09:46 2016 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 09:09:46 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> Message-ID: <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a little while ago http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity Helen, This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. Martin > On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper wrote: > > > The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter argument: > > http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu > entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion > > Helen > >> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Remarkable and beautiful! >> >> andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>> >> did-language-begin/> >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> David, >>>> >>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>>> >>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >>>> >>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Henry: >>>>> >>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes >>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying >>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not >>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. >>>>> >>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first >>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, >>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. >>>>> >>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead >>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, >>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking >>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the >>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so >>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to >>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language >>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries >>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate >>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first >>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our >>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and >>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not >>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>>> >>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar >>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional >>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big >>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. >>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended >>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through >>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single >>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Gente, >>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or >>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, >>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only >>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the >>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >>>>>> And >>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of >>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx >>>>>>> should be considered >>>>>> the >>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for >>>>>>> that >>>>>> matter >>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign >>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that >>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that >>>>>>> this view >>>>>> of >>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as >>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is >>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the >>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and >>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple >>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't >>>>>>> appear >>>>>> to >>>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>>>> accidents, >>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the >>>>>>> properties that >>>>>> we >>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are >>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the >>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the >>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal >>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a >>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's >>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of >>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose >>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only >>>>>>> renders the >>>>>> idea >>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to >>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally >>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, >>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) >>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only >>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to >>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create >>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have >>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool >>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the >>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of >>>>>>>> any other species developing anything >>>>>> like >>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in >>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed >>>>>>>> in humans, is the >>>>>> key >>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of >>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he >>>>>>>> was so determined, >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among >>>>>>>> not-literate >>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >>>>>> What >>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved >>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the >>>>>>>> same time as they >>>>>> learnt >>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a >>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology >>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>> communicative >>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a >>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he >>>>>>>> looked >>>>>> *not* >>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found >>>>>>>> among >>>>>> humans >>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to >>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one >>>>>>>> species to >>>>>> another. >>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as >>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- >>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>>>> primates. >>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is >>>>>>>>> no >>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. >>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has >>>>>>>>> temporal priority over >>>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any >>>>>>>>> more than >>>>>> they >>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence >>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional >>>>>>>>> paths, the >>>>>> one >>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of >>>>>>>>> paper a >>>>>> day, >>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a >>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter >>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord >>>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and >>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >>>>>> But it >>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the >>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was >>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red >>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with >>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in >>>>>>>>> their bed >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, >>>>>>>>> Christ >>>>>> transforms >>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into >>>>>>>>> blood >>>>>> before >>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has >>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man >>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed >>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this >>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>>> great >>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>>>> instead >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create >>>>>>>>> great >>>>>> art. >>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, >>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than >>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the >>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the >>>>>> one >>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you >>>>>>>>> are at >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it >>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to >>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you >>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision >>>>>>>>> of words >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>> says, >>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex >>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was >>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>> mass >>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the >>>>>>>>> tools. To >>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as >>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. >>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal >>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of >>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural >>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>>> writing >>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with >>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving >>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For >>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own >>>>>>>>>> identity >>>>>> work. >>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. >>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help >>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool >>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological >>>>>>>>>> development: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x >>>>>> 23ugom >>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity >>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point >>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For >>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call >>>>>>>>>> to women >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop >>>>>>>>>> culture >>>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder >>>>>>>>>> how >>>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is >>>>>>>>>> both >>>>>> affected >>>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national >>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the >>>>>> web >>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ >>>>>> Hegelianism >>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we live >>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. So >>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a >>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a super-category >>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all >>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, but >>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite >>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to >>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to your >>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have found >>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not >>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to /Capital/. >>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making >>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their own >>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human >>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural >>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their material >>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, >>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not under >>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere >>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and >>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is >>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction >>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be >>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in >>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and >>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this >>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised >>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, >>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the >>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. >>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for >>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. >>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the >>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > From helen.harper@bigpond.com Thu May 5 06:37:01 2016 From: helen.harper@bigpond.com (Helen Harper) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 23:07:01 +0930 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> Message-ID: my bad, I should have done better than just skim both the paper and the critique at the outset. Helen > On 5 May 2016, at 10:13 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Helen, > > This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. > > Martin > > > > >> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper wrote: >> >> >> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter argument: >> >> http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/quentin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion >> >> Helen >> >>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Remarkable and beautiful! >>> >>> andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> >>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>>>> >>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >>>>> >>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Henry: >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes that you >>>>>> can trace the spread of language by studying mitochondrial DNA. This >>>>>> overlooks the fact the people do not simply inherit languages. They learn >>>>>> them. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first two years >>>>>> of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, provides us >>>>>> with...the key to the origins of language. >>>>>> >>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead speakers >>>>>> tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, the only field >>>>>> workers were amateur archaeologists seeking Biblical confirmation: a quest >>>>>> for the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the >>>>>> field became so speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie >>>>>> des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to revive it >>>>>> by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language gene" have led >>>>>> absolutely nowhere. >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries to invent >>>>>> it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate roots, and then >>>>>> come together, what he means is that the first languages, which are still >>>>>> being invented right in front of our noses, have separate two layers: a >>>>>> semantics and a phonetics, and these are then linked. But that link is not >>>>>> yet wording; it's not lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>>>> >>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar he sees >>>>>> and hears being enacted around him to his own functional purposes, his own >>>>>> semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big step, but it's a step that even >>>>>> a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. Throughout >>>>>> human history, the number of human languages has tended to diminish and not >>>>>> increase, either through genocide or through literacy or both. Babel was >>>>>> indeed our past, but the single language that supposedly preceded it is >>>>>> really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Gente, >>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or written, do >>>>>>> we know whether it was invented once, or many times, independently? Are we >>>>>>> humans alone in the universe, the only inventors of language? Are these >>>>>>> questions relevant to the thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re >>>>>>> my best shot. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >>>>>>> And >>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of evolution >>>>>>>> vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx should be considered >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for that >>>>>>> matter >>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign languages >>>>>>>> predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that speech co-evolved with >>>>>>>> mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that this view >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as internal >>>>>>>> phenomena. The pace of change of language is qualitatively different from >>>>>>>> the pace of change of the "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to >>>>>>>> locate it, and this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a >>>>>>>> simple adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't appear >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>>>>> accidents, >>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the properties that >>>>>>> we >>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick >>>>>>>> are deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the lungs, >>>>>>>> the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the oral cavity, the >>>>>>>> tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal passages. But this did not evolve >>>>>>>> at all; in fact, as a physiological organ the vocal tract does not even >>>>>>>> exist. It's not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing >>>>>>>> together of organs which evolved with very different functions for >>>>>>>> a purpose which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >>>>>>>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only renders the >>>>>>> idea >>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to impossible to >>>>>>>> consciously and deliberately and rationally introduce design into >>>>>>>> development. If signs are, like tools, just ways of slavishly adapting to >>>>>>>> an environment or (worse) slavishly adapting the environment to human >>>>>>>> whims, we can only stagger and struggle against each other, from one >>>>>>>> adaptation to the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to >>>>>>>> create an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have some hope >>>>>>>> of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common >>>>>>>> collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite >>>>>>>>> common in higher primates. But while the higher primates regularly use >>>>>>>>> gesture, there is no evidence of any other species developing anything >>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in non-human >>>>>>>>> animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed in humans, is the >>>>>>> key >>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of man" (to >>>>>>>>> use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he was so determined, >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among not-literate >>>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >>>>>>> What >>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved together with >>>>>>>>> the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the same time as they >>>>>>> learnt >>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a spoken word >>>>>>>>> was as much a sign as a piece of technology manufactured for >>>>>>> communicative >>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a qualitative leap in >>>>>>>>> human cultural development. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he looked >>>>>>> *not* >>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found among >>>>>>> humans >>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to the >>>>>>>>> mediating activity which produced the change from one species to >>>>>>> another. >>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as opposed to the >>>>>>>>> positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>> On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>>>>> primates. >>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no >>>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. It's in >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> sense that I was arguing that tool use has temporal priority over >>>>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any more than >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence and >>>>>>>>>> speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional paths, the >>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of paper a >>>>>>> day, >>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a safe in the >>>>>>>>>> evening. He used this to write a very long letter to his lover Lord >>>>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and highly >>>>>>>>>> contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >>>>>>> But it >>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the sorry mess >>>>>>>>>> into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was hanged while he was in >>>>>>>>>> prison. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat >>>>>>>>>> For blood and wine are red >>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands >>>>>>>>>> When they found him with the dead >>>>>>>>>> The poor dead woman that he loved >>>>>>>>>> And murdered in their bed >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, Christ >>>>>>> transforms >>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into blood >>>>>>> before >>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has against >>>>>>>>>> Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man kills the thing he >>>>>>>>>> loves >>>>>>>>>> but each man does not die" is changed into "murdered in their bed". But >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> very first step in this transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>>>>> instead >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create great >>>>>>> art. >>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it's hard to >>>>>>>>>> stand back and let the material alone rather than try to whip it into >>>>>>>>>> shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the sense that your pain is the >>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you are at >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it withers your >>>>>>>>>> embrace right at the very moment when you need to reach out, makes you >>>>>>>>>> unfit for companionship right when you need it most, fills your mouth >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision of words >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as Vygotsky >>>>>>> says, >>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex machina, >>>>>>>>>> i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was manufactured for >>>>>>> mass >>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the tools. To >>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as ontogenetically seems >>>>>>>>>>> false. >>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal writing >>>>>>>>>>> systems >>>>>>>>>>> but sign systems evolved as a form of communication long before? I am >>>>>>>>>>> not a >>>>>>>>>>> cultural anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>>>> writing >>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with sign >>>>>>>>>>> systems >>>>>>>>>>> and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving is even >>>>>>>>>>> more >>>>>>>>>>> stark when we consider the age of the web. For the first 25 years of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own identity >>>>>>> work. >>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. xmca >>>>>>>>>>> listservs, >>>>>>>>>>> etc were defining the tools in a way to help define themselves. Here >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool development >>>>>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>>>>> not be separated from his own ontological development: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x23ugom >>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity or a >>>>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>>>> activity. I am not sure it matters. The point is to be a force. For >>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call to women >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop culture >>>>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder how >>>>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is both >>>>>>> affected >>>>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national identity. Is the >>>>>>> web >>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_Hegelianism >>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and >>>>>>>>>>>>> we live in a country where socks are considered formal >>>>>>>>>>>>> apparel. So I imagine that no question mark is required to >>>>>>>>>>>>> start a discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>>>>>>>>>>>> super-category he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and >>>>>>>>>>>>> for HEGEL, all activity can be said to be both mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>> and mediated, but this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your >>>>>>>>>>>>> own distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and >>>>>>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also >>>>>>>>>>>>> quite unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place >>>>>>>>>>>>> to acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>>>>>>>>>>>> your assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>>>>>>>>>>>> found in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >>>>>>>>>>>>> not really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx >>>>>>>>>>>>> quoting Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote >>>>>>>>>>>>> to /Capital/. Marx puts an interesting twist on the >>>>>>>>>>>>> point Hegel is making in the original. I think it is a >>>>>>>>>>>>> twist which preserves Hegel's meaning, but it is >>>>>>>>>>>>> really the opposite of what Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >>>>>>>>>>>>> own logic, irrespective of the intentions of their >>>>>>>>>>>>> human actors. Marx twists this to make the point that >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural objects act according to human purposes, not >>>>>>>>>>>>> their material properties as such. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human >>>>>>>>>>>>> affairs, "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course >>>>>>>>>>>>> unlike Marx, Hegel deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make >>>>>>>>>>>>> history, only not under conditions of their own >>>>>>>>>>>>> choosing. For Hegel, men are mere tools of the >>>>>>>>>>>>> Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>> and mediated activity, though given that all activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> is mediated and all activity is mediating, the >>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction strikes me as academic in the extreme. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> remain to be convinced that Hegel knoew of any such >>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of >>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason" in the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >>>>>>>>>>>>> and objective. It is however essentially >>>>>>>>>>>>> characteristic of this unity, that the subjective and >>>>>>>>>>>>> objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is >>>>>>>>>>>>> subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion, and thereby to the power above it. The End >>>>>>>>>>>>> maintains itself against and in the objective: for it >>>>>>>>>>>>> is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>>>>>>>>>>>> both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, >>>>>>>>>>>>> is the content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu May 5 12:44:35 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 19:44:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> Message-ID: Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World Atlas of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in its characterization of the phonemes in each language. Martin > On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a little while ago > http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity > > Helen, > > This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. > > Martin > > > > >> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper wrote: >> >> >> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter argument: >> >> http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu >> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion >> >> Helen >> >>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Remarkable and beautiful! >>> >>> andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> did-language-begin/> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> >>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>>>> >>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >>>>> >>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have been stripped out. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Henry: >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes >>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying >>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not >>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first >>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, >>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. >>>>>> >>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead >>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, >>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking >>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the >>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so >>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to >>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language >>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries >>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate >>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first >>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our >>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and >>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not >>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>>>> >>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar >>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional >>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big >>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make given the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. >>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended >>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through >>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single >>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is yet-to-come. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Gente, >>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or >>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, >>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only >>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the >>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, Andy. >>>>>>> And >>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of >>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx >>>>>>>> should be considered >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>> matter >>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign >>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that >>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that >>>>>>>> this view >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as >>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is >>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the >>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and >>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple >>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't >>>>>>>> appear >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>>>>> accidents, >>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the >>>>>>>> properties that >>>>>>> we >>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are >>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the >>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the >>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal >>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a >>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's >>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of >>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose >>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only >>>>>>>> renders the >>>>>>> idea >>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to >>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally >>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, >>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) >>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only >>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to >>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create >>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have >>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool >>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the >>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of >>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything >>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in >>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed >>>>>>>>> in humans, is the >>>>>>> key >>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of >>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he >>>>>>>>> was so determined, >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among >>>>>>>>> not-literate >>>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound insight. >>>>>>> What >>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved >>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the >>>>>>>>> same time as they >>>>>>> learnt >>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a >>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology >>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>> communicative >>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a >>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he >>>>>>>>> looked >>>>>>> *not* >>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found >>>>>>>>> among >>>>>>> humans >>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to >>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one >>>>>>>>> species to >>>>>>> another. >>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as >>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks for "essential" >>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- >>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>>>>> primates. >>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is >>>>>>>>>> no >>>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. >>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has >>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over >>>>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any >>>>>>>>>> more than >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence >>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional >>>>>>>>>> paths, the >>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards conspecifics. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of >>>>>>>>>> paper a >>>>>>> day, >>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a >>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter >>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord >>>>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and >>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De Profundis"). >>>>>>> But it >>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the >>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was >>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red >>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with >>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in >>>>>>>>>> their bed >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, >>>>>>>>>> Christ >>>>>>> transforms >>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into >>>>>>>>>> blood >>>>>>> before >>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has >>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man >>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed >>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this >>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>>>>> instead >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create >>>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>> art. >>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, >>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than >>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the >>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the >>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you >>>>>>>>>> are at >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it >>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to >>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you >>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision >>>>>>>>>> of words >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>> says, >>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex >>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was >>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>> mass >>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or both. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the >>>>>>>>>> tools. To >>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as >>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. >>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal >>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of >>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural >>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>>>> writing >>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with >>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving >>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For >>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own >>>>>>>>>>> identity >>>>>>> work. >>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. >>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help >>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool >>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological >>>>>>>>>>> development: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x >>>>>>> 23ugom >>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity >>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point >>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For >>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call >>>>>>>>>>> to women >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and vilified. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop >>>>>>>>>>> culture >>>>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder >>>>>>>>>>> how >>>>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is >>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>>>> affected >>>>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national >>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the >>>>>>> web >>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ >>>>>>> Hegelianism >>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we live >>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. So >>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a >>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a super-category >>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, but >>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own >>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite >>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to >>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to your >>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have found >>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not >>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to /Capital/. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their own >>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human >>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural >>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their material >>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, >>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not under >>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere >>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction >>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and >>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this >>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised >>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, >>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the >>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. >>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. >>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the >>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu May 5 14:42:36 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 6 May 2016 07:42:36 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> Message-ID: That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the author talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have fewer varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo modus sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in phonemes. I think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto meaning, and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly corresponding to a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts of writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and this is why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more phonemes we "discover" in it. By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental methodological mistake of correlating language variation with variation in mitochondrial DNA. See: Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World Atlas > of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in its > characterization of the phonemes in each language. > > Martin > > > > > > On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > > Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a little > while ago > > http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > > Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity > > > > Helen, > > > > This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to > document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread > geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > >> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper > wrote: > >> > >> > >> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit > bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say > anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter > argument: > >> > >> http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu > >> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion > >> > >> Helen > >> > >>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>> Remarkable and beautiful! > >>> > >>> andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> Andy Blunden > >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> >>>> did-language-begin/> > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> David, > >>>>> > >>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. > I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: > >>>>> > >>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder > effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. > >>>>> > >>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have > been stripped out. > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Henry: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes > >>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying > >>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not > >>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. > >>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first > >>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, > >>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little > >>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into > >>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead > >>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, > >>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking > >>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the > >>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so > >>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des > sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. > >>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to > >>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language > >>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries > >>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate > >>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first > >>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our > >>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and > >>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not > >>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming > >>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar > >>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional > >>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big > >>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make given > the collaborative help of conspecifics. > >>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. > >>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended > >>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through > >>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single > >>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is > yet-to-come. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Gente, > >>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or > >>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, > >>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only > >>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the > >>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. > >>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, > Andy. > >>>>>>> And > >>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of > >>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx > >>>>>>>> should be considered > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>> matter > >>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign > >>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that > >>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that > >>>>>>>> this view > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as > >>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is > >>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the > >>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and > >>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple > >>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't > >>>>>>>> appear > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in > >>>>>>> accidents, > >>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the > >>>>>>>> properties that > >>>>>>> we > >>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are > >>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the > >>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the > >>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal > >>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a > >>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's > >>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of > >>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose > >>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to > create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only > >>>>>>>> renders the > >>>>>>> idea > >>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to > >>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally > >>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, > >>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) > >>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only > >>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to > >>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create > >>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of > >>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have > >>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against > all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool > >>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the > >>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of > >>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything > >>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," > >>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in > >>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed > >>>>>>>>> in humans, is the > >>>>>>> key > >>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of > >>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he > >>>>>>>>> was so determined, > >>>>>>> at > >>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among > >>>>>>>>> not-literate > >>>>>>> peoples > >>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound > insight. > >>>>>>> What > >>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved > >>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the > >>>>>>>>> same time as they > >>>>>>> learnt > >>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a > >>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology > >>>>>>>>> manufactured for > >>>>>>> communicative > >>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a > >>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he > >>>>>>>>> looked > >>>>>>> *not* > >>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found > >>>>>>>>> among > >>>>>>> humans > >>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to > >>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one > >>>>>>>>> species to > >>>>>>> another. > >>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as > >>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks > for "essential" > >>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- > >>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Greg: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher > >>>>>>> primates. > >>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is > >>>>>>>>>> no > >>>>>>> evidence > >>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. > >>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has > >>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over > >>>>>>> signs. I > >>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any > >>>>>>>>>> more than > >>>>>>> they > >>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence > >>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional > >>>>>>>>>> paths, the > >>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards > conspecifics. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of > >>>>>>>>>> paper a > >>>>>>> day, > >>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a > >>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter > >>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord > >>>>>>> Alfred > >>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and > >>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De > Profundis"). > >>>>>>> But it > >>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the > >>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was > >>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red > >>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with > >>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in > >>>>>>>>>> their bed > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, > >>>>>>>>>> Christ > >>>>>>> transforms > >>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into > >>>>>>>>>> blood > >>>>>>> before > >>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has > >>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man > >>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed > >>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this > >>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into > >>>>>>> great > >>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" > >>>>>>> instead > >>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> "I". > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create > >>>>>>>>>> great > >>>>>>> art. > >>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, > >>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than > >>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the > >>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the > >>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you > >>>>>>>>>> are at > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it > >>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to > >>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you > >>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth > >>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision > >>>>>>>>>> of words > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as > >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>> says, > >>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the > >>>>>>> individuation of > >>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex > >>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was > >>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > >>>>>>> mass > >>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or > both. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the > >>>>>>>>>> tools. To > >>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as > >>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. > >>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal > >>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of > >>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural > >>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a > >>>>>>> writing > >>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with > >>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving > >>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For > >>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own > >>>>>>>>>>> identity > >>>>>>> work. > >>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. > >>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help > >>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here > >>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool > >>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological > >>>>>>>>>>> development: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x > >>>>>>> 23ugom > >>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity > >>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point > >>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For > >>>>>>> those > >>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call > >>>>>>>>>>> to women > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and > vilified. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop > >>>>>>>>>>> culture > >>>>>>> deficit) > >>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder > >>>>>>>>>>> how > >>>>>>> Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is > >>>>>>>>>>> both > >>>>>>> affected > >>>>>>>>>>> by > >>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national > >>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the > >>>>>>> web > >>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., > >>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. > >>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point > >>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated > >>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation > >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ > >>>>>>> Hegelianism > >>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through > >>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number > >>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably > >>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction > >>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew > >>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, > >>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other > >>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the > >>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". > >>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. > >>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which > >>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would > >>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, > >>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied > >>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, > >>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his > >>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your > >>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > >>>>>>> king > >>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we live > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. So > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > >>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a super-category > >>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all > >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, but > >>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > >>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > >>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but > >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own > >>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite > >>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to your > >>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have found > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > >>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not > >>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to /Capital/. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their own > >>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human > >>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural > >>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their material > >>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not under > >>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere > >>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction > >>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be > >>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this > >>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for > >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > >>>>>>> king > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski > >>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > >>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms > >>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > >>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't > >>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she > >>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's > >>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > >>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when > >>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against > >>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters > >>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet > >>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > >>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > >>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely > >>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against > >>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > >>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; > >>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > >>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore > >>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > >>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > >>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just > >>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > >>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he > >>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > >>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > >>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users > >>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > >>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign > >>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > >>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating > >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act > >>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own > >>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound > >>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less > >>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > >>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an > >>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's > >>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something > >>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as > >>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > >>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating > >>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered > >>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply > >>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", > >>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > >>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > >>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > >>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman > >>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu May 5 16:30:45 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 16:30:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> Message-ID: <572bd7b7.904f620a.8590e.6cc0@mx.google.com> David, A question came to mind as I read your comment on phonemes as artifacts generated from written language*systems* projecting back onto spoken language Would you say generally: The more we study (....) the more we discover (....) In other words the phenomena *discovered* is an artifact of our studying (....) Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: David Kellogg Sent: May 5, 2016 2:45 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the author talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have fewer varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo modus sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in phonemes. I think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto meaning, and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly corresponding to a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts of writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and this is why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more phonemes we "discover" in it. By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental methodological mistake of correlating language variation with variation in mitochondrial DNA. See: Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World Atlas > of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in its > characterization of the phonemes in each language. > > Martin > > > > > > On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > > Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a little > while ago > > http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > > Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity > > > > Helen, > > > > This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to > document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread > geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > >> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper > wrote: > >> > >> > >> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit > bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say > anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter > argument: > >> > >> http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu > >> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion > >> > >> Helen > >> > >>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>> Remarkable and beautiful! > >>> > >>> andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> Andy Blunden > >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> >>>> did-language-begin/> > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> David, > >>>>> > >>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. > I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: > >>>>> > >>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder > effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. > >>>>> > >>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have > been stripped out. > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Henry: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes > >>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying > >>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not > >>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. > >>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first > >>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, > >>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little > >>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into > >>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead > >>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, > >>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking > >>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the > >>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so > >>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des > sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. > >>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to > >>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language > >>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries > >>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate > >>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first > >>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our > >>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and > >>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not > >>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming > >>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar > >>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional > >>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big > >>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make given > the collaborative help of conspecifics. > >>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. > >>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended > >>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through > >>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single > >>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is > yet-to-come. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Gente, > >>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or > >>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, > >>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only > >>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the > >>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. > >>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, > Andy. > >>>>>>> And > >>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of > >>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx > >>>>>>>> should be considered > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>> matter > >>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign > >>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that > >>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that > >>>>>>>> this view > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as > >>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is > >>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the > >>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and > >>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple > >>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't > >>>>>>>> appear > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in > >>>>>>> accidents, > >>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the > >>>>>>>> properties that > >>>>>>> we > >>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are > >>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the > >>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the > >>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal > >>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a > >>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's > >>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of > >>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose > >>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to > create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only > >>>>>>>> renders the > >>>>>>> idea > >>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to > >>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally > >>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, > >>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) > >>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only > >>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to > >>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create > >>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of > >>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have > >>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against > all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool > >>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the > >>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of > >>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything > >>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," > >>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in > >>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed > >>>>>>>>> in humans, is the > >>>>>>> key > >>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of > >>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he > >>>>>>>>> was so determined, > >>>>>>> at > >>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among > >>>>>>>>> not-literate > >>>>>>> peoples > >>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound > insight. > >>>>>>> What > >>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved > >>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the > >>>>>>>>> same time as they > >>>>>>> learnt > >>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a > >>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology > >>>>>>>>> manufactured for > >>>>>>> communicative > >>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a > >>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he > >>>>>>>>> looked > >>>>>>> *not* > >>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found > >>>>>>>>> among > >>>>>>> humans > >>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to > >>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one > >>>>>>>>> species to > >>>>>>> another. > >>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as > >>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks > for "essential" > >>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- > >>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Greg: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher > >>>>>>> primates. > >>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is > >>>>>>>>>> no > >>>>>>> evidence > >>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. > >>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has > >>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over > >>>>>>> signs. I > >>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any > >>>>>>>>>> more than > >>>>>>> they > >>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence > >>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional > >>>>>>>>>> paths, the > >>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards > conspecifics. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of > >>>>>>>>>> paper a > >>>>>>> day, > >>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a > >>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter > >>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord > >>>>>>> Alfred > >>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and > >>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De > Profundis"). > >>>>>>> But it > >>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the > >>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was > >>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red > >>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with > >>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in > >>>>>>>>>> their bed > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, > >>>>>>>>>> Christ > >>>>>>> transforms > >>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into > >>>>>>>>>> blood > >>>>>>> before > >>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has > >>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man > >>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed > >>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this > >>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into > >>>>>>> great > >>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" > >>>>>>> instead > >>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> "I". > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create > >>>>>>>>>> great > >>>>>>> art. > >>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, > >>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than > >>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the > >>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the > >>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you > >>>>>>>>>> are at > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it > >>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to > >>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you > >>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth > >>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision > >>>>>>>>>> of words > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as > >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>> says, > >>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the > >>>>>>> individuation of > >>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex > >>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was > >>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > >>>>>>> mass > >>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or > both. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the > >>>>>>>>>> tools. To > >>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as > >>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. > >>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal > >>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of > >>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural > >>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a > >>>>>>> writing > >>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with > >>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving > >>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For > >>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own > >>>>>>>>>>> identity > >>>>>>> work. > >>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. > >>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help > >>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here > >>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool > >>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological > >>>>>>>>>>> development: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x > >>>>>>> 23ugom > >>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity > >>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point > >>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For > >>>>>>> those > >>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call > >>>>>>>>>>> to women > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and > vilified. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop > >>>>>>>>>>> culture > >>>>>>> deficit) > >>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder > >>>>>>>>>>> how > >>>>>>> Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is > >>>>>>>>>>> both > >>>>>>> affected > >>>>>>>>>>> by > >>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national > >>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the > >>>>>>> web > >>>>>>>>>>> the w From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu May 5 20:57:30 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 21:57:30 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> Message-ID: David, My son had a roommate who was doing work in digital speech recognition. He said phonemes were not necessary for his work. Actually he said that phonemes didn?t exist. I wonder if others in the chat have done work with speech recognition or have more to say about phonemes. On the other hand, I found phonemes and attending to their variants, or allophones, were very helpful to me, an adult language learner of various languages...very useful in attaining a more native accent. My strategies for learning those languages was very literacy bound, especially flash cards for learning vocabulary. That was study. I also immersed myself in the culture of those languages. The direct approach, so to speak. On the other, other hand, Paolo Freire, in teaching literacy to adults, emphasized core, highly meaningful (?generative? for his students) vocabulary and the syllabication of those words to create easy-to-read materials. Of course, he worked in Portuguese and Spanish, with simpler syllable structures than English. I am sure there are chatters that know a lot more about Freire?s work than I do, and may even find my short description of his method falls short. So, I guess my claim would be that whether the phoneme exists or not, whether it is helpful to think that it does, depends on age and literacy ability. However, I have never learned a language with other than a phonetic writing system. What I learned of Japanese leaned on transliteration into the Roman alphabet, but I didn?t have a Freire to teach me literacy in Japanese as I was learning the spoken language. Henry Regarding syllables > On May 5, 2016, at 3:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the author > talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have fewer > varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the > diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo modus > sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. > > My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in phonemes. I > think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto meaning, > and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly corresponding to > a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic > listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts of > writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and this is > why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more > phonemes we "discover" in it. > > By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental methodological > mistake of correlating language variation with variation in mitochondrial > DNA. See: > > Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) > *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World Atlas >> of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in its >> characterization of the phonemes in each language. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >>> On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> >>> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a little >> while ago >>> http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity >>> >>> Helen, >>> >>> This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to >> document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread >> geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper >> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit >> bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say >> anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter >> argument: >>>> >>>> http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu >>>> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion >>>> >>>> Helen >>>> >>>>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Remarkable and beautiful! >>>>> >>>>> andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> did-language-begin/> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. >> I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder >> effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have >> been stripped out. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes >>>>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying >>>>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not >>>>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first >>>>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, >>>>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>>>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>>>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead >>>>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, >>>>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking >>>>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the >>>>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so >>>>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des >> sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to >>>>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language >>>>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries >>>>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate >>>>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first >>>>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our >>>>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and >>>>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not >>>>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar >>>>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional >>>>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big >>>>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make given >> the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. >>>>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended >>>>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through >>>>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single >>>>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is >> yet-to-come. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Gente, >>>>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or >>>>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, >>>>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only >>>>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the >>>>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, >> Andy. >>>>>>>>> And >>>>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of >>>>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx >>>>>>>>>> should be considered >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> matter >>>>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign >>>>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that >>>>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that >>>>>>>>>> this view >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as >>>>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is >>>>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and >>>>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple >>>>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't >>>>>>>>>> appear >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>>>>>>> accidents, >>>>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the >>>>>>>>>> properties that >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are >>>>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the >>>>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the >>>>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal >>>>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a >>>>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's >>>>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of >>>>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose >>>>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only >>>>>>>>>> renders the >>>>>>>>> idea >>>>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to >>>>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally >>>>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, >>>>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) >>>>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only >>>>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to >>>>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create >>>>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have >>>>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against >> all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool >>>>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the >>>>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of >>>>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything >>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in >>>>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed >>>>>>>>>>> in humans, is the >>>>>>>>> key >>>>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of >>>>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he >>>>>>>>>>> was so determined, >>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among >>>>>>>>>>> not-literate >>>>>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound >> insight. >>>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved >>>>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the >>>>>>>>>>> same time as they >>>>>>>>> learnt >>>>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a >>>>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology >>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>>>> communicative >>>>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a >>>>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he >>>>>>>>>>> looked >>>>>>>>> *not* >>>>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found >>>>>>>>>>> among >>>>>>>>> humans >>>>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to >>>>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one >>>>>>>>>>> species to >>>>>>>>> another. >>>>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as >>>>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks >> for "essential" >>>>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- >>>>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>>>>>>> primates. >>>>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is >>>>>>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. >>>>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over >>>>>>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any >>>>>>>>>>>> more than >>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence >>>>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional >>>>>>>>>>>> paths, the >>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards >> conspecifics. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of >>>>>>>>>>>> paper a >>>>>>>>> day, >>>>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a >>>>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter >>>>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord >>>>>>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and >>>>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De >> Profundis"). >>>>>>>>> But it >>>>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the >>>>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was >>>>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red >>>>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with >>>>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in >>>>>>>>>>>> their bed >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, >>>>>>>>>>>> Christ >>>>>>>>> transforms >>>>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into >>>>>>>>>>>> blood >>>>>>>>> before >>>>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has >>>>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man >>>>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed >>>>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this >>>>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>>>>>>> instead >>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create >>>>>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>> art. >>>>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, >>>>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than >>>>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the >>>>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the >>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you >>>>>>>>>>>> are at >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it >>>>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to >>>>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you >>>>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision >>>>>>>>>>>> of words >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>> says, >>>>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>>>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex >>>>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was >>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>>>> mass >>>>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or >> both. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the >>>>>>>>>>>> tools. To >>>>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal >>>>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of >>>>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural >>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>>>>>> writing >>>>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with >>>>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving >>>>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity >>>>>>>>> work. >>>>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. >>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help >>>>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool >>>>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological >>>>>>>>>>>>> development: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x >>>>>>>>> 23ugom >>>>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point >>>>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For >>>>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call >>>>>>>>>>>>> to women >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and >> vilified. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop >>>>>>>>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder >>>>>>>>>>>>> how >>>>>>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is >>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>>>>>> affected >>>>>>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the >>>>>>>>> web >>>>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ >>>>>>>>> Hegelianism >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we live >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. So >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a super-category >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have found >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to /Capital/. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their material >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu May 5 21:35:53 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 22:35:53 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <572bd7b7.904f620a.8590e.6cc0@mx.google.com> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> <572bd7b7.904f620a.8590e.6cc0@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <79E56081-7C1D-4ACB-9FE3-A763F89087E1@gmail.com> Larry, I just posted to David, then remembered your post below. and think that, for me, the phoneme WAS an artifact that I discovered while studying and learning Spanish. This was before I had taken any linguistics, so when I was learning Spanish, phoneme and allophonic variants were lived, cultually immersive concepts before I learned how to talk and write about the abstraction in my linguistics coursework. Vygotsky said that we don?t understand our first language until we learn a second. I think he meant we didn?t learn how to talk and write metalinguistically. But children, even very young ones, adjust their speech to their audience. So, they are metalinguistically aware before they can explain metalinguistically why they make the adjustments they do. Kids who grow up bilingual are the recognized champs at code switching, but I think we all code switch a lot. And we all understand codes we can?t speak. So learning different codes goes on all the time, no study needed. That doesn?t mean learning new codes is necessarily easy. Take this chat. Henry > On May 5, 2016, at 5:30 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > David, > A question came to mind as I read your comment on phonemes as artifacts generated from written language*systems* projecting back onto spoken language > Would you say generally: > > > The more we study (....) the more we discover (....) > In other words the phenomena *discovered* is an artifact of our studying (....) > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: David Kellogg > Sent: May 5, 2016 2:45 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity > > That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the author > talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have fewer > varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the > diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo modus > sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. > > My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in phonemes. I > think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto meaning, > and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly corresponding to > a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic > listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts of > writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and this is > why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more > phonemes we "discover" in it. > > By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental methodological > mistake of correlating language variation with variation in mitochondrial > DNA. See: > > Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) > *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World Atlas >> of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in its >> characterization of the phonemes in each language. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >>> On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> >>> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a little >> while ago >>> http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity >>> >>> Helen, >>> >>> This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to >> document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread >> geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper >> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit >> bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say >> anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter >> argument: >>>> >>>> http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu >>>> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion >>>> >>>> Helen >>>> >>>>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Remarkable and beautiful! >>>>> >>>>> andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> did-language-begin/> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. >> I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder >> effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have >> been stripped out. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes >>>>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying >>>>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not >>>>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first >>>>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, >>>>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>>>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>>>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead >>>>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, >>>>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking >>>>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the >>>>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so >>>>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des >> sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to >>>>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language >>>>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries >>>>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate >>>>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first >>>>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our >>>>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and >>>>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not >>>>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar >>>>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional >>>>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big >>>>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make given >> the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. >>>>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended >>>>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through >>>>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single >>>>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is >> yet-to-come. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Gente, >>>>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or >>>>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, >>>>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only >>>>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the >>>>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, >> Andy. >>>>>>>>> And >>>>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of >>>>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx >>>>>>>>>> should be considered >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> matter >>>>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign >>>>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that >>>>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that >>>>>>>>>> this view >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as >>>>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is >>>>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and >>>>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple >>>>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't >>>>>>>>>> appear >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>>>>>>> accidents, >>>>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the >>>>>>>>>> properties that >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are >>>>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the >>>>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the >>>>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal >>>>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a >>>>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's >>>>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of >>>>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose >>>>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only >>>>>>>>>> renders the >>>>>>>>> idea >>>>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to >>>>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally >>>>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, >>>>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) >>>>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only >>>>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to >>>>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create >>>>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have >>>>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against >> all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool >>>>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the >>>>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of >>>>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything >>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in >>>>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed >>>>>>>>>>> in humans, is the >>>>>>>>> key >>>>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of >>>>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he >>>>>>>>>>> was so determined, >>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among >>>>>>>>>>> not-literate >>>>>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound >> insight. >>>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved >>>>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the >>>>>>>>>>> same time as they >>>>>>>>> learnt >>>>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a >>>>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology >>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>>>> communicative >>>>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a >>>>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he >>>>>>>>>>> looked >>>>>>>>> *not* >>>>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found >>>>>>>>>>> among >>>>>>>>> humans >>>>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to >>>>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one >>>>>>>>>>> species to >>>>>>>>> another. >>>>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as >>>>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks >> for "essential" >>>>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- >>>>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>>>>>>> primates. >>>>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is >>>>>>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. >>>>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over >>>>>>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any >>>>>>>>>>>> more than >>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence >>>>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional >>>>>>>>>>>> paths, the >>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards >> conspecifics. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of >>>>>>>>>>>> paper a >>>>>>>>> day, >>>>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a >>>>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter >>>>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord >>>>>>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and >>>>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De >> Profundis"). >>>>>>>>> But it >>>>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the >>>>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was >>>>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red >>>>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with >>>>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in >>>>>>>>>>>> their bed >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, >>>>>>>>>>>> Christ >>>>>>>>> transforms >>>>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into >>>>>>>>>>>> blood >>>>>>>>> before >>>>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has >>>>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man >>>>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed >>>>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this >>>>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>>>>>>> instead >>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create >>>>>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>> art. >>>>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, >>>>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than >>>>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the >>>>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the >>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you >>>>>>>>>>>> are at >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it >>>>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to >>>>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you >>>>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision >>>>>>>>>>>> of words >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>> says, >>>>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>>>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex >>>>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was >>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>>>> mass >>>>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or >> both. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the >>>>>>>>>>>> tools. To >>>>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal >>>>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of >>>>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural >>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>>>>>> writing >>>>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with >>>>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving >>>>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity >>>>>>>>> work. >>>>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. >>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help >>>>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool >>>>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological >>>>>>>>>>>>> development: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x >>>>>>>>> 23ugom >>>>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point >>>>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For >>>>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call >>>>>>>>>>>>> to women >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and >> vilified. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop >>>>>>>>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder >>>>>>>>>>>>> how >>>>>>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is >>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>>>>>> affected >>>>>>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the >>>>>>>>> web >>>>>>>>>>>>> the w > From helen.harper@bigpond.com Fri May 6 01:40:04 2016 From: helen.harper@bigpond.com (Helen Harper) Date: Fri, 6 May 2016 18:10:04 +0930 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> Message-ID: <2672A2EA-7A2A-40AA-A247-9F9E8D0AD3CD@bigpond.com> Hmm, David, I hesitate to jump in too deep, because I haven?t time right now to read things properly, so I can?t engage sufficiently with the papers under discussion, but I don?t think it?s a matter of choosing to believe in phonemes or not. Phonemes are just a tool of analysis. They are a perceived unit: as an English speaker I perceive /p/ is different from /b/; and /pin/ is a different word from /bin/ - so /p/ and /b/ are distinct phonemes for English speakers. There might be situations where there are better tools of analysis, but often phonemes are just dandy, and can come in very handy when you?re learning a new language, and trying to figure out how to distinguish the different sounds. But not really my area of expertise, so I?ll finish my plug for phonemes right here ?. > On 6 May 2016, at 7:12 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the author > talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have fewer > varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the > diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo modus > sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. > > My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in phonemes. I > think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto meaning, > and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly corresponding to > a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic > listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts of > writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and this is > why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more > phonemes we "discover" in it. > > By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental methodological > mistake of correlating language variation with variation in mitochondrial > DNA. See: > > Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) > *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World Atlas >> of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in its >> characterization of the phonemes in each language. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >>> On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> >>> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a little >> while ago >>> http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity >>> >>> Helen, >>> >>> This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to >> document how selected members of the Indo-European language family spread >> geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper >> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit >> bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say >> anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter >> argument: >>>> >>>> http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu >>>> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion >>>> >>>> Helen >>>> >>>>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Remarkable and beautiful! >>>>> >>>>> andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> did-language-begin/> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. >> I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial founder >> effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to have >> been stripped out. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes >>>>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying >>>>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not >>>>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first >>>>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, >>>>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little >>>>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into >>>>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead >>>>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, >>>>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking >>>>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the >>>>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so >>>>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des >> sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to >>>>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language >>>>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries >>>>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate >>>>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first >>>>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our >>>>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and >>>>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not >>>>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar >>>>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional >>>>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big >>>>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make given >> the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. >>>>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended >>>>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through >>>>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single >>>>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is >> yet-to-come. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Gente, >>>>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or >>>>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, >>>>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only >>>>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the >>>>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with everything, >> Andy. >>>>>>>>> And >>>>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of >>>>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx >>>>>>>>>> should be considered >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> matter >>>>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign >>>>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that >>>>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that >>>>>>>>>> this view >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as >>>>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is >>>>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and >>>>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple >>>>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't >>>>>>>>>> appear >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in >>>>>>>>> accidents, >>>>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the >>>>>>>>>> properties that >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are >>>>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the >>>>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the >>>>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal >>>>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a >>>>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's >>>>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of >>>>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose >>>>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to >> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only >>>>>>>>>> renders the >>>>>>>>> idea >>>>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to >>>>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally >>>>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, >>>>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) >>>>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only >>>>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to >>>>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create >>>>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of >>>>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have >>>>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each against >> all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution indeed. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool >>>>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the >>>>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of >>>>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything >>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child," >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in >>>>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed >>>>>>>>>>> in humans, is the >>>>>>>>> key >>>>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of >>>>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he >>>>>>>>>>> was so determined, >>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among >>>>>>>>>>> not-literate >>>>>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound >> insight. >>>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved >>>>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the >>>>>>>>>>> same time as they >>>>>>>>> learnt >>>>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a >>>>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology >>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>>>> communicative >>>>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a >>>>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he >>>>>>>>>>> looked >>>>>>>>> *not* >>>>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found >>>>>>>>>>> among >>>>>>>>> humans >>>>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to >>>>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one >>>>>>>>>>> species to >>>>>>>>> another. >>>>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as >>>>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which looks >> for "essential" >>>>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- >>>>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher >>>>>>>>> primates. >>>>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is >>>>>>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. >>>>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over >>>>>>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any >>>>>>>>>>>> more than >>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence >>>>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional >>>>>>>>>>>> paths, the >>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards >> conspecifics. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of >>>>>>>>>>>> paper a >>>>>>>>> day, >>>>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a >>>>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter >>>>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord >>>>>>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and >>>>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De >> Profundis"). >>>>>>>>> But it >>>>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the >>>>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was >>>>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red >>>>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with >>>>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in >>>>>>>>>>>> their bed >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, >>>>>>>>>>>> Christ >>>>>>>>> transforms >>>>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into >>>>>>>>>>>> blood >>>>>>>>> before >>>>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has >>>>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man >>>>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed >>>>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this >>>>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with "he" >>>>>>>>> instead >>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create >>>>>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>> art. >>>>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, >>>>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than >>>>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the >>>>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the >>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you >>>>>>>>>>>> are at >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it >>>>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to >>>>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you >>>>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision >>>>>>>>>>>> of words >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>> says, >>>>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>>>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual emotion. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex >>>>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was >>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>>>> mass >>>>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. Or >> both. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the >>>>>>>>>>>> tools. To >>>>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal >>>>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of >>>>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural >>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>>>>>> writing >>>>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with >>>>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving >>>>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity >>>>>>>>> work. >>>>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. >>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help >>>>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool >>>>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological >>>>>>>>>>>>> development: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x >>>>>>>>> 23ugom >>>>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point >>>>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For >>>>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call >>>>>>>>>>>>> to women >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and >> vilified. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop >>>>>>>>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder >>>>>>>>>>>>> how >>>>>>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is >>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>>>>>> affected >>>>>>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the >>>>>>>>> web >>>>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation >>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ >>>>>>>>> Hegelianism >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew >>>>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your >>>>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we live >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. So >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a super-category >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have found >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to /Capital/. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their material >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri May 6 14:28:55 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 7 May 2016 07:28:55 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <2672A2EA-7A2A-40AA-A247-9F9E8D0AD3CD@bigpond.com> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> <2672A2EA-7A2A-40AA-A247-9F9E8D0AD3CD@bigpond.com> Message-ID: Not at all, Helen; if you go back over the thread, you'll see that your contribution was pivotal. I am usually, just like you; I skim things, and look askance when life is elsewhere. Maybe you didn't have time to sit through the animations of proto-Indo-European spreading across the steppes like a reversal of the Mongol conquests, but on that morning I did so I did it for you. This morning, though, I'm translating, so I'll be short and apologize in advance for mansplainin' atcha. Voila: if you are trying to decide if a rock is a meteorite, and if it may have come from Mars, and if those little globules that you think you discern amongst the crystals might be fossilized bacteria, then it really does matter if your microscope lens is clean. Similarly, if you trying to learn a language, phonemes can be extremely useful--but so can substitution tables, glossaries, fictional dialogues, drills and any number of language exercises that we do not use in the study of language or even in daily conversation. The mere fact that they are very useful doesn't mean they exist outside the particular learning task you are trying to accomplish (James famously argued that God must exist, because he's just such a handy bloke to have around). When you are trying to decide if phonemic variation is a clue to the time and place language was first created--or even when you are trying to decide if there was a single creative moment, or if language just "co-evolved" wherever there were social groups of early man large enough to carry out joint activities--then it matters whether or not phonemes really exist. If phonemes are simply produced in the act of describing language (after all, describing a language is really just folding language back on itself) then variation in their number variation cannot be construed as a faint echo of a distant "big bang". Let me make one final point. I am reading the work of the French and Swiss Vygotskyans these days. Unlike the work of Yasnitsky and van der Veer, this is work which takes CHAT quite seriously. Andy is often cited, and so are Martin--and of course Mike. The treatment is not uncritical, but one of the things that is really appreciated is this: when you are studying any cultural-historical (or, as they like to say, "historico-culturelle") phenomenon, it really does matter what the people who produced it thought. Phonemes, that is, minimal differences which do not themselves bear meaning but which do allow us to distinguish between segments that do bear meaning, were "discovered" (well, invented, actually) in the mid-twentieth century. When Vygotsky refers to "phonemes", he is usually talking about meaning-bearing elements such as case endings or tense endings which we would call "morphemes" today. Which brings me back to translating and above all annotating. Because, as we learn when we read how Vygotsky is "applied" to language teaching, when you are studying Vygotsky, it really does matter what Vygotsky thought he was doing.... David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 6:40 PM, Helen Harper wrote: > Hmm, David, I hesitate to jump in too deep, because I haven?t time right > now to read things properly, so I can?t engage sufficiently with the papers > under discussion, but I don?t think it?s a matter of choosing to believe in > phonemes or not. Phonemes are just a tool of analysis. They are a perceived > unit: as an English speaker I perceive /p/ is different from /b/; and /pin/ > is a different word from /bin/ - so /p/ and /b/ are distinct phonemes for > English speakers. > > There might be situations where there are better tools of analysis, but > often phonemes are just dandy, and can come in very handy when you?re > learning a new language, and trying to figure out how to distinguish the > different sounds. > > But not really my area of expertise, so I?ll finish my plug for phonemes > right here ?. > > > > > On 6 May 2016, at 7:12 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the author > > talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have fewer > > varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the > > diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo > modus > > sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. > > > > My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in > phonemes. I > > think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto > meaning, > > and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly corresponding > to > > a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic > > listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts of > > writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and this > is > > why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more > > phonemes we "discover" in it. > > > > By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental methodological > > mistake of correlating language variation with variation in mitochondrial > > DNA. See: > > > > Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) > > *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > >> Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World Atlas > >> of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in its > >> characterization of the phonemes in each language. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>> > >>> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a > little > >> while ago > >>> http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > >>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity > >>> > >>> Helen, > >>> > >>> This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to > >> document how selected members of the Indo-European language family > spread > >> geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper > >> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit > >> bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say > >> anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter > >> argument: > >>>> > >>>> > http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu > >>>> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion > >>>> > >>>> Helen > >>>> > >>>>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Remarkable and beautiful! > >>>>> > >>>>> andy > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>> > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> < > https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/04/16/where-on-earth- > >>>>>> did-language-begin/> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared genes. > >> I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial > founder > >> effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to > have > >> been stripped out. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Henry: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes > >>>>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying > >>>>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not > >>>>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked contribution. > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's first > >>>>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" studies, > >>>>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a little > >>>>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into > >>>>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and dead > >>>>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual history, > >>>>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking > >>>>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the > >>>>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so > >>>>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des > >> sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. > >>>>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to > >>>>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language > >>>>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries > >>>>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have separate > >>>>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first > >>>>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our > >>>>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, and > >>>>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's not > >>>>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming > >>>>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the lexicogrammar > >>>>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional > >>>>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big > >>>>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make > given > >> the collaborative help of conspecifics. > >>>>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. > >>>>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has tended > >>>>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through > >>>>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single > >>>>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that is > >> yet-to-come. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Gente, > >>>>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or > >>>>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many times, > >>>>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only > >>>>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the > >>>>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. > >>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with > everything, > >> Andy. > >>>>>>>>> And > >>>>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of > >>>>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx > >>>>>>>>>> should be considered > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or for > >>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> matter > >>>>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign > >>>>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that > >>>>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that > >>>>>>>>>> this view > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as > >>>>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is > >>>>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the > >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and > >>>>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a simple > >>>>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't > >>>>>>>>>> appear > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" in > >>>>>>>>> accidents, > >>>>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the > >>>>>>>>>> properties that > >>>>>>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick are > >>>>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: the > >>>>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the > >>>>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal > >>>>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a > >>>>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's > >>>>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of > >>>>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a purpose > >>>>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt to > >> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only > >>>>>>>>>> renders the > >>>>>>>>> idea > >>>>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to > >>>>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally > >>>>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, > >>>>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) > >>>>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only > >>>>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation to > >>>>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to create > >>>>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of > >>>>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might have > >>>>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each > against > >> all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution > indeed. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool > >>>>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while the > >>>>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence of > >>>>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything > >>>>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and > Child," > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in > >>>>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully developed > >>>>>>>>>>> in humans, is the > >>>>>>>>> key > >>>>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence of > >>>>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he > >>>>>>>>>>> was so determined, > >>>>>>>>> at > >>>>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among > >>>>>>>>>>> not-literate > >>>>>>>>> peoples > >>>>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound > >> insight. > >>>>>>>>> What > >>>>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved > >>>>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at the > >>>>>>>>>>> same time as they > >>>>>>>>> learnt > >>>>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a > >>>>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology > >>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > >>>>>>>>> communicative > >>>>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a > >>>>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he > >>>>>>>>>>> looked > >>>>>>>>> *not* > >>>>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found > >>>>>>>>>>> among > >>>>>>>>> humans > >>>>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary to > >>>>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one > >>>>>>>>>>> species to > >>>>>>>>> another. > >>>>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as > >>>>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which > looks > >> for "essential" > >>>>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>>>> > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- > >>>>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Greg: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in higher > >>>>>>>>> primates. > >>>>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there is > >>>>>>>>>>>> no > >>>>>>>>> evidence > >>>>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a lexicogrammar. > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has > >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over > >>>>>>>>> signs. I > >>>>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any > >>>>>>>>>>>> more than > >>>>>>>>> they > >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical intelligence > >>>>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate functional > >>>>>>>>>>>> paths, the > >>>>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards > >> conspecifics. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of > >>>>>>>>>>>> paper a > >>>>>>>>> day, > >>>>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a > >>>>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long letter > >>>>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord > >>>>>>>>> Alfred > >>>>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and > >>>>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as "De > >> Profundis"). > >>>>>>>>> But it > >>>>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the > >>>>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was > >>>>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red > >>>>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him with > >>>>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in > >>>>>>>>>>>> their bed > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, > >>>>>>>>>>>> Christ > >>>>>>>>> transforms > >>>>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into > >>>>>>>>>>>> blood > >>>>>>>>> before > >>>>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde has > >>>>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man > >>>>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is changed > >>>>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in this > >>>>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into > >>>>>>>>> great > >>>>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with > "he" > >>>>>>>>> instead > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>> "I". > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to create > >>>>>>>>>>>> great > >>>>>>>>> art. > >>>>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, > >>>>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather than > >>>>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile the > >>>>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the > >>>>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that you > >>>>>>>>>>>> are at > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it > >>>>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need to > >>>>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you > >>>>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth > >>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the precision > >>>>>>>>>>>> of words > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>> says, > >>>>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the > >>>>>>>>> individuation of > >>>>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual > emotion. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus ex > >>>>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was > >>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > >>>>>>>>> mass > >>>>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. > Or > >> both. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the > >>>>>>>>>>>> tools. To > >>>>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as > >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal > >>>>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural > >>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a > >>>>>>>>> writing > >>>>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe with > >>>>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools coevolving > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own > >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity > >>>>>>>>> work. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to help > >>>>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here > >>>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool > >>>>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological > >>>>>>>>>>>>> development: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x > >>>>>>>>> 23ugom > >>>>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For > >>>>>>>>> those > >>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a call > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to women > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and > >> vilified. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop > >>>>>>>>>>>>> culture > >>>>>>>>> deficit) > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I wonder > >>>>>>>>>>>>> how > >>>>>>>>> Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> both > >>>>>>>>> affected > >>>>>>>>>>>>> by > >>>>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national > >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the > >>>>>>>>> web > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch later. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" point > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be differentiated > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the differentiation > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ > >>>>>>>>> Hegelianism > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to your > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > >>>>>>>>> king > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we live > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. So > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a super-category > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, but > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to your > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have found > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to /Capital/. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is making > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their material > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above it. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > >>>>>>>>> king > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From peterfh46@gmail.com Sun May 8 16:14:18 2016 From: peterfh46@gmail.com (Peter Hourdequin) Date: Mon, 9 May 2016 08:14:18 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Pub pub / JODS Message-ID: Dear Chatters, Recently I discovered what appears to be an innovative new publishing platform created by MIT?s media lab that encourages dialogic communication (like this list) in a space that is open to anyone and free (unlike much of academic publishing). I?d be interested to hear what people on this list think about the platform?s ?three core experiments,? which are articulated here: http://pubpub.media.mit.edu/ , and the affordances and ethos of the platform?s first journal presented (in form and content) in the inaugural essay entitled ?Design and Science? by Joi Ito, available here: http://jods.mitpress.mit.edu . I commented in the section of that essay entitled ?Rethinking Academic Practice? (and you can too). Best Regards, Peter ---------------------------------------- Peter Hourdequin Faculty of Foreign Studies Tokoha University 1-22-1 Sena, Aoi Ward Shizuoka City, Shizuoka JAPAN 420-0911 Tel: +81 54 261-3608 Fax: +81 54 263-2750 Post-Graduate Researcher Educational Research Lancaster University, U.K. ---------------------------------------- From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon May 9 08:44:06 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 9 May 2016 09:44:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: A New Type of Academic Conference In-Reply-To: <8a0e9f51265d4d19b47938023f2d743e@MB8.byu.local> References: <8a0e9f51265d4d19b47938023f2d743e@MB8.byu.local> Message-ID: The message below describes an international conference that has a "nearly non-existent carbon footprint". It also boasts greater egalitarianism by not requiring long-distance travel. Seems like it poses some interesting possibilities. -greg ---------- Forwarded message ---------- A hint before you print: think green. UC Santa Barbara is currently conducting an unusual international conference, which has over 50 speakers from eight countries, yet has a nearly nonexistent carbon footprint. Had this been a traditional fly-in conference, the slate of speakers would have had to collectively travel over 300,000 miles, generating the equivalent of over 100,000 pounds of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the process. This is equal to the total annual carbon footprint of 50 people living in India, 165 in Kenya. In contrast, this conference takes a digital approach. Because the talks and Q&A sessions all reside online (the talks are prerecorded; the Q&A sessions are interactive forums), travel was unnecessary. The conference has four keynote talks and fourteen panels, each of which has three talks and its own Q&A session. The Q&A sessions are open from May 3-24. The topic is Climate Change: Views from the Humanities . We are sending this out to encourage faculty and students to visit and take part in the conference. You can register here . For obvious environmental reasons, in the future we can expect more events like this, which also promise to be more egalitarian: the cost of airfare from anywhere in the developing world to anywhere in North America or Europe is often greater than the average annual income in these countries. This simple fact effectively bars the majority of the planet?s scholars from taking part in international conferences, ensuring that they remain open to only a privileged few. In contrast, conferences such as this one allow nearly any scholar anywhere with a computer or mobile device and adequate internet access to equally take part in the event. In you get a chance, do check out our conference experiment at http://ehc.english.ucsb.edu/?page_id=12687! Ken -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.png Type: image/png Size: 7164 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160509/bee0acf5/attachment.png From annalisa@unm.edu Mon May 9 19:50:23 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 10 May 2016 02:50:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Libraries, publishers, ebooks & Amazon Message-ID: Hi XMCAristas, This came in my box from Cory Doctorow, thought it may be of interest in terms of scholarly comms and the future of digital libraries? Kind regards, Annalisa Publishing is in a weird place: ebook sales are stagnating; publishing has shrunk to five major publishers; libraries and publishers are at each others' throats over ebook pricing; and major writers' groups are up in arms over ebook royalties, and, of course, we only have one major book retailer left -- what is to be done? In my new Locus Magazine column, "Peace in Our Time," I propose a pair of software projects that could bring all together writers, publishers and libraries to increase competition, give publishers the market intelligence they need to sell more books, triple writers' ebook royalties, and sell more ebooks to libraries, on much fairer terms. The first project is a free/open version of Overdrive, the software that publishers insist that libraries use for ebook circulation. A free/open version, collectively created and maintained by the library community, would create a source of data that publishers could use to compete with Amazon, their biggest frenemy, while still protecting patron privacy. The publishers' quid-pro-quo for this data would be an end to the practice of gouging libraries on ebook prices, leaving them with more capital to buy more books. The second project is a federated ebook store for writers, that would allow writers to act as retailers for their publishers, selling their own books and keeping the retailer's share in addition to their traditional royalty: a move that would increase the writer's share by 300%, without costing the publishers a penny. Writer-operated ebook stores, spread all over the Web but searchable from central portals, do not violate the publishers' agreements with Amazon, but they do create new sales category: "fair trade ebooks," whose sale gives the writers you love the money to feed their families and write more books -- without costing you anything extra. http://www.locusmag.com/Perspectives/2016/05/cory-doctorow-peace-in-our-time/ -- FOR PUBLIC SAFETY REASONS, THIS EMAIL HAS BEEN INTERCEPTED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT AND WILL BE RETAINED FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS -- Cory Doctorow doctorow@craphound.com Wickr: doctorow For avoidance of doubt: This email does not constitute permission to add me to your mailing list. blog: boingboing.net upcoming appearances: craphound.com/?page_id=4667 books (novels, collections graphic novels, essay collections): craphound.com latest nonfiction: Information Doesn't Want to Be Free latest graphic novel: In Real Life podcast: feeds.feedburner.com/doctorow_podcast latest novel: Homeland craphound.com/homeland latest short story collection: With a Little Help craphound.com/walh Join my mailing list and find out about upcoming books, stories, articles and appearances: http://www.ctyme.com/mailman/listinfo/doctorow READ CAREFULLY. By reading this email, you agree, on behalf of your employer, to release me from all obligations and waivers arising from any and all NON-NEGOTIATED agreements, licenses, terms-of-service, shrinkwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, non-compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS") that I have entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors, agents and assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing rights and privileges. You further represent that you have the authority to release me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf of your employer. As is the case with every email you've ever received, this email has not been scanned for all known viruses. Duh. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon May 9 20:18:29 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 9 May 2016 20:18:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Libraries, publishers, ebooks & Amazon In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Seems like a fundamental issue that gets too little attention -- publication for what? For whom? In a neoliberal global regime, in a world of digital relocation that Benjamin could not imagine, seems like the purpose of publication needs a lot of "not for profit" interrogation. Mike On Monday, May 9, 2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi XMCAristas, > > > This came in my box from Cory Doctorow, thought it may be of interest in > terms of scholarly comms and the future of digital libraries? > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > Publishing is in a weird place: ebook sales are stagnating; publishing > has shrunk to five major publishers; libraries and publishers are at > each others' throats over ebook pricing; and major writers' groups are > up in arms over ebook royalties, and, of course, we only have one major > book retailer left -- what is to be done? > > In my new Locus Magazine column, "Peace in Our Time," I propose a pair > of software projects that could bring all together writers, publishers > and libraries to increase competition, give publishers the market > intelligence they need to sell more books, triple writers' ebook > royalties, and sell more ebooks to libraries, on much fairer terms. > > The first project is a free/open version of Overdrive, the software that > publishers insist that libraries use for ebook circulation. A free/open > version, collectively created and maintained by the library community, > would create a source of data that publishers could use to compete with > Amazon, their biggest frenemy, while still protecting patron privacy. > The publishers' quid-pro-quo for this data would be an end to the > practice of gouging libraries on ebook prices, leaving them with more > capital to buy more books. > > The second project is a federated ebook store for writers, that would > allow writers to act as retailers for their publishers, selling their > own books and keeping the retailer's share in addition to their > traditional royalty: a move that would increase the writer's share by > 300%, without costing the publishers a penny. Writer-operated ebook > stores, spread all over the Web but searchable from central portals, do > not violate the publishers' agreements with Amazon, but they do create > new sales category: "fair trade ebooks," whose sale gives the writers > you love the money to feed their families and write more books -- > without costing you anything extra. > > > http://www.locusmag.com/Perspectives/2016/05/cory-doctorow-peace-in-our-time/ > > -- > > FOR PUBLIC SAFETY REASONS, THIS EMAIL HAS BEEN INTERCEPTED BY YOUR > GOVERNMENT AND WILL BE RETAINED FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS > > -- > > Cory Doctorow > doctorow@craphound.com > > Wickr: doctorow > > For avoidance of doubt: This email does not constitute permission to add > me to your mailing list. > > blog: boingboing.net > upcoming appearances: craphound.com/?page_id=4667 > books (novels, collections graphic novels, essay collections): > craphound.com > latest nonfiction: Information Doesn't Want to Be Free > latest graphic novel: In Real Life > podcast: feeds.feedburner.com/doctorow_podcast > latest novel: Homeland craphound.com/homeland > latest short story collection: With a Little Help craphound.com/walh > > Join my mailing list and find out about upcoming books, stories, > articles and appearances: > > http://www.ctyme.com/mailman/listinfo/doctorow > > READ CAREFULLY. By reading this email, you agree, on behalf of your > employer, to release me from all obligations and waivers arising from > any and all NON-NEGOTIATED agreements, licenses, terms-of-service, > shrinkwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, > non-compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS") that I have > entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors, agents and > assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing rights and > privileges. You further represent that you have the authority to release > me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf of your employer. > > As is the case with every email you've ever received, this email has not > been scanned for all known viruses. > > Duh. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Tue May 10 13:18:06 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Tue, 10 May 2016 23:18:06 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Adolescence learning Message-ID: Once upon a time, I received an advice from Mike on Vygotsky reading, Bodrova, Leong, it was a tremendous advice, and since then I read and re-read it, looked at references etc it was so useful for years Now, I need to try it for adolescence learning for some of the best references, please. Thanks Ulvi From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Tue May 10 13:30:56 2016 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Tue, 10 May 2016 20:30:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> <2672A2EA-7A2A-40AA-A247-9F9E8D0AD3CD@bigpond.com> Message-ID: So if phonemes do not exist and were only created as a unit of analysis to understand language once a language has been mapped to a written system what does this say about mediating and mediated activity? What I mean then going back to the earlier argument of whether there is co-evolution of both development in tools. In other words we know how children (atleast in English) develop phonemic awareness. There are clear developmental milestones that occur in the same order in almost every child. No one can substitute a phoneme before they can segment phonemes. If the tool of written language had to be created before phonemes existed, and phoneme recognition and manipulation happens in such a systematic and developmental way does this not prove tool creation leads to changes in development? On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:31 PM David Kellogg wrote: > Not at all, Helen; if you go back over the thread, you'll see that your > contribution was pivotal. I am usually, just like you; I skim things, and > look askance when life is elsewhere. Maybe you didn't have time to sit > through the animations of proto-Indo-European spreading across the steppes > like a reversal of the Mongol conquests, but on that morning I did so I did > it for you. This morning, though, I'm translating, so I'll be short and > apologize in advance for mansplainin' atcha. > > Voila: if you are trying to decide if a rock is a meteorite, and if it may > have come from Mars, and if those little globules that you think you > discern amongst the crystals might be fossilized bacteria, then it really > does matter if your microscope lens is clean. Similarly, if you trying to > learn a language, phonemes can be extremely useful--but so can substitution > tables, glossaries, fictional dialogues, drills and any number of language > exercises that we do not use in the study of language or even in daily > conversation. The mere fact that they are very useful doesn't mean they > exist outside the particular learning task you are trying to accomplish > (James famously argued that God must exist, because he's just such a handy > bloke to have around). > > When you are trying to decide if phonemic variation is a clue to the time > and place language was first created--or even when you are trying to decide > if there was a single creative moment, or if language just "co-evolved" > wherever there were social groups of early man large enough to carry out > joint activities--then it matters whether or not phonemes really exist. If > phonemes are simply produced in the act of describing language (after all, > describing a language is really just folding language back on itself) then > variation in their number variation cannot be construed as a faint echo of > a distant "big bang". > > Let me make one final point. I am reading the work of the French and Swiss > Vygotskyans these days. Unlike the work of Yasnitsky and van der Veer, this > is work which takes CHAT quite seriously. Andy is often cited, and so are > Martin--and of course Mike. The treatment is not uncritical, but one of the > things that is really appreciated is this: when you are studying any > cultural-historical (or, as they like to say, "historico-culturelle") > phenomenon, it really does matter what the people who produced it thought. > Phonemes, that is, minimal differences which do not themselves bear meaning > but which do allow us to distinguish between segments that do bear > meaning, were "discovered" (well, invented, actually) in the mid-twentieth > century. When Vygotsky refers to "phonemes", he is usually talking about > meaning-bearing elements such as case endings or tense endings which we > would call "morphemes" today. > > Which brings me back to translating and above all annotating. Because, as > we learn when we read how Vygotsky is "applied" to language teaching, when > you are studying Vygotsky, it really does matter what Vygotsky thought he > was doing.... > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 6:40 PM, Helen Harper > wrote: > > > Hmm, David, I hesitate to jump in too deep, because I haven?t time right > > now to read things properly, so I can?t engage sufficiently with the > papers > > under discussion, but I don?t think it?s a matter of choosing to believe > in > > phonemes or not. Phonemes are just a tool of analysis. They are a > perceived > > unit: as an English speaker I perceive /p/ is different from /b/; and > /pin/ > > is a different word from /bin/ - so /p/ and /b/ are distinct phonemes > for > > English speakers. > > > > There might be situations where there are better tools of analysis, but > > often phonemes are just dandy, and can come in very handy when you?re > > learning a new language, and trying to figure out how to distinguish the > > different sounds. > > > > But not really my area of expertise, so I?ll finish my plug for phonemes > > right here ?. > > > > > > > > > On 6 May 2016, at 7:12 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the author > > > talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have fewer > > > varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the > > > diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo > > modus > > > sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. > > > > > > My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in > > phonemes. I > > > think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto > > meaning, > > > and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly corresponding > > to > > > a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic > > > listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts of > > > writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and > this > > is > > > why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more > > > phonemes we "discover" in it. > > > > > > By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental > methodological > > > mistake of correlating language variation with variation in > mitochondrial > > > DNA. See: > > > > > > Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) > > > *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World > Atlas > > >> of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in its > > >> characterization of the phonemes in each language. > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >>> On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a > > little > > >> while ago > > >>> http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -----Original Message----- > > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > > >>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM > > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity > > >>> > > >>> Helen, > > >>> > > >>> This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports to > > >> document how selected members of the Indo-European language family > > spread > > >> geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. > > >>> > > >>> Martin > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper > > > >> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit > > >> bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say > > >> anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the counter > > >> argument: > > >>>> > > >>>> > > http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu > > >>>> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion > > >>>> > > >>>> Helen > > >>>> > > >>>>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Remarkable and beautiful! > > >>>>> > > >>>>> andy > > >>>>> > > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >>>>> > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >>>>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> < > > https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/04/16/where-on-earth- > > >>>>>> did-language-begin/> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < > > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> David, > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared > genes. > > >> I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial > > founder > > >> effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, 346-349. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to > > have > > >> been stripped out. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg > > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Henry: > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which assumes > > >>>>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying > > >>>>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not > > >>>>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked > contribution. > > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's > first > > >>>>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" > studies, > > >>>>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a > little > > >>>>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go into > > >>>>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and > dead > > >>>>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual > history, > > >>>>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking > > >>>>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the > > >>>>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so > > >>>>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des > > >> sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. > > >>>>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts to > > >>>>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a "language > > >>>>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant tries > > >>>>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have > separate > > >>>>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first > > >>>>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of our > > >>>>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, > and > > >>>>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's > not > > >>>>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming > > >>>>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the > lexicogrammar > > >>>>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own functional > > >>>>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big > > >>>>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make > > given > > >> the collaborative help of conspecifics. > > >>>>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. > > >>>>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has > tended > > >>>>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or through > > >>>>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single > > >>>>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that > is > > >> yet-to-come. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Gente, > > >>>>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed or > > >>>>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many > times, > > >>>>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only > > >>>>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the > > >>>>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best shot. > > >>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with > > everything, > > >> Andy. > > >>>>>>>>> And > > >>>>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea of > > >>>>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx > > >>>>>>>>>> should be considered > > >>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or > for > > >>>>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>> matter > > >>>>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign > > >>>>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that > > >>>>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, that > > >>>>>>>>>> this view > > >>>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as > > >>>>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is > > >>>>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the > > >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, and > > >>>>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a > simple > > >>>>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't > > >>>>>>>>>> appear > > >>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering "rudiments" > in > > >>>>>>>>> accidents, > > >>>>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the > > >>>>>>>>>> properties that > > >>>>>>>>> we > > >>>>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick > are > > >>>>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: > the > > >>>>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the > > >>>>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal > > >>>>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a > > >>>>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. It's > > >>>>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of > > >>>>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a > purpose > > >>>>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt > to > > >> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic one. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only > > >>>>>>>>>> renders the > > >>>>>>>>> idea > > >>>>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to > > >>>>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally > > >>>>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, > > >>>>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) > > >>>>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can only > > >>>>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation > to > > >>>>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to > create > > >>>>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made of > > >>>>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might > have > > >>>>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each > > against > > >> all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution > > indeed. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net > > > > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool > > >>>>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while > the > > >>>>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence > of > > >>>>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything > > >>>>>>>>> like > > >>>>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and > > Child," > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > > >>>>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in > > >>>>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully > developed > > >>>>>>>>>>> in humans, is the > > >>>>>>>>> key > > >>>>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the "essence > of > > >>>>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why he > > >>>>>>>>>>> was so determined, > > >>>>>>>>> at > > >>>>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among > > >>>>>>>>>>> not-literate > > >>>>>>>>> peoples > > >>>>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a profound > > >> insight. > > >>>>>>>>> What > > >>>>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved > > >>>>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at > the > > >>>>>>>>>>> same time as they > > >>>>>>>>> learnt > > >>>>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that a > > >>>>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology > > >>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > > >>>>>>>>> communicative > > >>>>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a > > >>>>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, he > > >>>>>>>>>>> looked > > >>>>>>>>> *not* > > >>>>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively found > > >>>>>>>>>>> among > > >>>>>>>>> humans > > >>>>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the contrary > to > > >>>>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one > > >>>>>>>>>>> species to > > >>>>>>>>> another. > > >>>>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as > > >>>>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which > > looks > > >> for "essential" > > >>>>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until 1931. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- > > >>>>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Greg: > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in > higher > > >>>>>>>>> primates. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there > is > > >>>>>>>>>>>> no > > >>>>>>>>> evidence > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a > lexicogrammar. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has > > >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over > > >>>>>>>>> signs. I > > >>>>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically any > > >>>>>>>>>>>> more than > > >>>>>>>>> they > > >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical > intelligence > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate > functional > > >>>>>>>>>>>> paths, the > > >>>>>>>>> one > > >>>>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards > > >> conspecifics. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet of > > >>>>>>>>>>>> paper a > > >>>>>>>>> day, > > >>>>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in a > > >>>>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long > letter > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord > > >>>>>>>>> Alfred > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and > > >>>>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as > "De > > >> Profundis"). > > >>>>>>>>> But it > > >>>>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who was > > >>>>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are red > > >>>>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him > with > > >>>>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in > > >>>>>>>>>>>> their bed > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Christ > > >>>>>>>>> transforms > > >>>>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed into > > >>>>>>>>>>>> blood > > >>>>>>>>> before > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde > has > > >>>>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man > > >>>>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is > changed > > >>>>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in > this > > >>>>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into > > >>>>>>>>> great > > >>>>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins with > > "he" > > >>>>>>>>> instead > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "I". > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to > create > > >>>>>>>>>>>> great > > >>>>>>>>> art. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather > than > > >>>>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile > the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the > > >>>>>>>>> one > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that > you > > >>>>>>>>>>>> are at > > >>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it > > >>>>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you need > to > > >>>>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when you > > >>>>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth > > >>>>>>>>> with > > >>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the > precision > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of words > > >>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > > >>>>>>>>> says, > > >>>>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the > > >>>>>>>>> individuation of > > >>>>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual > > emotion. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is deus > ex > > >>>>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it was > > >>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > > >>>>>>>>> mass > > >>>>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it was. > > Or > > >> both. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> tools. To > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to formal > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a > > >>>>>>>>> writing > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe > with > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools > coevolving > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. For > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of > > >>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity > > >>>>>>>>> work. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat rooms. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to > help > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here > > >>>>>>>>> is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own ontological > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> development: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x > > >>>>>>>>> 23ugom > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating > activity > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The point > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For > > >>>>>>>>> those > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a > call > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to women > > >>>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and > > >> vilified. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> culture > > >>>>>>>>> deficit) > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I > wonder > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> how > > >>>>>>>>> Hegel > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > >>>>>>>>> affected > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> by > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the > > >>>>>>>>> web > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch > later. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" > point > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be > differentiated > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the > differentiation > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ > > >>>>>>>>> Hegelianism > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a number > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The correction > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you drew > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my catalogue, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read them, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of his > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to > your > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > > >>>>>>>>> king > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we > live > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. > So > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see Vygotsky's > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a > super-category > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, all > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, > but > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to > your > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have > found > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is not > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to > /Capital/. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is > making > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their own > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their > material > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, > Hegel > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not > under > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are mere > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" > in > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of > this > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are neutralised > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to > the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above > it. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: > for > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of > both. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > > >>>>>>>>> king > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue May 10 15:38:14 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 08:38:14 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> <2672A2EA-7A2A-40AA-A247-9F9E8D0AD3CD@bigpond.com> Message-ID: Greg: Thanks for keeping us on topic. It's pretty hard, in the scrum, to keep our eyes on the ball! There are different views. My view is that the distinction between mediating activity and mediated activity is essential; that it is the beginning--only the beginning, but an important beginning--to undoing a serious distortion in Vygotsky's legacy, which is collapsing the difference between tools and signs in expressions like "psychological tools", "mediating artefacts", etc. Andy's view is that all mediational activities are both mediating and mediated, so it is a distinction without a difference. I say they are more distinct than linked, and Andy says they are more linked than distinct. Andy does something very different from me. I spend my days coding data and translating Vygotsky, so I am always sensitive to concepts like exaptation and metastability: how something that is evolved for one purpose (like transforming the environment) becomes useful for something entirely different (like semiosis) and also how a relationship like mediation must fundamentally change just in order to stay the same. For me the dynamic view always takes precedence over the synoptic. Andy spends his days thinking and writing about the concept of language and the concept of society, so he is pretty much the other way around. It's a little bit like the man who walks around a tree trying to catch sight of a squirrel that does not want to be caught sight of. When the man has circumambulated the tree, has he circumambulated the squirrel? It all depends on whether you are more interested in the relationship of the squirrel to the tree (as Andy is) or the squirrel to the man (as I am). Children do develop sound awareness. If you teach a child a rhyme like: Dr. Foster went to Gloucester And it began to rain. He stepped in a puddle right up to his middle And never went there again. Children will tell you which words rhyme, and which words half rhyme, and which words don't rhyme. Notice, though, that this is rather more sound awareness than phonemic awareness. "Foster" and "Gloucester" only rhyme if you have a Gloucester accent (and you can make them rhyme more or less by approaching or distancing yourself from Gloucester). "Puddle" and "middle" do not rhyme at all by the rules of phonemic awareness. So what children are really aware of is a wide range of sound contrasts, of which the contrasts we call "phonemic" are only a small part. This explains: a) why, for example, in languages which are not phonemically described like Chinese, there are nevertheless long traditions, going back over a thousand years, of non-phonemic sound analysis (e.g. lists of rhymes compiled by poets, intonation schemes for poetic reading, etc), and b) why in languages which are phonemically described like English we keep finding more and more "phonemic" differences (e.g. the difference between "Sorry!" and "Sorry?") I think that hardly anybody on this list would deny that tool creation fundamentally changes development, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. Vygotsky certainly didn't deny it: tool creation was THE essential moment of anthropogenesis in evolution, and it is also one of the key neoformations in infancy according to his lectures on pedology. But if you say that tools and signs "co-evolve" it becomes very hard to argue that practical thinking and speech have different roots, and that is one of the key tenets of "Thinking and Speech". In his lecture on the Crisis at One, Vygotsky wonders aloud: a) Do Kohler's apes really use tools? What kind of a tool is a box if it loses all its tool-power when a chimp looking for a box to stand on to get a banana sees another chimp sleeping on a box and, after trying to jump and get the banana fruitlessly for fifteen minutes or so, just lies down next to the chimp on the box and goes to sleep? Isn't this a little like the child's forays into autonomous speech? b) Does walking have the same relationship to physical space that proto-speech has to social space? Here's where Andy comes in handy. Remember what he said about trying to catch the concept in its becoming and not just its being. Yes, Vygotsky says that that Kohler's apes use "proto-tools", and that in the same negative, not-quite-there-yet, sense, the child's autonomous speech is a kind of proto-speech. This is not a tool and that is not speech, but both COULD be, and WOULD develop in that direction, given the right social situation of development. They are, in my terminology, exaptable affordances. No, Vygotsky says that walking is a permanent adaptation to the environment, while proto-speech is a critical neoformation which has no independent role to play in subsequent development (although it does become a dependent part of permanent speech in the form of intonation, stress, onomatopoeia, etc). David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, May 11, 2016 at 6:30 AM, Greg Mcverry wrote: > So if phonemes do not exist and were only created as a unit of analysis to > understand language once a language has been mapped to a written system > what does this say about mediating and mediated activity? > > What I mean then going back to the earlier argument of whether there is > co-evolution of both development in tools. In other words we know how > children (atleast in English) develop phonemic awareness. There are clear > developmental milestones that occur in the same order in almost every > child. No one can substitute a phoneme before they can segment phonemes. > > If the tool of written language had to be created before phonemes existed, > and phoneme recognition and manipulation happens in such a systematic and > developmental way does this not prove tool creation leads to changes in > development? > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:31 PM David Kellogg wrote: > > > Not at all, Helen; if you go back over the thread, you'll see that your > > contribution was pivotal. I am usually, just like you; I skim things, and > > look askance when life is elsewhere. Maybe you didn't have time to sit > > through the animations of proto-Indo-European spreading across the > steppes > > like a reversal of the Mongol conquests, but on that morning I did so I > did > > it for you. This morning, though, I'm translating, so I'll be short and > > apologize in advance for mansplainin' atcha. > > > > Voila: if you are trying to decide if a rock is a meteorite, and if it > may > > have come from Mars, and if those little globules that you think you > > discern amongst the crystals might be fossilized bacteria, then it really > > does matter if your microscope lens is clean. Similarly, if you trying to > > learn a language, phonemes can be extremely useful--but so can > substitution > > tables, glossaries, fictional dialogues, drills and any number of > language > > exercises that we do not use in the study of language or even in daily > > conversation. The mere fact that they are very useful doesn't mean they > > exist outside the particular learning task you are trying to accomplish > > (James famously argued that God must exist, because he's just such a > handy > > bloke to have around). > > > > When you are trying to decide if phonemic variation is a clue to the time > > and place language was first created--or even when you are trying to > decide > > if there was a single creative moment, or if language just "co-evolved" > > wherever there were social groups of early man large enough to carry out > > joint activities--then it matters whether or not phonemes really exist. > If > > phonemes are simply produced in the act of describing language (after > all, > > describing a language is really just folding language back on itself) > then > > variation in their number variation cannot be construed as a faint echo > of > > a distant "big bang". > > > > Let me make one final point. I am reading the work of the French and > Swiss > > Vygotskyans these days. Unlike the work of Yasnitsky and van der Veer, > this > > is work which takes CHAT quite seriously. Andy is often cited, and so are > > Martin--and of course Mike. The treatment is not uncritical, but one of > the > > things that is really appreciated is this: when you are studying any > > cultural-historical (or, as they like to say, "historico-culturelle") > > phenomenon, it really does matter what the people who produced it > thought. > > Phonemes, that is, minimal differences which do not themselves bear > meaning > > but which do allow us to distinguish between segments that do bear > > meaning, were "discovered" (well, invented, actually) in the > mid-twentieth > > century. When Vygotsky refers to "phonemes", he is usually talking about > > meaning-bearing elements such as case endings or tense endings which we > > would call "morphemes" today. > > > > Which brings me back to translating and above all annotating. Because, as > > we learn when we read how Vygotsky is "applied" to language teaching, > when > > you are studying Vygotsky, it really does matter what Vygotsky thought he > > was doing.... > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 6:40 PM, Helen Harper > > wrote: > > > > > Hmm, David, I hesitate to jump in too deep, because I haven?t time > right > > > now to read things properly, so I can?t engage sufficiently with the > > papers > > > under discussion, but I don?t think it?s a matter of choosing to > believe > > in > > > phonemes or not. Phonemes are just a tool of analysis. They are a > > perceived > > > unit: as an English speaker I perceive /p/ is different from /b/; and > > /pin/ > > > is a different word from /bin/ - so /p/ and /b/ are distinct phonemes > > for > > > English speakers. > > > > > > There might be situations where there are better tools of analysis, but > > > often phonemes are just dandy, and can come in very handy when you?re > > > learning a new language, and trying to figure out how to distinguish > the > > > different sounds. > > > > > > But not really my area of expertise, so I?ll finish my plug for > phonemes > > > right here ?. > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 6 May 2016, at 7:12 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > > > > That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the > author > > > > talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have > fewer > > > > varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the > > > > diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo > > > modus > > > > sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. > > > > > > > > My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in > > > phonemes. I > > > > think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto > > > meaning, > > > > and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly > corresponding > > > to > > > > a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic > > > > listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts > of > > > > writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and > > this > > > is > > > > why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more > > > > phonemes we "discover" in it. > > > > > > > > By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental > > methodological > > > > mistake of correlating language variation with variation in > > mitochondrial > > > > DNA. See: > > > > > > > > Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) > > > > *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World > > Atlas > > > >> of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in > its > > > >> characterization of the phonemes in each language. > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >>> On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin > wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a > > > little > > > >> while ago > > > >>> http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > > > >>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM > > > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity > > > >>> > > > >>> Helen, > > > >>> > > > >>> This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports > to > > > >> document how selected members of the Indo-European language family > > > spread > > > >> geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. > > > >>> > > > >>> Martin > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper < > helen.harper@bigpond.com > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit > > > >> bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say > > > >> anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the > counter > > > >> argument: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu > > > >>>> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Helen > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Remarkable and beautiful! > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> andy > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>>> Andy Blunden > > > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > >>>>> > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > >>>>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> < > > > https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/04/16/where-on-earth- > > > >>>>>> did-language-begin/> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Martin > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < > > > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> David, > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared > > genes. > > > >> I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial > > > founder > > > >> effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, > 346-349. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to > > > have > > > >> been stripped out. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Martin > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Henry: > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which > assumes > > > >>>>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying > > > >>>>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not > > > >>>>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked > > contribution. > > > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's > > first > > > >>>>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" > > studies, > > > >>>>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a > > little > > > >>>>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go > into > > > >>>>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and > > dead > > > >>>>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual > > history, > > > >>>>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking > > > >>>>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the > > > >>>>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so > > > >>>>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des > > > >> sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. > > > >>>>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts > to > > > >>>>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a > "language > > > >>>>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant > tries > > > >>>>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have > > separate > > > >>>>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first > > > >>>>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of > our > > > >>>>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, > > and > > > >>>>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's > > not > > > >>>>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming > > > >>>>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the > > lexicogrammar > > > >>>>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own > functional > > > >>>>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big > > > >>>>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make > > > given > > > >> the collaborative help of conspecifics. > > > >>>>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. > > > >>>>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has > > tended > > > >>>>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or > through > > > >>>>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single > > > >>>>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that > > is > > > >> yet-to-come. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Gente, > > > >>>>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed > or > > > >>>>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many > > times, > > > >>>>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only > > > >>>>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the > > > >>>>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best > shot. > > > >>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg < > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with > > > everything, > > > >> Andy. > > > >>>>>>>>> And > > > >>>>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea > of > > > >>>>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx > > > >>>>>>>>>> should be considered > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or > > for > > > >>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>> matter > > > >>>>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign > > > >>>>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that > > > >>>>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, > that > > > >>>>>>>>>> this view > > > >>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as > > > >>>>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is > > > >>>>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the > > > >>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, > and > > > >>>>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a > > simple > > > >>>>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't > > > >>>>>>>>>> appear > > > >>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering > "rudiments" > > in > > > >>>>>>>>> accidents, > > > >>>>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the > > > >>>>>>>>>> properties that > > > >>>>>>>>> we > > > >>>>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick > > are > > > >>>>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: > > the > > > >>>>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the > > > >>>>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal > > > >>>>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a > > > >>>>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. > It's > > > >>>>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of > > > >>>>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a > > purpose > > > >>>>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt > > to > > > >> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic > one. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only > > > >>>>>>>>>> renders the > > > >>>>>>>>> idea > > > >>>>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to > > > >>>>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally > > > >>>>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, > > > >>>>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) > > > >>>>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can > only > > > >>>>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to > > create > > > >>>>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made > of > > > >>>>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might > > have > > > >>>>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each > > > against > > > >> all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution > > > indeed. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden < > > ablunden@mira.net > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool > > > >>>>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while > > the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything > > > >>>>>>>>> like > > > >>>>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and > > > Child," > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in > > > >>>>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully > > developed > > > >>>>>>>>>>> in humans, is the > > > >>>>>>>>> key > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the > "essence > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why > he > > > >>>>>>>>>>> was so determined, > > > >>>>>>>>> at > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among > > > >>>>>>>>>>> not-literate > > > >>>>>>>>> peoples > > > >>>>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a > profound > > > >> insight. > > > >>>>>>>>> What > > > >>>>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved > > > >>>>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at > > the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> same time as they > > > >>>>>>>>> learnt > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that > a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology > > > >>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > > > >>>>>>>>> communicative > > > >>>>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, > he > > > >>>>>>>>>>> looked > > > >>>>>>>>> *not* > > > >>>>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively > found > > > >>>>>>>>>>> among > > > >>>>>>>>> humans > > > >>>>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the > contrary > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one > > > >>>>>>>>>>> species to > > > >>>>>>>>> another. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as > > > >>>>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which > > > looks > > > >> for "essential" > > > >>>>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until > 1931. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > > > >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- > > > >>>>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Greg: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in > > higher > > > >>>>>>>>> primates. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there > > is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> no > > > >>>>>>>>> evidence > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a > > lexicogrammar. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over > > > >>>>>>>>> signs. I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically > any > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> more than > > > >>>>>>>>> they > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical > > intelligence > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate > > functional > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> paths, the > > > >>>>>>>>> one > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards > > > >> conspecifics. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> paper a > > > >>>>>>>>> day, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in > a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long > > letter > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord > > > >>>>>>>>> Alfred > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as > > "De > > > >> Profundis"). > > > >>>>>>>>> But it > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform > the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who > was > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are > red > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him > > with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> their bed > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Christ > > > >>>>>>>>> transforms > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed > into > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> blood > > > >>>>>>>>> before > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde > > has > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is > > changed > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in > > this > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into > > > >>>>>>>>> great > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins > with > > > "he" > > > >>>>>>>>> instead > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "I". > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to > > create > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> great > > > >>>>>>>>> art. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather > > than > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile > > the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the > > > >>>>>>>>> one > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that > > you > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> are at > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you > need > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when > you > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth > > > >>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the > > precision > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of words > > > >>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>>> says, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the > > > >>>>>>>>> individuation of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual > > > emotion. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is > deus > > ex > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it > was > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > > > >>>>>>>>> mass > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it > was. > > > Or > > > >> both. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> tools. To > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to > formal > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a > > > >>>>>>>>> writing > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe > > with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools > > coevolving > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. > For > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity > > > >>>>>>>>> work. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat > rooms. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to > > help > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here > > > >>>>>>>>> is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own > ontological > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> development: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x > > > >>>>>>>>> 23ugom > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating > > activity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The > point > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For > > > >>>>>>>>> those > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a > > call > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to women > > > >>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and > > > >> vilified. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> culture > > > >>>>>>>>> deficit) > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I > > wonder > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> how > > > >>>>>>>>> Hegel > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture > is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > >>>>>>>>> affected > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> by > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the > > > >>>>>>>>> web > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch > > later. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" > > point > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be > > differentiated > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the > > differentiation > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ > > > >>>>>>>>> Hegelianism > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a > number > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The > correction > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you > drew > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my > catalogue, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read > them, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of > his > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to > > your > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > > > >>>>>>>>> king > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we > > live > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. > > So > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see > Vygotsky's > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs > and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a > > super-category > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, > all > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, > > but > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to > > your > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have > > found > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is > not > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to > > /Capital/. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is > > making > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their > own > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their > > material > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, > > Hegel > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not > > under > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are > mere > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating > and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" > > in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective > and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of > > this > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are > neutralised > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to > > the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above > > it. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: > > for > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of > > both. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy < > http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > > > >>>>>>>>> king > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed May 11 12:36:23 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 13:36:23 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Jon Oliver on science Message-ID: Anyone interested in a little levity? Here is a fun little bit by Jon Oliver about media reporting of science in the U.S. https://www.facebook.com/LastWeekTonight/videos/896755337120143/ Good times, greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From nataliag@sfu.ca Wed May 11 20:06:34 2016 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 20:06:34 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reviewers Needed for CHAT SIG AERA In-Reply-To: <1208215432.115367075.1461702675266.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <02bd01d19fda$d09a8710$71cf9530$@uic.edu> <1208215432.115367075.1461702675266.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: <638010956.5288642.1463022394141.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Dear All! This is a gentle reminder about our call for volunteers to review for Cultural-Historical Research SIG at AERA. The deadline to volunteer has just been extended to this Friday, May 13, 2016. To view the Call for Volunteer Reviewers, and to sign up, please, follow the link below and select Cultural-Historical Research SIG: http://www.aera.net/EventsMeetings/2017AnnualMeetingCallforVolunteerReviewers/tabid/16234/Default.aspx Thank you, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Natalia Gajdamaschko" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 1:31:15 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reviewers Needed for CHAT SIG AERA Hi Dear All, Just to add to Aria?s call for volunteers for our SIG (Cultural-Historical Research ) at AERA ? we really depend on your good will to volunteer to be a reviewer for our SIG. This year in Washington we?ve had a very successful AERA, mostly thanks to our volunteers who served as peer reviewers and, of course, our wonderful presenters. We would like to build on our success for the next year. Please, join us! The deadline is near, May 11, 2016. You can find the details of signing up to be a reviewer here: http://www.aera.net/EventsMeetings/2017AnnualMeetingCallforVolunteerReviewers/tabid/16234/Default.aspx Call for Volunteer Reviewers Deadline to Sign Up: May 11, 2016 The American Educational Research Association (AERA) is seeking volunteers to serve as peer reviewers for submissions for the 2017 AERA Annual Meeting. A quality peer review system is the bedrock for a quality annual meeting, and thus we encourage persons with depth of research expertise to volunteer to review and respond to this call. Panel Reviewer Selection Criteria Review panels will be constituted to be inclusive of well-qualified researchers knowledgeable across the span of research topics, methods, and modes of inquiry likely to be considered by a submission unit. The criteria for invited panel reviewers include such considerations as: (a) experience in some form of peer reviewing, (b) service on other professional review panels, (c) knowledge of the field, (d) scholarly productivity or roles that require research expertise, (e) knowledge of the emerging literature, and (f) broad knowledge of a range of researchers and research specialties in an area. Graduate students may be invited to serve as panel reviewers. Each submission will be reviewed by at least three reviewers and may be reviewed by a graduate student or students serving as additional reviewers. All reviews, including graduate student reviews, will be provided to submitters, although graduate student review scores are not included in the scoring calculations. When graduate students are serving as panel reviewers, the unit program chair is encouraged to incorporate a plan to provide feedback and mentoring to graduate students to enrich the educational value of this experience. Please, let me or Aria know if you have any additional questions about it. Cheers, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Aria Razfar" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 9:43:51 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Reviewers Needed for CHAT SIG AERA Hello All, Natalia Gajdamaschko and I will be serving as program co-chairs for next year's annual meeting in San Antonio. Please sign up as reviewers. Thanks, Aria and Natalia Cultural Historical Call for Proposals AERA 2017 When AERA was founded a century ago, Lev Vygotsky was 20 years old and on the brink of a decade of prolific work leading to discoveries that would (eventually) shake up Western psychology and education and would reshape how learning, development, culture, play, language and the relationship between all of these are understood. While it took over 50 years for those discoveries to make it to the United States, Vygotsky's theories (and those of his colleagues) are now some of the most utilized frameworks for innovations in education in formal and informal settings. In that time, Vygotsky's original work has given birth to a wide range of theories and practices, including Socio-Cultural, Cultural-Historical, Activity, and related critical and post-modern approaches, all of which are represented by the Cultural-Historical Research SIG. The CHR SIG of AERA is therefore calling for proposals for the 2017 Annual Meeting that represent the breadth and relevance of Vygotskian, Socio-Cultural, Activity and related theory, research and practice for education in the 21st century. We are particularly seeking proposals that represent: . The diversity of approaches that fall under the umbrella of CHR, including, socio-cultural, Marxist, activity, and arts-based and postmodern approaches. . The relevance of Vygotsky for innovations in education that offer creative responses to the ongoing education "crisis" in the US and around the world . The range of methodologies that utilize CH approaches, including mixed methods, action research, arts based research, and performance studies. . The diversity of fields and settings in which CH theory is used and to which it is applicable (i.e. early childhood, outside of school, STEM learning, literacy, adult learning, ELL). . Proposals that explore the past, present and future of CH approaches. . Proposals that address the intersections of CH theories with critical theories that include, for example, focus on relations of power, activities that create the "Other," and sources of oppression. Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 From kplakits@gmail.com Thu May 12 00:08:38 2016 From: kplakits@gmail.com (Katerina Plakitsi) Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 10:08:38 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reviewers Needed for CHAT SIG AERA In-Reply-To: <638010956.5288642.1463022394141.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <02bd01d19fda$d09a8710$71cf9530$@uic.edu> <1208215432.115367075.1461702675266.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <638010956.5288642.1463022394141.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: Thanks Natalia!!! ???? ??????, 12 ????? 2016, ? ??????? Natalia Gajdamaschko ??????: > Dear All! > > This is a gentle reminder about our call for volunteers to review for > Cultural-Historical Research SIG at AERA. The deadline to volunteer has > just been extended to this Friday, May 13, 2016. > > To view the Call for Volunteer Reviewers, and to sign up, please, follow > the link below and select Cultural-Historical Research SIG: > > > http://www.aera.net/EventsMeetings/2017AnnualMeetingCallforVolunteerReviewers/tabid/16234/Default.aspx > > Thank you, > Natalia. > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Natalia Gajdamaschko" > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 1:31:15 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reviewers Needed for CHAT SIG AERA > > Hi Dear All, > Just to add to Aria?s call for volunteers for our SIG (Cultural-Historical > Research ) at AERA ? we really depend on your good will to volunteer to be > a reviewer for our SIG. This year in Washington we?ve had a very > successful AERA, mostly thanks to our volunteers who served as peer > reviewers and, of course, our wonderful presenters. We would like to build > on our success for the next year. Please, join us! The deadline is near, > May 11, 2016. > > You can find the details of signing up to be a reviewer here: > > http://www.aera.net/EventsMeetings/2017AnnualMeetingCallforVolunteerReviewers/tabid/16234/Default.aspx > > > Call for Volunteer Reviewers > Deadline to Sign Up: May 11, 2016 > > The American Educational Research Association (AERA) is seeking volunteers > to serve as peer reviewers for submissions for the 2017 AERA Annual > Meeting. A quality peer review system is the bedrock for a quality annual > meeting, and thus we encourage persons with depth of research expertise to > volunteer to review and respond to this call. > > Panel Reviewer Selection Criteria > Review panels will be constituted to be inclusive of well-qualified > researchers knowledgeable across the span of research topics, methods, and > modes of inquiry likely to be considered by a submission unit. The criteria > for invited panel reviewers include such considerations as: > (a) experience in some form of peer reviewing, > (b) service on other professional review panels, > (c) knowledge of the field, > (d) scholarly productivity or roles that require research expertise, > (e) knowledge of the emerging literature, and > (f) broad knowledge of a range of researchers and research specialties in > an area. > Graduate students may be invited to serve as panel reviewers. Each > submission will be reviewed by at least three reviewers and may be reviewed > by a graduate student or students serving as additional reviewers. All > reviews, including graduate student reviews, will be provided to > submitters, although graduate student review scores are not included in the > scoring calculations. When graduate students are serving as panel > reviewers, the unit program chair is encouraged to incorporate a plan to > provide feedback and mentoring to graduate students to enrich the > educational value of this experience. > > Please, let me or Aria know if you have any additional questions about it. > Cheers, > Natalia. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Aria Razfar" > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 9:43:51 AM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Reviewers Needed for CHAT SIG AERA > > Hello All, > > > > Natalia Gajdamaschko and I will be serving as program co-chairs for next > year's annual meeting in San Antonio. Please sign up as reviewers. > > > > Thanks, > > > > Aria and Natalia > > > > Cultural Historical Call for Proposals > > AERA 2017 > > > > When AERA was founded a century ago, Lev Vygotsky was 20 years old and on > the brink of a decade of prolific work leading to discoveries that would > (eventually) shake up Western psychology and education and would reshape > how > learning, development, culture, play, language and the relationship between > all of these are understood. While it took over 50 years for those > discoveries to make it to the United States, Vygotsky's theories (and those > of his colleagues) are now some of the most utilized frameworks for > innovations in education in formal and informal settings. In that time, > Vygotsky's original work has given birth to a wide range of theories and > practices, including Socio-Cultural, Cultural-Historical, Activity, and > related critical and post-modern approaches, all of which are represented > by > the Cultural-Historical Research SIG. > > > > The CHR SIG of AERA is therefore calling for proposals for the 2017 Annual > Meeting that represent the breadth and relevance of Vygotskian, > Socio-Cultural, Activity and related theory, research and practice for > education in the 21st century. We are particularly seeking proposals that > represent: > > > > . The diversity of approaches that fall under the umbrella of > CHR, including, socio-cultural, Marxist, activity, and arts-based and > postmodern approaches. > > > > . The relevance of Vygotsky for innovations in education that > offer creative responses to the ongoing education "crisis" in the US and > around the world > > > > . The range of methodologies that utilize CH approaches, > including mixed methods, action research, arts based research, and > performance studies. > > > > . The diversity of fields and settings in which CH theory is > used and to which it is applicable (i.e. early childhood, outside of > school, > STEM learning, literacy, adult learning, ELL). > > > > . Proposals that explore the past, present and future of CH > approaches. > > > > . Proposals that address the intersections of CH theories with > critical theories that include, for example, focus on relations of power, > activities that create the "Other," and sources of oppression. > > > > > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture > > Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction > > University of Illinois at Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) > > www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > -- ............................................................ Katerina Plakitsi Associate Professor of Science Education School of Education University of Ioannina University Campus Dourouti 45110 Ioannina Greece tel. +302651005771 fax. +302651005842 mobile.phone +306972898463 http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu May 12 12:12:45 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 13:12:45 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> <2672A2EA-7A2A-40AA-A247-9F9E8D0AD3CD@bigpond.com> Message-ID: <8776A2EF-3FB4-4D5F-83CC-3134EE11A27A@gmail.com> David and all, When I first read the posts on this thread (mediating and mediated activity), what came to my mind was automatic and controlled processes, which can apply to either physical or mental processes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_and_controlled_processes_(ACP) My understanding, from my research in second language learning among highly literate adults, is that optimal performance at any level of L2 fluency (development), where optimality is judged in terms of both immediate communicative goals and rate of learning, is achieved by a judicious mix of automatic and controlled processes. L2 learners and their ?helpers" (especially teachers and more fluent L2 speakering friends) move the process of the development of L2 verbal fluency forward best by speaking in such a way that the learner is challenged but not too much. This sounds like the Goldilocks story. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldilocks_principle My son and I just had an interesting discussion about arousal, anxiety and stress. This discussion was grounded in some major stressors he encountered as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nicaragua. I found that both wikipedia articles (automatic/controlled processes and Goldilocks) included the idea of optimality imaged as an inverted U shape. My question then goes to David?s claim: > "Andy's view is that all mediational activities > are both mediating and mediated, so it is a distinction without a difference.? Automatic and controlled processing are certainly distinct. Why can?t mediating and mediated be distinct in the same way? With respect, Henry > > On May 10, 2016, at 4:38 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Greg: > > Thanks for keeping us on topic. It's pretty hard, in the scrum, to keep our > eyes on the ball! > > There are different views. My view is that the distinction between > mediating activity and mediated activity is essential; that it is the > beginning--only the beginning, but an important beginning--to undoing a > serious distortion in Vygotsky's legacy, which is collapsing the difference > between tools and signs in expressions like "psychological tools", > "mediating artefacts", etc. Andy's view is that all mediational activities > are both mediating and mediated, so it is a distinction without a > difference. I say they are more distinct than linked, and Andy says they > are more linked than distinct. > > Andy does something very different from me. I spend my days coding data and > translating Vygotsky, so I am always sensitive to concepts like exaptation > and metastability: how something that is evolved for one purpose (like > transforming the environment) becomes useful for something entirely > different (like semiosis) and also how a relationship like mediation must > fundamentally change just in order to stay the same. For me the dynamic > view always takes precedence over the synoptic. Andy spends his days > thinking and writing about the concept of language and the concept of > society, so he is pretty much the other way around. It's a little bit like > the man who walks around a tree trying to catch sight of a squirrel that > does not want to be caught sight of. When the man has circumambulated the > tree, has he circumambulated the squirrel? It all depends on whether you > are more interested in the relationship of the squirrel to the tree (as > Andy is) or the squirrel to the man (as I am). > > Children do develop sound awareness. If you teach a child a rhyme like: > > Dr. Foster went to Gloucester > And it began to rain. > He stepped in a puddle right up to his middle > And never went there again. > > Children will tell you which words rhyme, and which words half rhyme, and > which words don't rhyme. Notice, though, that this is rather more sound > awareness than phonemic awareness. "Foster" and "Gloucester" only rhyme if > you have a Gloucester accent (and you can make them rhyme more or less by > approaching or distancing yourself from Gloucester). "Puddle" and "middle" > do not rhyme at all by the rules of phonemic awareness. So what children > are really aware of is a wide range of sound contrasts, of which the > contrasts we call "phonemic" are only a small part. This explains: > > a) why, for example, in languages which are not phonemically described like > Chinese, there are nevertheless long traditions, going back over a thousand > years, of non-phonemic sound analysis (e.g. lists of rhymes compiled by > poets, intonation schemes for poetic reading, etc), and > > b) why in languages which are phonemically described like English we keep > finding more and more "phonemic" differences (e.g. the difference between > "Sorry!" and "Sorry?") > > I think that hardly anybody on this list would deny that tool creation > fundamentally changes development, both phylogenetically and > ontogenetically. Vygotsky certainly didn't deny it: tool creation was THE > essential moment of anthropogenesis in evolution, and it is also one of the > key neoformations in infancy according to his lectures on pedology. But if > you say that tools and signs "co-evolve" it becomes very hard to argue that > practical thinking and speech have different roots, and that is one of the > key tenets of "Thinking and Speech". > > In his lecture on the Crisis at One, Vygotsky wonders aloud: > > a) Do Kohler's apes really use tools? What kind of a tool is a box if it > loses all its tool-power when a chimp looking for a box to stand on to get > a banana sees another chimp sleeping on a box and, after trying to jump and > get the banana fruitlessly for fifteen minutes or so, just lies down next > to the chimp on the box and goes to sleep? Isn't this a little like the > child's forays into autonomous speech? > > b) Does walking have the same relationship to physical space that > proto-speech has to social space? > > Here's where Andy comes in handy. Remember what he said about trying to > catch the concept in its becoming and not just its being. > > Yes, Vygotsky says that that Kohler's apes use "proto-tools", and that in > the same negative, not-quite-there-yet, sense, the child's autonomous > speech is a kind of proto-speech. This is not a tool and that is not > speech, but both COULD be, and WOULD develop in that direction, given the > right social situation of development. They are, in my terminology, > exaptable affordances. > > No, Vygotsky says that walking is a permanent adaptation to the > environment, while proto-speech is a critical neoformation which has no > independent role to play in subsequent development (although it does become > a dependent part of permanent speech in the form of intonation, stress, > onomatopoeia, etc). > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, May 11, 2016 at 6:30 AM, Greg Mcverry > wrote: > >> So if phonemes do not exist and were only created as a unit of analysis to >> understand language once a language has been mapped to a written system >> what does this say about mediating and mediated activity? >> >> What I mean then going back to the earlier argument of whether there is >> co-evolution of both development in tools. In other words we know how >> children (atleast in English) develop phonemic awareness. There are clear >> developmental milestones that occur in the same order in almost every >> child. No one can substitute a phoneme before they can segment phonemes. >> >> If the tool of written language had to be created before phonemes existed, >> and phoneme recognition and manipulation happens in such a systematic and >> developmental way does this not prove tool creation leads to changes in >> development? >> >> On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:31 PM David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Not at all, Helen; if you go back over the thread, you'll see that your >>> contribution was pivotal. I am usually, just like you; I skim things, and >>> look askance when life is elsewhere. Maybe you didn't have time to sit >>> through the animations of proto-Indo-European spreading across the >> steppes >>> like a reversal of the Mongol conquests, but on that morning I did so I >> did >>> it for you. This morning, though, I'm translating, so I'll be short and >>> apologize in advance for mansplainin' atcha. >>> >>> Voila: if you are trying to decide if a rock is a meteorite, and if it >> may >>> have come from Mars, and if those little globules that you think you >>> discern amongst the crystals might be fossilized bacteria, then it really >>> does matter if your microscope lens is clean. Similarly, if you trying to >>> learn a language, phonemes can be extremely useful--but so can >> substitution >>> tables, glossaries, fictional dialogues, drills and any number of >> language >>> exercises that we do not use in the study of language or even in daily >>> conversation. The mere fact that they are very useful doesn't mean they >>> exist outside the particular learning task you are trying to accomplish >>> (James famously argued that God must exist, because he's just such a >> handy >>> bloke to have around). >>> >>> When you are trying to decide if phonemic variation is a clue to the time >>> and place language was first created--or even when you are trying to >> decide >>> if there was a single creative moment, or if language just "co-evolved" >>> wherever there were social groups of early man large enough to carry out >>> joint activities--then it matters whether or not phonemes really exist. >> If >>> phonemes are simply produced in the act of describing language (after >> all, >>> describing a language is really just folding language back on itself) >> then >>> variation in their number variation cannot be construed as a faint echo >> of >>> a distant "big bang". >>> >>> Let me make one final point. I am reading the work of the French and >> Swiss >>> Vygotskyans these days. Unlike the work of Yasnitsky and van der Veer, >> this >>> is work which takes CHAT quite seriously. Andy is often cited, and so are >>> Martin--and of course Mike. The treatment is not uncritical, but one of >> the >>> things that is really appreciated is this: when you are studying any >>> cultural-historical (or, as they like to say, "historico-culturelle") >>> phenomenon, it really does matter what the people who produced it >> thought. >>> Phonemes, that is, minimal differences which do not themselves bear >> meaning >>> but which do allow us to distinguish between segments that do bear >>> meaning, were "discovered" (well, invented, actually) in the >> mid-twentieth >>> century. When Vygotsky refers to "phonemes", he is usually talking about >>> meaning-bearing elements such as case endings or tense endings which we >>> would call "morphemes" today. >>> >>> Which brings me back to translating and above all annotating. Because, as >>> we learn when we read how Vygotsky is "applied" to language teaching, >> when >>> you are studying Vygotsky, it really does matter what Vygotsky thought he >>> was doing.... >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 6:40 PM, Helen Harper >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hmm, David, I hesitate to jump in too deep, because I haven?t time >> right >>>> now to read things properly, so I can?t engage sufficiently with the >>> papers >>>> under discussion, but I don?t think it?s a matter of choosing to >> believe >>> in >>>> phonemes or not. Phonemes are just a tool of analysis. They are a >>> perceived >>>> unit: as an English speaker I perceive /p/ is different from /b/; and >>> /pin/ >>>> is a different word from /bin/ - so /p/ and /b/ are distinct phonemes >>> for >>>> English speakers. >>>> >>>> There might be situations where there are better tools of analysis, but >>>> often phonemes are just dandy, and can come in very handy when you?re >>>> learning a new language, and trying to figure out how to distinguish >> the >>>> different sounds. >>>> >>>> But not really my area of expertise, so I?ll finish my plug for >> phonemes >>>> right here ?. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On 6 May 2016, at 7:12 AM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the >> author >>>>> talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have >> fewer >>>>> varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the >>>>> diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo >>>> modus >>>>> sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. >>>>> >>>>> My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in >>>> phonemes. I >>>>> think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto >>>> meaning, >>>>> and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly >> corresponding >>>> to >>>>> a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic >>>>> listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts >> of >>>>> writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and >>> this >>>> is >>>>> why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more >>>>> phonemes we "discover" in it. >>>>> >>>>> By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental >>> methodological >>>>> mistake of correlating language variation with variation in >>> mitochondrial >>>>> DNA. See: >>>>> >>>>> Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) >>>>> *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer < >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World >>> Atlas >>>>>> of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in >> its >>>>>> characterization of the phonemes in each language. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a >>>> little >>>>>> while ago >>>>>>> http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Helen, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports >> to >>>>>> document how selected members of the Indo-European language family >>>> spread >>>>>> geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper < >> helen.harper@bigpond.com >>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit >>>>>> bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say >>>>>> anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the >> counter >>>>>> argument: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu >>>>>>>> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Helen >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Remarkable and beautiful! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> < >>>> https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/04/16/where-on-earth- >>>>>>>>>> did-language-begin/> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared >>> genes. >>>>>> I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial >>>> founder >>>>>> effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, >> 346-349. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to >>>> have >>>>>> been stripped out. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which >> assumes >>>>>>>>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying >>>>>>>>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not >>>>>>>>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked >>> contribution. >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's >>> first >>>>>>>>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" >>> studies, >>>>>>>>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a >>> little >>>>>>>>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go >> into >>>>>>>>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and >>> dead >>>>>>>>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual >>> history, >>>>>>>>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking >>>>>>>>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the >>>>>>>>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so >>>>>>>>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des >>>>>> sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. >>>>>>>>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts >> to >>>>>>>>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a >> "language >>>>>>>>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant >> tries >>>>>>>>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have >>> separate >>>>>>>>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first >>>>>>>>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of >> our >>>>>>>>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, >>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's >>> not >>>>>>>>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming >>>>>>>>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the >>> lexicogrammar >>>>>>>>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own >> functional >>>>>>>>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big >>>>>>>>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make >>>> given >>>>>> the collaborative help of conspecifics. >>>>>>>>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. >>>>>>>>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has >>> tended >>>>>>>>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or >> through >>>>>>>>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single >>>>>>>>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that >>> is >>>>>> yet-to-come. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Gente, >>>>>>>>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed >> or >>>>>>>>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many >>> times, >>>>>>>>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only >>>>>>>>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the >>>>>>>>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best >> shot. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg < >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with >>>> everything, >>>>>> Andy. >>>>>>>>>>>>> And >>>>>>>>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea >> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx >>>>>>>>>>>>>> should be considered >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or >>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>> matter >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign >>>>>>>>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, >> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this view >>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, >> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a >>> simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> appear >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering >> "rudiments" >>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> accidents, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties that >>>>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick >>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal >>>>>>>>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. >> It's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a >>> purpose >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt >>> to >>>>>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic >> one. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only >>>>>>>>>>>>>> renders the >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally >>>>>>>>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can >> only >>>>>>>>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation >>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to >>> create >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made >> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might >>> have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each >>>> against >>>>>> all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution >>>> indeed. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden < >>> ablunden@mira.net >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything >>>>>>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and >>>> Child," >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully >>> developed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in humans, is the >>>>>>>>>>>>> key >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the >> "essence >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why >> he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was so determined, >>>>>>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not-literate >>>>>>>>>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a >> profound >>>>>> insight. >>>>>>>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same time as they >>>>>>>>>>>>> learnt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that >> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>>>>>>>> communicative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, >> he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looked >>>>>>>>>>>>> *not* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively >> found >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> among >>>>>>>>>>>>> humans >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the >> contrary >>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> species to >>>>>>>>>>>>> another. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which >>>> looks >>>>>> for "essential" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until >> 1931. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in >>> higher >>>>>>>>>>>>> primates. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there >>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>>>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a >>> lexicogrammar. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over >>>>>>>>>>>>> signs. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically >> any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than >>>>>>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical >>> intelligence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate >>> functional >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paths, the >>>>>>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards >>>>>> conspecifics. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet >> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper a >>>>>>>>>>>>> day, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in >> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long >>> letter >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord >>>>>>>>>>>>> Alfred >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as >>> "De >>>>>> Profundis"). >>>>>>>>>>>>> But it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform >> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who >> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are >> red >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him >>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their bed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Christ >>>>>>>>>>>>> transforms >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed >> into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blood >>>>>>>>>>>>> before >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde >>> has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is >>> changed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in >>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into >>>>>>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins >> with >>>> "he" >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "I". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to >>> create >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> great >>>>>>>>>>>>> art. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather >>> than >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the >>>>>>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that >>> you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are at >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you >> need >>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when >> you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth >>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the >>> precision >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of words >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>>> says, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the >>>>>>>>>>>>> individuation of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual >>>> emotion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is >> deus >>> ex >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it >> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for >>>>>>>>>>>>> mass >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it >> was. >>>> Or >>>>>> both. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools. To >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to >> formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a >>>>>>>>>>>>> writing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe >>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools >>> coevolving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. >> For >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity >>>>>>>>>>>>> work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat >> rooms. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to >>> help >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here >>>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own >> ontological >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x >>>>>>>>>>>>> 23ugom >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating >>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The >> point >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For >>>>>>>>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a >>> call >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to women >>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and >>>>>> vilified. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>>>>> deficit) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I >>> wonder >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture >> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>>>>>>>>>> affected >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the >>>>>>>>>>>>> web >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch >>> later. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" >>> point >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be >>> differentiated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the >>> differentiation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegelianism >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a >> number >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The >> correction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you >> drew >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my >> catalogue, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read >> them, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of >> his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to >>> your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>>>>>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we >>> live >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. >>> So >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see >> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs >> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a >>> super-category >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, >> all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, >>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to >>> your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have >>> found >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is >> not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to >>> /Capital/. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is >>> making >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their >> own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their >>> material >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, >>> Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not >>> under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are >> mere >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating >> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" >>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective >> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of >>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are >> neutralised >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above >>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: >>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of >>> both. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> ----------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy < >> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy >>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma >>>>>>>>>>>>> king >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu May 12 23:56:09 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 16:56:09 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity In-Reply-To: <8776A2EF-3FB4-4D5F-83CC-3134EE11A27A@gmail.com> References: <046fcef6-895b-8e08-ca61-500731f39428@mira.net> <083543A6-7FDA-4853-8522-8C97A87D82EB@gmail.com> <36EFD52A-789C-4237-97A3-A74B5010465C@uniandes.edu.co> <668fc5d2-3da4-9dc3-d76b-99e72027715c@mira.net> <250F67C2-72F8-469D-904F-4AB30C9B4EA7@bigpond.com> <001b01d1a6cf$66c28440$34478cc0$@att.net> <2672A2EA-7A2A-40AA-A247-9F9E8D0AD3CD@bigpond.com> <8776A2EF-3FB4-4D5F-83CC-3134EE11A27A@gmail.com> Message-ID: Enrico: I think that in order for things to be linked, they must be distinct. So for example if I take one of those awful four-by-four matrices that people sometimes use in order to not have to think about the specificity and context-dependedness of both physical and mental activity, we can say this: MEDIATING ACTIVITY (e.g. sign use, language) MEDIATED ACTIVITY (e.g. tool use, digging holes) CONTROLLED PROCESSING Language learning Gardening AUTOMATIC PROCESSING Language use Ploughing The (only) advantage I can see of laying things out in a matrix like this is that it allows us to see things as first distinct and then linked. We lay them out as far apart as possible, and we immediately notice that the axis you mentioned, that of controlled processing and automatic processing is in fact completely different from the axis of mediated and mediating activity: one of them has to do with the nature of the activity itself and the other is merely concerned with how it is cognitively "processed" (note the rather disturbing metaphor of a food processor or an information processor). I am by nature an untidy person, and so as soon as I notice how tidy and separate these things are, I start to clutter up the picture a little. What about dance and drumming? Both are mediated, in the sense of being directed on the environment, but neither leaves the self uninvolved; one is slightly more "tool using", unless you consider the body itself as a tool (which it undoubtedly is). The same thing happens when we look at the other axis: we do learn language by using it (children exclusively so) and we also use language when we learn it, and of course in between gardening with a trowel and ploughing with a tractor there are activities like mowing the lawn or raking up leaves, either by hand or with a leaf blower. What I find not a little annoying about the diagramme is the two things. a) the idea that these axes are equally important--they're not. When I write signs for your delectation, I am not just digging a hole in your head and filling it b) the idea that either gardening or language use is a single "process". Being able to speak well is really a whole hierarchy of skills, of which some are almost always under control (semantics) and others are almost always automatic (pronunciation). The same thing is much less true of gardening and ploughing, which once again shows the problem with reducing activities to locations on a four-by-four matrix--or, for that matter, reducing their mediation to apices of an expanded triangle. Finally, I think this matrix obscures the real point of interest for me--by treating them as synoptic, it obscures the historical dimension and this is precisely the dimension which interests me most. I can well believe that controlled processing emerges first with second language learning but automatic processing emerges first in first language learning. For modern farmers, ploughing might be a skill acquired before gardening, although historically the opposite order seems more probable. By the way, I don't think that distinctness always comes before linkedness: sometimes things are whole, and then they become functionally differentiated. So I think that Andy's view of mediation--that there is neither distinctness nor linkedness--is a good one for people who don't have to situate things historically. I just don't think that ahistoricity really applies to very many CHAT researchers (at least, not nearly as many CHAT researchers who have treated the two forms of mediation as interchangeable!) David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 5:12 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David and all, > When I first read the posts on this thread (mediating and mediated > activity), what came to my mind was automatic and controlled processes, > which can apply to either physical or mental processes. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_and_controlled_processes_(ACP) < > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_and_controlled_processes_(ACP)> > > My understanding, from my research in second language learning among > highly literate adults, is that optimal performance at any level of L2 > fluency (development), where optimality is judged in terms of both > immediate communicative goals and rate of learning, is achieved by a > judicious mix of automatic and controlled processes. L2 learners and their > ?helpers" (especially teachers and more fluent L2 speakering friends) move > the process of the development of L2 verbal fluency forward best by > speaking in such a way that the learner is challenged but not too much. > This sounds like the Goldilocks story. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldilocks_principle < > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldilocks_principle> > > My son and I just had an interesting discussion about arousal, anxiety and > stress. This discussion was grounded in some major stressors he encountered > as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nicaragua. I found that both wikipedia > articles (automatic/controlled processes and Goldilocks) included the idea > of optimality imaged as an inverted U shape. > > My question then goes to David?s claim: > > > "Andy's view is that all mediational activities > > are both mediating and mediated, so it is a distinction without a > difference.? > > Automatic and controlled processing are certainly distinct. Why can?t > mediating and mediated be distinct in the same way? > > With respect, > Henry > > > > > > > > > > On May 10, 2016, at 4:38 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Greg: > > > > Thanks for keeping us on topic. It's pretty hard, in the scrum, to keep > our > > eyes on the ball! > > > > There are different views. My view is that the distinction between > > mediating activity and mediated activity is essential; that it is the > > beginning--only the beginning, but an important beginning--to undoing a > > serious distortion in Vygotsky's legacy, which is collapsing the > difference > > between tools and signs in expressions like "psychological tools", > > "mediating artefacts", etc. Andy's view is that all mediational > activities > > are both mediating and mediated, so it is a distinction without a > > difference. I say they are more distinct than linked, and Andy says they > > are more linked than distinct. > > > > Andy does something very different from me. I spend my days coding data > and > > translating Vygotsky, so I am always sensitive to concepts like > exaptation > > and metastability: how something that is evolved for one purpose (like > > transforming the environment) becomes useful for something entirely > > different (like semiosis) and also how a relationship like mediation must > > fundamentally change just in order to stay the same. For me the dynamic > > view always takes precedence over the synoptic. Andy spends his days > > thinking and writing about the concept of language and the concept of > > society, so he is pretty much the other way around. It's a little bit > like > > the man who walks around a tree trying to catch sight of a squirrel that > > does not want to be caught sight of. When the man has circumambulated the > > tree, has he circumambulated the squirrel? It all depends on whether you > > are more interested in the relationship of the squirrel to the tree (as > > Andy is) or the squirrel to the man (as I am). > > > > Children do develop sound awareness. If you teach a child a rhyme like: > > > > Dr. Foster went to Gloucester > > And it began to rain. > > He stepped in a puddle right up to his middle > > And never went there again. > > > > Children will tell you which words rhyme, and which words half rhyme, and > > which words don't rhyme. Notice, though, that this is rather more sound > > awareness than phonemic awareness. "Foster" and "Gloucester" only rhyme > if > > you have a Gloucester accent (and you can make them rhyme more or less by > > approaching or distancing yourself from Gloucester). "Puddle" and > "middle" > > do not rhyme at all by the rules of phonemic awareness. So what children > > are really aware of is a wide range of sound contrasts, of which the > > contrasts we call "phonemic" are only a small part. This explains: > > > > a) why, for example, in languages which are not phonemically described > like > > Chinese, there are nevertheless long traditions, going back over a > thousand > > years, of non-phonemic sound analysis (e.g. lists of rhymes compiled by > > poets, intonation schemes for poetic reading, etc), and > > > > b) why in languages which are phonemically described like English we keep > > finding more and more "phonemic" differences (e.g. the difference between > > "Sorry!" and "Sorry?") > > > > I think that hardly anybody on this list would deny that tool creation > > fundamentally changes development, both phylogenetically and > > ontogenetically. Vygotsky certainly didn't deny it: tool creation was THE > > essential moment of anthropogenesis in evolution, and it is also one of > the > > key neoformations in infancy according to his lectures on pedology. But > if > > you say that tools and signs "co-evolve" it becomes very hard to argue > that > > practical thinking and speech have different roots, and that is one of > the > > key tenets of "Thinking and Speech". > > > > In his lecture on the Crisis at One, Vygotsky wonders aloud: > > > > a) Do Kohler's apes really use tools? What kind of a tool is a box if it > > loses all its tool-power when a chimp looking for a box to stand on to > get > > a banana sees another chimp sleeping on a box and, after trying to jump > and > > get the banana fruitlessly for fifteen minutes or so, just lies down next > > to the chimp on the box and goes to sleep? Isn't this a little like the > > child's forays into autonomous speech? > > > > b) Does walking have the same relationship to physical space that > > proto-speech has to social space? > > > > Here's where Andy comes in handy. Remember what he said about trying to > > catch the concept in its becoming and not just its being. > > > > Yes, Vygotsky says that that Kohler's apes use "proto-tools", and that in > > the same negative, not-quite-there-yet, sense, the child's autonomous > > speech is a kind of proto-speech. This is not a tool and that is not > > speech, but both COULD be, and WOULD develop in that direction, given the > > right social situation of development. They are, in my terminology, > > exaptable affordances. > > > > No, Vygotsky says that walking is a permanent adaptation to the > > environment, while proto-speech is a critical neoformation which has no > > independent role to play in subsequent development (although it does > become > > a dependent part of permanent speech in the form of intonation, stress, > > onomatopoeia, etc). > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, May 11, 2016 at 6:30 AM, Greg Mcverry > > wrote: > > > >> So if phonemes do not exist and were only created as a unit of analysis > to > >> understand language once a language has been mapped to a written system > >> what does this say about mediating and mediated activity? > >> > >> What I mean then going back to the earlier argument of whether there is > >> co-evolution of both development in tools. In other words we know how > >> children (atleast in English) develop phonemic awareness. There are > clear > >> developmental milestones that occur in the same order in almost every > >> child. No one can substitute a phoneme before they can segment phonemes. > >> > >> If the tool of written language had to be created before phonemes > existed, > >> and phoneme recognition and manipulation happens in such a systematic > and > >> developmental way does this not prove tool creation leads to changes in > >> development? > >> > >> On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:31 PM David Kellogg > wrote: > >> > >>> Not at all, Helen; if you go back over the thread, you'll see that your > >>> contribution was pivotal. I am usually, just like you; I skim things, > and > >>> look askance when life is elsewhere. Maybe you didn't have time to sit > >>> through the animations of proto-Indo-European spreading across the > >> steppes > >>> like a reversal of the Mongol conquests, but on that morning I did so I > >> did > >>> it for you. This morning, though, I'm translating, so I'll be short and > >>> apologize in advance for mansplainin' atcha. > >>> > >>> Voila: if you are trying to decide if a rock is a meteorite, and if it > >> may > >>> have come from Mars, and if those little globules that you think you > >>> discern amongst the crystals might be fossilized bacteria, then it > really > >>> does matter if your microscope lens is clean. Similarly, if you trying > to > >>> learn a language, phonemes can be extremely useful--but so can > >> substitution > >>> tables, glossaries, fictional dialogues, drills and any number of > >> language > >>> exercises that we do not use in the study of language or even in daily > >>> conversation. The mere fact that they are very useful doesn't mean they > >>> exist outside the particular learning task you are trying to accomplish > >>> (James famously argued that God must exist, because he's just such a > >> handy > >>> bloke to have around). > >>> > >>> When you are trying to decide if phonemic variation is a clue to the > time > >>> and place language was first created--or even when you are trying to > >> decide > >>> if there was a single creative moment, or if language just "co-evolved" > >>> wherever there were social groups of early man large enough to carry > out > >>> joint activities--then it matters whether or not phonemes really exist. > >> If > >>> phonemes are simply produced in the act of describing language (after > >> all, > >>> describing a language is really just folding language back on itself) > >> then > >>> variation in their number variation cannot be construed as a faint echo > >> of > >>> a distant "big bang". > >>> > >>> Let me make one final point. I am reading the work of the French and > >> Swiss > >>> Vygotskyans these days. Unlike the work of Yasnitsky and van der Veer, > >> this > >>> is work which takes CHAT quite seriously. Andy is often cited, and so > are > >>> Martin--and of course Mike. The treatment is not uncritical, but one of > >> the > >>> things that is really appreciated is this: when you are studying any > >>> cultural-historical (or, as they like to say, "historico-culturelle") > >>> phenomenon, it really does matter what the people who produced it > >> thought. > >>> Phonemes, that is, minimal differences which do not themselves bear > >> meaning > >>> but which do allow us to distinguish between segments that do bear > >>> meaning, were "discovered" (well, invented, actually) in the > >> mid-twentieth > >>> century. When Vygotsky refers to "phonemes", he is usually talking > about > >>> meaning-bearing elements such as case endings or tense endings which we > >>> would call "morphemes" today. > >>> > >>> Which brings me back to translating and above all annotating. Because, > as > >>> we learn when we read how Vygotsky is "applied" to language teaching, > >> when > >>> you are studying Vygotsky, it really does matter what Vygotsky thought > he > >>> was doing.... > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 6:40 PM, Helen Harper > > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hmm, David, I hesitate to jump in too deep, because I haven?t time > >> right > >>>> now to read things properly, so I can?t engage sufficiently with the > >>> papers > >>>> under discussion, but I don?t think it?s a matter of choosing to > >> believe > >>> in > >>>> phonemes or not. Phonemes are just a tool of analysis. They are a > >>> perceived > >>>> unit: as an English speaker I perceive /p/ is different from /b/; and > >>> /pin/ > >>>> is a different word from /bin/ - so /p/ and /b/ are distinct phonemes > >>> for > >>>> English speakers. > >>>> > >>>> There might be situations where there are better tools of analysis, > but > >>>> often phonemes are just dandy, and can come in very handy when you?re > >>>> learning a new language, and trying to figure out how to distinguish > >> the > >>>> different sounds. > >>>> > >>>> But not really my area of expertise, so I?ll finish my plug for > >> phonemes > >>>> right here ?. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On 6 May 2016, at 7:12 AM, David Kellogg > >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> That's not the only question. See the last paragraph, where the > >> author > >>>>> talks about the amazing fact that smaller speech communities have > >> fewer > >>>>> varieties of hats and the clear evidence that this provides for the > >>>>> diffusion and diversification of a hat gene during the spread of homo > >>>> modus > >>>>> sapiens from its ancenstral home in the valley of the Seine. > >>>>> > >>>>> My own question is much more basic, Martin. I do not believe in > >>>> phonemes. I > >>>>> think that the unit of analysis for spoken language must map onto > >>>> meaning, > >>>>> and that points to a unit the size of a syllable, roughly > >> corresponding > >>>> to > >>>>> a word. (My mother uncovered evidence for this when she did dichotic > >>>>> listening tests on me as an infant.) Phonemes are actually artefacts > >> of > >>>>> writings systems, retroactively projected onto spoken language, and > >>> this > >>>> is > >>>>> why, as the article discovers, the more we study a language, the more > >>>>> phonemes we "discover" in it. > >>>>> > >>>>> By the way, Cavalli-Sforza's work DID make the fundamental > >>> methodological > >>>>> mistake of correlating language variation with variation in > >>> mitochondrial > >>>>> DNA. See: > >>>>> > >>>>> Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (2000) > >>>>> *Genes, Peoples, and Languages,* University of California Press. > >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>> > >>>>> On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Martin John Packer < > >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Right, the question here is whether the data used - from the World > >>> Atlas > >>>>>> of Language Structures - was sufficiently accurate and detailed in > >> its > >>>>>> characterization of the phonemes in each language. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On May 5, 2016, at 8:09 AM, Peg Griffin > >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Mark Liberman considered the Atkinson work in the Language Log a > >>>> little > >>>>>> while ago > >>>>>>> http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3090 > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 8:43 AM > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mediating Activity and Mediated Activity > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Helen, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> This is a different analysis, in a different paper, that purports > >> to > >>>>>> document how selected members of the Indo-European language family > >>>> spread > >>>>>> geographically between the seventh millennium BC and 1974. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On May 5, 2016, at 12:11 AM, Helen Harper < > >> helen.harper@bigpond.com > >>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The theory is attractive, but these theories are always a bit > >>>>>> bothersome. I don?t enough about historical linguistic theory to say > >>>>>> anything sensible but it always pays at least to look for the > >> counter > >>>>>> argument: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/linguistic-geography/qu > >>>>>>>> entin-atkinsons-nonsensical-maps-of-indo-european-expansion > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Helen > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On 5 May 2016, at 11:46 AM, Andy Blunden > >>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Remarkable and beautiful! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> andy > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>>>>>>> On 5/05/2016 12:02 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> < > >>>> https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/04/16/where-on-earth- > >>>>>>>>>> did-language-begin/> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> David, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> No, Cavalli-Sforza studies human migration by tracing shared > >>> genes. > >>>>>> I was referring to the work of Quentin Atkinson: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Atkinson, Q. D. (2011). Phonemic diversity supports a serial > >>>> founder > >>>>>> effect model of language expansion from Africa. Science, 332, > >> 346-349. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I tried to include an image in my last message, but it seems to > >>>> have > >>>>>> been stripped out. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 6:40 PM, David Kellogg < > >> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin's referring to the work of Cavalli-Sforza, which > >> assumes > >>>>>>>>>>>> that you can trace the spread of language by studying > >>>>>>>>>>>> mitochondrial DNA. This overlooks the fact the people do not > >>>>>>>>>>>> simply inherit languages. They learn them. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I think that this may be Vygotsky's most overlooked > >>> contribution. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's description of the proto-language of the child's > >>> first > >>>>>>>>>>>> two years of life, combined with Halliday's great "Nigel" > >>> studies, > >>>>>>>>>>>> provides us with...the key to the origins of language. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> The question of the origins of language in linguistics is a > >>> little > >>>>>>>>>>>> like string theory in physics; it's something linguists go > >> into > >>>>>>>>>>>> because they find working with data messy and unpleasant, and > >>> dead > >>>>>>>>>>>> speakers tell no tales. For most of Western intellectual > >>> history, > >>>>>>>>>>>> the only field workers were amateur archaeologists seeking > >>>>>>>>>>>> Biblical confirmation: a quest for the Garden of Eden and the > >>>>>>>>>>>> Tower of Babel. In the 19th Century, the field became so > >>>>>>>>>>>> speculative that the Royal Society and the French Academie des > >>>>>> sciences banned the acceptance of scientific papers on the subject. > >>>>>>>>>>>> It was almost forgotten in the twentieth, and recent attempts > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>> revive it by searching the Human Genome Project for a > >> "language > >>>>>>>>>>>> gene" have led absolutely nowhere. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky shows us what language looks like when the infant > >> tries > >>>>>>>>>>>> to invent it. When he says that thinking and speech have > >>> separate > >>>>>>>>>>>> roots, and then come together, what he means is that the first > >>>>>>>>>>>> languages, which are still being invented right in front of > >> our > >>>>>>>>>>>> noses, have separate two layers: a semantics and a phonetics, > >>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>> these are then linked. But that link is not yet wording; it's > >>> not > >>>>>>>>>>>> lexicogrammar: it's simply pointing out and naming > >>>>>>>>>>>> things: matching sounds to objects. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Halliday shows us how the child is able to exapt the > >>> lexicogrammar > >>>>>>>>>>>> he sees and hears being enacted around him to his own > >> functional > >>>>>>>>>>>> purposes, his own semantics and his own phonetics. It's a big > >>>>>>>>>>>> step, but it's a step that even a two year old human can make > >>>> given > >>>>>> the collaborative help of conspecifics. > >>>>>>>>>>>> So it is not reasonable to assume that it was made only once. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Throughout human history, the number of human languages has > >>> tended > >>>>>>>>>>>> to diminish and not increase, either through genocide or > >> through > >>>>>>>>>>>> literacy or both. Babel was indeed our past, but the single > >>>>>>>>>>>> language that supposedly preceded it is really a long-ago that > >>> is > >>>>>> yet-to-come. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 9:04 AM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Gente, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> As far as the invention of language, whether spoken, signed > >> or > >>>>>>>>>>>>> written, do we know whether it was invented once, or many > >>> times, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> independently? Are we humans alone in the universe, the only > >>>>>>>>>>>>> inventors of language? Are these questions relevant to the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> thread? If not, I only have questions, so they?re my best > >> shot. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On May 4, 2016, at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg < > >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, but then in hindsight everything coevolves with > >>>> everything, > >>>>>> Andy. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> And > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> only in hindsight. Three problems with that. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> First of all, this view of "co-evolution" renders the idea > >> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> evolution vacuous. There is no obvious reason why the larynx > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> should be considered > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language rather than the mouth or the ears or > >>> for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>> matter > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the hand (Stokoe makes a very convincing argument that sign > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> languages predate vocal ones). So then we have to say that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> speech co-evolved with mouths and ears and hands? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Secondly, to pre-empt a little the upcoming issue of MCA, > >> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this view > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolution also makes it impossible to explain crises as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> internal phenomena. The pace of change of language is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> qualitatively different from the pace of change of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "rudiment" of language, wherever you choose to locate it, > >> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this changing of gears needs to be explained. It wasn't a > >>> simple > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> adaptation to the environment, whatever it was; it doesn't > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> appear > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be environment specific at all. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thirdly, this notion of co-evolution, discovering > >> "rudiments" > >>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>> accidents, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not give us a unit of analysis that has all of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties that > >>>>>>>>>>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are interested in studying. The quipu and the notched stick > >>> are > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately endowed with meaning, but the larynx is not. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what you mean is not the larynx but the vocal tract: > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lungs, the bronchial tubes, the wind pipe, the voicebox, the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> oral cavity, the tongue, the lips and the nose and nasal > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> passages. But this did not evolve at all; in fact, as a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> physiological organ the vocal tract does not even exist. > >> It's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not an adaptation but an exaptation--a bringing together of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> organs which evolved with very different functions for a > >>> purpose > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is not an adaptation to the environment but an attempt > >>> to > >>>>>> create a qualitatively new type of environment, namely a semiotic > >> one. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The notion of the co-evolution of tools and signs not only > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> renders the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of evolution almost meaningless, it also makes it next to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible to consciously and deliberately and rationally > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> introduce design into development. If signs are, like tools, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just ways of slavishly adapting to an environment or (worse) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> slavishly adapting the environment to human whims, we can > >> only > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> stagger and struggle against each other, from one adaptation > >>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the next. But if speech is an audaciously wise attempt to > >>> create > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an environment of an entirely new type, an environment made > >> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning rather than merely of matter, then we humans might > >>> have > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> some hope of transforming the bitter blind combat of each > >>>> against > >>>>>> all into a common collaborative project. That would be co-evolution > >>>> indeed. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Andy Blunden < > >>> ablunden@mira.net > >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David, I am responding to "Tool use--and even tool > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manufacture--is quite common in higher primates. But while > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher primates regularly use gesture, there is no evidence > >>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any other species developing anything > >>>>>>>>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a lexicogrammar." > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In his somewhat discredited book "Ape, Primitive Man and > >>>> Child," > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> makes the point that the form of activity which is found in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-human animals in *rudimentary* form but is fully > >>> developed > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in humans, is the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> key > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the "transition from ape to man" and is thus the > >> "essence > >>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> man" (to use a lot of 19th century language). That is why > >> he > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was so determined, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the time, to find "rudimentary" forms of writing among > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not-literate > >>>>>>>>>>>>> peoples > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (those memory sticks and knots). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the faults of this work, I think this was a > >> profound > >>>>>> insight. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> What > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he seemed to have been blind to is that the larynx evolved > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together with the hand, and human beings learnt to speak at > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same time as they > >>>>>>>>>>>>> learnt > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to make tools. It was only in 1931 that he recognised that > >> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> spoken word was as much a sign as a piece of technology > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > >>>>>>>>>>>>> communicative > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> purposes - which nonetheless, did turn out to mark a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> qualitative leap in human cultural development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The great insight from this work is that despite himself, > >> he > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looked > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *not* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at the attribute of human beings which was exclusively > >> found > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> among > >>>>>>>>>>>>> humans > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (lexicogrammar) as the "essence of man," but on the > >> contrary > >>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the mediating activity which produced the change from one > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> species to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> another. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is the Hegelian idea of concept, a.k.a. species, as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposed to the positivist concept of species/concept which > >>>> looks > >>>>>> for "essential" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attributes as definitive. But he didn;t know that until > >> 1931. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> making On 4/05/2016 1:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greg: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tool use--and even tool manufacture--is quite common in > >>> higher > >>>>>>>>>>>>> primates. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But while the higher primates regularly use gesture, there > >>> is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no > >>>>>>>>>>>>> evidence > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of any other species developing anything like a > >>> lexicogrammar. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's in that sense that I was arguing that tool use has > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal priority over > >>>>>>>>>>>>> signs. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't think tools and signs co-evolved phylogenetically > >> any > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than > >>>>>>>>>>>>> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve ontogenetically. I think that practical > >>> intelligence > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and speech have separate genetic roots and separate > >>> functional > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paths, the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> oriented towards the environment and the other towards > >>>>>> conspecifics. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While he was in prison, Oscar Wilde was allowed one sheet > >> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> day, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which was issued to him in the morning and then locked in > >> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> safe in the evening. He used this to write a very long > >>> letter > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to his lover Lord > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Alfred > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Douglas (about a third of this letter, with the long and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> highly contradictory complaints removed, was published as > >>> "De > >>>>>> Profundis"). > >>>>>>>>>>>>> But it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was only after his release that he was able to transform > >> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sorry mess into great art, a ballad about a trooper who > >> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanged while he was in prison. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He did not wear his scarlet coat For blood and wine are > >> red > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And blood and wine were on his hands When they found him > >>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the dead The poor dead woman that he loved And murdered in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their bed > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's all there: the blue coat of the trooper is now red, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Christ > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transforms > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blue water into red wine at Canaa, wine is transformed > >> into > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blood > >>>>>>>>>>>>> before > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gethsemane and Golgotha, and even the main complaint Wilde > >>> has > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> against Douglas in "De Profundis", which is that "each man > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kills the thing he loves but each man does not die" is > >>> changed > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into "murdered in their bed". But the very first step in > >>> this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transsubstantiation of mere suffering into > >>>>>>>>>>>>> great > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> art happens in the very first word, where Wilde begins > >> with > >>>> "he" > >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "I". > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's possible to use your personal misery to > >>> create > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> great > >>>>>>>>>>>>> art. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But it's hard, for (at least) three reasons. First of all, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's hard to stand back and let the material alone rather > >>> than > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> try to whip it into shape. Second, it's hard to reconcile > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sense that your pain is the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and only and incomparable and ineffable and the sense that > >>> you > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are at > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same time everywoman. Thirdly, pain is debilitating: it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> withers your embrace right at the very moment when you > >> need > >>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reach out, makes you unfit for companionship right when > >> you > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> need it most, fills your mouth > >>>>>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent screams precisely when you most need the > >>> precision > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of words > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convey what you are feeling to others. On top of that, as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>>>>>> says, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really good art is not the contagion of feeling: it's the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> individuation of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social emotion and not the socialization of individual > >>>> emotion. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The unmotivated reconciliation that ends "Lemonade" is > >> deus > >>> ex > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> machina, i.e. both unartistic and unrealistic. Either it > >> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manufactured for > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mass > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> market consumption, or the raw emotion that preceded it > >> was. > >>>> Or > >>>>>> both. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Greg Mcverry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would have to agree with Andy on the co-evolution of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools. To > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> separate one as developing phylogenetically as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically seems false. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Could one argue that agriculture was a pre-cursor to > >> formal > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> writing systems but sign systems evolved as a form of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> communication long before? I am not a cultural > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropologist. I really do not know if there has been a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> writing > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system developed in a hunting and gathering culture. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet that does not mean those same cultures were not ripe > >>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sign systems and meaning makings. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the mediation and differentiation of tools > >>> coevolving > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is even more stark when we consider the age of the web. > >> For > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first 25 years of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> web the people building the web were also doing their own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity > >>>>>>>>>>>>> work. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> People that hung out on the the Well, Usenets, chat > >> rooms. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca listservs, etc were defining the tools in a way to > >>> help > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> define themselves. Here > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agreat piece by Ben Werdmuller reflecting on how his tool > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development could not be separated from his own > >> ontological > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> https://words.werd.io/we-are-the-monkeys-of-rum-70f81d4a02df#.n0x > >>>>>>>>>>>>> 23ugom > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In terms of Beyonce. Whether you call it a mediating > >>> activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or a mediated activity. I am not sure it matters. The > >> point > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is to be a force. For > >>>>>>>>>>>>> those > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the states her latest release has been seen as a > >>> call > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to women > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> color. Her Super Bowl performance was both celebrated and > >>>>>> vilified. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't heard Lemonade yet ( I suffer from severe pop > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> culture > >>>>>>>>>>>>> deficit) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but I hear it getting talked about all over the web. I > >>> wonder > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would think of something like the web where the culture > >> is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > >>>>>>>>>>>>> affected > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> market pressures but not limited to any one national > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity. Is the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> web > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the world spirit? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:44 PM Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the evidence is in that speech and labour (i.e., > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool-use) co-evolved, but writing came a whole epoch > >>> later. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do not think it is a sustainable "developmentalist" > >>> point > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of view that a form of activity can first be > >>> differentiated > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and then be mediated: the mediation and the > >>> differentiation > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> co-evolve (so to speak). That's the whole point. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On my update to: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> https://www.academia.edu/4781886/From_where_did_Vygotsky_get_his_ > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegelianism > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never claimed that Vygotsky only got his Hegel through > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx: his knowledge of Hegel was mediated through a > >> number > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of sources (including Lenin and Engels and probably > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plekhanov, followers of Deborin and Lewin). The > >> correction > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you referred to was my admission that the passage you > >> drew > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> my attention to in HDHMF I had overlooked in my > >> catalogue, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that it had to be included with the one or two other > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allusions which seem to have come from a reading of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> section of Hegel's Subjective Spirit named "Psychology". > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Someone, c. 1931, drew his attention to these passages. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are other passages of The Subjective Spirit which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have been of great interest to Vygotsky and would > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly have been appropriated if he had ever read > >> them, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but he hadn't, far less the Logic (though he had studied > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lenin's Annotations on the Logic) or the Phenomenology, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which no Marxist or Psychologist read in the period of > >> his > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lifetime. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it time yet, David, for you to make a correction to > >>> your > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> claim that the Vygotsky archive would eventually turn up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's annotations on the Phenomenology? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > >>>>>>>>>>>>> king > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/05/2016 9:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and I both come out of the pugilistic left, and we > >>> live > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a country where socks are considered formal apparel. > >>> So > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I imagine that no question mark is required to start a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion; nor pulling of punches to finish one. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I made the case that the distinction was pretty > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful, at least to Beyonc? fans--if not, see > >> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion to Chapter Two of HDHMF, where he points out > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the precise nature of the relationship of signs > >> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools needs to be worked out yet, but in any case that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation is indirect; it MUST pass through a > >>> super-category > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he calls MEDIATING activities. For YOU and for HEGEL, > >> all > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity can be said to be both mediating and mediated, > >>> but > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a non-developmental point of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> view: for a developmentalist, one must perforce be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiated first. Phylogenetically, it seems likely > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that tools were differentiated before signs, but > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontogenetically it is usually the other way around. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What really IS academic in the extreme is your own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between "really quoting" Hegel and quoting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel in a footnote to Marx academic. It's also quite > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. By the way, this might be a good place to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> acknowledge the corrections you have recently made to > >>> your > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assertion that every single Hegel reference you have > >>> found > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Vygotsky's work can be found verbatim in Marx. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't see a question mark anywhere David, but (for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasons of my own) could I just note that Vygotsky is > >> not > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really quoting Hegel, but rather quoting Marx quoting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's Shorter Logic in an author's footnote to > >>> /Capital/. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marx puts an interesting twist on the point Hegel is > >>> making > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the original. I think it is a twist which preserves > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's meaning, but it is really the opposite of what > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel is saying. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> By "the cunning of Reason" Hegel means how History and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> social processes in general unfold according to their > >> own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic, irrespective of the intentions of their human > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actors. Marx twists this to make the point that natural > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects act according to human purposes, not their > >>> material > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties as such. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that when Hegel is talking about human affairs, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Spirit" means "Activity", but of course unlike Marx, > >>> Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deifies Spirit. For Marx, men make history, only not > >>> under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions of their own choosing. For Hegel, men are > >> mere > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tools of the Weltgeist (world spirit). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I was able to grasp the distinction between mediating > >> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated activity, though given that all activity is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated and all activity is mediating, the distinction > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strikes me as academic in the extreme. I remain to be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced that Hegel knoew of any such distinction. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The paragraph following the note on "cunning of Reason" > >>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Shorter Logic is an interesting one: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TheRealised Endis thus the overt unity of subjective > >> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objective. It is however essentially characteristic of > >>> this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unity, that the subjective and objective are > >> neutralised > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while the objective is subdued and made conformable to > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power above > >>> it. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The End maintains itself against and in the objective: > >>> for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of > >>> both. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content which remains unchanged through all the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three/termini/of the syllogism and their movement. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>> ----------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy < > >> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-ma > >>>>>>>>>>>>> king > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/05/2016 9:03 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm reading a chapter by Janette Freidrich in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collection "Vygotski > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maintenant" published in 2011. It's an imaginary > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialogue between Buhler > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Vygotsky on the former's theory of language > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the latter's criticisms > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thereof, very cleverly written in INDIRECT SPEECH > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that Friedrich doesn't > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to waste time trying to imitate the voice of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each or pretend that she > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows the exact wording of each argument. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich begins with Hegel's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction (from the LONGER Logic, the one that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I've never read) between > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediating activity is what Vygotsky talks about > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using the quote from Hegel > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in HDHMF Chapter Two: it's when your role is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially bystanding, when > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you use one force of nature, more or less in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural state, against > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another.For example, you arrange the downspout of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your house roof gutters > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so that it bores a hole in a piece of limestone. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or you hang your wet > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> laundry on a tree branch and let the sun dry it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out instead of trying to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wring it dry yourself.. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mediated activity is in some ways the same, but in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others completely > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite. It's the same in that you are using one > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural force against > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another, but it's opposite in the sense that your > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role is not bystanding; > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are yourself one of the forces of nature. For > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, instead of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranging the downspout, you make a chisel or a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> drill of some kind to bore > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a hole in a piece of limestone and sculpt it into > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a flagstone or a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tombstone. Or you beat the laundry dry with a tree > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> branch instead of just > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hanging it there. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Friedrich points out that in Vygotsky's early work > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. "The History of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Crisis") Vygotsky speaks of psychic tools--he > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is treating ALL activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as "mediated" rather than mediating. But in HDHMF, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know that he > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> CRITIQUES this point of view, precisely because it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equates the sign and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. Now, you might think that the sign even more > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like mediated activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and even less like mediating activity than the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tool. After all, sign users > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not bystanders; they are even more intimately > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and intensively and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deliberately involved as subjects than tools. But > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that confuses the sign > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> user with the sign itself. It also ignores a key > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediating activity and mediated activity--which is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that in mediating > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity the force of nature is allowed to act > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to its own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties. When I use a word, I do not try to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transform it from a sound > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into something else; or rather, if I do, then I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get something that is less > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> obviously language and more like onomatopoeia. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While I read, I am listening to Beyonc?'s new > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> album "Lemonade", which is an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt to take a force of nature (the sour lemons > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a husband's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infidelity) and to transform it into something > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> larger than life or twice as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural (the eponymous lemonade). It's an uneasy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cross between a mediating > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity ("for colored girls who have considered > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suicide | when the rainbow > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is enuf", where 20 imaginary characters are used > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Ntozake Shange simply > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stands back) and a mediated one ("Black Macho and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Myth of Superwoman", > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where Michelle Wallace tries to use her own > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences alongside a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> traditional academic approach). Beyonc? can't > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quite figure out whether she > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wants to do this as a mediating choreographer for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an ineffable everywoman > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as a mediated activity by the one and only > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pasha Bey. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri May 13 10:18:23 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 10:18:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up with ethnography?" In-Reply-To: <43214509-C3D6-4E50-809F-5B8F6CF244D8@ucsd.edu> References: <43214509-C3D6-4E50-809F-5B8F6CF244D8@ucsd.edu> Message-ID: The discussion in the blog post below ought to be relevant to all those on the list who use qualitative methods they identify as ethnographic in their work. mike Provocatively posted on the Cultural Anthropology journal Facebook page this morning with the heading "Should anthropology break up with ethnography?" a letter responding to a recent Tim Ingold piece. http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/874-ethnography-translation -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri May 13 12:09:17 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 12:09:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up withethnography?" In-Reply-To: References: <43214509-C3D6-4E50-809F-5B8F6CF244D8@ucsd.edu> Message-ID: <57362672.08f1420a.10b64.068c@mx.google.com> Mike, a very interesting proposal. As I read Tim?s wanting to focus on humaning as verbs I am wondering if this notion shares an affinity with the concept of *mitsein* (our being in the world together WITH each other). Actions take place in the world and not in nature. World meaning a domain of openness or a place of *presence*. Frederick Olafson clarifies this distinction when he says: ?if the distinction between *world* and *nature* is not maintained , then actions simply become another kind of event in a mileau, in which people, (like everything else) are merely *side by side* with one another. In other words to imagine being side by side with others is not *mitsein* and may also be not *humaning* as verb. The concept of *mitsein* which notes we are *primordially WITH the other, focussing attention on this ek/sistence that supplies the necessary condition for all further understanding of the humaning world which may be lacking in ethnographic description that may be focusing more on our being side by side each other. For mitsein (and possibly humaning) the pairing of one?s own (being in the world) WITH that of real orhers (being in the world) becomes a *constitutive element* within all our perceptions of (and) thoughts about this mutually shared world. As adults we can try to call into question humaning which is in effect calling into question something that has enabled us to reach the point where we can pose these questions and write descriptions of moving together *side by side*. This lacks the depth of humaning and mitsein. Larry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: mike cole Sent: May 13, 2016 10:21 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up withethnography?" The discussion in the blog post below ought to be relevant to all those on the list who use qualitative methods they identify as ethnographic in their work. mike Provocatively posted on the Cultural Anthropology journal Facebook page this morning with the heading "Should anthropology break up with ethnography?" a letter responding to a recent Tim Ingold piece. http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/874-ethnography-translation -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 13 12:15:08 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 13:15:08 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up with ethnography?" In-Reply-To: References: <43214509-C3D6-4E50-809F-5B8F6CF244D8@ucsd.edu> Message-ID: That's funny, I didn't know that Anthropology and Ethnography were a couple! I thought I saw that Anthropology's facebook page lists its relationship to ethnography as: "It's complicated." (seems like sometimes in the 80's when it changed to this from its former status: "in a relationship with Ethnography"). But seriously, I get both sides of the argument here (and it is worth looking at the free pdf of Ingold's essay: http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.021). I think what Ingold is trying to do is, on the one hand, to shave off the bad parts of what anthropologists have been doing in the past and to throw it into the conceptual bin of "ethnography" (or maybe "merely descriptive ethnography"). On the other hand, he is taking all the good bits of what anthropology could be and throwing it into the conceptual bin called "participant observation." Ingold's move is really more of a disciplinary shamanic move than it is necessarily an intellectual move (although these aren't much different!). It is an attempt to do a kind of conceptual cleansing, a rite of purification in which one seeks toeliminate the profane (e.g., all the stuff that Writing Cultures and Fabian and others have brought up about the terrors of ethnography, schizotemprality, othering, silencing subalterns, and so on) while at the same time seizing upon the sacred (i.e., the real possibilites that participant observation holds, particularly cultivating the practice of empathy). This is necessary because anthropology must adapt to changing understandings of what is constituted as profane or sacred. Simply put, this is an attempt at ritual renewal. That said, I think Cook has an interesting point here in as much as she points to something that is missing, or at least not well articulated in Ingold's essay, namely, What/how does one write-up what one has participatingly observed? Ingold's essay only gives clues, "correspondence" rather than "description" seems to be the main axis that he introduces as a general guidepost to writing. But, of course, I'm not sure what he would have in mind as a write-up of participant observation that involves "correspondence" (perhaps something like Luke Eric Lassiter's collaborative ethnography?). But in the end, it seems, Ingold isn't necessarily wanting to throw out the ethnographic baby with the schizotemporal (etc.) bathwater. Instead it seems he is actually looking for a more substantial relationship between ethnography and theory (and to respond to Cook's critique: doesn't Liebow's Tally's Corner do this? Or is Liebow's ethnography merely descriptive particularism? That's an interesting question). Here, Ingold's argument slips into a much simpler argument: ethnography as descriptive particularism will not do. Instead, ethnography needs theory (e.g., he proposes that the parabola of theory and the parabola of ethnography be put face to face with each other so that they overlap and that the overlap is anthropology). Or to put this relationship a bit more simply: it's complicated. -greg On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 11:18 AM, mike cole wrote: > The discussion in the blog post below ought to be relevant to all those on > the list who use qualitative > methods they identify as ethnographic in their work. > > mike > > > Provocatively posted on the Cultural Anthropology journal Facebook page > this morning with the heading "Should anthropology break up with > ethnography?" a letter responding to a recent Tim Ingold piece. > > > http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/874-ethnography-translation > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri May 13 17:38:34 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 17:38:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up withethnography?" In-Reply-To: References: <43214509-C3D6-4E50-809F-5B8F6CF244D8@ucsd.edu> Message-ID: <573673d3.c30a620a.5d7bb.34e6@mx.google.com> Greg, Mike, On page 389 Tim explores the difference between *intersubjectivity* and his meaning for the term *correspondence* He defines correspondence as ?launched in the current of real time, participant observation couples the forward movements of one?s own perception and action with the movements of others, much as melodic lines are coupled in musical counterpoint. For this coupling of movements that, as they proceed, continually answer to each other. Tim emphasizes *correspondence* has nothing to do with *representation* or *description*. Tim makes a fascinating distinction about living *attentionally* in contrast to *intentionally* with others. Tim that when living *attentionally* gets cast within the frame of ethnography, correspondence *re-appears* in the guise of *inter/subjectivity*. And intersubjectivity [following Husserl] is about living with others NOT attentionally, but intentionally. Correspondence [as Tim means this term] is *not* a relation *between* one subject and other subjects [as the prefix *inter* indicates] but is a relation that *carries on* or *unfolds* along [con]current paths. Being within the current *with* others. Also, in this way of attentionally carrying on are not *already thrown* as the suffix *ject* implies but reside within the throwing. They are not subjects, or objects, or hybrid subject/objects. They are verbs. All beings are in this relation and the human way is *humaning* Indeed humans are not actually beings at all but are *becomings* as humaning ways. In other words this way realizes they are corresponding ? living lives that weave around *each other*within ever extending ways. To practise participant observation is to join in correspondence with others with whom we *learn* as a travelling that goes forward rather than backward in time. As such, this way of travelling is the very opposite of ethnography. Greg, I wonder if this is merely shamanic moves. I *hear* the melody of the concept *mitsein* flowing [con]currently within this stream of thought, this way of travelling. I hear Tim wanting to *limit* ethnography and what it does. To recognize how it is the opposite of correspondence. We can write *about* our experiences *afterwards* and this is ethnography. A valid practise. What Tim is saying that this is *not* living *attentionally* which is the humaning way forward. A fascinating ex/ploration of *mit/sein* or being with the other that is deeper grounded than notions of being *side by side*. It is a deeper ground within a mutual *world* of humaning. Larry Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Greg Thompson Sent: Friday, May 13, 2016 12:17 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up withethnography?" That's funny, I didn't know that Anthropology and Ethnography were a couple! I thought I saw that Anthropology's facebook page lists its relationship to ethnography as: "It's complicated." (seems like sometimes in the 80's when it changed to this from its former status: "in a relationship with Ethnography"). But seriously, I get both sides of the argument here (and it is worth looking at the free pdf of Ingold's essay: http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.021). I think what Ingold is trying to do is, on the one hand, to shave off the bad parts of what anthropologists have been doing in the past and to throw it into the conceptual bin of "ethnography" (or maybe "merely descriptive ethnography"). On the other hand, he is taking all the good bits of what anthropology could be and throwing it into the conceptual bin called "participant observation." Ingold's move is really more of a disciplinary shamanic move than it is necessarily an intellectual move (although these aren't much different!). It is an attempt to do a kind of conceptual cleansing, a rite of purification in which one seeks toeliminate the profane (e.g., all the stuff that Writing Cultures and Fabian and others have brought up about the terrors of ethnography, schizotemprality, othering, silencing subalterns, and so on) while at the same time seizing upon the sacred (i.e., the real possibilites that participant observation holds, particularly cultivating the practice of empathy). This is necessary because anthropology must adapt to changing understandings of what is constituted as profane or sacred. Simply put, this is an attempt at ritual renewal. That said, I think Cook has an interesting point here in as much as she points to something that is missing, or at least not well articulated in Ingold's essay, namely, What/how does one write-up what one has participatingly observed? Ingold's essay only gives clues, "correspondence" rather than "description" seems to be the main axis that he introduces as a general guidepost to writing. But, of course, I'm not sure what he would have in mind as a write-up of participant observation that involves "correspondence" (perhaps something like Luke Eric Lassiter's collaborative ethnography?). But in the end, it seems, Ingold isn't necessarily wanting to throw out the ethnographic baby with the schizotemporal (etc.) bathwater. Instead it seems he is actually looking for a more substantial relationship between ethnography and theory (and to respond to Cook's critique: doesn't Liebow's Tally's Corner do this? Or is Liebow's ethnography merely descriptive particularism? That's an interesting question). Here, Ingold's argument slips into a much simpler argument: ethnography as descriptive particularism will not do. Instead, ethnography needs theory (e.g., he proposes that the parabola of theory and the parabola of ethnography be put face to face with each other so that they overlap and that the overlap is anthropology). Or to put this relationship a bit more simply: it's complicated. -greg On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 11:18 AM, mike cole wrote: > The discussion in the blog post below ought to be relevant to all those on > the list who use qualitative > methods they identify as ethnographic in their work. > > mike > > > Provocatively posted on the Cultural Anthropology journal Facebook page > this morning with the heading "Should anthropology break up with > ethnography?" a letter responding to a recent Tim Ingold piece. > > > http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/874-ethnography-translation > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 13 17:46:35 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 18:46:35 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up withethnography?" In-Reply-To: <573673d3.c30a620a.5d7bb.34e6@mx.google.com> References: <43214509-C3D6-4E50-809F-5B8F6CF244D8@ucsd.edu> <573673d3.c30a620a.5d7bb.34e6@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Yes, Larry, I hear you. But I think the question that Joanna Cook is presenting is something like this (to blend these different languagings): How can you write humaningly? Is that entirely impossible? Is ethnography cursed with non-attentionality and un-becomingness? (the words get a bit, well, un-becoming...). And the mention of shamanic move was meant as a compliment. I think it is also a complement to your "hearing the melody of the concept **mitsein** flowing [con]currently within this stream of thought, this way of travelling." Isn't that precisely what a good shaman does? -greg On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 6:38 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, Mike, > > > > On page 389 Tim explores the difference between **intersubjectivity** and > his meaning for the term **correspondence** He defines correspondence as > ?launched in the current of real time, participant observation couples the > forward movements of one?s own perception and action with the movements of > others, much as melodic lines are coupled in musical counterpoint. For this > coupling of movements that, as they proceed, continually answer to each > other. Tim emphasizes **correspondence** has nothing to do with * > *representation** or **description**. > > > > Tim makes a fascinating distinction about living **attentionally** in > contrast to **intentionally** with others. > > Tim that when living **attentionally** gets cast within the frame of > ethnography, correspondence **re-appears** in the guise of * > *inter/subjectivity**. And intersubjectivity [following Husserl] is > about living with others NOT attentionally, but intentionally. > > > > Correspondence [as Tim means this term] is **not** a relation **between** > one subject and other subjects [as the prefix **inter** indicates] but is > a relation that **carries on** or **unfolds** along [con]current paths. > Being within the current **with** others. > > Also, in this way of attentionally carrying on are not **already thrown** > as the suffix **ject** implies but reside within the throwing. > > They are not subjects, or objects, or hybrid subject/objects. They are > verbs. All beings are in this relation and the human way is **humaning** > Indeed humans are not actually beings at all but are **becomings** as > humaning ways. > > > > In other words this way realizes they are corresponding ? living lives > that weave around **each other**within ever extending ways. > > > > To practise participant observation is to join in correspondence with > others with whom we **learn** as a travelling that goes forward rather > than backward in time. As such, this way of travelling is the very opposite > of ethnography. > > > > Greg, I wonder if this is merely shamanic moves. I **hear** the melody > of the concept **mitsein** flowing [con]currently within this stream of > thought, this way of travelling. > > > > I hear Tim wanting to **limit** ethnography and what it does. To > recognize how it is the opposite of correspondence. We can write **about** > our experiences **afterwards** and this is ethnography. A valid practise. > What Tim is saying that this is **not** living **attentionally** which is > the humaning way forward. > > A fascinating ex/ploration of **mit/sein** or being with the other that > is deeper grounded than notions of being **side by side**. It is a deeper > ground within a mutual **world** of humaning. > > Larry > > > > Sent from Mail for > Windows 10 > > > > *From: *Greg Thompson > *Sent: *Friday, May 13, 2016 12:17 PM > *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up > withethnography?" > > > > That's funny, I didn't know that Anthropology and Ethnography were a > > couple! I thought I saw that Anthropology's facebook page lists its > > relationship to ethnography as: "It's complicated." > > > > (seems like sometimes in the 80's when it changed to this from its former > > status: "in a relationship with Ethnography"). > > > > But seriously, I get both sides of the argument here (and it is worth > > looking at the free pdf of Ingold's essay: > > http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.021). > > > > I think what Ingold is trying to do is, on the one hand, to shave off the > > bad parts of what anthropologists have been doing in the past and to throw > > it into the conceptual bin of "ethnography" (or maybe "merely descriptive > > ethnography"). On the other hand, he is taking all the good bits of what > > anthropology could be and throwing it into the conceptual bin called > > "participant observation." Ingold's move is really more of a disciplinary > > shamanic move than it is necessarily an intellectual move (although these > > aren't much different!). It is an attempt to do a kind of conceptual > > cleansing, a rite of purification in which one seeks toeliminate the > > profane (e.g., all the stuff that Writing Cultures and Fabian and others > > have brought up about the terrors of ethnography, schizotemprality, > > othering, silencing subalterns, and so on) while at the same time seizing > > upon the sacred (i.e., the real possibilites that participant observation > > holds, particularly cultivating the practice of empathy). This is necessary > > because anthropology must adapt to changing understandings of what is > > constituted as profane or sacred. Simply put, this is an attempt at ritual > > renewal. > > > > That said, I think Cook has an interesting point here in as much as she > > points to something that is missing, or at least not well articulated in > > Ingold's essay, namely, What/how does one write-up what one has > > participatingly observed? Ingold's essay only gives clues, "correspondence" > > rather than "description" seems to be the main axis that he introduces as a > > general guidepost to writing. But, of course, I'm not sure what he would > > have in mind as a write-up of participant observation that involves > > "correspondence" (perhaps something like Luke Eric Lassiter's collaborative > > ethnography?). > > > > But in the end, it seems, Ingold isn't necessarily wanting to throw out the > > ethnographic baby with the schizotemporal (etc.) bathwater. Instead it > > seems he is actually looking for a more substantial relationship between > > ethnography and theory (and to respond to Cook's critique: doesn't Liebow's > > Tally's Corner do this? Or is Liebow's ethnography merely descriptive > > particularism? That's an interesting question). Here, Ingold's argument > > slips into a much simpler argument: ethnography as descriptive > > particularism will not do. Instead, ethnography needs theory (e.g., he > > proposes that the parabola of theory and the parabola of ethnography be put > > face to face with each other so that they overlap and that the overlap is > > anthropology). Or to put this relationship a bit more simply: it's > > complicated. > > > > -greg > > > > On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 11:18 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > The discussion in the blog post below ought to be relevant to all those > on > > > the list who use qualitative > > > methods they identify as ethnographic in their work. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > Provocatively posted on the Cultural Anthropology journal Facebook page > > > this morning with the heading "Should anthropology break up with > > > ethnography?" a letter responding to a recent Tim Ingold piece. > > > > > > > > > http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/874-ethnography-translation > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object > > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri May 13 23:38:53 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 23:38:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break upwithethnography?" In-Reply-To: References: <43214509-C3D6-4E50-809F-5B8F6CF244D8@ucsd.edu> <573673d3.c30a620a.5d7bb.34e6@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5736c812.8560620a.5e008.ffff885e@mx.google.com> Greg, Are you asking if writing can ex/press (as a form of becoming) ways of participatory observing with others and this form of writing as unfolding or carrying us (con)currently with others within streams of thought? As you say humanly writing which is opening inquiry that is not representing what has already occurred. Would this way of writing continue to be ethnography or do we take Tim?s advice and limit ethnographic writing to representing and describing what has previously occurred? It seems this kind of writing would have the quality of written conversation unfolding. Larry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Greg Thompson Sent: May 13, 2016 5:46 PM To: Larry Purss Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break upwithethnography?" Yes, Larry, I hear you. But I think the question that Joanna Cook is presenting is something like this (to blend these different languagings):? How can you write humaningly? Is that entirely impossible? Is ethnography cursed with non-attentionality and un-becomingness? (the words get a bit, well, un-becoming...). And the mention of shamanic move was meant as a compliment. I think it is also a complement to your "hearing the melody of the concept *mitsein* flowing [con]currently within this stream of thought, this way of travelling." Isn't that precisely what a good shaman does? -greg On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 6:38 PM, Larry Purss wrote: Greg, Mike, ? On page 389 Tim explores the difference between *intersubjectivity* and his meaning for the term *correspondence* He defines correspondence as ?launched in the current of real time, participant observation couples the forward movements of one?s own perception and action with the movements of others, much as melodic lines are coupled in musical counterpoint. For this coupling of movements that, as they proceed, continually ?answer to each other. Tim emphasizes *correspondence* has nothing to do with *representation* or *description*.? ? Tim makes a fascinating distinction about living *attentionally* in contrast to *intentionally* with others. Tim that when living *attentionally* gets cast within the frame of ethnography, correspondence *re-appears* in the guise of *inter/subjectivity*.? And intersubjectivity [following Husserl] is about living with others NOT attentionally, but intentionally. ? Correspondence [as Tim means this term] is *not* a relation *between* one subject and other subjects [as the prefix *inter* indicates] but is a relation that *carries on* or *unfolds* along [con]current paths. Being within the current *with* others. Also, in this way of attentionally carrying on are not *already thrown* as the suffix *ject* implies but reside within the throwing.? They are not subjects, or objects, or hybrid subject/objects. They are verbs. All beings are in this relation and the human way is *humaning* Indeed humans are not actually beings at all but are *becomings* as humaning ways. ? In other words this way realizes they are corresponding ? living lives that weave around *each other*within ever extending ways. ? To practise participant observation is to join in correspondence with others with whom we *learn* as a travelling that goes forward rather than backward in time. As such, this way of travelling is the very opposite of ethnography. ? Greg, I wonder if this is merely shamanic moves.? I *hear* the melody of the concept *mitsein* flowing [con]currently within this stream of thought, this way of travelling. ? I hear Tim wanting to *limit* ethnography and what it does. To recognize how it is the opposite of correspondence.? We can write *about* our experiences *afterwards* and this is ethnography. A valid practise. What Tim is saying that this is *not* living *attentionally* which is the humaning way forward. A fascinating ex/ploration of *mit/sein* or being with the other that is deeper grounded than notions of being *side by side*. It is a deeper ground within a mutual *world* of humaning. Larry ? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 ? From: Greg Thompson Sent: Friday, May 13, 2016 12:17 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break up withethnography?" ? That's funny, I didn't know that Anthropology and Ethnography were a couple! I thought I saw that Anthropology's facebook page lists its relationship to ethnography as: "It's complicated." ? (seems like sometimes in the 80's when it changed to this from its former status: "in a relationship with Ethnography"). ? But seriously, I get both sides of the argument here (and it is worth looking at the free pdf of Ingold's essay: http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.021). ? I think what Ingold is trying to do is, on the one hand, to shave off the bad parts of what anthropologists have been doing in the past and to throw it into the conceptual bin of "ethnography" (or maybe "merely descriptive ethnography"). On the other hand, he is taking all the good bits of what anthropology could be and throwing it into the conceptual bin called "participant observation." Ingold's move is really more of a disciplinary shamanic move than it is necessarily an intellectual move (although these aren't much different!). It is an attempt to do a kind of conceptual cleansing, a rite of purification in which one seeks toeliminate the profane (e.g., all the stuff that Writing Cultures and Fabian and others have brought up about the terrors of ethnography, schizotemprality, othering, silencing subalterns, and so on) while at the same time seizing upon the sacred (i.e., the real possibilites that participant observation holds, particularly cultivating the practice of empathy). This is necessary because anthropology must adapt to changing understandings of what is constituted as profane or sacred. Simply put, this is an attempt at ritual renewal. ? That said, I think Cook has an interesting point here in as much as she points to something that is missing, or at least not well articulated in Ingold's essay, namely, What/how does one write-up what one has participatingly observed? Ingold's essay only gives clues, "correspondence" rather than "description" seems to be the main axis that he introduces as a general guidepost to writing. But, of course, I'm not sure what he would have in mind as a write-up of participant observation that involves "correspondence" (perhaps something like Luke Eric Lassiter's collaborative ethnography?). ? But in the end, it seems, Ingold isn't necessarily wanting to throw out the ethnographic baby with the schizotemporal (etc.) bathwater. Instead it seems he is actually looking for a more substantial relationship between ethnography and theory (and to respond to Cook's critique: doesn't Liebow's Tally's Corner do this? Or is Liebow's ethnography merely descriptive particularism? That's an interesting question). Here, Ingold's argument slips into a much simpler argument: ethnography as descriptive particularism will not do. Instead, ethnography needs theory (e.g., he proposes that the parabola of theory and the parabola of ethnography be put face to face with each other so that they overlap and that the overlap is anthropology). Or to put this relationship a bit more simply: it's complicated. ? -greg ? On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 11:18 AM, mike cole wrote: ? > The discussion in the blog post below ought to be relevant to all those on > the list who use qualitative > methods they identify as ethnographic in their work. >? > mike >? >? > Provocatively posted on the Cultural Anthropology journal Facebook page > this morning with the heading "Should anthropology break up with > ethnography?" a letter responding to a recent Tim Ingold piece. >? >? > http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/874-ethnography-translation >? >? >? >? > -- >? > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch >? ? ? ? -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson ? -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Sat May 14 05:56:13 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 14 May 2016 22:56:13 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov Message-ID: <16706e18-7978-c162-a9c3-362e4292aa85@mira.net> Here are links to Nickolai Veresov's keynote speech on Perezhivanie on Symposium at ISCAR in Sydney. Perezhivanie in Cultural-Historical Theory: The Concept and is content. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJMpYarIRzs or at https://vimeo.com/164861983 Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat May 14 08:18:07 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 14 May 2016 08:18:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology breakupwithethnography?" In-Reply-To: <5736c812.8560620a.5e008.ffff885e@mx.google.com> References: <43214509-C3D6-4E50-809F-5B8F6CF244D8@ucsd.edu> <573673d3.c30a620a.5d7bb.34e6@mx.google.com> <5736c812.8560620a.5e008.ffff885e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <573741c5.0640620a.7d0a0.ffffd821@mx.google.com> As a work in progress (in the way Tim explains work) I want to inquire into this relation of participatory observation with ethnographic ways of writing. Tim emphasizing that ethnographic notions be limited and clwarer, focusing on the theme of *aboutness*as talking about participatory observation *afterwards*. Greg, I will play with languaging that ex/plores this theme using Frederick Olafson?s notions of (mitsein). Olafson reflects on how deeply problematic is the lack of recognition of the *dis/closive function* of language when language is privileged as merely an *encoding* medium. Olafson is focussing attention on the reality of a mutually shared *world* ek-sisting prior to this process of *encoding* the shared world. Olafson says this mode of thinking that language is mainly encoding is *occluding* the reality of shared *presence*. Olafson says privileging the encoding function distorts the dis/closive function of language. The kind of talk and writing that does not make a *place* for languagings disclosive *character* cannot *invite any co-disclosure* within our addressing each other in our con/versations. Olafaon suggests that to focus attention and being clear concerning this kind of disclosive languaging might undermine the false security that may co-occur if we were to acknowledge dis/closure (as) a function of what Tim calls *humaning* (as verb). Heidegger called this move (way of travelling) as a perversion of *an act of disclosure* into an *act of closing off* Greg, I am aware that I am combining Tim?s way of talking and Olafson?s way of talking and translating Tim?s appeal to limit and make distinct what is ethnographic. In other words my reflections suggest a potential affinity with the concept of *mitsein* as our humaning way mutually ek-sisting reciprocally each in the other. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Lplarry Sent: May 13, 2016 11:39 PM To: Greg Thompson Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology breakupwithethnography?" Greg, Are you asking if writing can ex/press (as a form of becoming) ?ways of ??participatory observing with others and this form of writing? as ?unfolding or carrying us ??(con)currently with others within ?streams of thought? As you say humanly writing which is opening inquiry that is not representing what has already occurred. Would this way of writing continue to be ethnography or do we take Tim?s advice and ?limit ethnographic writing to representing and describing what has previously occurred? It seems this kind of writing would have the quality of written conversation unfolding. Larry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Greg Thompson Sent: May 13, 2016 5:46 PM To: Larry Purss Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [Sed-l] "Should anthropology break upwithethnography?" Yes, Larry, I hear you. But I think the question that Joanna Cook is presenting is something like this (to blend these different languagings):? How can you write humaningly? Is that entirely impossible? Is ethnography cursed with non-attentionality and un-becomingness? (the words get a bit, well, un-becoming...). And the mention of shamanic move was meant as a compliment. I think it is also a complement to your "hearing the melody of the concept *mitsein* flowing [con]currently within this stream of thought, this way of travelling." Isn't that precisely what a good shaman does? -greg On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 6:38 PM, Larry Purss wrote: Greg, Mike, ? On page 389 Tim explores the difference between *intersubjectivity* and his meaning for the term *correspondence* He defines correspondence as ?launched in the current of real time, participant observation couples the forward movements of one?s own perception and action with the movements of others, much as melodic lines are coupled in musical counterpoint. For this coupling of movements that, as they proceed, continually ?answer to each other. Tim emphasizes *correspondence* has nothing to do with *representation* or *description*.? ? Tim makes a fascinating distinction about living *attentionally* in contrast to *intentionally* with others. Tim that when living *attentionally* gets cast within the frame of ethnography, correspondence *re-appears* in the guise of *inter/subjectivity*.? And intersubjectivity [following Husserl] is about living with others NOT attentionally, but intentionally. ? Correspondence [as Tim means this term] is *not* a relation *between* one subject and other subjects [as the prefix *inter* indicates] but is a relation that *carries on* or *unfolds* along [con]current paths. Being within the current *with* others. Also, in this way of attentionally carrying on are not *already thrown* as the suffix *ject* implies but reside within the throwing.? They are not subjects, or objects, or hybrid subject/objects. They are verbs. All beings are in this relation and the human way is *humaning* Indeed humans are not actually beings at all but are *becomings* as humaning ways. ? In other words this way realizes they are corresponding ? living lives that weave around *each other*within ever extending ways. ? To practise participant observation is to join in correspondence with others with whom we *learn* as a travelling that goes forward rather than backward in time. As such, this way of travelling is the very opposite of ethnography. ? Greg, I wonder if this is merely shamanic moves.? I *hear* the melody of the concept *mitsein* flowing [con]currently within this stream of thought, this way of travelling. ? I hear Tim wanting to *limit* ethnography and what it does. To recognize how it is the opposite of correspondence.? We can write *about* our experiences *afterwards* and this is ethnography. A valid practise. What Tim is saying that this is *not* living *attentionally* which is the humaning way forward. A fascinating ex/ploration of *mit/sein* or being with the other that is deeper grounded than notions of being *side by side*. It is a deeper ground within a mutual *world* of humaning. Larry ? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 ? From: From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sat May 14 09:48:17 2016 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sat, 14 May 2016 16:48:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov In-Reply-To: <16706e18-7978-c162-a9c3-362e4292aa85@mira.net> References: <16706e18-7978-c162-a9c3-362e4292aa85@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks for this, Andy. Nikolai?s emphasis on the distinction between P1 (the phenomenon of perezhivanie as a psychological process) and P2 (the abstract concept of perezhivanie as part of a theory) resonates, for me, with Ingold?s emphasis on doing ? ?human?, ?thought?, ?activity? and ?experience? are convenient fictions which allow us to stop the continuous flow of humaning, thinking, acting or experiencing so that we can think ABOUT them. I picture this as being like those moments in films (I think first in ?The Matrix?) when the action is paused as we move around within it, looking at it from various angles. Like a statue or model, the noun allows us to consider a process or event from different angles but the convenience of freezing the movement comes at a cost. There is a risk that we can forget that a human is only a human when it is humaning, an activity is only an activity when it is being enacted, etc. The way the social situation of development is ?refracted? through a particular child?s perezhivanie seems to me to be like the way the environment is ?understood? and understanding is etymologically close to ?standing among?. Being and acting within a social situation of development shapes (develops) the prism through which the social situation of development will shape development. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 14 May 2016 13:56 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov Here are links to Nickolai Veresov's keynote speech on Perezhivanie on Symposium at ISCAR in Sydney. Perezhivanie in Cultural-Historical Theory: The Concept and is content. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJMpYarIRzs or at https://vimeo.com/164861983 Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun May 15 05:55:06 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 15 May 2016 05:55:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov In-Reply-To: References: <16706e18-7978-c162-a9c3-362e4292aa85@mira.net> Message-ID: <573871c1.5020620a.8378e.ffff9433@mx.google.com> Rod, I want to continue with your insight of the ways perezhivanie, Tim?s *human being is humaning* and Gadamer?s notion of *mitsein* seem to be mutually con(current) ways of moving or orienting or approaching this theme of freeze framing *aboutness* that is an (abstracting) from our corresponding ways of moving together. (verbing). Tim being explicit that ethno/graphic doings are abstracting movements writing afterwards *about* what first must unfold and be disclosed through our humaning. I will offer a comment from Frederick Olafson on this concurrent theme. ?It is still not as widely understood as it should be how closely the claim of the natural sciences to be *the theory of everything* is bound up with the validity of the operation that was performed on the concept of the world by philosophers in the seventeenth century, and that has been, since that time, vigorously espoused by natural scientists themselves. This was the creation of the subjective/objective contrast and with it, of the mind as the receptable for mere appearance -that is, for everything that did not lend itself to the methods of inquiry of those sciences. Without the initial act of *abstraction* from *the world as we know it* and the availability of the mind as an *alibi*, an *elsewhere* for all the subjective debris that had been denied a place in the order of nature, the claim of the natural sciences to be *the* complete and authoritative account of what there is would seem feeble indeed.? The theme of humaning (as verb) as what human beings (human becomings) *do* within the world prior to our writing and abstracting and offering accounts *about* this *doing* is worth ex/ploring. Greg?s question if it is possible to graphically compose in a humaning way is an open question. Maybe they are distinct processes but are mutually and reciprocally necessary movements? Perezhevanie, humaning, and mitsein, share an affinity. Larry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Rod Parker-Rees Sent: May 14, 2016 9:50 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov Thanks for this, Andy. Nikolai?s emphasis on the distinction between P1 (the phenomenon of perezhivanie as a psychological process) and P2 (the abstract concept of perezhivanie as part of a theory) resonates, for me, with Ingold?s emphasis on doing ? ?human?, ?thought?, ?activity? and ?experience? are convenient fictions which allow us to stop the continuous flow of humaning, thinking, acting or experiencing so that we can think ABOUT them. I picture this as being like those moments in films (I think first in ?The Matrix?) when the action is paused as we move around within it, looking at it from various angles. Like a statue or model, the noun allows us to consider a process or event from different angles but the convenience of freezing the movement comes at a cost. There is a risk that we can forget that a human is only a human when it is humaning, an activity is only an activity when it is being enacted, etc. The way the social situation of development is ?refracted? through a particular child?s perezhivanie seems to me to be like the way the environment is ?understood? and understanding is etymologically close to ?standing among?. Being and acting within a social situation of development shapes (develops) the prism through which the social situation of development will shape development. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 14 May 2016 13:56 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov Here are links to Nickolai Veresov's keynote speech on Perezhivanie on Symposium at ISCAR in Sydney. Perezhivanie in Cultural-Historical Theory: The Concept and is content. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJMpYarIRzs or at https://vimeo.com/164861983 Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon May 16 07:37:21 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 07:37:21 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov In-Reply-To: <573871c1.5020620a.8378e.ffff9433@mx.google.com> References: <16706e18-7978-c162-a9c3-362e4292aa85@mira.net> <573871c1.5020620a.8378e.ffff9433@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5739db39.e3a0420a.831ec.ffffab39@mx.google.com> Nikolai Veresov makes a central point that perezhivanie is not *social situation* but is rather social situation (of) *development*. As such perezhivanie is a *unit* and not a *unity*. Perezhivanie has two aspects. Point 1 indicates perezhivanie as verb/process involving think/ing and as such is *phenomenological, which focusses attentional humaning on becoming (travelling beyond repetition and representation and description as aspects of *aboutness*. The key notion (of development) as not yet but potentially or possibly corresponding within the drama of the social situation. Point 2 indicates perezhivanie as being (accomplished) (implies attention is not becoming) and indicates noun/content. This is the content of human *being* that requires humaning to come into this place (of develop). What has previously come into ek-sistence and is now reflected upon concerning this refractive emerging phenomena (of development). Thinking becoming thought. Nikolai?s presentation of prezhivanie hinges on being clear that it is not the *social situation* that is the focus of attentional *mitsein* but rather the social situation *of* development. Now (of) generates specific notions but these notions involve a double genitive. Meaning 1: *of* as *aboutness* (within this relation of) what is meant is that the social situation of development addresses or tells us *about*the way social situation develops development as content Meaning 2: *of* as constitutive (within this way of). What is meant by (social situation of development) is development as phenomenal as that which is coming into ek-sistence within the social situation. Development as not yet but potentially emerging (dis/closing) within the social situation. I hear Nikolai Veresov and Ingold and Gadamer playing in the same sand box and an affinity between their ex/plorations. I hope this is not too cryptic. It is the melodic sound I hear within perezhivanie, humaning, and mitsein. Larry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Lplarry Sent: May 15, 2016 5:55 AM To: Rod Parker-Rees; ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov Rod, I want to continue with your insight of the ways perezhivanie, Tim?s *human being is humaning* and Gadamer?s notion of *mitsein* seem to be mutually con(current) ways of moving or orienting or approaching this theme of freeze framing *aboutness* that is an (abstracting) from our corresponding ways of moving together. (verbing). Tim being explicit that ethno/graphic doings are abstracting movements writing afterwards *about* what first must unfold and be disclosed through our humaning. I will offer a comment from Frederick Olafson on this concurrent theme. ?It is still not as widely understood as it should be how closely the claim of the natural sciences to be *the theory of everything* is bound up with the validity of the operation that was performed on the concept of the world by philosophers in the seventeenth century, and that has been, since that time, vigorously espoused by natural scientists themselves.? This was the creation of the subjective/objective contrast and with it, of the mind as the receptable for mere appearance -that is, for everything that did not lend itself to the methods of inquiry of those sciences.? Without the initial act of ?*abstraction* from *the world as we know it* and the availability of the mind as an *alibi*, an *elsewhere* for all the subjective debris that had been denied a place in the order of nature, the claim of the natural sciences to be *the* complete and authoritative account of what there is would seem feeble indeed.? The theme of humaning (as verb) as what human beings (human becomings) *do* within the world prior to our writing and abstracting and offering accounts *about* this *doing* is worth ex/ploring. Greg?s question if it is possible to graphically compose in a humaning way is an open question. Maybe they are distinct processes but are mutually and reciprocally necessary movements? Perezhevanie, humaning, and mitsein, share an affinity. Larry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Rod Parker-Rees Sent: May 14, 2016 9:50 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov Thanks for this, Andy. Nikolai?s emphasis on the distinction between P1 (the phenomenon of perezhivanie as a psychological process) and P2 (the abstract concept of perezhivanie as part of a theory) resonates, for me, with Ingold?s emphasis on doing ? ?human?, ?thought?, ?activity? and ?experience? are convenient fictions which allow us to stop the continuous flow of humaning, thinking, acting or experiencing so that we can think ABOUT them. I picture this as being like those moments in films (I think first in ?The Matrix?) when the action is paused as we move around within it, looking at it from various angles. Like a statue or model, the noun allows us to consider a process or event from different angles but the convenience of freezing the movement comes at a cost. There is a risk that we can forget that a human is only a human when it is humaning, an activity is only an activity when it is being enacted, etc. The way the social situation of development is ?refracted? through a particular child?s perezhivanie seems to me to be like the way the environment is ?understood? and understanding is etymologically close to ?standing among?. Being and acting within a social situation of development shapes (develops) the prism through which the social situation of development will shape development. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 14 May 2016 13:56 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Videos on perezhivanie from Nikolai Veresov Here are links to Nickolai Veresov's keynote speech on Perezhivanie on Symposium at ISCAR in Sydney. Perezhivanie in Cultural-Historical Theory: The Concept and is content. ??? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJMpYarIRzs or at ??? https://vimeo.com/164861983 Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri May 20 08:42:09 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 20 May 2016 08:42:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Post-doc in social-cognitive development In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This ought to be a great post-doc for someone on xmca! mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Hannes Rakoczy Date: Fri, May 20, 2016 at 1:34 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Post-doc in social-cognitive development To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org, dev-europe@lboro.ac.uk *The Department of Developmental Psychology **at the University of G?ttingen* invites applications for a position of a *POST-DOCTORAL RESEARCHER IN SOCIAL-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT *(TVL-13, 75-100%) *Research focus* The Department of Developmental Psychology investigates cognitive development in infancy and early childhood with a special focus on social cognition. The PhD position will be part of a collaborative project with Prof. Gil Diesendruck from Bar-Ilan University in Israel that is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and the Ministry of Education and Research of Lower Saxony. The project investigates, from a cross-cultural perspective, the ontogenetic roots and foundations of social group categorization and group biases with behavioral and eyetracking methodology (for details, see the project description below). *Requirements* - Excellent PhD degree in psychology or related cognitive science discipline - Background in experimental, developmental and/or cross-cultural psychological research - Experience with experimental studies with children, in particular with eye-tracking methodology is strongly desirable - Excellent German language skills are strongly desirable Starting date for the 3-year-position is from *August 2016* (or later). Deadline for applications is June 15, 2016. To apply, please send a detailed CV, research statement and the names and e-mail addresses of at least two potential referees, citing ?Pos-Doc? to: hannes.rakoczy@psych.uni-goettingen.de For further information please Hannes Rakoczy ( hannes.rakoczy@psych.uni-goettingen.de) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *Project description* *--Ontogenetic roots and cultural foundations of dual representations of social groups--* Social psychologists have for long noticed the ease and robustness with which adults develop discriminatory attitudes and behaviors that favor their ?in-group? (those similar to them) and undermine their ?out-group? (those different from them). From a cognitive point of view, one of the key foundations of such inter-group biases is the so-called ?out-group homogeneity effect? ? the tendency to represent in- and out-group members in fundamentally different ways, such that the former are primarily seen as distinct individuals whereas the latter are seen as tokens of a homogeneous type. This effect arguably serves as a catalyst for stereotyping, group-based prejudice, and de-humanization. >From an ontogenetic point of view, little is known so far about the developmental origins of these dual representations. Are they a product of social construction and thus emerge over an extended period of time on the basis of socialization processes? Or might they constitute more deeply rooted features of the way we represent the social world, with origins going back to infancy? The goal of the present project is to address this question by investigating the characteristic signatures associated with representations of in- vs. out-group members in infancy. To this end, in 5 experiments we will investigate the manifestation in the context of representing group members, of general cognitive processes known to be well in place by age 1. Specifically, we will investigate individuation, identification, and category-based induction vis-?-vis agents that ?in minimal group paradigms ? will be introduced as members of the same group as the infant, or as members of another group. The guiding question is whether infants individuate, identify, and inductively reason about in- vs. out-group members in systematically different ways, such that the former tend to be represented more as unique individuals and the latter as tokens of a homogeneous type. In addition, by conducting these studies in identical form with infants in Israel and Germany (where culturally, ethnic diversity and segregation is stronger in the former than in the latter), we will be able to address the cross-cultural question whether the nature and degree of such signatures of group representations are influenced by cultural and linguistic experience. Taken together, these studies will shed new light on the ontogenetic and cognitive foundations of group thinking and biases. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Hannes Rakoczy Department of Developmental Psychology Institute of Psychology, University of G?ttingen Waldweg 26, D-37073 G?ttingen tel. ++49 - (0)551 - 399235 mail. hannes.rakoczy@psych.uni-goettingen.de website. www.psych.uni-goettingen.de/en/development/team/rakoczy-hannes _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat May 21 13:33:43 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 21 May 2016 14:33:43 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Marriage Message-ID: <12B232D4-5689-4781-8DFA-937953FD06E6@gmail.com> Gente, Not long ago the chat profiled marriage. I have forgotten the subject line, but I am pretty sure it was Andy who nailed it. Anyway, I remembered about that just this afternoon in puttering around the house, as Judy and I get ready for a trip from here in ?Breaking Bad? territory: over to the California coast in San Luis Obispro... from whence north through San Franciso... inland to Sacramento and then up to southern Oregon for the wedding of my niece. Feeling good about the trip (we leave tomorrow!) but a little stressed as we get ready, with the predictable little bumps in our marriage as we try to collaborate comfortably, smoothly and effectively so as to leave at a good time tomorrow, good being so that we are at least half-way to the coast before we stop for the night in some motel. I am pleased to say that we are doing better than in times past at this. It seems to me that this is due in some part to our allowing ourselves to compliment and complement each other. Something ?mitsein? about our activity. I have come up with the following prediction: Subjects engaged in an activity together are more creative and effective when engaged in mutually supportive language and action. I say ?subjects? to encompass all sentient beings, but can imagine push back there. My own an hour from now. I like the semantic field suggested by creativity. All due respect to Vera and Andy, without pinning any blame for my little homily. Home? Get it? Sigh Henry From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat May 21 13:54:24 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 21 May 2016 14:54:24 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Marriage References: <12B232D4-5689-4781-8DFA-937953FD06E6@gmail.com> Message-ID: <68C7DB2A-33AD-47D4-BACF-7F296F6D0EEA@gmail.com> It?s been LESS than an hour. I can?t take back what I said, but I think ?Creative Collaboration? would be a better subject line, maybe. Hmmm?I love talking to myself. > Begin forwarded message: > > From: HENRY SHONERD > Subject: Marriage > Date: May 21, 2016 at 2:33:43 PM MDT > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Gente, > Not long ago the chat profiled marriage. I have forgotten the subject line, but I am pretty sure it was Andy who nailed it. Anyway, I remembered about that just this afternoon in puttering around the house, as Judy and I get ready for a trip from here in ?Breaking Bad? territory: over to the California coast in San Luis Obispro... from whence north through San Franciso... inland to Sacramento and then up to southern Oregon for the wedding of my niece. Feeling good about the trip (we leave tomorrow!) but a little stressed as we get ready, with the predictable little bumps in our marriage as we try to collaborate comfortably, smoothly and effectively so as to leave at a good time tomorrow, good being so that we are at least half-way to the coast before we stop for the night in some motel. I am pleased to say that we are doing better than in times past at this. It seems to me that this is due in some part to our allowing ourselves to compliment and complement each other. Something ?mitsein? about our activity. I have come up with the following prediction: > > Subjects engaged in an activity together are more creative and effective when engaged in mutually supportive language and action. > > I say ?subjects? to encompass all sentient beings, but can imagine push back there. My own an hour from now. I like the semantic field suggested by creativity. All due respect to Vera and Andy, without pinning any blame for my little homily. Home? Get it? > > Sigh > > Henry > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sat May 21 14:38:35 2016 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sat, 21 May 2016 21:38:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Marriage In-Reply-To: <68C7DB2A-33AD-47D4-BACF-7F296F6D0EEA@gmail.com> References: <12B232D4-5689-4781-8DFA-937953FD06E6@gmail.com> <68C7DB2A-33AD-47D4-BACF-7F296F6D0EEA@gmail.com> Message-ID: Have a good trip Henry Your post reminded me of Malcolm Gladwell's account (in 'Blink: the power of thinking without thinking') of John Gottman's research which showed that contempt was the most toxic symptom in arguments between couples. I guess the 'mitsein' is more or less the opposite of contempt - something to aspire to! All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: 21 May 2016 21:54 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Marriage It?s been LESS than an hour. I can?t take back what I said, but I think ?Creative Collaboration? would be a better subject line, maybe. Hmmm?I love talking to myself. > Begin forwarded message: > > From: HENRY SHONERD > Subject: Marriage > Date: May 21, 2016 at 2:33:43 PM MDT > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Gente, > Not long ago the chat profiled marriage. I have forgotten the subject line, but I am pretty sure it was Andy who nailed it. Anyway, I remembered about that just this afternoon in puttering around the house, as Judy and I get ready for a trip from here in ?Breaking Bad? territory: over to the California coast in San Luis Obispro... from whence north through San Franciso... inland to Sacramento and then up to southern Oregon for the wedding of my niece. Feeling good about the trip (we leave tomorrow!) but a little stressed as we get ready, with the predictable little bumps in our marriage as we try to collaborate comfortably, smoothly and effectively so as to leave at a good time tomorrow, good being so that we are at least half-way to the coast before we stop for the night in some motel. I am pleased to say that we are doing better than in times past at this. It seems to me that this is due in some part to our allowing ourselves to compliment and complement each other. Something ?mitsein? about our activity. I have come up with the following prediction: > > Subjects engaged in an activity together are more creative and effective when engaged in mutually supportive language and action. > > I say ?subjects? to encompass all sentient beings, but can imagine push back there. My own an hour from now. I like the semantic field suggested by creativity. All due respect to Vera and Andy, without pinning any blame for my little homily. Home? Get it? > > Sigh > > Henry > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat May 21 17:38:13 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 21 May 2016 17:38:13 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Marriage In-Reply-To: References: <12B232D4-5689-4781-8DFA-937953FD06E6@gmail.com> <68C7DB2A-33AD-47D4-BACF-7F296F6D0EEA@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5740ff8e.ce2b620a.7a282.ffffa07c@mx.google.com> Another candidate for toxic relations such as contempt may be *cynicism*. When engaged in *mutually supportive* language and action as complement and compliment seems a good place to begin a journey or a marriage or a return home from estranged lands. And being murually supportive is a good antidote to both contempt, cynicism. Larry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Rod Parker-Rees Sent: May 21, 2016 2:40 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Marriage Have a good trip Henry Your post reminded me of Malcolm Gladwell's account (in 'Blink: the power of thinking without thinking') of John Gottman's research which showed that contempt was the most toxic symptom in arguments between couples. I guess the 'mitsein' is more or less the opposite of contempt - something to aspire to! All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: 21 May 2016 21:54 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Marriage It?s been LESS than an hour. I can?t take back what I said, but I think ?Creative Collaboration? would be a better subject line, maybe. Hmmm?I love talking to myself. > Begin forwarded message: > > From: HENRY SHONERD > Subject: Marriage > Date: May 21, 2016 at 2:33:43 PM MDT > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Gente, > Not long ago the chat profiled marriage. I have forgotten the subject line, but I am pretty sure it was Andy who nailed it. Anyway, I remembered about that just this afternoon in puttering around the house, as Judy and I get ready for a trip from here in ?Breaking Bad? territory: over to the California coast in San Luis Obispro... from whence north through San Franciso... inland to Sacramento and then up to southern Oregon for the wedding of my niece. Feeling good about the trip (we leave tomorrow!) but a little stressed as we get ready, with the predictable little bumps in our marriage as we try to collaborate comfortably, smoothly and effectively so as to leave at a good time tomorrow, good being so that we are at least half-way to the coast before we stop for the night in some motel. I am pleased to say that we are doing better than in times past at this. It seems to me that this is due in some part to our allowing ourselves to compliment and complement each other. Something ?mitsein? about our activity. I have come up with the following prediction: > > Subjects engaged in an activity together are more creative and effective when engaged in mutually supportive language and action. > > I say ?subjects? to encompass all sentient beings, but can imagine push back there. My own an hour from now. I like the semantic field suggested by creativity. All due respect to Vera and Andy, without pinning any blame for my little homily. Home? Get it? > > Sigh > > Henry > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun May 22 06:49:59 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 22 May 2016 07:49:59 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Marriage In-Reply-To: References: <12B232D4-5689-4781-8DFA-937953FD06E6@gmail.com> <68C7DB2A-33AD-47D4-BACF-7F296F6D0EEA@gmail.com> Message-ID: Merci, Rod, Ha! You?re reminding me of two bumber stickers. 1) Resentment is like taking poison and waiting for the other person to die. 2) Non-judgment day is near. I?m on the lookout for more as we go west. Henry > On May 21, 2016, at 3:38 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > > Have a good trip Henry > > Your post reminded me of Malcolm Gladwell's account (in 'Blink: the power of thinking without thinking') of John Gottman's research which showed that contempt was the most toxic symptom in arguments between couples. I guess the 'mitsein' is more or less the opposite of contempt - something to aspire to! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: 21 May 2016 21:54 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Marriage > > It?s been LESS than an hour. I can?t take back what I said, but I think ?Creative Collaboration? would be a better subject line, maybe. Hmmm?I love talking to myself. > >> Begin forwarded message: >> >> From: HENRY SHONERD >> Subject: Marriage >> Date: May 21, 2016 at 2:33:43 PM MDT >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >> Gente, >> Not long ago the chat profiled marriage. I have forgotten the subject line, but I am pretty sure it was Andy who nailed it. Anyway, I remembered about that just this afternoon in puttering around the house, as Judy and I get ready for a trip from here in ?Breaking Bad? territory: over to the California coast in San Luis Obispro... from whence north through San Franciso... inland to Sacramento and then up to southern Oregon for the wedding of my niece. Feeling good about the trip (we leave tomorrow!) but a little stressed as we get ready, with the predictable little bumps in our marriage as we try to collaborate comfortably, smoothly and effectively so as to leave at a good time tomorrow, good being so that we are at least half-way to the coast before we stop for the night in some motel. I am pleased to say that we are doing better than in times past at this. It seems to me that this is due in some part to our allowing ourselves to compliment and complement each other. Something ?mitsein? about our activity. I have come up with the following prediction: >> >> Subjects engaged in an activity together are more creative and effective when engaged in mutually supportive language and action. >> >> I say ?subjects? to encompass all sentient beings, but can imagine push back there. My own an hour from now. I like the semantic field suggested by creativity. All due respect to Vera and Andy, without pinning any blame for my little homily. Home? Get it? >> >> Sigh >> >> Henry >> >> > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun May 22 07:07:24 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 22 May 2016 08:07:24 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Marriage In-Reply-To: <5740ff8e.ce2b620a.7a282.ffffa07c@mx.google.com> References: <12B232D4-5689-4781-8DFA-937953FD06E6@gmail.com> <68C7DB2A-33AD-47D4-BACF-7F296F6D0EEA@gmail.com> <5740ff8e.ce2b620a.7a282.ffffa07c@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <0BF20A21-ED35-4399-B80C-A0A925EBD0E2@gmail.com> Larry, Could cynicism elect Trump here in the fall? Henry > On May 21, 2016, at 6:38 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Another candidate for toxic relations such as contempt may be *cynicism*. > When engaged in *mutually supportive* language and action as complement and compliment seems a good place to begin a journey or a marriage or a return home from estranged lands. And being murually supportive is a good antidote to both contempt, cynicism. > Larry > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Rod Parker-Rees > Sent: May 21, 2016 2:40 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Marriage > > Have a good trip Henry > > Your post reminded me of Malcolm Gladwell's account (in 'Blink: the power of thinking without thinking') of John Gottman's research which showed that contempt was the most toxic symptom in arguments between couples. I guess the 'mitsein' is more or less the opposite of contempt - something to aspire to! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: 21 May 2016 21:54 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Marriage > > It?s been LESS than an hour. I can?t take back what I said, but I think ?Creative Collaboration? would be a better subject line, maybe. Hmmm?I love talking to myself. > >> Begin forwarded message: >> >> From: HENRY SHONERD >> Subject: Marriage >> Date: May 21, 2016 at 2:33:43 PM MDT >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >> Gente, >> Not long ago the chat profiled marriage. I have forgotten the subject line, but I am pretty sure it was Andy who nailed it. Anyway, I remembered about that just this afternoon in puttering around the house, as Judy and I get ready for a trip from here in ?Breaking Bad? territory: over to the California coast in San Luis Obispro... from whence north through San Franciso... inland to Sacramento and then up to southern Oregon for the wedding of my niece. Feeling good about the trip (we leave tomorrow!) but a little stressed as we get ready, with the predictable little bumps in our marriage as we try to collaborate comfortably, smoothly and effectively so as to leave at a good time tomorrow, good being so that we are at least half-way to the coast before we stop for the night in some motel. I am pleased to say that we are doing better than in times past at this. It seems to me that this is due in some part to our allowing ourselves to compliment and complement each other. Something ?mitsein? about our activity. I have come up with the following prediction: >> >> Subjects engaged in an activity together are more creative and effective when engaged in mutually supportive language and action. >> >> I say ?subjects? to encompass all sentient beings, but can imagine push back there. My own an hour from now. I like the semantic field suggested by creativity. All due respect to Vera and Andy, without pinning any blame for my little homily. Home? Get it? >> >> Sigh >> >> Henry >> >> > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun May 22 10:47:03 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 22 May 2016 10:47:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?q?_Erich_Fromm=E2=80=99s_Revolutionary_Hope_=7C_Reclaimi?= =?utf-8?q?ng_the_Sane_Society_=7C_Review_by_Kieran_Durkin_-?= Message-ID: <5741f08e.c89b420a.6c319.ffffab16@mx.google.com> Erich Fromm?s Revolutionary Hope | Reclaiming the Sane Society | Review by Kieran Durkin - Henry, yes I believe the Trump phenomenon is based on deep cynicism. I have been reflecting on the notion of *exemplary* lives that are models of hope for others. Here is two book reviews by Kieran Durkin. I am now reading his book on Fromm and Radical Humanism. Thinking of how Froom led a life of commitment to reawaken a sense of *radical humanism*. These two book reviews give a sense of Kieran?s engagement with Fromm and how he navigated through the 20th century. Not sure how others will respond to the notion of messianic prophetic humainism but it indicates the deep tap roots of a theme that can travel from theistic, to nontheistic secular terms but remain within the same *spirit* of a shared mutual value. Fromm travelled through Judaic humanistic theism towards radical humanism but carried the *spirit* of the earlier themes into his radical humanistic commitments to create what I will call the *new commons*. His life was given over to responding to the type of cynicism that Trump expresses. http://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviewofbooks/reviews/2014/1397 Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun May 22 10:50:56 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 22 May 2016 10:50:56 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Radical Humanism of Erich Fromm | Review by Michael Arfken - Message-ID: <5741f178.ce57620a.8c284.ffffd6bc@mx.google.com> A book review of Kieran Durkin?s *The Radical Humanism of Erich Fromm* Read Kieran?s response in comments. An interesting exploration through the way a life is generative within a social situation OF development. The Radical Humanism of Erich Fromm | Review by Michael Arfken - http://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviewofbooks/reviews/2015/1497 Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon May 23 08:37:28 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 08:37:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Larry Purss has shared a file with you. Message-ID: <574323d2.c1d8420a.82e46.ffff8cff@mx.google.com> I thought this preview of a book on Erich Fromm may be an answer to Trump cynicism. Skepticism and doubt may lead towards *hope* but cynicism destroys hope. This book is volume 4 as part of a series edited by Tricia Kress and Robert L. Lake titled ?Imagination and Praxis: Criticality and Creativity in Education and Educational Research?. This book is researching Erich Fromm?S notion of *messianism*. Fromm?s version is *prophetic* messianism and is in marked contrast to *catastrophic* or *apocalyptic* messianism. Fromm?s version has roots in The Judaic tradition expressing Maimondes Negative theology. Fromm moves through Judaic theism to a radical nontheistic radical humanism and this book traces this arc through his life. Fromm?s project of *radical hope* though leaving the orbit of theistic Judaism (informed by Maimondes) continues to express the *spirit* of this radical humanism. Prophetic messianism is in the spirit of *alternativism*. Prophets announced alternative futures and indicated what they fore saw as the consequences of each choice . The choice remains with humanity to choose. Robert Lake came across Joan Braune?s work when researching the intersecting lines between Erich Fromm and Paulo Friere. And their mutual commitment to creating radical hope as active, dynamic and forward looking. For Fromm hope not acted upon is not hope at all. For Friere, hope is so *essential* to what it means to be *human* that Friere describes it as an ontological *need* of what Ingold calls *humaning*. It is Robert Lake?s hope that Joan Braune?s book (in the spirit of Fromm and Friere?s radical humanism) *inspires* (mitsein) readers everywhere to imagine and transform our places into the *new commons*. Into dynamic places of radical love, sustainable life, and the undiminished light of radical humanity at its best. These lives become *exemplary* lives expressed through the arc of a living commitment that chooses the *new commons*. A note if reading the term *messianism* with skepticism (but not cynicism). These 70 pages as a preview will indicate that Fromm uses this term within a nontheistic radical humanism but recognizes its source emerging from within the tap root of Judaic traditions. This travelling from theistic to nontheistic mythemes that share a mutual tap root is a theme to explore within all theories. I hope this is one response to Trumpism. To view the file, please follow the link below: 2144-erich-fromms-revolutionary-hope.pdf https://files.acrobat.com/a/preview/423379db-f922-4304-90f0-c54687331f0b Sent from my Windows 10 phone From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Mon May 23 09:13:28 2016 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:13:28 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Larry Purss has shared a file with you. In-Reply-To: <574323d2.c1d8420a.82e46.ffff8cff@mx.google.com> References: <574323d2.c1d8420a.82e46.ffff8cff@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Thank-you for your astute comments and interest in this work Larry, and for posting the introduction to Joan Braun's book. I was also amazed to discover the many points of convergence between Vygotsky and Fromm's reading of Marx as clearly distinct from mechanized and deterministic materialism. For example both Fromm and Vygotsky believed that when ?man interacts with nature and transforms it??nature also interacts with man and transforms his consciousness.? Or as Vygotsky puts it ?method is simultaneously prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of the study? Vygotsky, 1978, p. 65). *Robert Lake* On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 11:37 AM, Lplarry wrote: > I thought this preview of a book on Erich Fromm may be an answer to Trump > cynicism. > Skepticism and doubt may lead towards *hope* but cynicism destroys hope. > This book is volume 4 as part of a series edited by Tricia Kress and > Robert L. Lake titled ?Imagination and Praxis: Criticality and Creativity > in Education and Educational Research?. > This book is researching Erich Fromm?S notion of *messianism*. Fromm?s > version is *prophetic* messianism and is in marked contrast to > *catastrophic* or *apocalyptic* messianism. > > Fromm?s version has roots in The Judaic tradition expressing Maimondes > Negative theology. Fromm moves through Judaic theism to a radical > nontheistic radical humanism and this book traces this arc through his life. > Fromm?s project of *radical hope* though leaving the orbit of theistic > Judaism (informed by Maimondes) continues to express the *spirit* of this > radical humanism. > > Prophetic messianism is in the spirit of *alternativism*. Prophets > announced alternative futures and indicated what they fore saw as the > consequences of each choice . > The choice remains with humanity to choose. > > Robert Lake came across Joan Braune?s work when researching the > intersecting lines between Erich Fromm and Paulo Friere. And their mutual > commitment to creating radical hope as active, dynamic and forward looking. > For Fromm hope not acted upon is not hope at all. > For Friere, hope is so *essential* to what it means to be *human* that > Friere describes it as an ontological *need* of what Ingold calls > *humaning*. > It is Robert Lake?s hope that Joan Braune?s book (in the spirit of Fromm > and Friere?s radical humanism) *inspires* (mitsein) readers everywhere to > imagine and transform our places into the *new commons*. > Into dynamic places of radical love, sustainable life, and the > undiminished light of radical humanity at its best. > > These lives become *exemplary* lives expressed through the arc of a living > commitment that chooses the *new commons*. > > A note if reading the term *messianism* with skepticism (but not > cynicism). These 70 pages as a preview will indicate that Fromm uses this > term within a nontheistic radical humanism but recognizes its source > emerging from within the tap root of Judaic traditions. > > This travelling from theistic to nontheistic mythemes that share a mutual > tap root is a theme to explore within all theories. > I hope this is one response to Trumpism. > > > To view the file, please follow the link below: > 2144-erich-fromms-revolutionary-hope.pdf > https://files.acrobat.com/a/preview/423379db-f922-4304-90f0-c54687331f0b > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > -- Robert Lake Ed.D. Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University P. O. Box 8144, Statesboro, GA 30460 Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group Webpage: https://georgiasouthern.academia.edu/RobertLake*Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its midwife.* John Dewey-*Democracy and Education*,1916, p. 139 From annalisa@unm.edu Mon May 23 10:09:42 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 17:09:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The power of Humanities in a recursive loop Message-ID: Hi, This was an interesting article I spied in the NYT: To Write Better Code, Read Virginia Woolf http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/opinion/sunday/to-write-software-read-novels.html I hope that there might be more discussion about this in the mainstream, because I do think that in order for the neo-liberal bent in technology to change, it means more non-neo-liberals have to understand how to program. We need to crack that Rosetta Stone. A thermogeologist once told me, "The solution to pollution is dilution." So my thinking is like that. Kind regards, Annalisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon May 23 11:47:36 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 18:47:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> That?s exactly what I figure each time I flush paint thinner down the toilet! :) Martin > On May 23, 2016, at 12:09 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > A thermogeologist once told me, "The solution to pollution is dilution." So my thinking is like that. From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Mon May 23 12:03:31 2016 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 19:03:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Annalisa, A poem I wrote in response to the "every kid should code" nonsense: http://quickthoughts.jgregorymcverry.com/2015/so-you-want-your-kid-to-code-edtechchat On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 2:51 PM Martin John Packer wrote: > That?s exactly what I figure each time I flush paint thinner down the > toilet! :) > > Martin > > > > On May 23, 2016, at 12:09 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > A thermogeologist once told me, "The solution to pollution is dilution." > So my thinking is like that. > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon May 23 12:18:45 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 19:18:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co>, Message-ID: Thanks Martin and Greg, Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the toilet thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management department on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, Martin? And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" algorithmically doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there is something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github or reddit, as I'm not a masochist. However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends to be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. I myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can count, and it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great things with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down rather than bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then fill in the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd become a dialectic coder. Is there such a thing? Kind recursions, Annalisa From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Mon May 23 12:27:55 2016 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 19:27:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends to be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse practices, and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the next gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic coder is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source projects in the last few years as a non-technical contributor. Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right now its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than I knew yesterday. There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn how to code or markup webpages. On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Thanks Martin and Greg, > > Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the toilet > thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management department > on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, Martin? > > And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" algorithmically > doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) > > As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there is > something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github or > reddit, as I'm not a masochist. > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends to > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. I > myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can count, and > it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great things > with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down rather than > bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then fill in > the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd become a > dialectic coder. > > Is there such a thing? > > Kind recursions, > > Annalisa > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon May 23 12:41:43 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:41:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Greg-- What do you make of the minecraft world? I know a lot of kids that love to play it (and adults who think they are wasting their time). What has impressed me is how little live adult co-presence is needed for a group of kids to develop pretty high level skills (the adult is behind the code, somewhere, of course). I ask both because minecraft appears as an issue in places I inhabit and because one of the reasons live adults give if they think it is a good activity for kids is that it is a pathway into the world of coding. I liked the poem as well. Thanks for that. mike (Martin does his flushing in Bogota, Annalisa; perhaps that accounts for the poor advice). On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Greg Mcverry wrote: > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends to > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > > I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse practices, > and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. > > Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the next > gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. > > I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic coder > is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source projects in the > last few years as a non-technical contributor. > > Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right now > its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than I knew > yesterday. > > There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn how to > code or markup webpages. > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Thanks Martin and Greg, > > > > Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the toilet > > thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management > department > > on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, > Martin? > > > > And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" > algorithmically > > doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) > > > > As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there is > > something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github or > > reddit, as I'm not a masochist. > > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > to > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > I > > myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can count, > and > > it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great things > > with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down rather > than > > bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then fill > in > > the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd become a > > dialectic coder. > > > > Is there such a thing? > > > > Kind recursions, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Mon May 23 12:54:00 2016 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 19:54:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Mike, Minecarft is a fascinating world in that it builds the modular puzzle like thinking necessary for coding. I agree it is all child directed. The average 12 year old in the US now watches more minutes of "play with me" videos on YouTube than TV. Meaning they just watch other people play games then play games themselves. I think though much of the minecraft work is the the same identity work kids did through play. The number of Minecraft players who move beyond the survival or play modes and start running servers and making mods is relatively small. Most of the narratology happening is not too complex. Also as Minecraft went mainstream the need to hack at solutions dwindled. It now comes pre-packaged on any mobile device. Not necessarily a bad thing and as you noted the child directed play is too often a short commodity. The identity work of Minecraft however is not in short as a commodity. The marketing, toys, and branding have taken root whereas when I was a kid the identity work being done in gaming and mod communities was more subversive. The activity of the others. In many ways I see this as the state of much technology and the web. It was built by people figuring out how to do identity work from the outside but the processes they created have been packaged and this identity work is now being sold to children. On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:44 PM mike cole wrote: > Greg-- What do you make of the minecraft world? I know a lot of kids that > love to play it (and adults who > think they are wasting their time). What has impressed me is how little > live adult co-presence is needed for a group of kids to develop pretty high > level skills (the adult is behind the code, somewhere, of course). > > I ask both because minecraft appears as an issue in places I inhabit and > because one of the reasons live adults give if they think it is a good > activity for kids is that it is a pathway into the world of coding. > > I liked the poem as well. Thanks for that. > mike > > (Martin does his flushing in Bogota, Annalisa; perhaps that accounts for > the poor advice). > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Greg Mcverry > wrote: > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > to > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > > > > I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse practices, > > and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. > > > > Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the next > > gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. > > > > I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic coder > > is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source projects in > the > > last few years as a non-technical contributor. > > > > Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right now > > its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than I knew > > yesterday. > > > > There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn how > to > > code or markup webpages. > > > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > > Thanks Martin and Greg, > > > > > > Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the toilet > > > thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management > > department > > > on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, > > Martin? > > > > > > And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" > > algorithmically > > > doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) > > > > > > As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there is > > > something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github or > > > reddit, as I'm not a masochist. > > > > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > > to > > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic > stalinists. > > I > > > myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can count, > > and > > > it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great > things > > > with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down rather > > than > > > bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then fill > > in > > > the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd > become a > > > dialectic coder. > > > > > > Is there such a thing? > > > > > > Kind recursions, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From ewall@umich.edu Mon May 23 13:05:04 2016 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 15:05:04 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <17520D5A-A423-4732-9D09-9A1DA78E8F33@umich.edu> All Although I have been known to pour paint thinner down the toilet, I much approve of Annalisa?s solution (unfortunately there are no water quality people around here). Insofar as coding goes, I did, perhaps, learn to code by means other than strictly copying or pasting. However, oddly enough, I began with sketching - I needed to do this for a programmer who did work for me from time to time - and, when he was busy, I found myself translating the sketch into pseudo-code and later into code. Nonetheless, it is as Greg may be saying, you build-on /copy/paste others? insights. Even original coding does that and I have written operating systems, compliers, games, etc. Anyway, Annalisa?s point of beginning with sketching is a very good idea. Then when you have a sort of idea of what you want to happen you need to learn how to force whatever system of coding you are using to implement the sketch. There are people who don?t need to do this, but they probably wrote the system you are using out of a particular need of their own. Finally, you need to think like a computer; i.e.. dumb! This is probably the most important characteristic a good coder has. He or she knows how to think dumb. People have tried to take the ?coding? out and leave the sketching in. That works well for simple applications - see, for example, the community version of LiveCode. However, it doesn?t work too well for something interesting. The history of computer languages provides, by the way, a rather fascinating picture of attempts to capture aspects of human rationality and some of the more interesting attempts you could say were non-STEM. Ed > On May 23, 2016, at 2:27 PM, Greg Mcverry wrote: > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends to > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > > I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse practices, > and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. > > Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the next > gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. > > I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic coder > is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source projects in the > last few years as a non-technical contributor. > > Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right now > its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than I knew > yesterday. > > There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn how to > code or markup webpages. > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> >> Thanks Martin and Greg, >> >> Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the toilet >> thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management department >> on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, Martin? >> >> And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" algorithmically >> doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) >> >> As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there is >> something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github or >> reddit, as I'm not a masochist. >> >> However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends to >> be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. I >> myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can count, and >> it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great things >> with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down rather than >> bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then fill in >> the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd become a >> dialectic coder. >> >> Is there such a thing? >> >> Kind recursions, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Mon May 23 13:15:27 2016 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 20:15:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: <17520D5A-A423-4732-9D09-9A1DA78E8F33@umich.edu> References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> <17520D5A-A423-4732-9D09-9A1DA78E8F33@umich.edu> Message-ID: Ed, Sorry to keep spamming the thread with my rants from all over the web but I agree with you on sketching. There is something about thinking on paper as a tool that allows my mind to solve problems better than a keyboard. This was a comment I made to someone bemoaning the loss of physical typography: https://medium.com/@jgmac1106/why-has-this-stopped-a303b42cebc6#.1vtz1rlau On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 4:07 PM Ed Wall wrote: > All > > Although I have been known to pour paint thinner down the toilet, I > much approve of Annalisa?s solution (unfortunately there are no water > quality people around here). > > Insofar as coding goes, I did, perhaps, learn to code by means other > than strictly copying or pasting. However, oddly enough, I began with > sketching - I needed to do this for a programmer who did work for me from > time to time - and, when he was busy, I found myself translating the sketch > into pseudo-code and later into code. Nonetheless, it is as Greg may be > saying, you build-on /copy/paste others? insights. Even original coding > does that and I have written operating systems, compliers, games, etc. > Anyway, Annalisa?s point of beginning with sketching is a very good > idea. Then when you have a sort of idea of what you want to happen you need > to learn how to force whatever system of coding you are using to implement > the sketch. There are people who don?t need to do this, but they probably > wrote the system you are using out of a particular need of their own. > Finally, you need to think like a computer; i.e.. dumb! This is probably > the most important characteristic a good coder has. He or she knows how to > think dumb. > People have tried to take the ?coding? out and leave the sketching > in. That works well for simple applications - see, for example, the > community version of LiveCode. However, it doesn?t work too well for > something interesting. The history of computer languages provides, by the > way, a rather fascinating picture of attempts to capture aspects of human > rationality and some of the more interesting attempts you could say were > non-STEM. > > Ed > > > On May 23, 2016, at 2:27 PM, Greg Mcverry > wrote: > > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > to > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > > > > I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse practices, > > and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. > > > > Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the next > > gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. > > > > I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic coder > > is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source projects in > the > > last few years as a non-technical contributor. > > > > Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right now > > its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than I knew > > yesterday. > > > > There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn how > to > > code or markup webpages. > > > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > >> > >> Thanks Martin and Greg, > >> > >> Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the toilet > >> thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management > department > >> on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, > Martin? > >> > >> And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" > algorithmically > >> doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) > >> > >> As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there is > >> something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github or > >> reddit, as I'm not a masochist. > >> > >> However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > to > >> be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic > stalinists. I > >> myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can count, > and > >> it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great things > >> with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down rather > than > >> bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then fill > in > >> the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd become > a > >> dialectic coder. > >> > >> Is there such a thing? > >> > >> Kind recursions, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon May 23 16:20:28 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 16:20:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Larry Purss has shared a file with you. In-Reply-To: References: <574323d2.c1d8420a.82e46.ffff8cff@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <57439057.c96e620a.f1ac7.ffffd0bc@mx.google.com> Robert, I am interested in the deep tap roots that seem to travel in a mutually informing *spirit* and go through multiple versions as transformations on a theme. The Christian theme of The Fall (away from the source) and our yearning to return is one example. Erich Fromm is delving deep within an alternative version of the theme of the Fall not as turning away from the source but the leaving Paradise as the theme of the awakening of humanity entering radical historical humaning. The tradition within Judaism that Fromm calls Prophetic messianism. Here is how Fromm reads Marx as expressing this awakening in Fromm?s book *Marx?s Concept of Man* ?I shall try to demonstrate that ... (Marx?s) theory does not assume that the main motive of man is one of material gain; that, furthermore, the very aim of Marx is to liberate man from the pressure of economic needs, so that he can be fully human; that Marx is primarily concerned with the emancipation of man as an individual, the overcoming of alienation, the restoration of his capacity to relate himself fully to man and to nature; that Marx?s philosophy constitutes a spiritual existentialism in secular language and because of this spiritual quality is opposed to the materialistic practice and thinly disguised materialistic philosophy of our age. Marx?s aim, socialism, based on this theory of man, is essentially prophetic messianism in the language of the nineteenth century.? I am focusing on the deep tap root that has travelled through the centuries within Western themes (here a Judaic tap root called prophetic messianiam) that has generated a particular *development* (within a particular social situation). This theme as a deep Judaic tap root informs the arc of Erich Fromm?s life and developed into his concept of *radical humanism*. Fromm is appealing to the alternative of *radical hope* in the face of radical cynicism. For Fromm we have an ethical obligation to *choose* radical hope over cynicism. The arc of his life is exemplary of his choosing this prophetic choice as he participated in generating the *new* commons coming into expression as we re occupy public spaces. For Fromm this is an expression of our radical humanity expressing radical hope. An ontological need expressing our present social situation of development. This is a particular theme which may be transformative if lived deeply. It posits a mutually shared radical humanity as an alternative which chooses hope. Only within this choice will this alternative become real. Chosse otherwise and a different future awakens. Larry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Robert Lake Sent: May 23, 2016 9:17 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Larry Purss has shared a file with you. Thank-you for your astute comments and interest in this work Larry, and for posting the introduction to Joan Braun's book. I was also amazed to discover the many points of convergence between Vygotsky and Fromm's reading of Marx as clearly distinct from mechanized and deterministic materialism. For example both Fromm and Vygotsky believed that when ?man interacts with nature and transforms it??nature also interacts with man and transforms his consciousness.? Or as Vygotsky puts it ?method is simultaneously prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of the study? Vygotsky, 1978, p. 65). *Robert Lake* On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 11:37 AM, Lplarry wrote: > I thought this preview of a book on Erich Fromm may be an answer to Trump > cynicism. > Skepticism and doubt may lead towards *hope* but cynicism destroys hope. > This book is volume 4 as part of a series edited by Tricia Kress and > Robert L. Lake titled ?Imagination and Praxis: Criticality and Creativity > in Education and Educational Research?. > This book is researching Erich Fromm?S notion of *messianism*. Fromm?s > version is *prophetic* messianism and is in marked contrast to > *catastrophic* or *apocalyptic* messianism. > > Fromm?s version has roots in The Judaic tradition expressing Maimondes > Negative theology. Fromm moves through Judaic theism to a radical > nontheistic radical humanism and this book traces this arc through his life. > Fromm?s project of *radical hope* though leaving the orbit of theistic > Judaism (informed by Maimondes) continues to express the *spirit* of this > radical humanism. > > Prophetic messianism is in the spirit of *alternativism*. Prophets > announced alternative futures and indicated what they fore saw as the > consequences of each choice . > The choice remains with humanity to choose. > > Robert Lake came across Joan Braune?s work when researching the > intersecting lines between Erich Fromm and Paulo Friere. And their mutual > commitment to creating radical hope as active, dynamic and forward looking. > For Fromm hope not acted upon is not hope at all. > For Friere, hope is so *essential* to what it means to be *human* that > Friere describes it as an ontological *need* of what Ingold calls > *humaning*. > It is Robert Lake?s hope that Joan Braune?s book (in the spirit of Fromm > and Friere?s radical humanism) *inspires* (mitsein) readers everywhere to > imagine and transform our places into the *new commons*. > Into dynamic places of radical love, sustainable life, and the > undiminished light of radical humanity at its best. > > These lives become *exemplary* lives expressed through the arc of a living > commitment that chooses the *new commons*. > > A note if reading the term *messianism* with skepticism (but not > cynicism). These 70 pages as a preview will indicate that Fromm uses this > term within a nontheistic radical humanism but recognizes its source > emerging from within the tap root of Judaic traditions. > > This travelling from theistic to nontheistic mythemes that share a mutual > tap root is a theme to explore within all theories. > I hope this is one response to Trumpism. > > > To view the file, please follow the link below: > 2144-erich-fromms-revolutionary-hope.pdf > https://files.acrobat.com/a/preview/423379db-f922-4304-90f0-c54687331f0b > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > -- Robert Lake Ed.D. Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University P. O. Box 8144, Statesboro, GA 30460 Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group Webpage: https://georgiasouthern.academia.edu/RobertLake*Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its midwife.* John Dewey-*Democracy and Education*,1916, p. 139 From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 23 17:09:21 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 10:09:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <02cd921b-fb1b-eb40-5046-d89ca3d8dbfb@mira.net> There is a fascinating sub-branch of science which has developed in which scientists sample the sewerage outflow from entire cities and analyse it down to tiny traces, producing a measure of the amount of alcohol or methanphetamine being used, the extent of diabetes, the state of the populations kdineys etc., just as they would for an individual. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 24/05/2016 4:47 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > That?s exactly what I figure each time I flush paint thinner down the toilet! :) > > Martin > > >> On May 23, 2016, at 12:09 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> A thermogeologist once told me, "The solution to pollution is dilution." So my thinking is like that. > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed May 25 10:46:27 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 17:46:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: <02cd921b-fb1b-eb40-5046-d89ca3d8dbfb@mira.net> References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> <02cd921b-fb1b-eb40-5046-d89ca3d8dbfb@mira.net> Message-ID: With a historical dimension, too: Martin > On May 23, 2016, at 7:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > There is a fascinating sub-branch of science which has developed in which scientists sample the sewerage outflow from entire cities and analyse it down to tiny traces, producing a measure of the amount of alcohol or methanphetamine being used, the extent of diabetes, the state of the populations kdineys etc., just as they would for an individual. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 24/05/2016 4:47 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> That?s exactly what I figure each time I flush paint thinner down the toilet! :) >> >> Martin >> >> >>> On May 23, 2016, at 12:09 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> A thermogeologist once told me, "The solution to pollution is dilution." So my thinking is like that. >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed May 25 11:49:30 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 11:49:30 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> <02cd921b-fb1b-eb40-5046-d89ca3d8dbfb@mira.net> Message-ID: Kudos to Andy and Martin for focusing on such a lowly topic: human waste. Here?s a quote from the link from Martin on toilets in the cradle of western civilization: "So the health benefits of the technology would have been limited, McMahon says. Although the pit toilets would have successfully separated people from their waste ? the measure of a good sanitation system because it prevents the faecal?oral spread of disease ? studies by the US Agency for International Development say that some 75% of a population must have access before there are widespread improvements in health.? The idea seems to be that increases in human life spans come from broad epidemiological advances, rather than heroic, end-of-life measures that are available only to those with lots of money and power. The rich do live somewhat longer, but not a whole lot. A rising tide raises all boats. This is collaborative creativity on a large scale. This is not a triumphalist, heroic narrative, rather more grounded, lowly. More Emily Dickinson than Homer. But still the humanities, in keeping with the subject line. Incidentally, I am reading a book by Yuval Noah Harari?Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. The last sentence from the first chapter: "Homo Sapiens conquered the world thanks above all to its unique language.? An interesting reference in the Wikipedia article on Harari is an article he wrote on a historical shift of the self-concept of the soldier from hero to victim, in keeping with a shift away from the triumphalist narrative. I can?t help thinking this is a reflection on electoral politics in American, which is a reflection on everything else. A hall of mirrors. On the Road (In Oakland now, just across the bridge from San Francisco) Henry > On May 25, 2016, at 10:46 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > With a historical dimension, too: > > > > > Martin > >> On May 23, 2016, at 7:09 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> There is a fascinating sub-branch of science which has developed in which scientists sample the sewerage outflow from entire cities and analyse it down to tiny traces, producing a measure of the amount of alcohol or methanphetamine being used, the extent of diabetes, the state of the populations kdineys etc., just as they would for an individual. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 24/05/2016 4:47 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> That?s exactly what I figure each time I flush paint thinner down the toilet! :) >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>>> On May 23, 2016, at 12:09 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: >>>> >>>> A thermogeologist once told me, "The solution to pollution is dilution." So my thinking is like that. >>> >>> >> > > From jkindred@cnr.edu Thu May 26 06:42:38 2016 From: jkindred@cnr.edu (Kindred, Jessica Dr.) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 13:42:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> , Message-ID: I read a huge article in the Sunday Times magazine a few weeks back about Minecraft. It was a full on endorsement as far as I could tell, but at the end, buried in some point about how it teaches kids about coding and creating things from resources, it said "Kill a spider, get the silk." This is the wrong lesson to be teaching kids about spiders and other living things. Spiders don't make silk once they're dead, except in exploitative fictional landscapes like this that are teaching kids to kill nature for their own use. This seems tragic on the heels of a generation that was raised to save the earth, in the wake of what their parents have done to it. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: Monday, May 23, 2016 3:41 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop Greg-- What do you make of the minecraft world? I know a lot of kids that love to play it (and adults who think they are wasting their time). What has impressed me is how little live adult co-presence is needed for a group of kids to develop pretty high level skills (the adult is behind the code, somewhere, of course). I ask both because minecraft appears as an issue in places I inhabit and because one of the reasons live adults give if they think it is a good activity for kids is that it is a pathway into the world of coding. I liked the poem as well. Thanks for that. mike (Martin does his flushing in Bogota, Annalisa; perhaps that accounts for the poor advice). On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Greg Mcverry wrote: > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends to > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > > I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse practices, > and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. > > Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the next > gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. > > I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic coder > is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source projects in the > last few years as a non-technical contributor. > > Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right now > its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than I knew > yesterday. > > There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn how to > code or markup webpages. > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Thanks Martin and Greg, > > > > Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the toilet > > thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management > department > > on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, > Martin? > > > > And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" > algorithmically > > doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) > > > > As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there is > > something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github or > > reddit, as I'm not a masochist. > > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > to > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > I > > myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can count, > and > > it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great things > > with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down rather > than > > bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then fill > in > > the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd become a > > dialectic coder. > > > > Is there such a thing? > > > > Kind recursions, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From glassman.13@osu.edu Thu May 26 06:52:16 2016 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 13:52:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> , Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F903C037EF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> I have been doing some prep work with students on using Second Life in the classroom and there is a lot of cross talk about Minecraft. Boy did it make me feel old. The general feeling is that it has not been as good since MicroSoft took it over (that may just be good old days phenomenon however), that it was fun and interesting but there are better building programs coming online - one of my students showed me one and it's amazing. Minecraft also may be limited because it is not really set up for establishing goal driven communities (this is gossip for me, I never played it, and if I did I would be terrible at it.) My primary worry about Minecraft is that because it is now owned by MicroSoft which is very proprietary it won't have the same interconnections, import/export capabilities as other platforms. The primary connection Minecraft seems to have now is with the New York Times magazine. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kindred, Jessica Dr. Sent: Thursday, May 26, 2016 9:43 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop I read a huge article in the Sunday Times magazine a few weeks back about Minecraft. It was a full on endorsement as far as I could tell, but at the end, buried in some point about how it teaches kids about coding and creating things from resources, it said "Kill a spider, get the silk." This is the wrong lesson to be teaching kids about spiders and other living things. Spiders don't make silk once they're dead, except in exploitative fictional landscapes like this that are teaching kids to kill nature for their own use. This seems tragic on the heels of a generation that was raised to save the earth, in the wake of what their parents have done to it. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: Monday, May 23, 2016 3:41 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop Greg-- What do you make of the minecraft world? I know a lot of kids that love to play it (and adults who think they are wasting their time). What has impressed me is how little live adult co-presence is needed for a group of kids to develop pretty high level skills (the adult is behind the code, somewhere, of course). I ask both because minecraft appears as an issue in places I inhabit and because one of the reasons live adults give if they think it is a good activity for kids is that it is a pathway into the world of coding. I liked the poem as well. Thanks for that. mike (Martin does his flushing in Bogota, Annalisa; perhaps that accounts for the poor advice). On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Greg Mcverry wrote: > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which > tends to be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > > I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse > practices, and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. > > Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the > next gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. > > I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic > coder is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source > projects in the last few years as a non-technical contributor. > > Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right > now its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than > I knew yesterday. > > There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn > how to code or markup webpages. > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Thanks Martin and Greg, > > > > Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the > > toilet thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste > > management > department > > on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, > Martin? > > > > And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" > algorithmically > > doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) > > > > As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there > > is something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean > > github or reddit, as I'm not a masochist. > > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which > > tends > to > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > I > > myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can > > count, > and > > it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great > > things with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking > > (top-down rather > than > > bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then > > fill > in > > the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd > > become a dialectic coder. > > > > Is there such a thing? > > > > Kind recursions, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu May 26 09:37:48 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 09:37:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Jessica -- Your observation of deep commitments of Western common sense to a culture/nature dualistic ontology fits with my experience with "edutainment" games as a genre that was very important at least from about a 20 year stretch. Oregon trails is an award winning game whose underlying schema can be the source of rich educational experiences, but fits the Grand Narrative of American expansionism excusing mass genocide that Jim Wertsch writes about in terms of the influence of national narratives. There must be a whole academic industry in games studies doing such critical analyses but I have not read much of it. mike little about it. On Thu, May 26, 2016 at 6:42 AM, Kindred, Jessica Dr. wrote: > I read a huge article in the Sunday Times magazine a few weeks back about > Minecraft. It was a full on endorsement as far as I could tell, but at the > end, buried in some point about how it teaches kids about coding and > creating things from resources, it said "Kill a spider, get the silk." This > is the wrong lesson to be teaching kids about spiders and other living > things. Spiders don't make silk once they're dead, except in exploitative > fictional landscapes like this that are teaching kids to kill nature for > their own use. This seems tragic on the heels of a generation that was > raised to save the earth, in the wake of what their parents have done to it. > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Monday, May 23, 2016 3:41 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop > > Greg-- What do you make of the minecraft world? I know a lot of kids that > love to play it (and adults who > think they are wasting their time). What has impressed me is how little > live adult co-presence is needed for a group of kids to develop pretty high > level skills (the adult is behind the code, somewhere, of course). > > I ask both because minecraft appears as an issue in places I inhabit and > because one of the reasons live adults give if they think it is a good > activity for kids is that it is a pathway into the world of coding. > > I liked the poem as well. Thanks for that. > mike > > (Martin does his flushing in Bogota, Annalisa; perhaps that accounts for > the poor advice). > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Greg Mcverry > wrote: > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > to > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic stalinists. > > > > I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse practices, > > and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. > > > > Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the next > > gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. > > > > I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic coder > > is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source projects in > the > > last few years as a non-technical contributor. > > > > Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right now > > its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than I knew > > yesterday. > > > > There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn how > to > > code or markup webpages. > > > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > > Thanks Martin and Greg, > > > > > > Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the toilet > > > thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management > > department > > > on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, > > Martin? > > > > > > And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" > > algorithmically > > > doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) > > > > > > As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there is > > > something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github or > > > reddit, as I'm not a masochist. > > > > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > > to > > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic > stalinists. > > I > > > myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can count, > > and > > > it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great > things > > > with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down rather > > than > > > bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then fill > > in > > > the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd > become a > > > dialectic coder. > > > > > > Is there such a thing? > > > > > > Kind recursions, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From fsulliva@temple.edu Thu May 26 11:57:24 2016 From: fsulliva@temple.edu (FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN) Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 14:57:24 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop In-Reply-To: References: <858AF350-2402-4612-BBC2-AD0EA061D2A9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: In response to Mike's point that "There must be a whole academic industry in games studies doing such critical analyses but I have not read much of it," James Paul Gee is a small industry unto himself in that regard. Some may take issue with his take on video games--he's not your father's Marxist--but he's thoughtful and committed. Francis J. Sullivan, Ph.D. Associate Professor Department of Teaching and Learning College of Education Temple University Philadelphia, PA 19122 Find out what any people will quietly submit to and you have the exact measure of the injustice and wrong which will be imposed on them. Frederick Douglass On Thu, May 26, 2016 at 12:37 PM, mike cole wrote: > Hi Jessica -- Your observation of deep commitments of Western common sense > to a culture/nature dualistic ontology fits with my experience with > "edutainment" games as a genre that was very > important at least from about a 20 year stretch. Oregon trails is an award > winning game whose underlying > schema can be the source of rich educational experiences, but fits the > Grand Narrative of American expansionism excusing mass genocide that Jim > Wertsch writes about in terms of the influence of national narratives. > > There must be a whole academic industry in games studies doing such > critical analyses but I have not read much of it. > > mike > little about it. > > On Thu, May 26, 2016 at 6:42 AM, Kindred, Jessica Dr. > wrote: > > > I read a huge article in the Sunday Times magazine a few weeks back about > > Minecraft. It was a full on endorsement as far as I could tell, but at > the > > end, buried in some point about how it teaches kids about coding and > > creating things from resources, it said "Kill a spider, get the silk." > This > > is the wrong lesson to be teaching kids about spiders and other living > > things. Spiders don't make silk once they're dead, except in exploitative > > fictional landscapes like this that are teaching kids to kill nature for > > their own use. This seems tragic on the heels of a generation that was > > raised to save the earth, in the wake of what their parents have done to > it. > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Monday, May 23, 2016 3:41 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The power of Humanities in a recursive loop > > > > Greg-- What do you make of the minecraft world? I know a lot of kids that > > love to play it (and adults who > > think they are wasting their time). What has impressed me is how little > > live adult co-presence is needed for a group of kids to develop pretty > high > > level skills (the adult is behind the code, somewhere, of course). > > > > I ask both because minecraft appears as an issue in places I inhabit and > > because one of the reasons live adults give if they think it is a good > > activity for kids is that it is a pathway into the world of coding. > > > > I liked the poem as well. Thanks for that. > > mike > > > > (Martin does his flushing in Bogota, Annalisa; perhaps that accounts for > > the poor advice). > > > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Greg Mcverry > > wrote: > > > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which tends > > to > > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic > stalinists. > > > > > > I think this is a stereotype, a specialized set of discourse > practices, > > > and a reflection of gender inequity among coders. > > > > > > Nobody learns to code. You can just copy and paste better than the next > > > gal. It takes a long time to generate original code. > > > > > > I am a self taught....actually community taught...the auto-didactic > coder > > > is a myth. I have been involved in a variety of open source projects in > > the > > > last few years as a non-technical contributor. > > > > > > Yet every project I get involved in, I learn a little bit more. Right > now > > > its just html/css/javascript but its always a little bit more than I > knew > > > yesterday. > > > > > > There are amazing and really inclusive places to reach out and learn > how > > to > > > code or markup webpages. > > > > > > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 3:21 PM Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks Martin and Greg, > > > > > > > > Um... first things first. I never do the paint thinner down the > toilet > > > > thing. I actually make an appointment with the waste management > > > department > > > > on Saturdays and drive it in. Do they not have such a thing for you, > > > Martin? > > > > > > > > And, I love your poem Greg. Just because computers "think" > > > algorithmically > > > > doesn't mean we do. Humans first! :) And Humanities first (too!) > > > > > > > > As much as code is a stinky affair for some of us non-STEMers, there > is > > > > something to be said of occupying the codebases. I don't mean github > or > > > > reddit, as I'm not a masochist. > > > > > > > > However coding should not be a social-darwinist experiment, which > tends > > > to > > > > be the case because code interpreters are ruthless syntactic > > stalinists. > > > I > > > > myself have tried to teach myself to code more times than I can > count, > > > and > > > > it still eludes me! If I had the right teacher, I'd do some great > > things > > > > with code. I think it's because of my system-thinking (top-down > rather > > > than > > > > bottom up) that it eludes me. You can't sketch with code, and then > fill > > > in > > > > the lines (or can you?) I sense, if I were to learn to code, I'd > > become a > > > > dialectic coder. > > > > > > > > Is there such a thing? > > > > > > > > Kind recursions, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch >