[Xmca-l] Re: Which comes first, context or text?

[mike cole]

Metaphors of context as a rope, regarding the discussion on con-text,
fon/phoneme, climate/weather

or not

mike

On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 5:27 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

> Dear Colleagues.
>
> Mike:
>
> I did not intend to offer the oriole example as an example of foreground
> and background, David. Rather, what I was after was the process of an event
> becoming a semantic event. I was under the influence of the discussion of
> fon/phonem and Rod's questions about which comes first.
>
>
>
> My example seems to fit Rod's specifies the process as I experienced it
> pretty well. An initial flash of unexpected light for which there is no
> name that becomes lexified as "the male oriole!"  But the issue of sharing
> is a little problematic. Standing in the backyard, not talking aloud, with
> whom was I sharing an event being woven into a semantic event? The semantic
> event happened, but the sharing?
>
>
>
> It seems important that Tomsello's monumental corpus of work should find
> its way into this discussion. And Nelson's too.
>
>
>
> Anyway, thanks to all for bringing round this topic. That it should occur
> mutually relevant to community psychology and to whatever this list
> represents, seems non-accidental.
>
>
>
> mike
>
>
>
> PS- On the question of context and figure/ground, I will send around three
> uses of the metaphor of context as rope. Their variety of
> origins/applications of the metaphor strike me as worth thinking about and
> speak to David's characterization of my views.
>
> On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 3:31 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>> This is helpful, David but I am not sure that your cline, as I understand
>> it, fully recognises the asymmetries of texts framed in systems of concepts
>> and texts framed in 'real' things and interactions. For the infant there is
>> no significant distinction between the attention and activity and the
>> knowledge which subtends them. Concepts, categories and words allow
>> multiple instances to be woven into nameable ideas which can exist outside
>> any particular 'real' context and can therefore be shared but whether we
>> think lived experience is reduced or elevated to shareable knowledge, that
>> knowledge can only be understood if it is given colour and vitality by
>> 'spontaneous concepts'. So the wordy, abstractable text depends on every
>> hearer/reader/participant's ability to connect shared branches with private
>> roots - breathing meaning into it but when meaning is shared directly, in
>> shared attention, for example, it does not depend on participants' ability
>> to make connections with the branches of a system of concepts. It may be
>> possible to put this sort of 'face to face' meaning sharing into words
>> (though inevitably this will involve some reduction or elevation) but this
>> translation is not a necessary part of the experience of the text.
>>
>> I have a feeling that weather is already half way reduced/elevated, a
>> generalisation which can describe an experience shared by many, even if it
>> has not attained the level of generalisation required for thinking about
>> climate. Shared attention may be something more contained - a flash of
>> lightning, a gust of wind or a flurry of snow on the face of that beast!
>>
>> It seems to me that what is required for an event to be woven into a
>> semantic event is just that its noticing is shared. When infants 'discover'
>> that a previously undifferentiated 'Great We' can be differentiated into
>> 'my attention' AND 'your attention' they can delight in the experience of
>> 'locking on' which is felt when attention is shared. I am still very
>> uncertain about the boundary beyond which an event can be thought of as
>> semantic. I suspect that the felt familiarity of a situation which has been
>> shared before (like Andy's book sharing but not necessarily with anything
>> as texty as a book) may be enough to produce a sense of 'Ah, I know what to
>> expect here' which might convert an experience into a kind of experience,
>> elevating it (or reducing it) out of the weather of context.
>>
>> It is difficult to form uncertain ideas into texts which stand a chance
>> of sharing meaning with people I have never even met but grappling with
>> these posts does sometimes bring me up with a flash of connection (or what
>> feels to me like connection!). I did like the footprints in the snow.
>>
>> All the best,
>>
>> Rod
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
>> Sent: 21 March 2016 20:57
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Which comes first, context or text?
>>
>> Rod:
>>
>> I think the word "context" will work just fine. We just have to see a
>> cline of instantiation, from the context of culture (the speech community
>> as a whole, seen as the sum total of all the persons who speak a language)
>> and the context of situation (the elements of the context of culture and
>> the elements of a material situational setting which are selected to be
>> semanticized in a given exchange). This cline of instantiation between
>> context of culture and context of situation is exactly what Malinowski
>> describes in the long addendum he appended to "The Meaning of Meaning"
>> in Ogden and Richards, except that Malinowski is not so clear about
>> distinguishing between a material situational setting and a context of
>> situation.
>>
>> Halliday (who was a big influence on Stephen P. Witte) describes the
>> relationship between context of culture and context of situation as being
>> like weather and climate: two different perspectives brought about by two
>> different timescales on one and the same phenomenon. The difference in
>> timescale does mean that in a context of culture certain phenomena which I
>> will call cultural and social are foregrounded and other phenomena which I
>> will call interpersonal and psychological are backgrounded, while in a
>> context of situation, we find things the other way around: the
>> interpersonal and psychological is made explicit and thus tends to get
>> foregrounded while the cultural and social are left implicit and therefore
>> backgrounded. This is not that different from climate and
>> weather: with climate, what is decisive is the angle of the sun and the
>> extent to which the earth retains solar radiation and what is accidental is
>> the patterns of air movement, while with weather what is decisive is the
>> pattern of air movement and the incidence of solar radiation is...well,
>> incidental.
>>
>> Mike likes to say that foreground and background "create each other" I
>> think that's one reason he is so taken with his orioles and with
>> McDermott's spirals/concentric circles. I am less taken with these: taken
>> too far, they set my dialectics against my materialism. To me the reason
>> why the infant must give up proto-speech and learn mother tongue as a
>> SECOND language is because in the long run climate determines weather
>> rather than the other way around; in a language, the context of culture is
>> ultimately mightier than the context of situation even though (and even
>> precisely because) the context of culture is really nothing more than the
>> sum total of contexts of situations.
>>
>> But let us apply Mike's principle here. If context and text really do
>> create each other (and if they evolve, as you and Katherine Nelson and also
>> Vygotsky describe, out of an undifferentiated joint attention) then we
>> should be able to find a counterpart to text at one end of the cline of
>> instantiation as easily as we do at the other.
>>
>> So we do. The counterpart to a context of situation is, of course, a
>> text, so long as we see text as a semantic event and not simply the
>> recording thereof in paper and ink. Text is what people like to call
>> discourse, but such is the conservatism of academics we tend to associate
>> text with writing rather than with thinking and with speech. If that were
>> text, though, infants would have to wait for half a decade for it, and they
>> don't. Text is semantic; we have text wherever we have the analysis of a
>> setting into a context and the sharing of that analysis through
>> communication. Text is the beast itself and not simply its footprints in
>> the snow.
>>
>> And the counterpart to a context of culture? It's just the sum total of
>> everything that a speech community writes, reads, speaks and understands:
>> it's the sum total of text produced in a language. But my point was that
>> it's text, or anyway the socio/cultural equivalent of text (and in some
>> cases, e.g. the Torah or the Confucian Classics, it's literally reducible
>> to a handful of written texts). It's not just "behaviour", or "activity",
>> or "production".
>>
>> It's not behaviour because it's more about knowing than doing. It's not
>> activity because it's not defined by single goals. And it's not production
>> because there is no exchanging of labor and capital, no production of
>> commodities, no use or exchange value, just "value" tout court. But it's
>> value to which every infant is invited to partake, and in at least one way
>> the infant's understanding of what is going on with the context of culture
>> is more accurate than ours. Infants, unlike adults, appear to assume that
>> since attention and even activity is shared, the knowledge which subtends
>> them must be shared as well.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 8:01 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
>> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>>
>> > David,
>> >
>> > I have opened a new strand to avoid distracting from the discussion of
>> > the Tharp and O'Donnell article.
>> >
>> > If we go back to the roots of text in weaving it makes sense that, in
>> > the wider sense to which you allude, text is always between people. It
>> > is when people connect their interests in some way and share meanings
>> > that stuff and events get woven into text. Even if you hadn't said
>> > anything when you presented the book to the 9 month old baby, the
>> > second presentation would be recognised as a social event - 'Oh yes,
>> > this thing that we do' and this feeling of shared experience does seem
>> > to play an important part in infants' assisted ability to weave
>> > public, cultural meanings into their private, personal experiences.
>> >
>> > As Vygotsky noted, infants develop within an already woven context of
>> > culture so what happens to and around them is pre-patterned and
>> > because humans are oddly interested in what their infants are
>> > interested in, interactions serve to model particular weaving patterns
>> > and styles. Studies by Tomasello, Moll and colleagues (discussed in
>> Moll, H. and Meltzoff, A.
>> > (2011) Joint Attention as the fundamental basis of understanding
>> > perspectives. In A. Seemann (ed.) Joint Attention: new developments in
>> > psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. Cambridge,
>> > MA: MIT Press, 393-413) show that 12 month old infants appear to
>> > 'remember' their interactions with a researcher and selected toys but
>> > only if they have played with the toys together - watching the
>> > researcher play with the toys, or playing with them while the
>> > researcher watches, does not provide enough embodied, enactive,
>> > interactive experience to shape future interactions (and the infant's
>> > knowledge is 'context specific' - not extended to other researchers or
>> other toys).
>> >
>> > So there is a naming problem here. Is there, as you say, no context
>> > without specific, personally experienced and woven text? Or is there a
>> > pre-existing context which, as yet unbeknown to the weaver, influences
>> > and guides the texts which come to be formed? Infants are surrounded
>> > by a cultural context which is richly and densely shaped by the
>> > concept systems which have evolved out of the patterns in people's
>> > behaviour. What their caregivers do with, to and around them is shaped
>> > both by what those caregivers have seen other people do and by a long
>> > history of people hearing and reading about what other people do and
>> > have done. I would like to be able to use context to refer to the
>> > culturally patterned environment in which infants are helped to notice
>> > particular kinds of patterns but you want the word (if I have
>> > understood correctly - and what are the chances?) to refer to a
>> > personal frame of reference. This is helpful for me, highlighting the
>> > way the 'same' cultural environment can be woven into different
>> > contexts by different weavers, but that leaves me needing another word
>> > for the co-woven, negotiated environment which enables infants to join
>> > in before they have sorted out or internalised the concept systems
>> > which shape it. And which allows someone entering a new job or a new
>> > role to sidle in from peripheral participation to feeling they belong
>> at the core of the group.
>> >
>> > If you haven't already read Katherine Nelson's 'Young Minds in Social
>> > Worlds: experience, meaning and memory' (Harvard 2007) I would
>> > strongly recommend this - she develops a strongly Vygotskyan argument
>> > that infant development has to be understood in terms of interwoven
>> > processes of making sense and making relationships - drawing together
>> > a huge amount of research on early communication and meaning sharing.
>> >
>> > All the best,
>> >
>> > Rod
>> >
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
>> > Sent: 20 March 2016 20:31
>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
>> >
>> > Rod:
>> >
>> > Actually, that's just the kind of text I'm working with right now.
>> > Here's the plan. Every week, we give a nine month old baby a book. We
>> > ask four questions in two languages (because the baby has one Korean
>> > speaking parent and one English speaking one):
>> >
>> > a) English: What's this?
>> > b) English: Is it a ...?
>> > c) Yigot mueo ya? (What's this?)
>> > d) ... yi ya?   (Is it a ...?)
>> >
>> > Sometimes we mix up the order. This goes on every week for the next
>> > three years, as the child first figures out that a book is not edible.
>> > That it contains pictures. That that the pictures are not just colors
>> > but meant to be signs. That beneath the pictures there are letters.
>> > That the letters are not just drawings but are meant to be symbols.
>> > That the symbols encode settings, characters, and problems. That the
>> > problems can only be solved by means of dialogue, etc.
>> >
>> > Now, the first time I tried this, the child simply could not
>> > concentrate on the object for any length of time. But the SECOND time
>> > I did it, the child literally could not look away from it! You could
>> > see that although the child had no idea what was being said, the child
>> > was might just be starting to think some proto-language equivalent of
>> > "What's this?" "Is it a...?" "Yi got mu eo ya?" "Chaek yi ya?" And
>> > after a minute or so, the child looked up, as if to see whether the
>> > large person making so much noise might be thinking something along
>> those lines too.
>> >
>> > So maybe THAT's text! And as you can see it doesn't matter at all
>> > whether the text realizes concepts or feelings or just perceptions,
>> > the underlying semiotic mechanism is pretty much the same. But it
>> > seems that there's only text when something has been selected from the
>> > material setting by some human consciousness or consciousnesses for
>> > semiotic transformation; there's only text when there some kind of
>> > "metaphor" (gestural, phonological,
>> > lexicogrammatical) for context. It seems that it's precisely THIS act
>> > of selection which transforms a material setting into a context, and
>> > it's premature to speak of context before that happens. So for example
>> > I wouldn't use the term context for the first week of work, only for
>> > the second.
>> >
>> > I think it's legitimate to talk about "social context" and "cultural
>> > context", because I believe that context, like text, exists on a cline
>> > of instantiation. At one end, we have the relationship between a
>> > context of situation (Malinowski) and a text (Halliday). That's the
>> > end I'm at right now. At the other, we have the relationship between a
>> > context of culture (again, Malinowski) and...and a whole language
>> > system (again, Halliday). I gather that's the end at which the KEEP
>> > and the Community Development projects in Micronesia and the
>> > Delinquency Research plans are working. But I don't see how "activity"
>> > or "behaviour" can ever realize context, unless it is semiotic
>> > activity and semiotic behaviour, in which case we might as well start
>> looking around for text. That's where the garlic and ginger is.
>> >
>> > (Rod--I'm new at this stuff: watching infants crack the whole problem
>> > of anthropogenesis single-handed, I mean. That's how exciting it is,
>> > and that's about how baffling it is too. I know you are an old hand.
>> > Can you give me any tips on what to read and advice about what to do
>> > next?)
>> >
>> > David Kellogg
>> > Macquarie University
>> >
>> >
>> > On Sun, Mar 20, 2016 at 10:14 PM, Rod Parker-Rees <
>> > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
>> >
>> > > I was driven to respond to David's earlier comments about context
>> > > since my own understanding of this term is in the context of trying
>> > > to understand how preverbal children make sense (meanings framed by
>> > > social and physical contexts more than by systems of concepts). Here
>> > > it is difficult to separate a text out of the context, an 'individual'
>> > > thought process apart from the interactions in which it can occur.
>> > >
>> > > It strikes me that Andy's point about the contexts in which concepts
>> > > have their meanings is particularly relevant here. The
>> > > intersubjectivity available to a caregiver-child dyad or within a
>> > > family is of a different order to that available between otherwise
>> > > unconnected speakers of the 'same' language. Where one is rooted in
>> > > a history of shared experiences in common contexts  the other is
>> > > rooted in a history of more or less abstracted ideas (concepts)
>> > > which refer to
>> > experiences but 'from above'
>> > > rather than 'from within'. Knowing what someone else means is never
>> > > completely achievable and I think the positive consequence of this
>> > > is that intersubjectivity has to be understood as a process, a
>> > > conversation rather than an answer. 'Feeling' with other people is
>> > > not an achieved end but a means towards sharing understanding (I
>> > > like the idea that the word understanding is misunderstood - 'under'
>> > > deriving from the same root as 'inter' and meaning 'among' rather
>> than 'below'
>> > > - to understand something is to stand IN it).
>> > >
>> > > We can know ABOUT other cultures through reading about them or
>> > > watching films but how we know cultures in which we have stood is
>> > > importantly different - I think. Meeting other people, or meeting
>> > > with them, can enrich our personal understanding by exposing us to
>> > > different ways of thinking but I think we have to recognise that
>> > > thinking ABOUT ways of interacting has to be understood as a
>> > > multi-layered thing, ranging from the thickest knowing of our lived
>> > > and co-lived experiences to the ethereal abstractions of
>> > > philosophical
>> > thought-play.
>> > >
>> > > So sharing concepts out of context is doable but not achievable.
>> > >
>> > > All the best,
>> > >
>> > > Rod
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > -----Original Message-----
>> > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>> > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> > > Sent: 20 March 2016 10:34
>> > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Article for Discussion
>> > >
>> > > I don't know if the issue is having common interests, Cliff.
>> > > I think it's very productive, even necessary, that each little bunch
>> > > of us has different concerns and shines light on different aspects
>> > > of
>> > human life.
>> > > But what we really need is shared concepts, through which we can
>> > > understand each other and collaborate. So it is good news that CC
>> > > has appropriated zone of proximal development, activity setting,
>> > > shared activity and the law of genetic development.
>> > > I think we need to be very conscious of the dangers inherent in
>> > > appropriating expressions like these though. You pointed out that in
>> > > the early days of CC, "'cultural psychology' was generally practiced
>> > > as 'cross-cultural', largely as comparison studies", but everything
>> > > I read in your paper tends to suggest "culture" is still understood
>> > > and used in just this sense. Consequently it is very easy to miss
>> > > the meaning attached to "culture" in CHAT, which, after all,
>> > > originated in pretty much a mono-cultural situation. One word can
>> > > index different concepts. Achieving interdisciplinarity is only
>> > > achieved by means of shared concepts. But on the other hand, since
>> > > the content of a concept is ultimately the larger system of
>> > > practices to which it is indigenous, it seems almost as if a concept
>> > > can only be shared when the broader context of its use is already
>> assimilated.
>> > > Along these lines, it was a little while before I realised that you
>> > > were using the word "intersubjectivity" with quite a different
>> > > meaning than I would. It seems to denote empathy. "Intersubjectivity
>> > > involves co-actors feeling the same emotions and values in the same
>> > > situations," and I don't even know it means to "feel values."
>> > > Connected with this the description of joint action, turned out to
>> > > be in sharp contrast to my conception of it. As I see it,
>> > > collaboration (my preferred term, rather than "joint
>> > > action") necessarily entails both moments of conflict as well as
>> > > cooperation. Harmony and bliss are great things, but I think they
>> > > are rather cheaply purchased simply by everyone marching in step.
>> > > I suspect that these two examples of shared words indicating
>> > > different concepts are connected to the hope of mutual appropriation
>> > > by means of having a "center of commonality."
>> > >
>> > > Andy
>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------
>> > > *Andy Blunden*
>> > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> > > On 20/03/2016 12:28 PM, Cliff O'Donnell wrote:
>> > > > Thanks for your thoughtful comments, Alfredo. Roland and I thought
>> > > > that although CC and CHAT have many common interests, most folks
>> > > > in each appeared to be unaware of the other (judging by the
>> > > > infrequency of common citations). As described in our article, we
>> > > > and several of our colleagues have been influenced by CHAT and
>> > > > have used CHAT concepts in our research and intervention programs.
>> > > > As for influence in the opposite direction, perhaps the KEEP
>> > > > project, Seymour Sarason's work, and some of Maynard's work with
>> > Greenfield.
>> > > > Also Kurt Lewin is a source common to both CC and CHAT. I too
>> > > > would be interested to hear of additional influence in the
>> > > > opposite
>> > direction.
>> > > >
>> > > > You are correct that Delta Theory builds on psychosocial systems
>> > > > with Vygotsky as an important source. Delta Theory boldly attempts
>> > > > to be a universal theory of how change occurs using Delta as the
>> > > > symbol for change.
>> > > >
>> > > > I'm pleased that you found the discussion of cognitive science,
>> > > > psycho-neurology, and a potential center of commonality in
>> > > > psychology of interest! That is the goal of the article, i.e., to
>> > > > show how the commonality of CC and CHAT have the potential to form
>> > > > that commonality with developmental, educational, cognitive, and
>> > neuro-psychology.
>> > > > Hopefully this discussion format will facilitate interest in the
>> > > > process.
>> > > >
>> > > > Cliff
>> > > >
>> > > > On Mar 19, 2016, at 6:17 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>> > > >
>> > > >> Thanks Cliff and Mike for sharing this interesting article. I was
>> > > >> not familiar to cultural community psychology and this and the
>> > > >> other papers in the symposium do a great job introducing and
>> > > >> concisely describing the field, and how it evolved from community
>> > > >> to cultural community psychology.
>> > > >>
>> > > >> As I was reading, I wondered how much the influence of CHAT
>> > > >> literature had influenced the development of community psychology
>> > > >> itself from the start. As I progressed in my reading, I then
>> > > >> found clear references to these influences, which even meant the
>> > > >> delay of the publishing of Roland's work, I assume, due to the
>> > > >> important input that Vygotsky's publications meant for the
>> > > >> project. But then I wondered on what had been other sources. What
>> > > >> were other foundational influences to the field? I'd be
>> > > >> interested to know about them in part because, while the paper
>> > > >> discusses many examples in which CHAT gives input to CC, I would
>> > > >> like to know more about the (possible) inputs in the other
>> direction.
>> > > >>
>> > > >> Also, I found interesting the mention of a new center of
>> > > >> commonality in psychology in general. I was glad to see, however
>> > > >> brief, mentions to research in cognitive science and
>> > > >> psycho-neurology. In your paper, Delta theory is mentioned as a
>> > > >> move forward towards integration. In the case of CHAT, this was
>> > > >> pursued by means of developing a scientific discipline based on
>> > > >> dialectical materialism and the sociogenetic method. Delta theory
>> > > >> (I just had a very brief first
>> > > >> contact) seems to build upon the notion of psychosocial systems.
>> > > >> This sounds very much in line with Vygotsky, who surely is a
>> > > >> central source. Again, here I would love to hear what other
>> > > >> insights/sources are involved that may provide new insights to
>> > > >> those more familiar to CHAT but not so much with CC and Delta
>> theory.
>> > > >>
>> > > >> Thanks,
>> > > >> Alfredo
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> ________________________________________
>> > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> > > >> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of mike cole
>> > > >> <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>> > > >> Sent: 18 March 2016 02:39
>> > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Article for Discussion
>> > > >>
>> > > >> Dear XCMA-er-o-philes-
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> We thought it appropriate to put up for discussion the paper by
>> > > >> Roland Tharp and Cliff  O'Donnell from the most recent issue of
>> MCA.
>> > > >> Roland wanted to stimulate discussion among what he and Cliff saw
>> > > >> as people with a strong family resemblance. He passed away before
>> > > >> this part of the discussion could take place.
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> Roland and Cliff argue for the mutual relevance of Cultural
>> > > >> Community Psychology and Vygotskian inspired research in the
>> > > >> approach referred to often in these pages as CHAT, not only
>> > > >> because it is an acronym for cultural-historical activity theory,
>> > > >> but because we have a tradition of chatting here about the ideas
>> > > >> in papers that sample our different interests.
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> In this case, Cliff is intending to send this message and an
>> > > >> invitation to people from Community Psychology to join in. May it
>> > > >> be celebratory of Roland's long life seeking to promote growth
>> > > >> enhancing communication.
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> get your copy at
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/current
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> Enjoy, and of course, send along to others you think might be
>> > > >> interested.
>> > > >> Its legal, free, above board, and, hopefully, interesting!
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> mike
>> > > >>
>> > > >> --
>> > > >>
>> > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with
>> > > >> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>> > > >
>> > > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D.
>> > > > Professor Emeritus
>> > > > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA
>> > > > Division 27)
>> > > >
>> > > > University of Hawai'i
>> > > > Department of Psychology
>> > > > 2530 Dole Street
>> > > > Honolulu, HI 96822
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > >
>> > > ________________________________
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>> > > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass>
>> > >
>> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended
>> > > solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you
>> > > are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other
>> > > use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you
>> > > should not rely on
>> > it.
>> > > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know
>> > > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are
>> > > not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth
>> > > University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your
>> > > responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth
>> > > University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after
>> > > it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an
>> > > order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order
>> form.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > ________________________________
>> > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]<
>> > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass>
>> >
>> > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely
>> > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not
>> > the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the
>> > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on
>> it.
>> > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know
>> > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not
>> > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University
>> > accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to
>> > scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept
>> > responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this
>> > email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services
>> > unless accompanied by an official order form.
>> >
>> ________________________________
>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]<
>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass>
>>
>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for
>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the
>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the
>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it.
>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know
>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not
>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts
>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails
>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility
>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its
>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied
>> by an official order form.
>>
>>
>
>
> --
>
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object
> that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
>
>


-- 

It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object
that creates history. Ernst Boesch
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