[Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon

[Andy Blunden]

Very interesting questions, Sue.
* browse around research on the impact of the death of 
Princess Dianna Spencer. In my experience it had an even 
greater emotional impact globally.
* Check out the work of Alain Badiou on the Event - not 
stuff I like, but there is a lot of discussion around it.
* I think the idea of such moments and the period of their 
"overcoming" being instances of collective perezhivanie is 
which appropriate. I don't know of anyone looking at just 
this angle though.

Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 14/01/2016 11:44 AM, Susan Davis wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps
> how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news
> about David Bowie¹s death and possible experiences of individual and
> collective perezhivanie.
>
> The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief,
> and very public and personal recollections and sharing of
> meaningful moments.  Across social media platforms, in the news and
> conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on
> things that made a difference in their own lives.   People are shedding
> very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps
> thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or
> could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance
> of Bowie¹s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage
> to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing
> Œperezhivanie¹, having a very real and very personal experience right now,
> but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing
> with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct
> meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience
> in lives going forward.
>   
>
> I am intrigued by what is going on with these Œmoments' and times of
> collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous
> collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on
> networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these
> experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people¹s lives by the
> latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a
> sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to
> something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also
> deeply personal. This seems like a form of Œperezhivanie¹ to meŠ does
> anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of
> communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social
> media?
>
> Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential
> new area for investigation?
>
>
> Kind regards
>
> Sue
>
> Dr Susan Davis
> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division
> CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566
> P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au
>
> CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au
>   <http://www.cqu.edu.au/>
>   
>
>
>
>
>
> On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>>
>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
>> progression in its transformation?
>>
>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to to
>> teeth/molars at present...
>>
>> Best,
>> Huw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
>>> the
>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>
>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
>>> is a
>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>> "moment"
>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>
>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology
>>> in a
>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something
>>> like a
>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>> almost
>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>> This
>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>>> as we
>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>> present,
>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because
>>> even
>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>>> angular momentum.
>>>
>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>> sometimes
>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>>> from
>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context
>>> of
>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>>
>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>> seriously
>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>>> solar
>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
>>> the
>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way
>>> to
>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>> example,
>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Dear all ,
>>>>
>>>> Look at this please !
>>>>
>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>> thought
>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>> the
>>>> object is
>>>> ³embedded.² If the construction of this object can still be
>>> represented
>>> as
>>>> a process of
>>>> abstraction of the real object¹s properties, then this third moment
>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>>> within this special
>>>> system of links that the object¹s content gets revealed.]]
>>>>
>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>>> action
>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>>> even
>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
>>> nor
>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>> motionality ,
>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>> converted
>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>>
>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
>>> with
>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>>> It's a
>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>>> affect
>>> or
>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>>> think
>>> of
>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then ,
>>> the
>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>>> note in
>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>> which
>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>> occurs
>>> .
>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
>>> said
>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>>> for
>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best
>>>>
>>>> Haydi
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>
>