[Xmca-l] Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)

[‪Haydi Zulfei‬ ‪]

 Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue :
[[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people’s object-oriented,
practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves,
reflect existent being. But a different content—the mediatedness and connectedness of being,
its inner content—“seeps in” through practical action, where things (the object and the means
of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content—the external and the internal,
the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . 
With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks !
David,
Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions .
[[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a
broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a
transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this
broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the
very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]]
[[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for
understanding its separate components:
In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates
over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general
illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a
particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has
materialized within it.]]
[[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the
dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a
certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing’s specificity when
it is transformed into its own “other”—i.e. their internal connection—is the object of
theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things,
but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and
in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, “It is the work of science to resolve the
visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement…”]]
[[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in
their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory
observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish
certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just
precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the
following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an
“unscientific observer” and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, “takes
the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues,
recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.”[26] External repeatability,
resemblance, differentiation—these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and
subsumed “under schematizing definitions” (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]]
[[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of
individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the “unity
of the diverse.”[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation,
in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its
manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the
process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold
of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development,
in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system’s internal links and thus the
connection between the individual and the universal.
It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and
general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or
formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this
process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]]
Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . 
BestHaydi

















BestHaydi