From laires11@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 01:58:30 2016 From: laires11@gmail.com (=?utf-8?Q?Lu=C3=ADsa_Aires?=) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 09:58:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New 2016 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> Dear XMCAers I wish you a Happy New Year! Luisa A. > Em 30/12/2015, ?s 18:44, Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane escreveu: > > Happy New 2016 Year > > > I wish you a lot of happiness, joy, health, success, fun, good books, films, shows, music to listen and to dance to, many travels and meeting new and exciting people; I wish for the peace in the world, goodheartedness, incredible science, technical, medical and ecological advances; and, of course, I wish you to have all your wishes fulfilled. > But, most of all, I wish us to have a lot of good time together. > > Ana > > > > ________________________________ > Ana Marjanovic-Shane > anamshane@gmail.com > (m) 267-334-2905 > > > > From laires11@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 01:58:30 2016 From: laires11@gmail.com (=?utf-8?Q?Lu=C3=ADsa_Aires?=) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 09:58:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New 2016 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> Dear XMCAers I wish you a Happy New Year! Luisa A. > Em 30/12/2015, ?s 18:44, Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane escreveu: > > Happy New 2016 Year > > > I wish you a lot of happiness, joy, health, success, fun, good books, films, shows, music to listen and to dance to, many travels and meeting new and exciting people; I wish for the peace in the world, goodheartedness, incredible science, technical, medical and ecological advances; and, of course, I wish you to have all your wishes fulfilled. > But, most of all, I wish us to have a lot of good time together. > > Ana > > > > ________________________________ > Ana Marjanovic-Shane > anamshane@gmail.com > (m) 267-334-2905 > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 13:36:54 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 13:36:54 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> Message-ID: <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> David, Yes, it makes sense to me too. It at least partly explains why my comments in the margin of my copy of Speech and Language I bought so many years ago can still evoke my irritation at Vygotsky, who, it turns out, is not the author I thought he was. Another part is my own constantly gaining and losing my grasp on a coherent socio-cultural bead on the here and now, very much connected to the pulses of this chat. Funny how then and now inform each other. Henry > On Dec 31, 2015, at 4:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Thanks, David! :) > All makes sense to me. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are seven >> facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that are...well, more or less >> right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's "Revisionist >> Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on Routledge in the new >> year. >> >> 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, ritualistic, >> deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to cults and >> personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that I am making an >> unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and today's relatively benign >> and bucolic academic atmosphere, note that Anton's revolutionary >> revisionist point in this first section is precisely that: the present day >> reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic >> interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded reference >> lists,an almost complete disjunction between high theory and more or less >> banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in Russia and >> the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, who saw the promised >> land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. Is the >> comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is that it is too >> obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. >> >> There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. The first >> is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a medical fact >> that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it is not >> really much more far fetched to say that he died without ever knowing that >> in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language and widely >> read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that mythbusters are >> themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical facts and >> construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that the >> previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or that it was >> constructed around correct facts which have been grossly misinterpreted in >> some way. So.... >> >> 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky School" >> was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and drifted away, >> spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, although the >> loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This section, based on >> Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first section, which manages to be >> both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. But of >> course for that very reason it tends to undermine the claims of the first >> part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most obvious >> evidence that there really WAS something like a Pyatorka--the fact that >> Vygotsky's own letters referto the Pyatorka, and the fact that the Pyatorka >> held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this contradicts Anton's >> main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were convenient >> constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of understanding) for >> thinking about the history of the Vygotsky school even while it was >> happening. But it also doesn't answer the question I have always had about >> the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton points out, >> there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong pro-Trotsky sympathies), >> the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a bureaucratic >> bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust Trotsky from power in the >> year following Lenin's death. . >> >> 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, is an >> unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from materials which >> really fit rather poorly, during the months immediately before...and >> after...Vygotsky's death. I think anybody who really knows the chronology >> of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this controversial; >> the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence and power >> of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to undermine the >> popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe to--that there >> are three very different Vygotskies believing three very different >> foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). >> >> So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary enough for >> Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to claim that the works >> that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we read today, >> and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. They >> found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three times >> during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two of these lists >> are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job >> application knows very well that you list things that your potential >> employer will find impressive, and these are usually quite far from being >> the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, >> Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational Psychology", >> which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely followed by >> "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the authors quite correctly >> point out, a work of popular science (and includes references to textbook >> writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). >> >> Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the Development >> of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that the former >> was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two unrelated >> texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a benign forgery >> by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. >> >> First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF that it was >> conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion which goes >> back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in which it was conceived >> and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the chapters fit >> together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the problem, the >> approach and the research method followed in the "special studies" of the >> second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. is is >> really weak stuff: they >> >> Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of benign >> forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence in recovering >> historic manuscripts) does not actually explain what it is supposed to >> explain, which is the recurrence of several paragraphs, not word for word, >> but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of Ptolemaic >> epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't bother to read >> what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only authority for >> this story, which seems so much less probable than the alternative >> explanation that this is simply another instance of Vygotsky's tendency t >> repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon Goldberg ("The >> Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and other must >> readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), and an anonymous >> blogger (neither source seems very well disposed to their erstwhile >> professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact that a story is highly >> improbable and that the sources are somewhat jaundiced do not mean that it >> is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean that it >> is...well, possibly mythical. >> >> 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly in mind. >> This much too should be have been already very clear to any careful reader >> of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting part of the >> book, and the only part of the book which really does offer completely new >> evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not written by >> Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a lot of what >> Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed Nietszcheanism and his >> rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of consciousness in favor of "sense" >> (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, as I did, >> whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and if so up to >> what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you may wonder >> what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other unfinished >> works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" is >> mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child Development"). >> But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to learn >> something. It's also the part of the book where we see the most Vygotsky >> inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. >> >> 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write either of the >> English language books for which he is famous. The facts are depressingly >> clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something like half of >> the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the "redundancies", >> which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the inauthenticity of Tool and Sign) >> cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that Vygotsky ever >> wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all of the New Testament, >> like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put together >> by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what the >> revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: "Mind >> in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the significant >> omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they saw that they could >> bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, and that is exactly what they >> did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, whether by >> Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the Vygotsky "boom"; the real >> question we have to ask is--what can we actually accomplish with the energy >> that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of the boom >> stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" suggested >> archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of course that is >> certainly very much to be desired. But it also ignores the exoteric nature >> of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory and >> practice noted in point 1) above. >> >> 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were suppressed in >> order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's national minorities. This >> too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own preface, as well >> as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official denunciation >> of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to be...well, >> more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak the truth >> in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political >> correctness" which only show how very little they understand the concrete >> realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really objectionable >> part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that Vygotsky >> is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations of >> production, without any education, was enough to create concepts in the >> minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in any of Vygotsky's or >> Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the contrary. (Luria repeatedly >> refers to the effect of schooling). Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do not >> raise a number of key issues: >> >> a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those who take >> experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological fieldwork with >> them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. Does this explain why he >> did not personally take part? >> >> b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people like >> Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all unprecedented; they >> were in fact part of a recognized and continuing tradition in >> cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and Cole, and also recent work on >> chimps and children in Africa). This ethnographic tradition WAS politically >> suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it sparingly, and >> why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) >> conclusions? >> >> 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin himself, but >> instead was subject to an informal ban, which did not prevent him from >> being favorably cited in the twenty years between his death and the first >> publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. Stalin was >> not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky would >> have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this really is both >> sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic (and anachronistic) to >> imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to deserve the >> kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, or even >> Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost fact-free >> articles published against Vygotsky in the years after his death were >> somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign against his work (which began >> WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 decree on >> pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself mentions in Thinking >> and Speech Chapter Six?) >> >> As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is a >> dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. The danger >> is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a gut >> rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism out of their >> firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material that is anything but >> obvious. When that happens, we get something that is neither a gorgon nor a >> minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being Earnest": >> something like a monster without being a myth. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like Aristotle, Jesus >> Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't edit the >> books that made him famous. The problem of course is that Vygotsky didn't >> know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de Saussure, >> Vygotsky did not >> >> >> >> So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 13:45:20 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 13:45:20 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New 2016 In-Reply-To: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> References: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> Message-ID: <92E0ED0D-34D3-4412-AC7B-282AC3C12907@gmail.com> To Ana and Lisa and todos los demas xmcieros; Here?s to a kick-ass chat all year long! It would be cool for chatters to post a new year?s salute in any language that suits their fancy. No pressure. Henry > On Jan 1, 2016, at 1:58 AM, Lu?sa Aires wrote: > > Dear XMCAers > > I wish you a Happy New Year! > Luisa A. > > >> Em 30/12/2015, ?s 18:44, Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane escreveu: >> >> Happy New 2016 Year >> >> >> I wish you a lot of happiness, joy, health, success, fun, good books, films, shows, music to listen and to dance to, many travels and meeting new and exciting people; I wish for the peace in the world, goodheartedness, incredible science, technical, medical and ecological advances; and, of course, I wish you to have all your wishes fulfilled. >> But, most of all, I wish us to have a lot of good time together. >> >> Ana >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> Ana Marjanovic-Shane >> anamshane@gmail.com >> (m) 267-334-2905 >> >> >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 13:45:20 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 13:45:20 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New 2016 In-Reply-To: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> References: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> Message-ID: <92E0ED0D-34D3-4412-AC7B-282AC3C12907@gmail.com> To Ana and Lisa and todos los demas xmcieros; Here?s to a kick-ass chat all year long! It would be cool for chatters to post a new year?s salute in any language that suits their fancy. No pressure. Henry > On Jan 1, 2016, at 1:58 AM, Lu?sa Aires wrote: > > Dear XMCAers > > I wish you a Happy New Year! > Luisa A. > > >> Em 30/12/2015, ?s 18:44, Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane escreveu: >> >> Happy New 2016 Year >> >> >> I wish you a lot of happiness, joy, health, success, fun, good books, films, shows, music to listen and to dance to, many travels and meeting new and exciting people; I wish for the peace in the world, goodheartedness, incredible science, technical, medical and ecological advances; and, of course, I wish you to have all your wishes fulfilled. >> But, most of all, I wish us to have a lot of good time together. >> >> Ana >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> Ana Marjanovic-Shane >> anamshane@gmail.com >> (m) 267-334-2905 >> >> >> >> > From laires11@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 14:53:41 2016 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 22:53:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New 2016 In-Reply-To: <92E0ED0D-34D3-4412-AC7B-282AC3C12907@gmail.com> References: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> <92E0ED0D-34D3-4412-AC7B-282AC3C12907@gmail.com> Message-ID: Muito estimados e estimadas XMCAers Desejo a todos e a todas um Feliz Ano Novo, com paz e muita criatividade. Que esta nossa comunidade continue a ser um espa?o de diversidade e de di?logos inspiradores, com a participa??o de todos e, em particular, com a presen?a atenta de M. Cole. Um abra?o, Lu?sa A. 2016-01-01 21:45 GMT+00:00 HENRY SHONERD : > To Ana and Lisa and todos los demas xmcieros; > Here?s to a kick-ass chat all year long! It would be cool for chatters to > post a new year?s salute in any language that suits their fancy. No > pressure. > Henry > > > On Jan 1, 2016, at 1:58 AM, Lu?sa Aires wrote: > > > > Dear XMCAers > > > > I wish you a Happy New Year! > > Luisa A. > > > > > >> Em 30/12/2015, ?s 18:44, Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane > escreveu: > >> > >> Happy New 2016 Year > >> > >> > >> I wish you a lot of happiness, joy, health, success, fun, good books, > films, shows, music to listen and to dance to, many travels and meeting new > and exciting people; I wish for the peace in the world, goodheartedness, > incredible science, technical, medical and ecological advances; and, of > course, I wish you to have all your wishes fulfilled. > >> But, most of all, I wish us to have a lot of good time together. > >> > >> Ana > >> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________ > >> Ana Marjanovic-Shane > >> anamshane@gmail.com > >> (m) 267-334-2905 > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From laires11@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 14:53:41 2016 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 22:53:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New 2016 In-Reply-To: <92E0ED0D-34D3-4412-AC7B-282AC3C12907@gmail.com> References: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> <92E0ED0D-34D3-4412-AC7B-282AC3C12907@gmail.com> Message-ID: Muito estimados e estimadas XMCAers Desejo a todos e a todas um Feliz Ano Novo, com paz e muita criatividade. Que esta nossa comunidade continue a ser um espa?o de diversidade e de di?logos inspiradores, com a participa??o de todos e, em particular, com a presen?a atenta de M. Cole. Um abra?o, Lu?sa A. 2016-01-01 21:45 GMT+00:00 HENRY SHONERD : > To Ana and Lisa and todos los demas xmcieros; > Here?s to a kick-ass chat all year long! It would be cool for chatters to > post a new year?s salute in any language that suits their fancy. No > pressure. > Henry > > > On Jan 1, 2016, at 1:58 AM, Lu?sa Aires wrote: > > > > Dear XMCAers > > > > I wish you a Happy New Year! > > Luisa A. > > > > > >> Em 30/12/2015, ?s 18:44, Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane > escreveu: > >> > >> Happy New 2016 Year > >> > >> > >> I wish you a lot of happiness, joy, health, success, fun, good books, > films, shows, music to listen and to dance to, many travels and meeting new > and exciting people; I wish for the peace in the world, goodheartedness, > incredible science, technical, medical and ecological advances; and, of > course, I wish you to have all your wishes fulfilled. > >> But, most of all, I wish us to have a lot of good time together. > >> > >> Ana > >> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________ > >> Ana Marjanovic-Shane > >> anamshane@gmail.com > >> (m) 267-334-2905 > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 15:44:03 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 08:44:03 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry: Of course, when you read a translation, you are not reading the writer, or at least not the writer in large letters; you are reading the writer in small letters; that is, the translator. When we finished translating "Thinking and Speech" into Korean (which we did from the French and Italian translations, because our Russian was no good, and because we could see, from the very first chapter, that the English was no good either) one of our best translators quit the team with the bitter comment that none of us knew any Russian (true) and some of us knew very little Korean, or at least very little literary Korean (also, alas, true). We've worked pretty hard to overcome both of these problems, and next month we'll bring out our seventh volume of Vygotsky's works in Korean. Years ago I was rather astonished when I heard Eugene Subbotsky describe Vygotsky as a poet, since I too had read him entirely in translation and had (wrongly as it turns out) come to think of him as quite clumsy, maladroit, redundant and wordy. But I have come to see that Subbotsky was right: there are certain wordings in Vygotsky, like the idea that the child is "intertwined (interpersonally) and interwoven (socially)" that have wings; that overleap both languages and soar. As Vygotsky says, there is a kind of thinking without words that only thinking with words can bring about. So when you read Vygotsky in English you are reading the thinker and not the writer. There are certain advantages to that, which you should be very conscious of as a teacher of foreign languages and as a foreign language learner. The whole point of the first part of "Thinking and Speech" is that the thinker and the speaker are really two diferent creatures, and even in the second part we can see that they are two radically different persona, even where they partake and participate in the same personality. By standing aloof for a moment from the language of expression, we can get a certain critical distance, a sense of the overall shape of the thoughts. And in fact that was the point I was trying to make: "Thinking and Speech" was not Vygotsky's final word (there will never be a final word, thanks to people like you, Henry), and it was not even his finished word, and its very unfinished quality is, I think, also responsible for the fact that LSV doesn't list either HDHMF or Tool and Sign in any of his "Greatest Hits' (though, significantly, Tool and Sign IS in the references to the first edition of Thinking and Speech). This patchy, unfinished quality makes the sheer brilliance and consistency of the ideas all the more remarkable. I would like to think that our clumsy translations also have the effect of throwing the spotlight on the grace and coherence of Vygotsky's thinking, but I know that unfortunately this probably isn't the case; I imagine there are lots of people scribbling imprecations against Vygotsky in the margins of their Korean translations which really ought to be directed against us. There can really be only one excuse for what we did. It is the same excuse that Mike, Sylvia Scribner, Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman have for issuing a compilation under Vygotsky's name. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer admit that no deception was involved, and their main complaint is that the process of compiling it is not sufficiently transparent to be made reversible, but of course the same thing is true of almost any compilation and indeed coauthorship quite generally--we only know which chapters in "Ape, Primitive, Child" are by Luria and which by Vygotsky because of Vygotsky's complaints about Luria's Freudianism in his letters, and there is no way for the reader to know which of the revolutionary revisionist ideas in this book are Van der Veer's and which are Yasnitsky's! Of course, we have different standards for writers of historic stature than we do for each other, and that's perfectly okay, so long as we keep in mind that at the time "Mind in Society" was published, Vygotsky was not generally considered a writer of historic stature: his publication list in English was considerably shorter than Mike Cole's. Today it's just too easy for people to forget that the difficulty of publishing Vygotsky in the West was actually far greater than that of publishing him in the USSR for most of the twentieth century, thanks to the very real totalitarianism exercised (increasingly) by commercial publishing. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer do have the grace to acknowledge that "Mind in Society" started the Vygotsky boom that made it posssible for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer to start their revisionist revolution. We can't really fault historians for not knowing what to do next. But we can fault them for forgetting that people back then didn't know what we know today. In the end, I think that's the only excuse for doing translations, good or bad: Nobody else will, or nobody else will do it as well. To be fair, I should say that there WERE no less than two other teams translating Thinking and Speech into Korean when we went ahead and published; one was a very well-funded team of Russian professors at Korea University and the other had an official contract with MIT Press--but the latter used the Hanfmann and Vakar translation into English and the team of Russian professors--incredibly--used the Minick translation! So I am very glad we went ahead and published ours, imperfect as it is. As Tagore says, Ekla Chalo Re: If they answer not to your call walk aloneIf they are afraid and cower mutely facing the wall,O thou unlucky one,open your mind and speak out alone.If they turn away, and desert you when crossing the wilderness,O thou unlucky one,trample the thorns under thy tread,and along the blood-lined track travel alone.If they shut doors and do not hold up the light when the night is troubled with storm,O thou unlucky one,with the thunder flame of pain ignite your own heart,and let it burn alone. (Translated from Tagore's Bengali by Tagore himself--but was it back translated?) David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: While we were working on Piaget's response to "Thinking and Speech" I wrote to MIT Press to get permission to translate it into Korean. I learned that the original French manuscript had been lost, and that the translator, Francoise Seve, had had to reconstruct it from a typescript, part of which could only be reconstructed by back translating from English to French! dk On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:36 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David, > Yes, it makes sense to me too. It at least partly explains why my comments > in the margin of my copy of Speech and Language I bought so many years ago > can still evoke my irritation at Vygotsky, who, it turns out, is not the > author I thought he was. Another part is my own constantly gaining and > losing my grasp on a coherent socio-cultural bead on the here and now, very > much connected to the pulses of this chat. Funny how then and now inform > each other. > Henry > > > On Dec 31, 2015, at 4:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > Thanks, David! :) > > All makes sense to me. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are seven > >> facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that are...well, more or > less > >> right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's "Revisionist > >> Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on Routledge in the new > >> year. > >> > >> 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, > ritualistic, > >> deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to cults and > >> personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that I am making an > >> unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and today's relatively benign > >> and bucolic academic atmosphere, note that Anton's revolutionary > >> revisionist point in this first section is precisely that: the present > day > >> reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic > >> interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded reference > >> lists,an almost complete disjunction between high theory and more or > less > >> banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in Russia and > >> the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, who saw the > promised > >> land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. Is the > >> comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is that it is > too > >> obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. > >> > >> There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. The > first > >> is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a medical > fact > >> that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it is not > >> really much more far fetched to say that he died without ever knowing > that > >> in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language and > widely > >> read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that mythbusters > are > >> themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical facts > and > >> construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that the > >> previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or that it was > >> constructed around correct facts which have been grossly misinterpreted > in > >> some way. So.... > >> > >> 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky > School" > >> was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and drifted > away, > >> spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, although the > >> loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This section, based on > >> Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first section, which manages to > be > >> both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. But of > >> course for that very reason it tends to undermine the claims of the > first > >> part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most obvious > >> evidence that there really WAS something like a Pyatorka--the fact that > >> Vygotsky's own letters referto the Pyatorka, and the fact that the > Pyatorka > >> held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this contradicts > Anton's > >> main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were > convenient > >> constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of understanding) for > >> thinking about the history of the Vygotsky school even while it was > >> happening. But it also doesn't answer the question I have always had > about > >> the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton points out, > >> there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong pro-Trotsky > sympathies), > >> the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a bureaucratic > >> bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust Trotsky from power in > the > >> year following Lenin's death. . > >> > >> 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, is an > >> unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from materials which > >> really fit rather poorly, during the months immediately before...and > >> after...Vygotsky's death. I think anybody who really knows the > chronology > >> of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this > controversial; > >> the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence and > power > >> of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to undermine > the > >> popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe to--that > there > >> are three very different Vygotskies believing three very different > >> foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). > >> > >> So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary enough for > >> Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to claim that the > works > >> that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we read > today, > >> and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. > They > >> found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three times > >> during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two of these > lists > >> are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job > >> application knows very well that you list things that your potential > >> employer will find impressive, and these are usually quite far from > being > >> the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, > >> Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational > Psychology", > >> which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely followed by > >> "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the authors quite correctly > >> point out, a work of popular science (and includes references to > textbook > >> writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). > >> > >> Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the > Development > >> of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that the > former > >> was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two > unrelated > >> texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a benign > forgery > >> by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. > >> > >> First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF that it > was > >> conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion which goes > >> back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in which it was > conceived > >> and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the chapters > fit > >> together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the problem, the > >> approach and the research method followed in the "special studies" of > the > >> second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. is is > >> really weak stuff: they > >> > >> Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of benign > >> forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence in recovering > >> historic manuscripts) does not actually explain what it is supposed to > >> explain, which is the recurrence of several paragraphs, not word for > word, > >> but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of > Ptolemaic > >> epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't bother to > read > >> what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only authority > for > >> this story, which seems so much less probable than the alternative > >> explanation that this is simply another instance of Vygotsky's tendency > t > >> repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon Goldberg > ("The > >> Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and other must > >> readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), and an anonymous > >> blogger (neither source seems very well disposed to their erstwhile > >> professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact that a story is highly > >> improbable and that the sources are somewhat jaundiced do not mean that > it > >> is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean that > it > >> is...well, possibly mythical. > >> > >> 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly in > mind. > >> This much too should be have been already very clear to any careful > reader > >> of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting part of > the > >> book, and the only part of the book which really does offer completely > new > >> evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not written by > >> Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a lot of what > >> Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed Nietszcheanism and his > >> rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of consciousness in favor of > "sense" > >> (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, as I > did, > >> whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and if so > up to > >> what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you may > wonder > >> what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other > unfinished > >> works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" is > >> mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child > Development"). > >> But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to learn > >> something. It's also the part of the book where we see the most Vygotsky > >> inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. > >> > >> 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write either of > the > >> English language books for which he is famous. The facts are > depressingly > >> clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something like > half of > >> the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the "redundancies", > >> which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the inauthenticity of Tool and > Sign) > >> cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that Vygotsky ever > >> wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all of the New > Testament, > >> like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put > together > >> by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what the > >> revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: > "Mind > >> in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the significant > >> omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they saw that they could > >> bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, and that is exactly what > they > >> did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, whether by > >> Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the Vygotsky "boom"; the real > >> question we have to ask is--what can we actually accomplish with the > energy > >> that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of the > boom > >> stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" suggested > >> archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of course that is > >> certainly very much to be desired. But it also ignores the exoteric > nature > >> of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory and > >> practice noted in point 1) above. > >> > >> 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were suppressed in > >> order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's national minorities. > This > >> too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own preface, as > well > >> as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official > denunciation > >> of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to > be...well, > >> more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak the > truth > >> in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political > >> correctness" which only show how very little they understand the > concrete > >> realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really > objectionable > >> part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that > Vygotsky > >> is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations of > >> production, without any education, was enough to create concepts in the > >> minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in any of Vygotsky's or > >> Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the contrary. (Luria repeatedly > >> refers to the effect of schooling). Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do > not > >> raise a number of key issues: > >> > >> a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those who > take > >> experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological fieldwork with > >> them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. Does this explain > why he > >> did not personally take part? > >> > >> b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people like > >> Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all unprecedented; they > >> were in fact part of a recognized and continuing tradition in > >> cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and Cole, and also recent work on > >> chimps and children in Africa). This ethnographic tradition WAS > politically > >> suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it sparingly, > and > >> why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) > >> conclusions? > >> > >> 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin himself, but > >> instead was subject to an informal ban, which did not prevent him from > >> being favorably cited in the twenty years between his death and the > first > >> publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. Stalin > was > >> not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky would > >> have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this really is both > >> sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic (and anachronistic) > to > >> imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to deserve > the > >> kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, or > even > >> Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost fact-free > >> articles published against Vygotsky in the years after his death were > >> somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign against his work (which > began > >> WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 decree on > >> pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself mentions in > Thinking > >> and Speech Chapter Six?) > >> > >> As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is a > >> dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. The > danger > >> is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a gut > >> rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism out of their > >> firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material that is anything but > >> obvious. When that happens, we get something that is neither a gorgon > nor a > >> minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being > Earnest": > >> something like a monster without being a myth. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> > >> > >> , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like Aristotle, > Jesus > >> Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't edit the > >> books that made him famous. The problem of course is that Vygotsky > didn't > >> know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de Saussure, > >> Vygotsky did not > >> > >> > >> > >> So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well > >> > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 17:01:44 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 17:01:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> Message-ID: <568721b5.820b620a.204ac.fffff5f1@mx.google.com> David Your distinction of reading the thinker in contrast to reading the writer put a smile on my face and put me in a reflective mood. Being a translator yourself gives a special vantage place from which to reflect about others revisionings as myth builders and myth busters in general. This process of creatively opening spaces opened up by previous translators offering opportunities for further conjectures. Question: Is this a process of creating symbolic worlds? You circled back to the centrality of - sense - as a key to understanding vygotsky. I continue to learn and be informed concerning the centrality of sense in relation to knowledge and action. I am also wondering if entering the image is sense and if this allows us to take wing to enter within symbolic worlds of sociality? Looking forward to listening to this years conjectures from you as a writer, thinker, and conversationalist. Always enjoy the intertwining and interweaving as mutually shared notions. Anticipating further lively exchanges as the new year unfolds. Larry -----Original Message----- From: "David Kellogg" Sent: ?2016-?01-?01 3:47 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! Henry: Of course, when you read a translation, you are not reading the writer, or at least not the writer in large letters; you are reading the writer in small letters; that is, the translator. When we finished translating "Thinking and Speech" into Korean (which we did from the French and Italian translations, because our Russian was no good, and because we could see, from the very first chapter, that the English was no good either) one of our best translators quit the team with the bitter comment that none of us knew any Russian (true) and some of us knew very little Korean, or at least very little literary Korean (also, alas, true). We've worked pretty hard to overcome both of these problems, and next month we'll bring out our seventh volume of Vygotsky's works in Korean. Years ago I was rather astonished when I heard Eugene Subbotsky describe Vygotsky as a poet, since I too had read him entirely in translation and had (wrongly as it turns out) come to think of him as quite clumsy, maladroit, redundant and wordy. But I have come to see that Subbotsky was right: there are certain wordings in Vygotsky, like the idea that the child is "intertwined (interpersonally) and interwoven (socially)" that have wings; that overleap both languages and soar. As Vygotsky says, there is a kind of thinking without words that only thinking with words can bring about. So when you read Vygotsky in English you are reading the thinker and not the writer. There are certain advantages to that, which you should be very conscious of as a teacher of foreign languages and as a foreign language learner. The whole point of the first part of "Thinking and Speech" is that the thinker and the speaker are really two diferent creatures, and even in the second part we can see that they are two radically different persona, even where they partake and participate in the same personality. By standing aloof for a moment from the language of expression, we can get a certain critical distance, a sense of the overall shape of the thoughts. And in fact that was the point I was trying to make: "Thinking and Speech" was not Vygotsky's final word (there will never be a final word, thanks to people like you, Henry), and it was not even his finished word, and its very unfinished quality is, I think, also responsible for the fact that LSV doesn't list either HDHMF or Tool and Sign in any of his "Greatest Hits' (though, significantly, Tool and Sign IS in the references to the first edition of Thinking and Speech). This patchy, unfinished quality makes the sheer brilliance and consistency of the ideas all the more remarkable. I would like to think that our clumsy translations also have the effect of throwing the spotlight on the grace and coherence of Vygotsky's thinking, but I know that unfortunately this probably isn't the case; I imagine there are lots of people scribbling imprecations against Vygotsky in the margins of their Korean translations which really ought to be directed against us. There can really be only one excuse for what we did. It is the same excuse that Mike, Sylvia Scribner, Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman have for issuing a compilation under Vygotsky's name. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer admit that no deception was involved, and their main complaint is that the process of compiling it is not sufficiently transparent to be made reversible, but of course the same thing is true of almost any compilation and indeed coauthorship quite generally--we only know which chapters in "Ape, Primitive, Child" are by Luria and which by Vygotsky because of Vygotsky's complaints about Luria's Freudianism in his letters, and there is no way for the reader to know which of the revolutionary revisionist ideas in this book are Van der Veer's and which are Yasnitsky's! Of course, we have different standards for writers of historic stature than we do for each other, and that's perfectly okay, so long as we keep in mind that at the time "Mind in Society" was published, Vygotsky was not generally considered a writer of historic stature: his publication list in English was considerably shorter than Mike Cole's. Today it's just too easy for people to forget that the difficulty of publishing Vygotsky in the West was actually far greater than that of publishing him in the USSR for most of the twentieth century, thanks to the very real totalitarianism exercised (increasingly) by commercial publishing. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer do have the grace to acknowledge that "Mind in Society" started the Vygotsky boom that made it posssible for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer to start their revisionist revolution. We can't really fault historians for not knowing what to do next. But we can fault them for forgetting that people back then didn't know what we know today. In the end, I think that's the only excuse for doing translations, good or bad: Nobody else will, or nobody else will do it as well. To be fair, I should say that there WERE no less than two other teams translating Thinking and Speech into Korean when we went ahead and published; one was a very well-funded team of Russian professors at Korea University and the other had an official contract with MIT Press--but the latter used the Hanfmann and Vakar translation into English and the team of Russian professors--incredibly--used the Minick translation! So I am very glad we went ahead and published ours, imperfect as it is. As Tagore says, Ekla Chalo Re: If they answer not to your call walk aloneIf they are afraid and cower mutely facing the wall,O thou unlucky one,open your mind and speak out alone.If they turn away, and desert you when crossing the wilderness,O thou unlucky one,trample the thorns under thy tread,and along the blood-lined track travel alone.If they shut doors and do not hold up the light when the night is troubled with storm,O thou unlucky one,with the thunder flame of pain ignite your own heart,and let it burn alone. (Translated from Tagore's Bengali by Tagore himself--but was it back translated?) David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: While we were working on Piaget's response to "Thinking and Speech" I wrote to MIT Press to get permission to translate it into Korean. I learned that the original French manuscript had been lost, and that the translator, Francoise Seve, had had to reconstruct it from a typescript, part of which could only be reconstructed by back translating from English to French! dk On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:36 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David, > Yes, it makes sense to me too. It at least partly explains why my comments > in the margin of my copy of Speech and Language I bought so many years ago > can still evoke my irritation at Vygotsky, who, it turns out, is not the > author I thought he was. Another part is my own constantly gaining and > losing my grasp on a coherent socio-cultural bead on the here and now, very > much connected to the pulses of this chat. Funny how then and now inform > each other. > Henry > > > On Dec 31, 2015, at 4:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > Thanks, David! :) > > All makes sense to me. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are seven > >> facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that are...well, more or > less > >> right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's "Revisionist > >> Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on Routledge in the new > >> year. > >> > >> 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, > ritualistic, > >> deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to cults and > >> personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that I am making an > >> unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and today's relatively benign > >> and bucolic academic atmosphere, note that Anton's revolutionary > >> revisionist point in this first section is precisely that: the present > day > >> reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic > >> interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded reference > >> lists,an almost complete disjunction between high theory and more or > less > >> banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in Russia and > >> the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, who saw the > promised > >> land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. Is the > >> comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is that it is > too > >> obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. > >> > >> There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. The > first > >> is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a medical > fact > >> that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it is not > >> really much more far fetched to say that he died without ever knowing > that > >> in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language and > widely > >> read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that mythbusters > are > >> themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical facts > and > >> construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that the > >> previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or that it was > >> constructed around correct facts which have been grossly misinterpreted > in > >> some way. So.... > >> > >> 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky > School" > >> was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and drifted > away, > >> spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, although the > >> loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This section, based on > >> Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first section, which manages to > be > >> both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. But of > >> course for that very reason it tends to undermine the claims of the > first > >> part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most obvious > >> evidence that there really WAS something like a Pyatorka--the fact that > >> Vygotsky's own letters referto the Pyatorka, and the fact that the > Pyatorka > >> held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this contradicts > Anton's > >> main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were > convenient > >> constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of understanding) for > >> thinking about the history of the Vygotsky school even while it was > >> happening. But it also doesn't answer the question I have always had > about > >> the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton points out, > >> there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong pro-Trotsky > sympathies), > >> the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a bureaucratic > >> bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust Trotsky from power in > the > >> year following Lenin's death. . > >> > >> 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, is an > >> unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from materials which > >> really fit rather poorly, during the months immediately before...and > >> after...Vygotsky's death. I think anybody who really knows the > chronology > >> of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this > controversial; > >> the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence and > power > >> of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to undermine > the > >> popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe to--that > there > >> are three very different Vygotskies believing three very different > >> foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). > >> > >> So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary enough for > >> Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to claim that the > works > >> that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we read > today, > >> and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. > They > >> found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three times > >> during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two of these > lists > >> are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job > >> application knows very well that you list things that your potential > >> employer will find impressive, and these are usually quite far from > being > >> the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, > >> Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational > Psychology", > >> which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely followed by > >> "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the authors quite correctly > >> point out, a work of popular science (and includes references to > textbook > >> writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). > >> > >> Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the > Development > >> of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that the > former > >> was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two > unrelated > >> texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a benign > forgery > >> by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. > >> > >> First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF that it > was > >> conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion which goes > >> back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in which it was > conceived > >> and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the chapters > fit > >> together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the problem, the > >> approach and the research method followed in the "special studies" of > the > >> second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. is is > >> really weak stuff: they > >> > >> Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of benign > >> forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence in recovering > >> historic manuscripts) does not actually explain what it is supposed to > >> explain, which is the recurrence of several paragraphs, not word for > word, > >> but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of > Ptolemaic > >> epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't bother to > read > >> what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only authority > for > >> this story, which seems so much less probable than the alternative > >> explanation that this is simply another instance of Vygotsky's tendency > t > >> repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon Goldberg > ("The > >> Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and other must > >> readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), and an anonymous > >> blogger (neither source seems very well disposed to their erstwhile > >> professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact that a story is highly > >> improbable and that the sources are somewhat jaundiced do not mean that > it > >> is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean that > it > >> is...well, possibly mythical. > >> > >> 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly in > mind. > >> This much too should be have been already very clear to any careful > reader > >> of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting part of > the > >> book, and the only part of the book which really does offer completely > new > >> evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not written by > >> Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a lot of what > >> Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed Nietszcheanism and his > >> rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of consciousness in favor of > "sense" > >> (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, as I > did, > >> whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and if so > up to > >> what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you may > wonder > >> what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other > unfinished > >> works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" is > >> mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child > Development"). > >> But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to learn > >> something. It's also the part of the book where we see the most Vygotsky > >> inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. > >> > >> 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write either of > the > >> English language books for which he is famous. The facts are > depressingly > >> clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something like > half of > >> the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the "redundancies", > >> which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the inauthenticity of Tool and > Sign) > >> cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that Vygotsky ever > >> wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all of the New > Testament, > >> like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put > together > >> by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what the > >> revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: > "Mind > >> in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the significant > >> omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they saw that they could > >> bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, and that is exactly what > they > >> did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, whether by > >> Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the Vygotsky "boom"; the real > >> question we have to ask is--what can we actually accomplish with the > energy > >> that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of the > boom > >> stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" suggested > >> archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of course that is > >> certainly very much to be desired. But it also ignores the exoteric > nature > >> of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory and > >> practice noted in point 1) above. > >> > >> 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were suppressed in > >> order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's national minorities. > This > >> too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own preface, as > well > >> as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official > denunciation > >> of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to > be...well, > >> more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak the > truth > >> in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political > >> correctness" which only show how very little they understand the > concrete > >> realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really > objectionable > >> part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that > Vygotsky > >> is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations of > >> production, without any education, was enough to create concepts in the > >> minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in any of Vygotsky's or > >> Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the contrary. (Luria repeatedly > >> refers to the effect of schooling). Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do > not > >> raise a number of key issues: > >> > >> a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those who > take > >> experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological fieldwork with > >> them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. Does this explain > why he > >> did not personally take part? > >> > >> b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people like > >> Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all unprecedented; they > >> were in fact part of a recognized and continuing tradition in > >> cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and Cole [The entire original message is not included.] From dkirsh@lsu.edu Fri Jan 1 17:57:23 2016 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 01:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Journal In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Of possible interest to XMCAers... From: Kenneth J Fasching-Varner Sent: Friday, January 01, 2016 5:48 PM To: Kenneth J Fasching-Varner Cc: Lori L Martin Subject: Journal Greeting Colleagues, I hope 2016 is off to a great start. Lori Martin (a colleague of ours from Sociology and faculty member of the Curriculum Theory Project) and myself have been named Editors in Chief of Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education. Taboo has a strong history founded by Joe Kincheloe and Shirley Steinberg. The journal has a reputation for publishing critical, edgy, and transformative works that relates broadly to education and its socio-cultural context. As editors we are not committed to any one particular inquiry tradition; we will welcome submissions that reflect and address meaningful and critically important questions, answered or addressed by a variety of methodological approaches. We also welcome submissions that are less traditional in their manner/format of presentation. The journal is peer reviewed. ... We wanted to share the flyer with you all in the event that you, your students, colleagues outside of LSU, or list servs you are on may have interest in the journal. Please pass along the information to whomever you think might be interested or disregard the email if you are not interested but made it this far. All the best, Kenny [LSU] Kenneth J. Fasching-Varner, PhD Shirley B. Barton Endowed Associate Professor School of Education - College of Human Sciences and Education Louisiana State University 217 Peabody Hall, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 office 225-578-2918 | mobile 225-916-7615 varner@lsu.edu | lsu.edu http://www.lsu.edu/chse/education [Facebook] -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Taboo.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 139600 bytes Desc: Taboo.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160102/85c5f3e9/attachment.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 18:16:50 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 18:16:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability Message-ID: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability and the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the other thread. The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van de Aa, and Jan Blommaert. Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability as a culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for the other thread ongoing. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: NOVEMBER 4 2014 390 BLOMMAERT and Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 186757 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160101/740f3012/attachment.pdf From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Jan 1 19:04:53 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 03:04:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own conversation at the following point, no? Martin MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now that I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of socio-linguistic oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that will not stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this could be a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it proves also that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms even in a sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability and the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the other thread. > The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van de Aa, and Jan Blommaert. > Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability as a culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for the other thread ongoing. > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jan 1 19:47:51 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 19:47:51 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: can't escape it m On Fri, Jan 1, 2016 at 7:04 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own conversation at > the following point, no? > > Martin > > MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now that > I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of socio-linguistic > oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that will not > stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the > highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > > JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this could be > a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it proves also > that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms even in a > sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > > On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the > focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > > However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability and > the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the other > thread. > > The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van de Aa, > and Jan Blommaert. > > Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability as a > culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for the > other thread ongoing. > > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Jan 1 20:38:26 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 04:38:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come out of it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. Best, Huw On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer wrote: > It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own conversation at > the following point, no? > > Martin > > MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now that > I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of socio-linguistic > oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that will not > stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the > highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > > JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this could be > a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it proves also > that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms even in a > sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > > On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the > focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > > However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability and > the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the other > thread. > > The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van de Aa, > and Jan Blommaert. > > Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability as a > culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for the > other thread ongoing. > > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > > > From smago@uga.edu Sat Jan 2 03:33:28 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 11:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> Message-ID: I sent David's comments to Rene van der Veer, and part of his reply included a shot (attached) of what translators and editors have to go through in moving LSV and others into what today we'd call a book or article. Pretty daunting. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Friday, January 01, 2016 6:44 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! Henry: Of course, when you read a translation, you are not reading the writer, or at least not the writer in large letters; you are reading the writer in small letters; that is, the translator. When we finished translating "Thinking and Speech" into Korean (which we did from the French and Italian translations, because our Russian was no good, and because we could see, from the very first chapter, that the English was no good either) one of our best translators quit the team with the bitter comment that none of us knew any Russian (true) and some of us knew very little Korean, or at least very little literary Korean (also, alas, true). We've worked pretty hard to overcome both of these problems, and next month we'll bring out our seventh volume of Vygotsky's works in Korean. Years ago I was rather astonished when I heard Eugene Subbotsky describe Vygotsky as a poet, since I too had read him entirely in translation and had (wrongly as it turns out) come to think of him as quite clumsy, maladroit, redundant and wordy. But I have come to see that Subbotsky was right: there are certain wordings in Vygotsky, like the idea that the child is "intertwined (interpersonally) and interwoven (socially)" that have wings; that overleap both languages and soar. As Vygotsky says, there is a kind of thinking without words that only thinking with words can bring about. So when you read Vygotsky in English you are reading the thinker and not the writer. There are certain advantages to that, which you should be very conscious of as a teacher of foreign languages and as a foreign language learner. The whole point of the first part of "Thinking and Speech" is that the thinker and the speaker are really two diferent creatures, and even in the second part we can see that they are two radically different persona, even where they partake and participate in the same personality. By standing aloof for a moment from the language of expression, we can get a certain critical distance, a sense of the overall shape of the thoughts. And in fact that was the point I was trying to make: "Thinking and Speech" was not Vygotsky's final word (there will never be a final word, thanks to people like you, Henry), and it was not even his finished word, and its very unfinished quality is, I think, also responsible for the fact that LSV doesn't list either HDHMF or Tool and Sign in any of his "Greatest Hits' (though, significantly, Tool and Sign IS in the references to the first edition of Thinking and Speech). This patchy, unfinished quality makes the sheer brilliance and consistency of the ideas all the more remarkable. I would like to think that our clumsy translations also have the effect of throwing the spotlight on the grace and coherence of Vygotsky's thinking, but I know that unfortunately this probably isn't the case; I imagine there are lots of people scribbling imprecations against Vygotsky in the margins of their Korean translations which really ought to be directed against us. There can really be only one excuse for what we did. It is the same excuse that Mike, Sylvia Scribner, Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman have for issuing a compilation under Vygotsky's name. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer admit that no deception was involved, and their main complaint is that the process of compiling it is not sufficiently transparent to be made reversible, but of course the same thing is true of almost any compilation and indeed coauthorship quite generally--we only know which chapters in "Ape, Primitive, Child" are by Luria and which by Vygotsky because of Vygotsky's complaints about Luria's Freudianism in his letters, and there is no way for the reader to know which of the revolutionary revisionist ideas in this book are Van der Veer's and which are Yasnitsky's! Of course, we have different standards for writers of historic stature than we do for each other, and that's perfectly okay, so long as we keep in mind that at the time "Mind in Society" was published, Vygotsky was not generally considered a writer of historic stature: his publication list in English was considerably shorter than Mike Cole's. Today it's just too easy for people to forget that the difficulty of publishing Vygotsky in the West was actually far greater than that of publishing him in the USSR for most of the twentieth century, thanks to the very real totalitarianism exercised (increasingly) by commercial publishing. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer do have the grace to acknowledge that "Mind in Society" started the Vygotsky boom that made it posssible for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer to start their revisionist revolution. We can't really fault historians for not knowing what to do next. But we can fault them for forgetting that people back then didn't know what we know today. In the end, I think that's the only excuse for doing translations, good or bad: Nobody else will, or nobody else will do it as well. To be fair, I should say that there WERE no less than two other teams translating Thinking and Speech into Korean when we went ahead and published; one was a very well-funded team of Russian professors at Korea University and the other had an official contract with MIT Press--but the latter used the Hanfmann and Vakar translation into English and the team of Russian professors--incredibly--used the Minick translation! So I am very glad we went ahead and published ours, imperfect as it is. As Tagore says, Ekla Chalo Re: If they answer not to your call walk aloneIf they are afraid and cower mutely facing the wall,O thou unlucky one,open your mind and speak out alone.If they turn away, and desert you when crossing the wilderness,O thou unlucky one,trample the thorns under thy tread,and along the blood-lined track travel alone.If they shut doors and do not hold up the light when the night is troubled with storm,O thou unlucky one,with the thunder flame of pain ignite your own heart,and let it burn alone. (Translated from Tagore's Bengali by Tagore himself--but was it back translated?) David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: While we were working on Piaget's response to "Thinking and Speech" I wrote to MIT Press to get permission to translate it into Korean. I learned that the original French manuscript had been lost, and that the translator, Francoise Seve, had had to reconstruct it from a typescript, part of which could only be reconstructed by back translating from English to French! dk On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:36 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David, > Yes, it makes sense to me too. It at least partly explains why my > comments in the margin of my copy of Speech and Language I bought so > many years ago can still evoke my irritation at Vygotsky, who, it > turns out, is not the author I thought he was. Another part is my own > constantly gaining and losing my grasp on a coherent socio-cultural > bead on the here and now, very much connected to the pulses of this > chat. Funny how then and now inform each other. > Henry > > > On Dec 31, 2015, at 4:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > Thanks, David! :) > > All makes sense to me. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are > >> seven facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that are...well, > >> more or > less > >> right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's > >> "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on > >> Routledge in the new year. > >> > >> 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, > ritualistic, > >> deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to > >> cults and personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that I > >> am making an unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and today's > >> relatively benign and bucolic academic atmosphere, note that > >> Anton's revolutionary revisionist point in this first section is > >> precisely that: the present > day > >> reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic > >> interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded reference > >> lists,an almost complete disjunction between high theory and more > >> or > less > >> banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in > >> Russia and the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, who > >> saw the > promised > >> land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. > >> Is the comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is > >> that it is > too > >> obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. > >> > >> There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. > >> The > first > >> is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a > >> medical > fact > >> that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it is > >> not really much more far fetched to say that he died without ever > >> knowing > that > >> in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language > >> and > widely > >> read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that > >> mythbusters > are > >> themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical > >> facts > and > >> construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that > >> the previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or > >> that it was constructed around correct facts which have been > >> grossly misinterpreted > in > >> some way. So.... > >> > >> 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky > School" > >> was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and > >> drifted > away, > >> spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, > >> although the loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This > >> section, based on Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first > >> section, which manages to > be > >> both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. > >> But of course for that very reason it tends to undermine the claims > >> of the > first > >> part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most obvious > >> evidence that there really WAS something like a Pyatorka--the fact > >> that Vygotsky's own letters referto the Pyatorka, and the fact that > >> the > Pyatorka > >> held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this contradicts > Anton's > >> main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were > convenient > >> constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of understanding) > >> for thinking about the history of the Vygotsky school even while it > >> was happening. But it also doesn't answer the question I have > >> always had > about > >> the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton points > >> out, there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong pro-Trotsky > sympathies), > >> the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a > >> bureaucratic bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust > >> Trotsky from power in > the > >> year following Lenin's death. . > >> > >> 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, is > >> an unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from > >> materials which really fit rather poorly, during the months > >> immediately before...and after...Vygotsky's death. I think anybody > >> who really knows the > chronology > >> of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this > controversial; > >> the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence and > power > >> of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to > >> undermine > the > >> popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe > >> to--that > there > >> are three very different Vygotskies believing three very different > >> foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). > >> > >> So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary > >> enough for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to > >> claim that the > works > >> that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we read > today, > >> and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. > They > >> found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three > >> times during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two of > >> these > lists > >> are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job > >> application knows very well that you list things that your > >> potential employer will find impressive, and these are usually > >> quite far from > being > >> the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, > >> Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational > Psychology", > >> which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely > >> followed by "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the authors > >> quite correctly point out, a work of popular science (and includes > >> references to > textbook > >> writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). > >> > >> Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the > Development > >> of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that the > former > >> was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two > unrelated > >> texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a benign > forgery > >> by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. > >> > >> First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF > >> that it > was > >> conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion which > >> goes back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in which it > >> was > conceived > >> and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the > >> chapters > fit > >> together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the > >> problem, the approach and the research method followed in the > >> "special studies" of > the > >> second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. is > >> is really weak stuff: they > >> > >> Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of > >> benign forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence in > >> recovering historic manuscripts) does not actually explain what it > >> is supposed to explain, which is the recurrence of several > >> paragraphs, not word for > word, > >> but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of > Ptolemaic > >> epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't bother > >> to > read > >> what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only > >> authority > for > >> this story, which seems so much less probable than the alternative > >> explanation that this is simply another instance of Vygotsky's > >> tendency > t > >> repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon > >> Goldberg > ("The > >> Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and other > >> must readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), and an > >> anonymous blogger (neither source seems very well disposed to their > >> erstwhile professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact that a story > >> is highly improbable and that the sources are somewhat jaundiced do > >> not mean that > it > >> is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean > >> that > it > >> is...well, possibly mythical. > >> > >> 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly > >> in > mind. > >> This much too should be have been already very clear to any careful > reader > >> of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting part > >> of > the > >> book, and the only part of the book which really does offer > >> completely > new > >> evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not > >> written by Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a > >> lot of what Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed > >> Nietszcheanism and his rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of > >> consciousness in favor of > "sense" > >> (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, as > >> I > did, > >> whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and if > >> so > up to > >> what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you may > wonder > >> what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other > unfinished > >> works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" is > >> mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child > Development"). > >> But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to learn > >> something. It's also the part of the book where we see the most > >> Vygotsky inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. > >> > >> 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write either > >> of > the > >> English language books for which he is famous. The facts are > depressingly > >> clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something like > half of > >> the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the > >> "redundancies", which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the > >> inauthenticity of Tool and > Sign) > >> cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that Vygotsky > >> ever wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all of the New > Testament, > >> like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put > together > >> by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what the > >> revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: > "Mind > >> in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the > >> significant omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they saw > >> that they could bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, and > >> that is exactly what > they > >> did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, whether > >> by Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the Vygotsky "boom"; > >> the real question we have to ask is--what can we actually > >> accomplish with the > energy > >> that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of > >> the > boom > >> stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" > >> suggested archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of > >> course that is certainly very much to be desired. But it also > >> ignores the exoteric > nature > >> of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory and > >> practice noted in point 1) above. > >> > >> 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were suppressed > >> in order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's national minorities. > This > >> too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own preface, > >> as > well > >> as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official > denunciation > >> of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to > be...well, > >> more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak the > truth > >> in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political > >> correctness" which only show how very little they understand the > concrete > >> realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really > objectionable > >> part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that > Vygotsky > >> is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations > >> of production, without any education, was enough to create concepts > >> in the minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in any of > >> Vygotsky's or Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the > >> contrary. (Luria repeatedly refers to the effect of schooling). > >> Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do > not > >> raise a number of key issues: > >> > >> a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those > >> who > take > >> experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological fieldwork > >> with them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. Does this > >> explain > why he > >> did not personally take part? > >> > >> b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people > >> like Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all > >> unprecedented; they were in fact part of a recognized and > >> continuing tradition in cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and > >> Cole, and also recent work on chimps and children in Africa). This > >> ethnographic tradition WAS > politically > >> suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it > >> sparingly, > and > >> why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) > >> conclusions? > >> > >> 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin > >> himself, but instead was subject to an informal ban, which did not > >> prevent him from being favorably cited in the twenty years between > >> his death and the > first > >> publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. > >> Stalin > was > >> not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky > >> would have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this really > >> is both sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic (and > >> anachronistic) > to > >> imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to > >> deserve > the > >> kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, > >> or > even > >> Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost > >> fact-free articles published against Vygotsky in the years after > >> his death were somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign against > >> his work (which > began > >> WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 decree > >> on pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself mentions > >> in > Thinking > >> and Speech Chapter Six?) > >> > >> As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is a > >> dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. The > danger > >> is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a > >> gut rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism out > >> of their firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material that > >> is anything but obvious. When that happens, we get something that > >> is neither a gorgon > nor a > >> minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being > Earnest": > >> something like a monster without being a myth. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> > >> > >> , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like > >> Aristotle, > Jesus > >> Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't edit > >> the books that made him famous. The problem of course is that > >> Vygotsky > didn't > >> know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de > >> Saussure, Vygotsky did not > >> > >> > >> > >> So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well > >> > > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Vygotsky notebooks.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 834087 bytes Desc: Vygotsky notebooks.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160102/a64a250e/attachment-0001.jpg From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Jan 2 05:52:51 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 13:52:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: > Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come out of > it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > > Best, Huw But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the remaining remarks: MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other components, these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're understood in terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and working in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to which indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse language with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that we've taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed into one. And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they become instruments of oppression and stratification. JB: At the individual level. MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of institutionalized forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where do I stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, maybe reveal what's going on.' JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the 1939 Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... JB: 'The witch is dead' MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there is a wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls back a curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working the levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports [purports?] to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own conversation at >> the following point, no? >> >> Martin >> >> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now that >> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of socio-linguistic >> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that will not >> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the >> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. >> >> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this could be >> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it proves also >> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms even in a >> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. >> >> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the >> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. >>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability and >> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the other >> thread. >>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van de Aa, >> and Jan Blommaert. >>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability as a >> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for the >> other thread ongoing. >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> >> >> >> From glassman.13@osu.edu Sat Jan 2 07:48:49 2016 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 15:48:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32979@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> This reminds me of Dewey's argument against studying history as history, but studying history in the context of right now. When Mind and Society was released then, maybe we shouldn't consider it as Vygotsky, but as Vygotsky as he could be accepted and used at the time of its release. The text was who Vygotsky could be in the United States in 1978. I remember when the Winnick-Rieber version of Thinking and Speech was released it was Vygotsky in 1987, what we could understand, what we could use - fitting the moment in academics. The Subbotsky Van der Veer interpretation is maybe he same thing, Vygotsky as we can understand him and use him right now. There will almost certainly be another revision in another time frame, and at least according to Dewey, one that fits the time frame. The danger (and I realize perhaps what Dewey was warning against) is thinking not that this new revision is Vygotsky, but that this is Vygotsky right now (I remember the mistakes made in 1987 with everybody saying that version of Thinking and Speech was the true Vygotsky. Historians and people who love history (like me) hate this argument but it is very compelling. This is not an argument for relativism (a mistake many people make) - as a matter of fact it is the opposite. When you make a new revision you need to not only be aware of previous streams of ideas, connecting back to its original source, but also why you are making this addition/augmentation/revision to the idea at this historical moment. Something very hard to do I think, because we always want the development of ideas to stop at the moment we recognize it. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 6:33 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! I sent David's comments to Rene van der Veer, and part of his reply included a shot (attached) of what translators and editors have to go through in moving LSV and others into what today we'd call a book or article. Pretty daunting. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Friday, January 01, 2016 6:44 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! Henry: Of course, when you read a translation, you are not reading the writer, or at least not the writer in large letters; you are reading the writer in small letters; that is, the translator. When we finished translating "Thinking and Speech" into Korean (which we did from the French and Italian translations, because our Russian was no good, and because we could see, from the very first chapter, that the English was no good either) one of our best translators quit the team with the bitter comment that none of us knew any Russian (true) and some of us knew very little Korean, or at least very little literary Korean (also, alas, true). We've worked pretty hard to overcome both of these problems, and next month we'll bring out our seventh volume of Vygotsky's works in Korean. Years ago I was rather astonished when I heard Eugene Subbotsky describe Vygotsky as a poet, since I too had read him entirely in translation and had (wrongly as it turns out) come to think of him as quite clumsy, maladroit, redundant and wordy. But I have come to see that Subbotsky was right: there are certain wordings in Vygotsky, like the idea that the child is "intertwined (interpersonally) and interwoven (socially)" that have wings; that overleap both languages and soar. As Vygotsky says, there is a kind of thinking without words that only thinking with words can bring about. So when you read Vygotsky in English you are reading the thinker and not the writer. There are certain advantages to that, which you should be very conscious of as a teacher of foreign languages and as a foreign language learner. The whole point of the first part of "Thinking and Speech" is that the thinker and the speaker are really two diferent creatures, and even in the second part we can see that they are two radically different persona, even where they partake and participate in the same personality. By standing aloof for a moment from the language of expression, we can get a certain critical distance, a sense of the overall shape of the thoughts. And in fact that was the point I was trying to make: "Thinking and Speech" was not Vygotsky's final word (there will never be a final word, thanks to people like you, Henry), and it was not even his finished word, and its very unfinished quality is, I think, also responsible for the fact that LSV doesn't list either HDHMF or Tool and Sign in any of his "Greatest Hits' (though, significantly, Tool and Sign IS in the references to the first edition of Thinking and Speech). This patchy, unfinished quality makes the sheer brilliance and consistency of the ideas all the more remarkable. I would like to think that our clumsy translations also have the effect of throwing the spotlight on the grace and coherence of Vygotsky's thinking, but I know that unfortunately this probably isn't the case; I imagine there are lots of people scribbling imprecations against Vygotsky in the margins of their Korean translations which really ought to be directed against us. There can really be only one excuse for what we did. It is the same excuse that Mike, Sylvia Scribner, Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman have for issuing a compilation under Vygotsky's name. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer admit that no deception was involved, and their main complaint is that the process of compiling it is not sufficiently transparent to be made reversible, but of course the same thing is true of almost any compilation and indeed coauthorship quite generally--we only know which chapters in "Ape, Primitive, Child" are by Luria and which by Vygotsky because of Vygotsky's complaints about Luria's Freudianism in his letters, and there is no way for the reader to know which of the revolutionary revisionist ideas in this book are Van der Veer's and which are Yasnitsky's! Of course, we have different standards for writers of historic stature than we do for each other, and that's perfectly okay, so long as we keep in mind that at the time "Mind in Society" was published, Vygotsky was not generally considered a writer of historic stature: his publication list in English was considerably shorter than Mike Cole's. Today it's just too easy for people to forget that the difficulty of publishing Vygotsky in the West was actually far greater than that of publishing him in the USSR for most of the twentieth century, thanks to the very real totalitarianism exercised (increasingly) by commercial publishing. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer do have the grace to acknowledge that "Mind in Society" started the Vygotsky boom that made it posssible for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer to start their revisionist revolution. We can't really fault historians for not knowing what to do next. But we can fault them for forgetting that people back then didn't know what we know today. In the end, I think that's the only excuse for doing translations, good or bad: Nobody else will, or nobody else will do it as well. To be fair, I should say that there WERE no less than two other teams translating Thinking and Speech into Korean when we went ahead and published; one was a very well-funded team of Russian professors at Korea University and the other had an official contract with MIT Press--but the latter used the Hanfmann and Vakar translation into English and the team of Russian professors--incredibly--used the Minick translation! So I am very glad we went ahead and published ours, imperfect as it is. As Tagore says, Ekla Chalo Re: If they answer not to your call walk aloneIf they are afraid and cower mutely facing the wall,O thou unlucky one,open your mind and speak out alone.If they turn away, and desert you when crossing the wilderness,O thou unlucky one,trample the thorns under thy tread,and along the blood-lined track travel alone.If they shut doors and do not hold up the light when the night is troubled with storm,O thou unlucky one,with the thunder flame of pain ignite your own heart,and let it burn alone. (Translated from Tagore's Bengali by Tagore himself--but was it back translated?) David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: While we were working on Piaget's response to "Thinking and Speech" I wrote to MIT Press to get permission to translate it into Korean. I learned that the original French manuscript had been lost, and that the translator, Francoise Seve, had had to reconstruct it from a typescript, part of which could only be reconstructed by back translating from English to French! dk On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:36 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David, > Yes, it makes sense to me too. It at least partly explains why my > comments in the margin of my copy of Speech and Language I bought so > many years ago can still evoke my irritation at Vygotsky, who, it > turns out, is not the author I thought he was. Another part is my own > constantly gaining and losing my grasp on a coherent socio-cultural > bead on the here and now, very much connected to the pulses of this > chat. Funny how then and now inform each other. > Henry > > > On Dec 31, 2015, at 4:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > Thanks, David! :) > > All makes sense to me. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are > >> seven facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that are...well, > >> more or > less > >> right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's > >> "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on > >> Routledge in the new year. > >> > >> 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, > ritualistic, > >> deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to > >> cults and personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that I > >> am making an unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and today's > >> relatively benign and bucolic academic atmosphere, note that > >> Anton's revolutionary revisionist point in this first section is > >> precisely that: the present > day > >> reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic > >> interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded reference > >> lists,an almost complete disjunction between high theory and more > >> or > less > >> banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in > >> Russia and the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, who > >> saw the > promised > >> land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. > >> Is the comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is > >> that it is > too > >> obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. > >> > >> There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. > >> The > first > >> is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a > >> medical > fact > >> that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it is > >> not really much more far fetched to say that he died without ever > >> knowing > that > >> in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language > >> and > widely > >> read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that > >> mythbusters > are > >> themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical > >> facts > and > >> construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that > >> the previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or > >> that it was constructed around correct facts which have been > >> grossly misinterpreted > in > >> some way. So.... > >> > >> 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky > School" > >> was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and > >> drifted > away, > >> spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, > >> although the loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This > >> section, based on Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first > >> section, which manages to > be > >> both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. > >> But of course for that very reason it tends to undermine the claims > >> of the > first > >> part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most obvious > >> evidence that there really WAS something like a Pyatorka--the fact > >> that Vygotsky's own letters referto the Pyatorka, and the fact that > >> the > Pyatorka > >> held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this contradicts > Anton's > >> main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were > convenient > >> constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of understanding) > >> for thinking about the history of the Vygotsky school even while it > >> was happening. But it also doesn't answer the question I have > >> always had > about > >> the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton points > >> out, there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong pro-Trotsky > sympathies), > >> the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a > >> bureaucratic bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust > >> Trotsky from power in > the > >> year following Lenin's death. . > >> > >> 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, is > >> an unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from > >> materials which really fit rather poorly, during the months > >> immediately before...and after...Vygotsky's death. I think anybody > >> who really knows the > chronology > >> of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this > controversial; > >> the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence and > power > >> of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to > >> undermine > the > >> popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe > >> to--that > there > >> are three very different Vygotskies believing three very different > >> foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). > >> > >> So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary > >> enough for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to > >> claim that the > works > >> that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we read > today, > >> and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. > They > >> found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three > >> times during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two of > >> these > lists > >> are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job > >> application knows very well that you list things that your > >> potential employer will find impressive, and these are usually > >> quite far from > being > >> the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, > >> Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational > Psychology", > >> which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely > >> followed by "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the authors > >> quite correctly point out, a work of popular science (and includes > >> references to > textbook > >> writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). > >> > >> Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the > Development > >> of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that the > former > >> was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two > unrelated > >> texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a benign > forgery > >> by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. > >> > >> First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF > >> that it > was > >> conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion which > >> goes back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in which it > >> was > conceived > >> and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the > >> chapters > fit > >> together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the > >> problem, the approach and the research method followed in the > >> "special studies" of > the > >> second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. is > >> is really weak stuff: they > >> > >> Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of > >> benign forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence in > >> recovering historic manuscripts) does not actually explain what it > >> is supposed to explain, which is the recurrence of several > >> paragraphs, not word for > word, > >> but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of > Ptolemaic > >> epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't bother > >> to > read > >> what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only > >> authority > for > >> this story, which seems so much less probable than the alternative > >> explanation that this is simply another instance of Vygotsky's > >> tendency > t > >> repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon > >> Goldberg > ("The > >> Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and other > >> must readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), and an > >> anonymous blogger (neither source seems very well disposed to their > >> erstwhile professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact that a story > >> is highly improbable and that the sources are somewhat jaundiced do > >> not mean that > it > >> is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean > >> that > it > >> is...well, possibly mythical. > >> > >> 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly > >> in > mind. > >> This much too should be have been already very clear to any careful > reader > >> of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting part > >> of > the > >> book, and the only part of the book which really does offer > >> completely > new > >> evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not > >> written by Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a > >> lot of what Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed > >> Nietszcheanism and his rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of > >> consciousness in favor of > "sense" > >> (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, as > >> I > did, > >> whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and if > >> so > up to > >> what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you may > wonder > >> what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other > unfinished > >> works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" is > >> mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child > Development"). > >> But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to learn > >> something. It's also the part of the book where we see the most > >> Vygotsky inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. > >> > >> 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write either > >> of > the > >> English language books for which he is famous. The facts are > depressingly > >> clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something like > half of > >> the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the > >> "redundancies", which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the > >> inauthenticity of Tool and > Sign) > >> cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that Vygotsky > >> ever wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all of the New > Testament, > >> like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put > together > >> by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what the > >> revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: > "Mind > >> in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the > >> significant omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they saw > >> that they could bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, and > >> that is exactly what > they > >> did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, whether > >> by Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the Vygotsky "boom"; > >> the real question we have to ask is--what can we actually > >> accomplish with the > energy > >> that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of > >> the > boom > >> stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" > >> suggested archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of > >> course that is certainly very much to be desired. But it also > >> ignores the exoteric > nature > >> of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory and > >> practice noted in point 1) above. > >> > >> 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were suppressed > >> in order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's national minorities. > This > >> too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own preface, > >> as > well > >> as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official > denunciation > >> of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to > be...well, > >> more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak the > truth > >> in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political > >> correctness" which only show how very little they understand the > concrete > >> realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really > objectionable > >> part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that > Vygotsky > >> is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations > >> of production, without any education, was enough to create concepts > >> in the minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in any of > >> Vygotsky's or Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the > >> contrary. (Luria repeatedly refers to the effect of schooling). > >> Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do > not > >> raise a number of key issues: > >> > >> a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those > >> who > take > >> experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological fieldwork > >> with them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. Does this > >> explain > why he > >> did not personally take part? > >> > >> b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people > >> like Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all > >> unprecedented; they were in fact part of a recognized and > >> continuing tradition in cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and > >> Cole, and also recent work on chimps and children in Africa). This > >> ethnographic tradition WAS > politically > >> suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it > >> sparingly, > and > >> why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) > >> conclusions? > >> > >> 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin > >> himself, but instead was subject to an informal ban, which did not > >> prevent him from being favorably cited in the twenty years between > >> his death and the > first > >> publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. > >> Stalin > was > >> not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky > >> would have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this really > >> is both sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic (and > >> anachronistic) > to > >> imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to > >> deserve > the > >> kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, > >> or > even > >> Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost > >> fact-free articles published against Vygotsky in the years after > >> his death were somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign against > >> his work (which > began > >> WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 decree > >> on pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself mentions > >> in > Thinking > >> and Speech Chapter Six?) > >> > >> As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is a > >> dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. The > danger > >> is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a > >> gut rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism out > >> of their firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material that > >> is anything but obvious. When that happens, we get something that > >> is neither a gorgon > nor a > >> minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being > Earnest": > >> something like a monster without being a myth. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> > >> > >> , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like > >> Aristotle, > Jesus > >> Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't edit > >> the books that made him famous. The problem of course is that > >> Vygotsky > didn't > >> know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de > >> Saussure, Vygotsky did not > >> > >> > >> > >> So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well > >> > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 08:10:03 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 09:10:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were setting up? To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in social stratification? You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? ("their" in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two people. -greg On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come out > of > > it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > > > > Best, Huw > > But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > remaining remarks: > > MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other components, > these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're understood in > terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other > variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and working > in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to which > indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity > responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse language > with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that we've > taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become > visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed into one. > And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they become > instruments of oppression and stratification. > > JB: At the individual level. > > MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of institutionalized > forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where do I > stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, maybe > reveal what's going on.' > > JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > > MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the 1939 > Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > > JB: 'The witch is dead' > > MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > > JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > > MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there is a > wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls back a > curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working the > levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports [purports?] > to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > > JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > > MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > > On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > > >> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own conversation > at > >> the following point, no? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now that > >> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of socio-linguistic > >> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that will > not > >> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the > >> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > >> > >> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this could > be > >> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it proves > also > >> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms even > in a > >> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > >> > >> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> > >>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the > >> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > >>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability and > >> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the other > >> thread. > >>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van de > Aa, > >> and Jan Blommaert. > >>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability as a > >> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for the > >> other thread ongoing. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Jan 2 08:34:15 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 16:34:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other hand we have a confession that although the university is "at the highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue as usual. If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of citizen-scientists are we? Martin On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were setting up? > To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in social > stratification? > You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? ("their" > in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two people. > -greg > > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come out >> of >>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. >>> >>> Best, Huw >> >> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the >> remaining remarks: >> >> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other components, >> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're understood in >> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other >> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and working >> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to which >> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity >> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard >> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse language >> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that we've >> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become >> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed into one. >> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they become >> instruments of oppression and stratification. >> >> JB: At the individual level. >> >> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of institutionalized >> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where do I >> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, maybe >> reveal what's going on.' >> >> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. >> >> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the 1939 >> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... >> >> JB: 'The witch is dead' >> >> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead >> >> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died >> >> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there is a >> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls back a >> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working the >> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports [purports?] >> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. >> >> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. >> >> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! >> >> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer >>> wrote: >>> >>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own conversation >> at >>>> the following point, no? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now that >>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of socio-linguistic >>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that will >> not >>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the >>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. >>>> >>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this could >> be >>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it proves >> also >>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms even >> in a >>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. >>>> >>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the >>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. >>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability and >>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the other >>>> thread. >>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van de >> Aa, >>>> and Jan Blommaert. >>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability as a >>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for the >>>> other thread ongoing. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 08:57:11 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 09:57:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I first heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid to repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he notes that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and among his friends prior to being said in its canonical version). If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the anthropological argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say that the position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by exposing the workings of power to critique by others who can see those inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about understanding a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or perhaps in a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different horizons of understanding the system?]. -greg On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other hand we > have a confession that although the university is "at the highest pinnacle > of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue as > usual. > > If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > citizen-scientists are we? > > Martin > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Martin, > > I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were setting > up? > > To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in social > > stratification? > > You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > ("their" > > in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > > Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two > people. > > -greg > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > >>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come out > >> of > >>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > >>> > >>> Best, Huw > >> > >> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > >> remaining remarks: > >> > >> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other components, > >> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're understood > in > >> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other > >> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and > working > >> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to > which > >> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity > >> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > >> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse language > >> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that we've > >> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become > >> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed into > one. > >> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they > become > >> instruments of oppression and stratification. > >> > >> JB: At the individual level. > >> > >> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of institutionalized > >> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where do > I > >> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, > maybe > >> reveal what's going on.' > >> > >> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > >> > >> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the 1939 > >> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > >> > >> JB: 'The witch is dead' > >> > >> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > >> > >> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > >> > >> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there > is a > >> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls back a > >> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working the > >> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > [purports?] > >> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > >> > >> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > >> > >> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > >> > >> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own conversation > >> at > >>>> the following point, no? > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now > that > >>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of socio-linguistic > >>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that will > >> not > >>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the > >>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > >>>> > >>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this > could > >> be > >>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it proves > >> also > >>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms even > >> in a > >>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > >>>> > >>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the > >>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > >>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability > and > >>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the other > >>>> thread. > >>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van de > >> Aa, > >>>> and Jan Blommaert. > >>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability > as a > >>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for > the > >>>> other thread ongoing. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>>>> > >>>>> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 09:08:55 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 17:08:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does have obvious relevance. It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely guns for hire. Best, Huw On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson wrote: > Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I first > heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid to > repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he notes > that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and among his > friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > > If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the anthropological > argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to > understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say that the > position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > > I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by exposing > the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > > [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about understanding > a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or perhaps in > a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different > horizons of understanding the system?]. > > -greg > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > wrote: > > > No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > > "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other hand > we > > have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > pinnacle > > of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue as > > usual. > > > > If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > > citizen-scientists are we? > > > > Martin > > > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > Martin, > > > I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > setting > > up? > > > To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in > social > > > stratification? > > > You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > > ("their" > > > in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > > > Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two > > people. > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > wrote: > > > > > >>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come > out > > >> of > > >>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > > >>> > > >>> Best, Huw > > >> > > >> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > > >> remaining remarks: > > >> > > >> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > components, > > >> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > understood > > in > > >> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other > > >> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and > > working > > >> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to > > which > > >> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity > > >> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > > >> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > language > > >> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > we've > > >> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become > > >> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed into > > one. > > >> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they > > become > > >> instruments of oppression and stratification. > > >> > > >> JB: At the individual level. > > >> > > >> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > institutionalized > > >> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where > do > > I > > >> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, > > maybe > > >> reveal what's going on.' > > >> > > >> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > > >> > > >> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the 1939 > > >> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > > >> > > >> JB: 'The witch is dead' > > >> > > >> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > > >> > > >> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > > >> > > >> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there > > is a > > >> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > back a > > >> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working > the > > >> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > > [purports?] > > >> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > > >> > > >> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > > >> > > >> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > > >> > > >> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > >> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > conversation > > >> at > > >>>> the following point, no? > > >>>> > > >>>> Martin > > >>>> > > >>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now > > that > > >>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > socio-linguistic > > >>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that > will > > >> not > > >>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the > > >>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > > >>>> > > >>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this > > could > > >> be > > >>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it > proves > > >> also > > >>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > even > > >> in a > > >>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > > >>>> > > >>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the > > >>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > > >>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability > > and > > >>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the > other > > >>>> thread. > > >>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van > de > > >> Aa, > > >>>> and Jan Blommaert. > > >>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability > > as a > > >>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for > > the > > >>>> other thread ongoing. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 09:14:23 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 10:14:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Huw, Aren't ethics by definition normalizing? Maybe we mean something different by this term? -greg On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does have > obvious relevance. > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely guns > for hire. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I first > > heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid to > > repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he notes > > that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and among > his > > friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > > > > If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the anthropological > > argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to > > understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say that > the > > position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > > > > I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > exposing > > the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > > inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > > > > [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > understanding > > a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or perhaps > in > > a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different > > horizons of understanding the system?]. > > > > -greg > > > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > > > "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other hand > > we > > > have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > > pinnacle > > > of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue as > > > usual. > > > > > > If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > > > citizen-scientists are we? > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Martin, > > > > I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > > setting > > > up? > > > > To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in > > social > > > > stratification? > > > > You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > > > ("their" > > > > in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > > > > Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two > > > people. > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come > > out > > > >> of > > > >>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > > > >>> > > > >>> Best, Huw > > > >> > > > >> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > > > >> remaining remarks: > > > >> > > > >> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > > components, > > > >> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > > understood > > > in > > > >> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other > > > >> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and > > > working > > > >> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to > > > which > > > >> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of > superdiversity > > > >> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > > > >> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > > language > > > >> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > > we've > > > >> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they > become > > > >> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed > into > > > one. > > > >> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they > > > become > > > >> instruments of oppression and stratification. > > > >> > > > >> JB: At the individual level. > > > >> > > > >> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > > institutionalized > > > >> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where > > do > > > I > > > >> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, > > > maybe > > > >> reveal what's going on.' > > > >> > > > >> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > > > >> > > > >> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the > 1939 > > > >> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > > > >> > > > >> JB: 'The witch is dead' > > > >> > > > >> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > > > >> > > > >> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > > > >> > > > >> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... > there > > > is a > > > >> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > > back a > > > >> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working > > the > > > >> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > > > [purports?] > > > >> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > > > >> > > > >> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > > > >> > > > >> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > > > >> > > > >> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > > conversation > > > >> at > > > >>>> the following point, no? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Martin > > > >>>> > > > >>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now > > > that > > > >>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > > socio-linguistic > > > >>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that > > will > > > >> not > > > >>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at > the > > > >>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this > > > could > > > >> be > > > >>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it > > proves > > > >> also > > > >>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > > even > > > >> in a > > > >>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift > the > > > >>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > > > >>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > translatability > > > and > > > >>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the > > other > > > >>>> thread. > > > >>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van > > de > > > >> Aa, > > > >>>> and Jan Blommaert. > > > >>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of > translatability > > > as a > > > >>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance > for > > > the > > > >>>> other thread ongoing. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 09:32:31 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 17:32:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: No, ethics require continual evaluation. Best, Huw On 2 January 2016 at 17:14, Greg Thompson wrote: > Huw, > Aren't ethics by definition normalizing? > Maybe we mean something different by this term? > -greg > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does have > > obvious relevance. > > > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely guns > > for hire. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I > first > > > heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid to > > > repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he > notes > > > that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and among > > his > > > friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > > > > > > If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the > anthropological > > > argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to > > > understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say that > > the > > > position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > > > > > > I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > > exposing > > > the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > > > inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > > > > > > [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > > understanding > > > a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or > perhaps > > in > > > a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two > different > > > horizons of understanding the system?]. > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > > > > "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other > hand > > > we > > > > have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > > > pinnacle > > > > of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue > as > > > > usual. > > > > > > > > If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > > > > citizen-scientists are we? > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Martin, > > > > > I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > > > setting > > > > up? > > > > > To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in > > > social > > > > > stratification? > > > > > You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > > > > ("their" > > > > > in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > > > > > Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just > two > > > > people. > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > >>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could > come > > > out > > > > >> of > > > > >>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Best, Huw > > > > >> > > > > >> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > > > > >> remaining remarks: > > > > >> > > > > >> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > > > components, > > > > >> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > > > understood > > > > in > > > > >> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of > other > > > > >> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of > and > > > > working > > > > >> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - > to > > > > which > > > > >> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of > > superdiversity > > > > >> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse > standard > > > > >> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > > > language > > > > >> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > > > we've > > > > >> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they > > become > > > > >> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed > > into > > > > one. > > > > >> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, > they > > > > become > > > > >> instruments of oppression and stratification. > > > > >> > > > > >> JB: At the individual level. > > > > >> > > > > >> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > > > institutionalized > > > > >> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: > 'Where > > > do > > > > I > > > > >> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate > people, > > > > maybe > > > > >> reveal what's going on.' > > > > >> > > > > >> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > > > > >> > > > > >> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the > > 1939 > > > > >> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > > > > >> > > > > >> JB: 'The witch is dead' > > > > >> > > > > >> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > > > > >> > > > > >> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > > > > >> > > > > >> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... > > there > > > > is a > > > > >> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > > > back a > > > > >> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, > working > > > the > > > > >> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > > > > [purports?] > > > > >> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > > > > >> > > > > >> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > > > > >> > > > > >> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > > > > >> > > > > >> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > > > conversation > > > > >> at > > > > >>>> the following point, no? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Martin > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: > 'now > > > > that > > > > >>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > > > socio-linguistic > > > > >>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, > that > > > will > > > > >> not > > > > >>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at > > the > > > > >>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe > this > > > > could > > > > >> be > > > > >>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it > > > proves > > > > >> also > > > > >>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > > > even > > > > >> in a > > > > >>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is > everywhere. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > > > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift > > the > > > > >>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > > > > >>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > > translatability > > > > and > > > > >>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the > > > other > > > > >>>> thread. > > > > >>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef > Van > > > de > > > > >> Aa, > > > > >>>> and Jan Blommaert. > > > > >>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of > > translatability > > > > as a > > > > >>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance > > for > > > > the > > > > >>>> other thread ongoing. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Jan 2 09:42:00 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 17:42:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> , Message-ID: Hello, In keeping with Peter's image offered by Van der Veer, I thought this image (attached) might be interesting to consider as well and what kind of titanic arguments must have ensued in its translation and interpretations. It's always been an interesting popcorn-eating event watching team myth-makers vs team myth-busters at work all over the world and throughout the ages, and not just on this list! I most humbly submit that I sense a necessity for some humor (and maybe some historical distance?): First there's this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiZt79UKUFQ And second there's this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxyrhynchus_Papyri and this maybe even this: ---- from the Trackers of Oxyrynchus: He heard Apollo yammering for scraps and tatters of a lost play of Sophocles: The Tracking Satyrs. "Grenfell, Hunt!" he heard the voice abjure. "Prevent Apollo's play becoming mere manure." Night and day the voice went: "Grenfell, Bernard Pyne, hunt for my papyrus. This order is divine!" ---- see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trackers_of_Oxyrhynchus Perhaps, If I might offer, the lesson really to consider is that while it may appear that history ends with us, it really doesn't. We will one day just be the ghost of what we happened to be fortunate enough to write down on scraps of paper, and in my case it will likely be just a to-do list! (and what would Monty Python do with THAT I wonder?) In any case, the take away for me (and I do like popcorn, especially with all the innovative flavors that are coming out in the market these days, such as white-cheddar jalape?o popcorn) is that if one is hoping to write for posterity, and not just for one's peers and publications, or, even, the peanut gallery outside the ivory tower, it seems prudent to consider the audience of the future, whoever that might be; whoever we might conceive them to be. They certainly won't be us! We won't be here! One thing's for sure, any emotion we might have about these matters seems, at rock-bottom, to be an expression of care, rather than cynical hostility, that tends to have an appearance (only an appearance) of removing, with distancing, any previous past hurts and disappointments (which I suppose is also its own expression of care, but in a noodling sort of way). What I consider most of all when I think about Vygotsky is this: intellectual freedom is hard work, and it's not just the politics, but the material of it. We possess bodies that get sick, we can't read because our glasses are not the right prescription (anymore), we have to do our laundry, take care of our children, and parents and neighbors, tend to the egos of others so that we might eat another day. Sometimes we must suffer to watch witch burnings with little we can do about it. Then after that is dealt with, we attempt to make sense of the tiniest shreds of what has been left behind by those who came before us. That's what I learn from Vygotsky. It's really something, isn't it? Still! the spirit must continue to be willing because the alternative is not livable if we want to remain human. And since we are human, then the answer is apparent. Don't you think? Kind regards, and even: a very [merry/happy] new year! Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: P.Oxy._IX_1174_col._iv-v.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 1178628 bytes Desc: P.Oxy._IX_1174_col._iv-v.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160102/b2d91fe6/attachment-0001.jpg From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Jan 2 09:45:37 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 17:45:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is that if it is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree of power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one but three departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as member of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), then this suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation of power to (powerless) undergraduates! Martin On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does have > obvious relevance. > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely guns > for hire. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I first >> heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid to >> repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he notes >> that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and among his >> friends prior to being said in its canonical version). >> >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the anthropological >> argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to >> understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say that the >> position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. >> >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by exposing >> the workings of power to critique by others who can see those >> inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. >> >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about understanding >> a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or perhaps in >> a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different >> horizons of understanding the system?]. >> >> -greg >> >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> wrote: >> >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other hand >> we >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest >> pinnacle >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue as >>> usual. >>> >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of >>> citizen-scientists are we? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Martin, >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were >> setting >>> up? >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in >> social >>>> stratification? >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? >>> ("their" >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two >>> people. >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come >> out >>>>> of >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, Huw >>>>> >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the >>>>> remaining remarks: >>>>> >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other >> components, >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're >> understood >>> in >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other >>>>> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and >>> working >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to >>> which >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity >>>>> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard >>>>> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse >> language >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that >> we've >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become >>>>> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed into >>> one. >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they >>> become >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. >>>>> >>>>> JB: At the individual level. >>>>> >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of >> institutionalized >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where >> do >>> I >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, >>> maybe >>>>> reveal what's going on.' >>>>> >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. >>>>> >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the 1939 >>>>> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... >>>>> >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' >>>>> >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead >>>>> >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died >>>>> >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there >>> is a >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls >> back a >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working >> the >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports >>> [purports?] >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. >>>>> >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. >>>>> >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own >> conversation >>>>> at >>>>>>> the following point, no? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now >>> that >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of >> socio-linguistic >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that >> will >>>>> not >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at the >>>>>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this >>> could >>>>> be >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it >> proves >>>>> also >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms >> even >>>>> in a >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift the >>>>>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of translatability >>> and >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the >> other >>>>>>> thread. >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van >> de >>>>> Aa, >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability >>> as a >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance for >>> the >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 10:04:06 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 18:04:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Quite so. But there is no contradiction in excusing oneself and fobbing off others whilst being acclaimed as distinguished. The abuse of ethics stupefies: it closes down the scope of reflection. Best, Huw On 2 January 2016 at 17:45, Martin John Packer wrote: > I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the > contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an > institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no > matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard > that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is that if it > is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree of > power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one but three > departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as member > of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), then this > suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation of > power to (powerless) undergraduates! > > Martin > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does have > > obvious relevance. > > > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely guns > > for hire. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I first > >> heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid to > >> repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he notes > >> that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and among > his > >> friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > >> > >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the > anthropological > >> argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to > >> understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say that > the > >> position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > >> > >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > exposing > >> the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > >> inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > >> > >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > understanding > >> a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or > perhaps in > >> a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different > >> horizons of understanding the system?]. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other hand > >> we > >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > >> pinnacle > >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue as > >>> usual. > >>> > >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > >>> citizen-scientists are we? > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Martin, > >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > >> setting > >>> up? > >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in > >> social > >>>> stratification? > >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > >>> ("their" > >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two > >>> people. > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come > >> out > >>>>> of > >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > >>>>> remaining remarks: > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > >> components, > >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > >> understood > >>> in > >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other > >>>>> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and > >>> working > >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to > >>> which > >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity > >>>>> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > >>>>> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > >> language > >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > >> we've > >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become > >>>>> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed > into > >>> one. > >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they > >>> become > >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: At the individual level. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > >> institutionalized > >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where > >> do > >>> I > >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, > >>> maybe > >>>>> reveal what's going on.' > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the > 1939 > >>>>> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there > >>> is a > >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > >> back a > >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working > >> the > >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > >>> [purports?] > >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > >>>>> > >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > >>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > >> conversation > >>>>> at > >>>>>>> the following point, no? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now > >>> that > >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > >> socio-linguistic > >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that > >> will > >>>>> not > >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at > the > >>>>>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this > >>> could > >>>>> be > >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it > >> proves > >>>>> also > >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > >> even > >>>>> in a > >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift > the > >>>>>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > translatability > >>> and > >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the > >> other > >>>>>>> thread. > >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van > >> de > >>>>> Aa, > >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. > >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability > >>> as a > >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance > for > >>> the > >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> >>> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 11:41:34 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 11:41:34 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> Silverstein suggests that as citizen-scientists we use our knowledge to illuminate people, to reveal what is going on. Blommaert adds that is the least we can do. The question I have is if the intent is to reveal, to show, to illuminate, at the level of epistemology, the level of knowing, is this intent an inadequate ethical response? On page 2 there is an exploration of the western philosophical concept of words, concepts, things, as formalized and resting upon a system of denotational structure. Linguistic anthropology is revealing, showing, illuminating this formalized, denotational structural system. This practice is based in fact within a whole cultural belief system that can be commoditized and exported around the world and now each nation state is incorporating this notion of translatability of meaning into their institutional languaging practices. Is it possible as Greg asks to stay within this culturally bound system as an aspect of the Enlightenment project which had the effect of breaking apart the medieval trivium. (see page 3). This Enlightenment movement of thought which kept grammar and which kept logic, and showed semantics to be the way language is truth-functional. What you get with this breaking up of the medieval trivium is a sense of purity, a sense of objectivity, a sense of a notational system of denotation that is scientific. What needs illumination, what needs to be revealed is the ethical way this culturally bound system demarcates a particular figuring of the world, a symbolic figuring that encompasses our particular ways of forming citizen scientist identities focused on translatability of meanings.. As citizens of nation states we have this culturally bound denotational structural system as our presumed reality in order to develop pure and objective structural systems of language. (not languaging which is a notion of ethical practice). This is very illuminating, and revealing, and very culturally bound. Now that we are illuminated and the curtain has been pulled back will anything change?. As citizen scientists working within institutions upholding culturally bound standards now exported to all nation states what do we do with what has been revealed. After revelation, what is the next step? -----Original Message----- From: "Huw Lloyd" Sent: ?2016-?01-?02 10:06 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability Quite so. But there is no contradiction in excusing oneself and fobbing off others whilst being acclaimed as distinguished. The abuse of ethics stupefies: it closes down the scope of reflection. Best, Huw On 2 January 2016 at 17:45, Martin John Packer wrote: > I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the > contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an > institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no > matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard > that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is that if it > is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree of > power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one but three > departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as member > of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), then this > suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation of > power to (powerless) undergraduates! > > Martin > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does have > > obvious relevance. > > > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely guns > > for hire. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I first > >> heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid to > >> repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he notes > >> that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and among > his > >> friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > >> > >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the > anthropological > >> argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to > >> understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say that > the > >> position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > >> > >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > exposing > >> the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > >> inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > >> > >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > understanding > >> a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or > perhaps in > >> a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different > >> horizons of understanding the system?]. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other hand > >> we > >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > >> pinnacle > >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue as > >>> usual. > >>> > >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > >>> citizen-scientists are we? > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Martin, > >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > >> setting > >>> up? > >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in > >> social > >>>> stratification? > >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > >>> ("their" > >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two > >>> people. > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come > >> out > >>>>> of > >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > >>>>> remaining remarks: > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > >> components, > >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > >> understood > >>> in > >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other > >>>>> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and > >>> working > >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to > >>> which > >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity > >>>>> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > >>>>> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > >> language > >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > >> we've > >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become > >>>>> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed > into > >>> one. > >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they > >>> become > >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: At the individual level. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > >> institutionalized > >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where > >> do > >>> I > >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, > >>> maybe > >>>>> reveal what's going on.' > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the > 1939 > >>>>> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there > >>> is a > >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > >> back a > >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working > >> the > >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > >>> [purports?] > >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > >>>>> > >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > >>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > >> conversation > >>>>> at > >>>>>>> the following point, no? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now > >>> that > >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > >> socio-linguistic > >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that > >> will > >>>>> not > >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at > the > >>>>>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this > >>> could > >>>>> be > >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it > >> proves > >>>>> also > >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > >> even > >>>>> in a > >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift > the > >>>>>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > translatability > >>> and > >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the > >> other > >>>>>>> thread. > >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van > >> de > >>>>> Aa, > >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. > >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability > >>> as a > >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance > for > >>> the > >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> >>> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 12:04:30 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 13:04:30 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, I'm trying to make a finer point here, and one that I take from Chapters 9 & 10 of your lovely book, the Science of Qualitative Research. If one wants to understand the workings of system (e.g., of oppression) from the perspective of others (e.g., the the powerful), then one needs to encounter the system as those who inhabit that system would inhabit it. If one inhabits power solely with the interests of changing the system, then one suddenly becomes a different kind of actor, with different interests and motivations - unable to see the workings of the system that are most essential to the powerful. (and how many idealists have resided in the academy with hopes of "changing the system" and have failed? This isn't to say that they/we shouldn't keep trying... just to say that there might be value in taking another approach - to fully inhabit the horizons of a powerful academic and describe that experience. I'm taking this a bit further and in a more cynical (sinister?) direction than MS would take it. And I don't think that this is quite what MS is doing. But I think there is an argument to be made here). Again, this is not MS's argument. It is one that I am toying with here. -greg ? On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 10:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the > contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an > institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no > matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard > that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is that if it > is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree of > power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one but three > departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as member > of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), then this > suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation of > power to (powerless) undergraduates! > > Martin > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does have > > obvious relevance. > > > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely guns > > for hire. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I first > >> heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid to > >> repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he notes > >> that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and among > his > >> friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > >> > >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the > anthropological > >> argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to > >> understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say that > the > >> position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > >> > >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > exposing > >> the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > >> inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > >> > >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > understanding > >> a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or > perhaps in > >> a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different > >> horizons of understanding the system?]. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other hand > >> we > >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > >> pinnacle > >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue as > >>> usual. > >>> > >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > >>> citizen-scientists are we? > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Martin, > >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > >> setting > >>> up? > >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in > >> social > >>>> stratification? > >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > >>> ("their" > >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two > >>> people. > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could come > >> out > >>>>> of > >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > >>>>> remaining remarks: > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > >> components, > >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > >> understood > >>> in > >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other > >>>>> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and > >>> working > >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to > >>> which > >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity > >>>>> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > >>>>> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > >> language > >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > >> we've > >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they become > >>>>> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed > into > >>> one. > >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, they > >>> become > >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: At the individual level. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > >> institutionalized > >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: 'Where > >> do > >>> I > >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, > >>> maybe > >>>>> reveal what's going on.' > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the > 1939 > >>>>> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... there > >>> is a > >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > >> back a > >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working > >> the > >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > >>> [purports?] > >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > >>>>> > >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > >>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > >> conversation > >>>>> at > >>>>>>> the following point, no? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: 'now > >>> that > >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > >> socio-linguistic > >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that > >> will > >>>>> not > >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at > the > >>>>>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this > >>> could > >>>>> be > >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it > >> proves > >>>>> also > >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > >> even > >>>>> in a > >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift > the > >>>>>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > translatability > >>> and > >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the > >> other > >>>>>>> thread. > >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van > >> de > >>>>> Aa, > >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. > >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability > >>> as a > >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance > for > >>> the > >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> >>> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From glassman.13@osu.edu Sat Jan 2 12:14:42 2016 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 20:14:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C329F1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> I think I disagree with this Martin. The only reason we don't change the university is because we decide not to make the effort to change it. Once you realize a problem and then you don't work to change it (the types of normalization that comes through specific, though widespread approaches to grading that almost always bring the students closer to the desires of the system) then I think the argument can be made that you are getting something from it. If you are one of the oppressed what you get is a sense of belonging, if you are one of the oppressors then you are benefiting from the system (this is my interpretation of Friere). Once you give up the system you have adopted by working to change it there is a possibility the system might change. As one of my students said recently, Democracy and Education is not a how to book but a manifesto. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 12:46 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is that if it is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree of power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one but three departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as member of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), then this suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation of power to (powerless) undergraduates! Martin On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does > have obvious relevance. > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely > guns for hire. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I >> first heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not >> afraid to repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe >> Lincoln, he notes that the Gettysburg address had a long history in >> Abe's mouth and among his friends prior to being said in its canonical version). >> >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the >> anthropological argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive >> regime in order to understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz >> metaphor, we might say that the position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. >> >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by >> exposing the workings of power to critique by others who can see >> those inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. >> >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about >> understanding a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the >> "outside" - or perhaps in a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak >> about these as two different horizons of understanding the system?]. >> >> -greg >> >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> wrote: >> >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other >>> hand >> we >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest >> pinnacle >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue >>> as usual. >>> >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of >>> citizen-scientists are we? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Martin, >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were >> setting >>> up? >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in >> social >>>> stratification? >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? >>> ("their" >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just >>>> two >>> people. >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could >>>>>> come >> out >>>>> of >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, Huw >>>>> >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the >>>>> remaining remarks: >>>>> >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other >> components, >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're >> understood >>> in >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of >>>>> other variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms >>>>> of and >>> working >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - >>>>> to >>> which >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of >>>>> superdiversity responds - is indeed a complex one in which people >>>>> confuse standard register with normativity in the first place, and >>>>> they confuse >> language >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that >> we've >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they >>>>> become visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get >>>>> collapsed into >>> one. >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, >>>>> they >>> become >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. >>>>> >>>>> JB: At the individual level. >>>>> >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of >> institutionalized >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: >>>>> 'Where >> do >>> I >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate >>>>> people, >>> maybe >>>>> reveal what's going on.' >>>>> >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. >>>>> >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the >>>>> 1939 Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... >>>>> >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' >>>>> >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead >>>>> >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died >>>>> >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... >>>>> there >>> is a >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls >> back a >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, >>>>> working >> the >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports >>> [purports?] >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. >>>>> >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. >>>>> >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own >> conversation >>>>> at >>>>>>> the following point, no? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: >>>>>>> 'now >>> that >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of >> socio-linguistic >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, >>>>>>> that >> will >>>>> not >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at >>>>>>> the highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe >>>>>>> this >>> could >>>>> be >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it >> proves >>>>> also >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms >> even >>>>> in a >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> focus that David's thread opened up on myth busting. >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of >>>>>>>> translatability >>> and >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the >> other >>>>>>> thread. >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef >>>>>>>> Van >> de >>>>> Aa, >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of >>>>>>>> translatability >>> as a >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance >>>>>>> for >>> the >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 12:15:24 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 13:15:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, Yes, part of the trouble here is anthropology itself. One of the first things that an anthropologist encounters are the very deep ways in which the ethical is cultural. That makes it difficult for anthropologists to draw a line in the sand and say "this is good" (and "this is not"). This isn't to say that anthropologists can't or won't do this, just that they realize that when they are doing this, they are implicating their own time and place (as well as their own self) in ways that can be problematic if we wish to apply them across other times and places (and selves). Thus, we might see MS's response as a way of sidestepping the problem (only to a degree, though). By laying bare the workings of power, one then leaves it to others to act (with regard to a particular cultural and historical ethical framework). One example of how others have taken Silverstein's work and acted on it might be Silverstein's student, Jonathan Rosa. He has done quite a bit of activist work around language (including getting the AP to change their guidelines regarding the problematic use of the term "illegal immigrant", but also some great new stuff with Nelson Flores about standardization of language in school and society). And, of course, in the end it seems strange to say that Silverstein is fobbing this or fobbing that since he wasn't claiming any moral high ground in the first place. I think he would just say that he's just doing what he likes to do (or perhaps what he does well), and I think he would add that this is ethically problematic. Seems to me that all of this is something of a hill of beans, but maybe there are some deeper issues here that make this worth discussing. -greg On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 12:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Silverstein suggests that as citizen-scientists we use our knowledge to > illuminate people, to reveal what is going on. > Blommaert adds that is the least we can do. > The question I have is if the intent is to reveal, to show, to illuminate, > at the level of epistemology, the level of knowing, is this intent an > inadequate ethical response? > > On page 2 there is an exploration of the western philosophical concept of > words, concepts, things, as formalized and resting upon a system of > denotational structure. Linguistic anthropology is revealing, showing, > illuminating this formalized, denotational structural system. > > This practice is based in fact within a whole cultural belief system that > can be commoditized and exported around the world and now each nation state > is incorporating this notion of translatability of meaning into their > institutional languaging practices. > Is it possible as Greg asks to stay within this culturally bound system as > an aspect of the Enlightenment project which had the effect of breaking > apart the medieval trivium. (see page 3). > This Enlightenment movement of thought which kept grammar and which kept > logic, and showed semantics to be the way language is truth-functional. > What you get with this breaking up of the medieval trivium is a sense of > purity, a sense of objectivity, a sense of a notational system of > denotation that is scientific. > > What needs illumination, what needs to be revealed is the ethical way this > culturally bound system demarcates a particular figuring of the world, a > symbolic figuring that encompasses our particular ways of forming citizen > scientist identities focused on translatability of meanings.. > As citizens of nation states we have this culturally bound denotational > structural system as our presumed reality in order to develop pure and > objective structural systems of language. (not languaging which is a notion > of ethical practice). > This is very illuminating, and revealing, and very culturally bound. > Now that we are illuminated and the curtain has been pulled back will > anything change?. > As citizen scientists working within institutions upholding culturally > bound standards now exported to all nation states what do we do with what > has been revealed. > After revelation, what is the next step? > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > Sent: ?2016-?01-?02 10:06 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability > > Quite so. But there is no contradiction in excusing oneself and fobbing > off others whilst being acclaimed as distinguished. The abuse of ethics > stupefies: it closes down the scope of reflection. > > Best, > Huw > > On 2 January 2016 at 17:45, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the > > contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an > > institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no > > matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard > > that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is that if > it > > is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree of > > power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one but > three > > departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as > member > > of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), then > this > > suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation of > > power to (powerless) undergraduates! > > > > Martin > > > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > > > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does > have > > > obvious relevance. > > > > > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > > > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely > guns > > > for hire. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I > first > > >> heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not afraid > to > > >> repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, he > notes > > >> that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and > among > > his > > >> friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > > >> > > >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the > > anthropological > > >> argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order to > > >> understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might say > that > > the > > >> position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > > >> > > >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > > exposing > > >> the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > > >> inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > > >> > > >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > > understanding > > >> a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or > > perhaps in > > >> a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two > different > > >> horizons of understanding the system?]. > > >> > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > > >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other > hand > > >> we > > >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > > >> pinnacle > > >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue > as > > >>> usual. > > >>> > > >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > > >>> citizen-scientists are we? > > >>> > > >>> Martin > > >>> > > >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Martin, > > >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > > >> setting > > >>> up? > > >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in > > >> social > > >>>> stratification? > > >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > > >>> ("their" > > >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > > >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just two > > >>> people. > > >>>> -greg > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could > come > > >> out > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Best, Huw > > >>>>> > > >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the > > >>>>> remaining remarks: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > > >> components, > > >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > > >> understood > > >>> in > > >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of other > > >>>>> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms of and > > >>> working > > >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - to > > >>> which > > >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of > superdiversity > > >>>>> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > > >>>>> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > > >> language > > >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > > >> we've > > >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they > become > > >>>>> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed > > into > > >>> one. > > >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, > they > > >>> become > > >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: At the individual level. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > > >> institutionalized > > >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: > 'Where > > >> do > > >>> I > > >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate > people, > > >>> maybe > > >>>>> reveal what's going on.' > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the > > 1939 > > >>>>> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... > there > > >>> is a > > >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > > >> back a > > >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, > working > > >> the > > >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > > >>> [purports?] > > >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > > >> conversation > > >>>>> at > > >>>>>>> the following point, no? > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: > 'now > > >>> that > > >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > > >> socio-linguistic > > >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, that > > >> will > > >>>>> not > > >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at > > the > > >>>>>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe this > > >>> could > > >>>>> be > > >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it > > >> proves > > >>>>> also > > >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > > >> even > > >>>>> in a > > >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is > everywhere. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift > > the > > >>>>>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > > >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > > translatability > > >>> and > > >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the > > >> other > > >>>>>>> thread. > > >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef > Van > > >> de > > >>>>> Aa, > > >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. > > >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of > translatability > > >>> as a > > >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance > > for > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > >>> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From glassman.13@osu.edu Sat Jan 2 12:36:39 2016 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 20:36:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32A0E@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Greg, Again, I am going to make a Frierian counterpoint. You don't try and understand a system in order to change it, unless it is your own system. But if it is your own system you do try and understand in order to critique is - this can only be done through understanding your own participation in the system - outsiders can help some in setting processes, but it has to be the members of the system that are able to legitimately critique. But the purpose of critique is change. MS seems to want to critique his own system (academia) but then does not use that critique to work towards change. Is it really critique at all then? What is it? Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 3:05 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability Martin, I'm trying to make a finer point here, and one that I take from Chapters 9 & 10 of your lovely book, the Science of Qualitative Research. If one wants to understand the workings of system (e.g., of oppression) from the perspective of others (e.g., the the powerful), then one needs to encounter the system as those who inhabit that system would inhabit it. If one inhabits power solely with the interests of changing the system, then one suddenly becomes a different kind of actor, with different interests and motivations - unable to see the workings of the system that are most essential to the powerful. (and how many idealists have resided in the academy with hopes of "changing the system" and have failed? This isn't to say that they/we shouldn't keep trying... just to say that there might be value in taking another approach - to fully inhabit the horizons of a powerful academic and describe that experience. I'm taking this a bit further and in a more cynical (sinister?) direction than MS would take it. And I don't think that this is quite what MS is doing. But I think there is an argument to be made here). Again, this is not MS's argument. It is one that I am toying with here. -greg ? On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 10:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the > contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an > institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no > matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single > standard that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point > is that if it is so hard to change the university even when one has a > fair degree of power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" > in not one but three departments - anthropology, linguistics, and > psychology - as well as member of the Committee on Interdisciplinary > Studies in the Humanities), then this suggests that there is not much > merit in pointing out the operation of power to (powerless) undergraduates! > > Martin > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does > > have obvious relevance. > > > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely > > guns for hire. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I > >> first heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not > >> afraid to repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe > >> Lincoln, he notes that the Gettysburg address had a long history in > >> Abe's mouth and among > his > >> friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > >> > >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the > anthropological > >> argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in order > >> to understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might > >> say that > the > >> position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > >> > >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > exposing > >> the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > >> inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > >> > >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > understanding > >> a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or > perhaps in > >> a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two > >> different horizons of understanding the system?]. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other > >>> hand > >> we > >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > >> pinnacle > >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will > >>> continue as usual. > >>> > >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > >>> citizen-scientists are we? > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Martin, > >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > >> setting > >>> up? > >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays > >>>> in > >> social > >>>> stratification? > >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > >>> ("their" > >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just > >>>> two > >>> people. > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could > >>>>>> come > >> out > >>>>> of > >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are > >>>>> the remaining remarks: > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > >> components, > >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > >> understood > >>> in > >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of > >>>>> other variation as well that people are actually behaving in > >>>>> terms of and > >>> working > >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - > >>>>> to > >>> which > >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of > >>>>> superdiversity responds - is indeed a complex one in which > >>>>> people confuse standard register with normativity in the first > >>>>> place, and they confuse > >> language > >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things > >>>>> that > >> we've > >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they > >>>>> become visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get > >>>>> collapsed > into > >>> one. > >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, > >>>>> they > >>> become > >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: At the individual level. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > >> institutionalized > >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: > >>>>> 'Where > >> do > >>> I > >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate > >>>>> people, > >>> maybe > >>>>> reveal what's going on.' > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in > >>>>> the > 1939 > >>>>> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... > >>>>> there > >>> is a > >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - > >>>>> pulls > >> back a > >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, > >>>>> working > >> the > >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > >>> [purports?] > >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > >>>>> > >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > >>>>> > >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > >>>>> > >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > >>>>> > >>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > >> conversation > >>>>> at > >>>>>>> the following point, no? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: > >>>>>>> 'now > >>> that > >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > >> socio-linguistic > >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, > >>>>>>> that > >> will > >>>>> not > >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is > >>>>>>> at > the > >>>>>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe > >>>>>>> this > >>> could > >>>>> be > >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it > >> proves > >>>>> also > >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of > >>>>>>> norms > >> even > >>>>> in a > >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to > >>>>>>>> shift > the > >>>>>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > translatability > >>> and > >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with > >>>>>>> the > >> other > >>>>>>> thread. > >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef > >>>>>>>> Van > >> de > >>>>> Aa, > >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. > >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of > >>>>>>>> translatability > >>> as a > >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some > >>>>>>> relevance > for > >>> the > >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> >>> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 12:44:33 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 12:44:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C329F1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C329F1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <568836e8.e93e420a.22e11.05a1@mx.google.com> Once you give up the system you have adopted by working to change it there is a possibility the system might change (Michael Glassman). This seems to be an approach which values distancing from the system in an attempt to find leverage to change the system. Greg, in contrast, is appealing to inhabiting the place of oppression to have an experience located within the system. Moving outside the system as a reflective distancing move in order to implement change In contrast to Staying within or inhabiting this system in order to implement change as an active participant. I may be mis-interpreting as two contrasting approaches? -----Original Message----- From: "Glassman, Michael" Sent: ?2016-?01-?02 12:16 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability I think I disagree with this Martin. The only reason we don't change the university is because we decide not to make the effort to change it. Once you realize a problem and then you don't work to change it (the types of normalization that comes through specific, though widespread approaches to grading that almost always bring the students closer to the desires of the system) then I think the argument can be made that you are getting something from it. If you are one of the oppressed what you get is a sense of belonging, if you are one of the oppressors then you are benefiting from the system (this is my interpretation of Friere). Once you give up the system you have adopted by working to change it there is a possibility the system might change. As one of my students said recently, Democracy and Education is not a how to book but a manifesto. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 12:46 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is that if it is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree of power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one but three departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as member of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), then this suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation of power to (powerless) undergraduates! Martin On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does > have obvious relevance. > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely > guns for hire. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I >> first heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not >> afraid to repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe >> Lincoln, he notes that the Gettysburg address had a long history in >> Abe's mouth and among his friends prior to being said in its canonical version). >> >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the >> anthropological argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive >> regime in order to understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz >> metaphor, we might say that the position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. >> >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by >> exposing the workings of power to critique by others who can see >> those inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. >> >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about >> understanding a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the >> "outside" - or perhaps in a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak >> about these as two different horizons of understanding the system?]. >> >> -greg >> >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> wrote: >> >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other >>> hand >> we >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest >> pinnacle >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue >>> as usual. >>> >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of >>> citizen-scientists are we? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Martin, >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were >> setting >>> up? >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in >> social >>>> stratification? >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? >>> ("their" >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just >>>> two >>> people. >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could >>>>>> come >> out >>>>> of >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, Huw >>>>> >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the >>>>> remaining remarks: >>>>> >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other >> components, >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're >> understood >>> in >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of >>>>> other variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms >>>>> of and >>> working >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - >>>>> to >>> which >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of >>>>> superdiversity responds - is indeed a complex one in which people >>>>> confuse standard register with normativity in the first place, and >>>>> they confuse >> language >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that >> we've >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they >>>>> become visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get >>>>> collapsed into >>> one. >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, >>>>> they >>> become >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. >>>>> >>>>> JB: At the individual level. >>>>> >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of >> institutionalized >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: >>>>> 'Where >> do >>> I >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate >>>>> people, >>> maybe >>>>> reveal what's going on.' >>>>> >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. >>>>> >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the >>>>> 1939 Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... >>>>> >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' >>>>> >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead >>>>> >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died >>>>> >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... >>>>> there >>> is a >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls >> back a >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, >>>>> working >> the >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports >>> [purports?] >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. >>>>> >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. >>>>> >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own >> conversation >>>>> at >>>>>>> the following point, no? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: >>>>>>> 'now >>> that >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of >> socio-linguistic >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, >>>>>>> that >> will >>>>> not >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at >>>>>>> the highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe >>>>>>> this >>> could >>>>> be >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it >> proves >>>>> also >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms >> even >>>>> in a >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> focus that David's thread opened up on myth busting. >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of >>>>>>>> translatability >>> and >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the >> other >>>>>>> thread. >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef >>>>>>>> Van >> de >>>>> Aa, >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of >>>>>>>> translatability >>> as a >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance >>>>>>> for >>> the >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> From glassman.13@osu.edu Sat Jan 2 12:59:49 2016 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 20:59:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: <568836e8.e93e420a.22e11.05a1@mx.google.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C329F1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <568836e8.e93e420a.22e11.05a1@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32A29@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Larry, Not distancing Larry. Critique in this sense is not distancing but both recognizing and taking responsibility for. I think It is actually getting closer to the system. One of the techniques Friere suggests for instance in Pedagogy of the oppressed is taking pictures of engaging in the system and then analyzing your own actions and why you are doing them. Perhaps we are seeing this today in the videos of young Black men being beaten and killed by police officers. I don't know, haven't been able to think it through in that way. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lplarry Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 3:45 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability Once you give up the system you have adopted by working to change it there is a possibility the system might change (Michael Glassman). This seems to be an approach which values distancing from the system in an attempt to find leverage to change the system. Greg, in contrast, is appealing to inhabiting the place of oppression to have an experience located within the system. Moving outside the system as a reflective distancing move in order to implement change In contrast to Staying within or inhabiting this system in order to implement change as an active participant. I may be mis-interpreting as two contrasting approaches? -----Original Message----- From: "Glassman, Michael" Sent: ?2016-?01-?02 12:16 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability I think I disagree with this Martin. The only reason we don't change the university is because we decide not to make the effort to change it. Once you realize a problem and then you don't work to change it (the types of normalization that comes through specific, though widespread approaches to grading that almost always bring the students closer to the desires of the system) then I think the argument can be made that you are getting something from it. If you are one of the oppressed what you get is a sense of belonging, if you are one of the oppressors then you are benefiting from the system (this is my interpretation of Friere). Once you give up the system you have adopted by working to change it there is a possibility the system might change. As one of my students said recently, Democracy and Education is not a how to book but a manifesto. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 12:46 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is that if it is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree of power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one but three departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as member of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), then this suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation of power to (powerless) undergraduates! Martin On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it does > have obvious relevance. > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are merely > guns for hire. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when I >> first heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not >> afraid to repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe >> Lincoln, he notes that the Gettysburg address had a long history in >> Abe's mouth and among his friends prior to being said in its canonical version). >> >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the >> anthropological argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive >> regime in order to understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz >> metaphor, we might say that the position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. >> >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by >> exposing the workings of power to critique by others who can see >> those inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. >> >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about >> understanding a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the >> "outside" - or perhaps in a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak >> about these as two different horizons of understanding the system?]. >> >> -greg >> >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> wrote: >> >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the other >>> hand >> we >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest >> pinnacle >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will continue >>> as usual. >>> >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of >>> citizen-scientists are we? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Martin, >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were >> setting >>> up? >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays in >> social >>>> stratification? >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? >>> ("their" >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between just >>>> two >>> people. >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else could >>>>>> come >> out >>>>> of >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, Huw >>>>> >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are the >>>>> remaining remarks: >>>>> >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other >> components, >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're >> understood >>> in >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of >>>>> other variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms >>>>> of and >>> working >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system - >>>>> to >>> which >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of >>>>> superdiversity responds - is indeed a complex one in which people >>>>> confuse standard register with normativity in the first place, and >>>>> they confuse >> language >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that >> we've >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they >>>>> become visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get >>>>> collapsed into >>> one. >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most tellingly, >>>>> they >>> become >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. >>>>> >>>>> JB: At the individual level. >>>>> >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of >> institutionalized >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: >>>>> 'Where >> do >>> I >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate >>>>> people, >>> maybe >>>>> reveal what's going on.' >>>>> >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. >>>>> >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in the >>>>> 1939 Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... >>>>> >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' >>>>> >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead >>>>> >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died >>>>> >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of this... >>>>> there >>> is a >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls >> back a >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, >>>>> working >> the >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports >>> [purports?] >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. >>>>> >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. >>>>> >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own >> conversation >>>>> at >>>>>>> the following point, no? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the time: >>>>>>> 'now >>> that >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of >> socio-linguistic >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, >>>>>>> that >> will >>>>> not >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution is at >>>>>>> the highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe >>>>>>> this >>> could >>>>> be >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time it >> proves >>>>> also >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms >> even >>>>> in a >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> focus that David's thread opened up on myth busting. >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of >>>>>>>> translatability >>> and >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with the >> other >>>>>>> thread. >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef >>>>>>>> Van >> de >>>>> Aa, >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of >>>>>>>> translatability >>> as a >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance >>>>>>> for >>> the >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> From bazerman@education.ucsb.edu Sat Jan 2 13:05:58 2016 From: bazerman@education.ucsb.edu (Charles Bazerman) Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2016 13:05:58 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Production oriented fields such as composition, rhetoric, and writing take as the starting place the meanings that language users are bringing into being. Then normative expectations and typifications are seen only as facilitating (or constricting) meanings and responses the writer is trying to realize and elicit in readers. Depending on the social context and purpose various sets of expectations may hold sway, and violations evoke different kinds of judgment and consequences.Yet each of the sets of expectations have expressive potentials which went into the forming of these various communicative and activity systems. If one's meanings can be adequately formed for one's audience within these constraints, the expectations can work for you. Nonetheless, violations, transgressions, expansions, hybridization, novelty, even attempts to transform the vision and practices of the activity system all have risks and potential costs but they are certainly within the available repertoire and are not a priori ruled out of bounds. But usually they involve forethought and often extra work to be made intelligible and effective. For people interested in writing production, the social facts of expectations of language may be the same or similar to those noted by linguists and linguistic anthropologists, but the stance towards them and the meaning attributed to them are different. Meaning elaboration and effectiveness for particular audiences are the reigning criteria. Chuck ----- Original Message ----- From: Lplarry Date: Saturday, January 2, 2016 11:46 am Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Silverstein suggests that as citizen-scientists we use our knowledge > to illuminate people, to reveal what is going on. > Blommaert adds that is the least we can do. > The question I have is if the intent is to reveal, to show, to > illuminate, at the level of epistemology, the level of knowing, is > this intent an inadequate ethical response? > > On page 2 there is an exploration of the western philosophical concept > of words, concepts, things, as formalized and resting upon a system of > denotational structure. Linguistic anthropology is revealing, showing, > illuminating this formalized, denotational structural system. > > This practice is based in fact within a whole cultural belief system > that can be commoditized and exported around the world and now each > nation state is incorporating this notion of translatability of > meaning into their institutional languaging practices. > Is it possible as Greg asks to stay within this culturally bound > system as an aspect of the Enlightenment project which had the effect > of breaking apart the medieval trivium. (see page 3). > This Enlightenment movement of thought which kept grammar and which > kept logic, and showed semantics to be the way language is truth-functional. > What you get with this breaking up of the medieval trivium is a sense > of purity, a sense of objectivity, a sense of a notational system of > denotation that is scientific. > > What needs illumination, what needs to be revealed is the ethical way > this culturally bound system demarcates a particular figuring of the > world, a symbolic figuring that encompasses our particular ways of > forming citizen scientist identities focused on translatability of meanings.. > As citizens of nation states we have this culturally bound > denotational structural system as our presumed reality in order to > develop pure and objective structural systems of language. (not > languaging which is a notion of ethical practice). > This is very illuminating, and revealing, and very culturally bound. > Now that we are illuminated and the curtain has been pulled back will > anything change?. > As citizen scientists working within institutions upholding culturally > bound standards now exported to all nation states what do we do with > what has been revealed. > After revelation, what is the next step? > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > Sent: ?2016-?01-?02 10:06 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability > > Quite so. But there is no contradiction in excusing oneself and fobbing > off others whilst being acclaimed as distinguished. The abuse of ethics > stupefies: it closes down the scope of reflection. > > Best, > Huw > > On 2 January 2016 at 17:45, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the > > contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an > > institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no > > matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard > > that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is > that if it > > is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree > of > > power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one > but three > > departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as > member > > of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), > then this > > suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation > of > > power to (powerless) undergraduates! > > > > Martin > > > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it > does have > > > obvious relevance. > > > > > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > > > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are > merely guns > > > for hire. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when > I first > > >> heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not > afraid to > > >> repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, > he notes > > >> that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and > among > > his > > >> friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > > >> > > >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the > > anthropological > > >> argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in > order to > > >> understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might > say that > > the > > >> position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > > >> > > >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > > exposing > > >> the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > > >> inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > > >> > > >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > > understanding > > >> a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or > > perhaps in > > >> a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different > > >> horizons of understanding the system?]. > > >> > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > > >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the > other hand > > >> we > > >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > > >> pinnacle > > >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will > continue as > > >>> usual. > > >>> > > >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > > >>> citizen-scientists are we? > > >>> > > >>> Martin > > >>> > > >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Martin, > > >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > > >> setting > > >>> up? > > >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays > in > > >> social > > >>>> stratification? > > >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > > >>> ("their" > > >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > > >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between > just two > > >>> people. > > >>>> -greg > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else > could come > > >> out > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Best, Huw > > >>>>> > > >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are > the > > >>>>> remaining remarks: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > > >> components, > > >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > > >> understood > > >>> in > > >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of > other > > >>>>> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms > of and > > >>> working > > >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system > - to > > >>> which > > >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity > > >>>>> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > > >>>>> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > > >> language > > >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > > >> we've > > >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they > become > > >>>>> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed > > into > > >>> one. > > >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most > tellingly, they > > >>> become > > >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: At the individual level. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > > >> institutionalized > > >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: > 'Where > > >> do > > >>> I > > >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, > > >>> maybe > > >>>>> reveal what's going on.' > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in > the > > 1939 > > >>>>> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of > this... there > > >>> is a > > >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > > >> back a > > >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working > > >> the > > >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > > >>> [purports?] > > >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > > >> conversation > > >>>>> at > > >>>>>>> the following point, no? > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the > time: 'now > > >>> that > > >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > > >> socio-linguistic > > >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, > that > > >> will > > >>>>> not > > >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution > is at > > the > > >>>>>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe > this > > >>> could > > >>>>> be > > >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time > it > > >> proves > > >>>>> also > > >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > > >> even > > >>>>> in a > > >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift > > the > > >>>>>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > > >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > > translatability > > >>> and > > >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with > the > > >> other > > >>>>>>> thread. > > >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, > Jef Van > > >> de > > >>>>> Aa, > > >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. > > >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability > > >>> as a > > >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance > > for > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > >>> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 13:39:19 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 13:39:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> Charles, Thanks for this answer which is a clear answer to next steps. The awareness that the social facts of expectations of language may be the same or similar for writers as for linguistic anthropologists but the stance towards and meanings given to these social facts are different opens a new horizon. Meaning elaboration and effectiveness for particular audiences are the reigning criteria. Is there a source that focuses in on this difference in approach to the same social facts Does linguistic anthropology as a discipline have a different understanding of meaning. The metaphor of social facts as a prism through which is revealed or illuminated a spectrum of meanings is an image that comes to mind. -----Original Message----- From: "Charles Bazerman" Sent: ?2016-?01-?02 1:11 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability Production oriented fields such as composition, rhetoric, and writing take as the starting place the meanings that language users are bringing into being. Then normative expectations and typifications are seen only as facilitating (or constricting) meanings and responses the writer is trying to realize and elicit in readers. Depending on the social context and purpose various sets of expectations may hold sway, and violations evoke different kinds of judgment and consequences.Yet each of the sets of expectations have expressive potentials which went into the forming of these various communicative and activity systems. If one's meanings can be adequately formed for one's audience within these constraints, the expectations can work for you. Nonetheless, violations, transgressions, expansions, hybridization, novelty, even attempts to transform the vision and practices of the activity system all have risks and potential costs but they are certainly within the available repertoire and are not a priori ruled out of bounds. But usually they involve forethought and often extra work to be made intelligible and effective. For people interested in writing production, the social facts of expectations of language may be the same or similar to those noted by linguists and linguistic anthropologists, but the stance towards them and the meaning attributed to them are different. Meaning elaboration and effectiveness for particular audiences are the reigning criteria. Chuck ----- Original Message ----- From: Lplarry Date: Saturday, January 2, 2016 11:46 am Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Silverstein suggests that as citizen-scientists we use our knowledge > to illuminate people, to reveal what is going on. > Blommaert adds that is the least we can do. > The question I have is if the intent is to reveal, to show, to > illuminate, at the level of epistemology, the level of knowing, is > this intent an inadequate ethical response? > > On page 2 there is an exploration of the western philosophical concept > of words, concepts, things, as formalized and resting upon a system of > denotational structure. Linguistic anthropology is revealing, showing, > illuminating this formalized, denotational structural system. > > This practice is based in fact within a whole cultural belief system > that can be commoditized and exported around the world and now each > nation state is incorporating this notion of translatability of > meaning into their institutional languaging practices. > Is it possible as Greg asks to stay within this culturally bound > system as an aspect of the Enlightenment project which had the effect > of breaking apart the medieval trivium. (see page 3). > This Enlightenment movement of thought which kept grammar and which > kept logic, and showed semantics to be the way language is truth-functional. > What you get with this breaking up of the medieval trivium is a sense > of purity, a sense of objectivity, a sense of a notational system of > denotation that is scientific. > > What needs illumination, what needs to be revealed is the ethical way > this culturally bound system demarcates a particular figuring of the > world, a symbolic figuring that encompasses our particular ways of > forming citizen scientist identities focused on translatability of meanings.. > As citizens of nation states we have this culturally bound > denotational structural system as our presumed reality in order to > develop pure and objective structural systems of language. (not > languaging which is a notion of ethical practice). > This is very illuminating, and revealing, and very culturally bound. > Now that we are illuminated and the curtain has been pulled back will > anything change?. > As citizen scientists working within institutions upholding culturally > bound standards now exported to all nation states what do we do with > what has been revealed. > After revelation, what is the next step? > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > Sent: ?2016-?01-?02 10:06 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability > > Quite so. But there is no contradiction in excusing oneself and fobbing > off others whilst being acclaimed as distinguished. The abuse of ethics > stupefies: it closes down the scope of reflection. > > Best, > Huw > > On 2 January 2016 at 17:45, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > I'm certainly not trying to suggest that MS lacks ethics! On the > > contrary, I think his diagnosis of the university as generally an > > institution of normalization (in the sense of evaluating everyone, no > > matter their diverse abilities and backgrounds, against a single standard > > that derives from an elite) is an ethical diagnosis. My point is > that if it > > is so hard to change the university even when one has a fair degree > of > > power (MS is a named "distinguished service professor" in not one > but three > > departments - anthropology, linguistics, and psychology - as well as > member > > of the Committee on Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities), > then this > > suggests that there is not much merit in pointing out the operation > of > > power to (powerless) undergraduates! > > > > Martin > > > > On Jan 2, 2016, at 12:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > > Well, I'm not sure that this is what Larry's intent was, but it > does have > > > obvious relevance. > > > > > > It seems to me that one can "escape" normalisation, if one is ethical. > > > Ethics are what defines a profession. Without ethics we are > merely guns > > > for hire. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 2 January 2016 at 16:57, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > >> Yes, I see the contradiction there. I had the same reaction when > I first > > >> heard MS say it in his Language in Culture seminar (MS is not > afraid to > > >> repeat himself, indeed, in his short manuscript on Abe Lincoln, > he notes > > >> that the Gettysburg address had a long history in Abe's mouth and > among > > his > > >> friends prior to being said in its canonical version). > > >> > > >> If I may give the sympathetic reading, one might make the > > anthropological > > >> argument that one must fully inhabit an oppressive regime in > order to > > >> understand it. Thus, using his Wizard of Oz metaphor, we might > say that > > the > > >> position that MS is inhabiting is simultaneously Toto and the Wizard. > > >> > > >> I think that this can provide the seeds of revolutionary action by > > exposing > > >> the workings of power to critique by others who can see those > > >> inner-workings but without having to fully participate in them. > > >> > > >> [and perhaps this goes back to an older question I have about > > understanding > > >> a system from the "inside" as opposed to from the "outside" - or > > perhaps in > > >> a more Gadamerian sense we might just speak about these as two different > > >> horizons of understanding the system?]. > > >> > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Martin John Packer < > > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> No, my point was that one the one hand we have a call to be > > >>> "citizen-scientists" in the face of oppression, while on the > other hand > > >> we > > >>> have a confession that although the university is "at the highest > > >> pinnacle > > >>> of what you might call the oppressive regime" grading will > continue as > > >>> usual. > > >>> > > >>> If we can't change the very institution we work in, what kind of > > >>> citizen-scientists are we? > > >>> > > >>> Martin > > >>> > > >>> On Jan 2, 2016, at 11:10 AM, Greg Thompson > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Martin, > > >>>> I'm not clear on what the expectation was that the speakers were > > >> setting > > >>> up? > > >>>> To pull back the curtain to reveal the role that language plays > in > > >> social > > >>>> stratification? > > >>>> You don't suppose that this can be found elsewhere in their work? > > >>> ("their" > > >>>> in the generic sense of "linguistic anthropologists' work"). > > >>>> Seems a tall order to fill in a single conversation between > just two > > >>> people. > > >>>> -greg > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:52 AM, Martin John Packer < > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>>> Its only disappointing if you thought that anything else > could come > > >> out > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>> it. Note that this was uttered in the context of ethics. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Best, Huw > > >>>>> > > >>>>> But the speakers themselves set up this expectation! Here are > the > > >>>>> remaining remarks: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: Yes, exactly. Indeed there are norms even of these other > > >> components, > > >>>>> these non-denotational components as we were saying. They're > > >> understood > > >>> in > > >>>>> terms of a folk system of enrigisterment, but there's lots of > other > > >>>>> variation as well that people are actually behaving in terms > of and > > >>> working > > >>>>> in terms of. But this one particular, massively complex system > - to > > >>> which > > >>>>> indeed the aspiration of working under the umbrella of superdiversity > > >>>>> responds - is indeed a complex one in which people confuse standard > > >>>>> register with normativity in the first place, and they confuse > > >> language > > >>>>> with denotational structure. So all of these sorts of things that > > >> we've > > >>>>> taken decades and decades to pull apart, at least so that they > become > > >>>>> visible to us as students of languaging, as it were get collapsed > > into > > >>> one. > > >>>>> And most importantly and - as you pointed out - most > tellingly, they > > >>> become > > >>>>> instruments of oppression and stratification. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: At the individual level. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: At the individual level, through various kinds of > > >> institutionalized > > >>>>> forms so that you are summoned as a citizen-scientist to say: > 'Where > > >> do > > >>> I > > >>>>> stand on using my knowledge to, as it were, maybe illuminate people, > > >>> maybe > > >>>>> reveal what's going on.' > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: At least show what's going on. That's the least we can do. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: That's the least we can do. There is a wonderful scene in > the > > 1939 > > >>>>> Hollywood movie 'The Wizard of Oz' in which... > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: 'The witch is dead' > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: no no it's not that the witch is dead > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: ...a hit a few weeks ago when Margaret Thatcher died > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: that's a different story! Leave the Baroness out of > this... there > > >>> is a > > >>>>> wonderful scene in which Toto - the little dog of Dorothy - pulls > > >> back a > > >>>>> curtain when you see the mountebank, the snake-oil salesman, working > > >> the > > >>>>> levers of the machine that's running this thing which supports > > >>> [purports?] > > >>>>> to be Oz. And we can certainly try to be that little Toto. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> JB: So on that note thank you very very much, Michael. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> MS: Well it's always a pleasure to talk to you guys! > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 11:38 PM, Huw Lloyd > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On 2 January 2016 at 03:04, Martin John Packer < > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> It's a little disappointing that they oppressed their own > > >> conversation > > >>>>> at > > >>>>>>> the following point, no? > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> MS [Michael Silverstein]: I say to my students all the > time: 'now > > >>> that > > >>>>>>> I've revealed to you the entire massive machinery of > > >> socio-linguistic > > >>>>>>> oppression, of stratification around the standard and so on, > that > > >> will > > >>>>> not > > >>>>>>> stop me from correcting your papers because my institution > is at > > the > > >>>>>>> highest pinnacle of what you might call the oppressive regime'. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> JB [Jan Blommaert]: Absolutely. And at the same time - maybe > this > > >>> could > > >>>>> be > > >>>>>>> a useful conclusion of this conversation - at the same time > it > > >> proves > > >>>>> also > > >>>>>>> that there is no absence of norms, there is no shortage of norms > > >> even > > >>>>> in a > > >>>>>>> sociocultural organization of language. Normativity is everywhere. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Jan 1, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Larry Purss > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I decided to start a new thread because I did not want to shift > > the > > >>>>>>> focus that David?s thread opened up on myth busting. > > >>>>>>>> However, I do want to share a paper on the topic of > > translatability > > >>> and > > >>>>>>> the uses of standardization that does overlap somewhat with > the > > >> other > > >>>>>>> thread. > > >>>>>>>> The format is a conversation between Michael Silverstein, > Jef Van > > >> de > > >>>>> Aa, > > >>>>>>> and Jan Blommaert. > > >>>>>>>> Entering this conversation exploring the notion of translatability > > >>> as a > > >>>>>>> culturally bound philosophical construct may have some relevance > > for > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> other thread ongoing. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > >>> Silverstein_in_conversation.pdf> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > From bazerman@education.ucsb.edu Sat Jan 2 14:28:43 2016 From: bazerman@education.ucsb.edu (Charles Bazerman) Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2016 14:28:43 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: ----- Original Message ----- From: Lplarry Date: Saturday, January 2, 2016 1:43 pm > Meaning elaboration and effectiveness for particular audiences are the > reigning criteria. > Is there a source that focuses in on this difference in approach to > the same social facts The general approach is that I elaborate in my two recent books A Rhetoric of Literate Action and A Theory of Literate Action, downloadable at the WAC Clearinghouse (WAC.colostate.edu/books). I do have some comments on linguistics and language studies in both books, but especially chapter 8 of the Theory. > Does linguistic anthropology as a discipline have a different > understanding of meaning. I leave this for the linguistic anthropologists to elaborate, but I would point out that the approach I take is centered on participation rather than analytical removal. Chuck From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Jan 2 15:00:42 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 23:00:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A supplement to David's reflection on Translatability In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com>, Message-ID: WOW! These books of Charles's look quite tasty! I thought I'd post the direct links, because the search didn't work, so it'll save people a little step? A Rhetoric of Literate Action http://wac.colostate.edu/books/literateaction/v1/ The first in a two-volume set, A Rhetoric of Literate Action is written for "the experienced writer with a substantial repertoire of skills, [who] now would find it useful to think in more fundamental strategic terms about what they want their texts to accomplish, what form the texts might take, how to develop specific contents, and how to arrange the work of writing." The reader is offered a framework for identifying and understanding the situations writing comes out of and is directed toward; a consideration of how a text works to transform a situation and achieve the writer's motives; and advice on how to bring the text to completion and "how to manage the work and one's own emotions and energies so as to accomplish the work most effectively." A Theory of Literate Action http://wac.colostate.edu/books/literateaction/v2/ The second in a two-volume set, A Theory of Literate Action draws on work from the social sciences?and in particular sociocultural psychology, phenomenological sociology, and the pragmatic tradition of social science?to "reconceive rhetoric fundamentally around the problems of written communication rather than around rhetoric's founding concerns of high stakes, agonistic, oral public persuasion" (p. 3). An expression of more than a quarter-century of reflection and scholarly inquiry, this volume represents a significant contribution to contemporary rhetorical theory. (just in case there is any false/real modesty for Charles to not post the links!) It's supergreat that you have made the text available. Thanks! Kind regards, Annalisa From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 16:42:35 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 07:42:35 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com>, Message-ID: <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Hello, I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is all the rage. In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete and talk about methods. I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching in English when your English is not great. Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door to the global world and they know it. I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest they hook me off the stage. Thanks in advance, Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jan 2 17:10:51 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 03 Jan 2016 12:10:51 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com>, <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> Is it possible, do you think, Helena, to convince them to draw a line between on the one hand, the lectures and text books, which are formal and maybe be prepared in advance, and on the other hand tutorials, which apart from being essential to the education provided by top-line universities are informal and conversational? Perhaps to allow mixing languages in the tutorials so that the concepts delivered in lectures and books can be *grasped*. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 3/01/2016 11:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hello, > > I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is all the rage. > > In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. > > This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. > > The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. > > So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete and talk about methods. > > I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching in English when your English is not great. > > Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door to the global world and they know it. > > I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? > > I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest they hook me off the stage. > > Thanks in advance, > > Helena > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 18:10:23 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 11:10:23 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> Message-ID: Helena, Andy: Halliday remarks that we all have to learn scientific concepts in another language, even monolinguals. So for example in everyday language we talk about how much our children have grown, and if we want to speak metaphorically, the metaphors are pretty concrete. I remember my mother in law referring to my growing niece as a bamboo shoot, by which she meant to indicate simultaneously her narrow girth as well as her growth rate. But the whole idea of growith as a classifiable, modifiable, qualifiable thing--much less expressions like "an increase in the fracture growth rate which is direclty proportional to the force exerted on the material"--would have been a foreign concept to my niece, even expressed in her own language, Chinese, and that well into her middle school education. I think we all feel that the language of Shakespeare is slightly foreign, and most of us need a translator for Chaucer; all of us do for Beowulf. The reason isn't just the foreign vocabulary; even with Chaucer, the vocabulary is not that foreign, and when you get used to the spellings, it's a little like hearing somebody speak Australian rather than hearing somebody speak a foreign language (sorry, Andy--foreigness has to start somewhere!). s foreign to my niece. It isn't even the strange wordings beginning with "y-". It's to do with the different ways of construing meanings--some of which (e.g. Clinton's "grow our economy") are only a few decades old. So Halliday makes the key point, in an address to African educational linguists, that choosing a language for higher instruction is really a matter of choosing between foreign languages. Of course, other things being equal, your own language is best, and in an abstract sense other things are equal, because, as Halliday puts it, every single language is the best language on earth from the standpoint of its user. But concretely other things are NOT equal. When we translate Vygotsky into Korean, we sometimes end up using KOREAN expressions that don't make sense to Koreans until we translate them into English. So the NEXT best thing to your own language is one from your area. The example Halliday gives is that Swahili is related to Kikuyu and unrelated to Luo, but nevertheless even Luo speakers will find it much easier to learn to read and write in Swahili than in English, simply because the linguistic functions of Kikuyu and Swahili evolved in an environment that is similar to that of Luo and dissimilar to that of English. The obvious choice for Vietnamese education? Chinese, of course. Chinese is an excellent language for scientific discourse, and far more teachable to children than English. So for example in English very few fish end in the word "fish", and very very few vegetables end with the word "vegetable"--in Chinese, the name of every fish says "fish" (yu) and the name of every vegetable says "vegetable" or "melon", so the child is handed a hierarchical system of concepts on a plate. The principle is exactly the same when the time comes for the child to learn about gases and subatomic particles and machines. But suppose, for whatever reason, Vietnamese don't WANT to learn Chinese? Suppose they just, out of sheer historical perversity, wish to learn the language of their penultimate invaders (that is, English) rather than that of their most recent ones? I am not really so sure it's perversity. I have certainly benefited from learning Chinese and Korean. Of course, the benefits were at first immediate, tangible, and highly material: they often had to do with getting food and finding a toilet. But yesterday I found myself analyzing some data for an eleven month old child using the prosodics of Chinese syllables--and reflecting how impossible this would be to analyze using the kind of "distinctive features" analysis worked out for Western languages, whose phonological descriptions are obsessed with vowels and consonants (vowels and consonants which are entirely unnecessary for describing Chinese lexis, just as tones are largely unnecessary for describing English words). None of which really answers Helena's question. When my wife began teaching "Everyday Conversation in English" at a Chinese university, the class size was around four hundred (and some of the students were older than she was). She asked about method, and they handed her a bullhorn. I don't know if there really is any other "method" for teaching English speech to classes that size. But I guess I would say that if you have to do it, you might start by changing the name of the class from "Everyday Conversation in English" to "Scientific Concepts in English and Chinese". (And now you can hook ME offstage, Helena!) David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sun, Jan 3, 2016 at 10:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Is it possible, do you think, Helena, to convince them to draw a line > between on the one hand, the lectures and text books, which are formal and > maybe be prepared in advance, and on the other hand tutorials, which apart > from being essential to the education provided by top-line universities are > informal and conversational? Perhaps to allow mixing languages in the > tutorials so that the concepts delivered in lectures and books can be > *grasped*. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 3/01/2016 11:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is >> all the rage. >> >> In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by >> 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. >> >> This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such >> as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities >> (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and >> textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to >> teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for >> reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. >> >> The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to >> working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class >> size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- >> unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's >> the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. >> >> So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching >> methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 >> universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, >> Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these >> institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working >> conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of >> it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small >> class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete >> and talk about methods. >> >> I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching >> in English when your English is not great. >> >> Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they >> mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early >> 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting >> pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they >> don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the >> right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door >> to the global world and they know it. >> >> I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the >> concepts that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are >> incommensurate across languages and will require elaboration in the home >> language. This is probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific >> concepts, right? >> >> I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can >> someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be >> able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest >> they hook me off the stage. >> >> Thanks in advance, >> >> Helena >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> >> >> >> > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Jan 2 18:18:05 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 02:18:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com>, <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com>, <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> Message-ID: Helena, Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a seminar? Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers face? So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your Vietnamese noodle soup. Kind regards, Annalisa From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 20:12:43 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 13:12:43 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> Message-ID: Peter: Am I missing something? I don't see any account, daunting or otherwise, of how hard it is to get things published with Vygotsky's name on it. There's only a photograph of Vygotsky's notebook. And what about his other comments? Part of the problem is illiteracy. I don't mean the readership; they are more literate and more savvy than ever. I mean the publishers, who sometimes can make Stalin seem positively erudite. I am pretty sure that it wasn't Hanfmann and Vakar who decided that "Thinking and Speech" would really read a whole lot better if it were cut in half and given a title like "Thought and Language". I know that Mike had a very hard time getting ANYBODY to have a look at Luria's manuscript (and also that "Mind in Society" was NOT his idea, or Vygotsky's idea, of a title). You would think that it wouldn't be that hard to interest publishers in an academic blockbuster, since businessmen, unlike the rest of us, come armed with some kind of sixth sense, an ability to smell the money to be made, which justifies six figure incomes and seven figure bonuses. But it turns out that they have the same five senses as the rest of us; I am sure that Harvard were even more astonished by the success of "Mind in Society" than Mike was. Our own publisher has a similar tendency to choose titles for books that he doesn't bother to read (Luria's "Cognitive Development" is marketed in Korea under the title "Vygotsky and the Secret of Intelligence"). So perhaps we shouldn't be too hard on Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. They are trying to make their way in a pretty difficult market. I think that their marketing strategy--even as a marketing strategy--is not a very good one, but what do I know? We imagine that somehow academics have a "free press" and that the internet has made us far freer. But we also acknowledge that it is under supposedly totalitarian regimes like that of Stalin (or how about that of Queen Elizabeth) that intellectuals and literati were sometimes at their most productive. I'm not saying that somehow Stalinism was good for psychology, any more than I am saying that somehow Elizabeth's torturers were responsible for Shakespeare's plays. Actually, what I'm saying is pretty close to something that Anton was trying to say and got distracted from saying by his own myth busting. It's this: brute repression is not a very effective way of shutting down intellectual life, and it shouldn't really be called "totalitarian" at all ("futilitarian" would be a lot closer to the truth). Money does more than Milton can to justify the State's ways to man. One can't help suspecting that the strange combination of sensationalism and naivete that we find in the very title of "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky's Studies" owes something to that sad fact of life. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 8:33 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I sent David's comments to Rene van der Veer, and part of his reply > included a shot (attached) of what translators and editors have to go > through in moving LSV and others into what today we'd call a book or > article. Pretty daunting. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, January 01, 2016 6:44 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! > > Henry: > > Of course, when you read a translation, you are not reading the writer, or > at least not the writer in large letters; you are reading the writer in > small letters; that is, the translator. When we finished translating > "Thinking and Speech" into Korean (which we did from the French and Italian > translations, because our Russian was no good, and because we could see, > from the very first chapter, that the English was no good either) one of > our best translators quit the team with the bitter comment that none of us > knew any Russian (true) and some of us knew very little Korean, or at least > very little literary Korean (also, alas, true). We've worked pretty hard to > overcome both of these problems, and next month we'll bring out our seventh > volume of Vygotsky's works in Korean. > > Years ago I was rather astonished when I heard Eugene Subbotsky describe > Vygotsky as a poet, since I too had read him entirely in translation and > had (wrongly as it turns out) come to think of him as quite clumsy, > maladroit, redundant and wordy. But I have come to see that Subbotsky was > right: there are certain wordings in Vygotsky, like the idea that the > child is "intertwined (interpersonally) and interwoven (socially)" that > have wings; that overleap both languages and soar. As Vygotsky says, there > is a kind of thinking without words that only thinking with words can bring > about. > > So when you read Vygotsky in English you are reading the thinker and not > the writer. There are certain advantages to that, which you should be very > conscious of as a teacher of foreign languages and as a foreign language > learner. The whole point of the first part of "Thinking and Speech" is that > the thinker and the speaker are really two diferent creatures, and even in > the second part we can see that they are two radically different persona, > even where they partake and participate in the same personality. By > standing aloof for a moment from the language of expression, we can get a > certain critical distance, a sense of the overall shape of the thoughts. > > And in fact that was the point I was trying to make: "Thinking and Speech" > was not Vygotsky's final word (there will never be a final word, thanks to > people like you, Henry), and it was not even his finished word, and its > very unfinished quality is, I think, also responsible for the fact that LSV > doesn't list either HDHMF or Tool and Sign in any of his "Greatest Hits' > (though, significantly, Tool and Sign IS in the references to the first > edition of Thinking and Speech). This patchy, unfinished quality makes the > sheer brilliance and consistency of the ideas all the more remarkable. > > I would like to think that our clumsy translations also have the effect of > throwing the spotlight on the grace and coherence of Vygotsky's thinking, > but I know that unfortunately this probably isn't the case; I imagine there > are lots of people scribbling imprecations against Vygotsky in the margins > of their Korean translations which really ought to be directed against us. > There can really be only one excuse for what we did. > > It is the same excuse that Mike, Sylvia Scribner, Vera John-Steiner and > Ellen Souberman have for issuing a compilation under Vygotsky's name. > Yasnitsky and Van der Veer admit that no deception was involved, and their > main complaint is that the process of compiling it is not sufficiently > transparent to be made reversible, but of course the same thing is true of > almost any compilation and indeed coauthorship quite generally--we only > know which chapters in "Ape, Primitive, Child" are by Luria and which by > Vygotsky because of Vygotsky's complaints about Luria's Freudianism in his > letters, and there is no way for the reader to know which of the > revolutionary revisionist ideas in this book are Van der Veer's and which > are Yasnitsky's! > > Of course, we have different standards for writers of historic stature > than we do for each other, and that's perfectly okay, so long as we keep in > mind that at the time "Mind in Society" was published, Vygotsky was not > generally considered a writer of historic stature: his publication list in > English was considerably shorter than Mike Cole's. Today it's just too easy > for people to forget that the difficulty of publishing Vygotsky in the West > was actually far greater than that of publishing him in the USSR for most > of the twentieth century, thanks to the very real totalitarianism exercised > (increasingly) by commercial publishing. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer do > have the grace to acknowledge that "Mind in Society" started the Vygotsky > boom that made it posssible for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer to start their > revisionist revolution. We can't really fault historians for not knowing > what to do next. But we can fault them for forgetting that people back then > didn't know what we know today. > > In the end, I think that's the only excuse for doing translations, good or > bad: Nobody else will, or nobody else will do it as well. To be fair, I > should say that there WERE no less than two other teams translating > Thinking and Speech into Korean when we went ahead and published; one was a > very well-funded team of Russian professors at Korea University and the > other had an official contract with MIT Press--but the latter used the > Hanfmann and Vakar translation into English and the team of Russian > professors--incredibly--used the Minick translation! So I am very glad we > went ahead and published ours, imperfect as it is. As Tagore says, Ekla > Chalo Re: > > If they answer not to your call walk aloneIf they are afraid and cower > mutely facing the wall,O thou unlucky one,open your mind and speak out > alone.If they turn away, and desert you when crossing the wilderness,O thou > unlucky one,trample the thorns under thy tread,and along the blood-lined > track travel alone.If they shut doors and do not hold up the light when the > night is troubled with storm,O thou unlucky one,with the thunder flame of > pain ignite your own heart,and let it burn alone. > (Translated from Tagore's Bengali by Tagore himself--but was it back > translated?) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: While we were working on Piaget's response to "Thinking and Speech" I > wrote to MIT Press to get permission to translate it into Korean. I learned > that the original French manuscript had been lost, and that the translator, > Francoise Seve, had had to reconstruct it from a typescript, part of which > could only be reconstructed by back translating from English to French! > > dk > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:36 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > David, > > Yes, it makes sense to me too. It at least partly explains why my > > comments in the margin of my copy of Speech and Language I bought so > > many years ago can still evoke my irritation at Vygotsky, who, it > > turns out, is not the author I thought he was. Another part is my own > > constantly gaining and losing my grasp on a coherent socio-cultural > > bead on the here and now, very much connected to the pulses of this > > chat. Funny how then and now inform each other. > > Henry > > > > > On Dec 31, 2015, at 4:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > > Thanks, David! :) > > > All makes sense to me. > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >> Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are > > >> seven facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that are...well, > > >> more or > > less > > >> right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's > > >> "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on > > >> Routledge in the new year. > > >> > > >> 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, > > ritualistic, > > >> deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to > > >> cults and personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that I > > >> am making an unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and today's > > >> relatively benign and bucolic academic atmosphere, note that > > >> Anton's revolutionary revisionist point in this first section is > > >> precisely that: the present > > day > > >> reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic > > >> interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded reference > > >> lists,an almost complete disjunction between high theory and more > > >> or > > less > > >> banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in > > >> Russia and the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, who > > >> saw the > > promised > > >> land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. > > >> Is the comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is > > >> that it is > > too > > >> obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. > > >> > > >> There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. > > >> The > > first > > >> is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a > > >> medical > > fact > > >> that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it is > > >> not really much more far fetched to say that he died without ever > > >> knowing > > that > > >> in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language > > >> and > > widely > > >> read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that > > >> mythbusters > > are > > >> themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical > > >> facts > > and > > >> construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that > > >> the previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or > > >> that it was constructed around correct facts which have been > > >> grossly misinterpreted > > in > > >> some way. So.... > > >> > > >> 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky > > School" > > >> was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and > > >> drifted > > away, > > >> spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, > > >> although the loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This > > >> section, based on Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first > > >> section, which manages to > > be > > >> both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. > > >> But of course for that very reason it tends to undermine the claims > > >> of the > > first > > >> part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most obvious > > >> evidence that there really WAS something like a Pyatorka--the fact > > >> that Vygotsky's own letters referto the Pyatorka, and the fact that > > >> the > > Pyatorka > > >> held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this contradicts > > Anton's > > >> main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were > > convenient > > >> constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of understanding) > > >> for thinking about the history of the Vygotsky school even while it > > >> was happening. But it also doesn't answer the question I have > > >> always had > > about > > >> the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton points > > >> out, there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong pro-Trotsky > > sympathies), > > >> the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a > > >> bureaucratic bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust > > >> Trotsky from power in > > the > > >> year following Lenin's death. . > > >> > > >> 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, is > > >> an unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from > > >> materials which really fit rather poorly, during the months > > >> immediately before...and after...Vygotsky's death. I think anybody > > >> who really knows the > > chronology > > >> of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this > > controversial; > > >> the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence and > > power > > >> of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to > > >> undermine > > the > > >> popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe > > >> to--that > > there > > >> are three very different Vygotskies believing three very different > > >> foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). > > >> > > >> So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary > > >> enough for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to > > >> claim that the > > works > > >> that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we read > > today, > > >> and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. > > They > > >> found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three > > >> times during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two of > > >> these > > lists > > >> are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job > > >> application knows very well that you list things that your > > >> potential employer will find impressive, and these are usually > > >> quite far from > > being > > >> the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, > > >> Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational > > Psychology", > > >> which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely > > >> followed by "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the authors > > >> quite correctly point out, a work of popular science (and includes > > >> references to > > textbook > > >> writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). > > >> > > >> Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the > > Development > > >> of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that the > > former > > >> was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two > > unrelated > > >> texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a benign > > forgery > > >> by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. > > >> > > >> First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF > > >> that it > > was > > >> conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion which > > >> goes back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in which it > > >> was > > conceived > > >> and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the > > >> chapters > > fit > > >> together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the > > >> problem, the approach and the research method followed in the > > >> "special studies" of > > the > > >> second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. is > > >> is really weak stuff: they > > >> > > >> Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of > > >> benign forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence in > > >> recovering historic manuscripts) does not actually explain what it > > >> is supposed to explain, which is the recurrence of several > > >> paragraphs, not word for > > word, > > >> but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of > > Ptolemaic > > >> epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't bother > > >> to > > read > > >> what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only > > >> authority > > for > > >> this story, which seems so much less probable than the alternative > > >> explanation that this is simply another instance of Vygotsky's > > >> tendency > > t > > >> repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon > > >> Goldberg > > ("The > > >> Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and other > > >> must readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), and an > > >> anonymous blogger (neither source seems very well disposed to their > > >> erstwhile professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact that a story > > >> is highly improbable and that the sources are somewhat jaundiced do > > >> not mean that > > it > > >> is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean > > >> that > > it > > >> is...well, possibly mythical. > > >> > > >> 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly > > >> in > > mind. > > >> This much too should be have been already very clear to any careful > > reader > > >> of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting part > > >> of > > the > > >> book, and the only part of the book which really does offer > > >> completely > > new > > >> evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not > > >> written by Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a > > >> lot of what Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed > > >> Nietszcheanism and his rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of > > >> consciousness in favor of > > "sense" > > >> (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, as > > >> I > > did, > > >> whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and if > > >> so > > up to > > >> what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you may > > wonder > > >> what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other > > unfinished > > >> works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" is > > >> mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child > > Development"). > > >> But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to learn > > >> something. It's also the part of the book where we see the most > > >> Vygotsky inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. > > >> > > >> 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write either > > >> of > > the > > >> English language books for which he is famous. The facts are > > depressingly > > >> clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something like > > half of > > >> the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the > > >> "redundancies", which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the > > >> inauthenticity of Tool and > > Sign) > > >> cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that Vygotsky > > >> ever wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all of the New > > Testament, > > >> like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put > > together > > >> by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what the > > >> revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: > > "Mind > > >> in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the > > >> significant omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they saw > > >> that they could bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, and > > >> that is exactly what > > they > > >> did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, whether > > >> by Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the Vygotsky "boom"; > > >> the real question we have to ask is--what can we actually > > >> accomplish with the > > energy > > >> that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of > > >> the > > boom > > >> stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" > > >> suggested archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of > > >> course that is certainly very much to be desired. But it also > > >> ignores the exoteric > > nature > > >> of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory and > > >> practice noted in point 1) above. > > >> > > >> 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were suppressed > > >> in order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's national > minorities. > > This > > >> too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own preface, > > >> as > > well > > >> as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official > > denunciation > > >> of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to > > be...well, > > >> more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak the > > truth > > >> in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political > > >> correctness" which only show how very little they understand the > > concrete > > >> realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really > > objectionable > > >> part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that > > Vygotsky > > >> is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations > > >> of production, without any education, was enough to create concepts > > >> in the minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in any of > > >> Vygotsky's or Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the > > >> contrary. (Luria repeatedly refers to the effect of schooling). > > >> Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do > > not > > >> raise a number of key issues: > > >> > > >> a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those > > >> who > > take > > >> experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological fieldwork > > >> with them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. Does this > > >> explain > > why he > > >> did not personally take part? > > >> > > >> b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people > > >> like Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all > > >> unprecedented; they were in fact part of a recognized and > > >> continuing tradition in cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and > > >> Cole, and also recent work on chimps and children in Africa). This > > >> ethnographic tradition WAS > > politically > > >> suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it > > >> sparingly, > > and > > >> why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) > > >> conclusions? > > >> > > >> 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin > > >> himself, but instead was subject to an informal ban, which did not > > >> prevent him from being favorably cited in the twenty years between > > >> his death and the > > first > > >> publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. > > >> Stalin > > was > > >> not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky > > >> would have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this really > > >> is both sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic (and > > >> anachronistic) > > to > > >> imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to > > >> deserve > > the > > >> kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, > > >> or > > even > > >> Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost > > >> fact-free articles published against Vygotsky in the years after > > >> his death were somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign against > > >> his work (which > > began > > >> WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 decree > > >> on pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself mentions > > >> in > > Thinking > > >> and Speech Chapter Six?) > > >> > > >> As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is a > > >> dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. The > > danger > > >> is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a > > >> gut rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism out > > >> of their firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material that > > >> is anything but obvious. When that happens, we get something that > > >> is neither a gorgon > > nor a > > >> minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being > > Earnest": > > >> something like a monster without being a myth. > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Macquarie University > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like > > >> Aristotle, > > Jesus > > >> Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't edit > > >> the books that made him famous. The problem of course is that > > >> Vygotsky > > didn't > > >> know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de > > >> Saussure, Vygotsky did not > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well > > >> > > > > > > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 20:24:35 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 11:24:35 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com>, <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> Message-ID: That's a good idea. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 3, 2016, at 8:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Is it possible, do you think, Helena, to convince them to draw a line between on the one hand, the lectures and text books, which are formal and maybe be prepared in advance, and on the other hand tutorials, which apart from being essential to the education provided by top-line universities are informal and conversational? Perhaps to allow mixing languages in the tutorials so that the concepts delivered in lectures and books can be *grasped*. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 3/01/2016 11:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: >> Hello, >> >> I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is all the rage. >> >> In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. >> >> This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. >> >> The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. >> >> So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete and talk about methods. >> >> I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching in English when your English is not great. >> >> Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door to the global world and they know it. >> >> I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? >> >> I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest they hook me off the stage. >> >> Thanks in advance, >> >> Helena >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> >> >> > From swaiev@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 20:32:08 2016 From: swaiev@gmail.com (Elinami Swai) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 07:32:08 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Helena. Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process does not need to be described here. Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages (Kiswahili and English). In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). Kind Regards, Elinami On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Helena, > > Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a seminar? > Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? > > Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? > > I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" > (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and that > may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers face? > > So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your Vietnamese > noodle soup. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > -- Dr. Elinami Swai Senior Lecturer Associate Dean Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies Faculty of Education Open University of Tanzania P.O.Box 23409 Dar-Es-Salaam Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 Fax:022-2668759 Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ 0230102484 ...this faith will still deliver If you live it first to last Not everything which blooms must wither. Not all that was is past From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 20:38:41 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 11:38:41 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> Message-ID: <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> Thank you, Elinami. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: > Dear Helena. > Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a > post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of > language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has > been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had > settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary > 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. > > Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound > of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process > does not need to be described here. > > Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages > (Kiswahili and English). > > In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another > strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). > > Kind Regards, > > Elinami > > > > > On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Helena, >> >> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a seminar? >> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? >> >> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? >> >> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" >> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and that >> may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers face? >> >> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your Vietnamese >> noodle soup. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> > > > -- > Dr. Elinami Swai > Senior Lecturer > Associate Dean > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > Faculty of Education > Open University of Tanzania > P.O.Box 23409 > Dar-Es-Salaam > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > Fax:022-2668759 > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > 0230102484 > ...this faith will still deliver > If you live it first to last > Not everything which blooms must > wither. > Not all that was is past From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Jan 2 21:17:36 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 05:17:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> Message-ID: I don't suppose this is part of your remit, Helena, yet it seems relevant. Has anyone undertaken a study indicating that emulation of "top universities" is a successful strategy for becoming one? If the goal is to be taken literally, then it is necessary to discern what the criteria will be in 2037. I quite liked David's point about using English for conceptual domains. Perhaps an immersion in logical disputation (in English) is sufficient to start with. It seems to me that what you need to establish is a faculty based criteria -- where you want to be in five years time, for example. Only when you have some agreement on that is there much sense in sketching out detailed ways to achieve it. If you don't have this yet, then it seems that what you will be proffering are considerations towards this formulation. Although it may seem impossible, it seems to me that this is something that can actually be done, given the right circumstances. But I personally doubt it can be achieved by "copying" other approaches, especially when you are starting from a different situation -- a different language base, with highly motivated students. I think you need something more radical. Best, Huw On 3 January 2016 at 04:24, Helena Worthen wrote: > That's a good idea. > > H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jan 3, 2016, at 8:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Is it possible, do you think, Helena, to convince them to draw a line > between on the one hand, the lectures and text books, which are formal and > maybe be prepared in advance, and on the other hand tutorials, which apart > from being essential to the education provided by top-line universities are > informal and conversational? Perhaps to allow mixing languages in the > tutorials so that the concepts delivered in lectures and books can be > *grasped*. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 3/01/2016 11:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> Hello, > >> > >> I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English > is all the rage. > >> > >> In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world > by 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. > >> > >> This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, > such as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 > universities (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be > replicated and textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and > then used to teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be > good for reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. > >> > >> The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used > to working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class > size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- > unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's > the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. > >> > >> So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about > teaching methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at > Top 100 universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, > Cornell, Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of > these institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the > working conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and > downs of it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, > small class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more > concrete and talk about methods. > >> > >> I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of > teaching in English when your English is not great. > >> > >> Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they > mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early > 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting > pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they > don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the > right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door > to the global world and they know it. > >> > >> I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the > concepts that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are > incommensurate across languages and will require elaboration in the home > language. This is probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific > concepts, right? > >> > >> I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. > Can someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only > be able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest > they hook me off the stage. > >> > >> Thanks in advance, > >> > >> Helena > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Sat Jan 2 23:28:40 2016 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp) Date: Sun, 03 Jan 2016 16:28:40 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> Message-ID: <20160103072840.00004A53.0722@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Dear Helena, They say we should teach classes entirely in English in Japan. Many lifelong language teachers here accept that isn't probable or possible. I have the most success with a mix with an upperclassman student with a higher level of English interacting with me in front of the rest of the class. The ones who can "hear" are processing and attempt to participate. The ones who don't, move with the others to imitate. It's easy to conceal that they aren't hearing and understanding, as long as specific acts of understanding are not required. It's very easy to nod understanding when you don't. I cobbled together a language teaching approach based on "Community Language Learning" (40 years ago) and Wharton's Freshman "boot camp" ( 2004 vintage) for which older students were given credit for a class to coach/mentor a group of freshmen in a community activity. Einami's code- switching and code mixing resonates with ideas of mixed community events where "intrinsic" skills emerge and the group follows community leaders. The maneuvre is to merge and invite, without precipitating rejection. The approved English speaker models the desired goal and draws out certain talented learners who demonstrate their ability, which improves the more they do it, in an environment in which they will not be punished for talent. There is also a larger group of participants doing what they can to keep up. This all goes together with the flow provided by Andy's comment: "and on the other hand tutorials, which apart from being essential to the education provided by top-line universities are informal and conversational? Perhaps to allow mixing languages in the tutorials so that the concepts delivered in lectures and books can be *grasped*." The "event" or "collaborative group project" is something which can be rooted in its own native culture, and celebrated - with goal language narrative moving along with the original impulse celebrating community, family, culture - with visual input provided by the home culture - it's familiar. ... It project grows and the English grows along with it... It seems to me that you wanted a brief suggestion in a presentation ... putting forth an idea that might be acceptable to the deciders ... So the ideas that are being offered are to be boiled down into an image. So, perhaps there is something in the culture right in front of you that carries the index of what you are looking for (as in David's suggestions mentioning Chinese influence, French, or American on the Vietnamese culture.) V ----- Original Message ----- > Dear Helena. > Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a > post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of > language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has > been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had > settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary > 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. > > Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound > of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process > does not need to be described here. > > Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages > (Kiswahili and English). > > In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another > strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). > > Kind Regards, > > Elinami > > > > > On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Helena, > > > > Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a seminar? > > Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? > > > > Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? > > > > I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" > > (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and that > > may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers face? > > > > So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your Vietnamese > > noodle soup. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > -- > Dr. Elinami Swai > Senior Lecturer > Associate Dean > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > Faculty of Education > Open University of Tanzania > P.O.Box 23409 > Dar-Es-Salaam > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > Fax:022-2668759 > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > 0230102484 > ...this faith will still deliver > If you live it first to last > Not everything which blooms must > wither. > Not all that was is past > > > From smago@uga.edu Sun Jan 3 04:01:53 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 12:01:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> Message-ID: My observation was quite simple: that taking Vygotsky's notebooks and translating them into something that makes sense must be very difficult. That's all. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:13 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! Peter: Am I missing something? I don't see any account, daunting or otherwise, of how hard it is to get things published with Vygotsky's name on it. There's only a photograph of Vygotsky's notebook. And what about his other comments? Part of the problem is illiteracy. I don't mean the readership; they are more literate and more savvy than ever. I mean the publishers, who sometimes can make Stalin seem positively erudite. I am pretty sure that it wasn't Hanfmann and Vakar who decided that "Thinking and Speech" would really read a whole lot better if it were cut in half and given a title like "Thought and Language". I know that Mike had a very hard time getting ANYBODY to have a look at Luria's manuscript (and also that "Mind in Society" was NOT his idea, or Vygotsky's idea, of a title). You would think that it wouldn't be that hard to interest publishers in an academic blockbuster, since businessmen, unlike the rest of us, come armed with some kind of sixth sense, an ability to smell the money to be made, which justifies six figure incomes and seven figure bonuses. But it turns out that they have the same five senses as the rest of us; I am sure that Harvard were even more astonished by the success of "Mind in Society" than Mike was. Our own publisher has a similar tendency to choose titles for books that he doesn't bother to read (Luria's "Cognitive Development" is marketed in Korea under the title "Vygotsky and the Secret of Intelligence"). So perhaps we shouldn't be too hard on Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. They are trying to make their way in a pretty difficult market. I think that their marketing strategy--even as a marketing strategy--is not a very good one, but what do I know? We imagine that somehow academics have a "free press" and that the internet has made us far freer. But we also acknowledge that it is under supposedly totalitarian regimes like that of Stalin (or how about that of Queen Elizabeth) that intellectuals and literati were sometimes at their most productive. I'm not saying that somehow Stalinism was good for psychology, any more than I am saying that somehow Elizabeth's torturers were responsible for Shakespeare's plays. Actually, what I'm saying is pretty close to something that Anton was trying to say and got distracted from saying by his own myth busting. It's this: brute repression is not a very effective way of shutting down intellectual life, and it shouldn't really be called "totalitarian" at all ("futilitarian" would be a lot closer to the truth). Money does more than Milton can to justify the State's ways to man. One can't help suspecting that the strange combination of sensationalism and naivete that we find in the very title of "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky's Studies" owes something to that sad fact of life. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 8:33 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I sent David's comments to Rene van der Veer, and part of his reply > included a shot (attached) of what translators and editors have to go > through in moving LSV and others into what today we'd call a book or > article. Pretty daunting. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David > xmca-l-bounces+Kellogg > Sent: Friday, January 01, 2016 6:44 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! > > Henry: > > Of course, when you read a translation, you are not reading the > writer, or at least not the writer in large letters; you are reading > the writer in small letters; that is, the translator. When we finished > translating "Thinking and Speech" into Korean (which we did from the > French and Italian translations, because our Russian was no good, and > because we could see, from the very first chapter, that the English > was no good either) one of our best translators quit the team with the > bitter comment that none of us knew any Russian (true) and some of us > knew very little Korean, or at least very little literary Korean > (also, alas, true). We've worked pretty hard to overcome both of these > problems, and next month we'll bring out our seventh volume of Vygotsky's works in Korean. > > Years ago I was rather astonished when I heard Eugene Subbotsky > describe Vygotsky as a poet, since I too had read him entirely in > translation and had (wrongly as it turns out) come to think of him as > quite clumsy, maladroit, redundant and wordy. But I have come to see > that Subbotsky was > right: there are certain wordings in Vygotsky, like the idea that the > child is "intertwined (interpersonally) and interwoven (socially)" > that have wings; that overleap both languages and soar. As Vygotsky > says, there is a kind of thinking without words that only thinking > with words can bring about. > > So when you read Vygotsky in English you are reading the thinker and > not the writer. There are certain advantages to that, which you should > be very conscious of as a teacher of foreign languages and as a > foreign language learner. The whole point of the first part of > "Thinking and Speech" is that the thinker and the speaker are really > two diferent creatures, and even in the second part we can see that > they are two radically different persona, even where they partake and > participate in the same personality. By standing aloof for a moment > from the language of expression, we can get a certain critical distance, a sense of the overall shape of the thoughts. > > And in fact that was the point I was trying to make: "Thinking and Speech" > was not Vygotsky's final word (there will never be a final word, > thanks to people like you, Henry), and it was not even his finished > word, and its very unfinished quality is, I think, also responsible > for the fact that LSV doesn't list either HDHMF or Tool and Sign in any of his "Greatest Hits' > (though, significantly, Tool and Sign IS in the references to the > first edition of Thinking and Speech). This patchy, unfinished quality > makes the sheer brilliance and consistency of the ideas all the more remarkable. > > I would like to think that our clumsy translations also have the > effect of throwing the spotlight on the grace and coherence of > Vygotsky's thinking, but I know that unfortunately this probably isn't > the case; I imagine there are lots of people scribbling imprecations > against Vygotsky in the margins of their Korean translations which really ought to be directed against us. > There can really be only one excuse for what we did. > > It is the same excuse that Mike, Sylvia Scribner, Vera John-Steiner > and Ellen Souberman have for issuing a compilation under Vygotsky's name. > Yasnitsky and Van der Veer admit that no deception was involved, and > their main complaint is that the process of compiling it is not > sufficiently transparent to be made reversible, but of course the same > thing is true of almost any compilation and indeed coauthorship quite > generally--we only know which chapters in "Ape, Primitive, Child" are > by Luria and which by Vygotsky because of Vygotsky's complaints about > Luria's Freudianism in his letters, and there is no way for the reader > to know which of the revolutionary revisionist ideas in this book are > Van der Veer's and which are Yasnitsky's! > > Of course, we have different standards for writers of historic stature > than we do for each other, and that's perfectly okay, so long as we > keep in mind that at the time "Mind in Society" was published, > Vygotsky was not generally considered a writer of historic stature: > his publication list in English was considerably shorter than Mike > Cole's. Today it's just too easy for people to forget that the > difficulty of publishing Vygotsky in the West was actually far greater > than that of publishing him in the USSR for most of the twentieth > century, thanks to the very real totalitarianism exercised > (increasingly) by commercial publishing. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer do > have the grace to acknowledge that "Mind in Society" started the > Vygotsky boom that made it posssible for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer to > start their revisionist revolution. We can't really fault historians > for not knowing what to do next. But we can fault them for forgetting > that people back then didn't know what we know today. > > In the end, I think that's the only excuse for doing translations, > good or > bad: Nobody else will, or nobody else will do it as well. To be fair, > I should say that there WERE no less than two other teams translating > Thinking and Speech into Korean when we went ahead and published; one > was a very well-funded team of Russian professors at Korea University > and the other had an official contract with MIT Press--but the latter > used the Hanfmann and Vakar translation into English and the team of > Russian professors--incredibly--used the Minick translation! So I am > very glad we went ahead and published ours, imperfect as it is. As > Tagore says, Ekla Chalo Re: > > If they answer not to your call walk aloneIf they are afraid and cower > mutely facing the wall,O thou unlucky one,open your mind and speak out > alone.If they turn away, and desert you when crossing the wilderness,O > thou unlucky one,trample the thorns under thy tread,and along the > blood-lined track travel alone.If they shut doors and do not hold up > the light when the night is troubled with storm,O thou unlucky > one,with the thunder flame of pain ignite your own heart,and let it burn alone. > (Translated from Tagore's Bengali by Tagore himself--but was it back > translated?) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: While we were working on Piaget's response to "Thinking and > Speech" I wrote to MIT Press to get permission to translate it into > Korean. I learned that the original French manuscript had been lost, > and that the translator, Francoise Seve, had had to reconstruct it > from a typescript, part of which could only be reconstructed by back translating from English to French! > > dk > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:36 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > David, > > Yes, it makes sense to me too. It at least partly explains why my > > comments in the margin of my copy of Speech and Language I bought so > > many years ago can still evoke my irritation at Vygotsky, who, it > > turns out, is not the author I thought he was. Another part is my > > own constantly gaining and losing my grasp on a coherent > > socio-cultural bead on the here and now, very much connected to the > > pulses of this chat. Funny how then and now inform each other. > > Henry > > > > > On Dec 31, 2015, at 4:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > > Thanks, David! :) > > > All makes sense to me. > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >> Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are > > >> seven facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that > > >> are...well, more or > > less > > >> right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's > > >> "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on > > >> Routledge in the new year. > > >> > > >> 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, > > ritualistic, > > >> deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to > > >> cults and personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that > > >> I am making an unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and > > >> today's relatively benign and bucolic academic atmosphere, note > > >> that Anton's revolutionary revisionist point in this first > > >> section is precisely that: the present > > day > > >> reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic > > >> interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded > > >> reference lists,an almost complete disjunction between high > > >> theory and more or > > less > > >> banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in > > >> Russia and the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, > > >> who saw the > > promised > > >> land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. > > >> Is the comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is > > >> that it is > > too > > >> obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. > > >> > > >> There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. > > >> The > > first > > >> is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a > > >> medical > > fact > > >> that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it > > >> is not really much more far fetched to say that he died without > > >> ever knowing > > that > > >> in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language > > >> and > > widely > > >> read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that > > >> mythbusters > > are > > >> themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical > > >> facts > > and > > >> construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that > > >> the previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or > > >> that it was constructed around correct facts which have been > > >> grossly misinterpreted > > in > > >> some way. So.... > > >> > > >> 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky > > School" > > >> was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and > > >> drifted > > away, > > >> spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, > > >> although the loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This > > >> section, based on Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first > > >> section, which manages to > > be > > >> both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. > > >> But of course for that very reason it tends to undermine the > > >> claims of the > > first > > >> part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most > > >> obvious evidence that there really WAS something like a > > >> Pyatorka--the fact that Vygotsky's own letters referto the > > >> Pyatorka, and the fact that the > > Pyatorka > > >> held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this > > >> contradicts > > Anton's > > >> main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were > > convenient > > >> constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of > > >> understanding) for thinking about the history of the Vygotsky > > >> school even while it was happening. But it also doesn't answer > > >> the question I have always had > > about > > >> the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton > > >> points out, there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong > > >> pro-Trotsky > > sympathies), > > >> the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a > > >> bureaucratic bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust > > >> Trotsky from power in > > the > > >> year following Lenin's death. . > > >> > > >> 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, > > >> is an unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from > > >> materials which really fit rather poorly, during the months > > >> immediately before...and after...Vygotsky's death. I think > > >> anybody who really knows the > > chronology > > >> of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this > > controversial; > > >> the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence > > >> and > > power > > >> of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to > > >> undermine > > the > > >> popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe > > >> to--that > > there > > >> are three very different Vygotskies believing three very > > >> different foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). > > >> > > >> So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary > > >> enough for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to > > >> claim that the > > works > > >> that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we > > >> read > > today, > > >> and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. > > They > > >> found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three > > >> times during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two > > >> of these > > lists > > >> are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job > > >> application knows very well that you list things that your > > >> potential employer will find impressive, and these are usually > > >> quite far from > > being > > >> the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, > > >> Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational > > Psychology", > > >> which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely > > >> followed by "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the > > >> authors quite correctly point out, a work of popular science (and > > >> includes references to > > textbook > > >> writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). > > >> > > >> Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the > > Development > > >> of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that > > >> the > > former > > >> was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two > > unrelated > > >> texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a > > >> benign > > forgery > > >> by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. > > >> > > >> First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF > > >> that it > > was > > >> conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion > > >> which goes back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in > > >> which it was > > conceived > > >> and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the > > >> chapters > > fit > > >> together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the > > >> problem, the approach and the research method followed in the > > >> "special studies" of > > the > > >> second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. > > >> is is really weak stuff: they > > >> > > >> Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of > > >> benign forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence > > >> in recovering historic manuscripts) does not actually explain > > >> what it is supposed to explain, which is the recurrence of > > >> several paragraphs, not word for > > word, > > >> but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of > > Ptolemaic > > >> epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't > > >> bother to > > read > > >> what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only > > >> authority > > for > > >> this story, which seems so much less probable than the > > >> alternative explanation that this is simply another instance of > > >> Vygotsky's tendency > > t > > >> repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon > > >> Goldberg > > ("The > > >> Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and > > >> other must readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), > > >> and an anonymous blogger (neither source seems very well disposed > > >> to their erstwhile professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact > > >> that a story is highly improbable and that the sources are > > >> somewhat jaundiced do not mean that > > it > > >> is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean > > >> that > > it > > >> is...well, possibly mythical. > > >> > > >> 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly > > >> in > > mind. > > >> This much too should be have been already very clear to any > > >> careful > > reader > > >> of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting > > >> part of > > the > > >> book, and the only part of the book which really does offer > > >> completely > > new > > >> evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not > > >> written by Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a > > >> lot of what Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed > > >> Nietszcheanism and his rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of > > >> consciousness in favor of > > "sense" > > >> (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, > > >> as I > > did, > > >> whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and > > >> if so > > up to > > >> what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you > > >> may > > wonder > > >> what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other > > unfinished > > >> works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" > > >> is mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child > > Development"). > > >> But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to > > >> learn something. It's also the part of the book where we see the > > >> most Vygotsky inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. > > >> > > >> 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write > > >> either of > > the > > >> English language books for which he is famous. The facts are > > depressingly > > >> clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something > > >> like > > half of > > >> the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the > > >> "redundancies", which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the > > >> inauthenticity of Tool and > > Sign) > > >> cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that > > >> Vygotsky ever wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all > > >> of the New > > Testament, > > >> like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put > > together > > >> by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what > > >> the revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: > > "Mind > > >> in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the > > >> significant omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they > > >> saw that they could bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, > > >> and that is exactly what > > they > > >> did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, > > >> whether by Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the > > >> Vygotsky "boom"; the real question we have to ask is--what can we > > >> actually accomplish with the > > energy > > >> that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of > > >> the > > boom > > >> stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" > > >> suggested archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of > > >> course that is certainly very much to be desired. But it also > > >> ignores the exoteric > > nature > > >> of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory > > >> and practice noted in point 1) above. > > >> > > >> 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were > > >> suppressed in order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's > > >> national > minorities. > > This > > >> too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own > > >> preface, as > > well > > >> as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official > > denunciation > > >> of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to > > be...well, > > >> more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak > > >> the > > truth > > >> in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political > > >> correctness" which only show how very little they understand the > > concrete > > >> realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really > > objectionable > > >> part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that > > Vygotsky > > >> is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations > > >> of production, without any education, was enough to create > > >> concepts in the minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in > > >> any of Vygotsky's or Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the > > >> contrary. (Luria repeatedly refers to the effect of schooling). > > >> Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do > > not > > >> raise a number of key issues: > > >> > > >> a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those > > >> who > > take > > >> experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological > > >> fieldwork with them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. > > >> Does this explain > > why he > > >> did not personally take part? > > >> > > >> b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people > > >> like Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all > > >> unprecedented; they were in fact part of a recognized and > > >> continuing tradition in cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and > > >> Cole, and also recent work on chimps and children in Africa). > > >> This ethnographic tradition WAS > > politically > > >> suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it > > >> sparingly, > > and > > >> why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) > > >> conclusions? > > >> > > >> 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin > > >> himself, but instead was subject to an informal ban, which did > > >> not prevent him from being favorably cited in the twenty years > > >> between his death and the > > first > > >> publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. > > >> Stalin > > was > > >> not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky > > >> would have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this > > >> really is both sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic > > >> (and > > >> anachronistic) > > to > > >> imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to > > >> deserve > > the > > >> kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, > > >> or > > even > > >> Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost > > >> fact-free articles published against Vygotsky in the years after > > >> his death were somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign > > >> against his work (which > > began > > >> WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 > > >> decree on pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself > > >> mentions in > > Thinking > > >> and Speech Chapter Six?) > > >> > > >> As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is > > >> a dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. > > >> The > > danger > > >> is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a > > >> gut rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism > > >> out of their firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material > > >> that is anything but obvious. When that happens, we get something > > >> that is neither a gorgon > > nor a > > >> minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being > > Earnest": > > >> something like a monster without being a myth. > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Macquarie University > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like > > >> Aristotle, > > Jesus > > >> Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't > > >> edit the books that made him famous. The problem of course is > > >> that Vygotsky > > didn't > > >> know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de > > >> Saussure, Vygotsky did not > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well > > >> > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 3 04:36:29 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 03 Jan 2016 23:36:29 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: References: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> <92303379-051D-4C33-A19F-6148B343E157@gmail.com> Message-ID: <568915CD.7060806@mira.net> I got that, Peter! I think Van der Veer was very smart in just sending that image to us. :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 3/01/2016 11:01 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > My observation was quite simple: that taking Vygotsky's notebooks and translating them into something that makes sense must be very difficult. That's all. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:13 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! > > Peter: > > Am I missing something? I don't see any account, daunting or otherwise, of how hard it is to get things published with Vygotsky's name on it. There's only a photograph of Vygotsky's notebook. And what about his other comments? > > Part of the problem is illiteracy. I don't mean the readership; they are more literate and more savvy than ever. I mean the publishers, who sometimes can make Stalin seem positively erudite. I am pretty sure that it wasn't Hanfmann and Vakar who decided that "Thinking and Speech" would really read a whole lot better if it were cut in half and given a title like "Thought and Language". I know that Mike had a very hard time getting ANYBODY to have a look at Luria's manuscript (and also that "Mind in Society" was NOT his idea, or Vygotsky's idea, of a title). > > You would think that it wouldn't be that hard to interest publishers in an academic blockbuster, since businessmen, unlike the rest of us, come armed with some kind of sixth sense, an ability to smell the money to be made, which justifies six figure incomes and seven figure bonuses. But it turns out that they have the same five senses as the rest of us; I am sure that Harvard were even more astonished by the success of "Mind in Society" than Mike was. > > Our own publisher has a similar tendency to choose titles for books that he doesn't bother to read (Luria's "Cognitive Development" is marketed in Korea under the title "Vygotsky and the Secret of Intelligence"). So perhaps we shouldn't be too hard on Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. They are trying to make their way in a pretty difficult market. I think that their marketing strategy--even as a marketing strategy--is not a very good one, but what do I know? > > We imagine that somehow academics have a "free press" and that the internet has made us far freer. But we also acknowledge that it is under supposedly totalitarian regimes like that of Stalin (or how about that of Queen > Elizabeth) that intellectuals and literati were sometimes at their most productive. I'm not saying that somehow Stalinism was good for psychology, any more than I am saying that somehow Elizabeth's torturers were responsible for Shakespeare's plays. Actually, what I'm saying is pretty close to something that Anton was trying to say and got distracted from saying by his own myth busting. > > It's this: brute repression is not a very effective way of shutting down intellectual life, and it shouldn't really be called "totalitarian" at all ("futilitarian" would be a lot closer to the truth). Money does more than Milton can to justify the State's ways to man. One can't help suspecting that the strange combination of sensationalism and naivete that we find in the very title of "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky's Studies" owes something to that sad fact of life. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 8:33 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> I sent David's comments to Rene van der Veer, and part of his reply >> included a shot (attached) of what translators and editors have to go >> through in moving LSV and others into what today we'd call a book or >> article. Pretty daunting. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David >> xmca-l-bounces+Kellogg >> Sent: Friday, January 01, 2016 6:44 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! >> >> Henry: >> >> Of course, when you read a translation, you are not reading the >> writer, or at least not the writer in large letters; you are reading >> the writer in small letters; that is, the translator. When we finished >> translating "Thinking and Speech" into Korean (which we did from the >> French and Italian translations, because our Russian was no good, and >> because we could see, from the very first chapter, that the English >> was no good either) one of our best translators quit the team with the >> bitter comment that none of us knew any Russian (true) and some of us >> knew very little Korean, or at least very little literary Korean >> (also, alas, true). We've worked pretty hard to overcome both of these >> problems, and next month we'll bring out our seventh volume of Vygotsky's works in Korean. >> >> Years ago I was rather astonished when I heard Eugene Subbotsky >> describe Vygotsky as a poet, since I too had read him entirely in >> translation and had (wrongly as it turns out) come to think of him as >> quite clumsy, maladroit, redundant and wordy. But I have come to see >> that Subbotsky was >> right: there are certain wordings in Vygotsky, like the idea that the >> child is "intertwined (interpersonally) and interwoven (socially)" >> that have wings; that overleap both languages and soar. As Vygotsky >> says, there is a kind of thinking without words that only thinking >> with words can bring about. >> >> So when you read Vygotsky in English you are reading the thinker and >> not the writer. There are certain advantages to that, which you should >> be very conscious of as a teacher of foreign languages and as a >> foreign language learner. The whole point of the first part of >> "Thinking and Speech" is that the thinker and the speaker are really >> two diferent creatures, and even in the second part we can see that >> they are two radically different persona, even where they partake and >> participate in the same personality. By standing aloof for a moment >> from the language of expression, we can get a certain critical distance, a sense of the overall shape of the thoughts. >> >> And in fact that was the point I was trying to make: "Thinking and Speech" >> was not Vygotsky's final word (there will never be a final word, >> thanks to people like you, Henry), and it was not even his finished >> word, and its very unfinished quality is, I think, also responsible >> for the fact that LSV doesn't list either HDHMF or Tool and Sign in any of his "Greatest Hits' >> (though, significantly, Tool and Sign IS in the references to the >> first edition of Thinking and Speech). This patchy, unfinished quality >> makes the sheer brilliance and consistency of the ideas all the more remarkable. >> >> I would like to think that our clumsy translations also have the >> effect of throwing the spotlight on the grace and coherence of >> Vygotsky's thinking, but I know that unfortunately this probably isn't >> the case; I imagine there are lots of people scribbling imprecations >> against Vygotsky in the margins of their Korean translations which really ought to be directed against us. >> There can really be only one excuse for what we did. >> >> It is the same excuse that Mike, Sylvia Scribner, Vera John-Steiner >> and Ellen Souberman have for issuing a compilation under Vygotsky's name. >> Yasnitsky and Van der Veer admit that no deception was involved, and >> their main complaint is that the process of compiling it is not >> sufficiently transparent to be made reversible, but of course the same >> thing is true of almost any compilation and indeed coauthorship quite >> generally--we only know which chapters in "Ape, Primitive, Child" are >> by Luria and which by Vygotsky because of Vygotsky's complaints about >> Luria's Freudianism in his letters, and there is no way for the reader >> to know which of the revolutionary revisionist ideas in this book are >> Van der Veer's and which are Yasnitsky's! >> >> Of course, we have different standards for writers of historic stature >> than we do for each other, and that's perfectly okay, so long as we >> keep in mind that at the time "Mind in Society" was published, >> Vygotsky was not generally considered a writer of historic stature: >> his publication list in English was considerably shorter than Mike >> Cole's. Today it's just too easy for people to forget that the >> difficulty of publishing Vygotsky in the West was actually far greater >> than that of publishing him in the USSR for most of the twentieth >> century, thanks to the very real totalitarianism exercised >> (increasingly) by commercial publishing. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer do >> have the grace to acknowledge that "Mind in Society" started the >> Vygotsky boom that made it posssible for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer to >> start their revisionist revolution. We can't really fault historians >> for not knowing what to do next. But we can fault them for forgetting >> that people back then didn't know what we know today. >> >> In the end, I think that's the only excuse for doing translations, >> good or >> bad: Nobody else will, or nobody else will do it as well. To be fair, >> I should say that there WERE no less than two other teams translating >> Thinking and Speech into Korean when we went ahead and published; one >> was a very well-funded team of Russian professors at Korea University >> and the other had an official contract with MIT Press--but the latter >> used the Hanfmann and Vakar translation into English and the team of >> Russian professors--incredibly--used the Minick translation! So I am >> very glad we went ahead and published ours, imperfect as it is. As >> Tagore says, Ekla Chalo Re: >> >> If they answer not to your call walk aloneIf they are afraid and cower >> mutely facing the wall,O thou unlucky one,open your mind and speak out >> alone.If they turn away, and desert you when crossing the wilderness,O >> thou unlucky one,trample the thorns under thy tread,and along the >> blood-lined track travel alone.If they shut doors and do not hold up >> the light when the night is troubled with storm,O thou unlucky >> one,with the thunder flame of pain ignite your own heart,and let it burn alone. >> (Translated from Tagore's Bengali by Tagore himself--but was it back >> translated?) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> PS: While we were working on Piaget's response to "Thinking and >> Speech" I wrote to MIT Press to get permission to translate it into >> Korean. I learned that the original French manuscript had been lost, >> and that the translator, Francoise Seve, had had to reconstruct it >> from a typescript, part of which could only be reconstructed by back translating from English to French! >> >> dk >> >> On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 6:36 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> David, >>> Yes, it makes sense to me too. It at least partly explains why my >>> comments in the margin of my copy of Speech and Language I bought so >>> many years ago can still evoke my irritation at Vygotsky, who, it >>> turns out, is not the author I thought he was. Another part is my >>> own constantly gaining and losing my grasp on a coherent >>> socio-cultural bead on the here and now, very much connected to the >>> pulses of this chat. Funny how then and now inform each other. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 31, 2015, at 4:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks, David! :) >>>> All makes sense to me. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are >>>>> seven facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that >>>>> are...well, more or >>> less >>>>> right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's >>>>> "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on >>>>> Routledge in the new year. >>>>> >>>>> 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, >>> ritualistic, >>>>> deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to >>>>> cults and personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that >>>>> I am making an unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and >>>>> today's relatively benign and bucolic academic atmosphere, note >>>>> that Anton's revolutionary revisionist point in this first >>>>> section is precisely that: the present >>> day >>>>> reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic >>>>> interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded >>>>> reference lists,an almost complete disjunction between high >>>>> theory and more or >>> less >>>>> banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in >>>>> Russia and the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, >>>>> who saw the >>> promised >>>>> land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. >>>>> Is the comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is >>>>> that it is >>> too >>>>> obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. >>>>> >>>>> There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. >>>>> The >>> first >>>>> is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a >>>>> medical >>> fact >>>>> that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it >>>>> is not really much more far fetched to say that he died without >>>>> ever knowing >>> that >>>>> in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language >>>>> and >>> widely >>>>> read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that >>>>> mythbusters >>> are >>>>> themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical >>>>> facts >>> and >>>>> construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that >>>>> the previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or >>>>> that it was constructed around correct facts which have been >>>>> grossly misinterpreted >>> in >>>>> some way. So.... >>>>> >>>>> 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky >>> School" >>>>> was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and >>>>> drifted >>> away, >>>>> spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, >>>>> although the loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This >>>>> section, based on Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first >>>>> section, which manages to >>> be >>>>> both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. >>>>> But of course for that very reason it tends to undermine the >>>>> claims of the >>> first >>>>> part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most >>>>> obvious evidence that there really WAS something like a >>>>> Pyatorka--the fact that Vygotsky's own letters referto the >>>>> Pyatorka, and the fact that the >>> Pyatorka >>>>> held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this >>>>> contradicts >>> Anton's >>>>> main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were >>> convenient >>>>> constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of >>>>> understanding) for thinking about the history of the Vygotsky >>>>> school even while it was happening. But it also doesn't answer >>>>> the question I have always had >>> about >>>>> the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton >>>>> points out, there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong >>>>> pro-Trotsky >>> sympathies), >>>>> the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a >>>>> bureaucratic bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust >>>>> Trotsky from power in >>> the >>>>> year following Lenin's death. . >>>>> >>>>> 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, >>>>> is an unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from >>>>> materials which really fit rather poorly, during the months >>>>> immediately before...and after...Vygotsky's death. I think >>>>> anybody who really knows the >>> chronology >>>>> of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this >>> controversial; >>>>> the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence >>>>> and >>> power >>>>> of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to >>>>> undermine >>> the >>>>> popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe >>>>> to--that >>> there >>>>> are three very different Vygotskies believing three very >>>>> different foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). >>>>> >>>>> So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary >>>>> enough for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to >>>>> claim that the >>> works >>>>> that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we >>>>> read >>> today, >>>>> and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. >>> They >>>>> found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three >>>>> times during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two >>>>> of these >>> lists >>>>> are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job >>>>> application knows very well that you list things that your >>>>> potential employer will find impressive, and these are usually >>>>> quite far from >>> being >>>>> the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, >>>>> Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational >>> Psychology", >>>>> which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely >>>>> followed by "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the >>>>> authors quite correctly point out, a work of popular science (and >>>>> includes references to >>> textbook >>>>> writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). >>>>> >>>>> Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the >>> Development >>>>> of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that >>>>> the >>> former >>>>> was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two >>> unrelated >>>>> texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a >>>>> benign >>> forgery >>>>> by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. >>>>> >>>>> First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF >>>>> that it >>> was >>>>> conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion >>>>> which goes back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in >>>>> which it was >>> conceived >>>>> and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the >>>>> chapters >>> fit >>>>> together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the >>>>> problem, the approach and the research method followed in the >>>>> "special studies" of >>> the >>>>> second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. >>>>> is is really weak stuff: they >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of >>>>> benign forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence >>>>> in recovering historic manuscripts) does not actually explain >>>>> what it is supposed to explain, which is the recurrence of >>>>> several paragraphs, not word for >>> word, >>>>> but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of >>> Ptolemaic >>>>> epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't >>>>> bother to >>> read >>>>> what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only >>>>> authority >>> for >>>>> this story, which seems so much less probable than the >>>>> alternative explanation that this is simply another instance of >>>>> Vygotsky's tendency >>> t >>>>> repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon >>>>> Goldberg >>> ("The >>>>> Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and >>>>> other must readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), >>>>> and an anonymous blogger (neither source seems very well disposed >>>>> to their erstwhile professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact >>>>> that a story is highly improbable and that the sources are >>>>> somewhat jaundiced do not mean that >>> it >>>>> is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean >>>>> that >>> it >>>>> is...well, possibly mythical. >>>>> >>>>> 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly >>>>> in >>> mind. >>>>> This much too should be have been already very clear to any >>>>> careful >>> reader >>>>> of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting >>>>> part of >>> the >>>>> book, and the only part of the book which really does offer >>>>> completely >>> new >>>>> evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not >>>>> written by Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a >>>>> lot of what Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed >>>>> Nietszcheanism and his rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of >>>>> consciousness in favor of >>> "sense" >>>>> (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, >>>>> as I >>> did, >>>>> whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and >>>>> if so >>> up to >>>>> what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you >>>>> may >>> wonder >>>>> what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other >>> unfinished >>>>> works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" >>>>> is mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child >>> Development"). >>>>> But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to >>>>> learn something. It's also the part of the book where we see the >>>>> most Vygotsky inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. >>>>> >>>>> 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write >>>>> either of >>> the >>>>> English language books for which he is famous. The facts are >>> depressingly >>>>> clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something >>>>> like >>> half of >>>>> the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the >>>>> "redundancies", which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the >>>>> inauthenticity of Tool and >>> Sign) >>>>> cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that >>>>> Vygotsky ever wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all >>>>> of the New >>> Testament, >>>>> like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put >>> together >>>>> by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what >>>>> the revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: >>> "Mind >>>>> in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the >>>>> significant omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they >>>>> saw that they could bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, >>>>> and that is exactly what >>> they >>>>> did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, >>>>> whether by Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the >>>>> Vygotsky "boom"; the real question we have to ask is--what can we >>>>> actually accomplish with the >>> energy >>>>> that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of >>>>> the >>> boom >>>>> stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" >>>>> suggested archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of >>>>> course that is certainly very much to be desired. But it also >>>>> ignores the exoteric >>> nature >>>>> of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory >>>>> and practice noted in point 1) above. >>>>> >>>>> 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were >>>>> suppressed in order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's >>>>> national >> minorities. >>> This >>>>> too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own >>>>> preface, as >>> well >>>>> as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official >>> denunciation >>>>> of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to >>> be...well, >>>>> more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak >>>>> the >>> truth >>>>> in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political >>>>> correctness" which only show how very little they understand the >>> concrete >>>>> realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really >>> objectionable >>>>> part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that >>> Vygotsky >>>>> is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations >>>>> of production, without any education, was enough to create >>>>> concepts in the minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in >>>>> any of Vygotsky's or Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the >>>>> contrary. (Luria repeatedly refers to the effect of schooling). >>>>> Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do >>> not >>>>> raise a number of key issues: >>>>> >>>>> a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those >>>>> who >>> take >>>>> experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological >>>>> fieldwork with them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. >>>>> Does this explain >>> why he >>>>> did not personally take part? >>>>> >>>>> b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people >>>>> like Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all >>>>> unprecedented; they were in fact part of a recognized and >>>>> continuing tradition in cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and >>>>> Cole, and also recent work on chimps and children in Africa). >>>>> This ethnographic tradition WAS >>> politically >>>>> suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it >>>>> sparingly, >>> and >>>>> why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) >>>>> conclusions? >>>>> >>>>> 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin >>>>> himself, but instead was subject to an informal ban, which did >>>>> not prevent him from being favorably cited in the twenty years >>>>> between his death and the >>> first >>>>> publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. >>>>> Stalin >>> was >>>>> not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky >>>>> would have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this >>>>> really is both sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic >>>>> (and >>>>> anachronistic) >>> to >>>>> imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to >>>>> deserve >>> the >>>>> kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, >>>>> or >>> even >>>>> Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost >>>>> fact-free articles published against Vygotsky in the years after >>>>> his death were somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign >>>>> against his work (which >>> began >>>>> WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 >>>>> decree on pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself >>>>> mentions in >>> Thinking >>>>> and Speech Chapter Six?) >>>>> >>>>> As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is >>>>> a dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. >>>>> The >>> danger >>>>> is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a >>>>> gut rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism >>>>> out of their firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material >>>>> that is anything but obvious. When that happens, we get something >>>>> that is neither a gorgon >>> nor a >>>>> minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being >>> Earnest": >>>>> something like a monster without being a myth. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like >>>>> Aristotle, >>> Jesus >>>>> Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't >>>>> edit the books that made him famous. The problem of course is >>>>> that Vygotsky >>> didn't >>>>> know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de >>>>> Saussure, Vygotsky did not >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well >>>>> >>> >>> > From bella.kotik@gmail.com Sun Jan 3 04:55:18 2016 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 14:55:18 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helena, based on the Israeli experience, I would say that for non-English-speaking country oriented on English there have to be at least 3 problems to solve gradually: English as a FL for the whole system of education English for academic purposes at the higher education Translation of main handbooks and monograph for related professions, which will be a step to develop vocabularies for each field. Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Sun, Jan 3, 2016 at 2:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hello, > > I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is > all the rage. > > In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by > 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. > > This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such > as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities > (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and > textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to > teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for > reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. > > The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to > working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class > size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- > unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's > the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. > > So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching > methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 > universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, > Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these > institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working > conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of > it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small > class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete > and talk about methods. > > I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching > in English when your English is not great. > > Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they > mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early > 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting > pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they > don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the > right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door > to the global world and they know it. > > I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts > that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate > across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is > probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? > > I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can > someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be > able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest > they hook me off the stage. > > Thanks in advance, > > Helena > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Sun Jan 3 06:26:38 2016 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 14:26:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Helena, There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that is just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, where major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. However UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a second part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking parts of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and then posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual University is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the university can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Helena Worthen Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice Thank you, Elinami. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: > Dear Helena. > Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a > post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of > language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has > been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had > settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary > 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. > > Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound > of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process > does not need to be described here. > > Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages > (Kiswahili and English). > > In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another > strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). > > Kind Regards, > > Elinami > > > > > On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Helena, >> >> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a seminar? >> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? >> >> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? >> >> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" >> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and >> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers face? >> >> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your >> Vietnamese noodle soup. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> > > > -- > Dr. Elinami Swai > Senior Lecturer > Associate Dean > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > Faculty of Education > Open University of Tanzania > P.O.Box 23409 > Dar-Es-Salaam > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > Fax:022-2668759 > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > 0230102484 > ...this faith will still deliver > If you live it first to last > Not everything which blooms must > wither. > Not all that was is past From ewall@umich.edu Sun Jan 3 14:59:18 2016 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 16:59:18 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: <066DE945-8214-49A9-84A7-2F4A4BA60EA2@umich.edu> Helena I am not sure how to say such things succinctly as, for the most part, I lack the experience in teaching in a relevant environment (although there were incidents), but I think Jill Adler might have something to say as regards her experiences in South Africa as regards the sometimes necessity for code-switching. She is reasonably well published and although her expertise was in mathematics education, she also speaks of English language classrooms. Ed Wall > On Jan 2, 2016, at 6:42 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > Hello, > > I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is all the rage. > > In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. > > This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. > > The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. > > So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete and talk about methods. > > I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching in English when your English is not great. > > Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door to the global world and they know it. > > I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? > > I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest they hook me off the stage. > > Thanks in advance, > > Helena > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sun Jan 3 17:05:58 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 08:05:58 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: Thank you, Bella. This is very good short list. I am now compiling that various advices I have received to sort them into things I can use for different purposes. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 3, 2016, at 7:55 PM, Bella Kotik-Friedgut wrote: > Helena, based on the Israeli experience, I would say that for > non-English-speaking country oriented on English there have to be at least > 3 problems to solve gradually: > English as a FL for the whole system of education > English for academic purposes at the higher education > Translation of main handbooks and monograph for related professions, which > will be a step to develop vocabularies for each field. > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > On Sun, Jan 3, 2016 at 2:42 AM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is >> all the rage. >> >> In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by >> 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. >> >> This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such >> as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities >> (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and >> textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to >> teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for >> reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. >> >> The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to >> working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class >> size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- >> unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's >> the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. >> >> So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching >> methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 >> universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, >> Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these >> institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working >> conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of >> it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small >> class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete >> and talk about methods. >> >> I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching >> in English when your English is not great. >> >> Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they >> mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early >> 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting >> pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they >> don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the >> right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door >> to the global world and they know it. >> >> I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts >> that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate >> across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is >> probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? >> >> I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can >> someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be >> able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest >> they hook me off the stage. >> >> Thanks in advance, >> >> Helena >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> >> >> From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sun Jan 3 17:14:16 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 08:14:16 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Hmm, this will take me some research to check out. Thank you, Michael - However, I was given a Cross-Cultural leadership class to teach (in English) that drew from a syllabus placed online by an MIT professor. I said yes just to see what it would be like. It was a skimpy syllabus that relied heavily on the kind of student who would show up in a MIT class (multi-national and academically skilled) and the readings were mostly from Amazon; you got a button to click and buy. I was told that the instructor's lecture notes were all on line but what was actually on line was something he probably wrote in an hour. I had to re-write the class, of course. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 3, 2016, at 9:26 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Helena, > > There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that is just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, where major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. However UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a second part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking parts of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and then posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual University is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the university can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Helena Worthen > Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice > > Thank you, Elinami. > > H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: > >> Dear Helena. >> Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a >> post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of >> language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has >> been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had >> settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary >> 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. >> >> Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound >> of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process >> does not need to be described here. >> >> Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages >> (Kiswahili and English). >> >> In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another >> strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). >> >> Kind Regards, >> >> Elinami >> >> >> >> >> On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> Helena, >>> >>> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a seminar? >>> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? >>> >>> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? >>> >>> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" >>> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and >>> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers face? >>> >>> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your >>> Vietnamese noodle soup. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Dr. Elinami Swai >> Senior Lecturer >> Associate Dean >> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >> Faculty of Education >> Open University of Tanzania >> P.O.Box 23409 >> Dar-Es-Salaam >> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >> Fax:022-2668759 >> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >> 0230102484 >> ...this faith will still deliver >> If you live it first to last >> Not everything which blooms must >> wither. >> Not all that was is past > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 3 23:19:01 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 16:19:01 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Message-ID: A number of discussants have made the suggestion of small groups, tutorials, peer presentations, and so on, and this is an excellent suggestion. But we need know?and be able to explain?exactly why it is excellent, in what this excellence consists of, and what the limitations of the excellence are, because we often do find that in situations like the one which Helena is describing (situations like the ones where I have spent the last three and a half decades teaching), when we try to introduce small groups, tutorials, and peer presentations that we?ve only multiplied the problems that we started with and sometimes even exacerbated them. For if the professor has only a minimal grasp of English, and if the students find it almost impossible to have a conversation about the topic even when the professor is prompting them, we have to ask what the effect of removing or sidelining or backgrounding the professor will be. Many students feel?and the evidence is that they are not entirely wrong?that the effect is to remove or to background the only source of English and the main source of conceptual knowledge. The argument has to be taken seriously, for at least three reasons. First of all, as I said, there?s a lot of evidence that shows that although the professor undoubtedly feels a great deal of relief that his or her poor grasp of English is no longer the centre of the student?s critical attention, all that?s really been accomplished is to move the centre of attention to a student who in some cases bears it even less well than the professor did. Often the results of small groups are not noticeably better than the results of teacher fronted classes, except in ?skills based? classes which offer practice to learners, e.g. conversation classes, and in the case of conceptual knowledge based classes the results are sometimes dramatically worse. In fact, Hywel Coleman?s large scale studies in Nigeria showed that there really wasn?t any particular advantage for small classes over large classes, given highly motivated students (and the autodidacts amongst us can easily see why this might be). Secondly, even if there were no objective evidence on the side of large classes and against groupwork, there is an important subjective argument. Many learners, right or wrong, feel they learn better from a professor than from their peers, just as we sometimes feel that we learn better from our peers than from ourselves (or our children). This subjective argument is particularly important because I think one reason why groupwork and peer seminar have such clout with us is that, unlike Professor Silverstein, we are more interested in empowering our learners than merely informing them, yet again, of the ways they are disempowered. The argument that groupwork and peer seminars are right because they empower learners appears to be unanswerable?but suppose the learners use this power to call for the return of large professor led classes? The argument is, once again, unanswerable, and I think it shows the dangers of confusing issues that are pedagogical (and therefore social, political) with issues that are ethical (and therefore interpersonal, moral). The personal is NOT political; they are two very different, if linked, levels of being. But thirdly I think the argument in favor of large classes deserves to be taken seriously because it will help us get beneath the surface and find out what it is about small classes that is pedagogically more effective. It is certainly not the case that all small classes are pedagogically effective nor is it the case that large classes never are. Is it SIMPLY an aesthetic-political preference, that small is beautiful? Is it once again something we all favor for the convenience of the instructor rather than for the comfort of the student? Or is there something about the shape of actual discourse that we should be attending to, not least because it might be transferable to larger classes? Does this mysterious factor, having to do with the shape of actual discourse, apply equally to so-called ?content? subjects, where the emphasis is on what Vygotsky calls ?science concepts? and to everyday conversation classes? (But...I am well over Helena's one screen limit, and I feel the cold clammy hand of her hook on my throat....) David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 10:14 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hmm, this will take me some research to check out. Thank you, Michael - > > However, I was given a Cross-Cultural leadership class to teach (in > English) that drew from a syllabus placed online by an MIT professor. I > said yes just to see what it would be like. It was a skimpy syllabus that > relied heavily on the kind of student who would show up in a MIT class > (multi-national and academically skilled) and the readings were mostly from > Amazon; you got a button to click and buy. I was told that the instructor's > lecture notes were all on line but what was actually on line was something > he probably wrote in an hour. > > I had to re-write the class, of course. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jan 3, 2016, at 9:26 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > Hi Helena, > > > > There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the > Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that is > just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, where > major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in > their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of > universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. However > UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a second > part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are > locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking parts > of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and then > posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other > universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual University > is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the university > can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning > Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. > > > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Helena Worthen > > Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice > > > > Thank you, Elinami. > > > > H > > > > Helena Worthen > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > > > On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: > > > >> Dear Helena. > >> Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a > >> post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of > >> language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has > >> been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had > >> settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary > >> 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. > >> > >> Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound > >> of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process > >> does not need to be described here. > >> > >> Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages > >> (Kiswahili and English). > >> > >> In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another > >> strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). > >> > >> Kind Regards, > >> > >> Elinami > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>> Helena, > >>> > >>> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a > seminar? > >>> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? > >>> > >>> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? > >>> > >>> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" > >>> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and > >>> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers > face? > >>> > >>> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your > >>> Vietnamese noodle soup. > >>> > >>> Kind regards, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Dr. Elinami Swai > >> Senior Lecturer > >> Associate Dean > >> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > >> Faculty of Education > >> Open University of Tanzania > >> P.O.Box 23409 > >> Dar-Es-Salaam > >> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > >> Fax:022-2668759 > >> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > >> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > >> 0230102484 > >> ...this faith will still deliver > >> If you live it first to last > >> Not everything which blooms must > >> wither. > >> Not all that was is past > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 3 23:35:19 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 04 Jan 2016 18:35:19 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Message-ID: <568A20B7.2070407@mira.net> David, my argument for "group work" was solely that such contact hours would be conducted in the students' and tutors' native language. It was meant as a kind of compromise, allowing the university to present an English-only face to the world via textbooks, curriculum material, large lectures and (hopefully) audiorecordings of lectures, all of which can be rehearsed and revisited, while the "real" education is happening in face-to-face contact between the lecturer/tutor and the student. I think the idea someone mentioned of using students or postgrads who have good English skills to assist at this point was a good one, too. We had a great discussion about the point you are making when we were discussing mathematics education a year or so ago. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 4/01/2016 6:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > A number of discussants have made the suggestion of small groups, > tutorials, peer presentations, and so on, and this is an excellent > suggestion. But we need know?and be able to explain?exactly why it is > excellent, in what this excellence consists of, and what the limitations of > the excellence are, because we often do find that in situations like the > one which Helena is describing (situations like the ones where I have spent > the last three and a half decades teaching), when we try to introduce small > groups, tutorials, and peer presentations that we?ve only multiplied the > problems that we started with and sometimes even exacerbated them. For if > the professor has only a minimal grasp of English, and if the students find > it almost impossible to have a conversation about the topic even when the > professor is prompting them, we have to ask what the effect of removing or > sidelining or backgrounding the professor will be. Many students feel?and > the evidence is that they are not entirely wrong?that the effect is to > remove or to background the only source of English and the main source of > conceptual knowledge. > > The argument has to be taken seriously, for at least three reasons. First > of all, as I said, there?s a lot of evidence that shows that although the > professor undoubtedly feels a great deal of relief that his or her poor > grasp of English is no longer the centre of the student?s critical > attention, all that?s really been accomplished is to move the centre of > attention to a student who in some cases bears it even less well than the > professor did. Often the results of small groups are not noticeably better > than the results of teacher fronted classes, except in ?skills based? > classes which offer practice to learners, e.g. conversation classes, and in > the case of conceptual knowledge based classes the results are sometimes > dramatically worse. In fact, Hywel Coleman?s large scale studies in Nigeria > showed that there really wasn?t any particular advantage for small classes > over large classes, given highly motivated students (and the autodidacts > amongst us can easily see why this might be). > > Secondly, even if there were no objective evidence on the side of large > classes and against groupwork, there is an important subjective argument. > Many learners, right or wrong, feel they learn better from a professor than > from their peers, just as we sometimes feel that we learn better from our > peers than from ourselves (or our children). This subjective argument is > particularly important because I think one reason why groupwork and peer > seminar have such clout with us is that, unlike Professor Silverstein, we > are more interested in empowering our learners than merely informing them, > yet again, of the ways they are disempowered. The argument that groupwork > and peer seminars are right because they empower learners appears to be > unanswerable?but suppose the learners use this power to call for the return > of large professor led classes? The argument is, once again, unanswerable, > and I think it shows the dangers of confusing issues that are pedagogical > (and therefore social, political) with issues that are ethical (and > therefore interpersonal, moral). The personal is NOT political; they are > two very different, if linked, levels of being. > But thirdly I think the argument in favor of large classes deserves to be > taken seriously because it will help us get beneath the surface and find > out what it is about small classes that is pedagogically more effective. It > is certainly not the case that all small classes are pedagogically > effective nor is it the case that large classes never are. Is it SIMPLY an > aesthetic-political preference, that small is beautiful? Is it once again > something we all favor for the convenience of the instructor rather than > for the comfort of the student? Or is there something about the shape of > actual discourse that we should be attending to, not least because it might > be transferable to larger classes? Does this mysterious factor, having to > do with the shape of actual discourse, apply equally to so-called ?content? > subjects, where the emphasis is on what Vygotsky calls ?science concepts? > and to everyday conversation classes? > > (But...I am well over Helena's one screen limit, and I feel the cold clammy > hand of her hook on my throat....) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 10:14 AM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> Hmm, this will take me some research to check out. Thank you, Michael - >> >> However, I was given a Cross-Cultural leadership class to teach (in >> English) that drew from a syllabus placed online by an MIT professor. I >> said yes just to see what it would be like. It was a skimpy syllabus that >> relied heavily on the kind of student who would show up in a MIT class >> (multi-national and academically skilled) and the readings were mostly from >> Amazon; you got a button to click and buy. I was told that the instructor's >> lecture notes were all on line but what was actually on line was something >> he probably wrote in an hour. >> >> I had to re-write the class, of course. >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Jan 3, 2016, at 9:26 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> Hi Helena, >>> >>> There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the >> Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that is >> just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, where >> major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in >> their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of >> universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. However >> UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a second >> part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are >> locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking parts >> of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and then >> posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other >> universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual University >> is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the university >> can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning >> Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Helena Worthen >>> Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice >>> >>> Thank you, Elinami. >>> >>> H >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>> >>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Helena. >>>> Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a >>>> post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of >>>> language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has >>>> been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had >>>> settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary >>>> 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. >>>> >>>> Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound >>>> of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process >>>> does not need to be described here. >>>> >>>> Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages >>>> (Kiswahili and English). >>>> >>>> In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another >>>> strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). >>>> >>>> Kind Regards, >>>> >>>> Elinami >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> Helena, >>>>> >>>>> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a >> seminar? >>>>> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? >>>>> >>>>> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? >>>>> >>>>> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" >>>>> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and >>>>> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers >> face? >>>>> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your >>>>> Vietnamese noodle soup. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Dr. Elinami Swai >>>> Senior Lecturer >>>> Associate Dean >>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >>>> Faculty of Education >>>> Open University of Tanzania >>>> P.O.Box 23409 >>>> Dar-Es-Salaam >>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >>>> Fax:022-2668759 >>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >>>> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >>>> 0230102484 >>>> ...this faith will still deliver >>>> If you live it first to last >>>> Not everything which blooms must >>>> wither. >>>> Not all that was is past >>> >>> >> >> From helenaworthen@gmail.com Mon Jan 4 01:02:55 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 16:02:55 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: <00E7A566-3CBE-4E4B-8271-BC403DDD9BAA@illinois.edu> Bella, do you mean translation into English of main handbooks and monographs for related professions, from Hebrew? Or from English into Hebrew? Thanks -- Helena Helena Worthen 21 San Mateo Road Berkeley, CA 94707 hworthen@illinois.edu Vietnam blog is at: helenaworthen.wordpress.com 510-828-2745 On Jan 3, 2016, at 7:55 PM, Bella Kotik-Friedgut wrote: > Helena, based on the Israeli experience, I would say that for > non-English-speaking country oriented on English there have to be at least > 3 problems to solve gradually: > English as a FL for the whole system of education > English for academic purposes at the higher education > Translation of main handbooks and monograph for related professions, which > will be a step to develop vocabularies for each field. > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > On Sun, Jan 3, 2016 at 2:42 AM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> Hello, From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Mon Jan 4 06:11:19 2016 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (R.J.S.Parsons) Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 14:11:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New 2016 In-Reply-To: References: <933B4BD9-C47A-4B0D-9CAC-69B5F94A26B1@gmail.com> <92E0ED0D-34D3-4412-AC7B-282AC3C12907@gmail.com> Message-ID: <568A7D84.2070606@open.ac.uk> I couldn't resist this: http://ukdataexplorer.com/european-translator/?word=Happy+New+Year I'm now practising saying "??astn? Nov? Rok" as befits an ageing rocker. Rob On 01/01/2016 22:53, Luisa Aires wrote: Muito estimados e estimadas XMCAers Desejo a todos e a todas um Feliz Ano Novo, com paz e muita criatividade. Que esta nossa comunidade continue a ser um espa?o de diversidade e de di?logos inspiradores, com a participa??o de todos e, em particular, com a presen?a atenta de M. Cole. Um abra?o, Lu?sa A. 2016-01-01 21:45 GMT+00:00 HENRY SHONERD : To Ana and Lisa and todos los demas xmcieros; Here?s to a kick-ass chat all year long! It would be cool for chatters to post a new year?s salute in any language that suits their fancy. No pressure. Henry On Jan 1, 2016, at 1:58 AM, Lu?sa Aires wrote: Dear XMCAers I wish you a Happy New Year! Luisa A. Em 30/12/2015, ?s 18:44, Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane escreveu: Happy New 2016 Year I wish you a lot of happiness, joy, health, success, fun, good books, films, shows, music to listen and to dance to, many travels and meeting new and exciting people; I wish for the peace in the world, goodheartedness, incredible science, technical, medical and ecological advances; and, of course, I wish you to have all your wishes fulfilled. But, most of all, I wish us to have a lot of good time together. Ana ________________________________ Ana Marjanovic-Shane anamshane@gmail.com (m) 267-334-2905 -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jan 4 06:22:36 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 06:22:36 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Attending to the shape of this actual discourse Message-ID: <568a8035.1749620a.4f528.ffffaa70@mx.google.com> David's last question if we should be focusing on the shape of the pedagogical and the shape of the ethical realms as linked but also demarcated realms I believe is worthy of its own thread . I agree that many students prefer large classes where they get to encounter a professor who is knowledgeable pass on his/her love and passion for the subject. Matter. Others resist the large group format and value the opportunity for conversation styles of mutually responsive inquiry. I am interested in exploring the medial placing of the shifting demarcation line when attending to the shape and shaping of actual discourse. David, I read your appeal to explore the shapings and placings of actual phenomenological practicesof discourse as a -topos- and as a -tropos- as a generative and generous question. I wanted to pause and hold this focus of inquiry so i have raised it up. What is the actual shape of discourse? How central is the ethical to this shaping and placing? If the ethical is encompassing of the -mutual- as a realm then is the -oikos- as a realm also central to the shape of discourse as *inhabiting* discourse? Is the shape of meaningful discourse occur as inhabiting thought meaning mutually dwelling within the shape and place of discourse? David, that you for thinking otherwise. Larry From helenaworthen@gmail.com Mon Jan 4 06:53:49 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 21:53:49 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Message-ID: David, I'll make an exception this time. :) Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 4, 2016, at 2:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > A number of discussants have made the suggestion of small groups, > tutorials, peer presentations, and so on, and this is an excellent > suggestion. But we need know?and be able to explain?exactly why it is > excellent, in what this excellence consists of, and what the limitations of > the excellence are, because we often do find that in situations like the > one which Helena is describing (situations like the ones where I have spent > the last three and a half decades teaching), when we try to introduce small > groups, tutorials, and peer presentations that we?ve only multiplied the > problems that we started with and sometimes even exacerbated them. For if > the professor has only a minimal grasp of English, and if the students find > it almost impossible to have a conversation about the topic even when the > professor is prompting them, we have to ask what the effect of removing or > sidelining or backgrounding the professor will be. Many students feel?and > the evidence is that they are not entirely wrong?that the effect is to > remove or to background the only source of English and the main source of > conceptual knowledge. > > The argument has to be taken seriously, for at least three reasons. First > of all, as I said, there?s a lot of evidence that shows that although the > professor undoubtedly feels a great deal of relief that his or her poor > grasp of English is no longer the centre of the student?s critical > attention, all that?s really been accomplished is to move the centre of > attention to a student who in some cases bears it even less well than the > professor did. Often the results of small groups are not noticeably better > than the results of teacher fronted classes, except in ?skills based? > classes which offer practice to learners, e.g. conversation classes, and in > the case of conceptual knowledge based classes the results are sometimes > dramatically worse. In fact, Hywel Coleman?s large scale studies in Nigeria > showed that there really wasn?t any particular advantage for small classes > over large classes, given highly motivated students (and the autodidacts > amongst us can easily see why this might be). > > Secondly, even if there were no objective evidence on the side of large > classes and against groupwork, there is an important subjective argument. > Many learners, right or wrong, feel they learn better from a professor than > from their peers, just as we sometimes feel that we learn better from our > peers than from ourselves (or our children). This subjective argument is > particularly important because I think one reason why groupwork and peer > seminar have such clout with us is that, unlike Professor Silverstein, we > are more interested in empowering our learners than merely informing them, > yet again, of the ways they are disempowered. The argument that groupwork > and peer seminars are right because they empower learners appears to be > unanswerable?but suppose the learners use this power to call for the return > of large professor led classes? The argument is, once again, unanswerable, > and I think it shows the dangers of confusing issues that are pedagogical > (and therefore social, political) with issues that are ethical (and > therefore interpersonal, moral). The personal is NOT political; they are > two very different, if linked, levels of being. > But thirdly I think the argument in favor of large classes deserves to be > taken seriously because it will help us get beneath the surface and find > out what it is about small classes that is pedagogically more effective. It > is certainly not the case that all small classes are pedagogically > effective nor is it the case that large classes never are. Is it SIMPLY an > aesthetic-political preference, that small is beautiful? Is it once again > something we all favor for the convenience of the instructor rather than > for the comfort of the student? Or is there something about the shape of > actual discourse that we should be attending to, not least because it might > be transferable to larger classes? Does this mysterious factor, having to > do with the shape of actual discourse, apply equally to so-called ?content? > subjects, where the emphasis is on what Vygotsky calls ?science concepts? > and to everyday conversation classes? > > (But...I am well over Helena's one screen limit, and I feel the cold clammy > hand of her hook on my throat....) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 10:14 AM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> Hmm, this will take me some research to check out. Thank you, Michael - >> >> However, I was given a Cross-Cultural leadership class to teach (in >> English) that drew from a syllabus placed online by an MIT professor. I >> said yes just to see what it would be like. It was a skimpy syllabus that >> relied heavily on the kind of student who would show up in a MIT class >> (multi-national and academically skilled) and the readings were mostly from >> Amazon; you got a button to click and buy. I was told that the instructor's >> lecture notes were all on line but what was actually on line was something >> he probably wrote in an hour. >> >> I had to re-write the class, of course. >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Jan 3, 2016, at 9:26 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> Hi Helena, >>> >>> There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the >> Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that is >> just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, where >> major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in >> their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of >> universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. However >> UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a second >> part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are >> locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking parts >> of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and then >> posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other >> universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual University >> is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the university >> can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning >> Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Helena Worthen >>> Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice >>> >>> Thank you, Elinami. >>> >>> H >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>> >>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Helena. >>>> Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a >>>> post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of >>>> language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has >>>> been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had >>>> settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary >>>> 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. >>>> >>>> Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound >>>> of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process >>>> does not need to be described here. >>>> >>>> Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages >>>> (Kiswahili and English). >>>> >>>> In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another >>>> strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). >>>> >>>> Kind Regards, >>>> >>>> Elinami >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> Helena, >>>>> >>>>> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a >> seminar? >>>>> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? >>>>> >>>>> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? >>>>> >>>>> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League method" >>>>> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and >>>>> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers >> face? >>>>> >>>>> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your >>>>> Vietnamese noodle soup. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Dr. Elinami Swai >>>> Senior Lecturer >>>> Associate Dean >>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >>>> Faculty of Education >>>> Open University of Tanzania >>>> P.O.Box 23409 >>>> Dar-Es-Salaam >>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >>>> Fax:022-2668759 >>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >>>> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >>>> 0230102484 >>>> ...this faith will still deliver >>>> If you live it first to last >>>> Not everything which blooms must >>>> wither. >>>> Not all that was is past >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jan 4 13:00:48 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 06:00:48 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Message-ID: Wholeheartedly do I endorse Andy's idea--that separating the language of the curriculum (the regulative register, to use a Bernsteinian term) from the language of the tutorial (the instructional register, in the Bernstein lingo) is a subversive move rather than a revolutionary one: it is designed to bring in the native language through the back door, until we are in a position to lay revolutionary hands on the regulative register itself. But I think that we may find that laying native-speaking hands on the regulative register will sometimes have the unexpected effect of transforming the native language as well. The Chinese language passed through a very interesting period in the early twentieth centruy called the May Fourth Movement when revolutionaries tried to introduce foreign political concepts with foreign sounds, so that for example "democracy" became "de-mo-ke-la-xi". Today it is the morphemes and not the phonemes we use: "min zhu zhu yi" = "people-rule-thought-ism". Needless to say it is the latter word that united China in 1989 during the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement which coincided with the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, the death of Hu Yaobang, and which culiminated in the so-called Tiananmen Massacre (a movement which the West still mistakenly associates with students, with Gorbachov's visit to Beijing, with the supposed impact of the VOA and the BBC and thus with their own shining example, showing that the West still thinks about democracy as "de-mo-ke-la-xi"). Transforming the native language is not a bad thing at all, unless of course you are a craven fundamentalist, in which case there would be a turning of backs rather than a laying on of revolutionary hands (the good thing about revolutionaries is that they are always willing to undertake a revolutionary reconstruction of their own ideas; the bad thing about them is that they sometimes want to do this first, before they have laid revolutionary hands on the environment, and the Genetic Law--we control ourselves through controlling the environment--tells us that this is contrary to nature and will not do). But this brings us back to the question of what exactly needs to change, and how. Teaching mathematics is a bit of a dodge: mathematics already has a (written) language of its own, and all we really need to do is to oralize it. Helena's task is much more daunting. And yet not completely unrelated. Since Helena has given me permission to bust the one frame rule, let me take the example I have last time; "Fracture growth rate is directly proportional to the increase in pressure on the materials." The underlying structure of this clause is just "y = f (x)", that is, "Fracture growth rate" = "increase in pressure on the materials"/n. How did we get this structure, which barely exists in Greek and Latin, and which certainly did not exist in Chaucerian English (see his "Discourse on the Astrolabe", a text that he wrote in the scientific English of the time, which is actually quite close to the sort of thing we see in discovery learning classes based on the Piagetian model. Halliday's answer to this question actually moves us AWAY from the "hands on" model of science teaching and towards the more Davydovian theoretical model of instruction. We go this structure from the work of people like Galileo and Newton, and in Newton's "Opticks" we can actually see it taking shape, as Newton gets himself a prism and does experiments (rather as Chaucer did with his astrolabe, and Galileo with his telescope) and then tries to write them up. He finds that he needs words to describe the convex quality of lenses, and so he invents the word "plumpness". This word did not stick, but the concept certainly did, and so did the other words that arose from it: "refraction", "reflection", "dispersion", etc. So perhaps one way in which small group work works is as a time machine: it allows the tutor to dialogically unpack the "matematized" terms of discourse into everyday speech, e.g. Tutor: Look at this. "Fracture growth rate". What is it? Is it a fracture? Is it a growth? Or is it a rate? Ss: ... T: Right. What kind of rate? Is it fracture rate or growth rate? S:... T: Good. But growth rate of what? S:... T: You got it. Now, what would your mother say about this, if you were eating crackers and making a mess? She might say this: The cracker cracks are growing fast? Or slow? Of course the other terms can be unpacked in the same way, until these "yes/no" questions and "why" questions eventually give rise to questions like "Why does the fracture growth rate increase/decrease in circumstance X?" Let me make two points about this kind of unpacking and then I'll shut up. The first is Andy's: it can and should be done in the native language, not least because when we do this in the native language we may find ourselves setting new standards in native language teaching as well. But the second is that for precisely that reason, I don't think it depends on small groups, peer tutorials, and the kinds of classroom interaction patterns that have become historically associated with it in the West for historically specific reasons, some of which have more to do with bourgeois individualism than with pedagogical efficiency). David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 11:53 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > David, I'll make an exception this time. > > :) > > Helena > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jan 4, 2016, at 2:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > A number of discussants have made the suggestion of small groups, > > tutorials, peer presentations, and so on, and this is an excellent > > suggestion. But we need know?and be able to explain?exactly why it is > > excellent, in what this excellence consists of, and what the limitations > of > > the excellence are, because we often do find that in situations like the > > one which Helena is describing (situations like the ones where I have > spent > > the last three and a half decades teaching), when we try to introduce > small > > groups, tutorials, and peer presentations that we?ve only multiplied the > > problems that we started with and sometimes even exacerbated them. For if > > the professor has only a minimal grasp of English, and if the students > find > > it almost impossible to have a conversation about the topic even when the > > professor is prompting them, we have to ask what the effect of removing > or > > sidelining or backgrounding the professor will be. Many students feel?and > > the evidence is that they are not entirely wrong?that the effect is to > > remove or to background the only source of English and the main source of > > conceptual knowledge. > > > > The argument has to be taken seriously, for at least three reasons. First > > of all, as I said, there?s a lot of evidence that shows that although the > > professor undoubtedly feels a great deal of relief that his or her poor > > grasp of English is no longer the centre of the student?s critical > > attention, all that?s really been accomplished is to move the centre of > > attention to a student who in some cases bears it even less well than the > > professor did. Often the results of small groups are not noticeably > better > > than the results of teacher fronted classes, except in ?skills based? > > classes which offer practice to learners, e.g. conversation classes, and > in > > the case of conceptual knowledge based classes the results are sometimes > > dramatically worse. In fact, Hywel Coleman?s large scale studies in > Nigeria > > showed that there really wasn?t any particular advantage for small > classes > > over large classes, given highly motivated students (and the autodidacts > > amongst us can easily see why this might be). > > > > Secondly, even if there were no objective evidence on the side of large > > classes and against groupwork, there is an important subjective argument. > > Many learners, right or wrong, feel they learn better from a professor > than > > from their peers, just as we sometimes feel that we learn better from our > > peers than from ourselves (or our children). This subjective argument is > > particularly important because I think one reason why groupwork and peer > > seminar have such clout with us is that, unlike Professor Silverstein, we > > are more interested in empowering our learners than merely informing > them, > > yet again, of the ways they are disempowered. The argument that groupwork > > and peer seminars are right because they empower learners appears to be > > unanswerable?but suppose the learners use this power to call for the > return > > of large professor led classes? The argument is, once again, > unanswerable, > > and I think it shows the dangers of confusing issues that are pedagogical > > (and therefore social, political) with issues that are ethical (and > > therefore interpersonal, moral). The personal is NOT political; they are > > two very different, if linked, levels of being. > > But thirdly I think the argument in favor of large classes deserves to be > > taken seriously because it will help us get beneath the surface and find > > out what it is about small classes that is pedagogically more effective. > It > > is certainly not the case that all small classes are pedagogically > > effective nor is it the case that large classes never are. Is it SIMPLY > an > > aesthetic-political preference, that small is beautiful? Is it once again > > something we all favor for the convenience of the instructor rather than > > for the comfort of the student? Or is there something about the shape of > > actual discourse that we should be attending to, not least because it > might > > be transferable to larger classes? Does this mysterious factor, having to > > do with the shape of actual discourse, apply equally to so-called > ?content? > > subjects, where the emphasis is on what Vygotsky calls ?science concepts? > > and to everyday conversation classes? > > > > (But...I am well over Helena's one screen limit, and I feel the cold > clammy > > hand of her hook on my throat....) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 10:14 AM, Helena Worthen > > > wrote: > > > >> Hmm, this will take me some research to check out. Thank you, Michael - > >> > >> However, I was given a Cross-Cultural leadership class to teach (in > >> English) that drew from a syllabus placed online by an MIT professor. I > >> said yes just to see what it would be like. It was a skimpy syllabus > that > >> relied heavily on the kind of student who would show up in a MIT class > >> (multi-national and academically skilled) and the readings were mostly > from > >> Amazon; you got a button to click and buy. I was told that the > instructor's > >> lecture notes were all on line but what was actually on line was > something > >> he probably wrote in an hour. > >> > >> I had to re-write the class, of course. > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >> > >> On Jan 3, 2016, at 9:26 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >>> Hi Helena, > >>> > >>> There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the > >> Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that > is > >> just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, > where > >> major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in > >> their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of > >> universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. > However > >> UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a > second > >> part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are > >> locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking > parts > >> of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and > then > >> posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other > >> universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual > University > >> is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the > university > >> can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning > >> Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On > >> Behalf Of Helena Worthen > >>> Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice > >>> > >>> Thank you, Elinami. > >>> > >>> H > >>> > >>> Helena Worthen > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >>> > >>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: > >>> > >>>> Dear Helena. > >>>> Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a > >>>> post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of > >>>> language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has > >>>> been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had > >>>> settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary > >>>> 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. > >>>> > >>>> Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound > >>>> of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process > >>>> does not need to be described here. > >>>> > >>>> Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages > >>>> (Kiswahili and English). > >>>> > >>>> In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another > >>>> strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). > >>>> > >>>> Kind Regards, > >>>> > >>>> Elinami > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>>>> Helena, > >>>>> > >>>>> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a > >> seminar? > >>>>> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? > >>>>> > >>>>> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? > >>>>> > >>>>> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League > method" > >>>>> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and > >>>>> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers > >> face? > >>>>> > >>>>> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your > >>>>> Vietnamese noodle soup. > >>>>> > >>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>> > >>>>> Annalisa > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Dr. Elinami Swai > >>>> Senior Lecturer > >>>> Associate Dean > >>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > >>>> Faculty of Education > >>>> Open University of Tanzania > >>>> P.O.Box 23409 > >>>> Dar-Es-Salaam > >>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > >>>> Fax:022-2668759 > >>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > >>>> > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > >>>> 0230102484 > >>>> ...this faith will still deliver > >>>> If you live it first to last > >>>> Not everything which blooms must > >>>> wither. > >>>> Not all that was is past > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jan 4 14:59:58 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 15:59:58 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helen, I love that you asked for advice and have gotten such good stuff from the chatters. I have, what I think, might be something worth thinking about, maybe not. Maybe it?s already been raised and I just missed it. I have had a thought about contrasting pedagogies and that is the different personalities of the both students and teachers. Is there any chance that some students and some teachers prefer one approach and other students and teachers another? Alternatively, that some students and some teachers learn more and teach better using one approach, others by using another approach. Perhaps some amount of preference and choice? I am sure the emphasis on differences across cultures is well taken, but even those differences might be open to reflection and conjecture, just as differences of a more personal nature. At the very least, addressing these issues openly might help prepare your students, teachers and bureaucrats for the inevitable changes that will take place over time in how EFL in Vietnam will be taught. Could this discussion be part of curriculum development? Henry > On Jan 4, 2016, at 2:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Wholeheartedly do I endorse Andy's idea--that separating the language of > the curriculum (the regulative register, to use a Bernsteinian term) from > the language of the tutorial (the instructional register, in the Bernstein > lingo) is a subversive move rather than a revolutionary one: it is designed > to bring in the native language through the back door, until we are in a > position to lay revolutionary hands on the regulative register itself. But > I think that we may find that laying native-speaking hands on the > regulative register will sometimes have the unexpected effect of > transforming the native language as well. > > The Chinese language passed through a very interesting period in the early > twentieth centruy called the May Fourth Movement when revolutionaries tried > to introduce foreign political concepts with foreign sounds, so that for > example "democracy" became "de-mo-ke-la-xi". Today it is the morphemes and > not the phonemes we use: "min zhu zhu yi" = "people-rule-thought-ism". > Needless to say it is the latter word that united China in 1989 during the > 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement which coincided with the 200th > anniversary of the French Revolution, the death of Hu Yaobang, and which > culiminated in the so-called Tiananmen Massacre (a movement which the West > still mistakenly associates with students, with Gorbachov's visit to > Beijing, with the supposed impact of the VOA and the BBC and thus with > their own shining example, showing that the West still thinks about > democracy as "de-mo-ke-la-xi"). > > Transforming the native language is not a bad thing at all, unless of > course you are a craven fundamentalist, in which case there would be a > turning of backs rather than a laying on of revolutionary hands (the good > thing about revolutionaries is that they are always willing to undertake a > revolutionary reconstruction of their own ideas; the bad thing about them > is that they sometimes want to do this first, before they have laid > revolutionary hands on the environment, and the Genetic Law--we control > ourselves through controlling the environment--tells us that this is > contrary to nature and will not do). But this brings us back to the > question of what exactly needs to change, and how. Teaching mathematics is > a bit of a dodge: mathematics already has a (written) language of its own, > and all we really need to do is to oralize it. Helena's task is much more > daunting. > > And yet not completely unrelated. Since Helena has given me permission to > bust the one frame rule, let me take the example I have last time; > "Fracture growth rate is directly proportional to the increase in pressure > on the materials." The underlying structure of this clause is just "y = f > (x)", that is, "Fracture growth rate" = "increase in pressure on the > materials"/n. How did we get this structure, which barely exists in Greek > and Latin, and which certainly did not exist in Chaucerian English (see his > "Discourse on the Astrolabe", a text that he wrote in the scientific > English of the time, which is actually quite close to the sort of thing we > see in discovery learning classes based on the Piagetian model. Halliday's > answer to this question actually moves us AWAY from the "hands on" model of > science teaching and towards the more Davydovian theoretical model of > instruction. > > We go this structure from the work of people like Galileo and Newton, and > in Newton's "Opticks" we can actually see it taking shape, as Newton gets > himself a prism and does experiments (rather as Chaucer did with his > astrolabe, and Galileo with his telescope) and then tries to write them up. > He finds that he needs words to describe the convex quality of lenses, and > so he invents the word "plumpness". This word did not stick, but the > concept certainly did, and so did the other words that arose from it: > "refraction", "reflection", "dispersion", etc. > > So perhaps one way in which small group work works is as a time machine: it > allows the tutor to dialogically unpack the "matematized" terms of > discourse into everyday speech, e.g. > > Tutor: Look at this. "Fracture growth rate". What is it? Is it a fracture? > Is it a growth? Or is it a rate? > Ss: ... > T: Right. What kind of rate? Is it fracture rate or growth rate? > S:... > T: Good. But growth rate of what? > S:... > T: You got it. Now, what would your mother say about this, if you were > eating crackers and making a mess? She might say this: The cracker cracks > are growing fast? Or slow? > > Of course the other terms can be unpacked in the same way, until these > "yes/no" questions and "why" questions eventually give rise to questions > like "Why does the fracture growth rate increase/decrease in circumstance > X?" > > Let me make two points about this kind of unpacking and then I'll shut up. > The first is Andy's: it can and should be done in the native language, not > least because when we do this in the native language we may find ourselves > setting new standards in native language teaching as well. But the second > is that for precisely that reason, I don't think it depends on small > groups, peer tutorials, and the kinds of classroom interaction patterns > that have become historically associated with it in the West > for historically specific reasons, some of which have more to do > with bourgeois individualism than with pedagogical efficiency). > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 11:53 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> David, I'll make an exception this time. >> >> :) >> >> Helena >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Jan 4, 2016, at 2:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> A number of discussants have made the suggestion of small groups, >>> tutorials, peer presentations, and so on, and this is an excellent >>> suggestion. But we need know?and be able to explain?exactly why it is >>> excellent, in what this excellence consists of, and what the limitations >> of >>> the excellence are, because we often do find that in situations like the >>> one which Helena is describing (situations like the ones where I have >> spent >>> the last three and a half decades teaching), when we try to introduce >> small >>> groups, tutorials, and peer presentations that we?ve only multiplied the >>> problems that we started with and sometimes even exacerbated them. For if >>> the professor has only a minimal grasp of English, and if the students >> find >>> it almost impossible to have a conversation about the topic even when the >>> professor is prompting them, we have to ask what the effect of removing >> or >>> sidelining or backgrounding the professor will be. Many students feel?and >>> the evidence is that they are not entirely wrong?that the effect is to >>> remove or to background the only source of English and the main source of >>> conceptual knowledge. >>> >>> The argument has to be taken seriously, for at least three reasons. First >>> of all, as I said, there?s a lot of evidence that shows that although the >>> professor undoubtedly feels a great deal of relief that his or her poor >>> grasp of English is no longer the centre of the student?s critical >>> attention, all that?s really been accomplished is to move the centre of >>> attention to a student who in some cases bears it even less well than the >>> professor did. Often the results of small groups are not noticeably >> better >>> than the results of teacher fronted classes, except in ?skills based? >>> classes which offer practice to learners, e.g. conversation classes, and >> in >>> the case of conceptual knowledge based classes the results are sometimes >>> dramatically worse. In fact, Hywel Coleman?s large scale studies in >> Nigeria >>> showed that there really wasn?t any particular advantage for small >> classes >>> over large classes, given highly motivated students (and the autodidacts >>> amongst us can easily see why this might be). >>> >>> Secondly, even if there were no objective evidence on the side of large >>> classes and against groupwork, there is an important subjective argument. >>> Many learners, right or wrong, feel they learn better from a professor >> than >>> from their peers, just as we sometimes feel that we learn better from our >>> peers than from ourselves (or our children). This subjective argument is >>> particularly important because I think one reason why groupwork and peer >>> seminar have such clout with us is that, unlike Professor Silverstein, we >>> are more interested in empowering our learners than merely informing >> them, >>> yet again, of the ways they are disempowered. The argument that groupwork >>> and peer seminars are right because they empower learners appears to be >>> unanswerable?but suppose the learners use this power to call for the >> return >>> of large professor led classes? The argument is, once again, >> unanswerable, >>> and I think it shows the dangers of confusing issues that are pedagogical >>> (and therefore social, political) with issues that are ethical (and >>> therefore interpersonal, moral). The personal is NOT political; they are >>> two very different, if linked, levels of being. >>> But thirdly I think the argument in favor of large classes deserves to be >>> taken seriously because it will help us get beneath the surface and find >>> out what it is about small classes that is pedagogically more effective. >> It >>> is certainly not the case that all small classes are pedagogically >>> effective nor is it the case that large classes never are. Is it SIMPLY >> an >>> aesthetic-political preference, that small is beautiful? Is it once again >>> something we all favor for the convenience of the instructor rather than >>> for the comfort of the student? Or is there something about the shape of >>> actual discourse that we should be attending to, not least because it >> might >>> be transferable to larger classes? Does this mysterious factor, having to >>> do with the shape of actual discourse, apply equally to so-called >> ?content? >>> subjects, where the emphasis is on what Vygotsky calls ?science concepts? >>> and to everyday conversation classes? >>> >>> (But...I am well over Helena's one screen limit, and I feel the cold >> clammy >>> hand of her hook on my throat....) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 10:14 AM, Helena Worthen >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hmm, this will take me some research to check out. Thank you, Michael - >>>> >>>> However, I was given a Cross-Cultural leadership class to teach (in >>>> English) that drew from a syllabus placed online by an MIT professor. I >>>> said yes just to see what it would be like. It was a skimpy syllabus >> that >>>> relied heavily on the kind of student who would show up in a MIT class >>>> (multi-national and academically skilled) and the readings were mostly >> from >>>> Amazon; you got a button to click and buy. I was told that the >> instructor's >>>> lecture notes were all on line but what was actually on line was >> something >>>> he probably wrote in an hour. >>>> >>>> I had to re-write the class, of course. >>>> >>>> Helena Worthen >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>>> >>>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 9:26 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Helena, >>>>> >>>>> There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the >>>> Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that >> is >>>> just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, >> where >>>> major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in >>>> their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of >>>> universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. >> However >>>> UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a >> second >>>> part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are >>>> locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking >> parts >>>> of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and >> then >>>> posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other >>>> universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual >> University >>>> is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the >> university >>>> can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning >>>> Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> On >>>> Behalf Of Helena Worthen >>>>> Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, Elinami. >>>>> >>>>> H >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Dear Helena. >>>>>> Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a >>>>>> post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of >>>>>> language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has >>>>>> been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had >>>>>> settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary >>>>>> 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. >>>>>> >>>>>> Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound >>>>>> of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process >>>>>> does not need to be described here. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages >>>>>> (Kiswahili and English). >>>>>> >>>>>> In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another >>>>>> strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Elinami >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>>>> Helena, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a >>>> seminar? >>>>>>> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League >> method" >>>>>>> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and >>>>>>> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers >>>> face? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your >>>>>>> Vietnamese noodle soup. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai >>>>>> Senior Lecturer >>>>>> Associate Dean >>>>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >>>>>> Faculty of Education >>>>>> Open University of Tanzania >>>>>> P.O.Box 23409 >>>>>> Dar-Es-Salaam >>>>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >>>>>> Fax:022-2668759 >>>>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >>>>>> >> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >>>>>> 0230102484 >>>>>> ...this faith will still deliver >>>>>> If you live it first to last >>>>>> Not everything which blooms must >>>>>> wither. >>>>>> Not all that was is past >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Mon Jan 4 17:36:32 2016 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp) Date: Tue, 05 Jan 2016 10:36:32 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20160105013632.000061F1.0136@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Dear Helen (and others joining in this thread), >From the GST view point, there is the whole systems of universities (The Academy) throughout the world. An aspect of this whole conversation lives against this backdrop. Foregrounding of lecture style, personal style, class size draws attention away from the grand development in institutionalised education, temples, churches, literacy - China, Egypt, Spain, France, England, USA - India, Japan, Korea, Brazil, Africa (terrible how all that is Africa comes to one word - but I don't know enough about it). The choice to enter higher education is still a choice - maybe determined by class and income but talent is also respected. There are normative practices - Introductory Lectures, Core requirements, Specialty requirements. A four (to six) year course prepares young people to enter society/the work force - and some by interest and predisposition, choose to become teachers. The TA or tutor system gives opportunity to older students to manage or interact with small groups of younger students and brings these older "stake-holders" (who care about their professor, publication, and stipend) to exercise "normative" influence on the "sophomores" - especially the fiery ones who want to do something now to change things. So one sees all this happening over the course of 40 years in public and private educational systems, through experimental New Math and educational theories fed into the system from the faculties of education preparing teachers for service. This is when I plainly see Ross Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety - called the first law of cybernetics, complexity, or chaos (I've found all of them) at work. Japan, China, and Korea -as well as Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, are vying for better economies, educational systems, influence - and is India, USA, Canada - seeking out the best of the best and whisking them away to think tanks and laboratories with scholarships and funding in well equipped labs - while others stay near home, their families, and attempt to make for their own family, their children, a better life. And spend their money on cell phones, iPads, android connectivity. I've already used up my space, but my experience in Japan is all about me being a "native speaker of English" with a PhD, and nothing about Medieval or Classical Literature (what I studied). But being a career language teacher, well, some students show up and stick around and develop higher level abilities without having to go to another country, some students do take study abroad options. Universities expand possibilities, while parents have to pay, and some students get *here* ( Japan) and have to work with low pay to live and share digs with several people - we can see it happening, it's been happening all along. And now Vietnam wants to do a "bootstrap" operation to vault to a higher level - and the selection processes are intense, but all the while, there are individuals seeking their own level, seeking to go as far as they can, wanting nothing better than to be in their hometown and start a business ... I The conclusion (there is no real conclusion) is a thought that every conversation Helena has, every chance she has to present her ideas in visual, iconic, keyword form, transmitting essential information not only in the material, but her stance, the way she breathes and the resonance of her voice, and the way she works with whatever persons assist her will have a profound impact on those around her, no matter what! I myself am in awe of the wealth of perspective, array of practical ideas, the awareness of the darkness behind it all - or the good potential for growth and change. Thank you. ----- Original Message ----- > Helen, > I love that you asked for advice and have gotten such good stuff from the chatters. I have, what I think, might be something worth thinking about, maybe not. Maybe it?s already been raised and I just missed it. > > I have had a thought about contrasting pedagogies and that is the different personalities of the both students and teachers. Is there any chance that some students and some teachers prefer one approach and other students and teachers another? Alternatively, that some students and some teachers learn more and teach better using one approach, others by using another approach. Perhaps some amount of preference and choice? I am sure the emphasis on differences across cultures is well taken, but even those differences might be open to reflection and conjecture, just as differences of a more personal nature. At the very least, addressing these issues openly might help prepare your students, teachers and bureaucrats for the inevitable changes that will take place over time in how EFL in Vietnam will be taught. Could this discussion be part of curriculum development? > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 4, 2016, at 2:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Wholeheartedly do I endorse Andy's idea--that separating the language of > > the curriculum (the regulative register, to use a Bernsteinian term) from > > the language of the tutorial (the instructional register, in the Bernstein > > lingo) is a subversive move rather than a revolutionary one: it is designed > > to bring in the native language through the back door, until we are in a > > position to lay revolutionary hands on the regulative register itself. But > > I think that we may find that laying native-speaking hands on the > > regulative register will sometimes have the unexpected effect of > > transforming the native language as well. > > > > The Chinese language passed through a very interesting period in the early > > twentieth centruy called the May Fourth Movement when revolutionaries tried > > to introduce foreign political concepts with foreign sounds, so that for > > example "democracy" became "de-mo-ke-la-xi". Today it is the morphemes and > > not the phonemes we use: "min zhu zhu yi" = "people-rule-thought-ism ". > > Needless to say it is the latter word that united China in 1989 during the > > 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement which coincided with the 200th > > anniversary of the French Revolution, the death of Hu Yaobang, and which > > culiminated in the so-called Tiananmen Massacre (a movement which the West > > still mistakenly associates with students, with Gorbachov's visit to > > Beijing, with the supposed impact of the VOA and the BBC and thus with > > their own shining example, showing that the West still thinks about > > democracy as "de-mo-ke-la-xi"). > > > > Transforming the native language is not a bad thing at all, unless of > > course you are a craven fundamentalist, in which case there would be a > > turning of backs rather than a laying on of revolutionary hands (the good > > thing about revolutionaries is that they are always willing to undertake a > > revolutionary reconstruction of their own ideas; the bad thing about them > > is that they sometimes want to do this first, before they have laid > > revolutionary hands on the environment, and the Genetic Law--we control > > ourselves through controlling the environment--tells us that this is > > contrary to nature and will not do). But this brings us back to the > > question of what exactly needs to change, and how. Teaching mathematics is > > a bit of a dodge: mathematics already has a (written) language of its own, > > and all we really need to do is to oralize it. Helena's task is much more > > daunting. > > > > And yet not completely unrelated. Since Helena has given me permission to > > bust the one frame rule, let me take the example I have last time; > > "Fracture growth rate is directly proportional to the increase in pressure > > on the materials." The underlying structure of this clause is just "y = f > > (x)", that is, "Fracture growth rate" = "increase in pressure on the > > materials"/n. How did we get this structure, which barely exists in Greek > > and Latin, and which certainly did not exist in Chaucerian English ( see his > > "Discourse on the Astrolabe", a text that he wrote in the scientific > > English of the time, which is actually quite close to the sort of thing we > > see in discovery learning classes based on the Piagetian model. Halliday's > > answer to this question actually moves us AWAY from the "hands on" model of > > science teaching and towards the more Davydovian theoretical model of > > instruction. > > > > We go this structure from the work of people like Galileo and Newton, and > > in Newton's "Opticks" we can actually see it taking shape, as Newton gets > > himself a prism and does experiments (rather as Chaucer did with his > > astrolabe, and Galileo with his telescope) and then tries to write them up. > > He finds that he needs words to describe the convex quality of lenses, and > > so he invents the word "plumpness". This word did not stick, but the > > concept certainly did, and so did the other words that arose from it: > > "refraction", "reflection", "dispersion", etc. > > > > So perhaps one way in which small group work works is as a time machine: it > > allows the tutor to dialogically unpack the "matematized" terms of > > discourse into everyday speech, e.g. > > > > Tutor: Look at this. "Fracture growth rate". What is it? Is it a fracture? > > Is it a growth? Or is it a rate? > > Ss: ... > > T: Right. What kind of rate? Is it fracture rate or growth rate? > > S:... > > T: Good. But growth rate of what? > > S:... > > T: You got it. Now, what would your mother say about this, if you were > > eating crackers and making a mess? She might say this: The cracker cracks > > are growing fast? Or slow? > > > > Of course the other terms can be unpacked in the same way, until these > > "yes/no" questions and "why" questions eventually give rise to questions > > like "Why does the fracture growth rate increase/decrease in circumstance > > X?" > > > > Let me make two points about this kind of unpacking and then I'll shut up. > > The first is Andy's: it can and should be done in the native language, not > > least because when we do this in the native language we may find ourselves > > setting new standards in native language teaching as well. But the second > > is that for precisely that reason, I don't think it depends on small > > groups, peer tutorials, and the kinds of classroom interaction patterns > > that have become historically associated with it in the West > > for historically specific reasons, some of which have more to do > > with bourgeois individualism than with pedagogical efficiency). > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 11:53 PM, Helena Worthen > > wrote: > > > >> David, I'll make an exception this time. > >> > >> :) > >> > >> Helena > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >> > >> On Jan 4, 2016, at 2:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> A number of discussants have made the suggestion of small groups, > >>> tutorials, peer presentations, and so on, and this is an excellent > >>> suggestion. But we need know?and be able to explain?exactly why it is > >>> excellent, in what this excellence consists of, and what the limitations > >> of > >>> the excellence are, because we often do find that in situations like the > >>> one which Helena is describing (situations like the ones where I have > >> spent > >>> the last three and a half decades teaching), when we try to introduce > >> small > >>> groups, tutorials, and peer presentations that we?ve only multiplied the > >>> problems that we started with and sometimes even exacerbated them. For if > >>> the professor has only a minimal grasp of English, and if the students > >> find > >>> it almost impossible to have a conversation about the topic even when the > >>> professor is prompting them, we have to ask what the effect of removing > >> or > >>> sidelining or backgrounding the professor will be. Many students feel?and > >>> the evidence is that they are not entirely wrong?that the effect is to > >>> remove or to background the only source of English and the main source of > >>> conceptual knowledge. > >>> > >>> The argument has to be taken seriously, for at least three reasons. First > >>> of all, as I said, there?s a lot of evidence that shows that although the > >>> professor undoubtedly feels a great deal of relief that his or her poor > >>> grasp of English is no longer the centre of the student?s critical > >>> attention, all that?s really been accomplished is to move the centre of > >>> attention to a student who in some cases bears it even less well than the > >>> professor did. Often the results of small groups are not noticeably > >> better > >>> than the results of teacher fronted classes, except in ?skills based? > >>> classes which offer practice to learners, e.g. conversation classes, and > >> in > >>> the case of conceptual knowledge based classes the results are sometimes > >>> dramatically worse. In fact, Hywel Coleman?s large scale studies in > >> Nigeria > >>> showed that there really wasn?t any particular advantage for small > >> classes > >>> over large classes, given highly motivated students (and the autodidacts > >>> amongst us can easily see why this might be). > >>> > >>> Secondly, even if there were no objective evidence on the side of large > >>> classes and against groupwork, there is an important subjective argument. > >>> Many learners, right or wrong, feel they learn better from a professor > >> than > >>> from their peers, just as we sometimes feel that we learn better from our > >>> peers than from ourselves (or our children). This subjective argument is > >>> particularly important because I think one reason why groupwork and peer > >>> seminar have such clout with us is that, unlike Professor Silverstein, we > >>> are more interested in empowering our learners than merely informing > >> them, > >>> yet again, of the ways they are disempowered. The argument that groupwork > >>> and peer seminars are right because they empower learners appears to be > >>> unanswerable?but suppose the learners use this power to call for the > >> return > >>> of large professor led classes? The argument is, once again, > >> unanswerable, > >>> and I think it shows the dangers of confusing issues that are pedagogical > >>> (and therefore social, political) with issues that are ethical ( and > >>> therefore interpersonal, moral). The personal is NOT political; they are > >>> two very different, if linked, levels of being. > >>> But thirdly I think the argument in favor of large classes deserves to be > >>> taken seriously because it will help us get beneath the surface and find > >>> out what it is about small classes that is pedagogically more effective. > >> It > >>> is certainly not the case that all small classes are pedagogically > >>> effective nor is it the case that large classes never are. Is it SIMPLY > >> an > >>> aesthetic-political preference, that small is beautiful? Is it once again > >>> something we all favor for the convenience of the instructor rather than > >>> for the comfort of the student? Or is there something about the shape of > >>> actual discourse that we should be attending to, not least because it > >> might > >>> be transferable to larger classes? Does this mysterious factor, having to > >>> do with the shape of actual discourse, apply equally to so-called > >> ?content? > >>> subjects, where the emphasis is on what Vygotsky calls ?science concepts? > >>> and to everyday conversation classes? > >>> > >>> (But...I am well over Helena's one screen limit, and I feel the cold > >> clammy > >>> hand of her hook on my throat....) > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 10:14 AM, Helena Worthen >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hmm, this will take me some research to check out. Thank you, Michael - > >>>> > >>>> However, I was given a Cross-Cultural leadership class to teach ( in > >>>> English) that drew from a syllabus placed online by an MIT professor. I > >>>> said yes just to see what it would be like. It was a skimpy syllabus > >> that > >>>> relied heavily on the kind of student who would show up in a MIT class > >>>> (multi-national and academically skilled) and the readings were mostly > >> from > >>>> Amazon; you got a button to click and buy. I was told that the > >> instructor's > >>>> lecture notes were all on line but what was actually on line was > >> something > >>>> he probably wrote in an hour. > >>>> > >>>> I had to re-write the class, of course. > >>>> > >>>> Helena Worthen > >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >>>> > >>>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 9:26 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Helena, > >>>>> > >>>>> There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the > >>>> Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that > >> is > >>>> just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, > >> where > >>>> major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in > >>>> their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of > >>>> universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. > >> However > >>>> UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a > >> second > >>>> part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are > >>>> locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking > >> parts > >>>> of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and > >> then > >>>> posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other > >>>> universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual > >> University > >>>> is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the > >> university > >>>> can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning > >>>> Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael > >>>>> > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd. edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd. edu] > >> On > >>>> Behalf Of Helena Worthen > >>>>> Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice > >>>>> > >>>>> Thank you, Elinami. > >>>>> > >>>>> H > >>>>> > >>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >>>>> > >>>>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Dear Helena. > >>>>>> Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a > >>>>>> post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of > >>>>>> language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has > >>>>>> been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had > >>>>>> settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level ( primary > >>>>>> 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound > >>>>>> of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process > >>>>>> does not need to be described here. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages > >>>>>> (Kiswahili and English). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another > >>>>>> strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Kind Regards, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Elinami > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>>>>>> Helena, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a > >>>> seminar? > >>>>>>> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy- League > >> method" > >>>>>>> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and > >>>>>>> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers > >>>> face? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your > >>>>>>> Vietnamese noodle soup. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai > >>>>>> Senior Lecturer > >>>>>> Associate Dean > >>>>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > >>>>>> Faculty of Education > >>>>>> Open University of Tanzania > >>>>>> P.O.Box 23409 > >>>>>> Dar-Es-Salaam > >>>>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > >>>>>> Fax:022-2668759 > >>>>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > >>>>>> > >> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > >>>>>> 0230102484 > >>>>>> ...this faith will still deliver > >>>>>> If you live it first to last > >>>>>> Not everything which blooms must > >>>>>> wither. > >>>>>> Not all that was is past > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Jan 4 23:09:21 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 09:09:21 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Helena I have been reading the thread with great interest, and feel that everybody has made a valuable point. I would partly want to draw together some of the threads. This is especially in the light of my experience of 33 years in language ed in South Africa. You have 20 years to achieve your goal there. Is it possible to conceptualise it in bite-sized chunks, says every five years review and target setting? Otherwise I feel it's "you can't get there from here" impossible task. There are political elements to the task too. I have recently give an address here in South Africa, in which I said, if you want to learn English, learn your home language good and thoroughly. Unless you flesh out your own linguistic competence in developing the academic aspects of Vietnamese, where naturally there are many non-cognate words, then your academic thoughts are going to land on barren ground and not take root. This means formal and informal corpus planning in Vietnamese: the formal part could be a dictionary unit (or two) to develop secondary and tertiary level terminology. The informal part will come in the tutorials, where the students, at least for a decade, should be allowed to code-switch, but always start with a topic in Vietnamese. The question arises - in what way do you want to be in the top 100 schools? Are you emulating US schools? In which case do you want to become more American? I have in mind that you should become more *yourselves* - what is it about Vietnamese culture that you value and can capitalise on? I have great respect for Japanese education and their respectful attitude towards both teachers and students, and towards the curriculum process. (Having said this, I am aware of local parents here who want their children to learn through the medium of English in Grade 1 - so they can go overseas to university!!) What is it about Vietnamese life that is worth preserving and developing? Otherwise, in mimicking other cultures, where you only sense the surface structure of these, you might land up with a very shallow alternative. Ivy league classes deal with difficult concepts quickly and effectively, but remember the learning and social histories of the students are very specific. The fact that there are large libraries is no more important that there are large libraries at the high schools and the students' home too. There is a specific learning culture there too. Even the local classroom pedagogies should be closely observed, and see which students can be carried for a while, as they developing their expressive competence. Even if you can't talk at the beginning, you may end by talking very well. But the teaching methds alone, which are being urged on you, are never going to solve the "problem": it's much, much deeper, and more interesting than that! As usual my contribution comes in words of one syllable - so perhaps I should have replied off-list, as I promised. Good luck. Carol On 3 January 2016 at 02:42, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hello, > > I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is > all the rage. > > In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by > 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. > > This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such > as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities > (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and > textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to > teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for > reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. > > The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to > working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class > size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- > unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's > the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. > > So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching > methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 > universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, > Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these > institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working > conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of > it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small > class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete > and talk about methods. > > I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching > in English when your English is not great. > > Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they > mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early > 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting > pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they > don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the > right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door > to the global world and they know it. > > I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts > that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate > across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is > probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? > > I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can > someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be > able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest > they hook me off the stage. > > Thanks in advance, > > Helena > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* From bluetanso@googlemail.com Mon Jan 4 23:20:27 2016 From: bluetanso@googlemail.com (Hugh O'Donnell) Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 07:20:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Digital game-based learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greetings, Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based learning: http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action research. Kind Regards, Hugh O'Donnell http://bluetanso.WordPress.com Twitter: @bluetanso From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Jan 5 00:49:13 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 15:49:13 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: <9C482358-5472-4C85-93FB-9D3DD05FC90D@gmail.com> Thank you, Carol. I am presently trying to compile these into a form that I can give to our Dean who will pass it along to the committee that decides whether it should be disseminated or not. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 5, 2016, at 2:09 PM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Hi Helena > > I have been reading the thread with great interest, and feel that everybody > has made a valuable point. I would partly want to draw together some of the > threads. This is especially in the light of my experience of 33 years in > language ed in South Africa. > > You have 20 years to achieve your goal there. Is it possible to > conceptualise it in bite-sized chunks, says every five years review and > target setting? Otherwise I feel it's "you can't get there from here" > impossible task. > > There are political elements to the task too. I have recently give an > address here in South Africa, in which I said, if you want to learn > English, learn your home language good and thoroughly. Unless you flesh out > your own linguistic competence in developing the academic aspects of > Vietnamese, where naturally there are many non-cognate words, then your > academic thoughts are going to land on barren ground and not take root. > > This means formal and informal corpus planning in Vietnamese: the formal > part could be a dictionary unit (or two) to develop secondary and tertiary > level terminology. The informal part will come in the tutorials, where the > students, at least for a decade, should be allowed to code-switch, but > always start with a topic in Vietnamese. > > The question arises - in what way do you want to be in the top 100 > schools? Are you emulating US schools? In which case do you want to become > more American? I have in mind that you should become more *yourselves* - > what is it about Vietnamese culture that you value and can capitalise on? I > have great respect for Japanese education and their respectful attitude > towards both teachers and students, and towards the curriculum process. > (Having said this, I am aware of local parents here who want their children > to learn through the medium of English in Grade 1 - so they can go overseas > to university!!) > > What is it about Vietnamese life that is worth preserving and developing? > Otherwise, in mimicking other cultures, where you only sense the surface > structure of these, you might land up with a very shallow alternative. Ivy > league classes deal with difficult concepts quickly and effectively, but > remember the learning and social histories of the students are very > specific. The fact that there are large libraries is no more important that > there are large libraries at the high schools and the students' home too. > There is a specific learning culture there too. > > Even the local classroom pedagogies should be closely observed, and see > which students can be carried for a while, as they developing their > expressive competence. Even if you can't talk at the beginning, you may end > by talking very well. But the teaching methds alone, which are being urged > on you, are never going to solve the "problem": it's much, much deeper, and > more interesting than that! > > As usual my contribution comes in words of one syllable - so perhaps I > should have replied off-list, as I promised. Good luck. > > Carol > > On 3 January 2016 at 02:42, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is >> all the rage. >> >> In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by >> 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. >> >> This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such >> as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities >> (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and >> textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to >> teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for >> reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. >> >> The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to >> working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class >> size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- >> unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's >> the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. >> >> So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching >> methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 >> universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, >> Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these >> institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working >> conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of >> it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small >> class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete >> and talk about methods. >> >> I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching >> in English when your English is not great. >> >> Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they >> mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early >> 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting >> pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they >> don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the >> right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door >> to the global world and they know it. >> >> I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts >> that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate >> across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is >> probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? >> >> I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can >> someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be >> able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest >> they hook me off the stage. >> >> Thanks in advance, >> >> Helena >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Jan 5 11:38:18 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 19:38:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <9C482358-5472-4C85-93FB-9D3DD05FC90D@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> , <9C482358-5472-4C85-93FB-9D3DD05FC90D@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi, If I might pipe up again, I think Carol has synthesized things nicely here! What emerges for me from what Carol said about surfaces is this...and is perhaps restating what she said (or what she implied): Do the Vietnamese desire to copy the model of the "ideal of the Ivy League" because they want to replicate the surface features present, as evidence that they too will be a "quality school" in 20 years' time? OR do they want to adopt and embody the underlying processes present by which these features emerged so that their school culminates in a "quality school" ? It seems to me if they value their own culture (which they must), it would have to be the latter and not the former, because the former would be only a simulacra and by creating a simulacra they would by default give up on their own culture, or at least whatever they value about their own culture, by supplanting *a notion* of quality rather than quality itself. By adopting instead processes of quality (over surface features), they would create quality as derived intrinsic to Vietnamese culture, because they will use processes identified as "universally" qualified for manifesting a quality school (in 20 years time). But then having a feature of many libraries (in the high school, in the university, and in the home) is borne of the process of building a library collection (and Constitution that safeguards free speech and privacy, supposedly), and providing bookshelves and tables and chairs large enough (and sturdy enough) to hold all that thinking captured in books! Of course now that so much is digital, what would a library look like in 20 years in Vietnam? Would they just have lots of bean bag chairs? and tablets (instead of tables)? and headphones with mics? Remember that 70s TV show Love American Style? I thought of that too. But in this case: Ivy League University Vietnamese Style. :) Kind regards, Annalisa From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Jan 5 16:11:15 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 07:11:15 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> , <9C482358-5472-4C85-93FB-9D3DD05FC90D@gmail.com> Message-ID: <50D74739-1214-44EE-A8FA-62AFB16AD44C@gmail.com> Hi - I"m in the midst of compiling responses to my request and therefore haven't responded on list. There have been a number of comments that suggest that in emulating Top 100 universities in their textbooks, syllabi and language (English) lies a risk of losing Vietnamese culture. I don't think this is what's going on. This project, with its short deadline, centralized leadership, urgency and seemingly enthusiastic if nervous commitment on the part of the very young faculty, is in itself very Vietnamese. People aren't semi-committed or reluctant. Maybe I'm imagining this, and I've only been here 5 months and don't speak Vietnamese. The shift to a market economy has released, as expected, enormous amounts of energy; everyone is selling something, and so far, it's working for a lot of people. This excitement IS Vietnamese. As an American, I keep saying to myself, "This is how they won the war." Not just one war, either! Although the rivers are filthy, the air (in the city) is toxic and leaves a dust of particulate on your tongue, and the "library" has almost no books. But they're building a new whole library building as we speak. They work 7 days a week, dawn to dark. I think the risk in emulating Top 100 universities and requiring everyone (even the "guards" and the cleaners) to speak English too early is that people will create a local blend of Vietnamese and English which will not be intelligible beyond Vietnam. Any thoughts on that? I'm trying to express the reasons for teaching bi-lingually in words that will not offend anyone and will get heard. Thanks to all of you who have responded. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 6, 2016, at 2:38 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi, > > If I might pipe up again, I think Carol has synthesized things nicely here! > > What emerges for me from what Carol said about surfaces is this...and is perhaps restating what she said (or what she implied): > > Do the Vietnamese desire to copy the model of the "ideal of the Ivy League" because they want to replicate the surface features present, as evidence that they too will be a "quality school" in 20 years' time? OR do they want to adopt and embody the underlying processes present by which these features emerged so that their school culminates in a "quality school" ? > > It seems to me if they value their own culture (which they must), it would have to be the latter and not the former, because the former would be only a simulacra and by creating a simulacra they would by default give up on their own culture, or at least whatever they value about their own culture, by supplanting *a notion* of quality rather than quality itself. By adopting instead processes of quality (over surface features), they would create quality as derived intrinsic to Vietnamese culture, because they will use processes identified as "universally" qualified for manifesting a quality school (in 20 years time). > > But then having a feature of many libraries (in the high school, in the university, and in the home) is borne of the process of building a library collection (and Constitution that safeguards free speech and privacy, supposedly), and providing bookshelves and tables and chairs large enough (and sturdy enough) to hold all that thinking captured in books! > > Of course now that so much is digital, what would a library look like in 20 years in Vietnam? > > Would they just have lots of bean bag chairs? and tablets (instead of tables)? and headphones with mics? > > Remember that 70s TV show Love American Style? I thought of that too. But in this case: Ivy League University Vietnamese Style. > > :) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa From asmalina.saleh@gmail.com Tue Jan 5 19:10:47 2016 From: asmalina.saleh@gmail.com (Asmalina Saleh) Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 22:10:47 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <50D74739-1214-44EE-A8FA-62AFB16AD44C@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <9C482358-5472-4C85-93FB-9D3DD05FC90D@gmail.com> <50D74739-1214-44EE-A8FA-62AFB16AD44C@gmail.com> Message-ID: ?Helena, The possibility of a local blend of Viet and English is not as detrimental as it may seem. Singapore for instance, has its own version of English, or Singlish. It is often unintelligible to someone who has not lived there, but I have a great fondness for the language and see it as beneficial in teaching English to students. Some of my local colleagues at the primary and secondary levels, stress that their students recognize the need to switch between business English and Singlish. When I taught undergraduate classes in the local universities, the use of Singlish was often helpful in translating ideas and concepts from English to the local context. So, in my biased view, I think that a creole language would be beneficial in many ways. One possible way to suggest teaching bilingually is perhaps to use examples of countries that promote bilingual education in the region, such as Hongkong, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. There are many invaluable lessons that could be drawn on, and could be really useful in the Vietnamese context. ?Best, Lina? On Jan 5, 2016 7:13 PM, "Helena Worthen" wrote: > Hi - > > I"m in the midst of compiling responses to my request and therefore > haven't responded on list. > > There have been a number of comments that suggest that in emulating Top > 100 universities in their textbooks, syllabi and language (English) lies a > risk of losing Vietnamese culture. I don't think this is what's going on. > This project, with its short deadline, centralized leadership, urgency and > seemingly enthusiastic if nervous commitment on the part of the very young > faculty, is in itself very Vietnamese. People aren't semi-committed or > reluctant. Maybe I'm imagining this, and I've only been here 5 months and > don't speak Vietnamese. The shift to a market economy has released, as > expected, enormous amounts of energy; everyone is selling something, and so > far, it's working for a lot of people. > > This excitement IS Vietnamese. As an American, I keep saying to myself, > "This is how they won the war." Not just one war, either! > > Although the rivers are filthy, the air (in the city) is toxic and leaves > a dust of particulate on your tongue, and the "library" has almost no > books. But they're building a new whole library building as we speak. They > work 7 days a week, dawn to dark. > > I think the risk in emulating Top 100 universities and requiring everyone > (even the "guards" and the cleaners) to speak English too early is that > people will create a local blend of Vietnamese and English which will not > be intelligible beyond Vietnam. Any thoughts on that? > > I'm trying to express the reasons for teaching bi-lingually in words that > will not offend anyone and will get heard. Thanks to all of you who have > responded. > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jan 6, 2016, at 2:38 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Hi, > > > > If I might pipe up again, I think Carol has synthesized things nicely > here! > > > > What emerges for me from what Carol said about surfaces is this...and is > perhaps restating what she said (or what she implied): > > > > Do the Vietnamese desire to copy the model of the "ideal of the Ivy > League" because they want to replicate the surface features present, as > evidence that they too will be a "quality school" in 20 years' time? OR do > they want to adopt and embody the underlying processes present by which > these features emerged so that their school culminates in a "quality > school" ? > > > > It seems to me if they value their own culture (which they must), it > would have to be the latter and not the former, because the former would be > only a simulacra and by creating a simulacra they would by default give up > on their own culture, or at least whatever they value about their own > culture, by supplanting *a notion* of quality rather than quality itself. > By adopting instead processes of quality (over surface features), they > would create quality as derived intrinsic to Vietnamese culture, because > they will use processes identified as "universally" qualified for > manifesting a quality school (in 20 years time). > > > > But then having a feature of many libraries (in the high school, in the > university, and in the home) is borne of the process of building a library > collection (and Constitution that safeguards free speech and privacy, > supposedly), and providing bookshelves and tables and chairs large enough > (and sturdy enough) to hold all that thinking captured in books! > > > > Of course now that so much is digital, what would a library look like in > 20 years in Vietnam? > > > > Would they just have lots of bean bag chairs? and tablets (instead of > tables)? and headphones with mics? > > > > Remember that 70s TV show Love American Style? I thought of that too. > But in this case: Ivy League University Vietnamese Style. > > > > :) > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > From halammm@gmail.com Tue Jan 5 21:35:36 2016 From: halammm@gmail.com (Hans Lambrecht) Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 12:35:36 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: Dear Helena, I have been reading your question and the thread that evolved over the past days with great interest. Developing 'outstanding universities at international level' is one of the goals in the Education Development Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and is echoed in the Fundamental and Comprehensive Education Sector Reform launched by the Vietnamese communist party at the end of 2013. It is all about prestige. So it is clear why the goal is being pursued, but it remains questionable how relevant and desirable it is. In my opinion, becoming a top 100 university in Vietnam will not so much rely on teaching but probably more on the research that will be conducted. A paper published by Harvard Kennedy School in 2008 showed that Vietnamese universities hardly produced any publications in international peer-reviewed journals. Of course, language is also an important issue in this matter but not the only one. Check at your own university how many staff is actually involved in research. Evidence-based thinking did not gain much ground yet in the country, so the value attached to sound & rigorous research is limited. If efforts to become more renowned at international level result in a more vibrant research culture, it is maybe a good thing. As some in this thread argued, being proficient in the own language first and getting a proper grasp of abstracts concepts first could lead the lead to better proficiency in an another language later on. And this is also a big issue in Vietnam, be it not related to English and higher education. I am on behalf of a bilateral donor involved in policy dialogues with Ministry of Education and Training in Hanoi and the discussion around instructional language is purely a political one, but reduced and presented as a technical one. Based on the expressed concern to be inclusive, Government does efforts to teach language minority children (around 10% of the population, +/- 1 million children) Vietnamese as soon as possible in order to safeguard their education opportunities which are only offered in Vietnamese. The assimilation to the majority Kinh culture occurs along the way. Minority languages are just seen (and taught) as cultural artifacts (not in the AT sense; better call it relics) and not as a living language. Efforts made by many development partners to encourage bi-lingual teaching as part of preserving ethnic minority cultures have mostly been unsuccessful. Just some thoughts; I am aware this might not help a lot for your presentation. Best wishes, Hans Lambrecht On Sun, Jan 3, 2016 at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hello, > > I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is > all the rage. > > In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by > 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. > > This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such > as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities > (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and > textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to > teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for > reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. > > The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to > working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class > size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- > unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's > the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. > > So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching > methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 > universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, > Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these > institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working > conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of > it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small > class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete > and talk about methods. > > I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching > in English when your English is not great. > > Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they > mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early > 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting > pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they > don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the > right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door > to the global world and they know it. > > I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts > that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate > across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is > probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? > > I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can > someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be > able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest > they hook me off the stage. > > Thanks in advance, > > Helena > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Wed Jan 6 01:21:29 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 16:21:29 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> Message-ID: <22BD78EA-614D-4664-A37E-9BC75766FBD7@gmail.com> Dear Hans - This is fascinating. I have been stumped by what I see of the "ethnic minorities" and their presence or non-presence in the Vietnam we have been able to visit so far. I have avoided saying what I see because it has no correspondence with my understanding of "ethnic minorities" in the US. I have been gathering observations for a blog post, but so far, I am lost. I have incorporated the substance of your comments about research into my "Good teaching at TDTU" paper, which is directed at my colleague and translator who is supportive, my Dean, who is sceptical, and ultimately the president, who will either allow me to make a presentation to lecturers (young faculty with mostly MAs) or not. It is targeted to contrast with a university where students memorize, teachers have a 10-class per year load, use a microphone to address a class of 70 students and exams are multiple-choice and graded by faculty but "spot-checked" by the Department of Evaluation which has some connection to the Ministry of Education and Training, which you mention. There is a "research group" of temporarily hired experts whose job it is to publish in a certain set of journals, for which they will get rewarded with cash. May I send what I have written for your reaction? It's 6 pages, single space. Thanks - Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 6, 2016, at 12:35 PM, Hans Lambrecht wrote: > Dear Helena, > > I have been reading your question and the thread that evolved over the past > days with great interest. Developing 'outstanding universities at > international level' is one of the goals in the Education Development > Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and is echoed in the Fundamental and Comprehensive > Education Sector Reform launched by the Vietnamese communist party at the > end of 2013. It is all about prestige. So it is clear why the goal is being > pursued, but it remains questionable how relevant and desirable it is. > > In my opinion, becoming a top 100 university in Vietnam will not so much > rely on teaching but probably more on the research that will be conducted. > A paper published by Harvard Kennedy School in 2008 showed that Vietnamese > universities hardly produced any publications in international > peer-reviewed journals. Of course, language is also an important issue in > this matter but not the only one. Check at your own university how many > staff is actually involved in research. Evidence-based thinking did not > gain much ground yet in the country, so the value attached to sound & > rigorous research is limited. If efforts to become more renowned at > international level result in a more vibrant research culture, it is maybe > a good thing. > > As some in this thread argued, being proficient in the own language first > and getting a proper grasp of abstracts concepts first could lead the lead > to better proficiency in an another language later on. And this is also a > big issue in Vietnam, be it not related to English and higher education. I > am on behalf of a bilateral donor involved in policy dialogues with > Ministry of Education and Training in Hanoi and the discussion around > instructional language is purely a political one, but reduced and presented > as a technical one. Based on the expressed concern to be inclusive, > Government does efforts to teach language minority children (around 10% of > the population, +/- 1 million children) Vietnamese as soon as possible in > order to safeguard their education opportunities which are only offered in > Vietnamese. The assimilation to the majority Kinh culture occurs along the > way. Minority languages are just seen (and taught) as cultural artifacts > (not in the AT sense; better call it relics) and not as a living language. > Efforts made by many development partners to encourage bi-lingual teaching > as part of preserving ethnic minority cultures have mostly been > unsuccessful. > > Just some thoughts; I am aware this might not help a lot for your > presentation. > > Best wishes, > Hans Lambrecht > > > > On Sun, Jan 3, 2016 at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> I am presently working at Ton Duc Thang University in Vietnam. English is >> all the rage. >> >> In an effort to become one of the "Top 100" universities in the world by >> 2037, TDTU has adopted a new curriculum, which will be taught in English. >> >> This plan results in many top-down practices that make me heartsick, such >> as trolling the internet to identify classes taught at Top 100 universities >> (according to a certain list) that post syllabi that can be replicated and >> textbooks that can be bought, reduced to power points and then used to >> teach a class, in English by professors whose English may be good for >> reading or writing but is not ready for conversation. >> >> The plan is coming from the top administration. The students are used to >> working hard and getting over what I see as impossible obstacles (class >> size 70 or more, no private office hours for consultation, no books -- >> unless you can borrow the teacher's copy and run to the copy shop). It's >> the teachers, who take their work seriously, who are caught in the middle. >> >> So I have been asked to make a presentation to the faculty about teaching >> methods. First time around, they asked me to describe teaching at Top 100 >> universities, meaning specifically US "top" places like Harvard, Cornell, >> Berkeley, Stanford. Since I actually have direct experience of these >> institutions for various reasons, I set to it and wrote about the working >> conditions for tenured faculty at elite institutions, the ups and downs of >> it. This was not the presentation they wanted (low course load, small >> class size, big libraries, etc) so now I've been asked to be more concrete >> and talk about methods. >> >> I think I have to say something very clear about the problems of teaching >> in English when your English is not great. >> >> Let me emphasize that the teachers (lecturers, they are called; they >> mostly have MAs, not PhDs, are untenured and young -- in their 30s or early >> 40s at most) are serious about doing their jobs. yes, they are getting >> pressure from above and have been threatened with being replaced if they >> don't rise to the occasion. But they are also very serious about doing the >> right thing for their students. Getting an education in English is a door >> to the global world and they know it. >> >> I want to say that an English-only approach will oversimplify the concepts >> that they are hoping to transmit (share). Some concepts are incommensurate >> across languages and will require elaboration in the home language. This is >> probably true of whole registers of discipline-specific concepts, right? >> >> I am pretty sure that people on this list have experience with this. Can >> someone help me say this succinctly and clearly? I will probably only be >> able to devote a short paragraph to this in my actual presentation lest >> they hook me off the stage. >> >> Thanks in advance, >> >> Helena >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> >> >> From helenaworthen@gmail.com Wed Jan 6 01:24:54 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 16:24:54 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <9C482358-5472-4C85-93FB-9D3DD05FC90D@gmail.com> <50D74739-1214-44EE-A8FA-62AFB16AD44C@gmail.com> Message-ID: Thank you, Asmalina, this helps. Nothing like someone who actually has experience! Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 6, 2016, at 10:10 AM, Asmalina Saleh wrote: > ?Helena, > > The possibility of a local blend of Viet and English is not as detrimental > as it may seem. Singapore for instance, has its own version of English, or > Singlish. It is often unintelligible to someone who has not lived there, > but I have a great fondness for the language and see it as beneficial in > teaching English to students. Some of my local colleagues at the primary > and secondary levels, stress that their students recognize the need to > switch between business English and Singlish. When I taught undergraduate > classes in the local universities, the use of Singlish was often helpful in > translating ideas and concepts from English to the local context. So, in my > biased view, I think that a creole language would be beneficial in many > ways. > > One possible way to suggest teaching bilingually is perhaps to use examples > of countries that promote bilingual education in the region, such as > Hongkong, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. There are many invaluable > lessons that could be drawn on, and could be really useful in the > Vietnamese context. > > ?Best, > Lina? > > > On Jan 5, 2016 7:13 PM, "Helena Worthen" wrote: > >> Hi - >> >> I"m in the midst of compiling responses to my request and therefore >> haven't responded on list. >> >> There have been a number of comments that suggest that in emulating Top >> 100 universities in their textbooks, syllabi and language (English) lies a >> risk of losing Vietnamese culture. I don't think this is what's going on. >> This project, with its short deadline, centralized leadership, urgency and >> seemingly enthusiastic if nervous commitment on the part of the very young >> faculty, is in itself very Vietnamese. People aren't semi-committed or >> reluctant. Maybe I'm imagining this, and I've only been here 5 months and >> don't speak Vietnamese. The shift to a market economy has released, as >> expected, enormous amounts of energy; everyone is selling something, and so >> far, it's working for a lot of people. >> >> This excitement IS Vietnamese. As an American, I keep saying to myself, >> "This is how they won the war." Not just one war, either! >> >> Although the rivers are filthy, the air (in the city) is toxic and leaves >> a dust of particulate on your tongue, and the "library" has almost no >> books. But they're building a new whole library building as we speak. They >> work 7 days a week, dawn to dark. >> >> I think the risk in emulating Top 100 universities and requiring everyone >> (even the "guards" and the cleaners) to speak English too early is that >> people will create a local blend of Vietnamese and English which will not >> be intelligible beyond Vietnam. Any thoughts on that? >> >> I'm trying to express the reasons for teaching bi-lingually in words that >> will not offend anyone and will get heard. Thanks to all of you who have >> responded. >> >> Helena >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Jan 6, 2016, at 2:38 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> If I might pipe up again, I think Carol has synthesized things nicely >> here! >>> >>> What emerges for me from what Carol said about surfaces is this...and is >> perhaps restating what she said (or what she implied): >>> >>> Do the Vietnamese desire to copy the model of the "ideal of the Ivy >> League" because they want to replicate the surface features present, as >> evidence that they too will be a "quality school" in 20 years' time? OR do >> they want to adopt and embody the underlying processes present by which >> these features emerged so that their school culminates in a "quality >> school" ? >>> >>> It seems to me if they value their own culture (which they must), it >> would have to be the latter and not the former, because the former would be >> only a simulacra and by creating a simulacra they would by default give up >> on their own culture, or at least whatever they value about their own >> culture, by supplanting *a notion* of quality rather than quality itself. >> By adopting instead processes of quality (over surface features), they >> would create quality as derived intrinsic to Vietnamese culture, because >> they will use processes identified as "universally" qualified for >> manifesting a quality school (in 20 years time). >>> >>> But then having a feature of many libraries (in the high school, in the >> university, and in the home) is borne of the process of building a library >> collection (and Constitution that safeguards free speech and privacy, >> supposedly), and providing bookshelves and tables and chairs large enough >> (and sturdy enough) to hold all that thinking captured in books! >>> >>> Of course now that so much is digital, what would a library look like in >> 20 years in Vietnam? >>> >>> Would they just have lots of bean bag chairs? and tablets (instead of >> tables)? and headphones with mics? >>> >>> Remember that 70s TV show Love American Style? I thought of that too. >> But in this case: Ivy League University Vietnamese Style. >>> >>> :) >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jan 6 12:06:10 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 13:06:10 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <9C482358-5472-4C85-93FB-9D3DD05FC90D@gmail.com> <50D74739-1214-44EE-A8FA-62AFB16AD44C@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helen, I think it is, in light of this thread, serendipitous that the linguist John Holm just died. He focused on creoles, a project that started when he was travelling along the Carribean coast of Nicaragua and heard the English creole that grew up there. I am wondering how the history of a language that developed from the ground up would inform the top-down project you are engaged in. Henry > On Jan 6, 2016, at 2:24 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > Thank you, Asmalina, this helps. Nothing like someone who actually has experience! > > Helena > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jan 6, 2016, at 10:10 AM, Asmalina Saleh wrote: > >> ?Helena, >> >> The possibility of a local blend of Viet and English is not as detrimental >> as it may seem. Singapore for instance, has its own version of English, or >> Singlish. It is often unintelligible to someone who has not lived there, >> but I have a great fondness for the language and see it as beneficial in >> teaching English to students. Some of my local colleagues at the primary >> and secondary levels, stress that their students recognize the need to >> switch between business English and Singlish. When I taught undergraduate >> classes in the local universities, the use of Singlish was often helpful in >> translating ideas and concepts from English to the local context. So, in my >> biased view, I think that a creole language would be beneficial in many >> ways. >> >> One possible way to suggest teaching bilingually is perhaps to use examples >> of countries that promote bilingual education in the region, such as >> Hongkong, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. There are many invaluable >> lessons that could be drawn on, and could be really useful in the >> Vietnamese context. >> >> ?Best, >> Lina? >> >> >> On Jan 5, 2016 7:13 PM, "Helena Worthen" wrote: >> >>> Hi - >>> >>> I"m in the midst of compiling responses to my request and therefore >>> haven't responded on list. >>> >>> There have been a number of comments that suggest that in emulating Top >>> 100 universities in their textbooks, syllabi and language (English) lies a >>> risk of losing Vietnamese culture. I don't think this is what's going on. >>> This project, with its short deadline, centralized leadership, urgency and >>> seemingly enthusiastic if nervous commitment on the part of the very young >>> faculty, is in itself very Vietnamese. People aren't semi-committed or >>> reluctant. Maybe I'm imagining this, and I've only been here 5 months and >>> don't speak Vietnamese. The shift to a market economy has released, as >>> expected, enormous amounts of energy; everyone is selling something, and so >>> far, it's working for a lot of people. >>> >>> This excitement IS Vietnamese. As an American, I keep saying to myself, >>> "This is how they won the war." Not just one war, either! >>> >>> Although the rivers are filthy, the air (in the city) is toxic and leaves >>> a dust of particulate on your tongue, and the "library" has almost no >>> books. But they're building a new whole library building as we speak. They >>> work 7 days a week, dawn to dark. >>> >>> I think the risk in emulating Top 100 universities and requiring everyone >>> (even the "guards" and the cleaners) to speak English too early is that >>> people will create a local blend of Vietnamese and English which will not >>> be intelligible beyond Vietnam. Any thoughts on that? >>> >>> I'm trying to express the reasons for teaching bi-lingually in words that >>> will not offend anyone and will get heard. Thanks to all of you who have >>> responded. >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>> >>> On Jan 6, 2016, at 2:38 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> If I might pipe up again, I think Carol has synthesized things nicely >>> here! >>>> >>>> What emerges for me from what Carol said about surfaces is this...and is >>> perhaps restating what she said (or what she implied): >>>> >>>> Do the Vietnamese desire to copy the model of the "ideal of the Ivy >>> League" because they want to replicate the surface features present, as >>> evidence that they too will be a "quality school" in 20 years' time? OR do >>> they want to adopt and embody the underlying processes present by which >>> these features emerged so that their school culminates in a "quality >>> school" ? >>>> >>>> It seems to me if they value their own culture (which they must), it >>> would have to be the latter and not the former, because the former would be >>> only a simulacra and by creating a simulacra they would by default give up >>> on their own culture, or at least whatever they value about their own >>> culture, by supplanting *a notion* of quality rather than quality itself. >>> By adopting instead processes of quality (over surface features), they >>> would create quality as derived intrinsic to Vietnamese culture, because >>> they will use processes identified as "universally" qualified for >>> manifesting a quality school (in 20 years time). >>>> >>>> But then having a feature of many libraries (in the high school, in the >>> university, and in the home) is borne of the process of building a library >>> collection (and Constitution that safeguards free speech and privacy, >>> supposedly), and providing bookshelves and tables and chairs large enough >>> (and sturdy enough) to hold all that thinking captured in books! >>>> >>>> Of course now that so much is digital, what would a library look like in >>> 20 years in Vietnam? >>>> >>>> Would they just have lots of bean bag chairs? and tablets (instead of >>> tables)? and headphones with mics? >>>> >>>> Remember that 70s TV show Love American Style? I thought of that too. >>> But in this case: Ivy League University Vietnamese Style. >>>> >>>> :) >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> > > From ewall@umich.edu Wed Jan 6 16:39:26 2016 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 18:39:26 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Message-ID: <093BB669-106E-4DC2-8C91-5E62E3057D73@umich.edu> Hmm. How would you say ".1?. It makes a difference. Orality may be nontrivial. Also the same mathematical expression might be written in more than one way so as to emphasize focal aspects. Tautological rewrites are part and parcel of doing mathematics. My only point here is that the dynamics of a mathematics classroom, although some might wish and even theorize otherwise, ihas much in common with a Literacy classroom (or, if you wish, English classroom) Ed > On Jan 4, 2016, at 3:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Wholeheartedly do I endorse Andy's idea--that separating the language of > the curriculum (the regulative register, to use a Bernsteinian term) from > the language of the tutorial (the instructional register, in the Bernstein > lingo) is a subversive move rather than a revolutionary one: it is designed > to bring in the native language through the back door, until we are in a > position to lay revolutionary hands on the regulative register itself. But > I think that we may find that laying native-speaking hands on the > regulative register will sometimes have the unexpected effect of > transforming the native language as well. > > The Chinese language passed through a very interesting period in the early > twentieth centruy called the May Fourth Movement when revolutionaries tried > to introduce foreign political concepts with foreign sounds, so that for > example "democracy" became "de-mo-ke-la-xi". Today it is the morphemes and > not the phonemes we use: "min zhu zhu yi" = "people-rule-thought-ism". > Needless to say it is the latter word that united China in 1989 during the > 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement which coincided with the 200th > anniversary of the French Revolution, the death of Hu Yaobang, and which > culiminated in the so-called Tiananmen Massacre (a movement which the West > still mistakenly associates with students, with Gorbachov's visit to > Beijing, with the supposed impact of the VOA and the BBC and thus with > their own shining example, showing that the West still thinks about > democracy as "de-mo-ke-la-xi"). > > Transforming the native language is not a bad thing at all, unless of > course you are a craven fundamentalist, in which case there would be a > turning of backs rather than a laying on of revolutionary hands (the good > thing about revolutionaries is that they are always willing to undertake a > revolutionary reconstruction of their own ideas; the bad thing about them > is that they sometimes want to do this first, before they have laid > revolutionary hands on the environment, and the Genetic Law--we control > ourselves through controlling the environment--tells us that this is > contrary to nature and will not do). But this brings us back to the > question of what exactly needs to change, and how. Teaching mathematics is > a bit of a dodge: mathematics already has a (written) language of its own, > and all we really need to do is to oralize it. Helena's task is much more > daunting. > > And yet not completely unrelated. Since Helena has given me permission to > bust the one frame rule, let me take the example I have last time; > "Fracture growth rate is directly proportional to the increase in pressure > on the materials." The underlying structure of this clause is just "y = f > (x)", that is, "Fracture growth rate" = "increase in pressure on the > materials"/n. How did we get this structure, which barely exists in Greek > and Latin, and which certainly did not exist in Chaucerian English (see his > "Discourse on the Astrolabe", a text that he wrote in the scientific > English of the time, which is actually quite close to the sort of thing we > see in discovery learning classes based on the Piagetian model. Halliday's > answer to this question actually moves us AWAY from the "hands on" model of > science teaching and towards the more Davydovian theoretical model of > instruction. > > We go this structure from the work of people like Galileo and Newton, and > in Newton's "Opticks" we can actually see it taking shape, as Newton gets > himself a prism and does experiments (rather as Chaucer did with his > astrolabe, and Galileo with his telescope) and then tries to write them up. > He finds that he needs words to describe the convex quality of lenses, and > so he invents the word "plumpness". This word did not stick, but the > concept certainly did, and so did the other words that arose from it: > "refraction", "reflection", "dispersion", etc. > > So perhaps one way in which small group work works is as a time machine: it > allows the tutor to dialogically unpack the "matematized" terms of > discourse into everyday speech, e.g. > > Tutor: Look at this. "Fracture growth rate". What is it? Is it a fracture? > Is it a growth? Or is it a rate? > Ss: ... > T: Right. What kind of rate? Is it fracture rate or growth rate? > S:... > T: Good. But growth rate of what? > S:... > T: You got it. Now, what would your mother say about this, if you were > eating crackers and making a mess? She might say this: The cracker cracks > are growing fast? Or slow? > > Of course the other terms can be unpacked in the same way, until these > "yes/no" questions and "why" questions eventually give rise to questions > like "Why does the fracture growth rate increase/decrease in circumstance > X?" > > Let me make two points about this kind of unpacking and then I'll shut up. > The first is Andy's: it can and should be done in the native language, not > least because when we do this in the native language we may find ourselves > setting new standards in native language teaching as well. But the second > is that for precisely that reason, I don't think it depends on small > groups, peer tutorials, and the kinds of classroom interaction patterns > that have become historically associated with it in the West > for historically specific reasons, some of which have more to do > with bourgeois individualism than with pedagogical efficiency). > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 11:53 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >> David, I'll make an exception this time. >> >> :) >> >> Helena >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >> On Jan 4, 2016, at 2:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> A number of discussants have made the suggestion of small groups, >>> tutorials, peer presentations, and so on, and this is an excellent >>> suggestion. But we need know?and be able to explain?exactly why it is >>> excellent, in what this excellence consists of, and what the limitations >> of >>> the excellence are, because we often do find that in situations like the >>> one which Helena is describing (situations like the ones where I have >> spent >>> the last three and a half decades teaching), when we try to introduce >> small >>> groups, tutorials, and peer presentations that we?ve only multiplied the >>> problems that we started with and sometimes even exacerbated them. For if >>> the professor has only a minimal grasp of English, and if the students >> find >>> it almost impossible to have a conversation about the topic even when the >>> professor is prompting them, we have to ask what the effect of removing >> or >>> sidelining or backgrounding the professor will be. Many students feel?and >>> the evidence is that they are not entirely wrong?that the effect is to >>> remove or to background the only source of English and the main source of >>> conceptual knowledge. >>> >>> The argument has to be taken seriously, for at least three reasons. First >>> of all, as I said, there?s a lot of evidence that shows that although the >>> professor undoubtedly feels a great deal of relief that his or her poor >>> grasp of English is no longer the centre of the student?s critical >>> attention, all that?s really been accomplished is to move the centre of >>> attention to a student who in some cases bears it even less well than the >>> professor did. Often the results of small groups are not noticeably >> better >>> than the results of teacher fronted classes, except in ?skills based? >>> classes which offer practice to learners, e.g. conversation classes, and >> in >>> the case of conceptual knowledge based classes the results are sometimes >>> dramatically worse. In fact, Hywel Coleman?s large scale studies in >> Nigeria >>> showed that there really wasn?t any particular advantage for small >> classes >>> over large classes, given highly motivated students (and the autodidacts >>> amongst us can easily see why this might be). >>> >>> Secondly, even if there were no objective evidence on the side of large >>> classes and against groupwork, there is an important subjective argument. >>> Many learners, right or wrong, feel they learn better from a professor >> than >>> from their peers, just as we sometimes feel that we learn better from our >>> peers than from ourselves (or our children). This subjective argument is >>> particularly important because I think one reason why groupwork and peer >>> seminar have such clout with us is that, unlike Professor Silverstein, we >>> are more interested in empowering our learners than merely informing >> them, >>> yet again, of the ways they are disempowered. The argument that groupwork >>> and peer seminars are right because they empower learners appears to be >>> unanswerable?but suppose the learners use this power to call for the >> return >>> of large professor led classes? The argument is, once again, >> unanswerable, >>> and I think it shows the dangers of confusing issues that are pedagogical >>> (and therefore social, political) with issues that are ethical (and >>> therefore interpersonal, moral). The personal is NOT political; they are >>> two very different, if linked, levels of being. >>> But thirdly I think the argument in favor of large classes deserves to be >>> taken seriously because it will help us get beneath the surface and find >>> out what it is about small classes that is pedagogically more effective. >> It >>> is certainly not the case that all small classes are pedagogically >>> effective nor is it the case that large classes never are. Is it SIMPLY >> an >>> aesthetic-political preference, that small is beautiful? Is it once again >>> something we all favor for the convenience of the instructor rather than >>> for the comfort of the student? Or is there something about the shape of >>> actual discourse that we should be attending to, not least because it >> might >>> be transferable to larger classes? Does this mysterious factor, having to >>> do with the shape of actual discourse, apply equally to so-called >> ?content? >>> subjects, where the emphasis is on what Vygotsky calls ?science concepts? >>> and to everyday conversation classes? >>> >>> (But...I am well over Helena's one screen limit, and I feel the cold >> clammy >>> hand of her hook on my throat....) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 10:14 AM, Helena Worthen >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hmm, this will take me some research to check out. Thank you, Michael - >>>> >>>> However, I was given a Cross-Cultural leadership class to teach (in >>>> English) that drew from a syllabus placed online by an MIT professor. I >>>> said yes just to see what it would be like. It was a skimpy syllabus >> that >>>> relied heavily on the kind of student who would show up in a MIT class >>>> (multi-national and academically skilled) and the readings were mostly >> from >>>> Amazon; you got a button to click and buy. I was told that the >> instructor's >>>> lecture notes were all on line but what was actually on line was >> something >>>> he probably wrote in an hour. >>>> >>>> I had to re-write the class, of course. >>>> >>>> Helena Worthen >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>>> >>>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 9:26 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Helena, >>>>> >>>>> There is a possibility that your university is attempting to follow the >>>> Open Educational Resource model that is being promoted by UNESCO (that >> is >>>> just a guess). Are they using OpenCourseware, which started at MIT, >> where >>>> major universities post their curriculum and some related resources in >>>> their native language (mostly at this point in English?) A number of >>>> universities similar to yours are attempting to follow this model. >> However >>>> UNESCO itself recognizes the problem that you describe. There is a >> second >>>> part to the OER movement which involves Learning Objects. These are >>>> locally developed, much smaller approaches to teaching - even taking >> parts >>>> of OpenCourseware and experimenting with them in local classrooms and >> then >>>> posting them to share and in the best possible worlds discuss with other >>>> universities in Learning Object Repositories. African Virtual >> University >>>> is a good model for this. You can make one an argument that the >> university >>>> can achieve the type of recognition is requires by developing a Learning >>>> Objects Repository for Southeast Asia. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> On >>>> Behalf Of Helena Worthen >>>>> Sent: Saturday, January 02, 2016 11:39 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, Elinami. >>>>> >>>>> H >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Elinami Swai wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Dear Helena. >>>>>> Your dilemma resonates with what we are experiencing in Tanzania. As a >>>>>> post colonial country, we have been grappling with the issue of >>>>>> language of instruction for a very long time. Our education system has >>>>>> been jogging between Kiswahili and English and for a long time we had >>>>>> settled on Kiswahili for all the subjects in elementary level (primary >>>>>> 1-7) and English for secondary to university level. >>>>>> >>>>>> Talk of silences in classrooms. Here and there you could hear a sound >>>>>> of broken English from the teachers. The end product of such a process >>>>>> does not need to be described here. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of recent, the new policy has granted the use of both languages >>>>>> (Kiswahili and English). >>>>>> >>>>>> In your case, think of code-switching and code-mixing. Another >>>>>> strategy is team teaching (check Stanford University). >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Elinami >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 03/01/2016, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>>>> Helena, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it possible to ignite their imaginations around the concept of a >>>> seminar? >>>>>>> Or dare I say, peer-learning / study groups? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Vera devised the peer-exam, which is really cool, how about that? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't think peer-exam technically qualifies as an "Ivy-League >> method" >>>>>>> (though it certainly is innovative), but it's peer-led learning, and >>>>>>> that may be useful for overcoming the obstacles you and your teachers >>>> face? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So those are my (naive) pieces of broccoli and spinach for your >>>>>>> Vietnamese noodle soup. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai >>>>>> Senior Lecturer >>>>>> Associate Dean >>>>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >>>>>> Faculty of Education >>>>>> Open University of Tanzania >>>>>> P.O.Box 23409 >>>>>> Dar-Es-Salaam >>>>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >>>>>> Fax:022-2668759 >>>>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >>>>>> >> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >>>>>> 0230102484 >>>>>> ...this faith will still deliver >>>>>> If you live it first to last >>>>>> Not everything which blooms must >>>>>> wither. >>>>>> Not all that was is past >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Jan 7 22:33:18 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 06:33:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] TECH FLASH: update on the foibles of The Internet of Things, oh and also the honey bees Message-ID: Hello! Saw this article by Cory Doctorow: http://www.locusmag.com/Perspectives/2016/01/cory-doctorow-wicked-problems-resilience-through-sensing/ For people who've begun to hear the phrase, "The Internet of Things (TIOT)" and don't know what the hoopla is about, this is perhaps a nice introduction of what it might be and, importantly, various ethical implications that derive from a network of things that can talk to other things (with or without our knowing it). Software Defined Radio (SDR) is how it will work. So then... there's this thing about the bees: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/06/honeybee-populations-decline-pesticides-united-states-epa-study-imidacloprid Is there a reflection of SDR interference with TIOT between neonicotinoids interrupting bee pollination? ....maybe! If only Hedy Lamarr was still around to do the math for spread spectrum frequency hopping, but instead of bumping torpedoes off course she could provide our little bees anti-neonicotinoid kneepads (say that 10 times fast, eh?). Kind regards, Annalisa From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 00:02:05 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 08:02:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: TECH FLASH: update on the foibles of The Internet of Things, oh and also the honey bees In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Does he make a point or is it just rambling 'journalism'? I understand wicked problems to be ethically related too, not a mere soft systems problem. Probably the most salient thing I noticed in software circles related to the VW scandal was the lack of discussion. Most software people don't seem to recognise that there are or could be ethical values to uphold over company decision making. I guess there will be some nice things that come in through the internet of things mediators, such as getting careless drivers off our bumpers. As we see with change in habits for using plastic carrier bags (min 5p per bag), there are people who can't control their actions and admit to wanting externally imposed controls (because they seemingly can't do this for themselves). So the internet of things can help relieve these people of 'culturally mediated' effort. As I understand it, the reason why a 5p charge works for curtailing excess carrier bag wastage is that people find it hard to have a differentiated rule of frugality. If they started applying reasons to determine when 5p was a reasonable expense then they'd open themselves up to more commercial inveiglement, so instead they have a blanket rule of frugality which is occasionally forsaken in favour of binge spending. All of these crutches show how un-radical these ideas are compared to having schools teach how to think. Best, Huw On 8 January 2016 at 06:33, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello! > > > Saw this article by Cory Doctorow: > > > http://www.locusmag.com/Perspectives/2016/01/cory-doctorow-wicked-problems-resilience-through-sensing/ > > > For people who've begun to hear the phrase, "The Internet of Things > (TIOT)" and don't know what the hoopla is about, this is perhaps a nice > introduction of what it might be and, importantly, various ethical > implications that derive from a network of things that can talk to other > things (with or without our knowing it). Software Defined Radio (SDR) is > how it will work. > > > So then... there's this thing about the bees: > > > http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/06/honeybee-populations-decline-pesticides-united-states-epa-study-imidacloprid > > > Is there a reflection of SDR interference with TIOT between neonicotinoids > interrupting bee pollination? ....maybe! > > > If only Hedy Lamarr was still around to do the math for spread spectrum > frequency hopping, but instead of bumping torpedoes off course she could > provide our little bees anti-neonicotinoid kneepads (say that 10 times > fast, eh?). > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 08:06:05 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 08:06:05 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Groundings that make life worlds MORE real Message-ID: <568fde8d.530a620a.1395.ffffc347@mx.google.com> Greg Thompson posted the article - temporality, stance ownership, and the constitution of subjectivity - to academia.edu Greg, this article carried me through your exploration of -stance ownership - that opened new ways of connecting particular ways to make life more real. The three groundings presented: - intersubjectivity through recognition - embodied indexical iconicity - interobjectivity as the stance of things. Your paper guided me to a deep appreciation of the complexity of making life worlds more real. I found the exploration of embodied indexical iconicity the most transformative learning. However, I wanted to explore the notion of interobjectivity as agentic in one particular case. Can we imagine the oikos realm as interobjective? For the oikos realm to be interobjective is to recognize this realm as an object of evaluation. This means an orientation towards this object that has particular characteristics. In other words the oikos realm having some specific quality or value. I am suggesting that the specific quality of the oikos realm is -mutuality - in itself. The notion of mutuality for its own sake. If the figure of Hestia embodies this oikos realm, then the gathering around the hearth in itself results in flourishing. The hearth as interobjective stancetaking leading to particular characters or figures of intersubjective stancetaking and particular characters or figures of embodied iconicity. The quality and values of the places within placings in particular as evaluative orientations toward the oikos realm as interobjective. I recommend Greg's paper as a contribution to understanding particular groundings making life worlds more real. I found the connections generated were transformative. Larry From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 09:17:40 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 10:17:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Looking for lit on experiential learning? Message-ID: Folks, I have a favor to ask: I have a student who is interested in experiential learning (Kari Kane, cc'd on this email, so please "reply all" if possible), and we're looking for a greater breadth of the literature on experiential learning. So far, we have David Kolb's work on experiential learning and I've pointed her to some oldie but goodie stuff by Dewey as well as the not quite so oldie stuff by Cole. So I'm just wondering if you have suggestions of folks who have done particularly good work/writing on experiential learning? (doesn't necessarily have to be from a CHAT perspective, just good work). Some more details on Kari's research, she is going to be doing an academic internship at (and eventually shaping her thesis around) work at a tuition-based school for troubled youth that employs experiential learning as one of the main pedagogical/therapeutic tools. Kari's eventual interests are to bring a model like this to her work in low-income communities, but for now she is focusing on the practice and process of experiential learning. Many thanks in advance for your help with this! -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 09:46:25 2016 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Fri, 08 Jan 2016 17:46:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Looking for lit on experiential learning? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Big fan of Chip Bruce's work on inquiry learning and she should check out what the Digital Media Learning Hub is doing with the Connected Learning framework. These two sources may not show up in traditional lit reviews of experiential learning. On Fri, Jan 8, 2016, 12:23 PM Greg Thompson wrote: > Folks, > I have a favor to ask: > > I have a student who is interested in experiential learning (Kari Kane, > cc'd on this email, so please "reply all" if possible), and we're looking > for a greater breadth of the literature on experiential learning. > > So far, we have David Kolb's work on experiential learning and I've pointed > her to some oldie but goodie stuff by Dewey as well as the not quite so > oldie stuff by Cole. > > So I'm just wondering if you have suggestions of folks who have done > particularly good work/writing on experiential learning? (doesn't > necessarily have to be from a CHAT perspective, just good work). > > Some more details on Kari's research, she is going to be doing an academic > internship at (and eventually shaping her thesis around) work at a > tuition-based school for troubled youth that employs experiential learning > as one of the main pedagogical/therapeutic tools. Kari's eventual interests > are to bring a model like this to her work in low-income communities, but > for now she is focusing on the practice and process of experiential > learning. > > Many thanks in advance for your help with this! > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 09:46:25 2016 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Fri, 08 Jan 2016 17:46:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Looking for lit on experiential learning? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Big fan of Chip Bruce's work on inquiry learning and she should check out what the Digital Media Learning Hub is doing with the Connected Learning framework. These two sources may not show up in traditional lit reviews of experiential learning. On Fri, Jan 8, 2016, 12:23 PM Greg Thompson wrote: > Folks, > I have a favor to ask: > > I have a student who is interested in experiential learning (Kari Kane, > cc'd on this email, so please "reply all" if possible), and we're looking > for a greater breadth of the literature on experiential learning. > > So far, we have David Kolb's work on experiential learning and I've pointed > her to some oldie but goodie stuff by Dewey as well as the not quite so > oldie stuff by Cole. > > So I'm just wondering if you have suggestions of folks who have done > particularly good work/writing on experiential learning? (doesn't > necessarily have to be from a CHAT perspective, just good work). > > Some more details on Kari's research, she is going to be doing an academic > internship at (and eventually shaping her thesis around) work at a > tuition-based school for troubled youth that employs experiential learning > as one of the main pedagogical/therapeutic tools. Kari's eventual interests > are to bring a model like this to her work in low-income communities, but > for now she is focusing on the practice and process of experiential > learning. > > Many thanks in advance for your help with this! > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Jan 8 09:59:41 2016 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 17:59:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Looking for lit on experiential learning? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C336E5@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Greg, My own feeling is the best work in experiential learning right now is being done in virtual reality and I think eventually augmented reality. Check out the work of Kurt Squire and to a lesser extent Gilly Salmon. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Mcverry Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 12:46 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; xmca-l@ucsd.edu; kari kane Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Looking for lit on experiential learning? Big fan of Chip Bruce's work on inquiry learning and she should check out what the Digital Media Learning Hub is doing with the Connected Learning framework. These two sources may not show up in traditional lit reviews of experiential learning. On Fri, Jan 8, 2016, 12:23 PM Greg Thompson wrote: > Folks, > I have a favor to ask: > > I have a student who is interested in experiential learning (Kari > Kane, cc'd on this email, so please "reply all" if possible), and > we're looking for a greater breadth of the literature on experiential learning. > > So far, we have David Kolb's work on experiential learning and I've > pointed her to some oldie but goodie stuff by Dewey as well as the not > quite so oldie stuff by Cole. > > So I'm just wondering if you have suggestions of folks who have done > particularly good work/writing on experiential learning? (doesn't > necessarily have to be from a CHAT perspective, just good work). > > Some more details on Kari's research, she is going to be doing an > academic internship at (and eventually shaping her thesis around) work > at a tuition-based school for troubled youth that employs experiential > learning as one of the main pedagogical/therapeutic tools. Kari's > eventual interests are to bring a model like this to her work in > low-income communities, but for now she is focusing on the practice > and process of experiential learning. > > Many thanks in advance for your help with this! > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 10:49:18 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 11:49:18 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Looking for lit on experiential learning? In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C336E5@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C336E5@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Thanks Michael and Greg, Interesting that the place to go for experience is virtual reality! -greg On Fri, Jan 8, 2016 at 10:59 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Greg, > > My own feeling is the best work in experiential learning right now is > being done in virtual reality and I think eventually augmented reality. > Check out the work of Kurt Squire and to a lesser extent Gilly Salmon. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Greg Mcverry > Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 12:46 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; > xmca-l@ucsd.edu; kari kane > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Looking for lit on experiential learning? > > Big fan of Chip Bruce's work on inquiry learning and she should check out > what the Digital Media Learning Hub is doing with the Connected Learning > framework. > > These two sources may not show up in traditional lit reviews of > experiential learning. > > On Fri, Jan 8, 2016, 12:23 PM Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Folks, > > I have a favor to ask: > > > > I have a student who is interested in experiential learning (Kari > > Kane, cc'd on this email, so please "reply all" if possible), and > > we're looking for a greater breadth of the literature on experiential > learning. > > > > So far, we have David Kolb's work on experiential learning and I've > > pointed her to some oldie but goodie stuff by Dewey as well as the not > > quite so oldie stuff by Cole. > > > > So I'm just wondering if you have suggestions of folks who have done > > particularly good work/writing on experiential learning? (doesn't > > necessarily have to be from a CHAT perspective, just good work). > > > > Some more details on Kari's research, she is going to be doing an > > academic internship at (and eventually shaping her thesis around) work > > at a tuition-based school for troubled youth that employs experiential > > learning as one of the main pedagogical/therapeutic tools. Kari's > > eventual interests are to bring a model like this to her work in > > low-income communities, but for now she is focusing on the practice > > and process of experiential learning. > > > > Many thanks in advance for your help with this! > > -greg > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Fri Jan 8 11:10:11 2016 From: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org (Lois Holzman) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 14:10:11 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Looking for lit on experiential learning? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <79510E40-AB0B-4B68-97FA-8BB34C1E4F82@eastsideinstitute.org> There is an Association of Experiential Education (I was a keynote there 6-7 years ago). Mostly practitioners, but Jason Seaman Univ New Hampshire introduced me to it. He does research in this area. Lois Lois Holzman Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy 119 West 23 St, suite 902 New York, NY 10011 Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | Mad in America Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World All Stars Project On Jan 8, 2016, at 12:17 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Folks, > I have a favor to ask: > > I have a student who is interested in experiential learning (Kari Kane, > cc'd on this email, so please "reply all" if possible), and we're looking > for a greater breadth of the literature on experiential learning. > > So far, we have David Kolb's work on experiential learning and I've pointed > her to some oldie but goodie stuff by Dewey as well as the not quite so > oldie stuff by Cole. > > So I'm just wondering if you have suggestions of folks who have done > particularly good work/writing on experiential learning? (doesn't > necessarily have to be from a CHAT perspective, just good work). > > Some more details on Kari's research, she is going to be doing an academic > internship at (and eventually shaping her thesis around) work at a > tuition-based school for troubled youth that employs experiential learning > as one of the main pedagogical/therapeutic tools. Kari's eventual interests > are to bring a model like this to her work in low-income communities, but > for now she is focusing on the practice and process of experiential > learning. > > Many thanks in advance for your help with this! > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From scullyru@gwu.edu Fri Jan 8 12:53:22 2016 From: scullyru@gwu.edu (Ellen Scully-Russ) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 15:53:22 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Looking for lit on experiential learning? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I'd suggest the following... Infed.org is a great resource for theory and practice in informal education, with many cites and articles on experiential learning. For a good overview of perspectives and theories of experiential learning see... Fenwick, T.J. (2003). *Learning through experience: Troubling orthodoxies and intersecting questions*. Krieger, Malabar, Fl. Also check out Donald Sch?n's and Chris Argyris's work on reflective practice and action science, both heavily based on Dewey's theory of experience. See Robin Usher's work for a postmodern point of view and critique of experiential learning. Finally, for a great critique of Kolb see: Ord, J. (2009). Experiential learning in youth work in the UK: a return to Dewey.* International Journal of Lifelong Education*. Vol 28/4, 495-511 Good luck... On Fri, Jan 8, 2016 at 12:17 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Folks, > I have a favor to ask: > > I have a student who is interested in experiential learning (Kari Kane, > cc'd on this email, so please "reply all" if possible), and we're looking > for a greater breadth of the literature on experiential learning. > > So far, we have David Kolb's work on experiential learning and I've pointed > her to some oldie but goodie stuff by Dewey as well as the not quite so > oldie stuff by Cole. > > So I'm just wondering if you have suggestions of folks who have done > particularly good work/writing on experiential learning? (doesn't > necessarily have to be from a CHAT perspective, just good work). > > Some more details on Kari's research, she is going to be doing an academic > internship at (and eventually shaping her thesis around) work at a > tuition-based school for troubled youth that employs experiential learning > as one of the main pedagogical/therapeutic tools. Kari's eventual interests > are to bring a model like this to her work in low-income communities, but > for now she is focusing on the practice and process of experiential > learning. > > Many thanks in advance for your help with this! > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. Associate Professor and Co-Director, Curriculum, Executive Leadership Doctoral Program The Graduate School of Education and Human Development The George Washington University 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 Ashburn, VA 20147 Editorial Board Member,* Adult Learning, Advances in Developing Human Resources, Journal of Transformative Education* Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/escullyruss ************************************************************************************ Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. -- William James From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Jan 8 13:31:30 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 21:31:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: TECH FLASH: update on the foibles of The Internet of Things, oh and also the honey bees In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Hi Huw, I think the proof is in the pudding. What I considered when I read your reply, Huw, is ? 1. you are in the UK and don't have to care about the FCC (as the case with many others on this list not in the US) 2. you are far more knowledgeable about technology than many on this list. While none of these are damning properties in themselves, they might make Cory's points seem invisible to you. Hence your "so what?" response. Is this a possibility? Just asking. You hit the nail on the head (and perhaps are in agreement with Cory) in that there isn't much discussion about this, and more so, what it portends for our future. We had no clue, for example, what life "would be like" when almost everyone has a cellphone. It's changed the way we interact as humans, yes? What about TIOT? How will that change us and how we interact? I posted Cory's article (which was posted on a website dedicated to writers of science fiction and fantasy, not exactly the NY Times) because of its educational value for those who might not understand what TIOT means. I kinda have to know what the technology is and some idea how it works and what it's meant to do before I can begin to consider the implications, ethically or otherwise. What Cory seems to be saying is that there is a huge conflict ahead if this technology doesn't "play well with others" if "others" are our existing governance practices, or just my baby monitor playing well with your air-traffic control tower. It's good for people to understand what "wicked problem" means, as a definition for the kinds of problems when no one can agree that there actually IS a problem. Politics is wicked most of the time. There will be a conflict. It'll be another form of "The Wild West" which I don't think will be all that romantic. It will be another "market" for captains of industry to exploit. Additionally, our actual *space* will be colonized by radio waves (more than it already is), what was somewhat "pristine lands" despite electrical grids, TV and radio stations, and cellphone towers. But what if all these radio waves aren't good for us? That's what I've been thinking about. What if it's our version of Roman lead pipes? I remember someone telling me that people who are not properly educated (not just the three Rs but also how to be a decent human being) will have to rely upon government to "teach" them (in the form of school teachers, school principals, police officers, indifferent courts and punishing prisons), because those will be the ones who don't know how to relate [ethically, peacefully, or even vibrantly] in society. It seems that the TIOT could become another form of " a government with eyes", and that isn't exactly a happy thought if humans must rely upon TIOT to police them from inception. So like Cory, if there is a TIOT and it seems there will be, I agree it should not be automated, and it certainly shouldn't be centralized, but it also seems that it's just another way "inevitable technology" will invade us and we will just have to "get used to it." I don't think TIOT will bring utopia. Makes me want to move to a Pacific Island that is at a high enough enough to survive climate change. Am I a Luddite because I want to have radio silent space? The reason I posted the honeybees article, is that some people have wondered if the "volume" of radio waves penetrating the atmosphere have been interfering with honeybee hive health. Or even butterfly migrations. Neonicotinoids are only one clue of the bee colony collapse mystery. We just don't know enough yet. One things for sure, no bees, no food. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Jan 8 15:39:24 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 23:39:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] TECH FLASH: Universal Translators Message-ID: Hello! Seems there is a raft of new tech making big splashes in the news. This one caught my eye (which was published about a week ago), and I suspect would tickle the curiosity of many on this list! Machines, Lost In Translation: The Dream Of Universal Understanding http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/12/24/460743241/machines-lost-in-translation-the-dream-of-universal-understanding The title is a little misleading, depending on what definition of "understanding" you want to use. What I wonder, though, is what this means for language learning? It can't be the end of foreign language classes (and need for teachers!), but I wonder if such technology could function as scaffolding while learning a language? And if so, how? But also, does anything change about Vygotskian-based theories if tools can talk back to you or talk for you? Is there an extra layer of complexity that changes anything about development, interaction, and how tools shape our minds? Or does everything stay the same? Next question: would a machine's statistical analysis of written texts provide equivalent "rules" to those we've uncovered about language as studied by linguists? An aside: I find it regrettable that the "original" scientists researching this technology felt it would "give Americans a security edge over the Soviets but also promote world peace by eliminating language barriers." I'm not sure that those two things are synonymous exactly. But it was in the mid-1950s and the height of the cold war, so it goes with the zeitgeist... Another aside: If Leibniz were alive, I do not doubt he'd flip his wig about all this. [😊] Kind regards, Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OutlookEmoji-&#X1f60a.png Type: image/png Size: 488 bytes Desc: OutlookEmoji-&#X1f60a.png Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160108/0b29a344/attachment.png From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jan 8 16:00:34 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 16:00:34 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Qwerty, Vol. 10, n. 2 In-Reply-To: References: <86B6B77E972E4BF7B8A00B0B77706825@UserPC> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Beatrice Ligorio Date: Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 2:42 AM Subject: Qwerty, Vol. 10, n. 2 To: comitato scientifico Qwerty Dear Qwerty Scientific Committee (SC), the Vol 10, n. 2 is now online. This issue is strongly connected to the theme of the conference we just held in Trieste and most probably also the next issue it will be. Indeed, the conference was very inspiring with many interesting papers and we have a few submissions. You can find the issues here attached for your convenience, but each article is freely downloadable at this link http://www.ckbg.org/qwerty/index.php/qwerty As part of the SC we ask you to: - disseminate the issue among your connections - quote in your own publications - consider Qwerty as a venue for your own publications This email gives me also the opportunity to send you my greetings for the festivities just past and for the up-coming new year. I wish you all a fruitful and satisfying 2016, both under the professional and personal point of view. Best regards Beatrice in behalf of the editorial board Questa e-mail ? stata inviata da un computer privo di virus protetto da Avast. www.avast.com <#-946573351_DDB4FAA8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> -- Hai ricevuto questo messaggio perch? sei iscritto al gruppo "QwertyScientificCommittee" di Google Gruppi. Per annullare l'iscrizione a questo gruppo e non ricevere pi? le sue email, invia un'email a scientificcommittee+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. Per postare in questo gruppo, invia un'email a scientificcommittee@googlegroups.com. Visita questo gruppo all'indirizzo https://groups.google.com/group/scientificcommittee. Per altre opzioni visita https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Qwerty 10_2_2015_DEF.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 3172706 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160108/e755e724/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jan 8 16:32:16 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 16:32:16 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Disability Studies and Education Message-ID: This article made public this week by TC Record seemed of potential interest to the group. It touches on many issues that recur here. mike ------------- What ?My Kind? Can Offer: The Pressing Need for (More) Disability Studies and Disabled Scholars in Education Research by Dorothy Bossman ? November 13, 2015 *This piece is a reflection on my experiences with disability in education, first as a student, then as a teacher, and ultimately, as someone who became disabled, but it is also an argument for a significant change in the manner in which most educational institutions treat, represent, and serve individuals with disabilities. I suggest that including the perspectives of more researchers and teachers who are disabled into the wider education research community is one way to begin this transformation.* *?How **do **you manage a class in a wheelchair?? the human resources director asked me frankly.* Over the last decade, multiple sclerosis has rendered me unable to walk unaided and my increasing disability now often finds me in need of assistance to do basic physical tasks. Because of this progression, I had to leave my secondary teaching job, and by fiat, disability became the focus of my dissertation and the center of a newly defined scholarly career. My increasing marginalization demonstrated to me that disability is the ?last frontier of unquestioned inferiority,? a situation that ?makes it extremely difficult to embrace disabled people and to recognize their unnecessary and violent exclusion from society? (Siebers, 2008, p. 6). When I was able-bodied, I was oblivious to this abuse. Nancy Mairs, another writer with multiple sclerosis, suggests that ?if it is both possible and pleasant for me and my kind to enter, the world will become a livelier place? (1997, p. 106) and I think she is right. My nuanced perspective has enriched my intellectual life, but it has also made me aware of the misunderstandings of disability that are ubiquitous in educational circles. The insight I have gained is not just that a better understanding of disability will improve and enliven school for everyone; ?my kind? is not well represented here. As a teacher and as a scholar of education who also became someone with disabilities, I believe that I must share what I have learned from this transformation. Chief Justice Earl Warren in the *Brown v. Board* decision (1954) declared the school to be ?a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.? In their immediate surroundings, students may never have encountered someone who speaks a different language, someone who practices an unfamiliar religion, or someone with a disability. When students meet at school, it often results in ?a painful, critical, re-examination of their active ignorance about difference? (Mayo, 2004) and teachers find themselves engaged in mediation between individuals who are struggling to relate to one another. All students, able and disabled, observe these interactions and learn how to react to difference. For many disabled individuals, their invisibility, exclusion, and inability to fit in were first made most apparent at school. In my elementary years, the physically and mentally disabled students were, for the most part, kept away from the rest of us. If we saw these individuals at all, it was only as they passed our classroom or left the cafeteria when we arrived. One afternoon in second grade, I remember looking out into the hall at the sound of squeaking walkers, buzzing wheelchairs, and inarticulate speech only to be reminded that I was ?not to stare.? In secondary school, the visibility of disabled students increased slightly when a few would join us for assemblies and occasional gym and music classes. Still, these events were irregular, and the inclusion of this group was treated as something special, a coming together that was carefully facilitated by adults. What cultural values did this treatment of disability awaken in us? This systematic division of students demonstrated that those who have disabilities were different, fragile, dangerous, and generally unapproachable. What if my teachers had treated those with disabilities as something other than distant, helpless cases that one is not to look at or insult? What if I had known a disabled student?or teacher?to be competent, thoughtful, or at least multidimensional? I did not. Instead, my experiences with disability at school were governed by a tacit ?ideology of ability? (Siebers, 2008) that takes for granted that those with disabilities should be kept at a distance, that they are best served when they are isolated, and that they need to be protected from the fray of public life. When I trained to be a teacher, I had one class that surveyed different disabilities and offered an understanding of the legal rights of students who receive special education. Beyond that requirement, my experiences matched the observation that ?the study of disability is isolated in the specialized applied fields (e.g., special education, rehabilitation psychology, physical therapy), and that information is usually available only to majors in those fields? (Linton, 1998, p. 80). When I worked in schools, I found that students with disabilities were still often separated from those without this identification. Even when such students were enrolled in my ?regular? English classes, each came with an individual educational plan?with specific accommodations he or she required. However, when a student with disabilities joined a general education class, this inclusion was contingent on his or her ability to fit in, to act enough like the non-disabled students that instruction did not have to change dramatically. If a student with a disability needed more than this accommodation, he or she would be moved to a ?co-taught? section, which meant that for a period, my class included a special education teacher who brought with him or her a group of students, the same young people this person chaperoned to other classes. While I did my best to include all students equally, those with disabilities generally arrived together and acted as a social unit. Their separation was also frequently made apparent when the special education teacher removed only some of the class for remediation or to read materials aloud. If this situation was unsuccessful?usually meaning that a student frequently disrupted class?the problematic individual was moved to a more isolated setting. Once this move occurred, the student was no longer mine. I had done my best, but I had learned that *this s*tudent was better left to the specialists. Lessons about disability are also found in the academic curriculum, which often promotes problematic or distorted portrayals. In history, one particular favorite tale is someone who can overcome the odds, ?the inspirational disabled person.? The person with polio who later won Olympic medals for track, the one-armed pitcher who threw a no-hitter, or the blind pianist ?were all so good that no one knew or had to be aware of their handicap, and therein lay part of their glory? (Zola, 1983, p. 201). The rest of the world does not have to change; thus, true greatness for a disabled person is succeeding without accommodation. This moral is harmful for those individuals who do need help, but the portrayals of disability in fiction often teach a more dangerous lesson. A popular character in literature is the evil disabled person for whom ?physical handicaps are made the emblems of evil? (Longmore, 2003, p. 133). For nefarious individuals?like the one-handed Captain Hook (Barrie, 1980) or Count Rugen, the six-fingered man in *The Princess Bride *(Goldman, 1998)?their physical deformity is central in their characterization. Another unflattering depiction is the disabled person as a social misfit, which, like deformity ?[expresses] to varying degrees the loss of an essential part of one?s humanity? (Longmore, 2003, p. 135). For example, Lenny in *Of Mice and Men *(Steinbeck, 1963) and Quasimodo from *The Hunchback of Notre Dame *(Hugo, 2002)are characters that elicit sympathy, but ultimately cannot be included in mainstream society. Fiction and nonfiction stories often leave disability with tropes at opposite ends of a spectrum?the tenaciously brave or the sad and gruesome: a spectrum without a middle. Rather than portray these individuals as real people who have conflicts, goals, failures, losses, and joys (like everyone), many stories depict those with disabilities as exaggerated, distant people who exist to remind the non-disabled that they should not take for granted how great they have it. These examples of disability might be fictional or historical, but by dividing the disabled students from the able-bodied, the institutional arrangements of many schools support these misconceptions. Educational leaders espouse respect for those with disabilities, but ?the hidden curriculum, the stronger message, is that children in special education are different, incompetent, and unsavory, and, because of their isolation, easily avoidable? (Linton, 1998, p. 63). Once someone who is able-bodied becomes disabled or begins a path to disability, the options for living narrow into the misrepresentations he or she has acquired. As a result, the individual enters the new terrain of disability ?poorly prepared and with all the prejudices of the normal? (Zola, 1983, p. 206), wondering whether he or she will be a hero or a monster. If the larger milieu of education included more voices of thinkers who are themselves disabled, the chimera of inclusion could be replaced by solutions that are applicable to general classrooms. Teachers would be better prepared to disrupt and question the segregation of disabled students if they had colleagues who were themselves disabled. Also, if more teachers (and teachers of teachers) were disabled, the separation of students based on a bifurcated system of abled or disabled would become less obvious and less appealing. I was a good teacher when I was able-bodied, but I know now my teaching was not good for all students. Because my training did not include a focus on special education, I left the education of ?those students? to a different set of teachers. I did not question the segregated cafeteria, the private hallways, the separate buses, the isolated special education courses, or the systematic distancing of disabled students from ?regular? students. Now I do. What knowledge, other than that I gained from my personal illness and disability, could have brought me to this conclusion sooner? If I had actually *known *individuals?peers or teachers?with disabilities to be talented, successful, or content with their lives, I could have been less afraid to lose my mobility. If I had been familiar with disability scholars, their work could have introduced ?contradiction into the polarized categories of weak and strong, normal and abnormal, revered and reviled, dependent and independent, expendable and essential? (Linton, 1998, p. 186). Even without becoming disabled, I could have been a part of the necessary act of dismantling the consistent distortion, marginalization, and segregation of disability. By including and appreciating the uniqueness of those who have disabilities, schools could tell better stories about disability and display a clearer picture of reality. My kind?if one label can encompass all of us?could bring into focus the problems these divisions create for all of us. *References* Barrie, J. M. (1980). *Peter Pan.* Charles Scribner's Sons: J. P. Piper. Frank, A. (1995). *The wounded storyteller.* Chicago: University of Chicago. Goldman, W. (1998). *The Princess Bride (25th Anniversary).* New York: Ballantine Publishing Group. Hugo, V. (2002). *The hunchback of Notre-Dame (modern library classics).* New York: Modern Library. Lee, H. (1960). *To kill a mockingbird.* New York: J. P. Lippincott. Linton, S. (1998). *Claiming disability: Knowledge and identity.* New York: New York University. Linton, S. (2006). *My body politic.* Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Longmore, P. (2003). *Why I burned my book.* Philadelphia: Temple University. Mairs, N. (1997). *Waist-high in the world: A life among the non-disabled.* Boston: Beacon Press. Mayo, C. (2004). Relations are difficult. In C. Bingham, & A. M. Sidorkin, *No education without relation* (pp. 121-135). New York: Peter Lang. Shapiro, J. P. (1993). *No pity.* New York: Times Books. Siebers, T. (2008). *Disability theory.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Steinbeck, J. (1963). *Of mice and men.* New York: Bantam Classics. Zola, I. K. (1983). *Missing pieces: A chronicle of living with a disability.* Philadelphia: Temple University. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 17:11:45 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 03:11:45 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA0LI=?= =?utf-8?b?0ZHRgtGB0Y8=?= Message-ID: Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any philosopher, politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in fact, a proverb. Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context of (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist chain". I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a proverb rather than an aphorism. Thank you. Ulvi P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the imperialist chain via a revolution. From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 17:17:08 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 08:17:08 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <162564D2-60BF-4808-AEB3-F38C4FC304D3@uniandes.edu.co> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> Message-ID: <96A28D22-F038-4489-83FF-48CBBF96840F@illinois.edu> Hello - Thanks to everyone for the advice. I've compiled it and set it out to cool in a post on my blog: https://helenaworthen.wordpress.com/2016/01/07/the-global-financial-crisis-and-tdtu-classroom-teaching-methods/ I've listed many but not all of the people who responded, at the end of the post. The How to Teach in English topic was not part of my original assignment; they were just asking for "things teachers can do in the classroom." But teaching in English is obviously the elephant in the dining room, so I have slipped that in as as aspect of "teaching methods." The audience for this is my Vietnamese colleagues, which may explain some of the emphasis that will sound strange to US readers. Thanks very much to people who have experience from other educational systems (like Elinami from Tanzania, Carol from SA and Valerie from Japan -- I'm listing just a few as a teaser). There is probably a conference and a bunch of journals that focus on the transition to teaching in English; what an interesting topic! I would love to hear some comparative histories critically presented. I know that people from ISO (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/training-technical-assistance/standards-in-education.htm) are coming around and examining administrative proceses; do they ever get into actual quality of classroom experience? Thanks again -- Helena Helena Worthen 21 San Mateo Road Berkeley, CA 94707 hworthen@illinois.edu Vietnam blog is at: helenaworthen.wordpress.com 510-828-2745 From lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Fri Jan 8 17:24:22 2016 From: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org (Lois Holzman) Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 20:24:22 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] announcement re play, performance, social change Message-ID: <8219D19D-BBA6-48F6-9821-26014CAC2DE8@eastsideinstitute.org> Dear XMCAers, Every two years, I and the organizations I work with host Performing the World, an unusual conference/festival for those who take (or desire to take) a cultural, performatory approach to social change. I always announce it to this list and in ones and twos folks come. Inviting more, here's the link to this years theme. ANNOUNCEMENT & CALL FOR PROPOSALS September 23-25, 2016 Deadline for Proposals: February 21 The ninth Performing the World (PTW) conference will be held in New York City, Friday, September 23 through Sunday, September 25, 2016. Read more at http://www.performingtheworld.org Feel free to contact me for more information and conversation. And forwarding to others is appreciated. Thanks, Lois Lois Holzman Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy 119 West 23 St, suite 902 New York, NY 10011 Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | Mad in America Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World All Stars Project From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jan 8 18:19:28 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 09 Jan 2016 13:19:28 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <96A28D22-F038-4489-83FF-48CBBF96840F@illinois.edu> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> <96A28D22-F038-4489-83FF-48CBBF96840F@illinois.edu> Message-ID: <56906E30.8090608@mira.net> very well done, Helena. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 9/01/2016 12:17 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hello - > > Thanks to everyone for the advice. I've compiled it and set it out to cool in a post on my blog: > > https://helenaworthen.wordpress.com/2016/01/07/the-global-financial-crisis-and-tdtu-classroom-teaching-methods/ > > I've listed many but not all of the people who responded, at the end of the post. The How to Teach in English topic was not part of my original assignment; they were just asking for "things teachers can do in the classroom." But teaching in English is obviously the elephant in the dining room, so I have slipped that in as as aspect of "teaching methods." > > The audience for this is my Vietnamese colleagues, which may explain some of the emphasis that will sound strange to US readers. > > Thanks very much to people who have experience from other educational systems (like Elinami from Tanzania, Carol from SA and Valerie from Japan -- I'm listing just a few as a teaser). There is probably a conference and a bunch of journals that focus on the transition to teaching in English; what an interesting topic! I would love to hear some comparative histories critically presented. I know that people from ISO (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/training-technical-assistance/standards-in-education.htm) are coming around and examining administrative proceses; do they ever get into actual quality of classroom experience? > > Thanks again -- Helena > > Helena Worthen > 21 San Mateo Road > Berkeley, CA 94707 > hworthen@illinois.edu > Vietnam blog is at: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > 510-828-2745 > > > > > From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Fri Jan 8 19:27:47 2016 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (valerie A. Wilkinson) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 12:27:47 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <56906E30.8090608@mira.net> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> <96A28D22-F038-4489-83FF-48CBBF96840F@illino is.edu> <56906E30.8090 608@mira.net> Message-ID: <013001d14a8d$b67ec320$237c4960$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Thank you, Helena. Your summary is comprehensive and invites participation. This whole thread has been an education for me. It has provided a platform for articulating practices with a wide range of practitioners, which has the effect of "raising the bar" in a sense, lifting the discourse and level of abstraction, while creating a more expansive framework for discussion. More importantly, there are level markers, discipline codes, and international "milestones" (research numbers are conspicuous), so I know more about the world than I knew before. And thank you, XMCA. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+vwilk=inf.shizuoka.ac.jp@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+vwilk=inf.shizuoka.ac.jp@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Saturday, January 09, 2016 11:19 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice very well done, Helena. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 9/01/2016 12:17 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hello - > > Thanks to everyone for the advice. I've compiled it and set it out to cool in a post on my blog: > > https://helenaworthen.wordpress.com/2016/01/07/the-global-financial-crisis-a nd-tdtu-classroom-teaching-methods/ > > I've listed many but not all of the people who responded, at the end of the post. The How to Teach in English topic was not part of my original assignment; they were just asking for "things teachers can do in the classroom." But teaching in English is obviously the elephant in the dining room, so I have slipped that in as as aspect of "teaching methods." > > The audience for this is my Vietnamese colleagues, which may explain some of the emphasis that will sound strange to US readers. > > Thanks very much to people who have experience from other educational systems (like Elinami from Tanzania, Carol from SA and Valerie from Japan -- I'm listing just a few as a teaser). There is probably a conference and a bunch of journals that focus on the transition to teaching in English; what an interesting topic! I would love to hear some comparative histories critically presented. I know that people from ISO (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/training-technical-assistance/standards-i n-education.htm) are coming around and examining administrative proceses; do they ever get into actual quality of classroom experience? > > Thanks again -- Helena > > Helena Worthen > 21 San Mateo Road > Berkeley, CA 94707 > hworthen@illinois.edu > Vietnam blog is at: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > 510-828-2745 > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 19:57:04 2016 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 10:57:04 +0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <013001d14a8d$b67ec320$237c4960$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> <96A28D22-F038-4489-83FF-48CBBF96840F@illino is.edu> <56906E30.8090 608@mira.net> <013001d14a8d$b67ec320$237c4960$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Message-ID: <9241C0A4-D4FE-42F1-94F7-99AEF696AE0F@gmail.com> Now I'm starting to regret not thanking everyone; I think I skipped over people that I couldn't link to some particular country or university. A number of people contributed off-list; their comments might be appropriate now. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jan 9, 2016, at 10:27 AM, valerie A. Wilkinson wrote: > Thank you, Helena. Your summary is comprehensive and invites participation. > This whole thread has been an education for me. It has provided a platform > for articulating practices with a wide range of practitioners, which has the > effect of "raising the bar" in a sense, lifting the discourse and level of > abstraction, while creating a more expansive framework for discussion. More > importantly, there are level markers, discipline codes, and international > "milestones" (research numbers are conspicuous), so I know more about the > world than I knew before. And thank you, XMCA. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+vwilk=inf.shizuoka.ac.jp@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+vwilk=inf.shizuoka.ac.jp@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf > Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Saturday, January 09, 2016 11:19 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice > > very well done, Helena. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/01/2016 12:17 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >> Hello - >> >> Thanks to everyone for the advice. I've compiled it and set it out to cool > in a post on my blog: >> >> > https://helenaworthen.wordpress.com/2016/01/07/the-global-financial-crisis-a > nd-tdtu-classroom-teaching-methods/ >> >> I've listed many but not all of the people who responded, at the end of > the post. The How to Teach in English topic was not part of my original > assignment; they were just asking for "things teachers can do in the > classroom." But teaching in English is obviously the elephant in the dining > room, so I have slipped that in as as aspect of "teaching methods." >> >> The audience for this is my Vietnamese colleagues, which may explain some > of the emphasis that will sound strange to US readers. >> >> Thanks very much to people who have experience from other educational > systems (like Elinami from Tanzania, Carol from SA and Valerie from Japan -- > I'm listing just a few as a teaser). There is probably a conference and a > bunch of journals that focus on the transition to teaching in English; what > an interesting topic! I would love to hear some comparative histories > critically presented. I know that people from ISO > (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/training-technical-assistance/standards-i > n-education.htm) are coming around and examining administrative proceses; do > they ever get into actual quality of classroom experience? >> >> Thanks again -- Helena >> >> Helena Worthen >> 21 San Mateo Road >> Berkeley, CA 94707 >> hworthen@illinois.edu >> Vietnam blog is at: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> 510-828-2745 >> >> >> >> >> > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Jan 8 20:56:18 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 04:56:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA?= =?utf-8?b?0LLRkdGC0YHRjw==?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello Ulvi, I did a search and the intertubes tell me it is a quote by William James (1842-1910): Of course most of the websites are nothing official, but there were a few sites stating it. Marxist.org is the only place where it states it as something Lenin said, which was published in 1917. The William James wikipage is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_James I have no way to know if James is the first person to use it. But I thought I'd offer that to you for what it is worth. It's entirely possible that in any culture that possessed the technology for chains such a saying could exist. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 6:11 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any philosopher, politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in fact, a proverb. Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context of (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist chain". I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a proverb rather than an aphorism. Thank you. Ulvi P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the imperialist chain via a revolution. From carolmacdon@gmail.com Fri Jan 8 22:10:20 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 08:10:20 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice In-Reply-To: <9241C0A4-D4FE-42F1-94F7-99AEF696AE0F@gmail.com> References: <5687331b.d448620a.ccf62.2623@mx.google.com> <5688282e.5b13620a.58a99.ffff988f@mx.google.com> <568843c1.91f0420a.63f30.3e3b@mx.google.com> <500F10A5-F7B7-4FD1-AE4E-4CB9D7163E21@gmail.com> <5688751B.1070007@mira.net> <28D9D869-A596-4C1D-B0D2-DCD67CD3356B@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C32B77@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <5870F1F1-577A-4FA0-B930-C7745648E821@gmail.com> <013001d14a8d$b67ec320$237c4960$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> <9241C0A4-D4FE-42F1-94F7-99AEF696AE0F@gmail.com> Message-ID: I read that with great interest Helena, and also proud to see how many different countries your "helpers" come from. We all had something different to give. Carol On 9 January 2016 at 05:57, Helena Worthen wrote: > Now I'm starting to regret not thanking everyone; I think I skipped over > people that I couldn't link to some particular country or university. > > A number of people contributed off-list; their comments might be > appropriate now. > > H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jan 9, 2016, at 10:27 AM, valerie A. Wilkinson wrote: > > > Thank you, Helena. Your summary is comprehensive and invites > participation. > > This whole thread has been an education for me. It has provided a > platform > > for articulating practices with a wide range of practitioners, which has > the > > effect of "raising the bar" in a sense, lifting the discourse and level > of > > abstraction, while creating a more expansive framework for discussion. > More > > importantly, there are level markers, discipline codes, and international > > "milestones" (research numbers are conspicuous), so I know more about the > > world than I knew before. And thank you, XMCA. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+vwilk=inf.shizuoka.ac.jp@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+vwilk=inf.shizuoka.ac.jp@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf > > Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Saturday, January 09, 2016 11:19 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Request for advice > > > > very well done, Helena. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 9/01/2016 12:17 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> Hello - > >> > >> Thanks to everyone for the advice. I've compiled it and set it out to > cool > > in a post on my blog: > >> > >> > > > https://helenaworthen.wordpress.com/2016/01/07/the-global-financial-crisis-a > > nd-tdtu-classroom-teaching-methods/ > >> > >> I've listed many but not all of the people who responded, at the end of > > the post. The How to Teach in English topic was not part of my original > > assignment; they were just asking for "things teachers can do in the > > classroom." But teaching in English is obviously the elephant in the > dining > > room, so I have slipped that in as as aspect of "teaching methods." > >> > >> The audience for this is my Vietnamese colleagues, which may explain > some > > of the emphasis that will sound strange to US readers. > >> > >> Thanks very much to people who have experience from other educational > > systems (like Elinami from Tanzania, Carol from SA and Valerie from > Japan -- > > I'm listing just a few as a teaser). There is probably a conference and a > > bunch of journals that focus on the transition to teaching in English; > what > > an interesting topic! I would love to hear some comparative histories > > critically presented. I know that people from ISO > > ( > http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/training-technical-assistance/standards-i > > n-education.htm) are coming around and examining administrative > proceses; do > > they ever get into actual quality of classroom experience? > >> > >> Thanks again -- Helena > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> 21 San Mateo Road > >> Berkeley, CA 94707 > >> hworthen@illinois.edu > >> Vietnam blog is at: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >> 510-828-2745 > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* From bella.kotik@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 01:19:37 2016 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 11:19:37 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA?= =?utf-8?b?0LLRkdGC0YHRjw==?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? is really a Russian proverb. Sometimes equivalent proverbs are present in different languages like "An apple falls not far from the tree" , but sometimes similar meaning is presented in different words and/or metaphors. Yosef Guri in Israel published an interesting dictionary of equivalent proverbs in Russian, Hebrew, Yiddish and English, where some are translations, some same meaning in different words. Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 3:11 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger > than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) > > Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any philosopher, > politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in fact, > a proverb. > > Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context of > (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist > chain". > > I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a > proverb rather than an aphorism. > > Thank you. > > Ulvi > > P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have > supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the > imperialist chain via a revolution. > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 02:08:07 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 12:08:07 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA?= =?utf-8?b?0LLRkdGC0YHRjw==?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you. 9 Oca 2016 06:58 tarihinde "Annalisa Aguilar" yazd?: > Hello Ulvi, > > I did a search and the intertubes tell me it is a quote by William James > (1842-1910): > Of course most of the websites are nothing official, but there were a few > sites stating it. Marxist.org is the only place where it states it as > something Lenin said, which was published in 1917. > > The William James wikipage is here: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_James > > I have no way to know if James is the first person to use it. But I > thought I'd offer that to you for what it is worth. > > It's entirely possible that in any culture that possessed the technology > for chains such a saying could exist. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > > Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 6:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? > > Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger > than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) > > Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any philosopher, > politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in fact, > a proverb. > > Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context of > (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist > chain". > > I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a > proverb rather than an aphorism. > > Thank you. > > Ulvi > > P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have > supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the > imperialist chain via a revolution. > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 05:50:06 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 13:50:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) Message-ID: Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred to in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, p.85 and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. Best, Huw From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Sat Jan 9 06:49:05 2016 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 14:49:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA?= =?utf-8?b?0LLRkdGC0YHRjw==?= In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: 'It is clearly a literal fact that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. The conversion of that notion into a figurative phrase was established in the language by the 18th century. Thomas Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1786, included this line: '"In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the strength of the rest."' http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/the-weakest-link.html phillip ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Friday, January 8, 2016 9:56 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? Hello Ulvi, I did a search and the intertubes tell me it is a quote by William James (1842-1910): Of course most of the websites are nothing official, but there were a few sites stating it. Marxist.org is the only place where it states it as something Lenin said, which was published in 1917. The William James wikipage is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_James I have no way to know if James is the first person to use it. But I thought I'd offer that to you for what it is worth. It's entirely possible that in any culture that possessed the technology for chains such a saying could exist. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 6:11 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any philosopher, politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in fact, a proverb. Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context of (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist chain". I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a proverb rather than an aphorism. Thank you. Ulvi P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the imperialist chain via a revolution. From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 06:53:24 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 16:53:24 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA?= =?utf-8?b?0LLRkdGC0YHRjw==?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Excellent! Thank you very much. 9 Oca 2016 16:51 tarihinde "White, Phillip" yazd?: > 'It is clearly a literal fact that a chain is only as strong as its > weakest link. The conversion of that notion into a figurative phrase was > established in the language by the 18th century. Thomas Reid's Essays on > the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1786, included this line: > > '"In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be > no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the > strength of the rest."' > > http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/the-weakest-link.html > > phillip > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Annalisa Aguilar > Sent: Friday, January 8, 2016 9:56 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? > > Hello Ulvi, > > I did a search and the intertubes tell me it is a quote by William James > (1842-1910): > Of course most of the websites are nothing official, but there were a few > sites stating it. Marxist.org is the only place where it states it as > something Lenin said, which was published in 1917. > > The William James wikipage is here: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_James > > I have no way to know if James is the first person to use it. But I > thought I'd offer that to you for what it is worth. > > It's entirely possible that in any culture that possessed the technology > for chains such a saying could exist. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > > Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 6:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? > > Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger > than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) > > Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any philosopher, > politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in fact, > a proverb. > > Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context of > (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist > chain". > > I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a > proverb rather than an aphorism. > > Thank you. > > Ulvi > > P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have > supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the > imperialist chain via a revolution. > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 07:05:43 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 17:05:43 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA?= =?utf-8?b?0LLRkdGC0YHRjw==?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you! Ulvi On 9 January 2016 at 11:19, Bella Kotik-Friedgut wrote: > ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? is really a Russian proverb. Sometimes > equivalent proverbs are present in different languages like "An apple falls > not far from the tree" , but sometimes similar meaning is presented in > different words and/or metaphors. Yosef Guri in Israel published an > interesting dictionary of equivalent proverbs in Russian, Hebrew, Yiddish > and English, where some are translations, some same meaning in different > words. > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 3:11 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger > > than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) > > > > Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any > philosopher, > > politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in > fact, > > a proverb. > > > > Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context > of > > (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist > > chain". > > > > I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a > > proverb rather than an aphorism. > > > > Thank you. > > > > Ulvi > > > > P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have > > supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the > > imperialist chain via a revolution. > > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 07:07:31 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 17:07:31 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA?= =?utf-8?b?0LLRkdGC0YHRjw==?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you! On 9 January 2016 at 16:49, White, Phillip wrote: > 'It is clearly a literal fact that a chain is only as strong as its > weakest link. The conversion of that notion into a figurative phrase was > established in the language by the 18th century. Thomas Reid's Essays on > the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1786, included this line: > > '"In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be > no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the > strength of the rest."' > > http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/the-weakest-link.html > > phillip > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Annalisa Aguilar > Sent: Friday, January 8, 2016 9:56 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? > > Hello Ulvi, > > I did a search and the intertubes tell me it is a quote by William James > (1842-1910): > Of course most of the websites are nothing official, but there were a few > sites stating it. Marxist.org is the only place where it states it as > something Lenin said, which was published in 1917. > > The William James wikipage is here: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_James > > I have no way to know if James is the first person to use it. But I > thought I'd offer that to you for what it is worth. > > It's entirely possible that in any culture that possessed the technology > for chains such a saying could exist. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > > Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 6:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? > > Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger > than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) > > Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any philosopher, > politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in fact, > a proverb. > > Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context of > (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist > chain". > > I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a > proverb rather than an aphorism. > > Thank you. > > Ulvi > > P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have > supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the > imperialist chain via a revolution. > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 07:10:44 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 17:10:44 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0JPQtNC1INGC0L7MgdC90LrQviDigJQg0YLQsNC8INC4INGA?= =?utf-8?b?0LLRkdGC0YHRjw==?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: And "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man" A incredibly fascinating title for a book!! On 9 January 2016 at 16:49, White, Phillip wrote: > 'It is clearly a literal fact that a chain is only as strong as its > weakest link. The conversion of that notion into a figurative phrase was > established in the language by the 18th century. Thomas Reid's Essays on > the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1786, included this line: > > '"In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be > no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the > strength of the rest."' > > http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/the-weakest-link.html > > phillip > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Annalisa Aguilar > Sent: Friday, January 8, 2016 9:56 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? > > Hello Ulvi, > > I did a search and the intertubes tell me it is a quote by William James > (1842-1910): > Of course most of the websites are nothing official, but there were a few > sites stating it. Marxist.org is the only place where it states it as > something Lenin said, which was published in 1917. > > The William James wikipage is here: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_James > > I have no way to know if James is the first person to use it. But I > thought I'd offer that to you for what it is worth. > > It's entirely possible that in any culture that possessed the technology > for chains such a saying could exist. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > > Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 6:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] ??? ?????? ? ??? ? ?????? > > Thus we may justly quote the Russian proverb: ?The chain is no stronger > than its weakest link.? (Ilyenkov) > > Can anyone kindly confirm that this is not an aphorism by any philosopher, > politician, like Lenin or Trotsky, but it is, as Ilyenkov says it, in fact, > a proverb. > > Up to now, I though it was rather a theoretical aphorism, in the context of > (capitalist) imperialism, like "Russia is a weak link of the imperialist > chain". > > I do not know Russian, but the wording in Russian makes me think it is a > proverb rather than an aphorism. > > Thank you. > > Ulvi > > P.S. I think that, even if it is a proverb, and as such, it should have > supported immensely a political perspective to detach Russia from the > imperialist chain via a revolution. > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 12:19:31 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 20:19:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?) You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds of exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects of your paper you find interesting, problematic etc. For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for this. For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity (i.e. the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of mine. I think you can draw us in, yes? Best, Huw On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell wrote: > Greetings, > > Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based learning: > > http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 > > I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action research. > > Kind Regards, > Hugh O'Donnell > > http://bluetanso.WordPress.com > Twitter: @bluetanso > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 13:03:39 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 14:03:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Groundings that make life worlds MORE real In-Reply-To: <568fde8d.530a620a.1395.ffffc347@mx.google.com> References: <568fde8d.530a620a.1395.ffffc347@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, Thanks for the engagement here. First off, I remain ambivalent about the idea of "more" real. On the one hand, I think it gives some flexibility to a concept ("the real") that can be overly simplistic - either it is real or it is imagined (as if imagination isn't real!). On the other hand, I think that it could easily slide into a way of seeing social worlds as "less real" than material worlds. (I would prefer to avoid that dualism but it seems that a building has a qualitatively different nature than does a sewing circle. But I'd like to think about that some more before being so bold). Off the top of my head, I'm wondering if a better way of thinking this might be "finished" or, perhaps, "finalized" (as in Bakhtin's notion of "finalizability"). Thus, just as a building can be not yet "finalized", so too can a social group or a social act. An unfinalized real. Perhaps. Yes, I think the hearth as interobjective binding of oikos makes perfect sense to me. But I wonder, where is the hearth today. Despite all the laments about the television in the 50's and 60's (or the radio prior to that), it at least had a hearth like quality to it. Family members would gather round it and watch their favorite show (but yes, notice that as compared to a campfire, tv's didn't put people face to face). Today, each family member has their own screen and they might sit in the same room while watching their screen, but the oikos-tic interobjectivity is rather limited. Just my thoughts here. Thanks again for allowing my inscriptional object to pull us together... Best, greg On Fri, Jan 8, 2016 at 9:06 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Greg Thompson posted the article - temporality, stance ownership, and the > constitution of subjectivity - to academia.edu > > Greg, this article carried me through your exploration of -stance > ownership - that opened new ways of connecting particular ways to make life > more real. > The three groundings presented: > - intersubjectivity through recognition > - embodied indexical iconicity > - interobjectivity as the stance of things. > > Your paper guided me to a deep appreciation of the complexity of making > life worlds more real. > I found the exploration of embodied indexical iconicity the most > transformative learning. > However, I wanted to explore the notion of interobjectivity as agentic in > one particular case. > Can we imagine the oikos realm as interobjective? > For the oikos realm to be interobjective is to recognize this realm as an > object of evaluation. > This means an orientation towards this object that has particular > characteristics. > In other words the oikos realm having some specific quality or value. > > I am suggesting that the specific quality of the oikos realm is -mutuality > - in itself. > > The notion of mutuality for its own sake. > If the figure of Hestia embodies this oikos realm, then the gathering > around the hearth in itself results in flourishing. > The hearth as interobjective stancetaking leading to particular > characters or figures of intersubjective stancetaking and particular > characters or figures of embodied iconicity. > The quality and values of the places within placings in particular as > evaluative orientations toward the oikos realm as interobjective. > > I recommend Greg's paper as a contribution to understanding particular > groundings making life worlds more real. > > I found the connections generated were transformative. > Larry > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From rebecca.lewis.79@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 13:29:28 2016 From: rebecca.lewis.79@gmail.com (Rebecca Lewis) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 08:29:28 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] (no subject) Message-ID: <5A2244C8-C096-49C7-AF29-10DB3F78BE2F@gmail.com> To who it may concern, How do I get my name removed from this mailing list? Kind regards Sent from my iPhone From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jan 9 16:26:46 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 11:26:46 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] removal from list In-Reply-To: <5A2244C8-C096-49C7-AF29-10DB3F78BE2F@gmail.com> References: <5A2244C8-C096-49C7-AF29-10DB3F78BE2F@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5691A546.8030602@mira.net> send a message to Bruce Jones Bruce Jones Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 10/01/2016 8:29 AM, Rebecca Lewis wrote: > To who it may concern, > How do I get my name removed from this mailing list? > Kind regards > > Sent from my iPhone > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 17:02:24 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2016 17:02:24 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Groundings that make life worlds MORE real In-Reply-To: References: <568fde8d.530a620a.1395.ffffc347@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5691acff.4a7a420a.f2b11.ffffc0f3@mx.google.com> Greg, This question, Where is the oikos realm today? This Is the question I was engaging. I have attached your article so others may explore the complexity of stance ownership. The simplistic understanding that if the subject takes a stance, that that stance move in itself implies the subject then owns the stance. In other words to intentionally act [act on purpose] in itself generates ownership of that stance taken. This locates stance ownership as being generated from within the individual person's purposeful acts. Your article indicating that this is a very simplistic understanding of stance ownership and your analysis proposing there are actually three interrelated movements [stances] involved. The intersubjective mode The embodied iconic mode The interobjective mode. This is an expanded or enlarged triangulated depiction that develops a more complex figuration of stance ownership. What I am referring to as the vitality of the oikos realm may atrophy when market and state and empire forces of dis-placement actually dis-possess persons from the places which generate experiencing the vitality of the oikos realm. I am suggesting this realm of vitality recedes from awareness when neo-liberal market and state and empire forces dominate public discourse and activity I am not indicating the oikos realm as a utopia. I recognize the oikos realm can have a shadow side and be oppressive, patriarchal and deadening. However, the 3 modes of stance ownership indicated in your article may play out differently within inhabited places which express the quality of mutuality ? mutuality for itself as a way of flourishing. This contrasts with the notion of nature as bare existence where survival needs are dominant, or nature as market forces determined by rational economic calculations. I am proposing a notion of human desire for mutuality itself. The yearning and longing for intersubjective, embodied, interobjective movements of stance ownership generated within inhabited places of mutuality. Greg, these places may exist in our historical epoch more as expressions of yearning and desire but I am suggesting they may actually be vital for human flourishing. Your article invites us to go beyond notions of stance ownership as existing within purposeful individual stance moves. To consider the complexity of 3 modes of stance that extend beyond individual stance acts. I am suggesting that the various arenas [such as state, market, empire] may be dis-possessing us of the oikos realm leaving us with neo-liberal forms of stance ownership where our stances become instrumental and calculated. If I can give one example to make my case. This example comes from Ian Angus at SFU. In Scotland, the English empire invaded the Scottish highlands and cleared the land of the inhabitants and their way of life. This is known as the *clearances* The land was fenced and populated with sheep. I am suggesting the *clearances* destroyed the indigenous oikos realm where the stance taking of inter-subjectivity, embodied iconicity, and interobjectivity had existed and had been evaluated through a shared sense of mutuality or shared being-in-the-world. Binswanger enlarged Heidegger?s notion of being-in-the world to include 3 realms. Umwelt [cultural historical and material environment] Mitwelt [intersubjective realm of mutuality] Eigenwelt [private interior realm]. I am suggesting that with the expansion of market state and empire that there is a general clearing away of the oikos realm that leads to tragic consequences. This is the message of Greek tragedy. A sense of being-in-the-world as being home becomes unheimlich [uncanny] and we are left yearning and longing for that place of mutuality as a particular kind of stance ownership. larry Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Greg Thompson Sent: Saturday, January 9, 2016 1:04 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Groundings that make life worlds MORE real Larry, Thanks for the engagement here. First off, I remain ambivalent about the idea of "more" real. On the one hand, I think it gives some flexibility to a concept ("the real") that can be overly simplistic - either it is real or it is imagined (as if imagination isn't real!). On the other hand, I think that it could easily slide into a way of seeing social worlds as "less real" than material worlds. (I would prefer to avoid that dualism but it seems that a building has a qualitatively different nature than does a sewing circle. But I'd like to think about that some more before being so bold). Off the top of my head, I'm wondering if a better way of thinking this might be "finished" or, perhaps, "finalized" (as in Bakhtin's notion of "finalizability"). Thus, just as a building can be not yet "finalized", so too can a social group or a social act. An unfinalized real. Perhaps. Yes, I think the hearth as interobjective binding of oikos makes perfect sense to me. But I wonder, where is the hearth today. Despite all the laments about the television in the 50's and 60's (or the radio prior to that), it at least had a hearth like quality to it. Family members would gather round it and watch their favorite show (but yes, notice that as compared to a campfire, tv's didn't put people face to face). Today, each family member has their own screen and they might sit in the same room while watching their screen, but the oikos-tic interobjectivity is rather limited. Just my thoughts here. Thanks again for allowing my inscriptional object to pull us together... Best, greg On Fri, Jan 8, 2016 at 9:06 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Greg Thompson posted the article - temporality, stance ownership, and the > constitution of subjectivity - to academia.edu > > Greg, this article carried me through your exploration of -stance > ownership - that opened new ways of connecting particular ways to make life > more real. > The three groundings presented: > - intersubjectivity through recognition > - embodied indexical iconicity > - interobjectivity as the stance of things. > > Your paper guided me to a deep appreciation of the complexity of making > life worlds more real. > I found the exploration of embodied indexical iconicity the most > transformative learning. > However, I wanted to explore the notion of interobjectivity as agentic in > one particular case. > Can we imagine the oikos realm as interobjective? > For the oikos realm to be interobjective is to recognize this realm as an > object of evaluation. > This means an orientation towards this object that has particular > characteristics. > In other words the oikos realm having some specific quality or value. > > I am suggesting that the specific quality of the oikos realm is -mutuality > - in itself. > > The notion of mutuality for its own sake. > If the figure of Hestia embodies this oikos realm, then the gathering > around the hearth in itself results in flourishing. > The hearth as interobjective stancetaking leading to particular > characters or figures of intersubjective stancetaking and particular > characters or figures of embodied iconicity. > The quality and values of the places within placings in particular as > evaluative orientations toward the oikos realm as interobjective. > > I recommend Greg's paper as a contribution to understanding particular > groundings making life worlds more real. > > I found the connections generated were transformative. > Larry > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JANUARY 4 2016 THOMPSON GREG Temporality_stance_ownership_and_the_constitution of identity.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 308443 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160109/793be880/attachment.pdf From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 22:02:32 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 15:02:32 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Huw: Here's what Vygotsky really says: ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. (Russian Collected Works, p. 117). This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an unmediated or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would be completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring to is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a series of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in the Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the teat: you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, blueness, etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively colored whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's schemata". Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes, and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful to distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant behavior: in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred to > in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, p.85 > and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. > > Best, > Huw > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Jan 9 23:04:07 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 07:04:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I thought Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics you have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, is "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from the perspective of thinking about processes. Best, Huw On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > Here's what Vygotsky really says: > > ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? > ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? > ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. (Russian > Collected Works, p. 117). > > This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond > the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an unmediated > or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would be > completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". > > I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two > dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring to > is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an > affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively > colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were > absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a series > of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in the > Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > > What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a > triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all > different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the teat: > you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He > taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of > satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore > the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, blueness, > etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not > drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively colored > whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's > schemata". > > Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never > grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes, > and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the > German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful to > distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant behavior: > in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior > (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred > to > > in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, p.85 > > and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 10 09:32:56 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 02:32:56 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Huw: Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", "for others", "for myself". One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name", the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech development. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I thought > Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not > only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics you > have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. > > I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a > process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, is > "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from the > perspective of thinking about processes. > > Best, > Huw > > On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Huw: > > > > Here's what Vygotsky really says: > > > > ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? > > ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? > > ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. > (Russian > > Collected Works, p. 117). > > > > This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond > > the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an > unmediated > > or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would > be > > completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". > > > > I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two > > dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring to > > is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an > > affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively > > colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were > > absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a > series > > of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in > the > > Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > > > > What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a > > triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all > > different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the > teat: > > you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He > > taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of > > satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore > > the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, > blueness, > > etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not > > drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively colored > > whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's > > schemata". > > > > Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never > > grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes, > > and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the > > German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful to > > distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant > behavior: > > in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior > > (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred > > to > > > in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, > p.85 > > > and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Jan 10 11:16:06 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 19:16:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: That seems to be about the development of understanding of the units of construed things, David, from the unit at the level of an ostensive thing, to a unit of any ostensive index as a thing. That is, for the young child thingness is socially given, it isn't socially construed, whereby the understanding of the construal of objects resolves the contradiction between things that can be named but not pointed to ostensively. According to our 4.5 year old, Monday is thing that you are in, but that you can't point to. Our 1.5 year old is a virtuoso pointer, and will rather point than utter sounds. Some of his pointing seems to have some particular qualifications: occasionally he will point with his finger alongside his eye (a bit like the way we can make pretend horns) and sometimes he points upwards, like a gesture half-way between raising his hand and very vaguely gesturing at the thing that is wanted. He will often go and fetch books that we look at together. One of the books we looked at today has pictures of a man and toddler (example picture here: https://jillsbooks.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/jan-ormerod-illustration-reading.jpg?w=500&h=375). When I asked him who the child is, he pointed at himself, when I asked him who the man was, he pointed to me. My interpretation is that he is saying something along the lines of, "that is a toddler like me, and this is the toddler's daddy, like you". Best, Huw On 10 January 2016 at 17:32, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word > "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three > "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", "for > others", "for myself". > > One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the > Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three > moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. > "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is > ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a > name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place > Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding > that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that > everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? > > I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant > as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing > to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something > with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name", > the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could > be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the > idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name > objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of > pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is > indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech > development. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I > thought > > Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not > > only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics > you > > have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. > > > > I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a > > process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, > is > > "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from > the > > perspective of thinking about processes. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Huw: > > > > > > Here's what Vygotsky really says: > > > > > > ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? > > > ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? > > > ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. > > (Russian > > > Collected Works, p. 117). > > > > > > This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go > beyond > > > the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an > > unmediated > > > or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would > > be > > > completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". > > > > > > I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two > > > dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring > to > > > is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an > > > affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively > > > colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were > > > absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a > > series > > > of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in > > the > > > Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > > > > > > What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a > > > triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all > > > different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the > > teat: > > > you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He > > > taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of > > > satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually > ignore > > > the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, > > blueness, > > > etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not > > > drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively > colored > > > whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's > > > schemata". > > > > > > Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never > > > grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior > wholes, > > > and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the > > > German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful > to > > > distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant > > behavior: > > > in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior > > > (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is > referred > > > to > > > > in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, > > p.85 > > > > and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 10 16:10:09 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 11:10:09 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those concepts. Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" but these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they are also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three moments. In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a general secretary, can we? I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of Logic in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word > "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three > "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", "for > others", "for myself". > > One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the > Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three > moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. > "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is > ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a > name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place > Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding > that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that > everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? > > I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant > as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing > to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something > with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name", > the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could > be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the > idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name > objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of > pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is > indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech > development. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I thought >> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not >> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics you >> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >> >> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a >> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, is >> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from the >> perspective of thinking about processes. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Huw: >>> >>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>> >>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >> (Russian >>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>> >>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond >>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >> unmediated >>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would >> be >>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>> >>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring to >>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an >>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively >>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >> series >>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >> the >>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>> >>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a >>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the >> teat: >>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He >>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of >>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore >>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >> blueness, >>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not >>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively colored >>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>> schemata". >>> >>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never >>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes, >>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the >>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful to >>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >> behavior: >>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior >>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred >>> to >>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, >> p.85 >>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jan 10 16:23:36 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 16:23:36 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> Message-ID: The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The differing interpretations have quite different implications. mike On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, > David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those > concepts. > > Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" but > these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they are > also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three moments. > In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general > secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot > conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a general > secretary, can we? > > I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just > presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... > moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of > mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of Logic > in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Huw: >> >> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word >> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three >> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", >> "for >> others", "for myself". >> >> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the >> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three >> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. >> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is >> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a >> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place >> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding >> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that >> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? >> >> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant >> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing >> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something >> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name", >> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could >> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the >> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name >> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of >> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is >> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech >> development. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I thought >>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not >>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics >>> you >>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>> >>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a >>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, >>> is >>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from >>> the >>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Huw: >>>> >>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>> >>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >>>> >>> (Russian >>> >>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>> >>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond >>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >>>> >>> unmediated >>> >>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would >>>> >>> be >>> >>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>>> >>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring >>>> to >>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an >>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively >>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >>>> >>> series >>> >>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>>> >>> the >>> >>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>> >>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a >>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the >>>> >>> teat: >>> >>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He >>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of >>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore >>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >>>> >>> blueness, >>> >>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not >>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively >>>> colored >>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>>> schemata". >>>> >>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never >>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes, >>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the >>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful >>>> to >>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >>>> >>> behavior: >>> >>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior >>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred >>>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>>> >>>> p.85 >>> >>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Jan 10 17:20:03 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 01:20:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> Message-ID: <03DE8A63-B13C-4E1F-8ED0-CEEFFA0DA6A1@uniandes.edu.co> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology. Here is an accessible account of the basics: Martin On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole wrote: > The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The differing > interpretations have quite different implications. > mike > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, >> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those >> concepts. >> >> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" but >> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they are >> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three moments. >> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general >> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot >> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a general >> secretary, can we? >> >> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just >> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... >> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of >> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of Logic >> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Huw: >>> >>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word >>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three >>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", >>> "for >>> others", "for myself". >>> >>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the >>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three >>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. >>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is >>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a >>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place >>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding >>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that >>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? >>> >>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant >>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing >>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something >>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name", >>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could >>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the >>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name >>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of >>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is >>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech >>> development. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I thought >>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not >>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics >>>> you >>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>>> >>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a >>>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, >>>> is >>>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from >>>> the >>>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Huw: >>>>> >>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>>> >>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >>>>> >>>> (Russian >>>> >>>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>>> >>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond >>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >>>>> >>>> unmediated >>>> >>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would >>>>> >>>> be >>>> >>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>>>> >>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring >>>>> to >>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an >>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively >>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >>>>> >>>> series >>>> >>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>>> >>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a >>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the >>>>> >>>> teat: >>>> >>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He >>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of >>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore >>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >>>>> >>>> blueness, >>>> >>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not >>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively >>>>> colored >>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>>>> schemata". >>>>> >>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never >>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes, >>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the >>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful >>>>> to >>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >>>>> >>>> behavior: >>>> >>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior >>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>>>> >>>>> p.85 >>>> >>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 10 17:29:15 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:29:15 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> Message-ID: <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike. Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he thought should have been "instants" and then David introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," which was the subject of my comment. I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment" were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..." The one odd reference is this one: "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to represent the *moments* of this genetic process in their mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we have diverged from the complex and twisting path that characterizes the actual development of the child?s concepts." It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here to the distinct modes of conception which were manifested in the child's activity, at different stages, but which are combined in the most developed pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of association as "moments" of concept formation in the other sense of the word "moment" which is not interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for sure. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: > The theoretical point seems interesting and worth > clarifying. The differing interpretations have quite > different implications. > mike > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a > stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use phase, > category, stage or division for those concepts. > > Individual, Particular and Universal are typical > examples of "moments" but these are not steps, phases > or stages of the concepts, even though they are also > exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all > three moments. In a trade union, the members, the > branches/divisions and the general secretary are > individual, universal and particular moments. We > cannot conceive of a union developing from an > individual to a branch to a general secretary, can we? > > I will look into the origins of this expression. I > have always just presumed it came from mathematics, as > in the first, second, third, ... moments of a > function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of > mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in > the Science of Logic in his critique of calculus. But > I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Huw: > > Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often > "moments", and the word > "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a > step (as in the three > "moments" of the formation of the concept in > Hegel, as in "in itself", "for > others", "for myself". > > One of the most difficult problems we had to solve > in translating the > Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very > clearly distinguishes three > moments of speech development: indicative, > nominative, and signifying. > "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing > gesture. "Nominating" is > ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming > function: "every thing has a > name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin > down, and in one place > Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with > the adult understanding > that anything can be named. So what is the > difference between knowing that > everything has a name and the knowledge that any > thing can be named? > > I think that the distinction is just as subtle and > just as significant > as the distinction between pointing to something > with a gesture, pointing > to something with a word like "this" or "that", > and pointing to something > with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that > "everything has a name", > the name could be extremely general ("everything" > or "thing") or it could > be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But > I don't yet have the > idea that names are invented, and that therefore > it is possible to name > objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring > into existence modes of > pure abstract thinking through language. That's > signifying, and it is > indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the > lifelong process of speech > development. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > Thank you, David. That helps to explain a > particular aspect that I thought > Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, > which is that stimuli can not > only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they > afford the kind of dynamics you > have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. > > I have also noted that the translation of > phrases like "instances of a > process" is probably off the mark too. What > is really meant, I believe, is > "instants of a process". These have two > rather different meanings from the > perspective of thinking about processes. > > Best, > Huw > > On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Huw: > > Here's what Vygotsky really says: > > ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? > ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? > ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. > ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? > ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, > ???????????? ???????????. > > (Russian > > Collected Works, p. 117). > > This means (as nearly as I can make out): > "If the task did not go beyond > the natural capability of the child, he > could deal with it in an > > unmediated > > or primitive method. In this cases, the > structure of his behavior would > > be > > completely similar to the scheme as > presented by Volkelt". > > I think there is no diagramme, at least > not in the sense of a two > dimensional graphic one can have a copy > of. What Vygotsky is referring to > is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child > behavior as the result of an > affectively tinged FUSION of perception > and behavior, an affectively > colored, unanalyzable, whole in which > perception and behavior were > absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans > Volkelt concluded from a > > series > > of experiments that Vygotsky refers to > repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in > > the > > Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > > What Volkelt did was this: he had four > baby bottles: one shaped like a > triangle, one like a violin, one like a > square, etc. They were all > different colors as well. But three of > them didn't have holes in the > > teat: > > you could see and smell the milk but you > couldn't drink it. One did. He > taught the infants to associate the > drinking of milk and the feeling of > satiation with one particular bottle, so > that they would actually ignore > the bottle unless it had all the > characteristics: triangularity, > > blueness, > > etc. So Volkelt argued that from the > child's point of view, he was not > drinking milk but triangular blue milk. > This kind of "affectively colored > whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as > "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's > schemata". > > Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He > eventually decided that we never > grow out of unanalyzable affectively > colored perception-behavior wholes, > and this would explain the indivisible and > inseparable devotion of the > German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later > work Vygotsky is very careful to > distance himself from Volkelt even in his > explanations of infant > > behavior: > > in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that > ALL THREE layers of behavior > (that is, instinct, habit, and > intelligence) are present in infancy. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's > diagram" to hand that is referred > > to > > in The History of the Development of > Higher Mental Functions (1997, > > p.85 > > and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think > a reference is given. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural > science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 10 17:32:32 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:32:32 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <03DE8A63-B13C-4E1F-8ED0-CEEFFA0DA6A1@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <03DE8A63-B13C-4E1F-8ED0-CEEFFA0DA6A1@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <56930630.2090309@mira.net> Exactly, Martin. The article does give a very simple explanation, doesn't it! :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/01/2016 12:20 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology. Here is an accessible account of the basics: > > > > Martin > > On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The differing >> interpretations have quite different implications. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, >>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those >>> concepts. >>> >>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" but >>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they are >>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three moments. >>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general >>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot >>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a general >>> secretary, can we? >>> >>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just >>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... >>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of >>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of Logic >>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Huw: >>>> >>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word >>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three >>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", >>>> "for >>>> others", "for myself". >>>> >>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the >>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three >>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. >>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is >>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a >>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place >>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding >>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that >>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? >>>> >>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant >>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing >>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something >>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name", >>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could >>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the >>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name >>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of >>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is >>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech >>>> development. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I thought >>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not >>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics >>>>> you >>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>>>> >>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a >>>>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, >>>>> is >>>>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from >>>>> the >>>>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Huw: >>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>>>> >>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >>>>>> >>>>> (Russian >>>>> >>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>>>> >>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond >>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >>>>>> >>>>> unmediated >>>>> >>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would >>>>>> >>>>> be >>>>> >>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>>>>> >>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring >>>>>> to >>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an >>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively >>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >>>>>> >>>>> series >>>>> >>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>>>> >>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a >>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the >>>>>> >>>>> teat: >>>>> >>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He >>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of >>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore >>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >>>>>> >>>>> blueness, >>>>> >>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not >>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively >>>>>> colored >>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>>>>> schemata". >>>>>> >>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never >>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes, >>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the >>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful >>>>>> to >>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >>>>>> >>>>> behavior: >>>>> >>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior >>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>>>>> >>>>>> p.85 >>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jan 10 17:36:57 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 17:36:57 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> Message-ID: I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked, events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception. still learning! mike On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike. > Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he thought should have been > "instants" and then David introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of > "moments," which was the subject of my comment. > > I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that all bar one > instance of the use of the word "moment" were in the sense of "at this > moment in the story ..." The one odd reference is this one: > > "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the > analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to > represent the *moments* of this genetic process in their > mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we > have diverged from the complex and twisting path that > characterizes the actual development of the child?s > concepts." > > It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here to the distinct > modes of conception which were manifested in the child's activity, at > different stages, but which are combined in the most developed > pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative complexes, collection > complexes, chain complexes, diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could > not possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. Perhaps their *first > appearance* in ontogenesis could form some kind of regular sequence, > possibly, but it is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of > association as "moments" of concept formation in the other sense of the > word "moment" which is not interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't > say for sure. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The >> differing interpretations have quite different implications. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a >> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use phase, >> category, stage or division for those concepts. >> >> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical >> examples of "moments" but these are not steps, phases >> or stages of the concepts, even though they are also >> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all >> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the >> branches/divisions and the general secretary are >> individual, universal and particular moments. We >> cannot conceive of a union developing from an >> individual to a branch to a general secretary, can we? >> >> I will look into the origins of this expression. I >> have always just presumed it came from mathematics, as >> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a >> function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of >> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in >> the Science of Logic in his critique of calculus. But >> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often >> "moments", and the word >> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a >> step (as in the three >> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for >> others", "for myself". >> >> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve >> in translating the >> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very >> clearly distinguishes three >> moments of speech development: indicative, >> nominative, and signifying. >> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing >> gesture. "Nominating" is >> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming >> function: "every thing has a >> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin >> down, and in one place >> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with >> the adult understanding >> that anything can be named. So what is the >> difference between knowing that >> everything has a name and the knowledge that any >> thing can be named? >> >> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and >> just as significant >> as the distinction between pointing to something >> with a gesture, pointing >> to something with a word like "this" or "that", >> and pointing to something >> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that >> "everything has a name", >> the name could be extremely general ("everything" >> or "thing") or it could >> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But >> I don't yet have the >> idea that names are invented, and that therefore >> it is possible to name >> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring >> into existence modes of >> pure abstract thinking through language. That's >> signifying, and it is >> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the >> lifelong process of speech >> development. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a >> particular aspect that I thought >> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >> which is that stimuli can not >> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they >> afford the kind of dynamics you >> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >> >> I have also noted that the translation of >> phrases like "instances of a >> process" is probably off the mark too. What >> is really meant, I believe, is >> "instants of a process". These have two >> rather different meanings from the >> perspective of thinking about processes. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >> > > wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >> >> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? >> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. >> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >> ???????????? ???????????. >> >> (Russian >> >> Collected Works, p. 117). >> >> This means (as nearly as I can make out): >> "If the task did not go beyond >> the natural capability of the child, he >> could deal with it in an >> >> unmediated >> >> or primitive method. In this cases, the >> structure of his behavior would >> >> be >> >> completely similar to the scheme as >> presented by Volkelt". >> >> I think there is no diagramme, at least >> not in the sense of a two >> dimensional graphic one can have a copy >> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child >> behavior as the result of an >> affectively tinged FUSION of perception >> and behavior, an affectively >> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >> perception and behavior were >> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans >> Volkelt concluded from a >> >> series >> >> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >> >> the >> >> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >> >> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >> baby bottles: one shaped like a >> triangle, one like a violin, one like a >> square, etc. They were all >> different colors as well. But three of >> them didn't have holes in the >> >> teat: >> >> you could see and smell the milk but you >> couldn't drink it. One did. He >> taught the infants to associate the >> drinking of milk and the feeling of >> satiation with one particular bottle, so >> that they would actually ignore >> the bottle unless it had all the >> characteristics: triangularity, >> >> blueness, >> >> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >> child's point of view, he was not >> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. >> This kind of "affectively colored >> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >> schemata". >> >> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >> eventually decided that we never >> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >> colored perception-behavior wholes, >> and this would explain the indivisible and >> inseparable devotion of the >> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later >> work Vygotsky is very careful to >> distance himself from Volkelt even in his >> explanations of infant >> >> behavior: >> >> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that >> ALL THREE layers of behavior >> (that is, instinct, habit, and >> intelligence) are present in infancy. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's >> diagram" to hand that is referred >> >> to >> >> in The History of the Development of >> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >> >> p.85 >> >> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think >> a reference is given. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 10 17:59:36 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:59:36 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> Message-ID: <56930C88.6080101@mira.net> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means "An essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity" first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838. But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: > I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working > on the phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of > part-whole relation is what is at issue and "moments" in > this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked, events. > Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the > exception. > > still learning! > mike > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike. > Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he > thought should have been "instants" and then David > introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," > which was the subject of my comment. > > I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that > all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment" > were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..." > The one odd reference is this one: > > "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the > analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to > represent the *moments* of this genetic process in > their > mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we > have diverged from the complex and twisting path that > characterizes the actual development of the child?s > concepts." > > It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here > to the distinct modes of conception which were > manifested in the child's activity, at different > stages, but which are combined in the most developed > pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative > complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, > diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not > possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. > Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could > form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it > is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of > association as "moments" of concept formation in the > other sense of the word "moment" which is not > interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for > sure. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: > > The theoretical point seems interesting and worth > clarifying. The differing interpretations have > quite different implications. > mike > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a > stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use > phase, > category, stage or division for those concepts. > > Individual, Particular and Universal are typical > examples of "moments" but these are not steps, > phases > or stages of the concepts, even though they > are also > exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept > has all > three moments. In a trade union, the members, the > branches/divisions and the general secretary are > individual, universal and particular moments. We > cannot conceive of a union developing from an > individual to a branch to a general secretary, > can we? > > I will look into the origins of this expression. I > have always just presumed it came from > mathematics, as > in the first, second, third, ... moments of a > function, and I know Hegel did study this > branch of > mathematics, because he gives a lot of space > to it in > the Science of Logic in his critique of > calculus. But > I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Huw: > > Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even > more often > "moments", and the word > "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a > phase, or a > step (as in the three > "moments" of the formation of the concept in > Hegel, as in "in itself", "for > others", "for myself". > > One of the most difficult problems we had > to solve > in translating the > Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very > clearly distinguishes three > moments of speech development: indicative, > nominative, and signifying. > "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a > pointing > gesture. "Nominating" is > ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming > function: "every thing has a > name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin > down, and in one place > Vygotsky actually says that it is > synonymous with > the adult understanding > that anything can be named. So what is the > difference between knowing that > everything has a name and the knowledge > that any > thing can be named? > > I think that the distinction is just as > subtle and > just as significant > as the distinction between pointing to > something > with a gesture, pointing > to something with a word like "this" or > "that", > and pointing to something > with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I > say that > "everything has a name", > the name could be extremely general > ("everything" > or "thing") or it could > be highly specific ("Huw" or "this > computer"). But > I don't yet have the > idea that names are invented, and that > therefore > it is possible to name > objects which do not exist, and therefore > to bring > into existence modes of > pure abstract thinking through language. > That's > signifying, and it is > indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the > lifelong process of speech > development. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd > > >> > wrote: > > Thank you, David. That helps to explain a > particular aspect that I thought > Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, > which is that stimuli can not > only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they > afford the kind of dynamics you > have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. > > I have also noted that the translation of > phrases like "instances of a > process" is probably off the mark > too. What > is really meant, I believe, is > "instants of a process". These have two > rather different meanings from the > perspective of thinking about processes. > > Best, > Huw > > On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg > > >> wrote: > > Huw: > > Here's what Vygotsky really says: > > ???? ?????? ?? ????????? > ???????????? ??? > ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? > ???????????????? ??? ??????????? > ????????. > ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? > ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, > ???????????? ???????????. > > (Russian > > Collected Works, p. 117). > > This means (as nearly as I can > make out): > "If the task did not go beyond > the natural capability of the > child, he > could deal with it in an > > unmediated > > or primitive method. In this > cases, the > structure of his behavior would > > be > > completely similar to the scheme as > presented by Volkelt". > > I think there is no diagramme, at > least > not in the sense of a two > dimensional graphic one can have a > copy > of. What Vygotsky is referring to > is Volkelt's attempt to explain > all child > behavior as the result of an > affectively tinged FUSION of > perception > and behavior, an affectively > colored, unanalyzable, whole in which > perception and behavior were > absolutely inseparable. This was > what Hans > Volkelt concluded from a > > series > > of experiments that Vygotsky refers to > repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in > > the > > Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > > What Volkelt did was this: he had four > baby bottles: one shaped like a > triangle, one like a violin, one > like a > square, etc. They were all > different colors as well. But three of > them didn't have holes in the > > teat: > > you could see and smell the milk > but you > couldn't drink it. One did. He > taught the infants to associate the > drinking of milk and the feeling of > satiation with one particular > bottle, so > that they would actually ignore > the bottle unless it had all the > characteristics: triangularity, > > blueness, > > etc. So Volkelt argued that from the > child's point of view, he was not > drinking milk but triangular blue > milk. > This kind of "affectively colored > whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as > "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's > schemata". > > Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He > eventually decided that we never > grow out of unanalyzable affectively > colored perception-behavior wholes, > and this would explain the > indivisible and > inseparable devotion of the > German volk to their Fuhrer. So in > later > work Vygotsky is very careful to > distance himself from Volkelt even > in his > explanations of infant > > behavior: > > in the Lectures on Pedology he > argues that > ALL THREE layers of behavior > (that is, instinct, habit, and > intelligence) are present in infancy. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, > Huw Lloyd > > >> > wrote: > > Does anyone have a copy of > "Volkelt's > diagram" to hand that is referred > > to > > in The History of the > Development of > Higher Mental Functions (1997, > > p.85 > > and onwards in ch. 4)? I > don't think > a reference is given. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a > natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural > science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jan 10 18:11:28 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 18:11:28 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <56930C88.6080101@mira.net> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> <56930C88.6080101@mira.net> Message-ID: just cole's intuitions as enacted at a crucial juncture by his fingers. mike On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:59 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means "An > essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity" > first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838. > But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess > that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the >> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what >> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked, >> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception. >> >> still learning! >> mike >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike. >> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he >> thought should have been "instants" and then David >> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," >> which was the subject of my comment. >> >> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that >> all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment" >> were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..." >> The one odd reference is this one: >> >> "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the >> analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to >> represent the *moments* of this genetic process in >> their >> mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we >> have diverged from the complex and twisting path that >> characterizes the actual development of the child?s >> concepts." >> >> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here >> to the distinct modes of conception which were >> manifested in the child's activity, at different >> stages, but which are combined in the most developed >> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative >> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, >> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not >> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. >> Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could >> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it >> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of >> association as "moments" of concept formation in the >> other sense of the word "moment" which is not >> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for >> sure. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth >> clarifying. The differing interpretations have >> quite different implications. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a >> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use >> phase, >> category, stage or division for those concepts. >> >> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical >> examples of "moments" but these are not steps, >> phases >> or stages of the concepts, even though they >> are also >> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept >> has all >> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the >> branches/divisions and the general secretary are >> individual, universal and particular moments. We >> cannot conceive of a union developing from an >> individual to a branch to a general secretary, >> can we? >> >> I will look into the origins of this expression. I >> have always just presumed it came from >> mathematics, as >> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a >> function, and I know Hegel did study this >> branch of >> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space >> to it in >> the Science of Logic in his critique of >> calculus. But >> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even >> more often >> "moments", and the word >> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a >> phase, or a >> step (as in the three >> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for >> others", "for myself". >> >> One of the most difficult problems we had >> to solve >> in translating the >> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very >> clearly distinguishes three >> moments of speech development: indicative, >> nominative, and signifying. >> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a >> pointing >> gesture. "Nominating" is >> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming >> function: "every thing has a >> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin >> down, and in one place >> Vygotsky actually says that it is >> synonymous with >> the adult understanding >> that anything can be named. So what is the >> difference between knowing that >> everything has a name and the knowledge >> that any >> thing can be named? >> >> I think that the distinction is just as >> subtle and >> just as significant >> as the distinction between pointing to >> something >> with a gesture, pointing >> to something with a word like "this" or >> "that", >> and pointing to something >> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I >> say that >> "everything has a name", >> the name could be extremely general >> ("everything" >> or "thing") or it could >> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this >> computer"). But >> I don't yet have the >> idea that names are invented, and that >> therefore >> it is possible to name >> objects which do not exist, and therefore >> to bring >> into existence modes of >> pure abstract thinking through language. >> That's >> signifying, and it is >> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the >> lifelong process of speech >> development. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >> > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a >> particular aspect that I thought >> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >> which is that stimuli can not >> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they >> afford the kind of dynamics you >> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >> >> I have also noted that the translation of >> phrases like "instances of a >> process" is probably off the mark >> too. What >> is really meant, I believe, is >> "instants of a process". These have two >> rather different meanings from the >> perspective of thinking about processes. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >> > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >> >> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? >> ???????????? ??? >> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? >> ????????. >> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >> ???????????? ???????????. >> >> (Russian >> >> Collected Works, p. 117). >> >> This means (as nearly as I can >> make out): >> "If the task did not go beyond >> the natural capability of the >> child, he >> could deal with it in an >> >> unmediated >> >> or primitive method. In this >> cases, the >> structure of his behavior would >> >> be >> >> completely similar to the scheme as >> presented by Volkelt". >> >> I think there is no diagramme, at >> least >> not in the sense of a two >> dimensional graphic one can have a >> copy >> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >> is Volkelt's attempt to explain >> all child >> behavior as the result of an >> affectively tinged FUSION of >> perception >> and behavior, an affectively >> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >> perception and behavior were >> absolutely inseparable. This was >> what Hans >> Volkelt concluded from a >> >> series >> >> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >> >> the >> >> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >> >> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >> baby bottles: one shaped like a >> triangle, one like a violin, one >> like a >> square, etc. They were all >> different colors as well. But three of >> them didn't have holes in the >> >> teat: >> >> you could see and smell the milk >> but you >> couldn't drink it. One did. He >> taught the infants to associate the >> drinking of milk and the feeling of >> satiation with one particular >> bottle, so >> that they would actually ignore >> the bottle unless it had all the >> characteristics: triangularity, >> >> blueness, >> >> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >> child's point of view, he was not >> drinking milk but triangular blue >> milk. >> This kind of "affectively colored >> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >> schemata". >> >> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >> eventually decided that we never >> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >> colored perception-behavior wholes, >> and this would explain the >> indivisible and >> inseparable devotion of the >> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in >> later >> work Vygotsky is very careful to >> distance himself from Volkelt even >> in his >> explanations of infant >> >> behavior: >> >> in the Lectures on Pedology he >> argues that >> ALL THREE layers of behavior >> (that is, instinct, habit, and >> intelligence) are present in infancy. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, >> Huw Lloyd >> > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Does anyone have a copy of >> "Volkelt's >> diagram" to hand that is referred >> >> to >> >> in The History of the >> Development of >> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >> >> p.85 >> >> and onwards in ch. 4)? I >> don't think >> a reference is given. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a >> natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Jan 10 18:14:15 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 02:14:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Hello, Is it possible that the moment of "signifying" is the unification of "indicative" and "nominative" moments? Or has that already been indicated someplace in this thread? Kind regards, Annalisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Jan 10 19:03:28 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 03:03:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: That's an interesting idea, Annalisa! indicate: point out a thing nominate: give the name that is considered a label of the thing signify: name a thing so as to point it out, in a particular way ... Martin On Jan 10, 2016, at 9:14 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello, > > Is it possible that the moment of "signifying" is the unification of "indicative" and "nominative" moments? > > Or has that already been indicated someplace in this thread? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Jan 10 19:35:07 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 03:35:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: , , Message-ID: Actually Martin, that is very close to what I mean. Let's say there is a clay pot in front of us. If I point to the clay pot, and I say "clay" nothing changes about the pot still being a pot, but the signification of the name isn't the object itself, but a particular attribute of the object, the clay, its substance. When you see that I point to the plate and to the vase and also say "clay" then you know that I don't mean the particularity of the pot, or the other objects, but the substance of the pot, the vase, the plate (theoretically anyway). But if I point to the clay pot and say "pot" this signifying moment is going to be different than when I said "clay", even though I am pointing at the same object, the clay pot. And so these moments of signifying that occur in the mind will be different, even though I am pointing to the same object, because I'm using different names. So I suppose it depends whether pointing or whether the name is particular, but the unification in signifying in both cases is the same process as a connection made, not a connection like a chain is connection of links, but a unification to say this name IS that object. It's the aha moment, sometimes, full of recognition, and sometimes happiness. Kind regards, Annalisa From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 10 19:46:31 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 20:46:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Groundings that make life worlds MORE real In-Reply-To: <5691acff.4a7a420a.f2b11.ffffc0f3@mx.google.com> References: <568fde8d.530a620a.1395.ffffc347@mx.google.com> <5691acff.4a7a420a.f2b11.ffffc0f3@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Thanks Larry. Yes, this paper is part of a larger project to understand the suturing together of word and world, and to understand the consequences that these suturings can have for interactional participants. How do words become consequential in-the-world? (yes, Austin is key here but more so linguistic anthropology since Austin). Before saying any more, I should probably stop and defend the dualism implied here (and which I mentioned parenthetically in my prior message). I agree that this dualism is problematic. But I think we also must appreciate that this dualism is a *cultural* problematic of the dominant culture in the U.S. (whether or not a cultural universal, I don't have the data to speak to that but it does seem very widespread). That is to say, in this dominant culture in the U.S., one finds that people regularly split world and word in two. This is captured in the child's aphorism "sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me" (and please make sure to attend to the poetics of meter and rhyme!). This is a socializing moment to this understanding of language in which language is seen as fundamentally distinct and different from the world of things - a difference that is immediate and felt as "broken bones" or "hurt" (things can do this but words can't, b.c. they are just words). Now everyone in this dominant culture certainly is aware of the potential for words to be hurtful (whether in discourses about "hate speech" or social media violence), but the point is that it is often thought that these are errors in thinking, after all these are "just words" and people shouldn't really be so bothered by it (and there is an entire field that emerged in the early 20th century and became quite popular, General Semantics, at whose core was this basic understanding - popularized as "the map is not the territory" or less popularly "the word is not the thing"). That's all to say that the problem of dualism is a practical problem - i.e., a problem in practice - with very practical consequences for participants involved for it has everything to do with who they will become. In the case I presented, the ability of a student to take a "confident" stance toward a test will have real consequences for that student's performance when she takes that test. These are the consequences of stance-taking. And yes, I agree that this question of where can we find forms of mutuality of being is really one of the critical political questions of our time. I do suspect that there will need to be some new form to replace oikos but I have no idea what that will be (Hegel and Marx both had some interesting suggestions, as have many others...). Too much already. Thanks Larry, greg On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 6:02 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > > This question, Where is the oikos realm today? This Is the question I was > engaging. > > I have attached your article so others may explore the complexity of > stance ownership. > > > > The simplistic understanding that if the subject takes a stance, that that > stance move in itself implies the subject then owns the stance. In other > words to intentionally act [act on purpose] in itself generates ownership > of that stance taken. > > This locates stance ownership as being generated from within the > individual person's purposeful acts. > > > > Your article indicating that this is a very simplistic understanding of > stance ownership and your analysis proposing there are actually three > interrelated movements [stances] involved. > > The intersubjective mode > > The embodied iconic mode > > The interobjective mode. > > > > This is an expanded or enlarged triangulated depiction that develops a > more complex figuration of stance ownership. > > > > What I am referring to as the vitality of the oikos realm may atrophy when > market and state and empire forces of dis-placement actually dis-possess > persons from the places which generate experiencing the vitality of the > oikos realm. > > > > I am suggesting this realm of vitality recedes from awareness when > neo-liberal market and state and empire forces dominate public discourse > and activity > > I am not indicating the oikos realm as a utopia. I recognize the oikos > realm can have a shadow side and be oppressive, patriarchal and deadening. > > > > However, the 3 modes of stance ownership indicated in your article may > play out differently within inhabited places which express the quality of > mutuality ? mutuality for itself as a way of flourishing. > > This contrasts with the notion of nature as bare existence where survival > needs are dominant, or nature as market forces determined by rational > economic calculations. > > > > I am proposing a notion of human desire for mutuality itself. The yearning > and longing for intersubjective, embodied, interobjective movements of > stance ownership generated within inhabited places of mutuality. > > Greg, these places may exist in our historical epoch more as expressions > of yearning and desire but I am suggesting they may actually be vital for > human flourishing. > > > > Your article invites us to go beyond notions of stance ownership as > existing within purposeful individual stance moves. > > To consider the complexity of 3 modes of stance that extend beyond > individual stance acts. > > I am suggesting that the various arenas [such as state, market, empire] > may be dis-possessing us of the oikos realm leaving us with neo-liberal > forms of stance ownership where our stances become instrumental and > calculated. > > > > If I can give one example to make my case. This example comes from Ian > Angus at SFU. > > > > In Scotland, the English empire invaded the Scottish highlands and cleared > the land of the inhabitants and their way of life. This is known as the * > *clearances** The land was fenced and populated with sheep. > > I am suggesting the **clearances** destroyed the indigenous oikos realm > where the stance taking of inter-subjectivity, embodied iconicity, and > interobjectivity had existed and had been evaluated through a shared sense > of mutuality or shared being-in-the-world. Binswanger enlarged Heidegger?s > notion of being-in-the world to include 3 realms. Umwelt [cultural > historical and material environment] Mitwelt [intersubjective realm of > mutuality] Eigenwelt [private interior realm]. > > > > I am suggesting that with the expansion of market state and empire that > there is a general clearing away of the oikos realm that leads to tragic > consequences. This is the message of Greek tragedy. A sense of > being-in-the-world as being home becomes unheimlich [uncanny] and we are > left yearning and longing for that place of mutuality as a particular kind > of stance ownership. > > larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for > Windows 10 > > > > > *From: *Greg Thompson > *Sent: *Saturday, January 9, 2016 1:04 PM > *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Groundings that make life worlds MORE real > > > > Larry, > > Thanks for the engagement here. > > First off, I remain ambivalent about the idea of "more" real. On the one > > hand, I think it gives some flexibility to a concept ("the real") that can > > be overly simplistic - either it is real or it is imagined (as if > > imagination isn't real!). > > > > On the other hand, I think that it could easily slide into a way of seeing > > social worlds as "less real" than material worlds. (I would prefer to avoid > > that dualism but it seems that a building has a qualitatively different > > nature than does a sewing circle. But I'd like to think about that some > > more before being so bold). > > > > Off the top of my head, I'm wondering if a better way of thinking this > > might be "finished" or, perhaps, "finalized" (as in Bakhtin's notion of > > "finalizability"). Thus, just as a building can be not yet "finalized", so > > too can a social group or a social act. An unfinalized real. Perhaps. > > > > Yes, I think the hearth as interobjective binding of oikos makes perfect > > sense to me. But I wonder, where is the hearth today. Despite all the > > laments about the television in the 50's and 60's (or the radio prior to > > that), it at least had a hearth like quality to it. Family members would > > gather round it and watch their favorite show (but yes, notice that as > > compared to a campfire, tv's didn't put people face to face). Today, each > > family member has their own screen and they might sit in the same room > > while watching their screen, but the oikos-tic interobjectivity is rather > > limited. > > > > Just my thoughts here. Thanks again for allowing my inscriptional object to > > pull us together... > > > > Best, > > greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 8, 2016 at 9:06 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > Greg Thompson posted the article - temporality, stance ownership, and the > > > constitution of subjectivity - to academia.edu > > > > > > Greg, this article carried me through your exploration of -stance > > > ownership - that opened new ways of connecting particular ways to make > life > > > more real. > > > The three groundings presented: > > > - intersubjectivity through recognition > > > - embodied indexical iconicity > > > - interobjectivity as the stance of things. > > > > > > Your paper guided me to a deep appreciation of the complexity of making > > > life worlds more real. > > > I found the exploration of embodied indexical iconicity the most > > > transformative learning. > > > However, I wanted to explore the notion of interobjectivity as agentic in > > > one particular case. > > > Can we imagine the oikos realm as interobjective? > > > For the oikos realm to be interobjective is to recognize this realm as an > > > object of evaluation. > > > This means an orientation towards this object that has particular > > > characteristics. > > > In other words the oikos realm having some specific quality or value. > > > > > > I am suggesting that the specific quality of the oikos realm is > -mutuality > > > - in itself. > > > > > > The notion of mutuality for its own sake. > > > If the figure of Hestia embodies this oikos realm, then the gathering > > > around the hearth in itself results in flourishing. > > > The hearth as interobjective stancetaking leading to particular > > > characters or figures of intersubjective stancetaking and particular > > > characters or figures of embodied iconicity. > > > The quality and values of the places within placings in particular as > > > evaluative orientations toward the oikos realm as interobjective. > > > > > > I recommend Greg's paper as a contribution to understanding particular > > > groundings making life worlds more real. > > > > > > I found the connections generated were transformative. > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 10 20:06:40 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 21:06:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Interesting David, yes, I've always thought of the signifying "moment" as a metalinguistic moment, i.e. a moment in which the child is able to turn language back on itself such that language becomes an object. Cultural practices like teasing and irony seem like important scaffolding for this moment (which some have placed in the range of 7-9 years of age developmentally speaking). -greg On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 10:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word > "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three > "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", "for > others", "for myself". > > One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the > Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three > moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. > "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is > ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a > name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place > Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding > that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that > everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? > > I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant > as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing > to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something > with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name", > the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could > be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the > idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name > objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of > pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is > indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech > development. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I > thought > > Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not > > only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics > you > > have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. > > > > I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a > > process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, > is > > "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from > the > > perspective of thinking about processes. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Huw: > > > > > > Here's what Vygotsky really says: > > > > > > ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? > > > ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? > > > ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. > > (Russian > > > Collected Works, p. 117). > > > > > > This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go > beyond > > > the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an > > unmediated > > > or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would > > be > > > completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". > > > > > > I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two > > > dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring > to > > > is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an > > > affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively > > > colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were > > > absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a > > series > > > of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in > > the > > > Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > > > > > > What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a > > > triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all > > > different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the > > teat: > > > you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He > > > taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of > > > satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually > ignore > > > the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, > > blueness, > > > etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not > > > drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively > colored > > > whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's > > > schemata". > > > > > > Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never > > > grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior > wholes, > > > and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the > > > German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful > to > > > distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant > > behavior: > > > in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior > > > (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is > referred > > > to > > > > in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, > > p.85 > > > > and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 10 20:46:46 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 13:46:46 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> Message-ID: Actually, Andy, he does. Take a look at the attached file. Search it for "Momente". There are nearly three hundred instances, and the word "momente" is being used pretty much just the way Vygotsky uses it the Russian word "Moment". Or save yourself some time, and just think. A lot of what Hegel is doing here is criticizing Kant. The idea of "Momente" and "Instanz" is central to Kant. How could Hegel not use it? David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 9:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, > David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those > concepts. > > Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" but > these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they are > also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three moments. > In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general > secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot > conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a general > secretary, can we? > > I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just > presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... > moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of > mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of Logic > in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Huw: >> >> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word >> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three >> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", >> "for >> others", "for myself". >> >> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the >> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three >> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. >> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is >> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a >> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place >> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding >> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that >> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? >> >> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant >> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing >> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something >> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name", >> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could >> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the >> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name >> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of >> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is >> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech >> development. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I thought >>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not >>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics >>> you >>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>> >>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a >>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I believe, >>> is >>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings from >>> the >>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Huw: >>>> >>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>> >>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >>>> >>> (Russian >>> >>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>> >>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond >>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >>>> >>> unmediated >>> >>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would >>>> >>> be >>> >>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>>> >>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring >>>> to >>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an >>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively >>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >>>> >>> series >>> >>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>>> >>> the >>> >>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>> >>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a >>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the >>>> >>> teat: >>> >>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He >>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of >>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore >>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >>>> >>> blueness, >>> >>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not >>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively >>>> colored >>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>>> schemata". >>>> >>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never >>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes, >>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the >>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful >>>> to >>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >>>> >>> behavior: >>> >>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior >>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred >>>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>>> >>>> p.85 >>> >>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: The Project Gutenberg EBook of Wissenschaft der Logik.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 534513 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160111/8cc5b563/attachment-0001.bin From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 10 20:56:24 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:56:24 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> Message-ID: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> My German is not good enough to decipher the usage in all these instances, David. Of course, Hegel uses the word "moment" in all its modes, and that includes "at that moment in the story." The paradigmatic usage is with Individual, Particular and Universal moments, which are not stages, etc., but as in the page Martin found for us, inseparable aspects. It is this meaning which I find is generally the most troubling for people. I should not have said "Hegel does not use ..." Culpa mea. Hegel uses the word "moment" in all sorts of ways, yes. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/01/2016 3:46 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Actually, Andy, he does. Take a look at the attached file. > Search it for "Momente". There are nearly three hundred > instances, and the word "momente" is being used pretty > much just the way Vygotsky uses it the Russian word "Moment". > > Or save yourself some time, and just think. A lot of what > Hegel is doing here is criticizing Kant. The idea of > "Momente" and "Instanz" is central to Kant. How could > Hegel not use it? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 9:10 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a > stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use phase, > category, stage or division for those concepts. > > Individual, Particular and Universal are typical > examples of "moments" but these are not steps, phases > or stages of the concepts, even though they are also > exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all > three moments. In a trade union, the members, the > branches/divisions and the general secretary are > individual, universal and particular moments. We > cannot conceive of a union developing from an > individual to a branch to a general secretary, can we? > > I will look into the origins of this expression. I > have always just presumed it came from mathematics, as > in the first, second, third, ... moments of a > function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of > mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in > the Science of Logic in his critique of calculus. But > I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Huw: > > Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often > "moments", and the word > "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a > step (as in the three > "moments" of the formation of the concept in > Hegel, as in "in itself", "for > others", "for myself". > > One of the most difficult problems we had to solve > in translating the > Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very > clearly distinguishes three > moments of speech development: indicative, > nominative, and signifying. > "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing > gesture. "Nominating" is > ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming > function: "every thing has a > name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin > down, and in one place > Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with > the adult understanding > that anything can be named. So what is the > difference between knowing that > everything has a name and the knowledge that any > thing can be named? > > I think that the distinction is just as subtle and > just as significant > as the distinction between pointing to something > with a gesture, pointing > to something with a word like "this" or "that", > and pointing to something > with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that > "everything has a name", > the name could be extremely general ("everything" > or "thing") or it could > be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But > I don't yet have the > idea that names are invented, and that therefore > it is possible to name > objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring > into existence modes of > pure abstract thinking through language. That's > signifying, and it is > indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the > lifelong process of speech > development. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > Thank you, David. That helps to explain a > particular aspect that I thought > Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, > which is that stimuli can not > only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they > afford the kind of dynamics you > have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. > > I have also noted that the translation of > phrases like "instances of a > process" is probably off the mark too. What > is really meant, I believe, is > "instants of a process". These have two > rather different meanings from the > perspective of thinking about processes. > > Best, > Huw > > On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Huw: > > Here's what Vygotsky really says: > > ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? > ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? > ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. > ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? > ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, > ???????????? ???????????. > > (Russian > > Collected Works, p. 117). > > This means (as nearly as I can make out): > "If the task did not go beyond > the natural capability of the child, he > could deal with it in an > > unmediated > > or primitive method. In this cases, the > structure of his behavior would > > be > > completely similar to the scheme as > presented by Volkelt". > > I think there is no diagramme, at least > not in the sense of a two > dimensional graphic one can have a copy > of. What Vygotsky is referring to > is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child > behavior as the result of an > affectively tinged FUSION of perception > and behavior, an affectively > colored, unanalyzable, whole in which > perception and behavior were > absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans > Volkelt concluded from a > > series > > of experiments that Vygotsky refers to > repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in > > the > > Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > > What Volkelt did was this: he had four > baby bottles: one shaped like a > triangle, one like a violin, one like a > square, etc. They were all > different colors as well. But three of > them didn't have holes in the > > teat: > > you could see and smell the milk but you > couldn't drink it. One did. He > taught the infants to associate the > drinking of milk and the feeling of > satiation with one particular bottle, so > that they would actually ignore > the bottle unless it had all the > characteristics: triangularity, > > blueness, > > etc. So Volkelt argued that from the > child's point of view, he was not > drinking milk but triangular blue milk. > This kind of "affectively colored > whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as > "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's > schemata". > > Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He > eventually decided that we never > grow out of unanalyzable affectively > colored perception-behavior wholes, > and this would explain the indivisible and > inseparable devotion of the > German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later > work Vygotsky is very careful to > distance himself from Volkelt even in his > explanations of infant > > behavior: > > in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that > ALL THREE layers of behavior > (that is, instinct, habit, and > intelligence) are present in infancy. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's > diagram" to hand that is referred > > to > > in The History of the Development of > Higher Mental Functions (1997, > > p.85 > > and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think > a reference is given. > > Best, > Huw > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Jan 11 01:04:40 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:04:40 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> References: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> Message-ID: <982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Dear all , Look at this please ! [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .? And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .? Best Haydi?? From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Jan 11 01:04:40 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:04:40 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> References: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> Message-ID: <982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Dear all , Look at this please ! [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .? And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .? Best Haydi?? From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 03:23:19 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 11:23:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <03DE8A63-B13C-4E1F-8ED0-CEEFFA0DA6A1@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <03DE8A63-B13C-4E1F-8ED0-CEEFFA0DA6A1@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Martin, I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume. I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented in the blog is incomplete and incorrect. For example, the assertion "You don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room" is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and recall the experience of its colour. Likewise the notion of a 'whole' that is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft somehow qualified it as being independent. Best, Huw On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer wrote: > The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology. Here is an > accessible account of the basics: > > < > https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/ > > > > Martin > > On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The > differing > > interpretations have quite different implications. > > mike > > > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, > >> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those > >> concepts. > >> > >> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" > but > >> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they > are > >> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three > moments. > >> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general > >> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot > >> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a > general > >> secretary, can we? > >> > >> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just > >> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... > >> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of > >> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of > Logic > >> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> Huw: > >>> > >>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the > word > >>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the > three > >>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", > >>> "for > >>> others", "for myself". > >>> > >>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the > >>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three > >>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. > >>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. > "Nominating" is > >>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has > a > >>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place > >>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult > understanding > >>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing > that > >>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? > >>> > >>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant > >>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, > pointing > >>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to > something > >>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a > name", > >>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it > could > >>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the > >>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name > >>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence > modes of > >>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is > >>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of > speech > >>> development. > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I > thought > >>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can > not > >>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics > >>>> you > >>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. > >>>> > >>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a > >>>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I > believe, > >>>> is > >>>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings > from > >>>> the > >>>> perspective of thinking about processes. > >>>> > >>>> Best, > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Huw: > >>>>> > >>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: > >>>>> > >>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? > ??? > >>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? > ??? > >>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. > >>>>> > >>>> (Russian > >>>> > >>>>> Collected Works, p. 117). > >>>>> > >>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go > beyond > >>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an > >>>>> > >>>> unmediated > >>>> > >>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior > would > >>>>> > >>>> be > >>>> > >>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". > >>>>> > >>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two > >>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is > referring > >>>>> to > >>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of > an > >>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively > >>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were > >>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a > >>>>> > >>>> series > >>>> > >>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and > in > >>>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > >>>>> > >>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like > a > >>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all > >>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the > >>>>> > >>>> teat: > >>>> > >>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. > He > >>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling > of > >>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually > ignore > >>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, > >>>>> > >>>> blueness, > >>>> > >>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was > not > >>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively > >>>>> colored > >>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or > "Volkelt's > >>>>> schemata". > >>>>> > >>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we > never > >>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior > wholes, > >>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of > the > >>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very > careful > >>>>> to > >>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant > >>>>> > >>>> behavior: > >>>> > >>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of > behavior > >>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. > >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is > referred > >>>>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>> > >>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, > >>>>>> > >>>>> p.85 > >>>> > >>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 04:08:12 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:08:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <56930C88.6080101@mira.net> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> <56930C88.6080101@mira.net> Message-ID: Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides? E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect appearing as torque in another. Best, Huw On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden wrote: > According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means "An > essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity" > first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838. > But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess > that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the >> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what >> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked, >> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception. >> >> still learning! >> mike >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike. >> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he >> thought should have been "instants" and then David >> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," >> which was the subject of my comment. >> >> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that >> all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment" >> were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..." >> The one odd reference is this one: >> >> "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the >> analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to >> represent the *moments* of this genetic process in >> their >> mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we >> have diverged from the complex and twisting path that >> characterizes the actual development of the child?s >> concepts." >> >> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here >> to the distinct modes of conception which were >> manifested in the child's activity, at different >> stages, but which are combined in the most developed >> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative >> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, >> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not >> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. >> Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could >> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it >> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of >> association as "moments" of concept formation in the >> other sense of the word "moment" which is not >> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for >> sure. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth >> clarifying. The differing interpretations have >> quite different implications. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a >> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use >> phase, >> category, stage or division for those concepts. >> >> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical >> examples of "moments" but these are not steps, >> phases >> or stages of the concepts, even though they >> are also >> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept >> has all >> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the >> branches/divisions and the general secretary are >> individual, universal and particular moments. We >> cannot conceive of a union developing from an >> individual to a branch to a general secretary, >> can we? >> >> I will look into the origins of this expression. I >> have always just presumed it came from >> mathematics, as >> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a >> function, and I know Hegel did study this >> branch of >> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space >> to it in >> the Science of Logic in his critique of >> calculus. But >> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even >> more often >> "moments", and the word >> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a >> phase, or a >> step (as in the three >> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for >> others", "for myself". >> >> One of the most difficult problems we had >> to solve >> in translating the >> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very >> clearly distinguishes three >> moments of speech development: indicative, >> nominative, and signifying. >> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a >> pointing >> gesture. "Nominating" is >> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming >> function: "every thing has a >> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin >> down, and in one place >> Vygotsky actually says that it is >> synonymous with >> the adult understanding >> that anything can be named. So what is the >> difference between knowing that >> everything has a name and the knowledge >> that any >> thing can be named? >> >> I think that the distinction is just as >> subtle and >> just as significant >> as the distinction between pointing to >> something >> with a gesture, pointing >> to something with a word like "this" or >> "that", >> and pointing to something >> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I >> say that >> "everything has a name", >> the name could be extremely general >> ("everything" >> or "thing") or it could >> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this >> computer"). But >> I don't yet have the >> idea that names are invented, and that >> therefore >> it is possible to name >> objects which do not exist, and therefore >> to bring >> into existence modes of >> pure abstract thinking through language. >> That's >> signifying, and it is >> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the >> lifelong process of speech >> development. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >> > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a >> particular aspect that I thought >> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >> which is that stimuli can not >> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they >> afford the kind of dynamics you >> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >> >> I have also noted that the translation of >> phrases like "instances of a >> process" is probably off the mark >> too. What >> is really meant, I believe, is >> "instants of a process". These have two >> rather different meanings from the >> perspective of thinking about processes. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >> > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >> >> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? >> ???????????? ??? >> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? >> ????????. >> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >> ???????????? ???????????. >> >> (Russian >> >> Collected Works, p. 117). >> >> This means (as nearly as I can >> make out): >> "If the task did not go beyond >> the natural capability of the >> child, he >> could deal with it in an >> >> unmediated >> >> or primitive method. In this >> cases, the >> structure of his behavior would >> >> be >> >> completely similar to the scheme as >> presented by Volkelt". >> >> I think there is no diagramme, at >> least >> not in the sense of a two >> dimensional graphic one can have a >> copy >> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >> is Volkelt's attempt to explain >> all child >> behavior as the result of an >> affectively tinged FUSION of >> perception >> and behavior, an affectively >> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >> perception and behavior were >> absolutely inseparable. This was >> what Hans >> Volkelt concluded from a >> >> series >> >> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >> >> the >> >> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >> >> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >> baby bottles: one shaped like a >> triangle, one like a violin, one >> like a >> square, etc. They were all >> different colors as well. But three of >> them didn't have holes in the >> >> teat: >> >> you could see and smell the milk >> but you >> couldn't drink it. One did. He >> taught the infants to associate the >> drinking of milk and the feeling of >> satiation with one particular >> bottle, so >> that they would actually ignore >> the bottle unless it had all the >> characteristics: triangularity, >> >> blueness, >> >> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >> child's point of view, he was not >> drinking milk but triangular blue >> milk. >> This kind of "affectively colored >> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >> schemata". >> >> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >> eventually decided that we never >> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >> colored perception-behavior wholes, >> and this would explain the >> indivisible and >> inseparable devotion of the >> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in >> later >> work Vygotsky is very careful to >> distance himself from Volkelt even >> in his >> explanations of infant >> >> behavior: >> >> in the Lectures on Pedology he >> argues that >> ALL THREE layers of behavior >> (that is, instinct, habit, and >> intelligence) are present in infancy. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, >> Huw Lloyd >> > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Does anyone have a copy of >> "Volkelt's >> diagram" to hand that is referred >> >> to >> >> in The History of the >> Development of >> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >> >> p.85 >> >> and onwards in ch. 4)? I >> don't think >> a reference is given. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a >> natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 11 04:17:56 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:17:56 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> <56930C88.6080101@mira.net> Message-ID: <56939D74.6030605@mira.net> No all the science-related meanings are derived from either Integral of f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to angular momentum which is an integral of mass* distance from axis. The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment" expresses a property of the whole function. A function can be represented either by a series of values for each x, or by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the total mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise when you are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic systems with inertia. YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think, which is a kind of inverse of the above. yada yada yada, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon > influences the tides? E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum > like things that, when, considered together may appear as > 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then perhaps the > meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one > aspect appearing as torque in another. > > Best, > Huw > > On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense > 9. "moment" means "An essential element or significant > aspect of a complex conceptual entity" first used in a > translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838. > But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as > "torque," so I guess that exposes a bit of Cole word > play going on there, yes? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: > > I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still > working on the phenomenology of the usage. I think > the form of part-whole relation is what is at > issue and "moments" in this sense are > qualitatively distinct, marked, events. Events > whose conventional meaning is torqued by the > exception. > > still learning! > mike > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > I am not at all clear about the context here, > Mike. > Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he > thought should have been "instants" and then David > introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," > which was the subject of my comment. > > I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and > found that > all bar one instance of the use of the word > "moment" > were in the sense of "at this moment in the > story ..." > The one odd reference is this one: > > "We have consistently taken a genetic > approach to the > analysis of our problem. We have, however, > attempted to > represent the *moments* of this genetic > process in > their > mature, classic forms. The inevitable > result is that we > have diverged from the complex and twisting > path that > characterizes the actual development of the > child?s > concepts." > > It is possible that Vygotsky refers with > "moment" here > to the distinct modes of conception which were > manifested in the child's activity, at different > stages, but which are combined in the most > developed > pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative > complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, > diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not > possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. > Perhaps their *first appearance* in > ontogenesis could > form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, > but it > is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of > association as "moments" of concept formation > in the > other sense of the word "moment" which is not > interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't > say for > sure. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: > > The theoretical point seems interesting > and worth > clarifying. The differing interpretations have > quite different implications. > mike > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" > as meaning a > stage, phase or step, David. He tends > to use > phase, > category, stage or division for those > concepts. > > Individual, Particular and Universal > are typical > examples of "moments" but these are > not steps, > phases > or stages of the concepts, even though > they > are also > exhibited in this way. Every concrete > concept > has all > three moments. In a trade union, the > members, the > branches/divisions and the general > secretary are > individual, universal and particular > moments. We > cannot conceive of a union developing > from an > individual to a branch to a general > secretary, > can we? > > I will look into the origins of this > expression. I > have always just presumed it came from > mathematics, as > in the first, second, third, ... > moments of a > function, and I know Hegel did study this > branch of > mathematics, because he gives a lot of > space > to it in > the Science of Logic in his critique of > calculus. But > I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Huw: > > Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even > more often > "moments", and the word > "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a > phase, or a > step (as in the three > "moments" of the formation of the > concept in > Hegel, as in "in itself", "for > others", "for myself". > > One of the most difficult problems > we had > to solve > in translating the > Lectures on Pedology was that > Vygotsky very > clearly distinguishes three > moments of speech development: > indicative, > nominative, and signifying. > "Indicative" is often non-verbal, > e.g. a > pointing > gesture. "Nominating" is > ipso facto verbal, because it is > the naming > function: "every thing has a > name". But "signifying" is much > harder to pin > down, and in one place > Vygotsky actually says that it is > synonymous with > the adult understanding > that anything can be named. So > what is the > difference between knowing that > everything has a name and the > knowledge > that any > thing can be named? > > I think that the distinction is > just as > subtle and > just as significant > as the distinction between pointing to > something > with a gesture, pointing > to something with a word like > "this" or > "that", > and pointing to something > with a word like "apple" or > "pear". If I > say that > "everything has a name", > the name could be extremely general > ("everything" > or "thing") or it could > be highly specific ("Huw" or "this > computer"). But > I don't yet have the > idea that names are invented, and that > therefore > it is possible to name > objects which do not exist, and > therefore > to bring > into existence modes of > pure abstract thinking through > language. > That's > signifying, and it is > indeed a new moment, or a new > instant, in the > lifelong process of speech > development. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, > Huw Lloyd > > > > > >>> > wrote: > > Thank you, David. That helps > to explain a > particular aspect that I thought > Vygotsky was overlooking in > the narrative, > which is that stimuli can not > only signify but also > symbolise, i.e. they > afford the kind of dynamics you > have elucidated from Volkelt's > schema. > > I have also noted that the > translation of > phrases like "instances of a > process" is probably off the mark > too. What > is really meant, I believe, is > "instants of a process". > These have two > rather different meanings from the > perspective of thinking about > processes. > > Best, > Huw > > On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, > David Kellogg > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Huw: > > Here's what Vygotsky > really says: > > ???? ?????? ?? ????????? > ???????????? ??? > ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? > ???????????????? ??? > ??????????? > ????????. > ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? > ????????? ?????????? > ?????????? ?????, > ???????????? ???????????. > > (Russian > > Collected Works, p. 117). > > This means (as nearly as I can > make out): > "If the task did not go beyond > the natural capability of the > child, he > could deal with it in an > > unmediated > > or primitive method. In this > cases, the > structure of his behavior > would > > be > > completely similar to the > scheme as > presented by Volkelt". > > I think there is no > diagramme, at > least > not in the sense of a two > dimensional graphic one > can have a > copy > of. What Vygotsky is > referring to > is Volkelt's attempt to > explain > all child > behavior as the result of an > affectively tinged FUSION of > perception > and behavior, an affectively > colored, unanalyzable, > whole in which > perception and behavior were > absolutely inseparable. > This was > what Hans > Volkelt concluded from a > > series > > of experiments that > Vygotsky refers to > repeatedly, both in HDHMF > and in > > the > > Lectures on Pedology and > elswhere. > > What Volkelt did was this: > he had four > baby bottles: one shaped > like a > triangle, one like a > violin, one > like a > square, etc. They were all > different colors as well. > But three of > them didn't have holes in the > > teat: > > you could see and smell > the milk > but you > couldn't drink it. One did. He > taught the infants to > associate the > drinking of milk and the > feeling of > satiation with one particular > bottle, so > that they would actually > ignore > the bottle unless it had > all the > characteristics: > triangularity, > > blueness, > > etc. So Volkelt argued > that from the > child's point of view, he > was not > drinking milk but > triangular blue > milk. > This kind of "affectively > colored > whole" is what Vygotsky > refers to as > "Volkelt's scheme", or > "Volkelt's > schemata". > > Volkelt's scheme came to a > bad end. He > eventually decided that we > never > grow out of unanalyzable > affectively > colored > perception-behavior wholes, > and this would explain the > indivisible and > inseparable devotion of the > German volk to their > Fuhrer. So in > later > work Vygotsky is very > careful to > distance himself from > Volkelt even > in his > explanations of infant > > behavior: > > in the Lectures on Pedology he > argues that > ALL THREE layers of behavior > (that is, instinct, habit, and > intelligence) are present > in infancy. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at > 10:50 PM, > Huw Lloyd > > > > > > >>> > wrote: > > Does anyone have a copy of > "Volkelt's > diagram" to hand that > is referred > > to > > in The History of the > Development of > Higher Mental > Functions (1997, > > p.85 > > and onwards in ch. 4)? I > don't think > a reference is given. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a > natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a > natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 04:35:46 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:35:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <56939D74.6030605@mira.net> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> <56930C88.6080101@mira.net> <56939D74.6030605@mira.net> Message-ID: moment (n.) [image: Look up moment at Dictionary.com] mid-14c., "very brief portion of time, instant," in moment of time, from Old French moment (12c.) "moment, minute; importance, weight, value" or directly from Latin momentum "movement, motion; moving power; alteration, change;" also "short time, instant" (also source of Spanish, Italian momento), contraction of *movimentum, from movere "to move" (see move (v.)). Some (but not OED) explain the sense evolution of the Latin word by notion of a particle so small it would just "move" the pointer of a scale, which led to the transferred sense of "minute time division." Sense of "importance, 'weight' " is attested in English from 1520s. Phrase never a dull moment first recorded 1889 in Jerome K. Jerome's "Three Men in a Boat." Phrase moment of truth first recorded 1932 in Hemingway's "Death in the Afternoon," from Spanish el momento de la verdad, the final sword-thrust in a bull-fight. momentum (n.) [image: Look up momentum at Dictionary.com] 1690s, scientific use in mechanics, "quantity of motion of a moving body," from Latin momentum "movement, moving power" (see moment ). Figurative use dates from 1782. This would imply something like "the manifest force or expression at this point in time" or "the duration of time for which this manifest force is constant". On 11 January 2016 at 12:17, Andy Blunden wrote: > No all the science-related meanings are derived from either Integral of > f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to angular momentum which is an > integral of mass* distance from axis. > The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment" expresses a property > of the whole function. A function can be represented either by a series of > values for each x, or by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the > total mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise when you > are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic systems with inertia. > > YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think, which is a kind > of inverse of the above. > > yada yada yada, > > Andy > ------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides? > E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered > together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then > perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect > appearing as torque in another. > > Best, > Huw > > On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means >> "An essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity" >> first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838. >> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess >> that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the >>> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what >>> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked, >>> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception. >>> >>> still learning! >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike. >>> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he >>> thought should have been "instants" and then David >>> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," >>> which was the subject of my comment. >>> >>> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that >>> all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment" >>> were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..." >>> The one odd reference is this one: >>> >>> "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the >>> analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to >>> represent the *moments* of this genetic process in >>> their >>> mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we >>> have diverged from the complex and twisting path that >>> characterizes the actual development of the child?s >>> concepts." >>> >>> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here >>> to the distinct modes of conception which were >>> manifested in the child's activity, at different >>> stages, but which are combined in the most developed >>> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative >>> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, >>> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not >>> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. >>> Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could >>> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it >>> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of >>> association as "moments" of concept formation in the >>> other sense of the word "moment" which is not >>> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for >>> sure. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth >>> clarifying. The differing interpretations have >>> quite different implications. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a >>> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use >>> phase, >>> category, stage or division for those concepts. >>> >>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical >>> examples of "moments" but these are not steps, >>> phases >>> or stages of the concepts, even though they >>> are also >>> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept >>> has all >>> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the >>> branches/divisions and the general secretary are >>> individual, universal and particular moments. We >>> cannot conceive of a union developing from an >>> individual to a branch to a general secretary, >>> can we? >>> >>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I >>> have always just presumed it came from >>> mathematics, as >>> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a >>> function, and I know Hegel did study this >>> branch of >>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space >>> to it in >>> the Science of Logic in his critique of >>> calculus. But >>> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Huw: >>> >>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even >>> more often >>> "moments", and the word >>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a >>> phase, or a >>> step (as in the three >>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >>> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for >>> others", "for myself". >>> >>> One of the most difficult problems we had >>> to solve >>> in translating the >>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very >>> clearly distinguishes three >>> moments of speech development: indicative, >>> nominative, and signifying. >>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a >>> pointing >>> gesture. "Nominating" is >>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming >>> function: "every thing has a >>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin >>> down, and in one place >>> Vygotsky actually says that it is >>> synonymous with >>> the adult understanding >>> that anything can be named. So what is the >>> difference between knowing that >>> everything has a name and the knowledge >>> that any >>> thing can be named? >>> >>> I think that the distinction is just as >>> subtle and >>> just as significant >>> as the distinction between pointing to >>> something >>> with a gesture, pointing >>> to something with a word like "this" or >>> "that", >>> and pointing to something >>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I >>> say that >>> "everything has a name", >>> the name could be extremely general >>> ("everything" >>> or "thing") or it could >>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this >>> computer"). But >>> I don't yet have the >>> idea that names are invented, and that >>> therefore >>> it is possible to name >>> objects which do not exist, and therefore >>> to bring >>> into existence modes of >>> pure abstract thinking through language. >>> That's >>> signifying, and it is >>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the >>> lifelong process of speech >>> development. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a >>> particular aspect that I thought >>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >>> which is that stimuli can not >>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they >>> afford the kind of dynamics you >>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>> >>> I have also noted that the translation of >>> phrases like "instances of a >>> process" is probably off the mark >>> too. What >>> is really meant, I believe, is >>> "instants of a process". These have two >>> rather different meanings from the >>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Huw: >>> >>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>> >>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? >>> ???????????? ??? >>> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? >>> ????????. >>> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >>> ???????????? ???????????. >>> >>> (Russian >>> >>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>> >>> This means (as nearly as I can >>> make out): >>> "If the task did not go beyond >>> the natural capability of the >>> child, he >>> could deal with it in an >>> >>> unmediated >>> >>> or primitive method. In this >>> cases, the >>> structure of his behavior would >>> >>> be >>> >>> completely similar to the scheme as >>> presented by Volkelt". >>> >>> I think there is no diagramme, at >>> least >>> not in the sense of a two >>> dimensional graphic one can have a >>> copy >>> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain >>> all child >>> behavior as the result of an >>> affectively tinged FUSION of >>> perception >>> and behavior, an affectively >>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >>> perception and behavior were >>> absolutely inseparable. This was >>> what Hans >>> Volkelt concluded from a >>> >>> series >>> >>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >>> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>> >>> the >>> >>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>> >>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >>> baby bottles: one shaped like a >>> triangle, one like a violin, one >>> like a >>> square, etc. They were all >>> different colors as well. But three of >>> them didn't have holes in the >>> >>> teat: >>> >>> you could see and smell the milk >>> but you >>> couldn't drink it. One did. He >>> taught the infants to associate the >>> drinking of milk and the feeling of >>> satiation with one particular >>> bottle, so >>> that they would actually ignore >>> the bottle unless it had all the >>> characteristics: triangularity, >>> >>> blueness, >>> >>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >>> child's point of view, he was not >>> drinking milk but triangular blue >>> milk. >>> This kind of "affectively colored >>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >>> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>> schemata". >>> >>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >>> eventually decided that we never >>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >>> colored perception-behavior wholes, >>> and this would explain the >>> indivisible and >>> inseparable devotion of the >>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in >>> later >>> work Vygotsky is very careful to >>> distance himself from Volkelt even >>> in his >>> explanations of infant >>> >>> behavior: >>> >>> in the Lectures on Pedology he >>> argues that >>> ALL THREE layers of behavior >>> (that is, instinct, habit, and >>> intelligence) are present in infancy. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, >>> Huw Lloyd >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Does anyone have a copy of >>> "Volkelt's >>> diagram" to hand that is referred >>> >>> to >>> >>> in The History of the >>> Development of >>> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>> >>> p.85 >>> >>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I >>> don't think >>> a reference is given. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a >>> natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 11 05:38:18 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:38:18 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <5693056B.9040000@mira.net> <56930C88.6080101@mira.net> <56939D74.6030605@mira.net> <5693AC66.8040603@mira.net> Message-ID: <5693B04A.5090306@mira.net> So far as I can see the Latin "momentum" diverged along two paths somewhere around the 15th century. From the idea of a moment (of time) we had an "important moment," that is, an event with powerful repercussions and this lead to "momentum" meaning the inertia of a moving body, i.e., its power to affect things, and a measure of the power of bodies which (like angular momentum) integrated the mass and spatial dimensions, as well as mass and velocity, so the measure of angular momentum was generalised across different types of function, and then to high powers. So the two streams of meaning have a common origin. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 12/01/2016 12:27 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well, my understanding is that there isn't a hidden > dimension to its usage in text. That was the reason for > questioning it. But if you uncover something in the > origins of the expression (your earlier email) then it > would be interesting to know more. > > Best, > Huw > > > > On 11 January 2016 at 13:21, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > I don't know where this is going, Huw. > There are several quite distinct meanings of "moment." > Some to do with short periods of time, some to do with > large force. But there are literally dozens of > different shades of meaning. > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(physics) > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 11/01/2016 11:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> moment (n.) >> >> Look up moment at Dictionary.com >> >> mid-14c., "very brief portion of time, instant," >> in moment of time, from Old French moment (12c.) >> "moment, minute; importance, weight, value" or >> directly from Latin momentum "movement, motion; >> moving power; alteration, change;" also "short >> time, instant" (also source of Spanish, Italian >> momento), contraction of *movimentum, from >> movere "to move" (see move >> (v.)). >> Some (but not OED) explain the sense evolution of >> the Latin word by notion of a particle so small >> it would just "move" the pointer of a scale, >> which led to the transferred sense of "minute >> time division." Sense of "importance, 'weight' " >> is attested in English from 1520s. >> >> Phrase never a dull moment first recorded 1889 in >> Jerome K. Jerome's "Three Men in a Boat." Phrase >> moment of truth first recorded 1932 in >> Hemingway's "Death in the Afternoon," from >> Spanish el momento de la verdad, the final >> sword-thrust in a bull-fight. >> momentum (n.) >> >> Look up momentum at Dictionary.com >> >> 1690s, scientific use in mechanics, "quantity of >> motion of a moving body," from Latin >> momentum "movement, moving power" (see moment >> ). >> Figurative use dates from 1782. >> >> This would imply something like "the manifest force >> or expression at this point in time" or "the duration >> of time for which this manifest force is constant". >> >> On 11 January 2016 at 12:17, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> No all the science-related meanings are derived >> from either Integral of f(x) * (x to power n). >> Torque is related to angular momentum which is an >> integral of mass* distance from axis. >> The interpreation this leads to is that each >> "moment" expresses a property of the whole >> function. A function can be represented either by >> a series of values for each x, or by the series >> of moments. The zero-th moment is the total mass, >> the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments >> arise when you are dealing with flexible systems, >> or dynamic systems with inertia. >> >> YOu also get the term arising with power series, >> I think, which is a kind of inverse of the above. >> >> yada yada yada, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> Is torque being used here in the sense that the >>> moon influences the tides? E.g. conceiving >>> stages as pendulum like things that, when, >>> considered together may appear as 'torque' >>> applied to a base form. If so, then perhaps the >>> meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment >>> from one aspect appearing as torque in another. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden >>> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, >>> in sense 9. "moment" means "An essential >>> element or significant aspect of a complex >>> conceptual entity" first used in a >>> translation of Kant's Critique of Pure >>> Reason in 1838. >>> But the OED also refers to "moment" in >>> meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess that >>> exposes a bit of Cole word play going on >>> there, yes? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, >>> Andy. Still working on the phenomenology >>> of the usage. I think the form of >>> part-whole relation is what is at issue >>> and "moments" in this sense are >>> qualitatively distinct, marked, events. >>> Events whose conventional meaning is >>> torqued by the exception. >>> >>> still learning! >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy >>> Blunden >> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> I am not at all clear about the >>> context here, Mike. >>> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using >>> "instances" which he >>> thought should have been "instants" >>> and then David >>> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use >>> of "moments," >>> which was the subject of my comment. >>> >>> I did a search of "Thinking and >>> Speech" and found that >>> all bar one instance of the use of >>> the word "moment" >>> were in the sense of "at this moment >>> in the story ..." >>> The one odd reference is this one: >>> >>> "We have consistently taken a >>> genetic approach to the >>> analysis of our problem. We have, >>> however, attempted to >>> represent the *moments* of this >>> genetic process in >>> their >>> mature, classic forms. The >>> inevitable result is that we >>> have diverged from the complex >>> and twisting path that >>> characterizes the actual >>> development of the child?s >>> concepts." >>> >>> It is possible that Vygotsky refers >>> with "moment" here >>> to the distinct modes of conception >>> which were >>> manifested in the child's activity, >>> at different >>> stages, but which are combined in >>> the most developed >>> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that >>> associative >>> complexes, collection complexes, >>> chain complexes, >>> diffuse complexes, and >>> pseudocomplexes could not >>> possibly manifest themselves as >>> successive stages. >>> Perhaps their *first appearance* in >>> ontogenesis could >>> form some kind of regular sequence, >>> possibly, but it >>> is also possible that Vygotsky saw >>> these forms of >>> association as "moments" of concept >>> formation in the >>> other sense of the word "moment" >>> which is not >>> interchangeable with "instant". But >>> I couldn't say for >>> sure. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> The theoretical point seems >>> interesting and worth >>> clarifying. The differing >>> interpretations have >>> quite different implications. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, >>> Andy Blunden >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Actually, Hegel does not use >>> "moment" as meaning a >>> stage, phase or step, David. >>> He tends to use >>> phase, >>> category, stage or division >>> for those concepts. >>> >>> Individual, Particular and >>> Universal are typical >>> examples of "moments" but >>> these are not steps, >>> phases >>> or stages of the concepts, >>> even though they >>> are also >>> exhibited in this way. Every >>> concrete concept >>> has all >>> three moments. In a trade >>> union, the members, the >>> branches/divisions and the general >>> secretary are >>> individual, universal and >>> particular moments. We >>> cannot conceive of a union >>> developing from an >>> individual to a branch to a >>> general secretary, >>> can we? >>> >>> I will look into the origins >>> of this expression. I >>> have always just presumed it >>> came from >>> mathematics, as >>> in the first, second, third, >>> ... moments of a >>> function, and I know Hegel >>> did study this >>> branch of >>> mathematics, because he >>> gives a lot of space >>> to it in >>> the Science of Logic in his >>> critique of >>> calculus. But >>> I am probably quite wrong. >>> I'll check. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David >>> Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Huw: >>> >>> Yes, Vygotsky uses >>> "instants" and even >>> more often >>> "moments", and the word >>> "moment" sometimes means >>> a stage, or a >>> phase, or a >>> step (as in the three >>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >>> Hegel, as in "in >>> itself", "for >>> others", "for myself". >>> >>> One of the most >>> difficult problems we had >>> to solve >>> in translating the >>> Lectures on Pedology was >>> that Vygotsky very >>> clearly distinguishes three >>> moments of speech >>> development: indicative, >>> nominative, and signifying. >>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a >>> pointing >>> gesture. "Nominating" is >>> ipso facto verbal, >>> because it is the naming >>> function: "every thing has a >>> name". But "signifying" >>> is much harder to pin >>> down, and in one place >>> Vygotsky actually says >>> that it is >>> synonymous with >>> the adult understanding >>> that anything can be >>> named. So what is the >>> difference between knowing that >>> everything has a name and the knowledge >>> that any >>> thing can be named? >>> >>> I think that the >>> distinction is just as >>> subtle and >>> just as significant >>> as the distinction >>> between pointing to >>> something >>> with a gesture, pointing >>> to something with a word >>> like "this" or >>> "that", >>> and pointing to something >>> with a word like "apple" >>> or "pear". If I >>> say that >>> "everything has a name", >>> the name could be >>> extremely general >>> ("everything" >>> or "thing") or it could >>> be highly specific >>> ("Huw" or "this >>> computer"). But >>> I don't yet have the >>> idea that names are >>> invented, and that >>> therefore >>> it is possible to name >>> objects which do not >>> exist, and therefore >>> to bring >>> into existence modes of >>> pure abstract thinking >>> through language. >>> That's >>> signifying, and it is >>> indeed a new moment, or >>> a new instant, in the >>> lifelong process of speech >>> development. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at >>> 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> >>> >> >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you, David. >>> That helps to explain a >>> particular aspect that I thought >>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >>> which is that >>> stimuli can not >>> only signify but >>> also symbolise, i.e. they >>> afford the kind of >>> dynamics you >>> have elucidated from >>> Volkelt's schema. >>> >>> I have also noted >>> that the translation of >>> phrases like "instances of a >>> process" is probably off the mark >>> too. What >>> is really meant, I >>> believe, is >>> "instants of a process". These have two >>> rather different >>> meanings from the >>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 10 January 2016 >>> at 06:02, David Kellogg >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Huw: >>> >>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>> >>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? >>> ???????????? ??? >>> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? >>> ????????. >>> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >>> ???????????? ???????????. >>> >>> (Russian >>> >>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>> >>> This means (as nearly as I can >>> make out): >>> "If the task did not go beyond >>> the natural capability of the >>> child, he >>> could deal with it in an >>> >>> unmediated >>> >>> or primitive method. In this >>> cases, the >>> structure of his behavior would >>> >>> be >>> >>> completely similar to the scheme as >>> presented by Volkelt". >>> >>> I think there is no diagramme, at >>> least >>> not in the sense of a two >>> dimensional graphic one can have a >>> copy >>> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain >>> all child >>> behavior as the result of an >>> affectively tinged FUSION of >>> perception >>> and behavior, an affectively >>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >>> perception and behavior were >>> absolutely inseparable. This was >>> what Hans >>> Volkelt concluded from a >>> >>> series >>> >>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >>> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>> >>> the >>> >>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>> >>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >>> baby bottles: one shaped like a >>> triangle, one like a violin, one >>> like a >>> square, etc. They were all >>> different colors as well. But three of >>> them didn't have holes in the >>> >>> teat: >>> >>> you could see and smell the milk >>> but you >>> couldn't drink it. One did. He >>> taught the infants to associate the >>> drinking of milk and the feeling of >>> satiation with one particular >>> bottle, so >>> that they would actually ignore >>> the bottle unless it had all the >>> characteristics: triangularity, >>> >>> blueness, >>> >>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >>> child's point of view, he was not >>> drinking milk but triangular blue >>> milk. >>> This kind of "affectively colored >>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >>> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>> schemata". >>> >>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >>> eventually decided that we never >>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >>> colored perception-behavior wholes, >>> and this would explain the >>> indivisible and >>> inseparable devotion of the >>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in >>> later >>> work Vygotsky is very careful to >>> distance himself from Volkelt even >>> in his >>> explanations of infant >>> >>> behavior: >>> >>> in the Lectures on Pedology he >>> argues that >>> ALL THREE layers of behavior >>> (that is, instinct, habit, and >>> intelligence) are present in infancy. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, >>> Huw Lloyd >>> >> >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Does anyone have a copy of >>> "Volkelt's >>> diagram" to hand that is referred >>> >>> to >>> >>> in The History of the >>> Development of >>> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>> >>> p.85 >>> >>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I >>> don't think >>> a reference is given. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology >>> to deal as a >>> natural science with an >>> object that creates history. >>> Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal >>> as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Jan 11 06:07:08 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:07:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <03DE8A63-B13C-4E1F-8ED0-CEEFFA0DA6A1@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <67965018-2A54-4C11-91D0-8C65451F9C9E@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Huw, As I said, the blog offers a simple and accessible account. If you want something more detailed, you could try this: Smith, B. (Ed.), Parts and moments studies in logic and formal ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. Martin On Jan 11, 2016, at 6:23 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Martin, > > I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a > straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume. > > I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented > in the blog is incomplete and incorrect. For example, the assertion "You > don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room" > is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and > recall the experience of its colour. Likewise the notion of a 'whole' that > is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft > somehow qualified it as being independent. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology. Here is an >> accessible account of the basics: >> >> < >> https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/ >>> >> >> Martin >> >> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The >> differing >>> interpretations have quite different implications. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, >>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those >>>> concepts. >>>> >>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" >> but >>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they >> are >>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three >> moments. >>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general >>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot >>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a >> general >>>> secretary, can we? >>>> >>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just >>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... >>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of >>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of >> Logic >>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw: >>>>> >>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the >> word >>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the >> three >>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", >>>>> "for >>>>> others", "for myself". >>>>> >>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the >>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three >>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. >>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. >> "Nominating" is >>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has >> a >>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place >>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult >> understanding >>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing >> that >>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? >>>>> >>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant >>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, >> pointing >>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to >> something >>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a >> name", >>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it >> could >>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the >>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name >>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence >> modes of >>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is >>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of >> speech >>>>> development. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I >> thought >>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can >> not >>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics >>>>>> you >>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a >>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I >> believe, >>>>>> is >>>>>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings >> from >>>>>> the >>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? >> ??? >>>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? >> ??? >>>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >>>>>>> >>>>>> (Russian >>>>>> >>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go >> beyond >>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >>>>>>> >>>>>> unmediated >>>>>> >>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior >> would >>>>>>> >>>>>> be >>>>>> >>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is >> referring >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of >> an >>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively >>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >>>>>>> >>>>>> series >>>>>> >>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and >> in >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like >> a >>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the >>>>>>> >>>>>> teat: >>>>>> >>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. >> He >>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling >> of >>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually >> ignore >>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >>>>>>> >>>>>> blueness, >>>>>> >>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was >> not >>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively >>>>>>> colored >>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or >> "Volkelt's >>>>>>> schemata". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we >> never >>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior >> wholes, >>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of >> the >>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very >> careful >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >>>>>>> >>>>>> behavior: >>>>>> >>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of >> behavior >>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd < >> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is >> referred >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> p.85 >>>>>> >>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 06:38:05 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:38:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <67965018-2A54-4C11-91D0-8C65451F9C9E@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5692F2E1.5020202@mira.net> <03DE8A63-B13C-4E1F-8ED0-CEEFFA0DA6A1@uniandes.edu.co> <67965018-2A54-4C11-91D0-8C65451F9C9E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: How delightful. :) Thanks Martin. On 11 January 2016 at 14:07, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Huw, > > As I said, the blog offers a simple and accessible account. If you want > something more detailed, you could try this: > > Smith, B. (Ed.), Parts and moments studies in logic and formal ontology. > Munich: Philosophia Verlag. > > > > Martin > > On Jan 11, 2016, at 6:23 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > > > I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a > > straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume. > > > > I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented > > in the blog is incomplete and incorrect. For example, the assertion "You > > don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room" > > is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and > > recall the experience of its colour. Likewise the notion of a 'whole' > that > > is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft > > somehow qualified it as being independent. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer > > > wrote: > > > >> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology. Here is > an > >> accessible account of the basics: > >> > >> < > >> > https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/ > >>> > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The > >> differing > >>> interpretations have quite different implications. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or > step, > >>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those > >>>> concepts. > >>>> > >>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" > >> but > >>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though > they > >> are > >>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three > >> moments. > >>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general > >>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot > >>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a > >> general > >>>> secretary, can we? > >>>> > >>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just > >>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... > >>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of > >>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of > >> Logic > >>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll > check. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Huw: > >>>>> > >>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the > >> word > >>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the > >> three > >>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in > itself", > >>>>> "for > >>>>> others", "for myself". > >>>>> > >>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the > >>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes > three > >>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and > signifying. > >>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. > >> "Nominating" is > >>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing > has > >> a > >>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place > >>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult > >> understanding > >>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing > >> that > >>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? > >>>>> > >>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as > significant > >>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, > >> pointing > >>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to > >> something > >>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a > >> name", > >>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it > >> could > >>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have > the > >>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to > name > >>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence > >> modes of > >>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is > >>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of > >> speech > >>>>> development. > >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I > >> thought > >>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can > >> not > >>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of > dynamics > >>>>>> you > >>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances > of a > >>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I > >> believe, > >>>>>> is > >>>>>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings > >> from > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg > >> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Huw: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? > >> ??? > >>>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? > >> ??? > >>>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> (Russian > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go > >> beyond > >>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> unmediated > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior > >> would > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> be > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two > >>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is > >> referring > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of > >> an > >>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an > affectively > >>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were > >>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> series > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF > and > >> in > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped > like > >> a > >>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all > >>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in > the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> teat: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One > did. > >> He > >>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the > feeling > >> of > >>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually > >> ignore > >>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> blueness, > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was > >> not > >>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively > >>>>>>> colored > >>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or > >> "Volkelt's > >>>>>>> schemata". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we > >> never > >>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior > >> wholes, > >>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of > >> the > >>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very > >> careful > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> behavior: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of > >> behavior > >>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in > infancy. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd < > >> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is > >> referred > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions > (1997, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> p.85 > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >> > >> > >> > > > From bluetanso@googlemail.com Mon Jan 11 08:27:27 2016 From: bluetanso@googlemail.com (Hugh O'Donnell) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 16:27:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi, Huw! (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots monikers) Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a Masters Degree Dissertation... No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic writing/the academic a community. This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the moment - looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the action research project in light of game playing and language use. The one I distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of what was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire Science learning. My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science and Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration. I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine social engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated experience - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing episodes correlate with science content knowledge is effectively deployed? CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve better integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration... If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could have pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary elements to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say. Thanks for getting in touch! H Kind Regards, Hugh O'Donnell http://bluetanso.WordPress.com Twitter: @bluetanso On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?) > > You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds of > exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects of > your paper you find interesting, problematic etc. > > For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have > traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative > gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for > this. For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative > difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity (i.e. > the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of mine. > > I think you can draw us in, yes? > > Best, > Huw > > > On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell > wrote: > > > Greetings, > > > > Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based learning: > > > > http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 > > > > I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action research. > > > > Kind Regards, > > Hugh O'Donnell > > > > http://bluetanso.WordPress.com > > Twitter: @bluetanso > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 08:48:15 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 16:48:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Nice to hear back from you, Hugh. My quick impression to your response for me is: it is necessary to have something worth writing about to warrant the effort of writing it well. So your second paper discusses the same content from a different perspective, is that right? That might be interesting to look through. Best, Huw On 11 January 2016 at 16:27, Hugh O'Donnell wrote: > Hi, Huw! > > (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots > monikers) > > Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a > Masters Degree Dissertation... > > No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic writing/the > academic a community. > > This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the moment - > looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the action > research project in light of game playing and language use. The one I > distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of what > was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire Science > learning. > > My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science and > Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration. > > I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine social > engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated experience > - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing > episodes correlate with science content knowledge is effectively deployed? > > CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and > learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important > to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve better > integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration... > > If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could have > pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary elements > to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say. > > Thanks for getting in touch! > H > > Kind Regards, > Hugh O'Donnell > > http://bluetanso.WordPress.com > Twitter: @bluetanso > On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > > > Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?) > > > > You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds of > > exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects of > > your paper you find interesting, problematic etc. > > > > For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have > > traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative > > gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for > > this. For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative > > difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity > (i.e. > > the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of > mine. > > > > I think you can draw us in, yes? > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell > > wrote: > > > > > Greetings, > > > > > > Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based learning: > > > > > > http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 > > > > > > I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action > research. > > > > > > Kind Regards, > > > Hugh O'Donnell > > > > > > http://bluetanso.WordPress.com > > > Twitter: @bluetanso > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Jan 11 09:22:17 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:22:17 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Request for Articles: Anti-Poverty Policy Innovations In-Reply-To: <300.0.15.1B6.1D14C7DB9AC33E2.5EA75@me-ss2-vsujbl.mailengine1.com> References: <300.0.15.1B6.1D14C7DB9AC33E2.5EA75@me-ss2-vsujbl.mailengine1.com> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Russell Sage Foundation Date: Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:38 AM Subject: Request for Articles: Anti-Poverty Policy Innovations To: mcole@ucsd.edu Click here to view this message in a browser . [image: Image] *CALL FOR ARTICLESRSF: THE RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION JOURNAL OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCESANTI-POVERTY POLICY INNOVATIONS: NEW PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES* Edited by *Lawrence M. Berger* and *Katherine Magnuson*, University of Wisconsin-Madison; we also expect that *Maria Cancian* will join us as a coeditor when she returns from leave in 2016-2017 The Institute for Research on Poverty (IRP) and the Russell Sage Foundation have historically collaborated on a series of edited volumes on poverty and poverty policy, which includes *Fighting Poverty, Confronting Poverty, Understanding Poverty, and Changing Poverty, Changing Policies*. This series has been widely used by teachers and scholars of poverty and related issues, and has traditionally been comprised of state-of-the art review chapters. The last volume, *Changing Poverty, Changing Policies*, was published in 2009. Since that time, there have been a number of volumes focusing on the Great Recession, as well as the fifty years of the War on Poverty. These works have extensively reviewed recent trends, research, and policy in the poverty arena. However, much less attention has been focused on innovative, specific anti-poverty policy proposals in light of this evidence. We believe that an issue of *RSF* highlighting such proposals would greatly serve the field. We outline our vision for the issue below. The journal issue will showcase a collection of innovative and specific policy proposals intended to *reduce poverty in the short- and/or long-term or improve economic wellbeing*. Each article will focus on a specific social problem and/or population group. The issue aims to set the anti-poverty policy agenda for the next decade or more by presenting detailed real-world responses to current and emerging poverty-related problems. The policy or inter-related set of policies proposed in each article will include a description of the target group and problem; eligibility criteria; program/service or benefit type and amount; expectations regarding policy scope, reach, and take-up; potential heterogeneity in effects across population groups or geographic location; and expected cost and effectiveness, including public and private costs and benefits. Each article must be firmly grounded in existing social science research and present the science (theoretical and empirical research) underpinning the proposed policy. *Articles should not propose an overarching policy agenda in a particular domain. Rather each article should propose a specific, potentially high-impact, innovative, or particularly promising policy or policy approach and present evidence in support of that approach.* That is, articles should leverage existing research and policy analyses to present an evidence-based argument for implementing novel and potentially transformational policy innovations in a particular poverty-related domain. The coeditors will contribute an extensive introductory piece that provides a roadmap of current and expected poverty-related trends, evidence on the causes and consequences of poverty, existing anti-poverty policies, and evidence on the efficacy of existing approaches to addressing poverty. They will also contribute a concluding piece that weighs the pros and cons of the various proposals, including key tradeoffs, feasibility, and prioritization. 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Papers will be published open access on the RSF website as well as in several digital repositories, including JSTOR and UPCC/Muse. Please click here for a full description of the topics covered in this call for papers. ------------------------------ * Order RSF Books | Unsubscribe | Privacy Policy | Contact Us Russell Sage Foundation ? 112 East 64th Street, New York, NY 10065 ? (212) 750-6000* 112 East 64th Street New York, NY 10009 United States Update Profile / Unsubscribe -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From bluetanso@googlemail.com Mon Jan 11 10:48:42 2016 From: bluetanso@googlemail.com (Hugh O'Donnell) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 18:48:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Yes, I think it was Vygotsky who said that children want to write; they just want to write about something that matters. That's why we use the simulation: it allows pupils and teams to be engaged with mission critical activities that are supported by Science. Eg. Connect water pumps fitted with heaters: heat melts subterranean ice, water flow begins... You have water, you have hydrogen and oxygen for fuel and breathing. Of course, pupils could present narratives orally... I'll let you have a look at the second paper. Kind Regards, Hugh O'Donnell http://bluetanso.WordPress.com Twitter: @bluetanso On 11 Jan 2016 4:50 pm, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > Nice to hear back from you, Hugh. > > My quick impression to your response for me is: it is necessary to have > something worth writing about to warrant the effort of writing it well. > > So your second paper discusses the same content from a different > perspective, is that right? That might be interesting to look through. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 11 January 2016 at 16:27, Hugh O'Donnell > wrote: > > > Hi, Huw! > > > > (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots > > monikers) > > > > Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a > > Masters Degree Dissertation... > > > > No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic > writing/the > > academic a community. > > > > This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the > moment - > > looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the > action > > research project in light of game playing and language use. The one I > > distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of > what > > was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire > Science > > learning. > > > > My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science > and > > Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration. > > > > I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine > social > > engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated > experience > > - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing > > episodes correlate with science content knowledge is effectively > deployed? > > > > CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and > > learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important > > to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve > better > > integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration... > > > > If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could > have > > pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary > elements > > to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say. > > > > Thanks for getting in touch! > > H > > > > Kind Regards, > > Hugh O'Donnell > > > > http://bluetanso.WordPress.com > > Twitter: @bluetanso > > On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > > > > > Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?) > > > > > > You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds > of > > > exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects > of > > > your paper you find interesting, problematic etc. > > > > > > For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have > > > traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative > > > gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for > > > this. For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative > > > difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity > > (i.e. > > > the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of > > mine. > > > > > > I think you can draw us in, yes? > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Greetings, > > > > > > > > Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based > learning: > > > > > > > > http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 > > > > > > > > I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action > > research. > > > > > > > > Kind Regards, > > > > Hugh O'Donnell > > > > > > > > http://bluetanso.WordPress.com > > > > Twitter: @bluetanso > > > > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 15:08:22 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:08:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] missionaries and cannibals Message-ID: I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, post dinner in rather noisy circumstances. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries to shore and then wavered for a while. Next thing I know he is taking them down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the cannibals". What can you do? :) Best, Huw From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 15:09:26 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:09:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: are -> our On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd wrote: > I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, post > dinner in rather noisy circumstances. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem > > He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries > to shore and then wavered for a while. Next thing I know he is taking them > down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the > cannibals". > > What can you do? :) > > Best, > Huw > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jan 11 15:18:51 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:18:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] What is the word Message-ID: In keeping with the recent vogue, I thought this poem by Samuel Beckett was of timely deliverance: WHAT IS THE WORD Samuel Beckett for Joe Chaikin folly - folly for to - for to - what is the word - folly from this - all this - folly from all this - given - folly given all this - seeing - folly seeing all this - this - what is the word - this this - this this here - all this this here - folly given all this - seeing - folly seeing all this this here - for to - what is the word - see - glimpse - seem to glimpse - need to seem to glimpse - folly for to need to seem to glimpse - what - what is the word - and where - folly for to need to seem to glimpse what where - where - what is the word - there - over there - away over there - afar - afar away over there - afaint - afaint afar away over there what - what - what is the word - seeing all this - all this this - all this this here - folly for to see what - glimpse - seem to glimpse - need to seem to glimpse - afaint afar away over there what - folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what - what - what is the word - what is the word [from: Grand Street, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1990, pp.17-18, N.Y., ISSN 0734-5496] From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 16:00:00 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:00:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Reminiscent of Hopkins' "The leaden echo and the golden echo". What is the vogue? Why is it timely? Best, Huw On 11 January 2016 at 23:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > In keeping with the recent vogue, I thought this poem by Samuel Beckett > was of timely deliverance: > > > WHAT IS THE WORD > > Samuel Beckett > > for Joe Chaikin > > folly - > folly for to - > for to - > what is the word - > folly from this - > all this - > folly from all this - > given - > folly given all this - > seeing - > folly seeing all this - > this - > what is the word - > this this - > this this here - > all this this here - > folly given all this - > seeing - > folly seeing all this this here - > for to - > what is the word - > see - > glimpse - > seem to glimpse - > need to seem to glimpse - > folly for to need to seem to glimpse - > what - > what is the word - > and where - > folly for to need to seem to glimpse what where - > where - > what is the word - > there - > over there - > away over there - > afar - > afar away over there - > afaint - > afaint afar away over there what - > what - > what is the word - > seeing all this - > all this this - > all this this here - > folly for to see what - > glimpse - > seem to glimpse - > need to seem to glimpse - > afaint afar away over there what - > folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what - > what - > what is the word - > > what is the word > > > [from: Grand Street, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1990, pp.17-18, N.Y., ISSN > 0734-5496] > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jan 11 16:19:39 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:19:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Huw, Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words and signifying? Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something about that moment before signifying. It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words. That's all. Kind regards, Annalisa From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 16:28:23 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:28:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Okey-dokes. I thought it might have been vaguely Bowie related. Bowie of later years seemed rather 'soft' to me, though impressions were fleeting and far between. However, this interview with Paxman of all people, is refreshing. Lovely to see him dancing around Paxman's stern, unimaginative conservatism. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-35286749 Its nice to see that he gets the role of art and mediation intellectually and expresses it in those 'micro-genetic' gaps (mocking Paxman gently). Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 00:19, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Huw, > > Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words > and signifying? > > Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something about > that moment before signifying. > > It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the > construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words. > > That's all. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 16:43:27 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:43:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: More musical micro-ingenuity: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35276200 Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 00:28, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Okey-dokes. > > I thought it might have been vaguely Bowie related. Bowie of later years > seemed rather 'soft' to me, though impressions were fleeting and far > between. However, this interview with Paxman of all people, is > refreshing. Lovely to see him dancing around Paxman's stern, unimaginative > conservatism. > > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-35286749 > > Its nice to see that he gets the role of art and mediation intellectually > and expresses it in those 'micro-genetic' gaps (mocking Paxman gently). > > Best, > Huw > > > On 12 January 2016 at 00:19, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Huw, >> >> Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words >> and signifying? >> >> Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something >> about that moment before signifying. >> >> It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the >> construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words. >> >> That's all. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jan 11 16:53:13 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:53:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Huw, Well, the poem *was* linked to in a Bowie Obit at the New Yorker as well, but I thought Becket's poem still coincides with the list's recent occupations: http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/%E2%80%AAthe-beautiful-meaninglessness-of-david-bowie This one was also intriguing: David Bowie explained how he used 'cut ups' to create lyrics http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-35281247 Bowie also had spent time in a Buddhist monastery as a young man, so it likely plays a part in this. Meditation is frequently about being without thought, which to me is about being without words. Kind regards, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Jan 11 17:07:08 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 17:07:08 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sounds like a sensible solution to me, Huw. Nice to see him getting his feet wet! :-) mike On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > are -> our > > On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, > post > > dinner in rather noisy circumstances. > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem > > > > He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries > > to shore and then wavered for a while. Next thing I know he is taking > them > > down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the > > cannibals". > > > > What can you do? :) > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 17:31:48 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:31:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling me to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 00:53, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Huw, > > Well, the poem *was* linked to in a Bowie Obit at the New Yorker as well, > but I thought Becket's poem still coincides with the list's recent > occupations: > > http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/%E2%80%AAthe-beautiful-meaninglessness-of-david-bowie > > This one was also intriguing: > David Bowie explained how he used 'cut ups' to create lyrics > http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-35281247 > > Bowie also had spent time in a Buddhist monastery as a young man, so it > likely plays a part in this. Meditation is frequently about being without > thought, which to me is about being without words. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 17:43:12 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:43:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Not sure whether to give it another go (destination a ship) or move on to something else. The little one has started a wording; it is all about trying out meanings now -- joy. Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 01:07, mike cole wrote: > Sounds like a sensible solution to me, Huw. > Nice to see him getting his feet wet! > :-) > mike > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > are -> our > > > > On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > > > I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, > > post > > > dinner in rather noisy circumstances. > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem > > > > > > He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two > missionaries > > > to shore and then wavered for a while. Next thing I know he is taking > > them > > > down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the > > > cannibals". > > > > > > What can you do? :) > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jan 11 17:59:14 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Was there a link coming forth? From: Huw Lloyd Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling me to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). Best, Huw From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 18:02:57 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 02:02:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Keeping you waiting? :) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Was there a link coming forth? > > > From: Huw Lloyd > Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > > Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a > savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, > there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity > and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see > the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling me > to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". > > Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the > Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). > > Best, > Huw > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jan 11 22:25:04 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 06:25:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Hello, I didn't quite see your comparison of David Bowie's word cutouts with Daniel Tammet. I don't think Bowie himself thought of them as divinations, not literally anyway, but a means of creating songs. He was using a method shared with him by William Burroughs and Brion Gyson, as indicated here (read to the bottom): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cut-up_technique They do say they *seem* like divinations, but I didn't get the feeling they were doing them for the sake of divining. What you are talking about with Tammet and the Japanese soroban almost seems like I Ching to me, but neither do they seem to be divining, they are just exploring their abilities. I Ching however is practiced for divining, for the sake of it. In any case, the connection that I'd make about all this is that there is something tying everything together, which we cannot perceive, and since we can't perceive it, we also cannot measure it. And since we can't measure it, we usually will say it doesn't exist, tending toward scepticism. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: behalf of Huw Lloyd Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 7:02 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word Keeping you waiting? :) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Was there a link coming forth? > > > From: Huw Lloyd > Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > > Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a > savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, > there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity > and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see > the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling me > to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". > > Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the > Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). > > Best, > Huw > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 22:37:32 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:37:32 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> <982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation between "moment" and music. I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of angular momentum. Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > Dear all , > > Look at this please ! > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought > experiment: 1) The > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > essence can be revealed > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > transformations; 3) this same > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the > object is > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as > a process of > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > essentially becomes a > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only > within this special > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be converted > in the other as we all have seen . > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect or > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > Best > > Haydi > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 22:52:42 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 06:52:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: The imaginary soroban is different to the poker account (which was merely compared with divination). The imaginary soroban has obvious historical manifestations of how it is learnt. The divination was merely a comparison -- I have nothing to add to it. Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 06:25, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello, > > I didn't quite see your comparison of David Bowie's word cutouts with > Daniel Tammet. I don't think Bowie himself thought of them as divinations, > not literally anyway, but a means of creating songs. He was using a method > shared with him by William Burroughs and Brion Gyson, as indicated here > (read to the bottom): > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cut-up_technique > > They do say they *seem* like divinations, but I didn't get the feeling > they were doing them for the sake of divining. > > What you are talking about with Tammet and the Japanese soroban almost > seems like I Ching to me, but neither do they seem to be divining, they are > just exploring their abilities. > > I Ching however is practiced for divining, for the sake of it. > > In any case, the connection that I'd make about all this is that there is > something tying everything together, which we cannot perceive, and since we > can't perceive it, we also cannot measure it. And since we can't measure > it, we usually will say it doesn't exist, tending toward scepticism. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: behalf of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 7:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > > Keeping you waiting? :) > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Was there a link coming forth? > > > > > > From: Huw Lloyd > > Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > > > > Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a > > savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, > > there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity > > and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment > (see > > the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling > me > > to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". > > > > Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the > > Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Jan 11 23:13:07 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:13:07 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] help ! References: <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Dear all, Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks ! Best Haydi From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 11 23:29:21 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 18:29:21 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help ! In-Reply-To: <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5694AB51.1000502@mira.net> Haydi, there is nothing wrong with your computer or the xmca system. All your messages are getting through and being read. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 12/01/2016 6:13 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Dear all, > Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks ! > Best > Haydi > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 23:33:28 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help ! In-Reply-To: <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: This one got through, though not the previous one that David replied to. Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 07:13, wrote: > Dear all, > Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets > lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the > list . Thanks ! > Best > Haydi > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Jan 11 23:35:13 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:35:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> <982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a progression in its transformation? Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to teeth/molars at present... Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > between "moment" and music. > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a > way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a > sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of > angular momentum. > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > > > Dear all , > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought > > experiment: 1) The > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > > essence can be revealed > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > > transformations; 3) this same > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which > the > > object is > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented > as > > a process of > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > > essentially becomes a > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only > > within this special > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate > even > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > motionality , > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > converted > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect > or > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think > of > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on > which > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs > . > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources > for > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > Best > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 11 23:44:46 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 18:44:46 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> <982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5694AEEE.8050309@mira.net> molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of opposites, both originating from the same root. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. > > Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the > manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a > progression in its transformation? > > Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to > teeth/molars at present... > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >> between "moment" and music. >> >> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> >> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a >> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a >> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >> angular momentum. >> >> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >> >> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >> >>> Dear all , >>> >>> Look at this please ! >>> >>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>> experiment: 1) The >>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>> essence can be revealed >>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>> transformations; 3) this same >>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >> the >>> object is >>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >> as >>> a process of >>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>> essentially becomes a >>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>> within this special >>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>> >>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >> even >>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> motionality , >>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >> converted >>> in the other as we all have seen . >>> >>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >> or >>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >> of >>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >> which >>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >> . >>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >> for >>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>> >>> >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Jan 11 23:45:46 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:45:46 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help ! In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1081823808.5708789.1452584746800.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Thanks Andy and Huw ! But as?Hew says , he's not received my message of Jan.11th while Andy says : I received it . We all did. And I cannot see my messages appear on the list myself . And I receive some messages in pairs like the one sent by David . I wrote to Bruce jones , too . I should wait for more guidance , then .?Thanks?all ! H From: Huw Lloyd To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:03:28 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] help ! This one got through, though not the previous one that David replied to.? Best,Huw On 12 January 2016 at 07:13, wrote: ?Dear all, Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks ! Best Haydi From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Jan 12 01:12:57 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 09:12:57 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) References: <820642578.5882801.1452589977563.JavaMail.yahoo.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <820642578.5882801.1452589977563.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and?his?as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter?Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are?treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning"?of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue : [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented, practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves, reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being, its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal, the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action,?[THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that?each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized?, the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two?separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process .?Thanks ! David, Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions . [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]] [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for understanding its separate components: In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialized within it.]] [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things, but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]] [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues, recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability, resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]] [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation, in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development, in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the connection between the individual and the universal. It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]] Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . BestHaydi BestHaydi?? From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Jan 12 02:34:01 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 05:34:01 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] NYTimes.com: When Philosophy Lost Its Way Message-ID: <46hpx1gnlt98ox00yqxnbd27.1452594840913@email.android.com> From The New York Times: When Philosophy Lost Its Way Once upon a time, acquiring wisdom and being a good person were intimately linked. The modern university changed all that. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/when-philosophy-lost-its-way/?mwrsm=Email Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone From ablunden@mira.net Tue Jan 12 02:35:24 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 21:35:24 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <820642578.5882801.1452589977563.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> References: <820642578.5882801.1452589977563.JavaMail.yahoo.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <820642578.5882801.1452589977563.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5694D6EC.2090000@mira.net> Haydi, Your quote from the Grundrisse: "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity. " A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The Devil Wears Prada": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of the social context of its production. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue : > [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented, > practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves, > reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being, > its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means > of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal, > the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . > With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks ! > David, > Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions . > [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a > broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a > transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this > broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the > very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]] > [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for > understanding its separate components: > In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates > over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general > illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a > particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has > materialized within it.]] > [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the > dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a > certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when > it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of > theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things, > but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and > in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the > visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]] > [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in > their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory > observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish > certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just > precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the > following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an > ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes > the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues, > recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability, > resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and > subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]] > [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of > individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity > of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation, > in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its > manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the > process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold > of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development, > in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the > connection between the individual and the universal. > It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and > general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or > formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this > process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]] > Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . > BestHaydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > BestHaydi > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Jan 12 07:06:39 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:06:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so??we are unable to have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner connections' of a whole as 'moments'?. Dialectical Logic (close relative to CHAT) says as man?relies on object-related activity while an ideal adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to the finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model into a material?model ,?in reifying or objectifying that model into a finished?product and all through the durational time , you can see what is necessary?, essential and what is not . In higher momentums of conception , you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we mean it's ever?running through uninterruptedly because?the?whole entity falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart , again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says?we cannot stop at phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move (dynamicity) according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically .?We don't want to be stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as moments of your positioning while observing ,?you've not been able to convert those phenomenal aspects (empiricism)?into innermost movements hence agnosticism prevails . Yes ,? We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering , how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of?some detachable independent separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined moments of?inner mechanisms?of whole development (internalization , appropriation?, instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development?or even periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do they subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments still sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ?? --Secondly , we?agreed that moment is different from the instance as we took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact . --Thirdly , with what I?said ,?I suppose you've been responded to . Our focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ;?I first refrained from using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving movable whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some static?internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially realizable , will damage genuine cognition . BestHaydi ? From: David Kellogg To: Haydi Zulfei Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation between "moment" and music.? I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").? First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of angular momentum. Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). David KelloggMacquarie University On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: Dear all , Look at this please ! [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .? And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .? Best Haydi?? From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Jan 12 07:33:29 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:33:29 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <300561455.6277070.1452612809075.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Hi huw !?I don't know about?David's opinion but as for myself I agree to what you define so succinctly?especially when we read Davydov's 'dissolving particularities' to reach 'concrete universals' in one of the quotes I delivered . Thanks a lot ! Best Haydi ? From: Huw Lloyd To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:05:13 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a progression in its transformation? Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to teeth/molars at present... Best, Huw On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > between "moment" and music. > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a > way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a > sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of > angular momentum. > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > > > Dear all , > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought > > experiment: 1) The > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > > essence can be revealed > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > > transformations; 3) this same > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which > the > > object is > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented > as > > a process of > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > > essentially becomes a > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only > > within this special > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate > even > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > motionality , > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > converted > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect > or > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think > of > > how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on > which > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs > . > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources > for > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > Best > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Jan 12 07:40:15 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:40:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <5694AEEE.8050309@mira.net> References: <5694AEEE.8050309@mira.net> Message-ID: <694795909.6221451.1452613215224.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Thank you , Andy ! especially when you?refer to the opposition between mass material and molecular ; that's quite obvious ; you come near mine as 'variables in a state of fusion' . BestHaydi ? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:14:46 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of opposites, both originating from the same root. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. > > Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the > manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a > progression in its transformation? > > Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to > teeth/molars at present... > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >> between "moment" and music. >> >> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> >> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a >> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a >> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >> angular momentum. >> >> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >> >> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >> >>> Dear all , >>> >>> Look at this please ! >>> >>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>> experiment: 1) The >>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>> essence can be revealed >>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>> transformations; 3) this same >>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >> the >>> object is >>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >> as >>> a process of >>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>> essentially becomes a >>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>> within this special >>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>> >>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >> even >>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> motionality , >>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >> converted >>> in the other as we all have seen . >>> >>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >> or >>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >> of >>> how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >> which >>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >> . >>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >> for >>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>> >>> >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Jan 12 07:40:15 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:40:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <5694AEEE.8050309@mira.net> References: <5694AEEE.8050309@mira.net> Message-ID: <694795909.6221451.1452613215224.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Thank you , Andy ! especially when you?refer to the opposition between mass material and molecular ; that's quite obvious ; you come near mine as 'variables in a state of fusion' . BestHaydi ? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:14:46 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of opposites, both originating from the same root. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. > > Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the > manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a > progression in its transformation? > > Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to > teeth/molars at present... > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >> between "moment" and music. >> >> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> >> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a >> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a >> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >> angular momentum. >> >> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >> >> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >> >>> Dear all , >>> >>> Look at this please ! >>> >>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>> experiment: 1) The >>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>> essence can be revealed >>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>> transformations; 3) this same >>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >> the >>> object is >>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >> as >>> a process of >>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>> essentially becomes a >>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>> within this special >>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>> >>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >> even >>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> motionality , >>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >> converted >>> in the other as we all have seen . >>> >>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >> or >>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >> of >>> how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >> which >>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >> . >>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >> for >>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>> >>> >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Jan 12 20:48:01 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 04:48:01 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <5694D6EC.2090000@mira.net> References: <5694D6EC.2090000@mira.net> Message-ID: <315151224.6688990.1452660481374.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Thanks Andy, I watched and downloaded all 5 sequences . relevant and interesting . And your referring to very excellent points . H ? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 14:05:24 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) Haydi, Your quote from the Grundrisse: ? ? "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other ? ? colours and modifies their particularity. " A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The Devil Wears Prada": ? ? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of the social context of its production. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >? Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue : > [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented, > practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves, > reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being, > its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means > of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal, > the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . > With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks ! > David, > Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions . > [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a > broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a > transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this > broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the > very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]] > [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for > understanding its separate components: > In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates > over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general > illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a > particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has > materialized within it.]] > [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the > dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a > certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when > it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of > theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things, > but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and > in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the > visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]] > [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in > their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory > observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish > certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just > precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the > following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an > ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes > the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues, > recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability, > resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and > subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]] > [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of > individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity > of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation, > in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its > manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the > process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold > of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development, > in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the > connection between the individual and the universal. > It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and > general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or > formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this > process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]] > Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . > BestHaydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > BestHaydi > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Jan 12 20:48:01 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 04:48:01 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <5694D6EC.2090000@mira.net> References: <5694D6EC.2090000@mira.net> Message-ID: <315151224.6688990.1452660481374.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Thanks Andy, I watched and downloaded all 5 sequences . relevant and interesting . And your referring to very excellent points . H ? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 14:05:24 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) Haydi, Your quote from the Grundrisse: ? ? "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other ? ? colours and modifies their particularity. " A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The Devil Wears Prada": ? ? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of the social context of its production. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >? Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue : > [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented, > practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves, > reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being, > its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means > of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal, > the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . > With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks ! > David, > Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions . > [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a > broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a > transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this > broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the > very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]] > [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for > understanding its separate components: > In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates > over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general > illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a > particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has > materialized within it.]] > [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the > dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a > certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when > it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of > theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things, > but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and > in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the > visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]] > [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in > their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory > observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish > certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just > precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the > following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an > ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes > the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues, > recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability, > resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and > subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]] > [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of > individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity > of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation, > in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its > manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the > process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold > of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development, > in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the > connection between the individual and the universal. > It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and > general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or > formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this > process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]] > Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . > BestHaydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > BestHaydi > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jan 13 02:02:31 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 19:02:31 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Dear Haydi: In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as (to quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one case, we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, like a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we have a process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre that walks around us while we sit and observe. Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce the process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it, you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT, and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is that I am not sure that the position itself is correct. The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although this is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of producing and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality. Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be contemplation with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not actually so. I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, and the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic function (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away from reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are unable to > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close relative to > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to the > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a > finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what is > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of conception , > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart , > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop at > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move (dynamicity) > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to be > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as moments > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert those > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence agnosticism > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering , > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable independent > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined moments > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , appropriation , > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or even > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do they > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments still > sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact . > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving movable > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > > Best > Haydi > > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* David Kellogg > *To:* Haydi Zulfei > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > between "moment" and music. > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of > angular momentum. > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > Dear all , > > Look at this please ! > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought > experiment: 1) The > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > essence can be revealed > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > transformations; 3) this same > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the > object is > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as > a process of > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > essentially becomes a > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only > within this special > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be converted > in the other as we all have seen . > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect or > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > Best > > Haydi > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Jan 13 06:05:13 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 14:05:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative interpretation, I would say: 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. One does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress. 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is actually an excellent source of edification. 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem. There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve or express a particular problem. Best, Huw On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: > Dear Haydi: > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as (to > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one case, > we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, like > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we have a > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre > that walks around us while we sit and observe. > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce the > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it, > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT, > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is that > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although this > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of producing > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality. > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be contemplation > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not > actually so. > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, and > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic function > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away from > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are unable to > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close relative > to > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to > the > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what > is > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of > conception , > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart > , > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop at > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move > (dynamicity) > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to be > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as > moments > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert > those > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence > agnosticism > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always > inhering , > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable independent > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined > moments > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , > appropriation , > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or > even > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do > they > > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments > still > > sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? > > > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we > > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact . > > > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our > > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from > > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention > > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving > movable > > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some > > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially > > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > > > > Best > > Haydi > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* David Kellogg > > *To:* Haydi Zulfei > > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the > > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. > > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > > between "moment" and music. > > > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is > a > > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of > "moment" > > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the > > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in > > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something > like > > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe > > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is > almost > > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. > This > > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as > we > > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, > > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat > > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a > > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because > even > > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining > > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of > > angular momentum. > > > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes > > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The > > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different > from > > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but > > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context > of > > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a > > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological > > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", > > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, > > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously > > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same > > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between > solar > > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the > > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the > > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech > > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we > > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the > > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way > to > > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, > > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > > > > Dear all , > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought > > experiment: 1) The > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > > essence can be revealed > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > > transformations; 3) this same > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which > the > > object is > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented > as > > a process of > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > > essentially becomes a > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only > > within this special > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate > even > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > motionality , > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > converted > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect > or > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think > of > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on > which > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs > . > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources > for > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > Best > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Jan 13 09:15:38 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:15:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] [Lchc-l] A remarkable act of courage in American civil discourse Message-ID: Hello, Sorry for cross posting on two lists, but this was too good to not post. Please share! If we could enact more of these kinds of engagements, what would tomorrow bring? I so admire Kaddie Abdul's bravery. She reminds us of many important things. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/13/i-went-to-donald-trump-rally-in-my-hijab-supporters-arent-just-racist-caricatures Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Jan 13 11:03:25 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 19:03:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Beware Hysterical Librarians! Message-ID: Hello, Another nice find today! How librarians are the gatekeepers of ignorance: http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/13/us-library-records-purged-data-privacy So many things one could discuss from what this article implies. Kind regards, Annalisa From s.davis@cqu.edu.au Wed Jan 13 16:44:19 2016 From: s.davis@cqu.edu.au (Susan Davis) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 00:44:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon Message-ID: Hi all, I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and collective perezhivanie. The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief, and very public and personal recollections and sharing of meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in the news and conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on things that made a difference in their own lives. People are shedding very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now, but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience in lives going forward. I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social media? Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential new area for investigation? Kind regards Sue Dr Susan Davis Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: >Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. > >Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >progression in its transformation? > >Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to >teeth/molars at present... > >Best, >Huw > > > > > >On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >>the >> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >> between "moment" and music. >> >> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >>is a >> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>"moment" >> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> >> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology >>in a >> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something >>like a >> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>almost >> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>This >> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >>as we >> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>present, >> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because >>even >> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >> angular momentum. >> >> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>sometimes >> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >>from >> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context >>of >> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >> >> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>seriously >> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >>solar >> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much >>the >> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way >>to >> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>example, >> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >> >> > >> > Dear all , >> > >> > Look at this please ! >> > >> > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>thought >> > experiment: 1) The >> > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >> > essence can be revealed >> > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >> > transformations; 3) this same >> > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >> the >> > object is >> > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>represented >> as >> > a process of >> > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >> > essentially becomes a >> > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >> > within this special >> > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >> > >> > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>action >> > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >> even >> > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >> > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >> > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , >>nor >> > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >> > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> motionality , >> > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >> > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >> converted >> > in the other as we all have seen . >> > >> > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >>with >> > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>It's a >> > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >> > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >> > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >>affect >> or >> > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >>think >> of >> > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , >>the >> > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >>note in >> > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >> which >> > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>occurs >> . >> > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >> > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >> > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is >>said >> > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >> for >> > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >> > >> > >> > >> > Best >> > >> > Haydi >> > >> > >> > >> From anamshane@gmail.com Wed Jan 13 17:54:02 2016 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:54:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern In-Reply-To: <7bc58d870e16a7fe44f1794702603156@bounce.bluestatedigital.com> References: <7bc58d870e16a7fe44f1794702603156@bounce.bluestatedigital.com> Message-ID: Dear colleagues, As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the faculty, anyway! Period. Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair contract. Ana ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Faculty Forward Network Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane Friend us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter [image: Faculty Forward Logo] Dear Colleague, My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University. And I'm going on strike next week. For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work. At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable employees to help minimize instructional costs. *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern -- if we don't have a contract by then.* Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action to push the administration to act. Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of part-time faculty. *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration, demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.* *Why am I going on strike?* - In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun makes more than that in a day. - Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal labor law. - If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little, we should let them try and run things without us for a day. - Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty. Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at your school, as well. *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's time to treat adjunct faculty fairly. * In gratitude and solidarity, Haley Malm Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward All rights reserved. 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025 This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe Friend us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter -- *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu) Associate Professor of Education Chestnut Hill College phone: 267-334-2905 From ablunden@mira.net Wed Jan 13 19:17:43 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:17:43 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> Very interesting questions, Sue. * browse around research on the impact of the death of Princess Dianna Spencer. In my experience it had an even greater emotional impact globally. * Check out the work of Alain Badiou on the Event - not stuff I like, but there is a lot of discussion around it. * I think the idea of such moments and the period of their "overcoming" being instances of collective perezhivanie is which appropriate. I don't know of anyone looking at just this angle though. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 14/01/2016 11:44 AM, Susan Davis wrote: > Hi all, > > I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps > how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news > about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and > collective perezhivanie. > > The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief, > and very public and personal recollections and sharing of > meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in the news and > conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on > things that made a difference in their own lives. People are shedding > very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps > thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or > could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance > of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage > to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing > ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now, > but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing > with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct > meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience > in lives going forward. > > > I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of > collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous > collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on > networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these > experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the > latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a > sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to > something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also > deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does > anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of > communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social > media? > > Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential > new area for investigation? > > > Kind regards > > Sue > > Dr Susan Davis > Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division > CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 > P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au > > CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au > > > > > > > > On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > >> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >> >> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >> progression in its transformation? >> >> Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to >> teeth/molars at present... >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >>> the >>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>> between "moment" and music. >>> >>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >>> is a >>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>> "moment" >>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>> >>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology >>> in a >>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something >>> like a >>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>> almost >>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>> This >>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >>> as we >>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>> present, >>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because >>> even >>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >>> angular momentum. >>> >>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>> sometimes >>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >>> from >>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context >>> of >>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>> >>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>> seriously >>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >>> solar >>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much >>> the >>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way >>> to >>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>> example, >>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>> >>>> Dear all , >>>> >>>> Look at this please ! >>>> >>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>> thought >>>> experiment: 1) The >>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>> essence can be revealed >>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>> the >>>> object is >>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>> represented >>> as >>>> a process of >>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>> essentially becomes a >>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>>> within this special >>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>> >>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>> action >>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >>> even >>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , >>> nor >>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>> motionality , >>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>> converted >>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>> >>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >>> with >>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>> It's a >>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >>> affect >>> or >>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >>> think >>> of >>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , >>> the >>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >>> note in >>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>> which >>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>> occurs >>> . >>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is >>> said >>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >>> for >>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Jan 13 19:25:05 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:25:05 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> Message-ID: <56971511.40008@mira.net> er - "quite" not "which appropriate." :) ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 14/01/2016 2:17 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Very interesting questions, Sue. > * browse around research on the impact of the death of > Princess Dianna Spencer. In my experience it had an even > greater emotional impact globally. > * Check out the work of Alain Badiou on the Event - not > stuff I like, but there is a lot of discussion around it. > * I think the idea of such moments and the period of their > "overcoming" being instances of collective perezhivanie is > which appropriate. I don't know of anyone looking at just > this angle though. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 14/01/2016 11:44 AM, Susan Davis wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> I am very interested in the recent discussion about >> moments and perhaps >> how that might connect to current experiences in relation >> to the news >> about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of >> individual and >> collective perezhivanie. >> >> The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective >> outpouring of grief, >> and very public and personal recollections and sharing of >> meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in >> the news and >> conversations people recall the influence of his life and >> work, and on >> things that made a difference in their own lives. >> People are shedding >> very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but >> also perhaps >> thinking about the person they themselves were, are, >> could have been or >> could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on >> the importance >> of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, >> creativity and courage >> to explore difference. There is a sense that people are >> experiencing >> ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal >> experience right now, >> but they are also revisiting significant moments from >> their past, sharing >> with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to >> construct and reconstruct >> meaning and in some cases this may translate to new >> action and experience >> in lives going forward. >> >> I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' >> and times of >> collective grieving and remembering, of how now >> opportunities for enormous >> collective global grief occur, and make a mark on >> individual lives, on >> networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a >> sense that these >> experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in >> people?s lives by the >> latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, >> there is also a >> sense that something significant has happened, we have >> been connected to >> something of momentary significance that is global, >> communal but also >> deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? >> to me? does >> anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? >> On experiences of >> communal perezhivanie and how this is being further >> enabled through social >> media? >> >> Is this something anyone is currently researching or is >> this a potential >> new area for investigation? >> >> >> Kind regards >> >> Sue >> >> Dr Susan Davis >> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher >> Education Division >> CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 >> P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E >> s.davis@cqu.edu.au >> >> CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" >> wrote: >> >>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >>> >>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment >>> is the >>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the >>> instant, which is a >>> progression in its transformation? >>> >>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how >>> it relates to to >>> teeth/molars at present... >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word >>>> "molar" means (in >>>> the >>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry >>>> and dentistry is. >>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing >>>> up the relation >>>> between "moment" and music. >>>> >>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that >>>> what is meant >>>> is a >>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me >>>> there are three >>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating >>>> Vygotsky's use of >>>> "moment" >>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating >>>> Vygotsky's work is the >>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless >>>> "mythbusting"). >>>> >>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and >>>> in phenomenology >>>> in a >>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to >>>> describe something >>>> like a >>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may >>>> circumambulate and describe >>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being >>>> described is >>>> almost >>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding >>>> process. Where the >>>> synoptic object does not move and can be >>>> circumambulated, the dynamic >>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, >>>> observing it. >>>> This >>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole >>>> in retrospect: >>>> as we >>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were >>>> not even >>>> present, >>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We >>>> could somehow treat >>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty >>>> is implicit in a >>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena >>>> like speech or >>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and >>>> seems to deny the >>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think >>>> that the idea of >>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us >>>> around this (because >>>> even >>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I >>>> were explaining >>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would >>>> use the example of >>>> angular momentum. >>>> >>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses >>>> "moment" and >>>> sometimes >>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me >>>> that they are. The >>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is >>>> quite different >>>> from >>>> the description of development. A text is an instance >>>> of a language, but >>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an >>>> instance of a context >>>> of >>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say >>>> that "weather" is a >>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an >>>> instance. Viewed >>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to >>>> different chronological >>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using >>>> "phylogenesis", >>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a >>>> third problem, >>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is >>>> indispensible. >>>> >>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to >>>> be described >>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, >>>> that we can >>>> seriously >>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are >>>> descriptions of the same >>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, >>>> weather is chiefly >>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the >>>> relationship between >>>> solar >>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out >>>> into space) is >>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With >>>> climate, it's the >>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning >>>> develops, we see much >>>> the >>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment >>>> of infant speech >>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with >>>> dialogue on xmca we >>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the >>>> organic make up of the >>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, >>>> and an obvious way >>>> to >>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in >>>> opera, for >>>> example, >>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias >>>> are much more >>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand >>>> somewhat closer to >>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as >>>> text). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Dear all , >>>>> >>>>> Look at this please ! >>>>> >>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic >>>>> features of a >>>> thought >>>>> experiment: 1) The >>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to >>>>> conditions where its >>>>> essence can be revealed >>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes >>>>> further mental >>>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of >>>>> mental links in which >>>> the >>>>> object is >>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can >>>>> still be >>>> represented >>>> as >>>>> a process of >>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this >>>>> third moment >>>>> essentially becomes a >>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented >>>>> object. It is only >>>>> within this special >>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets >>>>> revealed.]] >>>>> >>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is >>>>> , activity , >>>> action >>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , >>>>> discrete and separate >>>> even >>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in >>>>> a circular >>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be >>>>> manifest in temporal >>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , >>>>> neither itself , >>>> nor >>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy >>>>> or stability or >>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of >>>>> succession or >>>> motionality , >>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the >>>>> three could be >>>> converted >>>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>>> >>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole >>>>> melody is played >>>> with >>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire >>>>> composition . >>>> It's a >>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the >>>>> invited pleasurable >>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't >>>>> refer to a >>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or >>>>> that kind of >>>> affect >>>> or >>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might >>>>> even stop to >>>> think >>>> of >>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to >>>>> imitation . Then , >>>> the >>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or >>>>> that single >>>> note in >>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a >>>>> temporal instant on >>>> which >>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , >>>>> feature , state >>>> occurs >>>> . >>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be >>>>> uncognizable or >>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or >>>>> with a substitute >>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the >>>>> "ideal" which is >>>> said >>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works >>>>> are good sources >>>> for >>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >> >> > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jan 13 20:08:02 2016 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 04:08:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C34328@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Susan, Interesting to raise this. I think many consider Michael Jackson's death to be a watershed moment for the Internet. I believe the Internet actually slowed in the days after his death due to traffic. It was also a herald for the rise of the flash mob phenomenon - a really interesting relationship between cyberspace and place. Individuals would gather in public areas, hundreds, brought together through the Internet and would start dancing to Billie Jean, following the dance moves introduced by Jackson. It was breathtaking. They were plastered all over Youtube for a while, but were taken down because of copyright infringement on the song. The Internet giveth, media conglomerates taketh away. There is probably some stuff written on those few days. I wonder what would have happened if the Interne had been around when John Lennon died. Bowie is more esoteric, I wonder if there is anybody today whose death would cause the outpouring of grief similar to Lennon and Jackson. It would be really interesting to see how an internetworked world would react. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Susan Davis Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2016 7:44 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon Hi all, I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and collective perezhivanie. The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief, and very public and personal recollections and sharing of meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in the news and conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on things that made a difference in their own lives. People are shedding very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now, but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience in lives going forward. I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social media? Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential new area for investigation? Kind regards Sue Dr Susan Davis Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: >Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. > >Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >progression in its transformation? > >Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to >to teeth/molars at present... > >Best, >Huw > > > > > >On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >>the wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and >>dentistry is. >> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>between "moment" and music. >> >> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >>is a moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are >>three problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use >>of "moment" >> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is >>the real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> >> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in >>phenomenology in a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to >>describe something like a sculpture which does not move, which we may >>circumambulate and describe from various sides. But in Vygotsky the >>"object" being described is almost always no object at all, but >>rather an unfolding process. Where the synoptic object does not move >>and can be circumambulated, the dynamic object moves, and we are >>usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>This >> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >>as we >> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>present, much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could >>somehow treat these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty >>is implicit in a newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena >>like speech or musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and >>seems to deny the irreducible unpredictability of development. I >>think that the idea of "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets >>us around this (because even nonlinear functions can be integrated). >>Certainly if I were explaining "moment" to a high school teacher of >>science, I would use the example of angular momentum. >> >> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>sometimes uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that >>they are. The cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is >>quite different from the description of development. A text is an >>instance of a language, but it's not a 'moment'. A context of >>situation is an instance of a context of culture, but it's not a >>moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a "moment" in the >>development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed synoptically, >>weather and climate are simply to different chronological sections of >>one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>"ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >> >> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>seriously say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions >>of the same phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather >>is chiefly influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the >>relationship between solar radiation absorbed and solar radiation >>reflected out into space) is present, but it is much less immediately >>causal. With climate, it's the other way around. When we say that >>word meaning develops, we see much the same qualitative shifts: sense >>is a constitutive moment of infant speech while signiication is quite >>peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we have the reverse >>relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the phenomenon >>also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to grasp >>this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >>is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >> >> > >> > Dear all , >> > >> > Look at this please ! >> > >> > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>thought >> > experiment: 1) The >> > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >> > essence can be revealed particularly clearly; 2) this object then >> > undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same experiment >> > leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >> the >> > object is >> > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>represented >> as >> > a process of >> > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >> > essentially becomes a productive contribution to the mentally >> > represented object. It is only within this special system of links >> > that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >> > >> > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>action >> > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and >> > separate >> even >> > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >> > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >> > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself >> > , >>nor >> > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability >> > or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> motionality , >> > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives , emotional >> > incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >> converted >> > in the other as we all have seen . >> > >> > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >>with >> > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>It's a >> > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited >> > pleasurable feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't >> > refer to a particular part or stage orietating on which this or >> > that kind of >>affect >> or >> > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >>think >> of >> > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then >> > , >>the >> > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >>note in >> > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant >> > on >> which >> > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>occurs >> . >> > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable >> > or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a >> > substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the >> > "ideal" which is >>said >> > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good >> > sources >> for >> > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >> > >> > >> > >> > Best >> > >> > Haydi >> > >> > >> > >> From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Jan 13 20:23:50 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 04:23:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> References: ,<56971357.7030007@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Susan and others, Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media, there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually found meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his passing. As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps a reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic content of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also because he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived in (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked at a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it. They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so, but I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience. There are all these different meanings colliding: What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? What is: a Frank Sinatra song? What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled in my own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also about filling in gaps. However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination with fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one, but rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some pathological desire for world domination. There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel compelled to know how that works. Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does, what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with consent (or lack of it)? Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about not acting, or non-doing. Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. Kind regards, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jan 13 20:32:49 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 20:32:49 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern In-Reply-To: References: <7bc58d870e16a7fe44f1794702603156@bounce.bluestatedigital.com> Message-ID: Great idea, Ana. Its a major problem eroding higher education. mike On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 5:54 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it > comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it > comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the > faculty, anyway! Period. > > Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair > contract. > > Ana > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: Faculty Forward Network > Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM > Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern > To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane > > > Friend us on Facebook > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsH/ > > > Follow > us on Twitter > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsE/ > > > [image: Faculty Forward Logo] > > Dear Colleague, > > My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University. > And I'm going on strike next week. > > For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern > for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless > stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work. > At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable > employees to help minimize instructional costs. > > *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts > at Northeastern > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baf/2144494657/VEsF/ > > > -- if we don't have a contract by then.* > > Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba8/2144494657/VEsC/ > > > to push the administration to act. > > Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsD/ > > > to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to > show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of > part-time faculty. > > *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration, > demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.* > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsA/ > > > > *Why am I going on strike?* > > - In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some > adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun > makes > more than that in a day. > - Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who > work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more > expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal > labor > law. > - If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little, > we should let them try and run things without us for a day. > - Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching > conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this > administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty. > > Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a > billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily > afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win > better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at > your school, as well. > > *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's > time to treat adjunct faculty fairly. > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsB/ > >* > > In gratitude and solidarity, > > Haley Malm > Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University > > > Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward > All rights reserved. > 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025 > This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baa/2144494657/VEsO/ > > > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsP/ > > > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBQ/ > > > Friend us on Facebook > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsHBA/ > > > Follow us on Twitter > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBw/ > > > -- > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu) > Associate Professor of Education > Chestnut Hill College > phone: 267-334-2905 > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jan 13 20:32:49 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 20:32:49 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern In-Reply-To: References: <7bc58d870e16a7fe44f1794702603156@bounce.bluestatedigital.com> Message-ID: Great idea, Ana. Its a major problem eroding higher education. mike On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 5:54 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it > comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it > comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the > faculty, anyway! Period. > > Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair > contract. > > Ana > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: Faculty Forward Network > Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM > Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern > To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane > > > Friend us on Facebook > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsH/ > > > Follow > us on Twitter > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsE/ > > > [image: Faculty Forward Logo] > > Dear Colleague, > > My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University. > And I'm going on strike next week. > > For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern > for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless > stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work. > At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable > employees to help minimize instructional costs. > > *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts > at Northeastern > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baf/2144494657/VEsF/ > > > -- if we don't have a contract by then.* > > Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba8/2144494657/VEsC/ > > > to push the administration to act. > > Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsD/ > > > to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to > show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of > part-time faculty. > > *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration, > demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.* > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsA/ > > > > *Why am I going on strike?* > > - In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some > adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun > makes > more than that in a day. > - Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who > work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more > expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal > labor > law. > - If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little, > we should let them try and run things without us for a day. > - Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching > conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this > administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty. > > Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a > billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily > afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win > better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at > your school, as well. > > *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's > time to treat adjunct faculty fairly. > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsB/ > >* > > In gratitude and solidarity, > > Haley Malm > Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University > > > Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward > All rights reserved. > 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025 > This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baa/2144494657/VEsO/ > > > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsP/ > > > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBQ/ > > > Friend us on Facebook > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsHBA/ > > > Follow us on Twitter > < > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBw/ > > > -- > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu) > Associate Professor of Education > Chestnut Hill College > phone: 267-334-2905 > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jan 13 21:28:53 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:28:53 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Huw: I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his death), etc. System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with cultural-historical determination. For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in the days to come. This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause; if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use. There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language) but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative > interpretation, I would say: > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. One > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress. > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is actually > an excellent source of edification. > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem. > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve > or express a particular problem. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Dear Haydi: > > > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the > > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic > > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something > > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand > > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as > (to > > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one > case, > > we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, > like > > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we > have a > > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre > > that walks around us while we sit and observe. > > > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce > the > > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or > > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by > > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these > > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even > > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of > > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it, > > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I > > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT, > > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is > that > > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. > > > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process > > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although > this > > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of > producing > > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is > > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively > > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning > > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality. > > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning > > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be > contemplation > > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not > > actually so. > > > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, > and > > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic > function > > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns > > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it > > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, > > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this > > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are > > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away > from > > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of > > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: > > > > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > > > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in > > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are unable > to > > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner > > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close > relative > > to > > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal > > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to > > the > > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental > model > > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a > > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what > > is > > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of > > conception , > > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical > rational > > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the > related > > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we > > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity > > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly > apart > > , > > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop > at > > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever > reproduce > > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and > true > > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move > > (dynamicity) > > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us > as > > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to > be > > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as > > moments > > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert > > those > > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence > > agnosticism > > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always > > inhering , > > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable > independent > > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined > > moments > > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , > > appropriation , > > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or > > even > > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do > > they > > > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments > > still > > > sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? > > > > > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we > > > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact > . > > > > > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our > > > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from > > > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention > > > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving > > movable > > > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some > > > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if > potentially > > > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > > > > > > Best > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > *From:* David Kellogg > > > *To:* Haydi Zulfei > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > > > > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in > the > > > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry > is. > > > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > > > between "moment" and music. > > > > > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant > is > > a > > > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > > > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of > > "moment" > > > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is > the > > > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > > > > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology > in > > > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something > > like > > > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and > describe > > > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is > > almost > > > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > > > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > > > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. > > This > > > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: > as > > we > > > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even > present, > > > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat > > > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a > > > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > > > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > > > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > > > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because > > even > > > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining > > > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example > of > > > angular momentum. > > > > > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and > sometimes > > > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The > > > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different > > from > > > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, > but > > > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context > > of > > > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a > > > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > > > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological > > > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", > > > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, > > > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > > > > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > > > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can > seriously > > > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same > > > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > > > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between > > solar > > > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > > > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the > > > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much > the > > > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant > speech > > > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca > we > > > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the > > > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way > > to > > > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for > example, > > > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > > > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > > > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > > > > > > > Dear all , > > > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a > thought > > > experiment: 1) The > > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > > > essence can be revealed > > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > > > transformations; 3) this same > > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which > > the > > > object is > > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented > > as > > > a process of > > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > > > essentially becomes a > > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only > > > within this special > > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , > action > > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate > > even > > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , > nor > > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > > motionality , > > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > > converted > > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with > > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . > It's a > > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of > affect > > or > > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think > > of > > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , > the > > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note > in > > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on > > which > > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state > occurs > > . > > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute > > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is > said > > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources > > for > > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Jan 14 03:41:52 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 11:41:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi David, I think I can summarise your description of meaning potential as a performative act (Austen) which can be appreciated in terms of alternative acts which were not undertaken, i.e. a commonality and variability analysis of a unit expression for a given domain. If we are taking activity and orientation into consideration, then it is sensible to widen the scope of this act to include the orientation and perhaps look for congruence in the content of the act with the orientation. With respect to the construction of knowledge with respect to using tools and manufacturing tools, an appreciation of this meaning potential is indeed available, although once we are habituated to the use of a tool it is not so readily consciously available -- it is often most manifest when we are first becoming habituated to the operations that a tool affords. It may be that an appreciation for the design of artefacts facilitates this appreciation. The menu system you refer to is a sitting duck in this regard, although it makes some things easier for some people, it makes other things much harder. In my attempt to understand how you are applying this to mind, my response is the same. Yes, we can appreciate how having certain knowledge changes the landscape of capabilities of a student, and we can appreciate how different variants of this knowledge can induce different capabilities. This is the essential technical aspect of conceptual development in developmental psychology. Best, Huw On 14 January 2016 at 05:28, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For > Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know > about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a > time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, > in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not > simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are > going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). > > For example, if I find myself saying > > "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of > different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" > > My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and > then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his > death), etc. > > System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense > that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, > in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices > over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art > do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of > choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with > cultural-historical determination. > > For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to > the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice > is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just > possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say > "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly > limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more > canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because > an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not > both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably > saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in > the days to come. > > This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly > skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also > true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause; > if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if > indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance > represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each > of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this > is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use. > > There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of > "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a > problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language > development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches > of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the > choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not > simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language) > but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE > made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is > simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is > always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of > NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference > between > > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of > > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of > activity > > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). > > > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an > alternative > > interpretation, I would say: > > > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. > One > > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in > > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite > regress. > > > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active > > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to > > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to > > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is > actually > > an excellent source of edification. > > > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active > problem. > > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. > > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to > solve > > or express a particular problem. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Dear Haydi: > > > > > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of > the > > > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the > basic > > > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as > something > > > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the > hand > > > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as > > (to > > > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one > > case, > > > we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, > > like > > > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we > > have a > > > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of > theatre > > > that walks around us while we sit and observe. > > > > > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce > > the > > > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye > or > > > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made > by > > > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these > > > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even > > > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of > > > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used > it, > > > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I > > > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to > CHAT, > > > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is > > that > > > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. > > > > > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the > process > > > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although > > this > > > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of > > producing > > > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is > > > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively > > > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning > > > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a > personality. > > > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning > > > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be > > contemplation > > > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not > > > actually so. > > > > > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, > > and > > > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic > > function > > > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which > turns > > > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it > > > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, > > > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this > > > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts > are > > > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away > > from > > > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of > > > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > > > > > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object > in > > > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are > unable > > to > > > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner > > > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close > > relative > > > to > > > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal > > > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity > to > > > the > > > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental > > model > > > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a > > > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can see > what > > > is > > > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of > > > conception , > > > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical > > rational > > > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the > > related > > > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , > we > > > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole > entity > > > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly > > apart > > > , > > > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot > stop > > at > > > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever > > reproduce > > > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and > > true > > > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move > > > (dynamicity) > > > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us > > as > > > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want > to > > be > > > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as > > > moments > > > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert > > > those > > > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence > > > agnosticism > > > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always > > > inhering , > > > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable > > independent > > > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined > > > moments > > > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , > > > appropriation , > > > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development > or > > > even > > > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do > > > they > > > > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments > > > still > > > > sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? > > > > > > > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as > we > > > > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very > fact > > . > > > > > > > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . > Our > > > > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained > from > > > > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the > intention > > > > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving > > > movable > > > > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some > > > > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if > > potentially > > > > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > > > > > > > > Best > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > *From:* David Kellogg > > > > *To:* Haydi Zulfei > > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > > > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > > > > > > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in > > the > > > > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry > > is. > > > > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > > > > between "moment" and music. > > > > > > > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant > > is > > > a > > > > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > > > > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of > > > "moment" > > > > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is > > the > > > > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > > > > > > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in > phenomenology > > in > > > > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe > something > > > like > > > > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and > > describe > > > > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is > > > almost > > > > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > > > > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > > > > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. > > > This > > > > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: > > as > > > we > > > > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even > > present, > > > > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow > treat > > > > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit > in a > > > > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > > > > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > > > > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > > > > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this > (because > > > even > > > > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were > explaining > > > > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example > > of > > > > angular momentum. > > > > > > > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and > > sometimes > > > > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. > The > > > > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different > > > from > > > > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, > > but > > > > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a > context > > > of > > > > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" > is a > > > > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > > > > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different > chronological > > > > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using > "phylogenesis", > > > > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third > problem, > > > > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > > > > > > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > > > > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can > > seriously > > > > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the > same > > > > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > > > > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between > > > solar > > > > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > > > > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's > the > > > > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much > > the > > > > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant > > speech > > > > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca > > we > > > > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of > the > > > > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious > way > > > to > > > > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for > > example, > > > > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > > > > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > > > > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear all , > > > > > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a > > thought > > > > experiment: 1) The > > > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > > > > essence can be revealed > > > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > > > > transformations; 3) this same > > > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in > which > > > the > > > > object is > > > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be > represented > > > as > > > > a process of > > > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > > > > essentially becomes a > > > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is > only > > > > within this special > > > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , > > action > > > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and > separate > > > even > > > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > > > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , > > nor > > > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > > > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > > > motionality , > > > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > > > converted > > > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played > with > > > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . > > It's a > > > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > > > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of > > affect > > > or > > > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to > think > > > of > > > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , > > the > > > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single > note > > in > > > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on > > > which > > > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state > > occurs > > > . > > > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > > > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a > substitute > > > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is > > said > > > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good > sources > > > for > > > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From bferholt@gmail.com Thu Jan 14 06:48:01 2016 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:48:01 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks, Susan. What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his death is a lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in public earlier in the day. It is sort of weird. With other celebrity deaths I have seen people talking and sometimes a few tears but not so many people crying. I think embodied emotion is a key part of perezhivanie that makes it generally harder to experience in a large group. I thought I was just having this reaction because of my age/what this particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions to his death are actually different than reactions to the other deaths mentioned above. His being in role so often is important for perezhivanie, as is the lack of violence in his death, I think. Beth On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Susan and others, > > Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media, > there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually found > meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his > passing. > > As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps a > reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up > with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic content > of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also because > he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct > our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively > interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." > > One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived in > (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked at > a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it. > They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so, but > I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience. > > There are all these different meanings colliding: > > What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? > What is: a Frank Sinatra song? > What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? > What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? > > Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art > took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled in my > own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also about > filling in gaps. > > However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while > reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination with > fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one, but > rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the > body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists > are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably > both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something > more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some > pathological desire for world domination. > > There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions > similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel > compelled to know how that works. > > Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does, > what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with > consent (or lack of it)? > > Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects > of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about > not acting, or non-doing. > > Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From brucerob1953@googlemail.com Thu Jan 14 07:15:05 2016 From: brucerob1953@googlemail.com (Bruce Robinson) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 15:15:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> Message-ID: <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> Even though I'm of the right age to have heard his early music as a background to my undergraduate years, I too found the recent attention to Bowie somewhat overblown - the entire first half of the BBC News, a 12 page supplement in the Guardian and interviews with everyone ever connected with him. The obvious parallel is Diana in 1997 when there were also hundreds of people on the streets crying, spontaneously embracing etc. Something strange that came out of nowhere and is now seen as a break with the continued stiff upper lips of the royal family and others, particularly men, of earlier generations. I found it worrying at the time. On Bowie and fascism - even if Bowie thought he was just playing with ideas and identity, which I doubt, he was doing so in a context where real fascism and extreme racism were on the rise in Britain in the 70s. Some other musicians expressed anti-immigrant views too. Even if it was 'playing', it was extremely irresponsible given his influence. However I doubt that was the case. I think he was probably identifying with one of the trends of the time. Bruce R On 14/01/2016 14:48, Beth Ferholt wrote: > Thanks, Susan. > > What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his > death is a lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in > public earlier in the day. > > It is sort of weird. With other celebrity deaths I have seen people > talking and sometimes a few tears but not so many people crying. I > think embodied emotion is a key part of perezhivanie that makes it > generally harder to experience in a large group. > > I thought I was just having this reaction because of my age/what this > particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions to his death > are actually different than reactions to the other deaths mentioned > above. His being in role so often is important for perezhivanie, as > is the lack of violence in his death, I think. > > Beth > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >> >> Hi Susan and others, >> >> Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the >> media, there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those >> who actually found meaning in the music and performance of David >> Bowie upon learning of his passing. >> >> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, >> perhaps a reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we >> may have grown up with this music, and we might have felt >> communion with his artistic content of difference and how that is >> joined with liberation. Perhaps also because he created large gaps >> that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct our own >> meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively >> interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." >> >> One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he >> lived in (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the >> stage unasked at a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The >> Berliners wouldn't have it. They "shrugged and asked him to step >> down." The article doesn't say so, but I can imagine him actually >> reveling in that experience. >> >> There are all these different meanings colliding: >> >> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? What is: a Frank Sinatra >> song? What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? What is: >> being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? >> >> Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his >> art took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be >> filled in my own summation, by what I bring to all those >> "meanings." Humor is also about filling in gaps. >> >> However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while >> reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived >> fascination with fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm >> pretty sure he wasn't one, but rather, as an artist he was >> exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the body" to see its >> inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists are wont >> to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably >> both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was >> something more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor >> was it some pathological desire for world domination. >> >> There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that >> functions similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie >> himself, I feel compelled to know how that works. >> >> Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it >> does, what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it >> have to do with consent (or lack of it)? >> >> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive >> aspects of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which >> seems to be about not acting, or non-doing. >> >> Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> > > a uc From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Jan 14 08:11:19 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:11:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: David, Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than entirely volitional. Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance to your statement: "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will" -greg On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For > Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know > about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a > time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, > in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not > simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are > going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). > > For example, if I find myself saying > > "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of > different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" > > My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and > then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his > death), etc. > > System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense > that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, > in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices > over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art > do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of > choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with > cultural-historical determination. > > For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to > the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice > is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just > possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say > "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly > limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more > canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because > an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not > both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably > saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in > the days to come. > > This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly > skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also > true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause; > if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if > indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance > represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each > of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this > is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use. > > There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of > "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a > problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language > development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches > of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the > choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not > simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language) > but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE > made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is > simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is > always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of > NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference > between > > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of > > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of > activity > > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). > > > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an > alternative > > interpretation, I would say: > > > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. > One > > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in > > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite > regress. > > > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active > > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to > > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to > > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is > actually > > an excellent source of edification. > > > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active > problem. > > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. > > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to > solve > > or express a particular problem. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Dear Haydi: > > > > > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of > the > > > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the > basic > > > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as > something > > > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the > hand > > > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as > > (to > > > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one > > case, > > > we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, > > like > > > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we > > have a > > > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of > theatre > > > that walks around us while we sit and observe. > > > > > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce > > the > > > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye > or > > > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made > by > > > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these > > > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even > > > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of > > > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used > it, > > > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I > > > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to > CHAT, > > > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is > > that > > > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. > > > > > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the > process > > > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although > > this > > > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of > > producing > > > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is > > > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively > > > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning > > > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a > personality. > > > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning > > > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be > > contemplation > > > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not > > > actually so. > > > > > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, > > and > > > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic > > function > > > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which > turns > > > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it > > > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, > > > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this > > > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts > are > > > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away > > from > > > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of > > > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > > > > > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object > in > > > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are > unable > > to > > > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner > > > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close > > relative > > > to > > > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal > > > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity > to > > > the > > > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental > > model > > > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a > > > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can see > what > > > is > > > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of > > > conception , > > > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical > > rational > > > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the > > related > > > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , > we > > > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole > entity > > > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly > > apart > > > , > > > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot > stop > > at > > > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever > > reproduce > > > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and > > true > > > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move > > > (dynamicity) > > > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us > > as > > > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want > to > > be > > > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as > > > moments > > > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert > > > those > > > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence > > > agnosticism > > > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always > > > inhering , > > > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable > > independent > > > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined > > > moments > > > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , > > > appropriation , > > > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development > or > > > even > > > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do > > > they > > > > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments > > > still > > > > sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? > > > > > > > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as > we > > > > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very > fact > > . > > > > > > > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . > Our > > > > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained > from > > > > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the > intention > > > > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving > > > movable > > > > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some > > > > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if > > potentially > > > > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > > > > > > > > Best > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > *From:* David Kellogg > > > > *To:* Haydi Zulfei > > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > > > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > > > > > > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in > > the > > > > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry > > is. > > > > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > > > > between "moment" and music. > > > > > > > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant > > is > > > a > > > > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > > > > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of > > > "moment" > > > > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is > > the > > > > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > > > > > > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in > phenomenology > > in > > > > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe > something > > > like > > > > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and > > describe > > > > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is > > > almost > > > > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > > > > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > > > > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. > > > This > > > > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: > > as > > > we > > > > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even > > present, > > > > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow > treat > > > > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit > in a > > > > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > > > > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > > > > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > > > > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this > (because > > > even > > > > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were > explaining > > > > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example > > of > > > > angular momentum. > > > > > > > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and > > sometimes > > > > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. > The > > > > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different > > > from > > > > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, > > but > > > > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a > context > > > of > > > > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" > is a > > > > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > > > > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different > chronological > > > > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using > "phylogenesis", > > > > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third > problem, > > > > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > > > > > > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > > > > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can > > seriously > > > > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the > same > > > > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > > > > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between > > > solar > > > > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > > > > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's > the > > > > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much > > the > > > > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant > > speech > > > > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca > > we > > > > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of > the > > > > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious > way > > > to > > > > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for > > example, > > > > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > > > > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > > > > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear all , > > > > > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a > > thought > > > > experiment: 1) The > > > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > > > > essence can be revealed > > > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > > > > transformations; 3) this same > > > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in > which > > > the > > > > object is > > > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be > represented > > > as > > > > a process of > > > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > > > > essentially becomes a > > > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is > only > > > > within this special > > > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , > > action > > > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and > separate > > > even > > > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > > > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , > > nor > > > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > > > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > > > motionality , > > > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > > > converted > > > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played > with > > > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . > > It's a > > > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > > > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of > > affect > > > or > > > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to > think > > > of > > > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , > > the > > > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single > note > > in > > > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on > > > which > > > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state > > occurs > > > . > > > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > > > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a > substitute > > > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is > > said > > > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good > sources > > > for > > > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Jan 14 08:18:37 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:18:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Society for Psychological Anthropology Vimeo page Message-ID: Thought that some folks on this listserve might be interested in the Society for Psychological Anthropology's new Vimeo page. This isn't edge-of-your-seat viewing, but there are lots of good talks posted from the recent Biennial conference. Lots on postcolonial theory, among many other things. Here is the link: https://vimeo.com/channels/psychanthro -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jan 14 08:30:32 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 08:30:32 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5697cd45.c493420a.faff1.5f17@mx.google.com> David, I am curious how you will respond to the notion of meaning potential using a phenomenological composition. To say: Meaning potential is the presence of absence. The dialectic between the placings taken and the placings not taken but could be otherwise Each choice as presence overlaps with the absent choice that could have been otherwise, Leaving a (gap) -----Original Message----- From: "David Kellogg" Sent: ?2016-?01-?13 9:31 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) Huw: I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his death), etc. System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with cultural-historical determination. For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in the days to come. This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause; if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use. There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language) but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative > interpretation, I would say: > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. One > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress. > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is actually > an excellent source of edification. > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem. > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve > or express a particular problem. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Dear Haydi: > > > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the > > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic > > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something > > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand > > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as > (to > > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one > case, > > we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, > like > > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we > have a > > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre > > that walks around us while we sit and observe. > > > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce > the > > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or > > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by > > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these > > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even > > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of > > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it, > > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I > > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT, > > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is > that > > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. > > > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process > > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although > this > > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of > producing > > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is > > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively > > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning > > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality. > > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning > > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be > contemplation > > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not > > actually so. > > > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, > and > > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic > function > > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns > > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it > > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, > > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this > > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are > > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away > from > > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of > > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: > > > > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > > > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in > > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are unable > to > > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner > > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close > relative > > to > > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal > > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to > > the > > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental > model > > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a > > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what > > is > > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of > > conception , > > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical > rational > > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the > related > > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we > > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity > > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly > apart > > , > > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop > at > > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever > reproduce > > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and > true > > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move > > (dynamicity) > > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us > as > > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to > be > > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as > > moments > > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert > > those > > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence > > agnosticism > > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always > > inhering , > > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable > independent > > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined > > moments > > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , > > appropriation , > > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or > > even > > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do > > they > > > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments > > still > > > sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? > > > > > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we > > > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact > . > > > > > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our > > > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from > > > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention > > > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving > > movable > > > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some > > > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if > potentially > > > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > > > > > > Best > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > *From:* David Kellogg > > > *To:* Haydi Zulfei > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > > > > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in > the > > > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry > is. > > > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > > > between "moment" and music. > > > > > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant > is > > a > > > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > > > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of > > "moment" > > > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is > the > > > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > > > > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology > in > > > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something > > like > > > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and > describe > > > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is > > almost > > > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > > > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > > > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. > > This > > > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: > as > > we > > > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even > present, > > > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat > > > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a > > > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > > > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > > > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > > > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because > > even > > > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining > > > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example > of > > > angular momentum. > > > > > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and > sometimes > > > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The > > > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different > > from > > > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, > but > > > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context > > of > > > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a > > > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > > > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological > > > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", > > > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, > > > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > > > > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > > > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can > seriously > > > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same > > > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > > > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between > > solar > > > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > > > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the > > > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much > the > > > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant > speech > > > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca > we > > > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the > > > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way > > to > > > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for > example, > > > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > > > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > > > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > > > > > > > Dear all , > > > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a > thought > > > experiment: 1) The > > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > > > essence can be revealed > > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > > > transformations; 3) this same > > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which > > the > > > object is > > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented > > as > > > a process of > > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > > > essentially becomes a > > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only > > > within this special > > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , > action > > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate > > even > > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , > nor > > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or > > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > > motionality , > > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > > converted > > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with > > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . > It's a > > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable > > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of > affect > > or > > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think > > of > > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , > the > > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note > in > > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on > > which > > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state > occurs > > . > > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or > > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute > > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is > said > > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources > > for > > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jan 14 08:56:32 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 11:56:32 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: BSA Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016 - Call for Papers Message-ID: Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: BSA events Team Date: 1/14/2016 11:50 AM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: BSA Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016 - Call for Papers Abstract submission closes at midnight on Monday?7 March?Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016'Work in Crisis'Dates: Tuesday 6 ? Thursday 8 September 2016 (Postgraduate Workshop: 5 September 2016)Venue: University of Leeds?The BSA and the Work, employment and society Editorial Board are pleased to announce that the WES Conference 2016 will be hosted by the University of Leeds. Like the journal, the conference is internationally focused and sociologically oriented, though it welcomes contributions from related fields. 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For more information please visit http://www.tsg.com/product/anti-virus-anti-spam ______________________________________________________________________ From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Jan 14 11:53:00 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 04:53:00 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Huw, Greg, Larry: Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure (eg. "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary than constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of "system" requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's donkey. Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics page of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third after the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can even imagine the very opposite chain of command). Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as a set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel of ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations in the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the novel. I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as "presence of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. But in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > David, > Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's > syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? > If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in > Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to > language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than > entirely volitional. > Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance > to your statement: > "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and > what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that > needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely > the emergence of free will" > -greg > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Huw: > > > > I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. > For > > Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know > > about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a > > time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, > > in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not > > simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are > > going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). > > > > For example, if I find myself saying > > > > "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of > > different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" > > > > My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and > > then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his > > death), etc. > > > > System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the > sense > > that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, > > in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices > > over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal > art > > do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number > of > > choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with > > cultural-historical determination. > > > > For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get > to > > the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice > > is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just > > possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say > > "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly > > limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more > > canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices > (because > > an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but > not > > both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am > probably > > saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie > in > > the days to come. > > > > This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly > > skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also > > true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor > clause; > > if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if > > indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance > > represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each > > of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this > > is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to > use. > > > > There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of > > "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as > a > > problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language > > development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other > branches > > of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, > the > > choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not > > simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant > language) > > but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD > HAVE > > made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is > > simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is > > always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense > of > > NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference > > between > > > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most > of > > > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of > > activity > > > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). > > > > > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an > > alternative > > > interpretation, I would say: > > > > > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. > > One > > > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component > in > > > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite > > regress. > > > > > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active > > > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to > > > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to > > > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is > > actually > > > an excellent source of edification. > > > > > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active > > problem. > > > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. > > > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to > > solve > > > or express a particular problem. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > > > Dear Haydi: > > > > > > > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of > > the > > > > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the > > basic > > > > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as > > something > > > > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the > > hand > > > > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind > as > > > (to > > > > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one > > > case, > > > > we have an object which really can be usefully described > synoptically, > > > like > > > > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we > > > have a > > > > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of > > theatre > > > > that walks around us while we sit and observe. > > > > > > > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to > produce > > > the > > > > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye > > or > > > > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were > made > > by > > > > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although > these > > > > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can > even > > > > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of > > > > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used > > it, > > > > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I > > > > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to > > CHAT, > > > > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem > is > > > that > > > > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. > > > > > > > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the > > process > > > > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although > > > this > > > > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of > > > producing > > > > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint > is > > > > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively > > > > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the > meaning > > > > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a > > personality. > > > > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning > > > > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be > > > contemplation > > > > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and > not > > > > actually so. > > > > > > > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and > Leontiev, > > > and > > > > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic > > > function > > > > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which > > turns > > > > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, > it > > > > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then > concepts, > > > > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this > > > > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts > > are > > > > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away > > > from > > > > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support > of > > > > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to > action. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > > > > > > > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material > object > > in > > > > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are > > unable > > > to > > > > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone > 'inner > > > > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close > > > relative > > > > to > > > > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal > > > > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the > activity > > to > > > > the > > > > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental > > > model > > > > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model > into a > > > > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can see > > what > > > > is > > > > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of > > > > conception , > > > > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical > > > rational > > > > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the > > > related > > > > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity > , > > we > > > > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole > > entity > > > > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly > > > apart > > > > , > > > > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot > > stop > > > at > > > > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever > > > reproduce > > > > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science > and > > > true > > > > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move > > > > (dynamicity) > > > > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to > us > > > as > > > > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want > > to > > > be > > > > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as > > > > moments > > > > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to > convert > > > > those > > > > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence > > > > agnosticism > > > > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always > > > > inhering , > > > > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable > > > independent > > > > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined > > > > moments > > > > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , > > > > appropriation , > > > > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development > > or > > > > even > > > > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or > do > > > > they > > > > > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those > moments > > > > still > > > > > sublated within the whole process reversible if development > defects ? > > > > > > > > > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance > as > > we > > > > > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very > > fact > > > . > > > > > > > > > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . > > Our > > > > > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained > > from > > > > > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the > > intention > > > > > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving > > > > movable > > > > > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some > > > > > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if > > > potentially > > > > > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > > *From:* David Kellogg > > > > > *To:* Haydi Zulfei > > > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > > > > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means > (in > > > the > > > > > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and > dentistry > > > is. > > > > > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the > relation > > > > > between "moment" and music. > > > > > > > > > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is > meant > > > is > > > > a > > > > > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are > three > > > > > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of > > > > "moment" > > > > > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work > is > > > the > > > > > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > > > > > > > > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in > > phenomenology > > > in > > > > > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe > > something > > > > like > > > > > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and > > > describe > > > > > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is > > > > almost > > > > > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > > > > > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the > dynamic > > > > > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing > it. > > > > This > > > > > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in > retrospect: > > > as > > > > we > > > > > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even > > > present, > > > > > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow > > treat > > > > > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit > > in a > > > > > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > > > > > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny > the > > > > > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea > of > > > > > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this > > (because > > > > even > > > > > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were > > explaining > > > > > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the > example > > > of > > > > > angular momentum. > > > > > > > > > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and > > > sometimes > > > > > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. > > The > > > > > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite > different > > > > from > > > > > the description of development. A text is an instance of a > language, > > > but > > > > > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a > > context > > > > of > > > > > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" > > is a > > > > > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > > > > > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different > > chronological > > > > > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using > > "phylogenesis", > > > > > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third > > problem, > > > > > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > > > > > > > > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be > described > > > > > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can > > > seriously > > > > > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the > > same > > > > > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > > > > > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship > between > > > > solar > > > > > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > > > > > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's > > the > > > > > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see > much > > > the > > > > > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant > > > speech > > > > > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on > xmca > > > we > > > > > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of > > the > > > > > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious > > way > > > > to > > > > > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for > > > example, > > > > > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much > more > > > > > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer > to > > > > > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear all , > > > > > > > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > > > > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a > > > thought > > > > > experiment: 1) The > > > > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its > > > > > essence can be revealed > > > > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental > > > > > transformations; 3) this same > > > > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in > > which > > > > the > > > > > object is > > > > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be > > represented > > > > as > > > > > a process of > > > > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment > > > > > essentially becomes a > > > > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is > > only > > > > > within this special > > > > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > > > > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , > > > action > > > > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and > > separate > > > > even > > > > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > > > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal > > > > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself > , > > > nor > > > > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability > or > > > > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > > > > motionality , > > > > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > > > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > > > > converted > > > > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > > > > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played > > with > > > > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . > > > It's a > > > > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited > pleasurable > > > > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > > > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of > > > affect > > > > or > > > > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to > > think > > > > of > > > > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then > , > > > the > > > > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single > > note > > > in > > > > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant > on > > > > which > > > > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state > > > occurs > > > > . > > > > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable > or > > > > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a > > substitute > > > > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which > is > > > said > > > > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good > > sources > > > > for > > > > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From s.davis@cqu.edu.au Thu Jan 14 13:59:16 2016 From: s.davis@cqu.edu.au (Susan Davis) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 21:59:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks Beth, Annalisa, Michael and Andy for your reflections, The news about another celebrity death this morning with Alan Rickman has also been met with a flood of social media response. Is this just mass hysteria, people with empty lives searching for meaning in the lives of others, or is it perezhivanie? Looking through the types of post related to both what seems to be clear is that while people respected Rickman and admired his work, many more identified with something about Bowie and his work and the experiences are much more like perezhivanie. What I?m thinking is that some of these events or moments perhaps are more significant and perhaps could be called instances of cultural perezhivanie? (and I must apologise here as while I have been following the thread about moments and instances I am not sure I can reflect the nuanced understandings in these comments). What makes it perezhivanie is that people are indeed ?living through? an experience that is both emotional and intellectual, there are notions of Badiou?s event (from my very brief reading Andy) with the recognition of ruptures revealed and the potential for transformation. The life and death of Bowie have confirmed the experience of personal transformation for many ? through providing a vision of alternatives for sexuality, living and also of dying. He was able to provide the pivots for the imagined to be made manifest, and the prompt for examination and reinterpretation. I am sure people don?t? necessarily agree with everything he did or may have believed (and dabbled with Annalisa) but there are identities, roles, images, songs, film clips that they identify with. As people have identified, this example is not unique. The outpourings of public grief were similar for Princess Diana, Michael Jackson and others. In terms of the wider cultural landscape I reflect on what else has assumed such cultural significance across the social media zeitgeist in recent years - perhaps the Obama inauguration, the twin towers coming down (however that was before the widespread use of social media and would very much signal a vision of negative transformation, but may well qualify as the most significant ?cultural perezhivanie? of our generation.) These kinds of events or moments (and even those in relation to celebrity deaths) are not confined to our era and their communal experiencing is also not new ? think for example of seminal moments such as the end of World War II and with ?celebrities? the death of people like Lord Byron,Dame Nellie Melba and many others were greeted by huge outpourings of public grief. However what is different now is the use of social media and elsewhere which enables people to move out of the position of witness and it becomes far more participatory. This week some people have spent enormous effort finding images, music, creating memes, changing their profile pictures to select their favourite Bowie image and so forth. Is this a good thing? Does it matter? What can we make of it? Perhaps it is about identifying these experiences of ?cultural perezhivanie? and certain markers within our overlapping social, personal, political, geographic worlds that are pivots for personal and social transformation???? Appreciate further reflection... Cheers Sue. On 15/01/2016 12:48 am, "Beth Ferholt" wrote: >Thanks, Susan. > >What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his death is a >lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in public earlier >in >the day. > >It is sort of weird. With other celebrity deaths I have seen people >talking and sometimes a few tears but not so many people crying. I think >embodied emotion is a key part of perezhivanie that makes it generally >harder to experience in a large group. > >I thought I was just having this reaction because of my age/what this >particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions to his death are >actually different than reactions to the other deaths mentioned above. >His >being in role so often is important for perezhivanie, as is the lack of >violence in his death, I think. > >Beth > >On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >wrote: > >> >> Hi Susan and others, >> >> Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media, >> there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually >>found >> meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his >> passing. >> >> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps >>a >> reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up >> with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic >>content >> of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also >>because >> he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby >>construct >> our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became >>"cognitively >> interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." >> >> One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived >>in >> (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked >>at >> a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it. >> They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so, >>but >> I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience. >> >> There are all these different meanings colliding: >> >> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? >> What is: a Frank Sinatra song? >> What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? >> What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? >> >> Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art >> took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled >>in my >> own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also >>about >> filling in gaps. >> >> However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while >> reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination >>with >> fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one, >>but >> rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on >>the >> body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance >>artists >> are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably >> both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something >> more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some >> pathological desire for world domination. >> >> There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions >> similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel >> compelled to know how that works. >> >> Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does, >> what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with >> consent (or lack of it)? >> >> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects >> of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about >> not acting, or non-doing. >> >> Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> > > >-- >Beth Ferholt >Assistant Professor >Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >Brooklyn College, City University of New York >2900 Bedford Avenue >Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > >Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >Phone: (718) 951-5205 >Fax: (718) 951-4816 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: default[1].xml Type: application/xml Size: 3222 bytes Desc: default[1].xml Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160114/530d9662/attachment.rdf From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Jan 14 15:12:25 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:12:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> , <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> Message-ID: Hi, I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those insights/explanations. Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it. As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against cancer. There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet back then. But after considering these things, there also appears to be several other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" concerning David Bowie's passing. One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive and kicking. The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual. The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would. The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him for doing it. A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages. Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity. Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album "Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name: ? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light ? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter annihilation in the early universe ? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes ? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole ? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside universe is impossible ? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold white dwarf These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming from different directions and locations. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Jan 14 15:22:47 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:22:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> , <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu>, Message-ID: SB: "My reading of it, there is NO desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. " From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Jan 14 20:05:29 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 21:05:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> Message-ID: <17C96EE1-31BF-4C06-B773-E0327542EE79@gmail.com> Susan and Annalisa, Thank you very much for your posts. I understand better at this moment art, performance and agency. Regarding Bowie's trans-generational narrative, I have fantasized that I am, at 72, capable of late blooming, even if that only means dying with dignity, and maybe a bit of panache. And maybe even juice for more than that. My favorite part of teaching has been reaching across generation gaps, whatever the cultural differences between my students and me. I have craved their respect and trust, even as I reflected on my shortcomings. Were I famous, would those I have injured speak ill of me? I have fantasized such fame and that I made my apologies before the infamy of public shaming. We, the unfamous, will go to our graves without fear that we will be publically outed. But we will still be disappointed in ourselves when we let go a chance to learn from our screw ups and do better the next time. Else what is perizhvanie for? Henry https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkLE1Gno724 > On Jan 14, 2016, at 4:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hi, > > I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those insights/explanations. > > Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it. > > As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. > > It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against cancer. > > There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet back then. > > But after considering these things, there also appears to be several other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" concerning David Bowie's passing. > > One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive and kicking. > > The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual. > > The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would. > > The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him for doing it. > > A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages. > > Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity. > > Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album "Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. > But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name: > ? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light > ? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter annihilation in the early universe > ? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes > ? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole > ? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside universe is impossible > ? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold white dwarf > > These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. > > Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming from different directions and locations. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Jan 14 21:20:01 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 05:20:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: In response to your points David, 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the referents not intended. 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. Best, Huw On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw, Greg, Larry: > > Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in > performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure (eg. > "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's > really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in > development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the > developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary than > constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses > of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's > various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it > mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly > perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think > that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps > I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always > struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. > > Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the > paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. > But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this > placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has > no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of "system" > requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, > in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, > for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most > fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's donkey. > > Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics page > of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially > syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second > panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third after > the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies > (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons > (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be > simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing > may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can > even imagine the very opposite chain of command). > > Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only > hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as a > set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could > also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel of > ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite > different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would > make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for > novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is > "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as > "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between > novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of > the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this > is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations in > the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the novel. > > I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as "presence > of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and > even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather > than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, > intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. But > in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and > there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). > If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right > fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > David, > > Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's > > syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? > > If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in > > Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to > > language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than > > entirely volitional. > > Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance > > to your statement: > > "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and > > what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that > > needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely > > the emergence of free will" > > -greg > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > Huw: > > > > > > I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. > > For > > > Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we > know > > > about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a > > > time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's > non-Markovian, > > > in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and > not > > > simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are > > > going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). > > > > > > For example, if I find myself saying > > > > > > "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of > > > different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" > > > > > > My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and > > > then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his > > > death), etc. > > > > > > System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the > > sense > > > that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free > choice, > > > in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" > choices > > > over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal > > art > > > do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) > number > > of > > > choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with > > > cultural-historical determination. > > > > > > For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I > get > > to > > > the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the > choice > > > is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just > > > possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say > > > "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly > > > limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more > > > canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices > > (because > > > an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but > > not > > > both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am > > probably > > > saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie > > in > > > the days to come. > > > > > > This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are > highly > > > skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is > also > > > true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor > > clause; > > > if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if > > > indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance > > > represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, > each > > > of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and > this > > > is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to > > use. > > > > > > There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use > of > > > "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen > as > > a > > > problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in > language > > > development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other > > branches > > > of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, > > the > > > choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) > not > > > simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant > > language) > > > but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD > > HAVE > > > made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is > > > simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential > is > > > always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the > sense > > of > > > NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference > > > between > > > > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most > > of > > > > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of > > > activity > > > > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). > > > > > > > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an > > > alternative > > > > interpretation, I would say: > > > > > > > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive > act. > > > One > > > > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component > > in > > > > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite > > > regress. > > > > > > > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active > > > > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to > > > > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to > > > > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is > > > actually > > > > an excellent source of edification. > > > > > > > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active > > > problem. > > > > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific > site. > > > > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to > > > solve > > > > or express a particular problem. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Dear Haydi: > > > > > > > > > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory > of > > > the > > > > > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the > > > basic > > > > > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as > > > something > > > > > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or > the > > > hand > > > > > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the > mind > > as > > > > (to > > > > > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In > one > > > > case, > > > > > we have an object which really can be usefully described > > synoptically, > > > > like > > > > > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other > we > > > > have a > > > > > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of > > > theatre > > > > > that walks around us while we sit and observe. > > > > > > > > > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to > > produce > > > > the > > > > > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the > eye > > > or > > > > > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were > > made > > > by > > > > > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although > > these > > > > > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can > > even > > > > > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of > > > > > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and > used > > > it, > > > > > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, > I > > > > > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to > > > CHAT, > > > > > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem > > is > > > > that > > > > > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. > > > > > > > > > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the > > > process > > > > > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even > (although > > > > this > > > > > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of > > > > producing > > > > > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint > > is > > > > > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively > > > > > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the > > meaning > > > > > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a > > > personality. > > > > > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning > > > > > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be > > > > contemplation > > > > > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and > > not > > > > > actually so. > > > > > > > > > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and > > Leontiev, > > > > and > > > > > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic > > > > function > > > > > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which > > > turns > > > > > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points > out, > > it > > > > > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then > > concepts, > > > > > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but > this > > > > > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: > concepts > > > are > > > > > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning > away > > > > from > > > > > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support > > of > > > > > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to > > action. > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > > > > > > > > > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material > > object > > > in > > > > > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are > > > unable > > > > to > > > > > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone > > 'inner > > > > > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close > > > > relative > > > > > to > > > > > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an > ideal > > > > > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the > > activity > > > to > > > > > the > > > > > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the > mental > > > > model > > > > > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model > > into a > > > > > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can > see > > > what > > > > > is > > > > > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of > > > > > conception , > > > > > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical > > > > rational > > > > > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the > > > > related > > > > > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an > activity > > , > > > we > > > > > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole > > > entity > > > > > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it > wholly > > > > apart > > > > > , > > > > > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot > > > stop > > > > at > > > > > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever > > > > reproduce > > > > > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science > > and > > > > true > > > > > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move > > > > > (dynamicity) > > > > > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come > to > > us > > > > as > > > > > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't > want > > > to > > > > be > > > > > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments > as > > > > > moments > > > > > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to > > convert > > > > > those > > > > > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence > > > > > agnosticism > > > > > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always > > > > > inhering , > > > > > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable > > > > independent > > > > > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , > intertwined > > > > > moments > > > > > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , > > > > > appropriation , > > > > > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does > development > > > or > > > > > even > > > > > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels > or > > do > > > > > they > > > > > > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those > > moments > > > > > still > > > > > > sublated within the whole process reversible if development > > defects ? > > > > > > > > > > > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance > > as > > > we > > > > > > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very > > > fact > > > > . > > > > > > > > > > > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded > to . > > > Our > > > > > > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained > > > from > > > > > > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the > > > intention > > > > > > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant > moving > > > > > movable > > > > > > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some > > > > > > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if > > > > potentially > > > > > > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > > > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > > > *From:* David Kellogg > > > > > > *To:* Haydi Zulfei > > > > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > > > > > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means > > (in > > > > the > > > > > > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and > > dentistry > > > > is. > > > > > > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the > > relation > > > > > > between "moment" and music. > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is > > meant > > > > is > > > > > a > > > > > > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are > > three > > > > > > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of > > > > > "moment" > > > > > > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work > > is > > > > the > > > > > > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > > > > > > > > > > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in > > > phenomenology > > > > in > > > > > > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe > > > something > > > > > like > > > > > > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and > > > > describe > > > > > > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described > is > > > > > almost > > > > > > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where > the > > > > > > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the > > dynamic > > > > > > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing > > it. > > > > > This > > > > > > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in > > retrospect: > > > > as > > > > > we > > > > > > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even > > > > present, > > > > > > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow > > > treat > > > > > > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is > implicit > > > in a > > > > > > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech > or > > > > > > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny > > the > > > > > > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the > idea > > of > > > > > > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this > > > (because > > > > > even > > > > > > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were > > > explaining > > > > > > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the > > example > > > > of > > > > > > angular momentum. > > > > > > > > > > > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and > > > > sometimes > > > > > > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they > are. > > > The > > > > > > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite > > different > > > > > from > > > > > > the description of development. A text is an instance of a > > language, > > > > but > > > > > > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a > > > context > > > > > of > > > > > > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that > "weather" > > > is a > > > > > > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. > Viewed > > > > > > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different > > > chronological > > > > > > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using > > > "phylogenesis", > > > > > > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third > > > problem, > > > > > > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is > indispensible. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be > > described > > > > > > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can > > > > seriously > > > > > > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of > the > > > same > > > > > > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is > chiefly > > > > > > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship > > between > > > > > solar > > > > > > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) > is > > > > > > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, > it's > > > the > > > > > > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see > > much > > > > the > > > > > > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant > > > > speech > > > > > > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on > > xmca > > > > we > > > > > > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up > of > > > the > > > > > > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an > obvious > > > way > > > > > to > > > > > > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for > > > > example, > > > > > > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much > > more > > > > > > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer > > to > > > > > > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear all , > > > > > > > > > > > > Look at this please ! > > > > > > > > > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a > > > > thought > > > > > > experiment: 1) The > > > > > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where > its > > > > > > essence can be revealed > > > > > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further > mental > > > > > > transformations; 3) this same > > > > > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in > > > which > > > > > the > > > > > > object is > > > > > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be > > > represented > > > > > as > > > > > > a process of > > > > > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third > moment > > > > > > essentially becomes a > > > > > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is > > > only > > > > > > within this special > > > > > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > > > > > > > > > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity > , > > > > action > > > > > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and > > > separate > > > > > even > > > > > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular > > > > > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in > temporal > > > > > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither > itself > > , > > > > nor > > > > > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability > > or > > > > > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or > > > > > motionality , > > > > > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives > > > > > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be > > > > > converted > > > > > > in the other as we all have seen . > > > > > > > > > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is > played > > > with > > > > > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition > . > > > > It's a > > > > > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited > > pleasurable > > > > > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a > > > > > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of > > > > affect > > > > > or > > > > > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to > > > think > > > > > of > > > > > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . > Then > > , > > > > the > > > > > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single > > > note > > > > in > > > > > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal > instant > > on > > > > > which > > > > > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state > > > > occurs > > > > > . > > > > > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be > uncognizable > > or > > > > > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a > > > substitute > > > > > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which > > is > > > > said > > > > > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good > > > sources > > > > > for > > > > > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > > > > > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Jan 15 04:17:13 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 12:17:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful. It is quite a compact paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc. Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or similar services. Best, Huw [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9 On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd wrote: > In response to your points David, > > 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I > then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. > What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper > towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. > 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the > referents not intended. > 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. > Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield > incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The > 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Huw, Greg, Larry: >> >> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in >> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure >> (eg. >> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's >> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in >> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the >> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary >> than >> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses >> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's >> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it >> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly >> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think >> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps >> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always >> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. >> >> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the >> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. >> But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this >> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has >> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of >> "system" >> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, >> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, >> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most >> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's >> donkey. >> >> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics >> page >> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially >> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second >> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third >> after >> the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies >> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons >> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be >> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing >> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can >> even imagine the very opposite chain of command). >> >> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only >> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as >> a >> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could >> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel >> of >> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite >> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would >> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for >> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is >> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as >> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between >> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of >> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this >> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations >> in >> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the >> novel. >> >> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as >> "presence >> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and >> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather >> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, >> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. >> But >> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and >> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). >> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right >> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson > > >> wrote: >> >> > David, >> > Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >> > syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >> > If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >> > Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >> > language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >> > entirely volitional. >> > Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more >> nuance >> > to your statement: >> > "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, >> and >> > what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing >> that >> > needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >> > the emergence of free will" >> > -greg >> > >> > >> > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >> > wrote: >> > >> > > Huw: >> > > >> > > I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, >> sense. >> > For >> > > Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we >> know >> > > about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at >> a >> > > time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's >> non-Markovian, >> > > in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and >> not >> > > simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you >> are >> > > going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >> > > >> > > For example, if I find myself saying >> > > >> > > "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >> > > different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >> > > >> > > My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" >> and >> > > then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >> > > death), etc. >> > > >> > > System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >> > sense >> > > that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free >> choice, >> > > in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" >> choices >> > > over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >> > art >> > > do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) >> number >> > of >> > > choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >> > > cultural-historical determination. >> > > >> > > For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I >> get >> > to >> > > the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the >> choice >> > > is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >> > > possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >> > > "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >> > > limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >> > > canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >> > (because >> > > an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity >> but >> > not >> > > both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >> > probably >> > > saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about >> Bowie >> > in >> > > the days to come. >> > > >> > > This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are >> highly >> > > skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is >> also >> > > true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >> > clause; >> > > if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >> > > indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >> > > represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, >> each >> > > of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and >> this >> > > is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >> > use. >> > > >> > > There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use >> of >> > > "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen >> as >> > a >> > > problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in >> language >> > > development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >> > branches >> > > of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >> > the >> > > choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) >> not >> > > simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >> > language) >> > > but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >> > HAVE >> > > made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >> > > simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential >> is >> > > always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the >> sense >> > of >> > > NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >> > > >> > > David Kellogg >> > > Macquarie University >> > > >> > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < >> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >> > > wrote: >> > > >> > > > >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >> > > between >> > > > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev >> (most >> > of >> > > > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >> > > activity >> > > > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >> > > > >> > > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >> > > alternative >> > > > interpretation, I would say: >> > > > >> > > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive >> act. >> > > One >> > > > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a >> component >> > in >> > > > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >> > > regress. >> > > > >> > > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >> > > > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable >> to >> > > > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >> > > > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >> > > actually >> > > > an excellent source of edification. >> > > > >> > > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >> > > problem. >> > > > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific >> site. >> > > > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer >> to >> > > solve >> > > > or express a particular problem. >> > > > >> > > > Best, >> > > > Huw >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >> > wrote: >> > > > >> > > > > Dear Haydi: >> > > > > >> > > > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the >> HIstory of >> > > the >> > > > > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of >> the >> > > basic >> > > > > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >> > > something >> > > > > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or >> the >> > > hand >> > > > > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the >> mind >> > as >> > > > (to >> > > > > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In >> one >> > > > case, >> > > > > we have an object which really can be usefully described >> > synoptically, >> > > > like >> > > > > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other >> we >> > > > have a >> > > > > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >> > > theatre >> > > > > that walks around us while we sit and observe. >> > > > > >> > > > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >> > produce >> > > > the >> > > > > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the >> eye >> > > or >> > > > > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >> > made >> > > by >> > > > > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >> > these >> > > > > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >> > even >> > > > > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >> > > > > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and >> used >> > > it, >> > > > > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That >> is, I >> > > > > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >> > > CHAT, >> > > > > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The >> problem >> > is >> > > > that >> > > > > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >> > > > > >> > > > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >> > > process >> > > > > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even >> (although >> > > > this >> > > > > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >> > > > producing >> > > > > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational >> standpoint >> > is >> > > > > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >> > > > > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >> > meaning >> > > > > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >> > > personality. >> > > > > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and >> meaning >> > > > > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >> > > > contemplation >> > > > > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active >> and >> > not >> > > > > actually so. >> > > > > >> > > > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >> > Leontiev, >> > > > and >> > > > > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >> > > > function >> > > > > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >> > > turns >> > > > > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points >> out, >> > it >> > > > > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >> > concepts, >> > > > > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but >> this >> > > > > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: >> concepts >> > > are >> > > > > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning >> away >> > > > from >> > > > > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete >> support >> > of >> > > > > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >> > action. >> > > > > >> > > > > David Kellogg >> > > > > Macquarie University >> > > > > >> > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >> > wrote: >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >> > > > > > >> > > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >> > object >> > > in >> > > > > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >> > > unable >> > > > to >> > > > > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >> > 'inner >> > > > > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >> > > > relative >> > > > > to >> > > > > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an >> ideal >> > > > > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >> > activity >> > > to >> > > > > the >> > > > > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the >> mental >> > > > model >> > > > > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >> > into a >> > > > > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can >> see >> > > what >> > > > > is >> > > > > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >> > > > > conception , >> > > > > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >> > > > rational >> > > > > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of >> the >> > > > related >> > > > > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an >> activity >> > , >> > > we >> > > > > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >> > > entity >> > > > > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it >> wholly >> > > > apart >> > > > > , >> > > > > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we >> cannot >> > > stop >> > > > at >> > > > > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >> > > > reproduce >> > > > > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >> > and >> > > > true >> > > > > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >> > > > > (dynamicity) >> > > > > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come >> to >> > us >> > > > as >> > > > > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't >> want >> > > to >> > > > be >> > > > > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take >> moments as >> > > > > moments >> > > > > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >> > convert >> > > > > those >> > > > > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >> > > > > agnosticism >> > > > > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >> > > > > inhering , >> > > > > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >> > > > independent >> > > > > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , >> intertwined >> > > > > moments >> > > > > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >> > > > > appropriation , >> > > > > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does >> development >> > > or >> > > > > even >> > > > > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels >> or >> > do >> > > > > they >> > > > > > subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those >> > moments >> > > > > still >> > > > > > sublated within the whole process reversible if development >> > defects ? >> > > > > > >> > > > > > --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the >> instance >> > as >> > > we >> > > > > > took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the >> very >> > > fact >> > > > . >> > > > > > >> > > > > > --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded >> to . >> > > Our >> > > > > > focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first >> refrained >> > > from >> > > > > > using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the >> > > intention >> > > > > > precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant >> moving >> > > > > movable >> > > > > > whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >> > > > > > static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if >> > > > potentially >> > > > > > realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Best >> > > > > > Haydi >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > ------------------------------ >> > > > > > *From:* David Kellogg >> > > > > > *To:* Haydi Zulfei >> > > > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >> > > > > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" >> means >> > (in >> > > > the >> > > > > > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and >> > dentistry >> > > > is. >> > > > > > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the >> > relation >> > > > > > between "moment" and music. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is >> > meant >> > > > is >> > > > > a >> > > > > > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are >> > three >> > > > > > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use >> of >> > > > > "moment" >> > > > > > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's >> work >> > is >> > > > the >> > > > > > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> > > > > > >> > > > > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in >> > > phenomenology >> > > > in >> > > > > > a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe >> > > something >> > > > > like >> > > > > > a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and >> > > > describe >> > > > > > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being >> described is >> > > > > almost >> > > > > > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where >> the >> > > > > > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the >> > dynamic >> > > > > > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, >> observing >> > it. >> > > > > This >> > > > > > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in >> > retrospect: >> > > > as >> > > > > we >> > > > > > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >> > > > present, >> > > > > > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could >> somehow >> > > treat >> > > > > > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is >> implicit >> > > in a >> > > > > > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech >> or >> > > > > > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to >> deny >> > the >> > > > > > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the >> idea >> > of >> > > > > > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this >> > > (because >> > > > > even >> > > > > > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were >> > > explaining >> > > > > > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the >> > example >> > > > of >> > > > > > angular momentum. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >> > > > sometimes >> > > > > > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they >> are. >> > > The >> > > > > > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite >> > different >> > > > > from >> > > > > > the description of development. A text is an instance of a >> > language, >> > > > but >> > > > > > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a >> > > context >> > > > > of >> > > > > > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that >> "weather" >> > > is a >> > > > > > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. >> Viewed >> > > > > > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different >> > > chronological >> > > > > > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using >> > > "phylogenesis", >> > > > > > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third >> > > problem, >> > > > > > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is >> indispensible. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be >> > described >> > > > > > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >> > > > seriously >> > > > > > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of >> the >> > > same >> > > > > > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is >> chiefly >> > > > > > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship >> > between >> > > > > solar >> > > > > > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into >> space) is >> > > > > > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, >> it's >> > > the >> > > > > > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see >> > much >> > > > the >> > > > > > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of >> infant >> > > > speech >> > > > > > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on >> > xmca >> > > > we >> > > > > > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make >> up of >> > > the >> > > > > > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an >> obvious >> > > way >> > > > > to >> > > > > > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >> > > > example, >> > > > > > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much >> > more >> > > > > > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat >> closer >> > to >> > > > > > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> > > > > > >> > > > > > David Kellogg >> > > > > > Macquarie University >> > > > > > >> > > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, >> > wrote: >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Dear all , >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Look at this please ! >> > > > > > >> > > > > > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >> > > > thought >> > > > > > experiment: 1) The >> > > > > > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where >> its >> > > > > > essence can be revealed >> > > > > > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further >> mental >> > > > > > transformations; 3) this same >> > > > > > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in >> > > which >> > > > > the >> > > > > > object is >> > > > > > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >> > > represented >> > > > > as >> > > > > > a process of >> > > > > > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third >> moment >> > > > > > essentially becomes a >> > > > > > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It >> is >> > > only >> > > > > > within this special >> > > > > > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >> > > > > > >> > > > > > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , >> activity , >> > > > action >> > > > > > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and >> > > separate >> > > > > even >> > > > > > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a >> circular >> > > > > > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in >> temporal >> > > > > > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither >> itself >> > , >> > > > nor >> > > > > > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or >> stability >> > or >> > > > > > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> > > > > motionality , >> > > > > > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >> > > > > > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could >> be >> > > > > converted >> > > > > > in the other as we all have seen . >> > > > > > >> > > > > > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is >> played >> > > with >> > > > > > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire >> composition . >> > > > It's a >> > > > > > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited >> > pleasurable >> > > > > > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to >> a >> > > > > > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind >> of >> > > > affect >> > > > > or >> > > > > > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop >> to >> > > think >> > > > > of >> > > > > > how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . >> Then >> > , >> > > > the >> > > > > > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that >> single >> > > note >> > > > in >> > > > > > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal >> instant >> > on >> > > > > which >> > > > > > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , >> state >> > > > occurs >> > > > > . >> > > > > > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be >> uncognizable >> > or >> > > > > > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a >> > > substitute >> > > > > > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" >> which >> > is >> > > > said >> > > > > > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good >> > > sources >> > > > > for >> > > > > > such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Best >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Haydi >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > Assistant Professor >> > Department of Anthropology >> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > Brigham Young University >> > Provo, UT 84602 >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jan 15 07:39:44 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 07:39:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <569912e8.c493420a.faff1.4af7@mx.google.com> Huw, This is interesting. A concept of discovering meaning and what is meant by the term (discovery)? The notion that phenomenological references Semiotic references Psychological references Each contribute a (portion?) to meaning developing through discovery processes in social spaces. This paper does seem to relate to our topic. -----Original Message----- From: "Huw Lloyd" Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 4:20 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful. It is quite a compact paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc. Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or similar services. Best, Huw [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9 On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd wrote: > In response to your points David, > > 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I > then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. > What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper > towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. > 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the > referents not intended. > 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. > Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield > incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The > 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Huw, Greg, Larry: >> >> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in >> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure >> (eg. >> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's >> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in >> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the >> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary >> than >> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses >> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's >> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it >> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly >> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think >> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps >> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always >> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. >> >> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the >> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. >> But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this >> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has >> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of >> "system" >> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, >> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, >> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most >> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's >> donkey. >> >> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics >> page >> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially >> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second >> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third >> after >> the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies >> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons >> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be >> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing >> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can >> even imagine the very opposite chain of command). >> >> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only >> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as >> a >> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could >> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel >> of >> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite >> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would >> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for >> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is >> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as >> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between >> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of >> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this >> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations >> in >> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the >> novel. >> >> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as >> "presence >> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and >> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather >> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, >> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. >> But >> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and >> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). >> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right >> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson > > >> wrote: >> >> > David, >> > Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >> > syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >> > If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >> > Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >> > language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >> > entirely volitional. >> > Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more >> nuance >> > to your statement: >> > "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, >> and >> > what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing >> that >> > needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >> > the emergence of free will" >> > -greg >> > >> > >> > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >> > wrote: >> > >> > > Huw: >> > > >> > > I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, >> sense. >> > For >> > > Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we >> know >> > > about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at >> a >> > > time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's >> non-Markovian, >> > > in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and >> not >> > > simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you >> are >> > > going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >> > > >> > > For example, if I find myself saying >> > > >> > > "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >> > > different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >> > > >> > > My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" >> and >> > > then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >> > > death), etc. >> > > >> > > System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >> > sense >> > > that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free >> choice, >> > > in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" >> choices >> > > over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >> > art >> > > do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) >> number >> > of >> > > choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >> > > cultural-historical determination. >> > > >> > > For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I >> get >> > to >> > > the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the >> choice >> > > is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >> > > possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >> > > "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >> > > limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >> > > canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >> > (because >> > > an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity >> but >> > not >> > > both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >> > probably >> > > saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about >> Bowie >> > in >> > > the days to come. >> > > >> > > This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are >> highly >> > > skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is >> also >> > > true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >> > clause; >> > > if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >> > > indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >> > > represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, >> each >> > > of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and >> this >> > > is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >> > use. >> > > >> > > There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use >> of >> > > "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen >> as >> > a >> > > problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in >> language >> > > development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >> > branches >> > > of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >> > the >> > > choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) >> not >> > > simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >> > language) >> > > but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >> > HAVE >> > > made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >> > > simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential >> is >> > > always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the >> sense >> > of >> > > NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >> > > >> > > David Kellogg >> > > Macquarie University >> > > >> > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < >> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >> > > wrote: >> > > >> > > > >From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >> > > between >> > > > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev >> (most >> > of >> > > > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >> > > activity >> > > > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >> > > > >> > > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >> > > alternative >> > > > interpretation, I would say: >> > > > >> > > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive >> act. >> > > One >> > > > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a >> component >> > in >> > > > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >> > > regress. >> > > > >> > > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >> > > > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable >> to >> > > > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >> > > > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >> > > actually >> > > > an excellent source of edification. >> > > > >> > > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >> > > problem. >> > > > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific >> site. >> > > > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer >> to >> > > solve >> > > > or express a particular problem. >> > > > >> > > > Best, >> > > > Huw >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >> > wrote: >> > > > >> > > > > Dear Haydi: >> > > > > >> > > > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the >> HIstory of >> > > the >> > > > > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of >> the >> > > basic >> > > > > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >> > > something >> > > > > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or >> the >> > > hand >> > > > > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the >> mind >> > as >> > > > (to >> > > > > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In >> one >> > > > case, >> > > > > we have an object which really can be usefully described >> > synoptically, >> > > > like >> > > > > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other >> we >> > > > have a >> > > > > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >> > > theatre >> > > > > that walks around us while we sit and observe. >> > > > > >> > > > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >> > produce >> > > > the >> > > > > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the >> eye >> > > or >> > > > > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >> > made >> > > by >> > > > > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >> > these >> > > > > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >> > even >> > > > > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >> > > > > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and >> used >> > > it, >> > > > > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That >> is, I >> > > > > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >> > > CHAT, >> > > > > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The >> problem >> > is >> > > > that >> > > > > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >> > > > > >> > > > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >> > > process >> > > > > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even >> (although >> > > > this >> > > > > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >> > > > producing >> > > > > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational >> standpoint >> > is >> > > > > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >> > > > > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >> > meaning >> > > > > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >> > > personality. >> > > > > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and >> meaning >> > > > > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >> > > > contemplation >> > > > > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active >> and >> > not >> > > > > actually so. >> > > > > >> > > > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >> > Leontiev, >> > > > and >> > > > > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >> > > > function >> > > > > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >> > > turns >> > > > > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points >> out, >> > it >> > > > > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >> > concepts, >> > > > > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but >> this >> > > > > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: >> concepts >> > > are >> > > > > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning >> away >> > > > from >> > > > > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete >> support >> > of >> > > > > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >> > action. >> > > > > >> > > > > David Kellogg >> > > > > Macquarie University >> > > > > >> > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >> > wrote: >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >> > > > > > >> > > > > > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >> > object >> > > in >> > > > > > itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >> > > unable >> > > > to >> > > > > > have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >> > 'inner >> > > > > > connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >> > > > relative >> > > > > to >> > > > > > CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an >> ideal >> > > > > > adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >> > activity >> > > to >> > > > > the >> > > > > > finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the >> mental >> > > > model >> > > > > > into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >> > into a >> > > > > > finished product and all through the durational time , you can >> see >> > > what >> > > > > is >> > > > > > necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >> > > > > conception , >> > > > > > you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >> > > > rational >> > > > > > cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of >> the >> > > > related >> > > > > > object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an >> activity >> > , >> > > we >> > > > > > mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >> > > entity >> > > > > > falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it >> wholly >> > > > apart >> > > > > , >> > > > > > again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we >> cannot >> > > stop >> > > > at >> > > > > > phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >> > > > reproduce >> > > > > > our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >> > and >> > > > true >> > > > > > science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >> > > > > (dynamicity) >> > > > > > according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come >> to >> > us >> > > > as >> > > > > > fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't >> want >> > > to >> > > > be >> > > > > > stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take >> moments as >> > > > > moments >> > > > > > of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >> > convert >> > > > > those >> > > > > > phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >> > > > > agnosticism >> > > > > > prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >> > > > > inhering , >> > > > > > how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >> > > > independent >> > > > > > separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , >> intertwined >> > > > > moments >> > > > > > of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >> > > > > appropriation , >> > > > > > instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does >> development >> > > or >> > > > > even >> > > > > > periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels >> or >> > do >> > > > > they >> > > > > > subsume some moments of developmental transform [The entire original message is not included.] From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Jan 15 07:53:50 2016 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 15:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <569912e8.c493420a.faff1.4af7@mx.google.com> References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> <569912e8.c493420a.faff1.4af7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <8B441D44-6AA7-45A8-AF04-28748647DDB6@uniandes.edu.co> I wrote a critique of the chapter by Wertsch and Kazak, published in the same book: Packer, M. J. (2011). Schooling: Domestication or ontological construction? In T. Koschmann (Ed.), Theories of learning and studies of instructional practice (pp. 167-188). New York: Springer. Martin On Jan 15, 2016, at 10:39 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Huw, > This is interesting. > A concept of discovering meaning and what is meant by the term (discovery)? > The notion that phenomenological references > Semiotic references > Psychological references > Each contribute a (portion?) to meaning developing through discovery processes in social spaces. > This paper does seem to relate to our topic. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 4:20 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper > from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful. It is quite a compact > paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological > accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering > meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc. > > Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it > may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or > similar services. > > Best, > Huw > > [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9 > > On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> In response to your points David, >> >> 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I >> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. >> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper >> towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. >> 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the >> referents not intended. >> 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. >> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield >> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The >> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Huw, Greg, Larry: >>> >>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in >>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure >>> (eg. >>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's >>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in >>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the >>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary >>> than >>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses >>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's >>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it >>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly >>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think >>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps >>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always >>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. >>> >>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the >>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. >>> But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this >>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has >>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of >>> "system" >>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, >>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, >>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most >>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's >>> donkey. >>> >>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics >>> page >>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially >>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second >>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third >>> after >>> the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies >>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons >>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be >>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing >>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can >>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command). >>> >>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only >>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as >>> a >>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could >>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel >>> of >>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite >>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would >>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for >>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is >>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as >>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between >>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of >>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this >>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations >>> in >>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the >>> novel. >>> >>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as >>> "presence >>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and >>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather >>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, >>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. >>> But >>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and >>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). >>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right >>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >>>> entirely volitional. >>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more >>> nuance >>>> to your statement: >>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, >>> and >>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing >>> that >>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >>>> the emergence of free will" >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw: >>>>> >>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, >>> sense. >>>> For >>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we >>> know >>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at >>> a >>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's >>> non-Markovian, >>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and >>> not >>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you >>> are >>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >>>>> >>>>> For example, if I find myself saying >>>>> >>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >>>>> >>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" >>> and >>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >>>>> death), etc. >>>>> >>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >>>> sense >>>>> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free >>> choice, >>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" >>> choices >>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >>>> art >>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) >>> number >>>> of >>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >>>>> cultural-historical determination. >>>>> >>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I >>> get >>>> to >>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the >>> choice >>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >>>> (because >>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity >>> but >>>> not >>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >>>> probably >>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about >>> Bowie >>>> in >>>>> the days to come. >>>>> >>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are >>> highly >>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is >>> also >>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >>>> clause; >>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, >>> each >>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and >>> this >>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >>>> use. >>>>> >>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use >>> of >>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen >>> as >>>> a >>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in >>> language >>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >>>> branches >>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >>>> the >>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) >>> not >>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >>>> language) >>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >>>> HAVE >>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential >>> is >>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the >>> sense >>>> of >>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < >>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >>>>> between >>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev >>> (most >>>> of >>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >>>>> activity >>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>>>>> >>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >>>>> alternative >>>>>> interpretation, I would say: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive >>> act. >>>>> One >>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a >>> component >>>> in >>>>>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >>>>> regress. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable >>> to >>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >>>>> actually >>>>>> an excellent source of edification. >>>>>> >>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >>>>> problem. >>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific >>> site. >>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer >>> to >>>>> solve >>>>>> or express a particular problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear Haydi: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the >>> HIstory of >>>>> the >>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of >>> the >>>>> basic >>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >>>>> something >>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or >>> the >>>>> hand >>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the >>> mind >>>> as >>>>>> (to >>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In >>> one >>>>>> case, >>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described >>>> synoptically, >>>>>> like >>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other >>> we >>>>>> have a >>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >>>>> theatre >>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >>>> produce >>>>>> the >>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the >>> eye >>>>> or >>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >>>> made >>>>> by >>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >>>> these >>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >>>> even >>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and >>> used >>>>> it, >>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That >>> is, I >>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >>>>> CHAT, >>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The >>> problem >>>> is >>>>>> that >>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >>>>> process >>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even >>> (although >>>>>> this >>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>>>>> producing >>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational >>> standpoint >>>> is >>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >>>> meaning >>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >>>>> personality. >>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and >>> meaning >>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>>>>> contemplation >>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active >>> and >>>> not >>>>>>> actually so. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >>>> Leontiev, >>>>>> and >>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>>>>> function >>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >>>>> turns >>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points >>> out, >>>> it >>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >>>> concepts, >>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but >>> this >>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: >>> concepts >>>>> are >>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning >>> away >>>>>> from >>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete >>> support >>>> of >>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >>>> action. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >>>> object >>>>> in >>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >>>>> unable >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >>>> 'inner >>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>>>>> relative >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an >>> ideal >>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >>>> activity >>>>> to >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the >>> mental >>>>>> model >>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >>>> into a >>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can >>> see >>>>> what >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>>>>> conception , >>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>>>>> rational >>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of >>> the >>>>>> related >>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an >>> activity >>>> , >>>>> we >>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >>>>> entity >>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it >>> wholly >>>>>> apart >>>>>>> , >>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we >>> cannot >>>>> stop >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>>>>> reproduce >>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >>>> and >>>>>> true >>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>>>>> (dynamicity) >>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come >>> to >>>> us >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't >>> want >>>>> to >>>>>> be >>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take >>> moments as >>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >>>> convert >>>>>>> those >>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>>>>> agnosticism >>>>>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>>>>> inhering , >>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >>>>>> independent >>>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , >>> intertwined >>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>>>>>> appropriation , >>>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does >>> development >>>>> or >>>>>>> even >>>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels >>> or >>>> do >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transform > > > [The entire original message is not included.] From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Fri Jan 15 08:45:23 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 11:45:23 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Article Message-ID: <61q8yuu028ob9uo11yqr1cls.1452876322669@email.android.com> Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Cecile Wright Date: 1/15/2016 11:05 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" , v.showunmi@ioe.ac.uk, carol tomlin Subject: Article Greetings, ? Please find attached a recent article. ? Best wishes, Cecile This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Nottingham. This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as permitted by UK legislation. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Young black males resilience and the use of capital to transform.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 348077 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160115/2f4f9d22/attachment-0001.pdf From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Jan 15 09:24:26 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 10:24:26 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [AAA_ACYIG] New CRN_Lifecourse In-Reply-To: <8D96E89D-1A50-4CA6-8175-7048C13C4030@nl.edu> References: <8D96E89D-1A50-4CA6-8175-7048C13C4030@nl.edu> Message-ID: Another nice resource that might be of interest - a joint Collaborative Research Network (CRN) for those interested in exploring connections (e.g., physical, political, developmental, symbolic, etc.) between childhood/youth and adulthood/old age. Details below. -greg ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Lauren Heidbrink Date: Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 7:34 AM Subject: [AAA_ACYIG] New CRN_Lifecourse To: "Aaa_acyig@binhost.com" Dear Colleagues, The Association for Anthropology and Gerontology working together with the Anthropology of Aging and the Life Course Interest Group (AALCIG) and ACYIG have now established a joint Collaborative Research Network (CRN) for those interested in exploring connections (e.g., physical, political, developmental, symbolic, etc.) between childhood/youth and adulthood/old age. The group has several potential project in mind (for those of you who like a few outputs to go with your intellectual exchange), including a blog share, a conference, organizing panels for other conferences, sharing teaching resources like syllabi, and developing opportunities for publishing and collaborative research projects. The central communication hub for plotting and schemeing will be our CRN_Lifecourse listserv. If you are interested in joining, please visit and complete the registration form. https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/acyig_lifecourse CRN_Lifecourse is interested in strengthening the intellectual exchange among scholars whose primary research focus has been on one stage of the life course but who are interested in inter-generational relationships, longitudinal studies, autobiographies, life course transitions, and the category of age itself in ways that require broader conceptual frameworks. At the moment, funding, publication, teaching curriculums, and the sections and subgroups of professional groups reinforce and naturalize divisions between scholars interested in the life course. Ages end up like fieldsites, where the anthropologist is encouraged, for example, to specialize on the internal workings of a single village, rather than looking at a the larger area of settlements with which it shares relationships and ecological context. In contrast, the CRN_Lifecourse encourages the development of concepts that problematize terms like ?stages of life,? ?generations,? and ?age,? and encourages the proliferation of specific methods and strategies to help us better conduct life-course research. Finally, the membership of CRN_Lifecourse will critically engage with the ways old age and youth are sometimes pitted against each other (e.g., in competition for humanitarian aid or organ transplants), while at other times, they are lumped together (e.g., as unproductive, naive, care-dependent, vulnerable, or sacred). We hope to examine how such connections impact the ways societies evaluate the life course. If you have questions (especially technical ones best handled off the listserv) contact Jason Danely (jdanely@brookes.ac.uk). All our best, ACYIG Board Lauren Heidbrink, MA/MS, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Social & Behavioral Sciences Chair, Public Policy and Administration Program NATIONAL LOUIS UNIVERSITY | 122 S. Michigan Ave., #3030, Chicago, IL 60603 Tel/fax: 312.261.3409 Skype: laurenheidbrink Email: lheidbrink@nl.edu Website: www.youthcirculations.com New book: Migrant Youth, Transnational Families and the State: Care and Contested Interests. University of Pennsylvania Press.? _______________________________________________ American Anthropological Association's Anthropology of Children and Youth Interest Group Listserv. AAA_ACYIG@binhost.com To view the message archives, please visit: https://lists.capalon.com/pipermail/aaa_acyig/ For help with this list, please contact the List Administrator acyig.aaa AT gmail DOT com You may also manage your own subscription preferences at: https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/aaa_acyig Note: To stop receiving email from this list, please set your account to DISABLED. AAA_ACYIG mailing list AAA_ACYIG@binhost.com https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/aaa_acyig -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jan 15 10:08:13 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 10:08:13 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) In-Reply-To: <8B441D44-6AA7-45A8-AF04-28748647DDB6@uniandes.edu.co> References: <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> <569912e8.c493420a.faff1.4af7@mx.google.com> <8B441D44-6AA7-45A8-AF04-28748647DDB6@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <569935b6.1a20620a.4ba77.5d3e@mx.google.com> Martin, I am wondering if you have a reflection on Merleau-Ponty's way of phenomenologically referencing - constituting activity -. Assuming 3 dimensions of emergence of meaning - structural emergence - genetic emergence - radical generative emergence Dimensions understood as not fully formed structures OR fully formed moments within genetic formings. Merleau-Ponty developing a new account of the radical generation of ORIGINAL genetic formings organically emerging. Merleau-Ponty exploring these 3 dimensions - structural, genetic, generative - developing new original orders of meaning.. Structural dimension emerging out of the genetic dimension. I have read many versions of this transformation on CHAT. Genetic dimension emerging out of the radical generative dimension which radically EXCEEDS AWARENESS because the generative dimension never was a present moment. Merleau-Ponty suggesting this generative dimension is offered against a genetic account of consciousness which questions constitutive activity. Merleau-Ponty exploring a particular sense of PASSIVITY which PRECEDES a synthetic principle of constitutive activity. This is a genre exploring the INSTITUTION of meaning which includes a radically PASSIVE generative dimension informing the genetic dimension. Similar in movement to the way the genetic dimension informs the structural dimension emerging. I am not sure if I have posed my question clearly but I do intuit a depth to this question? Structural dimension retrospectively explored as emergence within genetic concepts. Genetic dimension retrospectively explored as emergence within radical generative concepts. Leading to a critique of constitutive activity as synthetic consciousness being PRECEDED by this sense of radical passivity as an - institution - of meaning. I find this theme challenging, and I have not read Merleau-Ponty's Passivity lectures of 1955. However, I find this line of thought an opening through door-ways as ventures. Martin, your background studying Merleau-Ponty may guide my next step. -----Original Message----- From: "Martin John Packer" Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 7:55 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) I wrote a critique of the chapter by Wertsch and Kazak, published in the same book: Packer, M. J. (2011). Schooling: Domestication or ontological construction? In T. Koschmann (Ed.), Theories of learning and studies of instructional practice (pp. 167-188). New York: Springer. Martin On Jan 15, 2016, at 10:39 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Huw, > This is interesting. > A concept of discovering meaning and what is meant by the term (discovery)? > The notion that phenomenological references > Semiotic references > Psychological references > Each contribute a (portion?) to meaning developing through discovery processes in social spaces. > This paper does seem to relate to our topic. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 4:20 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper > from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful. It is quite a compact > paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological > accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering > meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc. > > Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it > may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or > similar services. > > Best, > Huw > > [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9 > > On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> In response to your points David, >> >> 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I >> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. >> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper >> towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. >> 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the >> referents not intended. >> 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. >> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield >> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The >> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Huw, Greg, Larry: >>> >>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in >>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure >>> (eg. >>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's >>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in >>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the >>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary >>> than >>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses >>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's >>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it >>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly >>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think >>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps >>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always >>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. >>> >>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the >>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. >>> But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this >>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has >>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of >>> "system" >>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, >>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, >>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most >>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's >>> donkey. >>> >>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics >>> page >>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially >>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second >>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third >>> after >>> the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies >>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons >>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be >>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing >>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can >>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command). >>> >>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only >>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as >>> a >>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could >>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel >>> of >>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite >>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would >>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for >>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is >>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as >>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between >>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of >>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this >>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations >>> in >>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the >>> novel. >>> >>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as >>> "presence >>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and >>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather >>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, >>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. >>> But >>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and >>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). >>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right >>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >>>> entirely volitional. >>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more >>> nuance >>>> to your statement: >>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, >>> and >>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing >>> that >>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >>>> the emergence of free will" >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw: >>>>> >>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, >>> sense. >>>> For >>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we >>> know >>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at >>> a >>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's >>> non-Markovian, >>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and >>> not >>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you >>> are >>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >>>>> >>>>> For example, if I find myself saying >>>>> >>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >>>>> >>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" >>> and >>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >>>>> death), etc. >>>>> >>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >>>> sense >>>>> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free >>> choice, >>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" >>> choices >>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >>>> art >>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) >>> number >>>> of >>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >>>>> cultural-historical determination. >>>>> >>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I >>> get >>>> to >>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the >>> choice >>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >>>> (because >>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity >>> but >>>> not >>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >>>> probably >>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about >>> Bowie >>>> in >>>>> the days to come. >>>>> >>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are >>> highly >>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is >>> also >>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >>>> clause; >>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, >>> each >>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and >>> this >>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >>>> use. >>>>> >>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use >>> of >>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen >>> as >>>> a >>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in >>> language >>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >>>> branches >>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >>>> the >>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) >>> not >>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >>>> language) >>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >>>> HAVE >>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential >>> is >>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the >>> sense >>>> of >>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < >>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >>>>> between >>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev >>> (most >>>> of >>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >>>>> activity >>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>>>>> >>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >>>>> alternative >>>>>> interpretation, I would say: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive >>> act. >>>>> One >>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a >>> component >>>> in >>>>>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >>>>> regress. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable >>> to >>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >>>>> actually >>>>>> an excellent source of edification. >>>>>> >>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >>>>> problem. >>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific >>> site. >>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer >>> to >>>>> solve >>>>>> or express a particular problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear Haydi: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the >>> HIstory of >>>>> the >>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of >>> the >>>>> basic >>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >>>>> something >>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or >>> the >>>>> hand >>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the >>> mind >>>> as >>>>>> (to >>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In >>> one >>>>>> case, >>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described >>>> synoptically, >>>>>> like >>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other >>> we >>>>>> have a >>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >>>>> theatre >>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >>>> produce >>>>>> the >>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the >>> eye >>>>> or >>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >>>> made >>>>> by >>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >>>> these >>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >>>> even >>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and >>> used >>>>> it, >>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That >>> is, I >>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >>>>> CHAT, >>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The >>> problem >>>> is >>>>>> that >>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >>>>> process >>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even >>> (although >>>>>> this >>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>>>>> producing >>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational >>> standpoint >>>> is >>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >>>> meaning >>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >>>>> personality. >>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and >>> meaning >>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>>>>> contemplation >>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active >>> and >>>> not >>>>>>> actually so. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >>>> Leontiev, >>>>>> and >>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>>>>> function >>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >>>>> turns >>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points >>> out, >>>> it >>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >>>> concepts, >>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but >>> this >>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: >>> concepts >>>>> are >>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning >>> away >>>>>> from >>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete >>> support >>>> of >>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >>>> action. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >>>> object >>>>> in >>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >>>>> unable >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >>>> 'inner >>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>>>>> relative >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an >>> ideal >>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >>>> activity >>>>> to >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the >>> mental >>>>>> model >>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >>>> into a >>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can >>> see >>>>> what >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>>>>> conception , >>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>>>>> rational >>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of >>> the >>>>>> related >>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an >>> activity >>>> , >>>>> we >>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >>>>> entity >>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it >>> wholly >>>>>> apart >>>>>>> , >>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we >>> cannot >>>>> stop >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>>>>> reproduce >>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >>>> and >>>>>> true >>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>>>>> (dynamicity) >>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come >>> to >>>> us >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't >>> want >>>>> to >>>>>> be >>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take >>> moments as >>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >>>> convert >>>>>>> those >>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>>>>> agnosticism >>>>>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>>>>> inhering , >>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and pa [The entire original message is not included.] From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Fri Jan 15 11:48:11 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 14:48:11 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: JNE ScholarOne E-News #10 Message-ID: Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: cjjoseph@howard.edu Date: 1/15/2016 1:54 PM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: JNE ScholarOne E-News #10 15-Jan-2016 Happy New Year! Please open the attached document to view the tenth JNE ScholarOne e-newsletter. Thanks, Lenda P. Hill Associate Editor The Journal of Negro Education -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: * JNEScholarOne-E-News-10.docx Type: application/octet-stream Size: 78946 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160115/f08e9732/attachment.obj From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jan 15 12:28:02 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 12:28:02 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [AAA_ACYIG] New CRN_Lifecourse In-Reply-To: References: <8D96E89D-1A50-4CA6-8175-7048C13C4030@nl.edu> Message-ID: Looks like a very interesting idea, Greg. Of definite interest to any Vygotskian in principle seems to me. But when I went as far as I could, I got to a page that spoke of lists of which there were none. Maybe it is just in the planning stages? Do you know? mike On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 9:24 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Another nice resource that might be of interest - a joint Collaborative > Research Network (CRN) for those interested in exploring connections (e.g., > physical, political, developmental, symbolic, etc.) between childhood/youth > and adulthood/old age. > Details below. > -greg > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Lauren Heidbrink > Date: Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 7:34 AM > Subject: [AAA_ACYIG] New CRN_Lifecourse > To: "Aaa_acyig@binhost.com" > > > Dear Colleagues, > > The Association for Anthropology and Gerontology working together with the > Anthropology of Aging and the Life Course Interest Group (AALCIG) and ACYIG > have now established a joint Collaborative Research Network (CRN) for those > interested in exploring connections (e.g., physical, political, > developmental, symbolic, etc.) between childhood/youth and adulthood/old > age. > > The group has several potential project in mind (for those of you who like > a few outputs to go with your intellectual exchange), including a blog > share, a conference, organizing panels for other conferences, sharing > teaching resources like syllabi, and developing opportunities for > publishing and collaborative research projects. > > The central communication hub for plotting and schemeing will be our > CRN_Lifecourse listserv. If you are interested in joining, please visit and > complete the registration form. > https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/acyig_lifecourse > > CRN_Lifecourse is interested in strengthening the intellectual exchange > among scholars whose primary research focus has been on one stage of the > life course but who are interested in inter-generational relationships, > longitudinal studies, autobiographies, life course transitions, and the > category of age itself in ways that require broader conceptual frameworks. > At the moment, funding, publication, teaching curriculums, and the sections > and subgroups of professional groups reinforce and naturalize divisions > between scholars interested in the life course. Ages end up like > fieldsites, where the anthropologist is encouraged, for example, to > specialize on the internal workings of a single village, rather than > looking at a the larger area of settlements with which it shares > relationships and ecological context. In contrast, the CRN_Lifecourse > encourages the development of concepts that problematize terms like ?stages > of life,? ?generations,? and ?age,? and encourages the proliferation of > specific methods and strategies to help us better conduct life-course > research. Finally, the membership of CRN_Lifecourse will critically engage > with the ways old age and youth are sometimes pitted against each other > (e.g., in competition for humanitarian aid or organ transplants), while at > other times, they are lumped together (e.g., as unproductive, naive, > care-dependent, vulnerable, or sacred). We hope to examine how such > connections impact the ways societies evaluate the life course. > > If you have questions (especially technical ones best handled off the > listserv) contact Jason Danely (jdanely@brookes.ac.uk jdanely@brookes.ac.uk>). > > All our best, > > ACYIG Board > > > > > > > Lauren Heidbrink, MA/MS, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor, Social & Behavioral Sciences > Chair, Public Policy and Administration Program > > NATIONAL LOUIS UNIVERSITY | 122 S. Michigan Ave., #3030, Chicago, IL 60603 > Tel/fax: 312.261.3409 > Skype: laurenheidbrink > Email: lheidbrink@nl.edu > Website: www.youthcirculations.com > > New book: Migrant Youth, Transnational Families and the State: Care and > Contested Interests. > University of Pennsylvania Press.? > > _______________________________________________ > > American Anthropological Association's Anthropology of Children and Youth > Interest Group Listserv. AAA_ACYIG@binhost.com > > To view the message archives, please visit: > https://lists.capalon.com/pipermail/aaa_acyig/ > > For help with this list, please contact the List Administrator > acyig.aaa AT gmail DOT com > > You may also manage your own subscription preferences at: > https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/aaa_acyig > Note: To stop receiving email from this list, please set your account to > DISABLED. > > AAA_ACYIG mailing list > AAA_ACYIG@binhost.com > https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/aaa_acyig > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Jan 15 12:51:45 2016 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 13:51:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [AAA_ACYIG] New CRN_Lifecourse In-Reply-To: References: <8D96E89D-1A50-4CA6-8175-7048C13C4030@nl.edu> Message-ID: Mike, Not sure, I will email Lauren Heidbrink about this. -greg On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 10:24 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Another nice resource that might be of interest - a joint Collaborative > Research Network (CRN) for those interested in exploring connections (e.g., > physical, political, developmental, symbolic, etc.) between childhood/youth > and adulthood/old age. > Details below. > -greg > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Lauren Heidbrink > Date: Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 7:34 AM > Subject: [AAA_ACYIG] New CRN_Lifecourse > To: "Aaa_acyig@binhost.com" > > > Dear Colleagues, > > The Association for Anthropology and Gerontology working together with the > Anthropology of Aging and the Life Course Interest Group (AALCIG) and ACYIG > have now established a joint Collaborative Research Network (CRN) for those > interested in exploring connections (e.g., physical, political, > developmental, symbolic, etc.) between childhood/youth and adulthood/old > age. > > The group has several potential project in mind (for those of you who like > a few outputs to go with your intellectual exchange), including a blog > share, a conference, organizing panels for other conferences, sharing > teaching resources like syllabi, and developing opportunities for > publishing and collaborative research projects. > > The central communication hub for plotting and schemeing will be our > CRN_Lifecourse listserv. If you are interested in joining, please visit and > complete the registration form. > https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/acyig_lifecourse > > CRN_Lifecourse is interested in strengthening the intellectual exchange > among scholars whose primary research focus has been on one stage of the > life course but who are interested in inter-generational relationships, > longitudinal studies, autobiographies, life course transitions, and the > category of age itself in ways that require broader conceptual frameworks. > At the moment, funding, publication, teaching curriculums, and the sections > and subgroups of professional groups reinforce and naturalize divisions > between scholars interested in the life course. Ages end up like > fieldsites, where the anthropologist is encouraged, for example, to > specialize on the internal workings of a single village, rather than > looking at a the larger area of settlements with which it shares > relationships and ecological context. In contrast, the CRN_Lifecourse > encourages the development of concepts that problematize terms like ?stages > of life,? ?generations,? and ?age,? and encourages the proliferation of > specific methods and strategies to help us better conduct life-course > research. Finally, the membership of CRN_Lifecourse will critically engage > with the ways old age and youth are sometimes pitted against each other > (e.g., in competition for humanitarian aid or organ transplants), while at > other times, they are lumped together (e.g., as unproductive, naive, > care-dependent, vulnerable, or sacred). We hope to examine how such > connections impact the ways societies evaluate the life course. > > If you have questions (especially technical ones best handled off the > listserv) contact Jason Danely (jdanely@brookes.ac.uk jdanely@brookes.ac.uk>). > > All our best, > > ACYIG Board > > > > > > > Lauren Heidbrink, MA/MS, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor, Social & Behavioral Sciences > Chair, Public Policy and Administration Program > > NATIONAL LOUIS UNIVERSITY | 122 S. Michigan Ave., #3030, Chicago, IL 60603 > Tel/fax: 312.261.3409 > Skype: laurenheidbrink > Email: lheidbrink@nl.edu > Website: www.youthcirculations.com > > New book: Migrant Youth, Transnational Families and the State: Care and > Contested Interests. > University of Pennsylvania Press.? > > _______________________________________________ > > American Anthropological Association's Anthropology of Children and Youth > Interest Group Listserv. AAA_ACYIG@binhost.com > > To view the message archives, please visit: > https://lists.capalon.com/pipermail/aaa_acyig/ > > For help with this list, please contact the List Administrator > acyig.aaa AT gmail DOT com > > You may also manage your own subscription preferences at: > https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/aaa_acyig > Note: To stop receiving email from this list, please set your account to > DISABLED. > > AAA_ACYIG mailing list > AAA_ACYIG@binhost.com > https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/aaa_acyig > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Fri Jan 15 13:50:57 2016 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 21:50:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Article In-Reply-To: <61q8yuu028ob9uo11yqr1cls.1452876322669@email.android.com> References: <61q8yuu028ob9uo11yqr1cls.1452876322669@email.android.com> Message-ID: FAO Paul Mocombe: Thank you for the 'Young Black Males'- Nottingham Uni piece Paul. Can any of it be used *covertly / unacknowledged as to source* in discussions around education policy in UK, or are the prohibitions attached to the article absolute? Best wishes Tom Richardson Middlesbrough UK On 15 January 2016 at 16:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Cecile Wright > Date: 1/15/2016 11:05 AM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" , v.showunmi@ioe.ac.uk, > carol tomlin > Subject: Article > > > > Greetings, > > Please find attached a recent article. > > Best wishes, > Cecile > > > > This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee > and may contain confidential information. If you have received this > message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. > > Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this > message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the > author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the > University of Nottingham. > > This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an > attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your > computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email > communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as > permitted by UK legislation. > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jan 15 15:41:51 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 15:41:51 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Institute of Advanced Study : Professor Alia Al-Saji - DurhamUniversity In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <569983e7.8b10620a.58ad0.7bf0@mx.google.com> I wanted to share an hour long podcast with Alia Al-Saji from McGill University. It is an exploration of critical race theory that explores the pre-reflective depths which must shift before transformation is possible. She grounds her orientation in the need for hesitation -interval- at the level of perception and affect. A provocative presentation -----Original Message----- From: "Larry Purss" Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 2:59 PM To: "Larry Purss" ; "Lplarry" Subject: Institute of Advanced Study : Professor Alia Al-Saji - DurhamUniversity https://www.dur.ac.uk/ias/fellows/1213/al-saji/ Sent from my Windows Phone From kvond@udel.edu Fri Jan 15 17:22:17 2016 From: kvond@udel.edu (Katherine von Duyke) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 20:22:17 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] unsubscribe In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <85BB7578-6862-44AB-A078-5F8B6F4D458C@udel.edu> > On Jan 15, 2016, at 11:46 AM, xmca-l-request@mailman.ucsd.edu wrote: > > Send xmca-l mailing list submissions to > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca-l > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > xmca-l-request@mailman.ucsd.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > xmca-l-owner@mailman.ucsd.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of xmca-l digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden) > 2. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 3. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 4. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 5. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 6. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden) > 7. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 8. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden) > 9. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Martin John Packer) > 10. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 11. Re: Digital game-based learning (Hugh O'Donnell) > 12. Re: Digital game-based learning (Huw Lloyd) > 13. Fwd: Request for Articles: Anti-Poverty Policy Innovations > (mike cole) > 14. Re: Digital game-based learning (Hugh O'Donnell) > 15. missionaries and cannibals (Huw Lloyd) > 16. Re: missionaries and cannibals (Huw Lloyd) > 17. What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar) > 18. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd) > 19. Re: What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar) > 20. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd) > 21. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd) > 22. Re: What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar) > 23. Re: missionaries and cannibals (mike cole) > 24. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd) > 25. Re: missionaries and cannibals (Huw Lloyd) > 26. Re: What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar) > 27. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd) > 28. Re: What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar) > 29. Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (David Kellogg) > 30. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd) > 31. help ! (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 32. Re: help ! (Andy Blunden) > 33. Re: help ! (Huw Lloyd) > 34. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 35. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden) > 36. Re: help ! (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 37. Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 38. NYTimes.com: When Philosophy Lost Its Way (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) > 39. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden) > 40. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 41. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 42. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 43. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 44. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 45. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?) > 46. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (David Kellogg) > 47. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 48. [Lchc-l] A remarkable act of courage in American civil > discourse (Annalisa Aguilar) > 49. Beware Hysterical Librarians! (Annalisa Aguilar) > 50. Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon > (Susan Davis) > 51. Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern > (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) > 52. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Andy Blunden) > 53. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Andy Blunden) > 54. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Glassman, Michael) > 55. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Annalisa Aguilar) > 56. Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern (mike cole) > 57. Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern (mike cole) > 58. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (David Kellogg) > 59. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 60. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Beth Ferholt) > 61. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Bruce Robinson) > 62. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Greg Thompson) > 63. Society for Psychological Anthropology Vimeo page (Greg Thompson) > 64. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Lplarry) > 65. Fwd: BSA Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016 - Call > for Papers (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) > 66. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (David Kellogg) > 67. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Susan Davis) > 68. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Annalisa Aguilar) > 69. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (Annalisa Aguilar) > 70. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon (HENRY SHONERD) > 71. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 72. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd) > 73. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Lplarry) > 74. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Martin John Packer) > 75. Fwd: Article (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:56:24 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: David Kellogg , "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Message-ID: <569335F8.60907@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed > > My German is not good enough to decipher the usage in all > these instances, David. > Of course, Hegel uses the word "moment" in all its modes, > and that includes "at that moment in the story." The > paradigmatic usage is with Individual, Particular and > Universal moments, which are not stages, etc., but as in the > page Martin found for us, inseparable aspects. It is this > meaning which I find is generally the most troubling for people. > > I should not have said "Hegel does not use ..." Culpa mea. > Hegel uses the word "moment" in all sorts of ways, yes. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 11/01/2016 3:46 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> Actually, Andy, he does. Take a look at the attached file. >> Search it for "Momente". There are nearly three hundred >> instances, and the word "momente" is being used pretty >> much just the way Vygotsky uses it the Russian word "Moment". >> >> Or save yourself some time, and just think. A lot of what >> Hegel is doing here is criticizing Kant. The idea of >> "Momente" and "Instanz" is central to Kant. How could >> Hegel not use it? >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 9:10 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a >> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use phase, >> category, stage or division for those concepts. >> >> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical >> examples of "moments" but these are not steps, phases >> or stages of the concepts, even though they are also >> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all >> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the >> branches/divisions and the general secretary are >> individual, universal and particular moments. We >> cannot conceive of a union developing from an >> individual to a branch to a general secretary, can we? >> >> I will look into the origins of this expression. I >> have always just presumed it came from mathematics, as >> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a >> function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of >> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in >> the Science of Logic in his critique of calculus. But >> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often >> "moments", and the word >> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a >> step (as in the three >> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for >> others", "for myself". >> >> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve >> in translating the >> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very >> clearly distinguishes three >> moments of speech development: indicative, >> nominative, and signifying. >> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing >> gesture. "Nominating" is >> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming >> function: "every thing has a >> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin >> down, and in one place >> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with >> the adult understanding >> that anything can be named. So what is the >> difference between knowing that >> everything has a name and the knowledge that any >> thing can be named? >> >> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and >> just as significant >> as the distinction between pointing to something >> with a gesture, pointing >> to something with a word like "this" or "that", >> and pointing to something >> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that >> "everything has a name", >> the name could be extremely general ("everything" >> or "thing") or it could >> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But >> I don't yet have the >> idea that names are invented, and that therefore >> it is possible to name >> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring >> into existence modes of >> pure abstract thinking through language. That's >> signifying, and it is >> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the >> lifelong process of speech >> development. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a >> particular aspect that I thought >> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >> which is that stimuli can not >> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they >> afford the kind of dynamics you >> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >> >> I have also noted that the translation of >> phrases like "instances of a >> process" is probably off the mark too. What >> is really meant, I believe, is >> "instants of a process". These have two >> rather different meanings from the >> perspective of thinking about processes. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >> > > wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >> >> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? >> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. >> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >> ???????????? ???????????. >> >> (Russian >> >> Collected Works, p. 117). >> >> This means (as nearly as I can make out): >> "If the task did not go beyond >> the natural capability of the child, he >> could deal with it in an >> >> unmediated >> >> or primitive method. In this cases, the >> structure of his behavior would >> >> be >> >> completely similar to the scheme as >> presented by Volkelt". >> >> I think there is no diagramme, at least >> not in the sense of a two >> dimensional graphic one can have a copy >> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child >> behavior as the result of an >> affectively tinged FUSION of perception >> and behavior, an affectively >> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >> perception and behavior were >> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans >> Volkelt concluded from a >> >> series >> >> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >> >> the >> >> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >> >> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >> baby bottles: one shaped like a >> triangle, one like a violin, one like a >> square, etc. They were all >> different colors as well. But three of >> them didn't have holes in the >> >> teat: >> >> you could see and smell the milk but you >> couldn't drink it. One did. He >> taught the infants to associate the >> drinking of milk and the feeling of >> satiation with one particular bottle, so >> that they would actually ignore >> the bottle unless it had all the >> characteristics: triangularity, >> >> blueness, >> >> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >> child's point of view, he was not >> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. >> This kind of "affectively colored >> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >> schemata". >> >> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >> eventually decided that we never >> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >> colored perception-behavior wholes, >> and this would explain the indivisible and >> inseparable devotion of the >> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later >> work Vygotsky is very careful to >> distance himself from Volkelt even in his >> explanations of infant >> >> behavior: >> >> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that >> ALL THREE layers of behavior >> (that is, instinct, habit, and >> intelligence) are present in infancy. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's >> diagram" to hand that is referred >> >> to >> >> in The History of the Development of >> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >> >> p.85 >> >> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think >> a reference is given. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:04:40 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "ablunden@mira.net" , David Kellogg > , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Message-ID: > <982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Dear all , > Look at this please ! > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .? > And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .? > > > Best > Haydi?? > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:04:40 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "ablunden@mira.net" , David Kellogg > , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Message-ID: > <982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Dear all , > Look at this please ! > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .? > And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .? > > > Best > Haydi?? > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 11:23:19 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Hi Martin, > > I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a > straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume. > > I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented > in the blog is incomplete and incorrect. For example, the assertion "You > don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room" > is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and > recall the experience of its colour. Likewise the notion of a 'whole' that > is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft > somehow qualified it as being independent. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology. Here is an >> accessible account of the basics: >> >> < >> https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/ >>> >> >> Martin >> >> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The >> differing >>> interpretations have quite different implications. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, >>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those >>>> concepts. >>>> >>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" >> but >>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they >> are >>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three >> moments. >>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general >>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot >>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a >> general >>>> secretary, can we? >>>> >>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just >>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... >>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of >>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of >> Logic >>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw: >>>>> >>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the >> word >>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the >> three >>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", >>>>> "for >>>>> others", "for myself". >>>>> >>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the >>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three >>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. >>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. >> "Nominating" is >>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has >> a >>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place >>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult >> understanding >>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing >> that >>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? >>>>> >>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant >>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, >> pointing >>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to >> something >>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a >> name", >>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it >> could >>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the >>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name >>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence >> modes of >>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is >>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of >> speech >>>>> development. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I >> thought >>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can >> not >>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics >>>>>> you >>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a >>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I >> believe, >>>>>> is >>>>>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings >> from >>>>>> the >>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? >> ??? >>>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? >> ??? >>>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >>>>>>> >>>>>> (Russian >>>>>> >>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go >> beyond >>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >>>>>>> >>>>>> unmediated >>>>>> >>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior >> would >>>>>>> >>>>>> be >>>>>> >>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is >> referring >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of >> an >>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively >>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >>>>>>> >>>>>> series >>>>>> >>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and >> in >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like >> a >>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the >>>>>>> >>>>>> teat: >>>>>> >>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. >> He >>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling >> of >>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually >> ignore >>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >>>>>>> >>>>>> blueness, >>>>>> >>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was >> not >>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively >>>>>>> colored >>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or >> "Volkelt's >>>>>>> schemata". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we >> never >>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior >> wholes, >>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of >> the >>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very >> careful >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >>>>>>> >>>>>> behavior: >>>>>> >>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of >> behavior >>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd < >> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is >> referred >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> p.85 >>>>>> >>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 5 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:08:12 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides? > E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered > together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then > perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect > appearing as torque in another. > > Best, > Huw > > On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means "An >> essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity" >> first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838. >> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess >> that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the >>> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what >>> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked, >>> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception. >>> >>> still learning! >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike. >>> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he >>> thought should have been "instants" and then David >>> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," >>> which was the subject of my comment. >>> >>> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that >>> all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment" >>> were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..." >>> The one odd reference is this one: >>> >>> "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the >>> analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to >>> represent the *moments* of this genetic process in >>> their >>> mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we >>> have diverged from the complex and twisting path that >>> characterizes the actual development of the child?s >>> concepts." >>> >>> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here >>> to the distinct modes of conception which were >>> manifested in the child's activity, at different >>> stages, but which are combined in the most developed >>> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative >>> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, >>> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not >>> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. >>> Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could >>> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it >>> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of >>> association as "moments" of concept formation in the >>> other sense of the word "moment" which is not >>> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for >>> sure. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth >>> clarifying. The differing interpretations have >>> quite different implications. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a >>> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use >>> phase, >>> category, stage or division for those concepts. >>> >>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical >>> examples of "moments" but these are not steps, >>> phases >>> or stages of the concepts, even though they >>> are also >>> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept >>> has all >>> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the >>> branches/divisions and the general secretary are >>> individual, universal and particular moments. We >>> cannot conceive of a union developing from an >>> individual to a branch to a general secretary, >>> can we? >>> >>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I >>> have always just presumed it came from >>> mathematics, as >>> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a >>> function, and I know Hegel did study this >>> branch of >>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space >>> to it in >>> the Science of Logic in his critique of >>> calculus. But >>> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Huw: >>> >>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even >>> more often >>> "moments", and the word >>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a >>> phase, or a >>> step (as in the three >>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >>> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for >>> others", "for myself". >>> >>> One of the most difficult problems we had >>> to solve >>> in translating the >>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very >>> clearly distinguishes three >>> moments of speech development: indicative, >>> nominative, and signifying. >>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a >>> pointing >>> gesture. "Nominating" is >>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming >>> function: "every thing has a >>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin >>> down, and in one place >>> Vygotsky actually says that it is >>> synonymous with >>> the adult understanding >>> that anything can be named. So what is the >>> difference between knowing that >>> everything has a name and the knowledge >>> that any >>> thing can be named? >>> >>> I think that the distinction is just as >>> subtle and >>> just as significant >>> as the distinction between pointing to >>> something >>> with a gesture, pointing >>> to something with a word like "this" or >>> "that", >>> and pointing to something >>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I >>> say that >>> "everything has a name", >>> the name could be extremely general >>> ("everything" >>> or "thing") or it could >>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this >>> computer"). But >>> I don't yet have the >>> idea that names are invented, and that >>> therefore >>> it is possible to name >>> objects which do not exist, and therefore >>> to bring >>> into existence modes of >>> pure abstract thinking through language. >>> That's >>> signifying, and it is >>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the >>> lifelong process of speech >>> development. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a >>> particular aspect that I thought >>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >>> which is that stimuli can not >>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they >>> afford the kind of dynamics you >>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>> >>> I have also noted that the translation of >>> phrases like "instances of a >>> process" is probably off the mark >>> too. What >>> is really meant, I believe, is >>> "instants of a process". These have two >>> rather different meanings from the >>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Huw: >>> >>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>> >>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? >>> ???????????? ??? >>> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? >>> ????????. >>> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >>> ???????????? ???????????. >>> >>> (Russian >>> >>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>> >>> This means (as nearly as I can >>> make out): >>> "If the task did not go beyond >>> the natural capability of the >>> child, he >>> could deal with it in an >>> >>> unmediated >>> >>> or primitive method. In this >>> cases, the >>> structure of his behavior would >>> >>> be >>> >>> completely similar to the scheme as >>> presented by Volkelt". >>> >>> I think there is no diagramme, at >>> least >>> not in the sense of a two >>> dimensional graphic one can have a >>> copy >>> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain >>> all child >>> behavior as the result of an >>> affectively tinged FUSION of >>> perception >>> and behavior, an affectively >>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >>> perception and behavior were >>> absolutely inseparable. This was >>> what Hans >>> Volkelt concluded from a >>> >>> series >>> >>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >>> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>> >>> the >>> >>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>> >>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >>> baby bottles: one shaped like a >>> triangle, one like a violin, one >>> like a >>> square, etc. They were all >>> different colors as well. But three of >>> them didn't have holes in the >>> >>> teat: >>> >>> you could see and smell the milk >>> but you >>> couldn't drink it. One did. He >>> taught the infants to associate the >>> drinking of milk and the feeling of >>> satiation with one particular >>> bottle, so >>> that they would actually ignore >>> the bottle unless it had all the >>> characteristics: triangularity, >>> >>> blueness, >>> >>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >>> child's point of view, he was not >>> drinking milk but triangular blue >>> milk. >>> This kind of "affectively colored >>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >>> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>> schemata". >>> >>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >>> eventually decided that we never >>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >>> colored perception-behavior wholes, >>> and this would explain the >>> indivisible and >>> inseparable devotion of the >>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in >>> later >>> work Vygotsky is very careful to >>> distance himself from Volkelt even >>> in his >>> explanations of infant >>> >>> behavior: >>> >>> in the Lectures on Pedology he >>> argues that >>> ALL THREE layers of behavior >>> (that is, instinct, habit, and >>> intelligence) are present in infancy. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, >>> Huw Lloyd >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Does anyone have a copy of >>> "Volkelt's >>> diagram" to hand that is referred >>> >>> to >>> >>> in The History of the >>> Development of >>> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>> >>> p.85 >>> >>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I >>> don't think >>> a reference is given. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a >>> natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 6 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:17:56 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: Huw Lloyd , "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Message-ID: <56939D74.6030605@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed > > No all the science-related meanings are derived from either > Integral of f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to > angular momentum which is an integral of mass* distance from > axis. > The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment" > expresses a property of the whole function. A function can > be represented either by a series of values for each x, or > by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the total > mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise > when you are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic > systems with inertia. > > YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think, > which is a kind of inverse of the above. > > yada yada yada, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon >> influences the tides? E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum >> like things that, when, considered together may appear as >> 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then perhaps the >> meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one >> aspect appearing as torque in another. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense >> 9. "moment" means "An essential element or significant >> aspect of a complex conceptual entity" first used in a >> translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838. >> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as >> "torque," so I guess that exposes a bit of Cole word >> play going on there, yes? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still >> working on the phenomenology of the usage. I think >> the form of part-whole relation is what is at >> issue and "moments" in this sense are >> qualitatively distinct, marked, events. Events >> whose conventional meaning is torqued by the >> exception. >> >> still learning! >> mike >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> wrote: >> >> I am not at all clear about the context here, >> Mike. >> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he >> thought should have been "instants" and then David >> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," >> which was the subject of my comment. >> >> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and >> found that >> all bar one instance of the use of the word >> "moment" >> were in the sense of "at this moment in the >> story ..." >> The one odd reference is this one: >> >> "We have consistently taken a genetic >> approach to the >> analysis of our problem. We have, however, >> attempted to >> represent the *moments* of this genetic >> process in >> their >> mature, classic forms. The inevitable >> result is that we >> have diverged from the complex and twisting >> path that >> characterizes the actual development of the >> child?s >> concepts." >> >> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with >> "moment" here >> to the distinct modes of conception which were >> manifested in the child's activity, at different >> stages, but which are combined in the most >> developed >> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative >> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, >> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not >> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. >> Perhaps their *first appearance* in >> ontogenesis could >> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, >> but it >> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of >> association as "moments" of concept formation >> in the >> other sense of the word "moment" which is not >> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't >> say for >> sure. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> The theoretical point seems interesting >> and worth >> clarifying. The differing interpretations have >> quite different implications. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden >> > >> > >> > >> >> > >>> wrote: >> >> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" >> as meaning a >> stage, phase or step, David. He tends >> to use >> phase, >> category, stage or division for those >> concepts. >> >> Individual, Particular and Universal >> are typical >> examples of "moments" but these are >> not steps, >> phases >> or stages of the concepts, even though >> they >> are also >> exhibited in this way. Every concrete >> concept >> has all >> three moments. In a trade union, the >> members, the >> branches/divisions and the general >> secretary are >> individual, universal and particular >> moments. We >> cannot conceive of a union developing >> from an >> individual to a branch to a general >> secretary, >> can we? >> >> I will look into the origins of this >> expression. I >> have always just presumed it came from >> mathematics, as >> in the first, second, third, ... >> moments of a >> function, and I know Hegel did study this >> branch of >> mathematics, because he gives a lot of >> space >> to it in >> the Science of Logic in his critique of >> calculus. But >> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even >> more often >> "moments", and the word >> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a >> phase, or a >> step (as in the three >> "moments" of the formation of the >> concept in >> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for >> others", "for myself". >> >> One of the most difficult problems >> we had >> to solve >> in translating the >> Lectures on Pedology was that >> Vygotsky very >> clearly distinguishes three >> moments of speech development: >> indicative, >> nominative, and signifying. >> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, >> e.g. a >> pointing >> gesture. "Nominating" is >> ipso facto verbal, because it is >> the naming >> function: "every thing has a >> name". But "signifying" is much >> harder to pin >> down, and in one place >> Vygotsky actually says that it is >> synonymous with >> the adult understanding >> that anything can be named. So >> what is the >> difference between knowing that >> everything has a name and the >> knowledge >> that any >> thing can be named? >> >> I think that the distinction is >> just as >> subtle and >> just as significant >> as the distinction between pointing to >> something >> with a gesture, pointing >> to something with a word like >> "this" or >> "that", >> and pointing to something >> with a word like "apple" or >> "pear". If I >> say that >> "everything has a name", >> the name could be extremely general >> ("everything" >> or "thing") or it could >> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this >> computer"). But >> I don't yet have the >> idea that names are invented, and that >> therefore >> it is possible to name >> objects which do not exist, and >> therefore >> to bring >> into existence modes of >> pure abstract thinking through >> language. >> That's >> signifying, and it is >> indeed a new moment, or a new >> instant, in the >> lifelong process of speech >> development. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, >> Huw Lloyd >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> wrote: >> >> Thank you, David. That helps >> to explain a >> particular aspect that I thought >> Vygotsky was overlooking in >> the narrative, >> which is that stimuli can not >> only signify but also >> symbolise, i.e. they >> afford the kind of dynamics you >> have elucidated from Volkelt's >> schema. >> >> I have also noted that the >> translation of >> phrases like "instances of a >> process" is probably off the mark >> too. What >> is really meant, I believe, is >> "instants of a process". >> These have two >> rather different meanings from the >> perspective of thinking about >> processes. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, >> David Kellogg >> > >> > > >> > >> >> > >>> wrote: >> >> Huw: >> >> Here's what Vygotsky >> really says: >> >> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? >> ???????????? ??? >> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >> ???????????????? ??? >> ??????????? >> ????????. >> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >> ????????? ?????????? >> ?????????? ?????, >> ???????????? ???????????. >> >> (Russian >> >> Collected Works, p. 117). >> >> This means (as nearly as I can >> make out): >> "If the task did not go beyond >> the natural capability of the >> child, he >> could deal with it in an >> >> unmediated >> >> or primitive method. In this >> cases, the >> structure of his behavior >> would >> >> be >> >> completely similar to the >> scheme as >> presented by Volkelt". >> >> I think there is no >> diagramme, at >> least >> not in the sense of a two >> dimensional graphic one >> can have a >> copy >> of. What Vygotsky is >> referring to >> is Volkelt's attempt to >> explain >> all child >> behavior as the result of an >> affectively tinged FUSION of >> perception >> and behavior, an affectively >> colored, unanalyzable, >> whole in which >> perception and behavior were >> absolutely inseparable. >> This was >> what Hans >> Volkelt concluded from a >> >> series >> >> of experiments that >> Vygotsky refers to >> repeatedly, both in HDHMF >> and in >> >> the >> >> Lectures on Pedology and >> elswhere. >> >> What Volkelt did was this: >> he had four >> baby bottles: one shaped >> like a >> triangle, one like a >> violin, one >> like a >> square, etc. They were all >> different colors as well. >> But three of >> them didn't have holes in the >> >> teat: >> >> you could see and smell >> the milk >> but you >> couldn't drink it. One did. He >> taught the infants to >> associate the >> drinking of milk and the >> feeling of >> satiation with one particular >> bottle, so >> that they would actually >> ignore >> the bottle unless it had >> all the >> characteristics: >> triangularity, >> >> blueness, >> >> etc. So Volkelt argued >> that from the >> child's point of view, he >> was not >> drinking milk but >> triangular blue >> milk. >> This kind of "affectively >> colored >> whole" is what Vygotsky >> refers to as >> "Volkelt's scheme", or >> "Volkelt's >> schemata". >> >> Volkelt's scheme came to a >> bad end. He >> eventually decided that we >> never >> grow out of unanalyzable >> affectively >> colored >> perception-behavior wholes, >> and this would explain the >> indivisible and >> inseparable devotion of the >> German volk to their >> Fuhrer. So in >> later >> work Vygotsky is very >> careful to >> distance himself from >> Volkelt even >> in his >> explanations of infant >> >> behavior: >> >> in the Lectures on Pedology he >> argues that >> ALL THREE layers of behavior >> (that is, instinct, habit, and >> intelligence) are present >> in infancy. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at >> 10:50 PM, >> Huw Lloyd >> > >> > > >> >> > >> > >>> >> wrote: >> >> Does anyone have a copy of >> "Volkelt's >> diagram" to hand that >> is referred >> >> to >> >> in The History of the >> Development of >> Higher Mental >> Functions (1997, >> >> p.85 >> >> and onwards in ch. 4)? I >> don't think >> a reference is given. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a >> natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a >> natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> >> >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 7 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:35:46 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: Andy Blunden > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > moment (n.) > [image: > Look up moment at Dictionary.com] > > mid-14c., "very brief portion of time, instant," in moment of time, from > Old French moment (12c.) "moment, minute; importance, weight, value" or > directly from Latin momentum "movement, motion; moving power; alteration, > change;" also "short time, instant" (also source of Spanish, Italian momento), > contraction of *movimentum, from movere "to move" (see move > (v.)). > Some (but not OED) explain the sense evolution of the Latin word by notion > of a particle so small it would just "move" the pointer of a scale, which > led to the transferred sense of "minute time division." Sense of > "importance, 'weight' " is attested in English from 1520s. > > Phrase never a dull moment first recorded 1889 in Jerome K. Jerome's "Three > Men in a Boat." Phrase moment of truth first recorded 1932 in Hemingway's > "Death in the Afternoon," from Spanish el momento de la verdad, the final > sword-thrust in a bull-fight. > momentum (n.) > [image: > Look up momentum at Dictionary.com] > 1690s, scientific use in > mechanics, "quantity of motion of a moving body," from Latin momentum > "movement, > moving power" (see moment > ). > Figurative use dates from 1782. > > This would imply something like "the manifest force or expression at this > point in time" or "the duration of time for which this manifest force is > constant". > > On 11 January 2016 at 12:17, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> No all the science-related meanings are derived from either Integral of >> f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to angular momentum which is an >> integral of mass* distance from axis. >> The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment" expresses a property >> of the whole function. A function can be represented either by a series of >> values for each x, or by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the >> total mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise when you >> are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic systems with inertia. >> >> YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think, which is a kind >> of inverse of the above. >> >> yada yada yada, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides? >> E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered >> together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then >> perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect >> appearing as torque in another. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means >>> "An essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity" >>> first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838. >>> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess >>> that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the >>>> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what >>>> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked, >>>> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception. >>>> >>>> still learning! >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike. >>>> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he >>>> thought should have been "instants" and then David >>>> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments," >>>> which was the subject of my comment. >>>> >>>> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that >>>> all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment" >>>> were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..." >>>> The one odd reference is this one: >>>> >>>> "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the >>>> analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to >>>> represent the *moments* of this genetic process in >>>> their >>>> mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we >>>> have diverged from the complex and twisting path that >>>> characterizes the actual development of the child?s >>>> concepts." >>>> >>>> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here >>>> to the distinct modes of conception which were >>>> manifested in the child's activity, at different >>>> stages, but which are combined in the most developed >>>> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative >>>> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes, >>>> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not >>>> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages. >>>> Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could >>>> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it >>>> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of >>>> association as "moments" of concept formation in the >>>> other sense of the word "moment" which is not >>>> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for >>>> sure. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth >>>> clarifying. The differing interpretations have >>>> quite different implications. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a >>>> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use >>>> phase, >>>> category, stage or division for those concepts. >>>> >>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical >>>> examples of "moments" but these are not steps, >>>> phases >>>> or stages of the concepts, even though they >>>> are also >>>> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept >>>> has all >>>> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the >>>> branches/divisions and the general secretary are >>>> individual, universal and particular moments. We >>>> cannot conceive of a union developing from an >>>> individual to a branch to a general secretary, >>>> can we? >>>> >>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I >>>> have always just presumed it came from >>>> mathematics, as >>>> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a >>>> function, and I know Hegel did study this >>>> branch of >>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space >>>> to it in >>>> the Science of Logic in his critique of >>>> calculus. But >>>> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Huw: >>>> >>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even >>>> more often >>>> "moments", and the word >>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a >>>> phase, or a >>>> step (as in the three >>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >>>> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for >>>> others", "for myself". >>>> >>>> One of the most difficult problems we had >>>> to solve >>>> in translating the >>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very >>>> clearly distinguishes three >>>> moments of speech development: indicative, >>>> nominative, and signifying. >>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a >>>> pointing >>>> gesture. "Nominating" is >>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming >>>> function: "every thing has a >>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin >>>> down, and in one place >>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is >>>> synonymous with >>>> the adult understanding >>>> that anything can be named. So what is the >>>> difference between knowing that >>>> everything has a name and the knowledge >>>> that any >>>> thing can be named? >>>> >>>> I think that the distinction is just as >>>> subtle and >>>> just as significant >>>> as the distinction between pointing to >>>> something >>>> with a gesture, pointing >>>> to something with a word like "this" or >>>> "that", >>>> and pointing to something >>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I >>>> say that >>>> "everything has a name", >>>> the name could be extremely general >>>> ("everything" >>>> or "thing") or it could >>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this >>>> computer"). But >>>> I don't yet have the >>>> idea that names are invented, and that >>>> therefore >>>> it is possible to name >>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore >>>> to bring >>>> into existence modes of >>>> pure abstract thinking through language. >>>> That's >>>> signifying, and it is >>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the >>>> lifelong process of speech >>>> development. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a >>>> particular aspect that I thought >>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >>>> which is that stimuli can not >>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they >>>> afford the kind of dynamics you >>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>>> >>>> I have also noted that the translation of >>>> phrases like "instances of a >>>> process" is probably off the mark >>>> too. What >>>> is really meant, I believe, is >>>> "instants of a process". These have two >>>> rather different meanings from the >>>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Huw: >>>> >>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>> >>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? >>>> ???????????? ??? >>>> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? >>>> ????????. >>>> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >>>> ???????????? ???????????. >>>> >>>> (Russian >>>> >>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>> >>>> This means (as nearly as I can >>>> make out): >>>> "If the task did not go beyond >>>> the natural capability of the >>>> child, he >>>> could deal with it in an >>>> >>>> unmediated >>>> >>>> or primitive method. In this >>>> cases, the >>>> structure of his behavior would >>>> >>>> be >>>> >>>> completely similar to the scheme as >>>> presented by Volkelt". >>>> >>>> I think there is no diagramme, at >>>> least >>>> not in the sense of a two >>>> dimensional graphic one can have a >>>> copy >>>> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain >>>> all child >>>> behavior as the result of an >>>> affectively tinged FUSION of >>>> perception >>>> and behavior, an affectively >>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >>>> perception and behavior were >>>> absolutely inseparable. This was >>>> what Hans >>>> Volkelt concluded from a >>>> >>>> series >>>> >>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >>>> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>> >>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >>>> baby bottles: one shaped like a >>>> triangle, one like a violin, one >>>> like a >>>> square, etc. They were all >>>> different colors as well. But three of >>>> them didn't have holes in the >>>> >>>> teat: >>>> >>>> you could see and smell the milk >>>> but you >>>> couldn't drink it. One did. He >>>> taught the infants to associate the >>>> drinking of milk and the feeling of >>>> satiation with one particular >>>> bottle, so >>>> that they would actually ignore >>>> the bottle unless it had all the >>>> characteristics: triangularity, >>>> >>>> blueness, >>>> >>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >>>> child's point of view, he was not >>>> drinking milk but triangular blue >>>> milk. >>>> This kind of "affectively colored >>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >>>> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>>> schemata". >>>> >>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >>>> eventually decided that we never >>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >>>> colored perception-behavior wholes, >>>> and this would explain the >>>> indivisible and >>>> inseparable devotion of the >>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in >>>> later >>>> work Vygotsky is very careful to >>>> distance himself from Volkelt even >>>> in his >>>> explanations of infant >>>> >>>> behavior: >>>> >>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he >>>> argues that >>>> ALL THREE layers of behavior >>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and >>>> intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, >>>> Huw Lloyd >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Does anyone have a copy of >>>> "Volkelt's >>>> diagram" to hand that is referred >>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>> in The History of the >>>> Development of >>>> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>> >>>> p.85 >>>> >>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I >>>> don't think >>>> a reference is given. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a >>>> natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 8 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:38:18 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: Huw Lloyd , "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Message-ID: <5693B04A.5090306@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed > > So far as I can see the Latin "momentum" diverged along two > paths somewhere around the 15th century. From the idea of a > moment (of time) we had an "important moment," that is, an > event with powerful repercussions and this lead to > "momentum" meaning the inertia of a moving body, i.e., its > power to affect things, and a measure of the power of bodies > which (like angular momentum) integrated the mass and > spatial dimensions, as well as mass and velocity, so the > measure of angular momentum was generalised across different > types of function, and then to high powers. > So the two streams of meaning have a common origin. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 12/01/2016 12:27 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> Well, my understanding is that there isn't a hidden >> dimension to its usage in text. That was the reason for >> questioning it. But if you uncover something in the >> origins of the expression (your earlier email) then it >> would be interesting to know more. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> On 11 January 2016 at 13:21, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> I don't know where this is going, Huw. >> There are several quite distinct meanings of "moment." >> Some to do with short periods of time, some to do with >> large force. But there are literally dozens of >> different shades of meaning. >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(physics) >> >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 11/01/2016 11:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> moment (n.) >>> >>> Look up moment at Dictionary.com >>> >>> mid-14c., "very brief portion of time, instant," >>> in moment of time, from Old French moment (12c.) >>> "moment, minute; importance, weight, value" or >>> directly from Latin momentum "movement, motion; >>> moving power; alteration, change;" also "short >>> time, instant" (also source of Spanish, Italian >>> momento), contraction of *movimentum, from >>> movere "to move" (see move >>> (v.)). >>> Some (but not OED) explain the sense evolution of >>> the Latin word by notion of a particle so small >>> it would just "move" the pointer of a scale, >>> which led to the transferred sense of "minute >>> time division." Sense of "importance, 'weight' " >>> is attested in English from 1520s. >>> >>> Phrase never a dull moment first recorded 1889 in >>> Jerome K. Jerome's "Three Men in a Boat." Phrase >>> moment of truth first recorded 1932 in >>> Hemingway's "Death in the Afternoon," from >>> Spanish el momento de la verdad, the final >>> sword-thrust in a bull-fight. >>> momentum (n.) >>> >>> Look up momentum at Dictionary.com >>> >>> 1690s, scientific use in mechanics, "quantity of >>> motion of a moving body," from Latin >>> momentum "movement, moving power" (see moment >>> ). >>> Figurative use dates from 1782. >>> >>> This would imply something like "the manifest force >>> or expression at this point in time" or "the duration >>> of time for which this manifest force is constant". >>> >>> On 11 January 2016 at 12:17, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>> >>> No all the science-related meanings are derived >>> from either Integral of f(x) * (x to power n). >>> Torque is related to angular momentum which is an >>> integral of mass* distance from axis. >>> The interpreation this leads to is that each >>> "moment" expresses a property of the whole >>> function. A function can be represented either by >>> a series of values for each x, or by the series >>> of moments. The zero-th moment is the total mass, >>> the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments >>> arise when you are dealing with flexible systems, >>> or dynamic systems with inertia. >>> >>> YOu also get the term arising with power series, >>> I think, which is a kind of inverse of the above. >>> >>> yada yada yada, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> Is torque being used here in the sense that the >>>> moon influences the tides? E.g. conceiving >>>> stages as pendulum like things that, when, >>>> considered together may appear as 'torque' >>>> applied to a base form. If so, then perhaps the >>>> meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment >>>> from one aspect appearing as torque in another. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden >>>> > >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, >>>> in sense 9. "moment" means "An essential >>>> element or significant aspect of a complex >>>> conceptual entity" first used in a >>>> translation of Kant's Critique of Pure >>>> Reason in 1838. >>>> But the OED also refers to "moment" in >>>> meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess that >>>> exposes a bit of Cole word play going on >>>> there, yes? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, >>>> Andy. Still working on the phenomenology >>>> of the usage. I think the form of >>>> part-whole relation is what is at issue >>>> and "moments" in this sense are >>>> qualitatively distinct, marked, events. >>>> Events whose conventional meaning is >>>> torqued by the exception. >>>> >>>> still learning! >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy >>>> Blunden >>> >>>> >>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> I am not at all clear about the >>>> context here, Mike. >>>> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using >>>> "instances" which he >>>> thought should have been "instants" >>>> and then David >>>> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use >>>> of "moments," >>>> which was the subject of my comment. >>>> >>>> I did a search of "Thinking and >>>> Speech" and found that >>>> all bar one instance of the use of >>>> the word "moment" >>>> were in the sense of "at this moment >>>> in the story ..." >>>> The one odd reference is this one: >>>> >>>> "We have consistently taken a >>>> genetic approach to the >>>> analysis of our problem. We have, >>>> however, attempted to >>>> represent the *moments* of this >>>> genetic process in >>>> their >>>> mature, classic forms. The >>>> inevitable result is that we >>>> have diverged from the complex >>>> and twisting path that >>>> characterizes the actual >>>> development of the child?s >>>> concepts." >>>> >>>> It is possible that Vygotsky refers >>>> with "moment" here >>>> to the distinct modes of conception >>>> which were >>>> manifested in the child's activity, >>>> at different >>>> stages, but which are combined in >>>> the most developed >>>> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that >>>> associative >>>> complexes, collection complexes, >>>> chain complexes, >>>> diffuse complexes, and >>>> pseudocomplexes could not >>>> possibly manifest themselves as >>>> successive stages. >>>> Perhaps their *first appearance* in >>>> ontogenesis could >>>> form some kind of regular sequence, >>>> possibly, but it >>>> is also possible that Vygotsky saw >>>> these forms of >>>> association as "moments" of concept >>>> formation in the >>>> other sense of the word "moment" >>>> which is not >>>> interchangeable with "instant". But >>>> I couldn't say for >>>> sure. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> The theoretical point seems >>>> interesting and worth >>>> clarifying. The differing >>>> interpretations have >>>> quite different implications. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Actually, Hegel does not use >>>> "moment" as meaning a >>>> stage, phase or step, David. >>>> He tends to use >>>> phase, >>>> category, stage or division >>>> for those concepts. >>>> >>>> Individual, Particular and >>>> Universal are typical >>>> examples of "moments" but >>>> these are not steps, >>>> phases >>>> or stages of the concepts, >>>> even though they >>>> are also >>>> exhibited in this way. Every >>>> concrete concept >>>> has all >>>> three moments. In a trade >>>> union, the members, the >>>> branches/divisions and the general >>>> secretary are >>>> individual, universal and >>>> particular moments. We >>>> cannot conceive of a union >>>> developing from an >>>> individual to a branch to a >>>> general secretary, >>>> can we? >>>> >>>> I will look into the origins >>>> of this expression. I >>>> have always just presumed it >>>> came from >>>> mathematics, as >>>> in the first, second, third, >>>> ... moments of a >>>> function, and I know Hegel >>>> did study this >>>> branch of >>>> mathematics, because he >>>> gives a lot of space >>>> to it in >>>> the Science of Logic in his >>>> critique of >>>> calculus. But >>>> I am probably quite wrong. >>>> I'll check. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David >>>> Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Huw: >>>> >>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses >>>> "instants" and even >>>> more often >>>> "moments", and the word >>>> "moment" sometimes means >>>> a stage, or a >>>> phase, or a >>>> step (as in the three >>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in >>>> Hegel, as in "in >>>> itself", "for >>>> others", "for myself". >>>> >>>> One of the most >>>> difficult problems we had >>>> to solve >>>> in translating the >>>> Lectures on Pedology was >>>> that Vygotsky very >>>> clearly distinguishes three >>>> moments of speech >>>> development: indicative, >>>> nominative, and signifying. >>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a >>>> pointing >>>> gesture. "Nominating" is >>>> ipso facto verbal, >>>> because it is the naming >>>> function: "every thing has a >>>> name". But "signifying" >>>> is much harder to pin >>>> down, and in one place >>>> Vygotsky actually says >>>> that it is >>>> synonymous with >>>> the adult understanding >>>> that anything can be >>>> named. So what is the >>>> difference between knowing that >>>> everything has a name and the knowledge >>>> that any >>>> thing can be named? >>>> >>>> I think that the >>>> distinction is just as >>>> subtle and >>>> just as significant >>>> as the distinction >>>> between pointing to >>>> something >>>> with a gesture, pointing >>>> to something with a word >>>> like "this" or >>>> "that", >>>> and pointing to something >>>> with a word like "apple" >>>> or "pear". If I >>>> say that >>>> "everything has a name", >>>> the name could be >>>> extremely general >>>> ("everything" >>>> or "thing") or it could >>>> be highly specific >>>> ("Huw" or "this >>>> computer"). But >>>> I don't yet have the >>>> idea that names are >>>> invented, and that >>>> therefore >>>> it is possible to name >>>> objects which do not >>>> exist, and therefore >>>> to bring >>>> into existence modes of >>>> pure abstract thinking >>>> through language. >>>> That's >>>> signifying, and it is >>>> indeed a new moment, or >>>> a new instant, in the >>>> lifelong process of speech >>>> development. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at >>>> 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thank you, David. >>>> That helps to explain a >>>> particular aspect that I thought >>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, >>>> which is that >>>> stimuli can not >>>> only signify but >>>> also symbolise, i.e. they >>>> afford the kind of >>>> dynamics you >>>> have elucidated from >>>> Volkelt's schema. >>>> >>>> I have also noted >>>> that the translation of >>>> phrases like "instances of a >>>> process" is probably off the mark >>>> too. What >>>> is really meant, I >>>> believe, is >>>> "instants of a process". These have two >>>> rather different >>>> meanings from the >>>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 10 January 2016 >>>> at 06:02, David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Huw: >>>> >>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>> >>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? >>>> ???????????? ??? >>>> ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ??? >>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? >>>> ????????. >>>> ? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? >>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, >>>> ???????????? ???????????. >>>> >>>> (Russian >>>> >>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>> >>>> This means (as nearly as I can >>>> make out): >>>> "If the task did not go beyond >>>> the natural capability of the >>>> child, he >>>> could deal with it in an >>>> >>>> unmediated >>>> >>>> or primitive method. In this >>>> cases, the >>>> structure of his behavior would >>>> >>>> be >>>> >>>> completely similar to the scheme as >>>> presented by Volkelt". >>>> >>>> I think there is no diagramme, at >>>> least >>>> not in the sense of a two >>>> dimensional graphic one can have a >>>> copy >>>> of. What Vygotsky is referring to >>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain >>>> all child >>>> behavior as the result of an >>>> affectively tinged FUSION of >>>> perception >>>> and behavior, an affectively >>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which >>>> perception and behavior were >>>> absolutely inseparable. This was >>>> what Hans >>>> Volkelt concluded from a >>>> >>>> series >>>> >>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to >>>> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in >>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>> >>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four >>>> baby bottles: one shaped like a >>>> triangle, one like a violin, one >>>> like a >>>> square, etc. They were all >>>> different colors as well. But three of >>>> them didn't have holes in the >>>> >>>> teat: >>>> >>>> you could see and smell the milk >>>> but you >>>> couldn't drink it. One did. He >>>> taught the infants to associate the >>>> drinking of milk and the feeling of >>>> satiation with one particular >>>> bottle, so >>>> that they would actually ignore >>>> the bottle unless it had all the >>>> characteristics: triangularity, >>>> >>>> blueness, >>>> >>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the >>>> child's point of view, he was not >>>> drinking milk but triangular blue >>>> milk. >>>> This kind of "affectively colored >>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as >>>> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's >>>> schemata". >>>> >>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He >>>> eventually decided that we never >>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively >>>> colored perception-behavior wholes, >>>> and this would explain the >>>> indivisible and >>>> inseparable devotion of the >>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in >>>> later >>>> work Vygotsky is very careful to >>>> distance himself from Volkelt even >>>> in his >>>> explanations of infant >>>> >>>> behavior: >>>> >>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he >>>> argues that >>>> ALL THREE layers of behavior >>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and >>>> intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, >>>> Huw Lloyd >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Does anyone have a copy of >>>> "Volkelt's >>>> diagram" to hand that is referred >>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>> in The History of the >>>> Development of >>>> Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>> >>>> p.85 >>>> >>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I >>>> don't think >>>> a reference is given. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology >>>> to deal as a >>>> natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. >>>> Ernst Boesch >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal >>>> as a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 9 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:07:08 +0000 > From: Martin John Packer > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: <67965018-2A54-4C11-91D0-8C65451F9C9E@uniandes.edu.co> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Hi Huw, > > As I said, the blog offers a simple and accessible account. If you want something more detailed, you could try this: > > Smith, B. (Ed.), Parts and moments studies in logic and formal ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. > > > > Martin > > On Jan 11, 2016, at 6:23 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Hi Martin, >> >> I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a >> straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume. >> >> I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented >> in the blog is incomplete and incorrect. For example, the assertion "You >> don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room" >> is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and >> recall the experience of its colour. Likewise the notion of a 'whole' that >> is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft >> somehow qualified it as being independent. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> >>> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology. Here is an >>> accessible account of the basics: >>> >>> < >>> https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/ >>>> >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The >>> differing >>>> interpretations have quite different implications. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step, >>>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those >>>>> concepts. >>>>> >>>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" >>> but >>>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they >>> are >>>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three >>> moments. >>>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general >>>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot >>>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a >>> general >>>>> secretary, can we? >>>>> >>>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just >>>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... >>>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of >>>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of >>> Logic >>>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Huw: >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the >>> word >>>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the >>> three >>>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself", >>>>>> "for >>>>>> others", "for myself". >>>>>> >>>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the >>>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three >>>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying. >>>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. >>> "Nominating" is >>>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has >>> a >>>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place >>>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult >>> understanding >>>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing >>> that >>>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant >>>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, >>> pointing >>>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to >>> something >>>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a >>> name", >>>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it >>> could >>>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the >>>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name >>>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence >>> modes of >>>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is >>>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of >>> speech >>>>>> development. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I >>> thought >>>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can >>> not >>>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics >>>>>>> you >>>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a >>>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I >>> believe, >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings >>> from >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? >>> ??? >>>>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? >>> ??? >>>>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> (Russian >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go >>> beyond >>>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> unmediated >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior >>> would >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> be >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is >>> referring >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of >>> an >>>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively >>>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> series >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and >>> in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like >>> a >>>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> teat: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. >>> He >>>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling >>> of >>>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually >>> ignore >>>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> blueness, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was >>> not >>>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively >>>>>>>> colored >>>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or >>> "Volkelt's >>>>>>>> schemata". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we >>> never >>>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior >>> wholes, >>>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of >>> the >>>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very >>> careful >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> behavior: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of >>> behavior >>>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd < >>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is >>> referred >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> p.85 >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 10 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:38:05 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > How delightful. :) Thanks Martin. > > > > On 11 January 2016 at 14:07, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Hi Huw, >> >> As I said, the blog offers a simple and accessible account. If you want >> something more detailed, you could try this: >> >> Smith, B. (Ed.), Parts and moments studies in logic and formal ontology. >> Munich: Philosophia Verlag. >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> On Jan 11, 2016, at 6:23 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> Hi Martin, >>> >>> I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a >>> straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume. >>> >>> I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented >>> in the blog is incomplete and incorrect. For example, the assertion "You >>> don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room" >>> is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and >>> recall the experience of its colour. Likewise the notion of a 'whole' >> that >>> is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft >>> somehow qualified it as being independent. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology. Here is >> an >>>> accessible account of the basics: >>>> >>>> < >>>> >> https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/ >>>>> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The >>>> differing >>>>> interpretations have quite different implications. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or >> step, >>>>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those >>>>>> concepts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" >>>> but >>>>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though >> they >>>> are >>>>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three >>>> moments. >>>>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general >>>>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot >>>>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a >>>> general >>>>>> secretary, can we? >>>>>> >>>>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just >>>>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ... >>>>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of >>>>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of >>>> Logic >>>>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll >> check. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the >>>> word >>>>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the >>>> three >>>>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in >> itself", >>>>>>> "for >>>>>>> others", "for myself". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the >>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes >> three >>>>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and >> signifying. >>>>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. >>>> "Nominating" is >>>>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing >> has >>>> a >>>>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place >>>>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult >>>> understanding >>>>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing >>>> that >>>>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as >> significant >>>>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, >>>> pointing >>>>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to >>>> something >>>>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a >>>> name", >>>>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it >>>> could >>>>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have >> the >>>>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to >> name >>>>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence >>>> modes of >>>>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is >>>>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of >>>> speech >>>>>>> development. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd < >> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I >>>> thought >>>>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can >>>> not >>>>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of >> dynamics >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances >> of a >>>>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too. What is really meant, I >>>> believe, >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> "instants of a process". These have two rather different meanings >>>> from >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ? >>>> ??? >>>>>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ????????? >>>> ??? >>>>>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (Russian >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go >>>> beyond >>>>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> unmediated >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior >>>> would >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two >>>>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is >>>> referring >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of >>>> an >>>>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an >> affectively >>>>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which perception and behavior were >>>>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> series >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF >> and >>>> in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped >> like >>>> a >>>>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all >>>>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in >> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> teat: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One >> did. >>>> He >>>>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the >> feeling >>>> of >>>>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually >>>> ignore >>>>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> blueness, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was >>>> not >>>>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively >>>>>>>>> colored >>>>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or >>>> "Volkelt's >>>>>>>>> schemata". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we >>>> never >>>>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior >>>> wholes, >>>>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of >>>> the >>>>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very >>>> careful >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> behavior: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of >>>> behavior >>>>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in >> infancy. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd < >>>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is >>>> referred >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions >> (1997, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> p.85 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I don't think a reference is given. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 11 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 16:27:27 +0000 > From: "Hugh O'Donnell" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Hi, Huw! > > (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots > monikers) > > Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a > Masters Degree Dissertation... > > No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic writing/the > academic a community. > > This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the moment - > looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the action > research project in light of game playing and language use. The one I > distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of what > was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire Science > learning. > > My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science and > Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration. > > I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine social > engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated experience > - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing > episodes correlate with science content knowledge is effectively deployed? > > CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and > learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important > to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve better > integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration... > > If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could have > pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary elements > to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say. > > Thanks for getting in touch! > H > > Kind Regards, > Hugh O'Donnell > > http://bluetanso.WordPress.com > Twitter: @bluetanso > On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > >> Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?) >> >> You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds of >> exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects of >> your paper you find interesting, problematic etc. >> >> For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have >> traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative >> gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for >> this. For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative >> difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity (i.e. >> the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of mine. >> >> I think you can draw us in, yes? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell >> wrote: >> >>> Greetings, >>> >>> Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based learning: >>> >>> http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 >>> >>> I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action research. >>> >>> Kind Regards, >>> Hugh O'Donnell >>> >>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com >>> Twitter: @bluetanso >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 12 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 16:48:15 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Nice to hear back from you, Hugh. > > My quick impression to your response for me is: it is necessary to have > something worth writing about to warrant the effort of writing it well. > > So your second paper discusses the same content from a different > perspective, is that right? That might be interesting to look through. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 11 January 2016 at 16:27, Hugh O'Donnell > wrote: > >> Hi, Huw! >> >> (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots >> monikers) >> >> Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a >> Masters Degree Dissertation... >> >> No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic writing/the >> academic a community. >> >> This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the moment - >> looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the action >> research project in light of game playing and language use. The one I >> distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of what >> was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire Science >> learning. >> >> My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science and >> Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration. >> >> I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine social >> engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated experience >> - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing >> episodes correlate with science content knowledge is effectively deployed? >> >> CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and >> learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important >> to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve better >> integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration... >> >> If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could have >> pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary elements >> to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say. >> >> Thanks for getting in touch! >> H >> >> Kind Regards, >> Hugh O'Donnell >> >> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com >> Twitter: @bluetanso >> On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: >> >>> Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?) >>> >>> You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds of >>> exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects of >>> your paper you find interesting, problematic etc. >>> >>> For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have >>> traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative >>> gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for >>> this. For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative >>> difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity >> (i.e. >>> the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of >> mine. >>> >>> I think you can draw us in, yes? >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Greetings, >>>> >>>> Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based learning: >>>> >>>> http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 >>>> >>>> I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action >> research. >>>> >>>> Kind Regards, >>>> Hugh O'Donnell >>>> >>>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com >>>> Twitter: @bluetanso >>>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 13 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:22:17 -0800 > From: mike cole > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Request for Articles: Anti-Poverty Policy > Innovations > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Russell Sage Foundation > Date: Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:38 AM > Subject: Request for Articles: Anti-Poverty Policy Innovations > To: mcole@ucsd.edu > > > Click here to view this message in a browser > > . > > > [image: Image] > > > > > > *CALL FOR ARTICLESRSF: THE RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION JOURNAL OF THE SOCIAL > SCIENCESANTI-POVERTY POLICY INNOVATIONS: NEW PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING > POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES* > > Edited by *Lawrence M. Berger* and *Katherine Magnuson*, University of > Wisconsin-Madison; we also expect that > *Maria Cancian* will join us as a coeditor when she returns from leave in > 2016-2017 > > The Institute for Research on Poverty (IRP) and the Russell Sage Foundation > have historically collaborated on a series of edited volumes on poverty and > poverty policy, which includes *Fighting Poverty, Confronting Poverty, > Understanding Poverty, and Changing Poverty, Changing Policies*. This > series has been widely used by teachers and scholars of poverty and related > issues, and has traditionally been comprised of state-of-the art review > chapters. The last volume, *Changing Poverty, Changing Policies*, was > published in 2009. Since that time, there have been a number of volumes > focusing on the Great Recession, as well as the fifty years of the War on > Poverty. These works have extensively reviewed recent trends, research, and > policy in the poverty arena. However, much less attention has been focused > on innovative, specific anti-poverty policy proposals in light of this > evidence. We believe that an issue of *RSF* highlighting such proposals > would greatly serve the field. We outline our vision for the issue below. > > The journal issue will showcase a collection of innovative and specific > policy proposals intended to *reduce poverty in the short- and/or long-term > or improve economic wellbeing*. Each article will focus on a specific > social problem and/or population group. The issue aims to set the > anti-poverty policy agenda for the next decade or more by presenting > detailed real-world responses to current and emerging poverty-related > problems. 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Rather each article > should propose a specific, potentially high-impact, innovative, or > particularly promising policy or policy approach and present evidence in > support of that approach.* That is, articles should leverage existing > research and policy analyses to present an evidence-based argument for > implementing novel and potentially transformational policy innovations in a > particular poverty-related domain. > > The coeditors will contribute an extensive introductory piece that provides > a roadmap of current and expected poverty-related trends, evidence on the > causes and consequences of poverty, existing anti-poverty policies, and > evidence on the efficacy of existing approaches to addressing poverty. They > will also contribute a concluding piece that weighs the pros and cons of > the various proposals, including key tradeoffs, feasibility, and > prioritization. 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The full and final issue will be published in the late 2017. > Papers will be published open access on the RSF website as well as in > several digital repositories, including JSTOR and UPCC/Muse. > > Please click here > > for a full description of the topics covered in this call for papers. > ------------------------------ > > > * Order RSF Books > > | > Unsubscribe > > | > Privacy Policy > > | > Contact Us > Russell > Sage Foundation > > ? > 112 East 64th Street, New York, NY 10065 > > ? > (212) 750-6000* > > > 112 East 64th Street > New York, NY 10009 > United States > > > Update Profile / Unsubscribe > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 14 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 18:48:42 +0000 > From: "Hugh O'Donnell" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Yes, I think it was Vygotsky who said that children want to write; they > just want to write about something that matters. That's why we use the > simulation: it allows pupils and teams to be engaged with mission critical > activities that are supported by Science. Eg. Connect water pumps fitted > with heaters: heat melts subterranean ice, water flow begins... You have > water, you have hydrogen and oxygen for fuel and breathing. > > Of course, pupils could present narratives orally... > > I'll let you have a look at the second paper. > > Kind Regards, > Hugh O'Donnell > > http://bluetanso.WordPress.com > Twitter: @bluetanso > On 11 Jan 2016 4:50 pm, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > >> Nice to hear back from you, Hugh. >> >> My quick impression to your response for me is: it is necessary to have >> something worth writing about to warrant the effort of writing it well. >> >> So your second paper discusses the same content from a different >> perspective, is that right? That might be interesting to look through. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 11 January 2016 at 16:27, Hugh O'Donnell >> wrote: >> >>> Hi, Huw! >>> >>> (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots >>> monikers) >>> >>> Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a >>> Masters Degree Dissertation... >>> >>> No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic >> writing/the >>> academic a community. >>> >>> This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the >> moment - >>> looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the >> action >>> research project in light of game playing and language use. The one I >>> distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of >> what >>> was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire >> Science >>> learning. >>> >>> My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science >> and >>> Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration. >>> >>> I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine >> social >>> engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated >> experience >>> - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing >>> episodes correlate with science content knowledge is effectively >> deployed? >>> >>> CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and >>> learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important >>> to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve >> better >>> integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration... >>> >>> If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could >> have >>> pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary >> elements >>> to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say. >>> >>> Thanks for getting in touch! >>> H >>> >>> Kind Regards, >>> Hugh O'Donnell >>> >>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com >>> Twitter: @bluetanso >>> On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?) >>>> >>>> You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds >> of >>>> exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects >> of >>>> your paper you find interesting, problematic etc. >>>> >>>> For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have >>>> traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative >>>> gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for >>>> this. For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative >>>> difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity >>> (i.e. >>>> the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of >>> mine. >>>> >>>> I think you can draw us in, yes? >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Greetings, >>>>> >>>>> Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based >> learning: >>>>> >>>>> http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 >>>>> >>>>> I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action >>> research. >>>>> >>>>> Kind Regards, >>>>> Hugh O'Donnell >>>>> >>>>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com >>>>> Twitter: @bluetanso >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 15 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:08:22 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] missionaries and cannibals > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, post > dinner in rather noisy circumstances. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem > > He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries to > shore and then wavered for a while. Next thing I know he is taking them > down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the > cannibals". > > What can you do? :) > > Best, > Huw > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 16 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:09:26 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > are -> our > > On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, post >> dinner in rather noisy circumstances. >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem >> >> He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries >> to shore and then wavered for a while. Next thing I know he is taking them >> down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the >> cannibals". >> >> What can you do? :) >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 17 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:18:51 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > In keeping with the recent vogue, I thought this poem by Samuel Beckett was of timely deliverance: > > > WHAT IS THE WORD > > Samuel Beckett > > for Joe Chaikin > > folly - > folly for to - > for to - > what is the word - > folly from this - > all this - > folly from all this - > given - > folly given all this - > seeing - > folly seeing all this - > this - > what is the word - > this this - > this this here - > all this this here - > folly given all this - > seeing - > folly seeing all this this here - > for to - > what is the word - > see - > glimpse - > seem to glimpse - > need to seem to glimpse - > folly for to need to seem to glimpse - > what - > what is the word - > and where - > folly for to need to seem to glimpse what where - > where - > what is the word - > there - > over there - > away over there - > afar - > afar away over there - > afaint - > afaint afar away over there what - > what - > what is the word - > seeing all this - > all this this - > all this this here - > folly for to see what - > glimpse - > seem to glimpse - > need to seem to glimpse - > afaint afar away over there what - > folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what - > what - > what is the word - > > what is the word > > > [from: Grand Street, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1990, pp.17-18, N.Y., ISSN 0734-5496] > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 18 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:00:00 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Reminiscent of Hopkins' "The leaden echo and the golden echo". > > What is the vogue? Why is it timely? > > Best, > Huw > > On 11 January 2016 at 23:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> In keeping with the recent vogue, I thought this poem by Samuel Beckett >> was of timely deliverance: >> >> >> WHAT IS THE WORD >> >> Samuel Beckett >> >> for Joe Chaikin >> >> folly - >> folly for to - >> for to - >> what is the word - >> folly from this - >> all this - >> folly from all this - >> given - >> folly given all this - >> seeing - >> folly seeing all this - >> this - >> what is the word - >> this this - >> this this here - >> all this this here - >> folly given all this - >> seeing - >> folly seeing all this this here - >> for to - >> what is the word - >> see - >> glimpse - >> seem to glimpse - >> need to seem to glimpse - >> folly for to need to seem to glimpse - >> what - >> what is the word - >> and where - >> folly for to need to seem to glimpse what where - >> where - >> what is the word - >> there - >> over there - >> away over there - >> afar - >> afar away over there - >> afaint - >> afaint afar away over there what - >> what - >> what is the word - >> seeing all this - >> all this this - >> all this this here - >> folly for to see what - >> glimpse - >> seem to glimpse - >> need to seem to glimpse - >> afaint afar away over there what - >> folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what - >> what - >> what is the word - >> >> what is the word >> >> >> [from: Grand Street, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1990, pp.17-18, N.Y., ISSN >> 0734-5496] >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 19 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:19:39 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Huw, > > Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words and signifying? > > Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something about that moment before signifying. > > It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words. > > That's all. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 20 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:28:23 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Okey-dokes. > > I thought it might have been vaguely Bowie related. Bowie of later years > seemed rather 'soft' to me, though impressions were fleeting and far > between. However, this interview with Paxman of all people, is > refreshing. Lovely to see him dancing around Paxman's stern, unimaginative > conservatism. > > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-35286749 > > Its nice to see that he gets the role of art and mediation intellectually > and expresses it in those 'micro-genetic' gaps (mocking Paxman gently). > > Best, > Huw > > > On 12 January 2016 at 00:19, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Huw, >> >> Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words >> and signifying? >> >> Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something about >> that moment before signifying. >> >> It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the >> construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words. >> >> That's all. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 21 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:43:27 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > More musical micro-ingenuity: > > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35276200 > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 00:28, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Okey-dokes. >> >> I thought it might have been vaguely Bowie related. Bowie of later years >> seemed rather 'soft' to me, though impressions were fleeting and far >> between. However, this interview with Paxman of all people, is >> refreshing. Lovely to see him dancing around Paxman's stern, unimaginative >> conservatism. >> >> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-35286749 >> >> Its nice to see that he gets the role of art and mediation intellectually >> and expresses it in those 'micro-genetic' gaps (mocking Paxman gently). >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 12 January 2016 at 00:19, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Huw, >>> >>> Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words >>> and signifying? >>> >>> Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something >>> about that moment before signifying. >>> >>> It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the >>> construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words. >>> >>> That's all. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 22 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:53:13 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Huw, > > Well, the poem *was* linked to in a Bowie Obit at the New Yorker as well, but I thought Becket's poem still coincides with the list's recent occupations: > http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/%E2%80%AAthe-beautiful-meaninglessness-of-david-bowie > > This one was also intriguing: > David Bowie explained how he used 'cut ups' to create lyrics > http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-35281247 > > Bowie also had spent time in a Buddhist monastery as a young man, so it likely plays a part in this. Meditation is frequently about being without thought, which to me is about being without words. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 23 > Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 17:07:08 -0800 > From: mike cole > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Sounds like a sensible solution to me, Huw. > Nice to see him getting his feet wet! > :-) > mike > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> are -> our >> >> On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, >> post >>> dinner in rather noisy circumstances. >>> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem >>> >>> He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries >>> to shore and then wavered for a while. Next thing I know he is taking >> them >>> down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the >>> cannibals". >>> >>> What can you do? :) >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >> > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 24 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:31:48 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a > savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, > there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity > and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see > the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling me > to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". > > Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the > Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 00:53, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Huw, >> >> Well, the poem *was* linked to in a Bowie Obit at the New Yorker as well, >> but I thought Becket's poem still coincides with the list's recent >> occupations: >> >> http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/%E2%80%AAthe-beautiful-meaninglessness-of-david-bowie >> >> This one was also intriguing: >> David Bowie explained how he used 'cut ups' to create lyrics >> http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-35281247 >> >> Bowie also had spent time in a Buddhist monastery as a young man, so it >> likely plays a part in this. Meditation is frequently about being without >> thought, which to me is about being without words. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 25 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:43:12 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Not sure whether to give it another go (destination a ship) or move on to > something else. > > The little one has started a wording; it is all about trying out meanings > now -- joy. > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 01:07, mike cole wrote: > >> Sounds like a sensible solution to me, Huw. >> Nice to see him getting his feet wet! >> :-) >> mike >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> are -> our >>> >>> On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >>> >>>> I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, >>> post >>>> dinner in rather noisy circumstances. >>>> >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem >>>> >>>> He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two >> missionaries >>>> to shore and then wavered for a while. Next thing I know he is taking >>> them >>>> down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the >>>> cannibals". >>>> >>>> What can you do? :) >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 26 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:59:14 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Was there a link coming forth? > > > From: Huw Lloyd > Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > > Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a > savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, > there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity > and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see > the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling me > to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". > > Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the > Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). > > Best, > Huw > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 27 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 02:02:57 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Keeping you waiting? :) > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Was there a link coming forth? >> >> >> From: Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word >> >> Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a >> savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, >> there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity >> and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see >> the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling me >> to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". >> >> Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the >> Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 28 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 06:25:04 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hello, > > I didn't quite see your comparison of David Bowie's word cutouts with Daniel Tammet. I don't think Bowie himself thought of them as divinations, not literally anyway, but a means of creating songs. He was using a method shared with him by William Burroughs and Brion Gyson, as indicated here (read to the bottom): > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cut-up_technique > > They do say they *seem* like divinations, but I didn't get the feeling they were doing them for the sake of divining. > > What you are talking about with Tammet and the Japanese soroban almost seems like I Ching to me, but neither do they seem to be divining, they are just exploring their abilities. > > I Ching however is practiced for divining, for the sake of it. > > In any case, the connection that I'd make about all this is that there is something tying everything together, which we cannot perceive, and since we can't perceive it, we also cannot measure it. And since we can't measure it, we usually will say it doesn't exist, tending toward scepticism. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: behalf of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 7:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > > Keeping you waiting? :) > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Was there a link coming forth? >> >> >> From: Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word >> >> Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a >> savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, >> there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity >> and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see >> the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling me >> to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". >> >> Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the >> Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 29 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:37:32 +0900 > From: David Kellogg > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the > wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. > Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation > between "moment" and music. > > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a > moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three > problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" > (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the > real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). > > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a > way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a > sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe > from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost > always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the > synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic > object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This > means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we > observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, > much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat > these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a > newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or > musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the > irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of > "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even > nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining > "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of > angular momentum. > > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes > uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The > cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from > the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but > it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of > culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a > "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed > synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological > sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", > "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, > where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described > synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously > say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same > phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly > influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar > radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is > present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the > other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the > same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech > while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we > have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the > phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to > grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, > is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more > regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to > emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > >> >> Dear all , >> >> Look at this please ! >> >> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >> experiment: 1) The >> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >> essence can be revealed >> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >> transformations; 3) this same >> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the >> object is >> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as >> a process of >> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >> essentially becomes a >> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >> within this special >> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >> >> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even >> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , >> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be converted >> in the other as we all have seen . >> >> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect or >> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of >> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the >> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which >> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . >> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for >> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >> >> >> >> Best >> >> Haydi >> >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 30 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 06:52:42 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > The imaginary soroban is different to the poker account (which was merely > compared with divination). The imaginary soroban has obvious historical > manifestations of how it is learnt. The divination was merely a comparison > -- I have nothing to add to it. > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 06:25, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> I didn't quite see your comparison of David Bowie's word cutouts with >> Daniel Tammet. I don't think Bowie himself thought of them as divinations, >> not literally anyway, but a means of creating songs. He was using a method >> shared with him by William Burroughs and Brion Gyson, as indicated here >> (read to the bottom): >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cut-up_technique >> >> They do say they *seem* like divinations, but I didn't get the feeling >> they were doing them for the sake of divining. >> >> What you are talking about with Tammet and the Japanese soroban almost >> seems like I Ching to me, but neither do they seem to be divining, they are >> just exploring their abilities. >> >> I Ching however is practiced for divining, for the sake of it. >> >> In any case, the connection that I'd make about all this is that there is >> something tying everything together, which we cannot perceive, and since we >> can't perceive it, we also cannot measure it. And since we can't measure >> it, we usually will say it doesn't exist, tending toward scepticism. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: behalf of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 7:02 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word >> >> Keeping you waiting? :) >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Was there a link coming forth? >>> >>> >>> From: Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word >>> >>> Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a >>> savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting. However, >>> there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity >>> and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment >> (see >>> the clip between 28:00 to 31:00). "But something in my head was telling >> me >>> to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing". >>> >>> Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the >>> Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban). >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 31 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:13:07 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] help ! > To: EXtended Mind Culture Activity > Message-ID: > <1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Dear all, > Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks ! > Best > Haydi > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 32 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 18:29:21 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help ! > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Message-ID: <5694AB51.1000502@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed > > Haydi, there is nothing wrong with your computer or the xmca > system. All your messages are getting through and being read. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 12/01/2016 6:13 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> Dear all, >> Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks ! >> Best >> Haydi >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 33 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:33:28 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help ! > To: Haydi Zulfei , "eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > This one got through, though not the previous one that David replied to. > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 07:13, wrote: > >> Dear all, >> Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets >> lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the >> list . Thanks ! >> Best >> Haydi >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 34 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:35:13 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. > > Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the > manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a > progression in its transformation? > > Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to > teeth/molars at present... > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >> between "moment" and music. >> >> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> >> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a >> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a >> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >> angular momentum. >> >> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >> >> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >> >>> >>> Dear all , >>> >>> Look at this please ! >>> >>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>> experiment: 1) The >>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>> essence can be revealed >>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>> transformations; 3) this same >>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >> the >>> object is >>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >> as >>> a process of >>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>> essentially becomes a >>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>> within this special >>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>> >>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >> even >>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> motionality , >>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >> converted >>> in the other as we all have seen . >>> >>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >> or >>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >> of >>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >> which >>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >> . >>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >> for >>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>> >>> >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 35 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 18:44:46 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Message-ID: <5694AEEE.8050309@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed > > molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and > molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" > originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same > sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s > with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in > contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of > opposites, both originating from the same root. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >> >> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >> progression in its transformation? >> >> Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to >> teeth/molars at present... >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>> between "moment" and music. >>> >>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>> >>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a >>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a >>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >>> angular momentum. >>> >>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>> >>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>> >>>> Dear all , >>>> >>>> Look at this please ! >>>> >>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>>> experiment: 1) The >>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>> essence can be revealed >>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>> the >>>> object is >>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >>> as >>>> a process of >>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>> essentially becomes a >>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>>> within this special >>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>> >>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >>> even >>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>> motionality , >>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>> converted >>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>> >>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >>> or >>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >>> of >>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>> which >>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >>> . >>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >>> for >>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 36 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:45:46 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help ! > To: Huw Lloyd , "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Message-ID: > <1081823808.5708789.1452584746800.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Thanks Andy and Huw ! But as?Hew says , he's not received my message of Jan.11th while Andy says : I received it . We all did. And I cannot see my messages appear on the list myself . And I receive some messages in pairs like the one sent by David . I wrote to Bruce jones , too . I should wait for more guidance , then .?Thanks?all ! H > > > From: Huw Lloyd > To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:03:28 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] help ! > > This one got through, though not the previous one that David replied to.? > Best,Huw > > On 12 January 2016 at 07:13, wrote: > > ?Dear all, > Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks ! > Best > Haydi > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 37 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 09:12:57 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: EXtended Mind Culture Activity > Message-ID: > <820642578.5882801.1452589977563.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and?his?as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter?Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are?treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning"?of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue : > [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented, > practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves, > reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being, > its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means > of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal, > the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action,?[THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . > With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that?each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized?, the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two?separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process .?Thanks ! > David, > Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions . > [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a > broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a > transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this > broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the > very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]] > [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for > understanding its separate components: > In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates > over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general > illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a > particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has > materialized within it.]] > [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the > dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a > certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when > it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of > theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things, > but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and > in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the > visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]] > [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in > their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory > observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish > certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just > precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the > following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an > ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes > the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues, > recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability, > resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and > subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]] > [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of > individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity > of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation, > in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its > manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the > process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold > of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development, > in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the > connection between the individual and the universal. > It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and > general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or > formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this > process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]] > Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . > BestHaydi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > BestHaydi?? > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 38 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 05:34:01 -0500 > From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Subject: [Xmca-l] NYTimes.com: When Philosophy Lost Its Way > To: "eXtended Mind Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: <46hpx1gnlt98ox00yqxnbd27.1452594840913@email.android.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > >> From The New York Times: > > When Philosophy Lost Its Way > > Once upon a time, acquiring wisdom and being a good person were intimately linked. The modern university changed all that. > > http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/when-philosophy-lost-its-way/?mwrsm=Email > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 39 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 21:35:24 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Message-ID: <5694D6EC.2090000@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed > > Haydi, > Your quote from the Grundrisse: > > "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other > colours and modifies their particularity. " > > A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of > the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The > Devil Wears Prada": > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc > > Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of > the social context of its production. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue : >> [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented, >> practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves, >> reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being, >> its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means >> of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal, >> the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . >> With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks ! >> David, >> Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions . >> [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a >> broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a >> transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this >> broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the >> very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]] >> [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for >> understanding its separate components: >> In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates >> over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general >> illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a >> particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has >> materialized within it.]] >> [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the >> dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a >> certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when >> it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of >> theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things, >> but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and >> in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the >> visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]] >> [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in >> their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory >> observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish >> certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just >> precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the >> following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an >> ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes >> the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues, >> recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability, >> resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and >> subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]] >> [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of >> individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity >> of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation, >> in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its >> manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the >> process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold >> of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development, >> in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the >> connection between the individual and the universal. >> It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and >> general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or >> formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this >> process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]] >> Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . >> BestHaydi >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> BestHaydi >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 40 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:06:39 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: David Kellogg , EXtended Mind Culture > Activity > Message-ID: > <149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! > --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so??we are unable to have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner connections' of a whole as 'moments'?. Dialectical Logic (close relative to CHAT) says as man?relies on object-related activity while an ideal adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to the finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model into a material?model ,?in reifying or objectifying that model into a finished?product and all through the durational time , you can see what is necessary?, essential and what is not . In higher momentums of conception , you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we mean it's ever?running through uninterruptedly because?the?whole entity falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart , again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says?we cannot stop at phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move (dynamicity) according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically .?We don't want to be stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as moments of your positioning while observing ,?you've not been able to convert those phenomenal aspects (empiricism)?into innermost movements hence agnosticism prevails . Yes ,? We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering , how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of?some detachable independent separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined moments of?inner mechanisms?of whole development (internalization , appropriation?, instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development?or even periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do they subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments still sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ?? > --Secondly , we?agreed that moment is different from the instance as we took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact . > --Thirdly , with what I?said ,?I suppose you've been responded to . Our focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ;?I first refrained from using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving movable whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some static?internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially realizable , will damage genuine cognition . > BestHaydi > ? > > From: David Kellogg > To: Haydi Zulfei > Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation between "moment" and music.? > I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").? > First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of angular momentum. > Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. > I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). > David KelloggMacquarie University > On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: > > > Dear all , > Look at this please ! > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is > ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of > abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special > system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .? > And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .? > > > Best > Haydi?? > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 41 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:33:29 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > <300561455.6277070.1452612809075.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Hi huw !?I don't know about?David's opinion but as for myself I agree to what you define so succinctly?especially when we read Davydov's 'dissolving particularities' to reach 'concrete universals' in one of the quotes I delivered . Thanks a lot ! > Best > Haydi > ? > > From: Huw Lloyd > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:05:13 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. > > Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the > manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a > progression in its transformation? > > Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to > teeth/molars at present... > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >> between "moment" and music. >> >> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> >> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a >> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a >> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >> angular momentum. >> >> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >> >> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >> >>> >>> Dear all , >>> >>> Look at this please ! >>> >>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>> experiment: 1) The >>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>> essence can be revealed >>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>> transformations; 3) this same >>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >> the >>> object is >>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >> as >>> a process of >>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>> essentially becomes a >>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>> within this special >>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>> >>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >> even >>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> motionality , >>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >> converted >>> in the other as we all have seen . >>> >>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >> or >>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >> of >>> how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >> which >>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >> . >>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >> for >>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>> >>> >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 42 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:40:15 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "ablunden@mira.net" , "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Message-ID: > <694795909.6221451.1452613215224.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Thank you , Andy ! especially when you?refer to the opposition between mass material and molecular ; that's quite obvious ; you come near mine as 'variables in a state of fusion' . > BestHaydi > ? > > From: Andy Blunden > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:14:46 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and > molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" > originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same > sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s > with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in > contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of > opposites, both originating from the same root. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >> >> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >> progression in its transformation? >> >> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to >> teeth/molars at present... >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>> between "moment" and music. >>> >>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>> >>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a >>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a >>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >>> angular momentum. >>> >>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>> >>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>> >>>> Dear all , >>>> >>>> Look at this please ! >>>> >>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>>> experiment: 1) The >>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>> essence can be revealed >>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>> the >>>> object is >>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >>> as >>>> a process of >>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>> essentially becomes a >>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>>> within this special >>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>> >>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >>> even >>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>> motionality , >>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>> converted >>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>> >>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >>> or >>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >>> of >>>> how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>> which >>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >>> . >>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >>> for >>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 43 > Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:40:15 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "ablunden@mira.net" , "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Message-ID: > <694795909.6221451.1452613215224.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Thank you , Andy ! especially when you?refer to the opposition between mass material and molecular ; that's quite obvious ; you come near mine as 'variables in a state of fusion' . > BestHaydi > ? > > From: Andy Blunden > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:14:46 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and > molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" > originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same > sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s > with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in > contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of > opposites, both originating from the same root. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >> >> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >> progression in its transformation? >> >> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to >> teeth/molars at present... >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>> between "moment" and music. >>> >>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>> >>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a >>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a >>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >>> angular momentum. >>> >>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>> >>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>> >>>> Dear all , >>>> >>>> Look at this please ! >>>> >>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>>> experiment: 1) The >>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>> essence can be revealed >>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>> the >>>> object is >>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >>> as >>>> a process of >>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>> essentially becomes a >>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>>> within this special >>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>> >>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >>> even >>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>> motionality , >>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>> converted >>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>> >>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >>> or >>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >>> of >>>> how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>> which >>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >>> . >>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >>> for >>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 44 > Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 04:48:01 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "ablunden@mira.net" , "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Message-ID: > <315151224.6688990.1452660481374.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Thanks Andy, > I watched and downloaded all 5 sequences . relevant and interesting . And your referring to very excellent points . H > ? > > From: Andy Blunden > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 14:05:24 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > Haydi, > Your quote from the Grundrisse: > > ? ? "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other > ? ? colours and modifies their particularity. " > > A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of > the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The > Devil Wears Prada": > > ? ? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc > > Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of > the social context of its production. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> ? Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue : >> [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented, >> practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves, >> reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being, >> its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means >> of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal, >> the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . >> With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks ! >> David, >> Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions . >> [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a >> broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a >> transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this >> broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the >> very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]] >> [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for >> understanding its separate components: >> In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates >> over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general >> illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a >> particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has >> materialized within it.]] >> [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the >> dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a >> certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when >> it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of >> theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things, >> but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and >> in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the >> visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]] >> [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in >> their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory >> observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish >> certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just >> precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the >> following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an >> ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes >> the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues, >> recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability, >> resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and >> subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]] >> [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of >> individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity >> of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation, >> in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its >> manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the >> process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold >> of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development, >> in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the >> connection between the individual and the universal. >> It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and >> general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or >> formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this >> process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]] >> Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . >> BestHaydi >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> BestHaydi >> > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 45 > Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 04:48:01 +0000 (UTC) > From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "ablunden@mira.net" , "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Message-ID: > <315151224.6688990.1452660481374.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Thanks Andy, > I watched and downloaded all 5 sequences . relevant and interesting . And your referring to very excellent points . H > ? > > From: Andy Blunden > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 14:05:24 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > Haydi, > Your quote from the Grundrisse: > > ? ? "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other > ? ? colours and modifies their particularity. " > > A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of > the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The > Devil Wears Prada": > > ? ? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc > > Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of > the social context of its production. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> ? Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue : >> [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented, >> practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves, >> reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being, >> its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means >> of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal, >> the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . >> With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks ! >> David, >> Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions . >> [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a >> broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a >> transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this >> broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the >> very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]] >> [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for >> understanding its separate components: >> In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates >> over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general >> illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a >> particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has >> materialized within it.]] >> [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the >> dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a >> certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when >> it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of >> theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things, >> but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and >> in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the >> visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]] >> [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in >> their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory >> observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish >> certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just >> precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the >> following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an >> ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes >> the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues, >> recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability, >> resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and >> subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]] >> [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of >> individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity >> of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation, >> in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its >> manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the >> process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold >> of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development, >> in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the >> connection between the individual and the universal. >> It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and >> general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or >> formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this >> process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]] >> Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . >> BestHaydi >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> BestHaydi >> > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 46 > Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 19:02:31 +0900 > From: David Kellogg > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: Haydi Zulfei , "eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Dear Haydi: > > In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the > Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic > division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something > made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand > or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as (to > quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one case, > we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, like > a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we have a > process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre > that walks around us while we sit and observe. > > Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce the > process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or > the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by > God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these > things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even > argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of > understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it, > you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I > understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT, > and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is that > I am not sure that the position itself is correct. > > The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process > of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although this > is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of producing > and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is > nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively > participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning > potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality. > Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning > potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be contemplation > with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not > actually so. > > I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, and > the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic function > (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns > away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it > receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, > both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this > "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are > not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away from > reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of > Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: > >> >> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >> >> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in >> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are unable to >> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner >> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close relative to >> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal >> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to the >> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model >> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a >> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what is >> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of conception , >> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational >> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related >> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we >> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity >> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart , >> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop at >> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce >> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true >> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move (dynamicity) >> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as >> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to be >> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as moments >> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert those >> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence agnosticism >> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering , >> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable independent >> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined moments >> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , appropriation , >> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or even >> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do they >> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments still >> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? >> >> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we >> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact . >> >> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our >> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from >> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention >> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving movable >> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially >> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >> >> Best >> Haydi >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* David Kellogg >> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >> >> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >> between "moment" and music. >> >> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a >> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" >> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >> >> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in >> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like >> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost >> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This >> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we >> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even >> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >> angular momentum. >> >> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from >> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of >> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >> >> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar >> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to >> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >> >> >> Dear all , >> >> Look at this please ! >> >> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >> experiment: 1) The >> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >> essence can be revealed >> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >> transformations; 3) this same >> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the >> object is >> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as >> a process of >> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >> essentially becomes a >> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >> within this special >> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >> >> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even >> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , >> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be converted >> in the other as we all have seen . >> >> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect or >> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of >> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the >> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which >> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . >> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for >> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >> >> >> >> Best >> >> Haydi >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 47 > Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 14:05:13 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > >> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between > the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of > which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity > or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). > > Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative > interpretation, I would say: > > 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. One > does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in > order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress. > > 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active > participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to > revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to > rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is actually > an excellent source of edification. > > 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem. > There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. > When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve > or express a particular problem. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Dear Haydi: >> >> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the >> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic >> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something >> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand >> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as (to >> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one case, >> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, like >> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we have a >> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre >> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >> >> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce the >> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or >> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by >> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these >> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even >> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it, >> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I >> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT, >> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is that >> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >> >> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process >> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although this >> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of producing >> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is >> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning >> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality. >> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning >> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be contemplation >> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not >> actually so. >> >> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, and >> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic function >> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns >> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it >> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, >> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this >> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are >> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away from >> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of >> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: >> >>> >>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>> >>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in >>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are unable to >>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner >>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close relative >> to >>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal >>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to >> the >>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model >>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a >>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what >> is >>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >> conception , >>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational >>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related >>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we >>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity >>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart >> , >>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop at >>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce >>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true >>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >> (dynamicity) >>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as >>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to be >>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as >> moments >>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert >> those >>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >> agnosticism >>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >> inhering , >>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable independent >>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined >> moments >>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >> appropriation , >>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or >> even >>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do >> they >>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments >> still >>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? >>> >>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we >>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact . >>> >>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our >>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from >>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention >>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving >> movable >>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially >>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >>> >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* David Kellogg >>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >>> >>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the >>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>> between "moment" and music. >>> >>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is >> a >>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >> "moment" >>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>> >>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in >>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something >> like >>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >> almost >>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >> This >>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as >> we >>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, >>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because >> even >>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >>> angular momentum. >>> >>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes >>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >> from >>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context >> of >>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>> >>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously >>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >> solar >>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the >>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way >> to >>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>> >>> >>> Dear all , >>> >>> Look at this please ! >>> >>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought >>> experiment: 1) The >>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>> essence can be revealed >>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>> transformations; 3) this same >>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >> the >>> object is >>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >> as >>> a process of >>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>> essentially becomes a >>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>> within this special >>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>> >>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action >>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >> even >>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor >>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >> motionality , >>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >> converted >>> in the other as we all have seen . >>> >>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a >>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect >> or >>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >> of >>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , the >>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in >>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >> which >>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs >> . >>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said >>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >> for >>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>> >>> >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 48 > Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:15:38 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] [Lchc-l] A remarkable act of courage in American > civil discourse > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" , > "lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hello, > > > Sorry for cross posting on two lists, but this was too good to not post. Please share! If we could enact more of these kinds of engagements, what would tomorrow bring? > > > I so admire Kaddie Abdul's bravery. She reminds us of many important things. > > http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/13/i-went-to-donald-trump-rally-in-my-hijab-supporters-arent-just-racist-caricatures > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 49 > Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 19:03:25 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] Beware Hysterical Librarians! > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hello, > > > Another nice find today! > > > How librarians are the gatekeepers of ignorance: > > http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/13/us-library-records-purged-data-privacy > > > So many things one could discuss from what this article implies. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 50 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 00:44:19 +0000 > From: Susan Davis > Subject: [Xmca-l] Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" > > Hi all, > > I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps > how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news > about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and > collective perezhivanie. > > The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief, > and very public and personal recollections and sharing of > meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in the news and > conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on > things that made a difference in their own lives. People are shedding > very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps > thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or > could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance > of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage > to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing > ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now, > but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing > with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct > meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience > in lives going forward. > > > I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of > collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous > collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on > networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these > experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the > latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a > sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to > something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also > deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does > anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of > communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social > media? > > Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential > new area for investigation? > > > Kind regards > > Sue > > Dr Susan Davis > Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division > CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 > P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au > > CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au > > > > > > > > On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > >> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >> >> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >> progression in its transformation? >> >> Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to >> teeth/molars at present... >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >>> the >>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>> between "moment" and music. >>> >>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >>> is a >>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>> "moment" >>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>> >>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology >>> in a >>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something >>> like a >>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>> almost >>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>> This >>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >>> as we >>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>> present, >>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because >>> even >>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >>> angular momentum. >>> >>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>> sometimes >>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >>> from >>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context >>> of >>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>> >>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>> seriously >>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >>> solar >>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much >>> the >>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way >>> to >>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>> example, >>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Dear all , >>>> >>>> Look at this please ! >>>> >>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>> thought >>>> experiment: 1) The >>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>> essence can be revealed >>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>> the >>>> object is >>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>> represented >>> as >>>> a process of >>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>> essentially becomes a >>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>>> within this special >>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>> >>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>> action >>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >>> even >>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , >>> nor >>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>> motionality , >>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>> converted >>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>> >>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >>> with >>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>> It's a >>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >>> affect >>> or >>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >>> think >>> of >>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , >>> the >>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >>> note in >>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>> which >>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>> occurs >>> . >>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is >>> said >>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >>> for >>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 51 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:54:02 +0000 > From: Ana Marjanovic-Shane > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern > To: PIG group , "OSE@yahoogroups.com" > , "xmca-l@ucsd.edu" > Cc: Carrie Lobman , Tony Perone > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Dear colleagues, > > As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it > comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it > comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the > faculty, anyway! Period. > > Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair > contract. > > Ana > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: Faculty Forward Network > Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM > Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern > To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane > > > Friend us on Facebook > > Follow > us on Twitter > > [image: Faculty Forward Logo] > > Dear Colleague, > > My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University. > And I'm going on strike next week. > > For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern > for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless > stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work. > At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable > employees to help minimize instructional costs. > > *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts > at Northeastern > > -- if we don't have a contract by then.* > > Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action > > to push the administration to act. > > Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message > > to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to > show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of > part-time faculty. > > *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration, > demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.* > > > *Why am I going on strike?* > > - In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some > adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun makes > more than that in a day. > - Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who > work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more > expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal labor > law. > - If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little, > we should let them try and run things without us for a day. > - Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching > conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this > administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty. > > Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a > billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily > afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win > better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at > your school, as well. > > *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's > time to treat adjunct faculty fairly. > * > > In gratitude and solidarity, > > Haley Malm > Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University > > > Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward > All rights reserved. > 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025 > This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com > http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe > > > > Friend us on Facebook > > Follow us on Twitter > > -- > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu) > Associate Professor of Education > Chestnut Hill College > phone: 267-334-2905 > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 52 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:17:43 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Message-ID: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed > > Very interesting questions, Sue. > * browse around research on the impact of the death of > Princess Dianna Spencer. In my experience it had an even > greater emotional impact globally. > * Check out the work of Alain Badiou on the Event - not > stuff I like, but there is a lot of discussion around it. > * I think the idea of such moments and the period of their > "overcoming" being instances of collective perezhivanie is > which appropriate. I don't know of anyone looking at just > this angle though. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 14/01/2016 11:44 AM, Susan Davis wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps >> how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news >> about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and >> collective perezhivanie. >> >> The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief, >> and very public and personal recollections and sharing of >> meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in the news and >> conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on >> things that made a difference in their own lives. People are shedding >> very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps >> thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or >> could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance >> of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage >> to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing >> ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now, >> but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing >> with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct >> meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience >> in lives going forward. >> >> >> I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of >> collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous >> collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on >> networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these >> experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the >> latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a >> sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to >> something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also >> deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does >> anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of >> communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social >> media? >> >> Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential >> new area for investigation? >> >> >> Kind regards >> >> Sue >> >> Dr Susan Davis >> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division >> CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 >> P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au >> >> CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: >> >>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >>> >>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >>> progression in its transformation? >>> >>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to >>> teeth/molars at present... >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >>>> the >>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. >>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>>> between "moment" and music. >>>> >>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >>>> is a >>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>>> "moment" >>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the >>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>>> >>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology >>>> in a >>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something >>>> like a >>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe >>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>>> almost >>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>>> This >>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >>>> as we >>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>>> present, >>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because >>>> even >>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of >>>> angular momentum. >>>> >>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>>> sometimes >>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >>>> from >>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but >>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context >>>> of >>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>>> >>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>>> seriously >>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >>>> solar >>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much >>>> the >>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech >>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we >>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way >>>> to >>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>>> example, >>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>>> >>>>> Dear all , >>>>> >>>>> Look at this please ! >>>>> >>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>>> thought >>>>> experiment: 1) The >>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>>> essence can be revealed >>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>>> the >>>>> object is >>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>>> represented >>>> as >>>>> a process of >>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>>> essentially becomes a >>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>>>> within this special >>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>>> >>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>>> action >>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >>>> even >>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , >>>> nor >>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>>> motionality , >>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>>> converted >>>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>>> >>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >>>> with >>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>>> It's a >>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >>>> affect >>>> or >>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >>>> think >>>> of >>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , >>>> the >>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >>>> note in >>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>>> which >>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>>> occurs >>>> . >>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is >>>> said >>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >>>> for >>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >> >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 53 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:25:05 +1100 > From: Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Message-ID: <56971511.40008@mira.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed > > er - "quite" not "which appropriate." :) > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 14/01/2016 2:17 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> Very interesting questions, Sue. >> * browse around research on the impact of the death of >> Princess Dianna Spencer. In my experience it had an even >> greater emotional impact globally. >> * Check out the work of Alain Badiou on the Event - not >> stuff I like, but there is a lot of discussion around it. >> * I think the idea of such moments and the period of their >> "overcoming" being instances of collective perezhivanie is >> which appropriate. I don't know of anyone looking at just >> this angle though. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 14/01/2016 11:44 AM, Susan Davis wrote: >>> Hi all, >>> >>> I am very interested in the recent discussion about >>> moments and perhaps >>> how that might connect to current experiences in relation >>> to the news >>> about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of >>> individual and >>> collective perezhivanie. >>> >>> The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective >>> outpouring of grief, >>> and very public and personal recollections and sharing of >>> meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in >>> the news and >>> conversations people recall the influence of his life and >>> work, and on >>> things that made a difference in their own lives. >>> People are shedding >>> very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but >>> also perhaps >>> thinking about the person they themselves were, are, >>> could have been or >>> could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on >>> the importance >>> of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, >>> creativity and courage >>> to explore difference. There is a sense that people are >>> experiencing >>> ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal >>> experience right now, >>> but they are also revisiting significant moments from >>> their past, sharing >>> with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to >>> construct and reconstruct >>> meaning and in some cases this may translate to new >>> action and experience >>> in lives going forward. >>> >>> I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' >>> and times of >>> collective grieving and remembering, of how now >>> opportunities for enormous >>> collective global grief occur, and make a mark on >>> individual lives, on >>> networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a >>> sense that these >>> experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in >>> people?s lives by the >>> latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, >>> there is also a >>> sense that something significant has happened, we have >>> been connected to >>> something of momentary significance that is global, >>> communal but also >>> deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? >>> to me? does >>> anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? >>> On experiences of >>> communal perezhivanie and how this is being further >>> enabled through social >>> media? >>> >>> Is this something anyone is currently researching or is >>> this a potential >>> new area for investigation? >>> >>> >>> Kind regards >>> >>> Sue >>> >>> Dr Susan Davis >>> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher >>> Education Division >>> CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 >>> P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E >>> s.davis@cqu.edu.au >>> >>> CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >>>> >>>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment >>>> is the >>>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the >>>> instant, which is a >>>> progression in its transformation? >>>> >>>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how >>>> it relates to to >>>> teeth/molars at present... >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word >>>>> "molar" means (in >>>>> the >>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry >>>>> and dentistry is. >>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing >>>>> up the relation >>>>> between "moment" and music. >>>>> >>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that >>>>> what is meant >>>>> is a >>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me >>>>> there are three >>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating >>>>> Vygotsky's use of >>>>> "moment" >>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating >>>>> Vygotsky's work is the >>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless >>>>> "mythbusting"). >>>>> >>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and >>>>> in phenomenology >>>>> in a >>>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to >>>>> describe something >>>>> like a >>>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may >>>>> circumambulate and describe >>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being >>>>> described is >>>>> almost >>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding >>>>> process. Where the >>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be >>>>> circumambulated, the dynamic >>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, >>>>> observing it. >>>>> This >>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole >>>>> in retrospect: >>>>> as we >>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were >>>>> not even >>>>> present, >>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We >>>>> could somehow treat >>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty >>>>> is implicit in a >>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena >>>>> like speech or >>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and >>>>> seems to deny the >>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think >>>>> that the idea of >>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us >>>>> around this (because >>>>> even >>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I >>>>> were explaining >>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would >>>>> use the example of >>>>> angular momentum. >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses >>>>> "moment" and >>>>> sometimes >>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me >>>>> that they are. The >>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is >>>>> quite different >>>>> from >>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance >>>>> of a language, but >>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an >>>>> instance of a context >>>>> of >>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say >>>>> that "weather" is a >>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an >>>>> instance. Viewed >>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to >>>>> different chronological >>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using >>>>> "phylogenesis", >>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a >>>>> third problem, >>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is >>>>> indispensible. >>>>> >>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to >>>>> be described >>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, >>>>> that we can >>>>> seriously >>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are >>>>> descriptions of the same >>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, >>>>> weather is chiefly >>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the >>>>> relationship between >>>>> solar >>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out >>>>> into space) is >>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With >>>>> climate, it's the >>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning >>>>> develops, we see much >>>>> the >>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment >>>>> of infant speech >>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with >>>>> dialogue on xmca we >>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the >>>>> organic make up of the >>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, >>>>> and an obvious way >>>>> to >>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in >>>>> opera, for >>>>> example, >>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias >>>>> are much more >>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand >>>>> somewhat closer to >>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as >>>>> text). >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Dear all , >>>>>> >>>>>> Look at this please ! >>>>>> >>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic >>>>>> features of a >>>>> thought >>>>>> experiment: 1) The >>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to >>>>>> conditions where its >>>>>> essence can be revealed >>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes >>>>>> further mental >>>>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of >>>>>> mental links in which >>>>> the >>>>>> object is >>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can >>>>>> still be >>>>> represented >>>>> as >>>>>> a process of >>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this >>>>>> third moment >>>>>> essentially becomes a >>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented >>>>>> object. It is only >>>>>> within this special >>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets >>>>>> revealed.]] >>>>>> >>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is >>>>>> , activity , >>>>> action >>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , >>>>>> discrete and separate >>>>> even >>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in >>>>>> a circular >>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be >>>>>> manifest in temporal >>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , >>>>>> neither itself , >>>>> nor >>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy >>>>>> or stability or >>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of >>>>>> succession or >>>>> motionality , >>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the >>>>>> three could be >>>>> converted >>>>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>>>> >>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole >>>>>> melody is played >>>>> with >>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire >>>>>> composition . >>>>> It's a >>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the >>>>>> invited pleasurable >>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't >>>>>> refer to a >>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or >>>>>> that kind of >>>>> affect >>>>> or >>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might >>>>>> even stop to >>>>> think >>>>> of >>>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to >>>>>> imitation . Then , >>>>> the >>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or >>>>>> that single >>>>> note in >>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a >>>>>> temporal instant on >>>>> which >>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , >>>>>> feature , state >>>>> occurs >>>>> . >>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be >>>>>> uncognizable or >>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or >>>>>> with a substitute >>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the >>>>>> "ideal" which is >>>>> said >>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works >>>>>> are good sources >>>>> for >>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Best >>>>>> >>>>>> Haydi >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 54 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 04:08:02 +0000 > From: "Glassman, Michael" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C34328@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Hi Susan, > > Interesting to raise this. I think many consider Michael Jackson's death to be a watershed moment for the Internet. I believe the Internet actually slowed in the days after his death due to traffic. It was also a herald for the rise of the flash mob phenomenon - a really interesting relationship between cyberspace and place. Individuals would gather in public areas, hundreds, brought together through the Internet and would start dancing to Billie Jean, following the dance moves introduced by Jackson. It was breathtaking. They were plastered all over Youtube for a while, but were taken down because of copyright infringement on the song. The Internet giveth, media conglomerates taketh away. > > There is probably some stuff written on those few days. I wonder what would have happened if the Interne had been around when John Lennon died. Bowie is more esoteric, I wonder if there is anybody today whose death would cause the outpouring of grief similar to Lennon and Jackson. It would be really interesting to see how an internetworked world would react. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Susan Davis > Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2016 7:44 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon > > Hi all, > > I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and collective perezhivanie. > > The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief, and very public and personal recollections and sharing of meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in the news and conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on > things that made a difference in their own lives. People are shedding > very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now, but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience in lives going forward. > > > I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social media? > > Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential new area for investigation? > > > Kind regards > > Sue > > Dr Susan Davis > Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au > > CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au > > > > > > > > On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" wrote: > >> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful. >> >> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the >> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a >> progression in its transformation? >> >> Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to >> to teeth/molars at present... >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >>> the wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and >>> dentistry is. >>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>> between "moment" and music. >>> >>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >>> is a moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are >>> three problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use >>> of "moment" >>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is >>> the real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>> >>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in >>> phenomenology in a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to >>> describe something like a sculpture which does not move, which we may >>> circumambulate and describe from various sides. But in Vygotsky the >>> "object" being described is almost always no object at all, but >>> rather an unfolding process. Where the synoptic object does not move >>> and can be circumambulated, the dynamic object moves, and we are >>> usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>> This >>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >>> as we >>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>> present, much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could >>> somehow treat these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty >>> is implicit in a newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena >>> like speech or musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and >>> seems to deny the irreducible unpredictability of development. I >>> think that the idea of "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets >>> us around this (because even nonlinear functions can be integrated). >>> Certainly if I were explaining "moment" to a high school teacher of >>> science, I would use the example of angular momentum. >>> >>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>> sometimes uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that >>> they are. The cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is >>> quite different from the description of development. A text is an >>> instance of a language, but it's not a 'moment'. A context of >>> situation is an instance of a context of culture, but it's not a >>> moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a "moment" in the >>> development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed synoptically, >>> weather and climate are simply to different chronological sections of >>> one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>> >>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>> seriously say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions >>> of the same phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather >>> is chiefly influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the >>> relationship between solar radiation absorbed and solar radiation >>> reflected out into space) is present, but it is much less immediately >>> causal. With climate, it's the other way around. When we say that >>> word meaning develops, we see much the same qualitative shifts: sense >>> is a constitutive moment of infant speech while signiication is quite >>> peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we have the reverse >>> relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the phenomenon >>> also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to grasp >>> this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, >>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Dear all , >>>> >>>> Look at this please ! >>>> >>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>> thought >>>> experiment: 1) The >>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>> essence can be revealed particularly clearly; 2) this object then >>>> undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same experiment >>>> leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>> the >>>> object is >>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>> represented >>> as >>>> a process of >>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>> essentially becomes a productive contribution to the mentally >>>> represented object. It is only within this special system of links >>>> that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>> >>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>> action >>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and >>>> separate >>> even >>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself >>>> , >>> nor >>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability >>>> or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>> motionality , >>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives , emotional >>>> incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>> converted >>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>> >>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >>> with >>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>> It's a >>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited >>>> pleasurable feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't >>>> refer to a particular part or stage orietating on which this or >>>> that kind of >>> affect >>> or >>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >>> think >>> of >>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then >>>> , >>> the >>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >>> note in >>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant >>>> on >>> which >>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>> occurs >>> . >>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable >>>> or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a >>>> substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the >>>> "ideal" which is >>> said >>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good >>>> sources >>> for >>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 55 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 04:23:50 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" , > "ablunden@mira.net" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > > Hi Susan and others, > > Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media, there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually found meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his passing. > > As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps a reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic content of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also because he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." > > One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived in (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked at a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it. They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so, but I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience. > > There are all these different meanings colliding: > > What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? > What is: a Frank Sinatra song? > What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? > What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? > > Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled in my own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also about filling in gaps. > > However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination with fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one, but rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some pathological desire for world domination. > > There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel compelled to know how that works. > > Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does, what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with consent (or lack of it)? > > Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about not acting, or non-doing. > > Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 56 > Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 20:32:49 -0800 > From: mike cole > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Cc: "OSE@yahoogroups.com" , "xmca-l@ucsd.edu" > , Carrie Lobman , Tony > Perone , PIG group > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Great idea, Ana. Its a major problem eroding higher education. > mike > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 5:54 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane > wrote: > >> Dear colleagues, >> >> As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it >> comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it >> comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the >> faculty, anyway! Period. >> >> Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair >> contract. >> >> Ana >> >> ---------- Forwarded message --------- >> From: Faculty Forward Network >> Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM >> Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern >> To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane >> >> >> Friend us on Facebook >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsH/ >>> >> Follow >> us on Twitter >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsE/ >>> >> [image: Faculty Forward Logo] >> >> Dear Colleague, >> >> My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University. >> And I'm going on strike next week. >> >> For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern >> for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless >> stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work. >> At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable >> employees to help minimize instructional costs. >> >> *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts >> at Northeastern >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baf/2144494657/VEsF/ >>> >> -- if we don't have a contract by then.* >> >> Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba8/2144494657/VEsC/ >>> >> to push the administration to act. >> >> Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsD/ >>> >> to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to >> show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of >> part-time faculty. >> >> *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration, >> demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.* >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsA/ >>> >> >> *Why am I going on strike?* >> >> - In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some >> adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun >> makes >> more than that in a day. >> - Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who >> work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more >> expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal >> labor >> law. >> - If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little, >> we should let them try and run things without us for a day. >> - Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching >> conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this >> administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty. >> >> Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a >> billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily >> afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win >> better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at >> your school, as well. >> >> *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's >> time to treat adjunct faculty fairly. >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsB/ >>> * >> >> In gratitude and solidarity, >> >> Haley Malm >> Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University >> >> >> Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward >> All rights reserved. >> 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025 >> This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baa/2144494657/VEsO/ >>> >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsP/ >>> >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBQ/ >>> >> Friend us on Facebook >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsHBA/ >>> >> Follow us on Twitter >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBw/ >>> >> -- >> *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* >> Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu) >> Associate Professor of Education >> Chestnut Hill College >> phone: 267-334-2905 >> > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 57 > Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 20:32:49 -0800 > From: mike cole > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Cc: "OSE@yahoogroups.com" , "xmca-l@ucsd.edu" > , Carrie Lobman , Tony > Perone , PIG group > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Great idea, Ana. Its a major problem eroding higher education. > mike > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 5:54 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane > wrote: > >> Dear colleagues, >> >> As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it >> comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it >> comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the >> faculty, anyway! Period. >> >> Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair >> contract. >> >> Ana >> >> ---------- Forwarded message --------- >> From: Faculty Forward Network >> Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM >> Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern >> To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane >> >> >> Friend us on Facebook >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsH/ >>> >> Follow >> us on Twitter >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsE/ >>> >> [image: Faculty Forward Logo] >> >> Dear Colleague, >> >> My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University. >> And I'm going on strike next week. >> >> For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern >> for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless >> stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work. >> At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable >> employees to help minimize instructional costs. >> >> *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts >> at Northeastern >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baf/2144494657/VEsF/ >>> >> -- if we don't have a contract by then.* >> >> Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba8/2144494657/VEsC/ >>> >> to push the administration to act. >> >> Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsD/ >>> >> to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to >> show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of >> part-time faculty. >> >> *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration, >> demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.* >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsA/ >>> >> >> *Why am I going on strike?* >> >> - In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some >> adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun >> makes >> more than that in a day. >> - Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who >> work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more >> expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal >> labor >> law. >> - If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little, >> we should let them try and run things without us for a day. >> - Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching >> conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this >> administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty. >> >> Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a >> billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily >> afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win >> better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at >> your school, as well. >> >> *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's >> time to treat adjunct faculty fairly. >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsB/ >>> * >> >> In gratitude and solidarity, >> >> Haley Malm >> Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University >> >> >> Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward >> All rights reserved. >> 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025 >> This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baa/2144494657/VEsO/ >>> >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsP/ >>> >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBQ/ >>> >> Friend us on Facebook >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsHBA/ >>> >> Follow us on Twitter >> < >> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBw/ >>> >> -- >> *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* >> Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu) >> Associate Professor of Education >> Chestnut Hill College >> phone: 267-334-2905 >> > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 58 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:28:53 +0900 > From: David Kellogg > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Huw: > > I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For > Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know > about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a > time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, > in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not > simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are > going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). > > For example, if I find myself saying > > "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of > different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" > > My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and > then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his > death), etc. > > System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense > that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, > in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices > over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art > do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of > choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with > cultural-historical determination. > > For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to > the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice > is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just > possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say > "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly > limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more > canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because > an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not > both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably > saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in > the days to come. > > This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly > skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also > true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause; > if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if > indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance > represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each > of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this > is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use. > > There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of > "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a > problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language > development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches > of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the > choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not > simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language) > but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE > made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is > simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is > always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of > NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between >> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of >> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity >> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >> >> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative >> interpretation, I would say: >> >> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. One >> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in >> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress. >> >> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to >> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is actually >> an excellent source of edification. >> >> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem. >> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. >> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve >> or express a particular problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Dear Haydi: >>> >>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the >>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic >>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something >>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand >>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as >> (to >>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one >> case, >>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, >> like >>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we >> have a >>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre >>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>> >>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce >> the >>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or >>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by >>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these >>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even >>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it, >>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I >>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT, >>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is >> that >>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>> >>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process >>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although >> this >>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >> producing >>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is >>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning >>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality. >>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning >>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >> contemplation >>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not >>> actually so. >>> >>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, >> and >>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >> function >>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns >>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it >>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, >>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this >>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are >>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away >> from >>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of >>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>> >>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in >>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are unable >> to >>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner >>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >> relative >>> to >>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal >>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to >>> the >>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental >> model >>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a >>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what >>> is >>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>> conception , >>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >> rational >>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the >> related >>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we >>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity >>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly >> apart >>> , >>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop >> at >>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >> reproduce >>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and >> true >>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>> (dynamicity) >>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us >> as >>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to >> be >>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as >>> moments >>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert >>> those >>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>> agnosticism >>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>> inhering , >>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >> independent >>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined >>> moments >>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>> appropriation , >>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or >>> even >>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do >>> they >>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments >>> still >>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? >>>> >>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we >>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact >> . >>>> >>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our >>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from >>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention >>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving >>> movable >>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if >> potentially >>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >>>> >>>> Best >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> *From:* David Kellogg >>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >>>> >>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >> the >>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry >> is. >>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>>> between "moment" and music. >>>> >>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >> is >>> a >>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>> "moment" >>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is >> the >>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>>> >>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology >> in >>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something >>> like >>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and >> describe >>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>> almost >>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>> This >>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >> as >>> we >>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >> present, >>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because >>> even >>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example >> of >>>> angular momentum. >>>> >>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >> sometimes >>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >>> from >>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, >> but >>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context >>> of >>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>>> >>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >> seriously >>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >>> solar >>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much >> the >>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant >> speech >>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca >> we >>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way >>> to >>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >> example, >>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Dear all , >>>> >>>> Look at this please ! >>>> >>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >> thought >>>> experiment: 1) The >>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>> essence can be revealed >>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>> the >>>> object is >>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >>> as >>>> a process of >>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>> essentially becomes a >>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>>> within this special >>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>> >>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >> action >>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >>> even >>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , >> nor >>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>> motionality , >>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>> converted >>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>> >>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >> It's a >>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >> affect >>> or >>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >>> of >>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , >> the >>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note >> in >>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>> which >>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >> occurs >>> . >>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is >> said >>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >>> for >>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 59 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 11:41:52 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Hi David, > > I think I can summarise your description of meaning potential as a > performative act (Austen) which can be appreciated in terms of alternative > acts which were not undertaken, i.e. a commonality and variability analysis > of a unit expression for a given domain. > > If we are taking activity and orientation into consideration, then it is > sensible to widen the scope of this act to include the orientation and > perhaps look for congruence in the content of the act with the orientation. > > With respect to the construction of knowledge with respect to using tools > and manufacturing tools, an appreciation of this meaning potential is > indeed available, although once we are habituated to the use of a tool it > is not so readily consciously available -- it is often most manifest when > we are first becoming habituated to the operations that a tool affords. It > may be that an appreciation for the design of artefacts facilitates this > appreciation. The menu system you refer to is a sitting duck in this > regard, although it makes some things easier for some people, it makes > other things much harder. > > In my attempt to understand how you are applying this to mind, my response > is the same. Yes, we can appreciate how having certain knowledge changes > the landscape of capabilities of a student, and we can appreciate how > different variants of this knowledge can induce different capabilities. > This is the essential technical aspect of conceptual development in > developmental psychology. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 January 2016 at 05:28, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Huw: >> >> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For >> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know >> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a >> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, >> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not >> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are >> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >> >> For example, if I find myself saying >> >> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >> >> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and >> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >> death), etc. >> >> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense >> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, >> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices >> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art >> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of >> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >> cultural-historical determination. >> >> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to >> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice >> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because >> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not >> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably >> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in >> the days to come. >> >> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly >> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also >> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause; >> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each >> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this >> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use. >> >> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of >> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a >> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language >> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches >> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the >> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not >> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language) >> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE >> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is >> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of >> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >> between >>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of >>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >> activity >>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>> >>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >> alternative >>> interpretation, I would say: >>> >>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. >> One >>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in >>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >> regress. >>> >>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to >>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >> actually >>> an excellent source of edification. >>> >>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >> problem. >>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. >>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to >> solve >>> or express a particular problem. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Haydi: >>>> >>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of >> the >>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the >> basic >>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >> something >>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the >> hand >>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as >>> (to >>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one >>> case, >>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, >>> like >>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we >>> have a >>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >> theatre >>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>> >>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce >>> the >>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye >> or >>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made >> by >>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these >>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even >>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used >> it, >>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I >>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >> CHAT, >>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is >>> that >>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>> >>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >> process >>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although >>> this >>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>> producing >>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is >>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning >>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >> personality. >>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning >>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>> contemplation >>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not >>>> actually so. >>>> >>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, >>> and >>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>> function >>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >> turns >>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it >>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, >>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this >>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts >> are >>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away >>> from >>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of >>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>> >>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object >> in >>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >> unable >>> to >>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner >>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>> relative >>>> to >>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal >>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity >> to >>>> the >>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental >>> model >>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a >>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see >> what >>>> is >>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>> conception , >>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>> rational >>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the >>> related >>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , >> we >>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >> entity >>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly >>> apart >>>> , >>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot >> stop >>> at >>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>> reproduce >>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and >>> true >>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>> (dynamicity) >>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us >>> as >>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want >> to >>> be >>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as >>>> moments >>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert >>>> those >>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>> agnosticism >>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>> inhering , >>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >>> independent >>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined >>>> moments >>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>>> appropriation , >>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development >> or >>>> even >>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do >>>> they >>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments >>>> still >>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? >>>>> >>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as >> we >>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very >> fact >>> . >>>>> >>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . >> Our >>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained >> from >>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the >> intention >>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving >>>> movable >>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if >>> potentially >>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> *From:* David Kellogg >>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >>>>> >>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >>> the >>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry >>> is. >>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>>>> between "moment" and music. >>>>> >>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >>> is >>>> a >>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>>> "moment" >>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is >>> the >>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>>>> >>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in >> phenomenology >>> in >>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe >> something >>>> like >>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and >>> describe >>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>>> almost >>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>>> This >>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >>> as >>>> we >>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>> present, >>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow >> treat >>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit >> in a >>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this >> (because >>>> even >>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were >> explaining >>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example >>> of >>>>> angular momentum. >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>> sometimes >>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. >> The >>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >>>> from >>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, >>> but >>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a >> context >>>> of >>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" >> is a >>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different >> chronological >>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using >> "phylogenesis", >>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third >> problem, >>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>>>> >>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>> seriously >>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the >> same >>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >>>> solar >>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's >> the >>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much >>> the >>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant >>> speech >>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca >>> we >>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of >> the >>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious >> way >>>> to >>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>> example, >>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dear all , >>>>> >>>>> Look at this please ! >>>>> >>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>> thought >>>>> experiment: 1) The >>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>>> essence can be revealed >>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in >> which >>>> the >>>>> object is >>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >> represented >>>> as >>>>> a process of >>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>>> essentially becomes a >>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is >> only >>>>> within this special >>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>>> >>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>> action >>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and >> separate >>>> even >>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , >>> nor >>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>>> motionality , >>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>>> converted >>>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>>> >>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >> with >>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>> It's a >>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >>> affect >>>> or >>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >> think >>>> of >>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , >>> the >>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >> note >>> in >>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>>> which >>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>> occurs >>>> . >>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a >> substitute >>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is >>> said >>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good >> sources >>>> for >>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 60 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:48:01 -0500 > From: Beth Ferholt > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Thanks, Susan. > > What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his death is a > lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in public earlier in > the day. > > It is sort of weird. With other celebrity deaths I have seen people > talking and sometimes a few tears but not so many people crying. I think > embodied emotion is a key part of perezhivanie that makes it generally > harder to experience in a large group. > > I thought I was just having this reaction because of my age/what this > particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions to his death are > actually different than reactions to the other deaths mentioned above. His > being in role so often is important for perezhivanie, as is the lack of > violence in his death, I think. > > Beth > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> >> Hi Susan and others, >> >> Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media, >> there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually found >> meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his >> passing. >> >> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps a >> reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up >> with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic content >> of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also because >> he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct >> our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively >> interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." >> >> One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived in >> (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked at >> a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it. >> They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so, but >> I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience. >> >> There are all these different meanings colliding: >> >> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? >> What is: a Frank Sinatra song? >> What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? >> What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? >> >> Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art >> took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled in my >> own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also about >> filling in gaps. >> >> However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while >> reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination with >> fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one, but >> rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the >> body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists >> are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably >> both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something >> more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some >> pathological desire for world domination. >> >> There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions >> similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel >> compelled to know how that works. >> >> Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does, >> what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with >> consent (or lack of it)? >> >> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects >> of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about >> not acting, or non-doing. >> >> Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 61 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 15:15:05 +0000 > From: Bruce Robinson > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Message-ID: <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed > > Even though I'm of the right age to have heard his early music as a > background to my undergraduate years, I too found the recent attention > to Bowie somewhat overblown - the entire first half of the BBC News, a > 12 page supplement in the Guardian and interviews with everyone ever > connected with him. The obvious parallel is Diana in 1997 when there > were also hundreds of people on the streets crying, spontaneously > embracing etc. Something strange that came out of nowhere and is now > seen as a break with the continued stiff upper lips of the royal family > and others, particularly men, of earlier generations. I found it > worrying at the time. > > On Bowie and fascism - even if Bowie thought he was just playing with > ideas and identity, which I doubt, he was doing so in a context where > real fascism and extreme racism were on the rise in Britain in the 70s. > Some other musicians expressed anti-immigrant views too. Even if it was > 'playing', it was extremely irresponsible given his influence. However I > doubt that was the case. I think he was probably identifying with one of > the trends of the time. > > Bruce R > > > On 14/01/2016 14:48, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> Thanks, Susan. > > What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his > > death is a lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in > > public earlier in the day. > > It is sort of weird. With other > celebrity deaths I have seen people > talking and sometimes a few tears > but not so many people crying. I > think embodied emotion is a key part > of perezhivanie that makes it > generally harder to experience in a > large group. > > I thought I was just having this reaction because of my > age/what this > particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions > to his death > are actually different than reactions to the other deaths > mentioned > above. His being in role so often is important for > perezhivanie, as > is the lack of violence in his death, I think. > > > Beth > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > >> >> Hi Susan and others, >> >> Yes, it > does feel like over the past few days, at least in the >> media, there > has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those >> who actually found > meaning in the music and performance of David >> Bowie upon learning of > his passing. >> >> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of > creating art, >> perhaps a reason we feel kinship with him is not only > because we >> may have grown up with this music, and we might have felt >>> communion with his artistic content of difference and how that is >> > joined with liberation. Perhaps also because he created large gaps >> > that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct our own >> > meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively >> > interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." >> >> One of the > most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he >> lived in > (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the >> stage > unasked at a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The >> Berliners > wouldn't have it. They "shrugged and asked him to step >> down." The > article doesn't say so, but I can imagine him actually >> reveling in > that experience. >> >> There are all these different meanings colliding: >>>>> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? What is: a Frank Sinatra >>> song? What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? What is: >> > being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? >> >> Thinking > about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his >> art took > form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be >> filled in > my own summation, by what I bring to all those >> "meanings." Humor is > also about filling in gaps. >> >> However, on a more somber note, one of > the aspects I consider while >> reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is > his short-lived >> fascination with fascism. I want to understand that > too. I'm >> pretty sure he wasn't one, but rather, as an artist he was >>> exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the body" to see its >> > inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists are wont >> > to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably >> > both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was >> > something more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor >> > was it some pathological desire for world domination. >> >> There is > something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that >> functions > similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie >> himself, I feel > compelled to know how that works. >> >> Does this also pertain in some > way to "global" perezhivanie? If it >> does, what makes it the same? And > how it is different. Does it >> have to do with consent (or lack of it)? >>>>> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive >>> aspects of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which >> > seems to be about not acting, or non-doing. >> >> Then, how does this > link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> > Annalisa >> >> > > > > a > uc > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 62 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:11:19 -0700 > From: Greg Thompson > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > David, > Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's > syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? > If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in > Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to > language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than > entirely volitional. > Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance > to your statement: > "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and > what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that > needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely > the emergence of free will" > -greg > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >> Huw: >> >> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For >> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know >> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a >> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, >> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not >> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are >> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >> >> For example, if I find myself saying >> >> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >> >> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and >> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >> death), etc. >> >> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense >> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, >> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices >> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art >> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of >> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >> cultural-historical determination. >> >> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to >> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice >> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because >> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not >> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably >> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in >> the days to come. >> >> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly >> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also >> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause; >> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each >> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this >> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use. >> >> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of >> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a >> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language >> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches >> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the >> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not >> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language) >> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE >> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is >> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of >> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >> between >>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of >>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >> activity >>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>> >>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >> alternative >>> interpretation, I would say: >>> >>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. >> One >>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in >>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >> regress. >>> >>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to >>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >> actually >>> an excellent source of edification. >>> >>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >> problem. >>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. >>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to >> solve >>> or express a particular problem. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Haydi: >>>> >>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of >> the >>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the >> basic >>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >> something >>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the >> hand >>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as >>> (to >>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one >>> case, >>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, >>> like >>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we >>> have a >>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >> theatre >>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>> >>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce >>> the >>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye >> or >>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made >> by >>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these >>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even >>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used >> it, >>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I >>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >> CHAT, >>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is >>> that >>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>> >>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >> process >>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although >>> this >>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>> producing >>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is >>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning >>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >> personality. >>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning >>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>> contemplation >>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not >>>> actually so. >>>> >>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, >>> and >>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>> function >>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >> turns >>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it >>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, >>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this >>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts >> are >>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away >>> from >>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of >>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>> >>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object >> in >>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >> unable >>> to >>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner >>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>> relative >>>> to >>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal >>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity >> to >>>> the >>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental >>> model >>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a >>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see >> what >>>> is >>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>> conception , >>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>> rational >>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the >>> related >>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , >> we >>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >> entity >>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly >>> apart >>>> , >>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot >> stop >>> at >>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>> reproduce >>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and >>> true >>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>> (dynamicity) >>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us >>> as >>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want >> to >>> be >>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as >>>> moments >>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert >>>> those >>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>> agnosticism >>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>> inhering , >>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >>> independent >>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined >>>> moments >>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>>> appropriation , >>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development >> or >>>> even >>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do >>>> they >>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments >>>> still >>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? >>>>> >>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as >> we >>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very >> fact >>> . >>>>> >>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . >> Our >>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained >> from >>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the >> intention >>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving >>>> movable >>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if >>> potentially >>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> *From:* David Kellogg >>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >>>>> >>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >>> the >>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry >>> is. >>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>>>> between "moment" and music. >>>>> >>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >>> is >>>> a >>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>>> "moment" >>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is >>> the >>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>>>> >>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in >> phenomenology >>> in >>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe >> something >>>> like >>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and >>> describe >>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>>> almost >>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>>> This >>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >>> as >>>> we >>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>> present, >>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow >> treat >>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit >> in a >>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this >> (because >>>> even >>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were >> explaining >>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example >>> of >>>>> angular momentum. >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>> sometimes >>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. >> The >>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >>>> from >>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, >>> but >>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a >> context >>>> of >>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" >> is a >>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different >> chronological >>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using >> "phylogenesis", >>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third >> problem, >>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>>>> >>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>> seriously >>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the >> same >>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >>>> solar >>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's >> the >>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much >>> the >>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant >>> speech >>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca >>> we >>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of >> the >>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious >> way >>>> to >>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>> example, >>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dear all , >>>>> >>>>> Look at this please ! >>>>> >>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>> thought >>>>> experiment: 1) The >>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>>> essence can be revealed >>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in >> which >>>> the >>>>> object is >>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >> represented >>>> as >>>>> a process of >>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>>> essentially becomes a >>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is >> only >>>>> within this special >>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>>> >>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>> action >>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and >> separate >>>> even >>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , >>> nor >>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>>> motionality , >>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>>> converted >>>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>>> >>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >> with >>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>> It's a >>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >>> affect >>>> or >>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >> think >>>> of >>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , >>> the >>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >> note >>> in >>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>>> which >>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>> occurs >>>> . >>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a >> substitute >>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is >>> said >>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good >> sources >>>> for >>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 63 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:18:37 -0700 > From: Greg Thompson > Subject: [Xmca-l] Society for Psychological Anthropology Vimeo page > To: "xmca-l@ucsd.edu" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Thought that some folks on this listserve might be interested in the > Society for Psychological Anthropology's new Vimeo page. This isn't > edge-of-your-seat viewing, but there are lots of good talks posted from the > recent Biennial conference. Lots on postcolonial theory, among many other > things. > > Here is the link: > https://vimeo.com/channels/psychanthro > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 64 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 08:30:32 -0800 > From: Lplarry > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: <5697cd45.c493420a.faff1.5f17@mx.google.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > David, > I am curious how you will respond to the notion of meaning potential using a phenomenological composition. > To say: > Meaning potential is the presence of absence. > The dialectic between the placings taken and the placings not taken but could be otherwise > > Each choice as presence overlaps with the absent choice that could have been otherwise, > Leaving a (gap) > > -----Original Message----- > From: "David Kellogg" > Sent: ?2016-?01-?13 9:31 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > Huw: > > I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For > Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know > about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a > time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, > in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not > simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are > going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). > > For example, if I find myself saying > > "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of > different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" > > My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and > then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his > death), etc. > > System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense > that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, > in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices > over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art > do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of > choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with > cultural-historical determination. > > For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to > the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice > is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just > possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say > "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly > limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more > canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because > an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not > both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably > saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in > the days to come. > > This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly > skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also > true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause; > if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if > indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance > represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each > of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this > is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use. > > There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of > "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a > problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language > development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches > of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the > choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not > simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language) > but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE > made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is > simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is > always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of > NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between >> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of >> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity >> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >> >> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative >> interpretation, I would say: >> >> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. One >> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in >> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress. >> >> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to >> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is actually >> an excellent source of edification. >> >> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem. >> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. >> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve >> or express a particular problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Dear Haydi: >>> >>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the >>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic >>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something >>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand >>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as >> (to >>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one >> case, >>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, >> like >>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we >> have a >>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre >>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>> >>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce >> the >>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or >>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by >>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these >>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even >>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it, >>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I >>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT, >>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is >> that >>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>> >>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process >>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although >> this >>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >> producing >>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is >>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the meaning >>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality. >>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning >>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >> contemplation >>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not >>> actually so. >>> >>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, >> and >>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >> function >>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns >>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it >>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts, >>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this >>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are >>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away >> from >>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of >>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>> >>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in >>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are unable >> to >>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner >>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >> relative >>> to >>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal >>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to >>> the >>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental >> model >>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a >>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what >>> is >>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>> conception , >>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >> rational >>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the >> related >>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we >>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity >>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly >> apart >>> , >>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop >> at >>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >> reproduce >>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and >> true >>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>> (dynamicity) >>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us >> as >>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to >> be >>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as >>> moments >>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert >>> those >>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>> agnosticism >>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>> inhering , >>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >> independent >>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined >>> moments >>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>> appropriation , >>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or >>> even >>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do >>> they >>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments >>> still >>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ? >>>> >>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we >>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact >> . >>>> >>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our >>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from >>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention >>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving >>> movable >>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if >> potentially >>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >>>> >>>> Best >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> *From:* David Kellogg >>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >>>> >>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in >> the >>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry >> is. >>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation >>>> between "moment" and music. >>>> >>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant >> is >>> a >>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three >>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>> "moment" >>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is >> the >>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>>> >>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology >> in >>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something >>> like >>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and >> describe >>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>> almost >>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic >>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. >>> This >>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: >> as >>> we >>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >> present, >>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat >>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a >>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the >>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of >>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because >>> even >>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining >>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example >> of >>>> angular momentum. >>>> >>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >> sometimes >>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The >>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different >>> from >>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, >> but >>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context >>> of >>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a >>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological >>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", >>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, >>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>>> >>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described >>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >> seriously >>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same >>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between >>> solar >>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the >>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much >> the >>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant >> speech >>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca >> we >>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the >>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way >>> to >>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >> example, >>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more >>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to >>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Dear all , >>>> >>>> Look at this please ! >>>> >>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >> thought >>>> experiment: 1) The >>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>> essence can be revealed >>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which >>> the >>>> object is >>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented >>> as >>>> a process of >>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>> essentially becomes a >>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only >>>> within this special >>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>> >>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >> action >>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate >>> even >>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , >> nor >>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or >>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>> motionality , >>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>> converted >>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>> >>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with >>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >> It's a >>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable >>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >> affect >>> or >>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think >>> of >>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then , >> the >>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note >> in >>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on >>> which >>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >> occurs >>> . >>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or >>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute >>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is >> said >>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources >>> for >>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 65 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 11:56:32 -0500 > From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: BSA Work, Employment and Society Conference > 2016 - Call for Papers > To: "eXtended Mind Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > > > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: BSA events Team > Date: 1/14/2016 11:50 AM (GMT-05:00) > To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com > Subject: BSA Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016 - Call for Papers > > Abstract submission closes at midnight on Monday?7 March?Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016'Work in Crisis'Dates: Tuesday 6 ? Thursday 8 September 2016 (Postgraduate Workshop: 5 September 2016)Venue: University of Leeds?The BSA and the Work, employment and society Editorial Board are pleased to announce that the WES Conference 2016 will be hosted by the University of Leeds. Like the journal, the conference is internationally focused and sociologically oriented, though it welcomes contributions from related fields. > > The conference comes at a critical time for the study of work internationally. The impact of the global financial crisis has not only been profound, but enduring. The crisis has not led to any fundamental reappraisal of the nature of capitalism, or how to ?govern? it. For the majority in work conditions have deteriorated, while those without employment have been subject to ever more punitive sanctions. Inequalities are increasing and working lives becoming more precarious. The WES 2016 conference will bring together sociologists of work from across the globe to consider the crisis within, and the possibility of moving beyond, capitalist work relations.??The full Call for Papers can be viewed at:? http://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/93221/WES2016_conference_CFP_070316.pdf?1448377582546???BSA Events TeamThe British Sociological Association > +44 (0)191 383 0839 > Visit our website at?http://www.britsoc.co.uk.See our Key Events at?http://www.britsoc.co.uk/events/keyevents.The BSA supports the Campaign for Social Science:?http://www.campaignforsocialscience.org.uk/.?Follow us via social networking: > http://www.facebook.com/britsoc > http://www.twitter.com/britsoci?P??????Please consider the environment before printing.?The information in this e-mail is confidential and is intended solely for the addressee. Access to this e-mail by anyone else is unauthorised. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on it, except for the purpose of delivery to the addressee, is prohibited and may be unlawful. Kindly notify the sender and delete the message and any attachment from your computer.? > > ______________________________________________________________________ > > > > This email has been scanned by TSG Cloud Based Mail Security. > > For more information please visit http://www.tsg.com/product/anti-virus-anti-spam > > ______________________________________________________________________ > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 66 > Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 04:53:00 +0900 > From: David Kellogg > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Huw, Greg, Larry: > > Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in > performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure (eg. > "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's > really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in > development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the > developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary than > constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses > of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's > various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it > mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly > perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think > that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps > I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always > struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. > > Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the > paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. > But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this > placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has > no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of "system" > requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, > in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, > for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most > fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's donkey. > > Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics page > of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially > syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second > panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third after > the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies > (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons > (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be > simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing > may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can > even imagine the very opposite chain of command). > > Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only > hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as a > set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could > also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel of > ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite > different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would > make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for > novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is > "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as > "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between > novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of > the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this > is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations in > the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the novel. > > I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as "presence > of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and > even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather > than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, > intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. But > in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and > there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). > If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right > fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> David, >> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >> entirely volitional. >> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance >> to your statement: >> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and >> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that >> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >> the emergence of free will" >> -greg >> >> >> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >>> Huw: >>> >>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. >> For >>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know >>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a >>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian, >>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not >>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are >>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >>> >>> For example, if I find myself saying >>> >>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >>> >>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and >>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >>> death), etc. >>> >>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >> sense >>> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice, >>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices >>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >> art >>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number >> of >>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >>> cultural-historical determination. >>> >>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get >> to >>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice >>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >> (because >>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but >> not >>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >> probably >>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie >> in >>> the days to come. >>> >>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly >>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also >>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >> clause; >>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each >>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this >>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >> use. >>> >>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of >>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as >> a >>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language >>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >> branches >>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >> the >>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not >>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >> language) >>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >> HAVE >>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is >>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense >> of >>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >>> between >>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most >> of >>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >>> activity >>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>>> >>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >>> alternative >>>> interpretation, I would say: >>>> >>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act. >>> One >>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component >> in >>>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >>> regress. >>>> >>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to >>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >>> actually >>>> an excellent source of edification. >>>> >>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >>> problem. >>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site. >>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to >>> solve >>>> or express a particular problem. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Dear Haydi: >>>>> >>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of >>> the >>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the >>> basic >>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >>> something >>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the >>> hand >>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind >> as >>>> (to >>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one >>>> case, >>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described >> synoptically, >>>> like >>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we >>>> have a >>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >>> theatre >>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>>> >>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >> produce >>>> the >>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye >>> or >>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >> made >>> by >>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >> these >>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >> even >>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used >>> it, >>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I >>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >>> CHAT, >>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem >> is >>>> that >>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>>> >>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >>> process >>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although >>>> this >>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>>> producing >>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint >> is >>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >> meaning >>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >>> personality. >>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning >>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>>> contemplation >>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and >> not >>>>> actually so. >>>>> >>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >> Leontiev, >>>> and >>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>>> function >>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >>> turns >>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, >> it >>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >> concepts, >>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this >>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts >>> are >>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away >>>> from >>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support >> of >>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >> action. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>>> >>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >> object >>> in >>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >>> unable >>>> to >>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >> 'inner >>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>>> relative >>>>> to >>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal >>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >> activity >>> to >>>>> the >>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental >>>> model >>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >> into a >>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see >>> what >>>>> is >>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>>> conception , >>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>>> rational >>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the >>>> related >>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity >> , >>> we >>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >>> entity >>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly >>>> apart >>>>> , >>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot >>> stop >>>> at >>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>>> reproduce >>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >> and >>>> true >>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>>> (dynamicity) >>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to >> us >>>> as >>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want >>> to >>>> be >>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as >>>>> moments >>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >> convert >>>>> those >>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>>> agnosticism >>>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>>> inhering , >>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >>>> independent >>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined >>>>> moments >>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>>>> appropriation , >>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development >>> or >>>>> even >>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or >> do >>>>> they >>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those >> moments >>>>> still >>>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development >> defects ? >>>>>> >>>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance >> as >>> we >>>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very >>> fact >>>> . >>>>>> >>>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . >>> Our >>>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained >>> from >>>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the >>> intention >>>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving >>>>> movable >>>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >>>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if >>>> potentially >>>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >>>>>> >>>>>> Best >>>>>> Haydi >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> *From:* David Kellogg >>>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means >> (in >>>> the >>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and >> dentistry >>>> is. >>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the >> relation >>>>>> between "moment" and music. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is >> meant >>>> is >>>>> a >>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are >> three >>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>>>> "moment" >>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work >> is >>>> the >>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>>>>> >>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in >>> phenomenology >>>> in >>>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe >>> something >>>>> like >>>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and >>>> describe >>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is >>>>> almost >>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the >>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the >> dynamic >>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing >> it. >>>>> This >>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in >> retrospect: >>>> as >>>>> we >>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>>> present, >>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow >>> treat >>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit >>> in a >>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or >>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny >> the >>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea >> of >>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this >>> (because >>>>> even >>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were >>> explaining >>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the >> example >>>> of >>>>>> angular momentum. >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>>> sometimes >>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. >>> The >>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite >> different >>>>> from >>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a >> language, >>>> but >>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a >>> context >>>>> of >>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" >>> is a >>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed >>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different >>> chronological >>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using >>> "phylogenesis", >>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third >>> problem, >>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be >> described >>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>>> seriously >>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the >>> same >>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly >>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship >> between >>>>> solar >>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is >>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's >>> the >>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see >> much >>>> the >>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant >>>> speech >>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on >> xmca >>>> we >>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of >>> the >>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious >>> way >>>>> to >>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>>> example, >>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much >> more >>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer >> to >>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dear all , >>>>>> >>>>>> Look at this please ! >>>>>> >>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>>> thought >>>>>> experiment: 1) The >>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its >>>>>> essence can be revealed >>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental >>>>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in >>> which >>>>> the >>>>>> object is >>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>> represented >>>>> as >>>>>> a process of >>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment >>>>>> essentially becomes a >>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is >>> only >>>>>> within this special >>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>>>> >>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , >>>> action >>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and >>> separate >>>>> even >>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal >>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself >> , >>>> nor >>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability >> or >>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>>>> motionality , >>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>>>> converted >>>>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>>>> >>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played >>> with >>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . >>>> It's a >>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited >> pleasurable >>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >>>> affect >>>>> or >>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >>> think >>>>> of >>>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then >> , >>>> the >>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >>> note >>>> in >>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant >> on >>>>> which >>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>>> occurs >>>>> . >>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable >> or >>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a >>> substitute >>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which >> is >>>> said >>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good >>> sources >>>>> for >>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Best >>>>>> >>>>>> Haydi >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 67 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 21:59:16 +0000 > From: Susan Davis > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" > > Thanks Beth, Annalisa, Michael and Andy for your reflections, > > The news about another celebrity death this morning with Alan Rickman has > also been met with a flood of social media response. Is this just mass > hysteria, people with empty lives searching for meaning in the lives of > others, or is it perezhivanie? > Looking through the types of post related to both what seems to be clear > is that while people respected Rickman and admired his work, many more > identified with something about Bowie and his work and the experiences are > much more like perezhivanie. > > > What I?m thinking is that some of these events or moments perhaps are more > significant and perhaps could be called instances of cultural > perezhivanie? (and I must apologise here as while I have been following > the thread about moments and instances I am not sure I can reflect the > nuanced understandings in these comments). What makes it perezhivanie is > that people are indeed ?living through? an experience that is both > emotional and intellectual, there are notions of Badiou?s event (from my > very brief reading Andy) with the recognition of ruptures revealed and the > potential for transformation. The life and death of Bowie have confirmed > the experience of personal transformation for many ? through providing a > vision of alternatives for sexuality, living and also of dying. He was > able to provide the pivots for the imagined to be made manifest, and the > prompt for examination and reinterpretation. I am sure people don?t? > necessarily agree with everything he did or may have believed (and dabbled > with Annalisa) but there are identities, roles, images, songs, film clips > that they identify with. > > > As people have identified, this example is not unique. The outpourings of > public grief were similar for Princess Diana, Michael Jackson and others. > In terms of the wider cultural landscape I reflect on what else has > assumed such cultural significance across the social media zeitgeist in > recent years - perhaps the Obama inauguration, the twin towers coming down > (however that was before the widespread use of social media and would very > much signal a vision of negative transformation, but may well qualify as > the most significant ?cultural perezhivanie? of our generation.) > > > These kinds of events or moments (and even those in relation to celebrity > deaths) are not confined to our era and their communal > experiencing is also not new ? think for example of seminal moments such > as the end of World War II and with ?celebrities? the death of people like > Lord Byron,Dame Nellie Melba and many others were greeted by huge > outpourings of public grief. However what is different now is the use of > social media and elsewhere which enables people to move out of the > position of witness and it becomes far > more participatory. This week some people have spent enormous effort > finding images, music, creating memes, changing > their profile pictures to select their favourite Bowie image and so forth. > > > > Is this a good thing? Does it matter? What can we make of it? Perhaps it > is about identifying these experiences of ?cultural perezhivanie? and > certain markers within our overlapping social, personal, political, > geographic worlds that are pivots for personal and social > transformation???? > > Appreciate further reflection... > > Cheers > Sue. > > > > On 15/01/2016 12:48 am, "Beth Ferholt" wrote: > >> Thanks, Susan. >> >> What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his death is a >> lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in public earlier >> in >> the day. >> >> It is sort of weird. With other celebrity deaths I have seen people >> talking and sometimes a few tears but not so many people crying. I think >> embodied emotion is a key part of perezhivanie that makes it generally >> harder to experience in a large group. >> >> I thought I was just having this reaction because of my age/what this >> particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions to his death are >> actually different than reactions to the other deaths mentioned above. >> His >> being in role so often is important for perezhivanie, as is the lack of >> violence in his death, I think. >> >> Beth >> >> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >> >>> >>> Hi Susan and others, >>> >>> Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media, >>> there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually >>> found >>> meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his >>> passing. >>> >>> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps >>> a >>> reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up >>> with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic >>> content >>> of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also >>> because >>> he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby >>> construct >>> our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became >>> "cognitively >>> interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." >>> >>> One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived >>> in >>> (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked >>> at >>> a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it. >>> They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so, >>> but >>> I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience. >>> >>> There are all these different meanings colliding: >>> >>> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? >>> What is: a Frank Sinatra song? >>> What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? >>> What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? >>> >>> Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art >>> took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled >>> in my >>> own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also >>> about >>> filling in gaps. >>> >>> However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while >>> reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination >>> with >>> fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one, >>> but >>> rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on >>> the >>> body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance >>> artists >>> are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably >>> both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something >>> more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some >>> pathological desire for world domination. >>> >>> There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions >>> similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel >>> compelled to know how that works. >>> >>> Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does, >>> what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with >>> consent (or lack of it)? >>> >>> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects >>> of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about >>> not acting, or non-doing. >>> >>> Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > -------------- next part -------------- > A non-text attachment was scrubbed... > Name: default[1].xml > Type: application/xml > Size: 3222 bytes > Desc: default[1].xml > Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160114/530d9662/attachment-0001.rdf > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 68 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:12:25 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" , > "bruce@brucerob.eu" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" > > > Hi, > > I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those insights/explanations. > > Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it. > > As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. > > It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against cancer. > > There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet back then. > > But after considering these things, there also appears to be several other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" concerning David Bowie's passing. > > One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive and kicking. > > The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual. > > The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would. > > The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him for doing it. > > A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages. > > Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity. > > Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album "Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. > But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name: > ? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light > ? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter annihilation in the early universe > ? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes > ? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole > ? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside universe is impossible > ? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold white dwarf > > These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. > > Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming from different directions and locations. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 69 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:22:47 +0000 > From: Annalisa Aguilar > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" , > "bruce@brucerob.eu" > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > SB: "My reading of it, there is NO desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. " > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 70 > Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 21:05:29 -0700 > From: HENRY SHONERD > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie > phenomenon > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: <17C96EE1-31BF-4C06-B773-E0327542EE79@gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 > > Susan and Annalisa, > Thank you very much for your posts. I understand better at this moment art, performance and agency. Regarding Bowie's trans-generational narrative, I have fantasized that I am, at 72, capable of late blooming, even if that only means dying with dignity, and maybe a bit of panache. And maybe even juice for more than that. My favorite part of teaching has been reaching across generation gaps, whatever the cultural differences between my students and me. I have craved their respect and trust, even as I reflected on my shortcomings. Were I famous, would those I have injured speak ill of me? I have fantasized such fame and that I made my apologies before the infamy of public shaming. We, the unfamous, will go to our graves without fear that we will be publically outed. But we will still be disappointed in ourselves when we let go a chance to learn from our screw ups and do better the next time. Else what is perizhvanie for? > Henry > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkLE1Gno724 > > >> On Jan 14, 2016, at 4:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >> Hi, >> >> I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those insights/explanations. >> >> Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it. >> >> As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. >> >> It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against cancer. >> >> There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet back then. >> >> But after considering these things, there also appears to be several other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" concerning David Bowie's passing. >> >> One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive and kicking. >> >> The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual. >> >> The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would. >> >> The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him for doing it. >> >> A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages. >> >> Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity. >> >> Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album "Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. >> But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name: >> ? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light >> ? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter annihilation in the early universe >> ? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes >> ? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole >> ? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside universe is impossible >> ? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold white dwarf >> >> These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. >> >> Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming from different directions and locations. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 71 > Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 05:20:01 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > In response to your points David, > > 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I > then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. > What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper > towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. > 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the > referents not intended. > 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. > Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield > incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The > 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Huw, Greg, Larry: >> >> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in >> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure (eg. >> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's >> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in >> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the >> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary than >> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses >> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's >> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it >> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly >> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think >> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps >> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always >> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. >> >> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the >> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. >> But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this >> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has >> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of "system" >> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, >> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, >> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most >> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's donkey. >> >> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics page >> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially >> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second >> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third after >> the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies >> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons >> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be >> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing >> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can >> even imagine the very opposite chain of command). >> >> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only >> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as a >> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could >> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel of >> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite >> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would >> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for >> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is >> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as >> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between >> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of >> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this >> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations in >> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the novel. >> >> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as "presence >> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and >> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather >> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, >> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. But >> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and >> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). >> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right >> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> David, >>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >>> entirely volitional. >>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance >>> to your statement: >>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and >>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that >>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >>> the emergence of free will" >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Huw: >>>> >>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. >>> For >>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we >> know >>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a >>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's >> non-Markovian, >>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and >> not >>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are >>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >>>> >>>> For example, if I find myself saying >>>> >>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >>>> >>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and >>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >>>> death), etc. >>>> >>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >>> sense >>>> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free >> choice, >>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" >> choices >>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >>> art >>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) >> number >>> of >>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >>>> cultural-historical determination. >>>> >>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I >> get >>> to >>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the >> choice >>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >>> (because >>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but >>> not >>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >>> probably >>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie >>> in >>>> the days to come. >>>> >>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are >> highly >>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is >> also >>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >>> clause; >>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, >> each >>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and >> this >>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >>> use. >>>> >>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use >> of >>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen >> as >>> a >>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in >> language >>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >>> branches >>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >>> the >>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) >> not >>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >>> language) >>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >>> HAVE >>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential >> is >>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the >> sense >>> of >>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >>>> between >>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most >>> of >>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >>>> activity >>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>>>> >>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >>>> alternative >>>>> interpretation, I would say: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive >> act. >>>> One >>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component >>> in >>>>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >>>> regress. >>>>> >>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to >>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >>>> actually >>>>> an excellent source of edification. >>>>> >>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >>>> problem. >>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific >> site. >>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to >>>> solve >>>>> or express a particular problem. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Dear Haydi: >>>>>> >>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory >> of >>>> the >>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the >>>> basic >>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >>>> something >>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or >> the >>>> hand >>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the >> mind >>> as >>>>> (to >>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In >> one >>>>> case, >>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described >>> synoptically, >>>>> like >>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other >> we >>>>> have a >>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >>>> theatre >>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >>> produce >>>>> the >>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the >> eye >>>> or >>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >>> made >>>> by >>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >>> these >>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >>> even >>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and >> used >>>> it, >>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, >> I >>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >>>> CHAT, >>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem >>> is >>>>> that >>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>>>> >>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >>>> process >>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even >> (although >>>>> this >>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>>>> producing >>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint >>> is >>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >>> meaning >>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >>>> personality. >>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning >>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>>>> contemplation >>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and >>> not >>>>>> actually so. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >>> Leontiev, >>>>> and >>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>>>> function >>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >>>> turns >>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points >> out, >>> it >>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >>> concepts, >>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but >> this >>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: >> concepts >>>> are >>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning >> away >>>>> from >>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support >>> of >>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >>> action. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >>> object >>>> in >>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >>>> unable >>>>> to >>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >>> 'inner >>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>>>> relative >>>>>> to >>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an >> ideal >>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >>> activity >>>> to >>>>>> the >>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the >> mental >>>>> model >>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >>> into a >>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can >> see >>>> what >>>>>> is >>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>>>> conception , >>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>>>> rational >>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the >>>>> related >>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an >> activity >>> , >>>> we >>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >>>> entity >>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it >> wholly >>>>> apart >>>>>> , >>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot >>>> stop >>>>> at >>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>>>> reproduce >>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >>> and >>>>> true >>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>>>> (dynamicity) >>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come >> to >>> us >>>>> as >>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't >> want >>>> to >>>>> be >>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments >> as >>>>>> moments >>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >>> convert >>>>>> those >>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>>>> agnosticism >>>>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>>>> inhering , >>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >>>>> independent >>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , >> intertwined >>>>>> moments >>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>>>>> appropriation , >>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does >> development >>>> or >>>>>> even >>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels >> or >>> do >>>>>> they >>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those >>> moments >>>>>> still >>>>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development >>> defects ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance >>> as >>>> we >>>>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very >>>> fact >>>>> . >>>>>>> >>>>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded >> to . >>>> Our >>>>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained >>>> from >>>>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the >>>> intention >>>>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant >> moving >>>>>> movable >>>>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >>>>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if >>>>> potentially >>>>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best >>>>>>> Haydi >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>> *From:* David Kellogg >>>>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >>>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means >>> (in >>>>> the >>>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and >>> dentistry >>>>> is. >>>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the >>> relation >>>>>>> between "moment" and music. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is >>> meant >>>>> is >>>>>> a >>>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are >>> three >>>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of >>>>>> "moment" >>>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work >>> is >>>>> the >>>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in >>>> phenomenology >>>>> in >>>>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe >>>> something >>>>>> like >>>>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and >>>>> describe >>>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described >> is >>>>>> almost >>>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where >> the >>>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the >>> dynamic >>>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing >>> it. >>>>>> This >>>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in >>> retrospect: >>>>> as >>>>>> we >>>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>>>> present, >>>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow >>>> treat >>>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is >> implicit >>>> in a >>>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech >> or >>>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny >>> the >>>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the >> idea >>> of >>>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this >>>> (because >>>>>> even >>>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were >>>> explaining >>>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the >>> example >>>>> of >>>>>>> angular momentum. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>>>> sometimes >>>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they >> are. >>>> The >>>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite >>> different >>>>>> from >>>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a >>> language, >>>>> but >>>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a >>>> context >>>>>> of >>>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that >> "weather" >>>> is a >>>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. >> Viewed >>>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different >>>> chronological >>>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using >>>> "phylogenesis", >>>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third >>>> problem, >>>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is >> indispensible. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be >>> described >>>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>>>> seriously >>>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of >> the >>>> same >>>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is >> chiefly >>>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship >>> between >>>>>> solar >>>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) >> is >>>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, >> it's >>>> the >>>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see >>> much >>>>> the >>>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant >>>>> speech >>>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on >>> xmca >>>>> we >>>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up >> of >>>> the >>>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an >> obvious >>>> way >>>>>> to >>>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>>>> example, >>>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much >>> more >>>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer >>> to >>>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, >>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear all , >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Look at this please ! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>>>> thought >>>>>>> experiment: 1) The >>>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where >> its >>>>>>> essence can be revealed >>>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further >> mental >>>>>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in >>>> which >>>>>> the >>>>>>> object is >>>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>>> represented >>>>>> as >>>>>>> a process of >>>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third >> moment >>>>>>> essentially becomes a >>>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is >>>> only >>>>>>> within this special >>>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity >> , >>>>> action >>>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and >>>> separate >>>>>> even >>>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular >>>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in >> temporal >>>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither >> itself >>> , >>>>> nor >>>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability >>> or >>>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>>>>> motionality , >>>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be >>>>>> converted >>>>>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is >> played >>>> with >>>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition >> . >>>>> It's a >>>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited >>> pleasurable >>>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a >>>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of >>>>> affect >>>>>> or >>>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to >>>> think >>>>>> of >>>>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . >> Then >>> , >>>>> the >>>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single >>>> note >>>>> in >>>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal >> instant >>> on >>>>>> which >>>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state >>>>> occurs >>>>>> . >>>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be >> uncognizable >>> or >>>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a >>>> substitute >>>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which >>> is >>>>> said >>>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good >>>> sources >>>>>> for >>>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Haydi >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 72 > Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 12:17:13 +0000 > From: Huw Lloyd > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper > from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful. It is quite a compact > paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological > accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering > meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc. > > Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it > may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or > similar services. > > Best, > Huw > > [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9 > > On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> In response to your points David, >> >> 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I >> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. >> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper >> towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. >> 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the >> referents not intended. >> 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. >> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield >> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The >> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Huw, Greg, Larry: >>> >>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in >>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure >>> (eg. >>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's >>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in >>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the >>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary >>> than >>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses >>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's >>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it >>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly >>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think >>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps >>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always >>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. >>> >>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the >>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. >>> But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this >>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has >>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of >>> "system" >>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, >>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, >>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most >>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's >>> donkey. >>> >>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics >>> page >>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially >>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second >>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third >>> after >>> the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies >>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons >>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be >>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing >>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can >>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command). >>> >>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only >>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as >>> a >>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could >>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel >>> of >>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite >>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would >>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for >>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is >>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as >>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between >>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of >>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this >>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations >>> in >>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the >>> novel. >>> >>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as >>> "presence >>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and >>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather >>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, >>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. >>> But >>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and >>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). >>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right >>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >>>> entirely volitional. >>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more >>> nuance >>>> to your statement: >>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, >>> and >>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing >>> that >>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >>>> the emergence of free will" >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw: >>>>> >>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, >>> sense. >>>> For >>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we >>> know >>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at >>> a >>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's >>> non-Markovian, >>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and >>> not >>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you >>> are >>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >>>>> >>>>> For example, if I find myself saying >>>>> >>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >>>>> >>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" >>> and >>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >>>>> death), etc. >>>>> >>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >>>> sense >>>>> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free >>> choice, >>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" >>> choices >>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >>>> art >>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) >>> number >>>> of >>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >>>>> cultural-historical determination. >>>>> >>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I >>> get >>>> to >>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the >>> choice >>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >>>> (because >>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity >>> but >>>> not >>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >>>> probably >>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about >>> Bowie >>>> in >>>>> the days to come. >>>>> >>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are >>> highly >>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is >>> also >>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >>>> clause; >>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, >>> each >>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and >>> this >>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >>>> use. >>>>> >>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use >>> of >>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen >>> as >>>> a >>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in >>> language >>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >>>> branches >>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >>>> the >>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) >>> not >>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >>>> language) >>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >>>> HAVE >>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential >>> is >>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the >>> sense >>>> of >>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < >>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >>>>> between >>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev >>> (most >>>> of >>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >>>>> activity >>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>>>>> >>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >>>>> alternative >>>>>> interpretation, I would say: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive >>> act. >>>>> One >>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a >>> component >>>> in >>>>>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >>>>> regress. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable >>> to >>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >>>>> actually >>>>>> an excellent source of edification. >>>>>> >>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >>>>> problem. >>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific >>> site. >>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer >>> to >>>>> solve >>>>>> or express a particular problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear Haydi: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the >>> HIstory of >>>>> the >>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of >>> the >>>>> basic >>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >>>>> something >>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or >>> the >>>>> hand >>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the >>> mind >>>> as >>>>>> (to >>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In >>> one >>>>>> case, >>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described >>>> synoptically, >>>>>> like >>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other >>> we >>>>>> have a >>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >>>>> theatre >>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >>>> produce >>>>>> the >>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the >>> eye >>>>> or >>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >>>> made >>>>> by >>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >>>> these >>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >>>> even >>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and >>> used >>>>> it, >>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That >>> is, I >>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >>>>> CHAT, >>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The >>> problem >>>> is >>>>>> that >>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >>>>> process >>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even >>> (although >>>>>> this >>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>>>>> producing >>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational >>> standpoint >>>> is >>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >>>> meaning >>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >>>>> personality. >>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and >>> meaning >>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>>>>> contemplation >>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active >>> and >>>> not >>>>>>> actually so. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >>>> Leontiev, >>>>>> and >>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>>>>> function >>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >>>>> turns >>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points >>> out, >>>> it >>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >>>> concepts, >>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but >>> this >>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: >>> concepts >>>>> are >>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning >>> away >>>>>> from >>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete >>> support >>>> of >>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >>>> action. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >>>> object >>>>> in >>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >>>>> unable >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >>>> 'inner >>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>>>>> relative >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an >>> ideal >>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >>>> activity >>>>> to >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the >>> mental >>>>>> model >>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >>>> into a >>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can >>> see >>>>> what >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>>>>> conception , >>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>>>>> rational >>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of >>> the >>>>>> related >>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an >>> activity >>>> , >>>>> we >>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >>>>> entity >>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it >>> wholly >>>>>> apart >>>>>>> , >>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we >>> cannot >>>>> stop >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>>>>> reproduce >>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >>>> and >>>>>> true >>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>>>>> (dynamicity) >>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come >>> to >>>> us >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't >>> want >>>>> to >>>>>> be >>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take >>> moments as >>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >>>> convert >>>>>>> those >>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>>>>> agnosticism >>>>>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>>>>> inhering , >>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >>>>>> independent >>>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , >>> intertwined >>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>>>>>> appropriation , >>>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does >>> development >>>>> or >>>>>>> even >>>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels >>> or >>>> do >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those >>>> moments >>>>>>> still >>>>>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development >>>> defects ? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the >>> instance >>>> as >>>>> we >>>>>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the >>> very >>>>> fact >>>>>> . >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded >>> to . >>>>> Our >>>>>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first >>> refrained >>>>> from >>>>>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the >>>>> intention >>>>>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant >>> moving >>>>>>> movable >>>>>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some >>>>>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if >>>>>> potentially >>>>>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition . >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>> Haydi >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *From:* David Kellogg >>>>>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei >>>>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03 >>>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" >>> means >>>> (in >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and >>>> dentistry >>>>>> is. >>>>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the >>>> relation >>>>>>>> between "moment" and music. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is >>>> meant >>>>>> is >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are >>>> three >>>>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use >>> of >>>>>>> "moment" >>>>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's >>> work >>>> is >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting"). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in >>>>> phenomenology >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe >>>>> something >>>>>>> like >>>>>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and >>>>>> describe >>>>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being >>> described is >>>>>>> almost >>>>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where >>> the >>>>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the >>>> dynamic >>>>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, >>> observing >>>> it. >>>>>>> This >>>>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in >>>> retrospect: >>>>>> as >>>>>>> we >>>>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even >>>>>> present, >>>>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could >>> somehow >>>>> treat >>>>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is >>> implicit >>>>> in a >>>>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech >>> or >>>>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to >>> deny >>>> the >>>>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the >>> idea >>>> of >>>>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this >>>>> (because >>>>>>> even >>>>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were >>>>> explaining >>>>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the >>>> example >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> angular momentum. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and >>>>>> sometimes >>>>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they >>> are. >>>>> The >>>>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite >>>> different >>>>>>> from >>>>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a >>>> language, >>>>>> but >>>>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a >>>>> context >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that >>> "weather" >>>>> is a >>>>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. >>> Viewed >>>>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different >>>>> chronological >>>>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using >>>>> "phylogenesis", >>>>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third >>>>> problem, >>>>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is >>> indispensible. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be >>>> described >>>>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can >>>>>> seriously >>>>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of >>> the >>>>> same >>>>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is >>> chiefly >>>>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship >>>> between >>>>>>> solar >>>>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into >>> space) is >>>>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, >>> it's >>>>> the >>>>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see >>>> much >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of >>> infant >>>>>> speech >>>>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on >>>> xmca >>>>>> we >>>>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make >>> up of >>>>> the >>>>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an >>> obvious >>>>> way >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for >>>>>> example, >>>>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much >>>> more >>>>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat >>> closer >>>> to >>>>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dear all , >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Look at this please ! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a >>>>>> thought >>>>>>>> experiment: 1) The >>>>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where >>> its >>>>>>>> essence can be revealed >>>>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further >>> mental >>>>>>>> transformations; 3) this same >>>>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in >>>>> which >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> object is >>>>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be >>>>> represented >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> a process of >>>>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third >>> moment >>>>>>>> essentially becomes a >>>>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It >>> is >>>>> only >>>>>>>> within this special >>>>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , >>> activity , >>>>>> action >>>>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and >>>>> separate >>>>>>> even >>>>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a >>> circular >>>>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in >>> temporal >>>>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither >>> itself >>>> , >>>>>> nor >>>>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or >>> stability >>>> or >>>>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or >>>>>>> motionality , >>>>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives >>>>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could >>> be >>>>>>> converted >>>>>>>> in the other as we all have seen . >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is >>> played >>>>> with >>>>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire >>> composition . >>>>>> It's a >>>>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited >>>> pleasurable >>>>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to >>> a >>>>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind >>> of >>>>>> affect >>>>>>> or >>>>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop >>> to >>>>> think >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . >>> Then >>>> , >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that >>> single >>>>> note >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal >>> instant >>>> on >>>>>>> which >>>>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , >>> state >>>>>> occurs >>>>>>> . >>>>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be >>> uncognizable >>>> or >>>>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a >>>>> substitute >>>>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" >>> which >>>> is >>>>>> said >>>>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good >>>>> sources >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now . >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Haydi >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>> >> >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 73 > Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 07:39:44 -0800 > From: Lplarry > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: <569912e8.c493420a.faff1.4af7@mx.google.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Huw, > This is interesting. > A concept of discovering meaning and what is meant by the term (discovery)? > The notion that phenomenological references > Semiotic references > Psychological references > Each contribute a (portion?) to meaning developing through discovery processes in social spaces. > This paper does seem to relate to our topic. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 4:20 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > > In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper > from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful. It is quite a compact > paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological > accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering > meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc. > > Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it > may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or > similar services. > > Best, > Huw > > [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9 > > On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> In response to your points David, >> >> 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I >> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. >> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper >> towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. >> 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the >> referents not intended. >> 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. >> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield >> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The >> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Huw, Greg, Larry: >>> >>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in >>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure >>> (eg. >>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's >>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in >>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the >>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary >>> than >>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses >>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's >>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it >>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly >>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think >>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps >>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always >>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. >>> >>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the >>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. >>> But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this >>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has >>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of >>> "system" >>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, >>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, >>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most >>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's >>> donkey. >>> >>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics >>> page >>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially >>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second >>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third >>> after >>> the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies >>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons >>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be >>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing >>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can >>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command). >>> >>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only >>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as >>> a >>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could >>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel >>> of >>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite >>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would >>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for >>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is >>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as >>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between >>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of >>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this >>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations >>> in >>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the >>> novel. >>> >>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as >>> "presence >>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and >>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather >>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, >>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. >>> But >>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and >>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). >>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right >>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >>>> entirely volitional. >>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more >>> nuance >>>> to your statement: >>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, >>> and >>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing >>> that >>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >>>> the emergence of free will" >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw: >>>>> >>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, >>> sense. >>>> For >>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we >>> know >>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at >>> a >>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's >>> non-Markovian, >>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and >>> not >>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you >>> are >>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >>>>> >>>>> For example, if I find myself saying >>>>> >>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >>>>> >>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" >>> and >>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >>>>> death), etc. >>>>> >>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >>>> sense >>>>> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free >>> choice, >>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" >>> choices >>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >>>> art >>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) >>> number >>>> of >>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >>>>> cultural-historical determination. >>>>> >>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I >>> get >>>> to >>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the >>> choice >>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >>>> (because >>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity >>> but >>>> not >>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >>>> probably >>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about >>> Bowie >>>> in >>>>> the days to come. >>>>> >>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are >>> highly >>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is >>> also >>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >>>> clause; >>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, >>> each >>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and >>> this >>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >>>> use. >>>>> >>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use >>> of >>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen >>> as >>>> a >>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in >>> language >>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >>>> branches >>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >>>> the >>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) >>> not >>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >>>> language) >>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >>>> HAVE >>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential >>> is >>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the >>> sense >>>> of >>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < >>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >>>>> between >>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev >>> (most >>>> of >>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >>>>> activity >>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>>>>> >>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >>>>> alternative >>>>>> interpretation, I would say: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive >>> act. >>>>> One >>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a >>> component >>>> in >>>>>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >>>>> regress. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable >>> to >>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >>>>> actually >>>>>> an excellent source of edification. >>>>>> >>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >>>>> problem. >>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific >>> site. >>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer >>> to >>>>> solve >>>>>> or express a particular problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear Haydi: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the >>> HIstory of >>>>> the >>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of >>> the >>>>> basic >>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >>>>> something >>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or >>> the >>>>> hand >>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the >>> mind >>>> as >>>>>> (to >>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In >>> one >>>>>> case, >>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described >>>> synoptically, >>>>>> like >>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other >>> we >>>>>> have a >>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >>>>> theatre >>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >>>> produce >>>>>> the >>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the >>> eye >>>>> or >>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >>>> made >>>>> by >>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >>>> these >>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >>>> even >>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and >>> used >>>>> it, >>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That >>> is, I >>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >>>>> CHAT, >>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The >>> problem >>>> is >>>>>> that >>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >>>>> process >>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even >>> (although >>>>>> this >>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>>>>> producing >>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational >>> standpoint >>>> is >>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >>>> meaning >>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >>>>> personality. >>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and >>> meaning >>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>>>>> contemplation >>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active >>> and >>>> not >>>>>>> actually so. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >>>> Leontiev, >>>>>> and >>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>>>>> function >>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >>>>> turns >>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points >>> out, >>>> it >>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >>>> concepts, >>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but >>> this >>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: >>> concepts >>>>> are >>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning >>> away >>>>>> from >>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete >>> support >>>> of >>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >>>> action. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >>>> object >>>>> in >>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >>>>> unable >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >>>> 'inner >>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>>>>> relative >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an >>> ideal >>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >>>> activity >>>>> to >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the >>> mental >>>>>> model >>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >>>> into a >>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can >>> see >>>>> what >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>>>>> conception , >>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>>>>> rational >>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of >>> the >>>>>> related >>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an >>> activity >>>> , >>>>> we >>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >>>>> entity >>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it >>> wholly >>>>>> apart >>>>>>> , >>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we >>> cannot >>>>> stop >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>>>>> reproduce >>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >>>> and >>>>>> true >>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>>>>> (dynamicity) >>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come >>> to >>>> us >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't >>> want >>>>> to >>>>>> be >>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take >>> moments as >>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >>>> convert >>>>>>> those >>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>>>>> agnosticism >>>>>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>>>>> inhering , >>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >>>>>> independent >>>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , >>> intertwined >>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>>>>>> appropriation , >>>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does >>> development >>>>> or >>>>>>> even >>>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels >>> or >>>> do >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transform > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 74 > Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 15:53:50 +0000 > From: Martin John Packer > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: <8B441D44-6AA7-45A8-AF04-28748647DDB6@uniandes.edu.co> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > I wrote a critique of the chapter by Wertsch and Kazak, published in the same book: > > Packer, M. J. (2011). Schooling: Domestication or ontological construction? In T. Koschmann (Ed.), Theories of learning and studies of instructional practice (pp. 167-188). New York: Springer. > > Martin > > On Jan 15, 2016, at 10:39 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Huw, >> This is interesting. >> A concept of discovering meaning and what is meant by the term (discovery)? >> The notion that phenomenological references >> Semiotic references >> Psychological references >> Each contribute a (portion?) to meaning developing through discovery processes in social spaces. >> This paper does seem to relate to our topic. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Huw Lloyd" >> Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 4:20 AM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) >> >> In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper >> from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful. It is quite a compact >> paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological >> accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering >> meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc. >> >> Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it >> may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or >> similar services. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9 >> >> On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> In response to your points David, >>> >>> 1. A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound. I >>> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act. >>> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water? The paper >>> towel? I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'. >>> 2. In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the >>> referents not intended. >>> 3. Structure and system as described are aspects of description. >>> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield >>> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given. The >>> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Huw, Greg, Larry: >>>> >>>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in >>>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure >>>> (eg. >>>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's >>>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in >>>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the >>>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary >>>> than >>>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses >>>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's >>>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it >>>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly >>>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think >>>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps >>>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always >>>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist. >>>> >>>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the >>>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure. >>>> But de Saussure called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this >>>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has >>>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of >>>> "system" >>>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is, >>>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF, >>>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most >>>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's >>>> donkey. >>>> >>>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics >>>> page >>>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially >>>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second >>>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third >>>> after >>>> the second, etc. But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies >>>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons >>>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be >>>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing >>>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can >>>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command). >>>> >>>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only >>>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as >>>> a >>>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could >>>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel >>>> of >>>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite >>>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would >>>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for >>>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is >>>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as >>>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between >>>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of >>>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this >>>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations >>>> in >>>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the >>>> novel. >>>> >>>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as >>>> "presence >>>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and >>>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather >>>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example, >>>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. >>>> But >>>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and >>>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting."). >>>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right >>>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's >>>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast? >>>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in >>>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to >>>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than >>>>> entirely volitional. >>>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more >>>> nuance >>>>> to your statement: >>>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, >>>> and >>>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing >>>> that >>>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely >>>>> the emergence of free will" >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Huw: >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, >>>> sense. >>>>> For >>>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we >>>> know >>>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at >>>> a >>>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's >>>> non-Markovian, >>>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and >>>> not >>>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you >>>> are >>>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away). >>>>>> >>>>>> For example, if I find myself saying >>>>>> >>>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of >>>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs" >>>>>> >>>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" >>>> and >>>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his >>>>>> death), etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the >>>>> sense >>>>>> that it can be thought of as kind of drop-down menu. It's a free >>>> choice, >>>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" >>>> choices >>>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal >>>>> art >>>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) >>>> number >>>>> of >>>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with >>>>>> cultural-historical determination. >>>>>> >>>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I >>>> get >>>>> to >>>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the >>>> choice >>>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just >>>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say >>>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly >>>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more >>>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices >>>>> (because >>>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity >>>> but >>>>> not >>>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am >>>>> probably >>>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about >>>> Bowie >>>>> in >>>>>> the days to come. >>>>>> >>>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are >>>> highly >>>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is >>>> also >>>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor >>>>> clause; >>>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if >>>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance >>>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, >>>> each >>>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and >>>> this >>>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to >>>>> use. >>>>>> >>>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use >>>> of >>>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen >>>> as >>>>> a >>>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in >>>> language >>>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other >>>>> branches >>>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, >>>>> the >>>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) >>>> not >>>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant >>>>> language) >>>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD >>>>> HAVE >>>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is >>>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential >>>> is >>>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the >>>> sense >>>>> of >>>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < >>>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference >>>>>> between >>>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev >>>> (most >>>>> of >>>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of >>>>>> activity >>>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an >>>>>> alternative >>>>>>> interpretation, I would say: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive >>>> act. >>>>>> One >>>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a >>>> component >>>>> in >>>>>>> order to make use of it. Indeed this is would entail an infinite >>>>>> regress. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active >>>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable >>>> to >>>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to >>>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design. This is >>>>>> actually >>>>>>> an excellent source of edification. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active >>>>>> problem. >>>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific >>>> site. >>>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer >>>> to >>>>>> solve >>>>>>> or express a particular problem. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dear Haydi: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the >>>> HIstory of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of >>>> the >>>>>> basic >>>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as >>>>>> something >>>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or >>>> the >>>>>> hand >>>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the >>>> mind >>>>> as >>>>>>> (to >>>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In >>>> one >>>>>>> case, >>>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described >>>>> synoptically, >>>>>>> like >>>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other >>>> we >>>>>>> have a >>>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of >>>>>> theatre >>>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to >>>>> produce >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the >>>> eye >>>>>> or >>>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were >>>>> made >>>>>> by >>>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although >>>>> these >>>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can >>>>> even >>>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of >>>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and >>>> used >>>>>> it, >>>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That >>>> is, I >>>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to >>>>>> CHAT, >>>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The >>>> problem >>>>> is >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the >>>>>> process >>>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even >>>> (although >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of >>>>>>> producing >>>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational >>>> standpoint >>>>> is >>>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively >>>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the >>>>> meaning >>>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a >>>>>> personality. >>>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and >>>> meaning >>>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be >>>>>>> contemplation >>>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active >>>> and >>>>> not >>>>>>>> actually so. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and >>>>> Leontiev, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic >>>>>>> function >>>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which >>>>>> turns >>>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points >>>> out, >>>>> it >>>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then >>>>> concepts, >>>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but >>>> this >>>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: >>>> concepts >>>>>> are >>>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning >>>> away >>>>>>> from >>>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete >>>> support >>>>> of >>>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to >>>>> action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always ! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material >>>>> object >>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so we are >>>>>> unable >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone >>>>> 'inner >>>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close >>>>>>> relative >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an >>>> ideal >>>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the >>>>> activity >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the >>>> mental >>>>>>> model >>>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model >>>>> into a >>>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can >>>> see >>>>>> what >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of >>>>>>>> conception , >>>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical >>>>>>> rational >>>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of >>>> the >>>>>>> related >>>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an >>>> activity >>>>> , >>>>>> we >>>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole >>>>>> entity >>>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it >>>> wholly >>>>>>> apart >>>>>>>> , >>>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we >>>> cannot >>>>>> stop >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever >>>>>>> reproduce >>>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science >>>>> and >>>>>>> true >>>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move >>>>>>>> (dynamicity) >>>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come >>>> to >>>>> us >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't >>>> want >>>>>> to >>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take >>>> moments as >>>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to >>>>> convert >>>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence >>>>>>>> agnosticism >>>>>>>>> prevails . Yes , We could somehow treat these moments as always >>>>>>>> inhering , >>>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable >>>>>>> independent >>>>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , >>>> intertwined >>>>>>>> moments >>>>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , >>>>>>>> appropriation , >>>>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does >>>> development >>>>>> or >>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels >>>> or >>>>> do >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transform >> >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 75 > Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 11:45:23 -0500 > From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Article > To: "eXtended Mind Culture, Activity" > Message-ID: <61q8yuu028ob9uo11yqr1cls.1452876322669@email.android.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Cecile Wright > Date: 1/15/2016 11:05 AM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" , v.showunmi@ioe.ac.uk, carol tomlin > Subject: Article > > > > Greetings, > ? > Please find attached a recent article. > ? > Best wishes, > Cecile > > > > This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee > and may contain confidential information. If you have received this > message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. > > Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this > message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the > author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the > University of Nottingham. > > This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an > attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your > computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email > communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as > permitted by UK legislation. > -------------- next part -------------- > A non-text attachment was scrubbed... > Name: Young black males resilience and the use of capital to transform.pdf > Type: application/pdf > Size: 348077 bytes > Desc: not available > Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160115/2f4f9d22/attachment.pdf > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > xmca-l mailing list > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca-l > > > End of xmca-l Digest, Vol 30, Issue 5 > ************************************* From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Jan 16 00:41:32 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 03:41:32 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Article Message-ID: Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Tom Richardson Date: 1/15/2016 4:50 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Article FAO Paul Mocombe: Thank you for the 'Young Black Males'- Nottingham Uni piece Paul. Can any of it be used *covertly / unacknowledged as to source* in discussions around education policy in UK, or are the prohibitions attached to the article absolute? Best wishes Tom Richardson Middlesbrough UK On 15 January 2016 at 16:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Cecile Wright > Date: 1/15/2016? 11:05 AM? (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" , v.showunmi@ioe.ac.uk, > carol tomlin > Subject: Article > > > > Greetings, > > Please find attached a recent article. > > Best wishes, > Cecile > > > > This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee > and may contain confidential information. If you have received this > message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. > > Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this > message or in any attachment.? Any views or opinions expressed by the > author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the > University of Nottingham. > > This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an > attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your > computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email > communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as > permitted by UK legislation. > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Jan 16 00:43:07 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 03:43:07 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Article Message-ID: Hey cecile... see question below Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Tom Richardson Date: 1/15/2016 4:50 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Article FAO Paul Mocombe: Thank you for the 'Young Black Males'- Nottingham Uni piece Paul. Can any of it be used *covertly / unacknowledged as to source* in discussions around education policy in UK, or are the prohibitions attached to the article absolute? Best wishes Tom Richardson Middlesbrough UK On 15 January 2016 at 16:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Cecile Wright > Date: 1/15/2016? 11:05 AM? (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" , v.showunmi@ioe.ac.uk, > carol tomlin > Subject: Article > > > > Greetings, > > Please find attached a recent article. > > Best wishes, > Cecile > > > > This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee > and may contain confidential information. If you have received this > message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. > > Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this > message or in any attachment.? Any views or opinions expressed by the > author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the > University of Nottingham. > > This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an > attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your > computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email > communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as > permitted by UK legislation. > From smago@uga.edu Sat Jan 16 06:12:50 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 14:12:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Lois Holzman commented on "On the Complementarity of Cultural Historical Psychology and Contemporary Disability Studies" In-Reply-To: <00000152478f6825-97c52374-fdda-4c72-a153-96861682f387-000000@email.amazonses.com> References: <00000152478f6825-97c52374-fdda-4c72-a153-96861682f387-000000@email.amazonses.com> Message-ID: Mike, Lucia Braga, and I have a paper under development that we?ve posted on Academic.edu. If you?re interested in how critical disabilities studies and CHAT (largely through LSV?s work in defectology) might complement one another, you are invited to read and comment. p From: Academia.edu [mailto:noreply-sessions@academia-mail.com] Sent: Friday, January 15, 2016 6:12 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: Lois Holzman commented on "On the Complementarity of Cultural Historical Psychology and Contemporary Disability Studies" [Academia.edu] On the Complementarity of Cultural Historical Psychology and Contemporary Disability Studies ________________________________ [Lois Holzman] Lois Holzman East Side Institute, Social Therapeutics, Faculty Member I was thrilled to see this and found the Vygotsky part very clear and the examples very illustrative of the theory being described. I was disappointed after that, wanting much more substance to C/DS rather than most of the discussion focused on its Frankfurt School... VIEW COMMENT Academia, 251 Kearny St., Suite 520, San Francisco, CA, 94108 Unsubscribe Privacy Policy Terms of Service ? 2016 Academia From gordonucsc@gmail.com Sat Jan 16 06:16:04 2016 From: gordonucsc@gmail.com (Gordon Wells) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 09:16:04 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Roland Tharp Message-ID: From: Lois Yamauchi Date: Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 7:39 AM Subject: Roland Tharp To: coe-l@lists.hawaii.edu, edpsych-l@lists.hawaii.edu Cc: Clifford O'Donnell Dear Colleagues: A close friend and treasured colleague for over 45 years, Roland Tharp, died on December 25th. He touched the lives of all who were privileged to know him with his kindness, generosity of spirit, and humanity. Roland was a renaissance human being: scholar, theorist, researcher, educator, poet, writer, and film director. He combined scientific rigor with an artistic mind, appreciating the cultural, mystical and spiritual among the many ways of knowing. For more than a decade, Roland taught a graduate seminar each summer in the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Hawai?i. He was Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the Universities of of Hawai?i and California-Santa Cruz and was also a Research Professor, Senior Scientist, and Director in the Graduate School of Education, University of California-Berkeley. In his eight years at Berkeley, he received $32M in competitive awards. His multidisciplinary research and theory spanned over 52 years and 250 publications. He began his professional career in Arizona where he founded the first graduate program in Community Psychology (University of Arizona, Master of Arts). In Arizona he formulated his Triadic Model of behavioral intervention with family and community members as change agents. His book with Bud Wetzel based on this work, Behavior Modification in the Natural Environment, is a recurrent Citations Classic. For the last 30 years he continued his work in Arizona by serving on the Board of Directors of the Intermountain Centers for Human Development providing community-based residential and support services to at-risk individuals and persons with disabilities. At the University of Hawai?i, he created a system of educational reform based on the cultural values and strengths of the Native Hawaiian community (the Kamehameha Early Education Project). His book with Ronald Gallimore based on this work, Rousing Minds to Life: Teaching and Learning in Social Context, won the prestigious Grawemeyer Award. This system of educational reform has been studied intensely and published widely for Native Hawaiians, Navajo, Zuni, urban mixed ethnicity poverty neighborhoods in Houston, Chicago and Indianapolis, Latino immigrant and migrant communities in Northern California, Appalachian urban migrants in Louisville, and in the recent national educational reform in urban migrants in Louisville, and in the recent national educational reform in Greenland. Also at the University of Hawai?i, he founded the Clinical Studies graduate program, guided the program to APA accreditation, and became a prominent professor in our doctoral program in Community and Cultural Psychology. He served as President of the Hawai?i Psychological Association and the Hawai?i Literary Arts Council, and was awarded the Regents Medal for Excellence in Teaching. In addition to his accomplishments in psychology and education, Roland received major awards for his fiction, poetry and films. Among many others, these include the Ida and Charles Freeman Short Story Award for Cat-House, a Robert Frost Fellowship in Poetry, the Grand Prize, Atlantic Monthly National Contest (Essay) for Romanesque Sculpture: A Study in the Hideous, and the American Film Magazine Award, Hawai?i International Film Festival, for his film My Aunt May. Roland maintained his intellectual curiosity right up to the end of his 85 years. In his late 70s and early 80s he traveled frequently to Greenland to consult on their educational reforms. At 80 he published his last book of poetry, Mad With Flowers And Tears. At 82 he published his theory locating the nexus of influence-for-change within the psychosocial systems and social networks of communities: Delta: Toward a Unified and Universal Theory and Practice of Influence and Change. In his last two years, several of his poems were set to music and released as a CD, and the 10th edition of Self-Directed Behavior: Self Modification for Personal Adjustment was published with David Watson. Roland's latest article, Cultural-Historical Activity Theory and Cultural Community Psychology: The Potential for Greater Commonality is in the current issue of Mind, Culture, and Activity. Roland is listed in the Outstanding Educators of America, Who?s Who in American Education, Poets of America, the International Who?s Who in Poetry, and Poets? Encyclopedia. Let us celebrate his remarkable life and continue to be inspired by his many works.* Please join us at a memorial service for Roland on* *Sunday, January 24 at Bishop Memorial Chapel, Kamehameha Schools, Kapalama Campus, noon until 4 pm. * Aloha, Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus, Psychology Lois A. Yamauchi, PhD, Professor, Educational Psychology From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Jan 16 06:50:08 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 06:50:08 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Roland Tharp In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you for telling us about Roland's passing, Gordon, and passing along Lois Yamauchi message about him. An article he co-authored will be in the next issue of MCA. He will be missed. mike On Sat, Jan 16, 2016 at 6:16 AM, Gordon Wells wrote: > From: Lois Yamauchi > Date: Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 7:39 AM > Subject: Roland Tharp > To: coe-l@lists.hawaii.edu, edpsych-l@lists.hawaii.edu > Cc: Clifford O'Donnell > > > Dear Colleagues: > > A close friend and treasured colleague for over 45 years, Roland Tharp, > died on December 25th. He touched the lives of all who were privileged to > know him with his kindness, generosity of spirit, and humanity. Roland was > a renaissance human being: scholar, theorist, researcher, educator, poet, > writer, and film director. He combined scientific rigor with an artistic > mind, appreciating the cultural, mystical and spiritual among the many ways > of knowing. > > For more than a decade, Roland taught a graduate seminar each summer in the > Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Hawai?i. He was > Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the Universities of of Hawai?i and > California-Santa Cruz and was also a Research Professor, Senior Scientist, > and Director in the Graduate School of Education, University of > California-Berkeley. In his eight years at Berkeley, he received $32M in > competitive awards. His multidisciplinary research and theory spanned over > 52 years and 250 publications. > > He began his professional career in Arizona where he founded the first > graduate program in Community Psychology (University of Arizona, Master of > Arts). In Arizona he formulated his Triadic Model of behavioral > intervention with family and community members as change agents. His book > with Bud Wetzel based on this work, Behavior Modification in the Natural > Environment, is a recurrent Citations Classic. For the last 30 years he > continued his work in Arizona by serving on the Board of Directors of the > Intermountain Centers for Human Development providing community-based > residential and support services to at-risk individuals and persons with > disabilities. > > At the University of Hawai?i, he created a system of educational reform > based on the cultural values and strengths of the Native Hawaiian community > (the Kamehameha Early Education Project). His book with Ronald Gallimore > based on this work, Rousing Minds to Life: Teaching and Learning in Social > Context, won the prestigious Grawemeyer Award. This system of educational > reform has been studied intensely and published widely for Native > Hawaiians, Navajo, Zuni, urban mixed ethnicity poverty neighborhoods in > Houston, Chicago and Indianapolis, Latino immigrant and migrant communities > in Northern California, Appalachian urban migrants in Louisville, and in > the recent national educational reform in urban migrants in Louisville, and > in the recent national educational reform in Greenland. > > Also at the University of Hawai?i, he founded the Clinical Studies graduate > program, guided the program to APA accreditation, and became a prominent > professor in our doctoral program in Community and Cultural Psychology. He > served as President of the Hawai?i Psychological Association and the > Hawai?i Literary Arts Council, and was awarded the Regents Medal for > Excellence in Teaching. > > In addition to his accomplishments in psychology and education, Roland > received major awards for his fiction, poetry and films. Among many others, > these include the Ida and Charles Freeman Short Story Award for Cat-House, > a Robert Frost Fellowship in Poetry, the Grand Prize, Atlantic Monthly > National Contest (Essay) for Romanesque Sculpture: A Study in the Hideous, > and the American Film Magazine Award, Hawai?i International Film Festival, > for his film My Aunt May. > > Roland maintained his intellectual curiosity right up to the end of his 85 > years. In his late 70s and early 80s he traveled frequently to Greenland to > consult on their educational reforms. At 80 he published his last book of > poetry, Mad With Flowers And Tears. At 82 he published his theory locating > the nexus of influence-for-change within the psychosocial systems and > social networks of communities: Delta: Toward a Unified and Universal > Theory and Practice of Influence and Change. > > In his last two years, several of his poems were set to music and released > as a CD, and the 10th edition of Self-Directed Behavior: Self Modification > for Personal Adjustment was published with David Watson. Roland's latest > article, Cultural-Historical Activity Theory and Cultural Community > Psychology: The Potential for Greater Commonality is in the current issue > of Mind, Culture, and Activity. > > Roland is listed in the Outstanding Educators of America, Who?s Who in > American Education, Poets of America, the International Who?s Who in > Poetry, and Poets? Encyclopedia. > > Let us celebrate his remarkable life and continue to be inspired by his > many works.* Please join us at a memorial service for Roland on* > > *Sunday, January 24 at Bishop Memorial Chapel, Kamehameha Schools, Kapalama > Campus, noon until 4 pm. * > Aloha, > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus, Psychology > > Lois A. Yamauchi, PhD, > Professor, Educational Psychology > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From laure.kloetzer@gmail.com Sat Jan 16 07:12:35 2016 From: laure.kloetzer@gmail.com (Laure Kloetzer) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 16:12:35 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Roland Tharp In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Very inspiring life for all of us - thank you Gordon. I'll be happy to read his latest MCA paper. Warm regards, LK 2016-01-16 15:50 GMT+01:00 mike cole : > Thank you for telling us about Roland's passing, Gordon, and passing along > Lois Yamauchi message about him. > An article he co-authored will be in the next issue of MCA. > He will be missed. > > mike > > On Sat, Jan 16, 2016 at 6:16 AM, Gordon Wells > wrote: > > > From: Lois Yamauchi > > Date: Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 7:39 AM > > Subject: Roland Tharp > > To: coe-l@lists.hawaii.edu, edpsych-l@lists.hawaii.edu > > Cc: Clifford O'Donnell > > > > > > Dear Colleagues: > > > > A close friend and treasured colleague for over 45 years, Roland Tharp, > > died on December 25th. He touched the lives of all who were privileged to > > know him with his kindness, generosity of spirit, and humanity. Roland > was > > a renaissance human being: scholar, theorist, researcher, educator, poet, > > writer, and film director. He combined scientific rigor with an artistic > > mind, appreciating the cultural, mystical and spiritual among the many > ways > > of knowing. > > > > For more than a decade, Roland taught a graduate seminar each summer in > the > > Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Hawai?i. He was > > Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the Universities of of Hawai?i and > > California-Santa Cruz and was also a Research Professor, Senior > Scientist, > > and Director in the Graduate School of Education, University of > > California-Berkeley. In his eight years at Berkeley, he received $32M in > > competitive awards. His multidisciplinary research and theory spanned > over > > 52 years and 250 publications. > > > > He began his professional career in Arizona where he founded the first > > graduate program in Community Psychology (University of Arizona, Master > of > > Arts). In Arizona he formulated his Triadic Model of behavioral > > intervention with family and community members as change agents. His book > > with Bud Wetzel based on this work, Behavior Modification in the Natural > > Environment, is a recurrent Citations Classic. For the last 30 years he > > continued his work in Arizona by serving on the Board of Directors of the > > Intermountain Centers for Human Development providing community-based > > residential and support services to at-risk individuals and persons with > > disabilities. > > > > At the University of Hawai?i, he created a system of educational reform > > based on the cultural values and strengths of the Native Hawaiian > community > > (the Kamehameha Early Education Project). His book with Ronald Gallimore > > based on this work, Rousing Minds to Life: Teaching and Learning in > Social > > Context, won the prestigious Grawemeyer Award. This system of educational > > reform has been studied intensely and published widely for Native > > Hawaiians, Navajo, Zuni, urban mixed ethnicity poverty neighborhoods in > > Houston, Chicago and Indianapolis, Latino immigrant and migrant > communities > > in Northern California, Appalachian urban migrants in Louisville, and in > > the recent national educational reform in urban migrants in Louisville, > and > > in the recent national educational reform in Greenland. > > > > Also at the University of Hawai?i, he founded the Clinical Studies > graduate > > program, guided the program to APA accreditation, and became a prominent > > professor in our doctoral program in Community and Cultural Psychology. > He > > served as President of the Hawai?i Psychological Association and the > > Hawai?i Literary Arts Council, and was awarded the Regents Medal for > > Excellence in Teaching. > > > > In addition to his accomplishments in psychology and education, Roland > > received major awards for his fiction, poetry and films. Among many > others, > > these include the Ida and Charles Freeman Short Story Award for > Cat-House, > > a Robert Frost Fellowship in Poetry, the Grand Prize, Atlantic Monthly > > National Contest (Essay) for Romanesque Sculpture: A Study in the > Hideous, > > and the American Film Magazine Award, Hawai?i International Film > Festival, > > for his film My Aunt May. > > > > Roland maintained his intellectual curiosity right up to the end of his > 85 > > years. In his late 70s and early 80s he traveled frequently to Greenland > to > > consult on their educational reforms. At 80 he published his last book of > > poetry, Mad With Flowers And Tears. At 82 he published his theory > locating > > the nexus of influence-for-change within the psychosocial systems and > > social networks of communities: Delta: Toward a Unified and Universal > > Theory and Practice of Influence and Change. > > > > In his last two years, several of his poems were set to music and > released > > as a CD, and the 10th edition of Self-Directed Behavior: Self > Modification > > for Personal Adjustment was published with David Watson. Roland's latest > > article, Cultural-Historical Activity Theory and Cultural Community > > Psychology: The Potential for Greater Commonality is in the current issue > > of Mind, Culture, and Activity. > > > > Roland is listed in the Outstanding Educators of America, Who?s Who in > > American Education, Poets of America, the International Who?s Who in > > Poetry, and Poets? Encyclopedia. > > > > Let us celebrate his remarkable life and continue to be inspired by his > > many works.* Please join us at a memorial service for Roland on* > > > > *Sunday, January 24 at Bishop Memorial Chapel, Kamehameha Schools, > Kapalama > > Campus, noon until 4 pm. * > > Aloha, > > > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > > Professor Emeritus, Psychology > > > > Lois A. Yamauchi, PhD, > > Professor, Educational Psychology > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Jan 16 08:37:06 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 08:37:06 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?q?Fwd=3A_Call_for_paper_for_a_special_issue_on_=22Cultiv?= =?utf-8?q?ating_knowledge-creating_competencies_through_socio-digi?= =?utf-8?q?tal_participation=E2=80=9D_edited_by_Sansone_=26_Hakkara?= =?utf-8?q?inen?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Beatrice Ligorio Date: 2016-01-16 8:26 GMT-08:00 Subject: Call for paper for a special issue on "Cultivating knowledge-creating competencies through socio-digital participation? edited by Sansone & Hakkarainen To: comitato scientifico Qwerty Dear Scientific Committee, please find here attached the new call for paper for a very special issue that Qwerty is going to host. Please, disseminate it as much as you can among your network Best regards Beatrice Questa e-mail ? stata inviata da un computer privo di virus protetto da Avast. www.avast.com <#888465614_DDB4FAA8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> -- Hai ricevuto questo messaggio perch? sei iscritto al gruppo "QwertyScientificCommittee" di Google Gruppi. Per annullare l'iscrizione a questo gruppo e non ricevere pi? le sue email, invia un'email a scientificcommittee+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. Per postare in questo gruppo, invia un'email a scientificcommittee@googlegroups.com. Visita questo gruppo all'indirizzo https://groups.google.com/group/scientificcommittee. Per altre opzioni visita https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Qwerty_Special Issue_Vol. 11_2.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 358474 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160116/ca001ed8/attachment-0001.pdf From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Jan 16 13:05:51 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 14:05:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Lois Holzman commented on "On the Complementarity of Cultural Historical Psychology and Contemporary Disability Studies" In-Reply-To: References: <00000152478f6825-97c52374-fdda-4c72-a153-96861682f387-000000@email.amazonses.com> Message-ID: <5E0D14C7-CCB2-4A75-8FC2-874E8395EA99@gmail.com> Peter (and Mike and Lucia), This is great! For all the years as an ed prof I would tell my students that Vygotsky was a trailblazer in what has been translated from Russian as ?defectology?. This is the article I would have used to prove the point. Now I need to read it. Peace Henry > On Jan 16, 2016, at 7:12 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > Mike, Lucia Braga, and I have a paper under development that we?ve posted on Academic.edu. If you?re interested in how critical disabilities studies and CHAT (largely through LSV?s work in defectology) might complement one another, you are invited to read and comment. p > > From: Academia.edu [mailto:noreply-sessions@academia-mail.com] > Sent: Friday, January 15, 2016 6:12 PM > To: Peter Smagorinsky > Subject: Lois Holzman commented on "On the Complementarity of Cultural Historical Psychology and Contemporary Disability Studies" > > [Academia.edu] > > > > > On the Complementarity of Cultural Historical Psychology and Contemporary Disability Studies > > > > > ________________________________ > > > > [Lois Holzman] > > Lois Holzman > > East Side Institute, Social Therapeutics, Faculty Member > > > > I was thrilled to see this and found the Vygotsky part very clear and the examples very illustrative of the theory being described. I was disappointed after that, wanting much more substance to C/DS rather than most of the discussion focused on its Frankfurt School... > > > > VIEW COMMENT > > > > > > > Academia, 251 Kearny St., Suite 520, San Francisco, CA, 94108 > Unsubscribe Privacy Policy Terms of Service ? 2016 Academia > > > > > From smago@uga.edu Sat Jan 16 12:02:09 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2016 20:02:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] JoLLE Call for Manuscripts: Lived Words and Worlds: Community Engaged Literacies Message-ID: [cid:image002.png@01D1506E.E2DBB810] Call for Manuscript Submissions [cid:image003.jpg@01D1506E.E2DBB810] JoLLE@UGA is currently accepting submissions to be considered for publication in the Spring 2016 issue, themed Lived Words and Worlds: Community Engaged Literacies, which invites teachers and researchers to examine ways in which communities and literacies inform one another in pedagogy and in scholarship. JoLLE understands literacies to include not only reading and writing, but other elements such as: ? the social, cultural and historical contexts of language and literacy learning and teaching; ? ongoing changes in communication tools and practices in the 21st century; and ? issues involving first and multiple language acquisition and use, regardless of semiotic systems involved. Whether you are able to participate in the Winter 2016 conference or not, we invite you to submit your manuscript, book review, and/or work of poetry and art. For all details regarding manuscript submissions, please see our submission guidelines: http://jolle.coe.uga.edu/about/submission-guidelines/ Manuscript submissions & Book Review submissions for our themed spring issue are due by February 21, 2016, 11:59 p.m. EST Submissions of Poetry and Art for our themed spring issue are due by March 11, 11:59p.m. EST If you have any questions regarding journal submissions, please contact the JoLLE Principal Editor, Meghan E. Barnes, at jolle@uga.edu. -------------- next part -------------- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image002.png Type: image/png Size: 17351 bytes Desc: image002.png Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160116/51128918/attachment.png -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image003.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 22623 bytes Desc: image003.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160116/51128918/attachment.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Spring Submission Call.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 320621 bytes Desc: Spring Submission Call.docx Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20160116/51128918/attachment.bin From s.davis@cqu.edu.au Sun Jan 17 04:15:10 2016 From: s.davis@cqu.edu.au (Susan Davis) Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2016 12:15:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> Message-ID: My apologies, sorry I missed Bruce?s comments and further reflections on Bowie & fascism and also on the perhaps overwrought response to his death. In terms of the dabbling with fascist stances there has been some reviews of that online, but still perhaps don?t answer your questions or concerns Annalisa: http://www.popmatters.com/feature/the-great-i-am-magic-fascism-and-race-in- david-bowies/ including transcription of some of the original interviews, http://thequietus.com/articles/03598-david-bowie-nme-interview-about-adolf- hitler-and-new-nazi-rock-movement I guess many will also have noted the growing body of discussion about the meaning of Bowie?s final legacy, his life and death as art and how this mortal struggle has been reflected in his final creative works. Across youtube comments, bulletin boards, blogs and online publishing you can find the active engagement of millions in contemplating and interpreting the Black Star and Lazarus songs/videos. Black Star https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kszLwBaC4Sw (currently with over 17 million views and over 32 000 comments) and Lazarus https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-JqH1M4Ya8 (with over 22 million views and over 25 000 comments) Overall the collective response seems to be an overwhelming admiration and respect for the way he was able to create such evocative, powerful works while dealing with chemo and cancer treatment - there are certainly the critics and crazies but many are also reaching out and connecting with others? these comments for example: +Gingerscantbepirates - "The stranger and more wonderful thing is he is inspiring me to reach out to others in a way I haven't been moved to do so for years. God Bless and God Speed David . ." Jake Butler - "I think I would find it pretty fucking hard to write a pop album if I knew I was terminally ill. It being dark is definitely to be expected the album is pretty much him preparing to die . In one of his last interviews he said he just was over writing to appease everyone so he ended up what I think was his only way of sorting out what was going on in his head at the time by writing songs I think he was able to make sense of it all and finally make peace with the reality of it. It's probably one thing to hear the diagnosis that death is coming but its probably another thing entirely to really grab your head around the fact that the time is up and now you are just waiting for it." What I am finding very touching and perhaps different to some of the responses to deaths of other celebrities is that through this engagement with Bowie?s possible struggles and perezhivanie through art, I think many are also thinking about their own mortality, their own work, their possible mark on the world ? perhaps thinking 'if I was dying what would be the expression of my living'? Bowie?s final works creatively manifest such struggles and so have prompted forms of ?cultural perezhivanie? of a quite personal and particular nature - How do we make sense of life and death? Regards Sue On 15/01/2016 9:12 am, "Annalisa Aguilar" wrote: > >Hi, > >I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I >said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly >in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK >isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those >insights/explanations. > >Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us >have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along >the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet >and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it. > >As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's >comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael >Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. > >It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say >all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His >death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, >and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, >and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an >illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have >friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against >cancer. > >There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With >news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion >feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching >the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own >kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet >back then. > >But after considering these things, there also appears to be several >other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" >concerning David Bowie's passing. > >One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be >a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for >several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do >A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, >David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished >musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other >artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we >might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for >collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the >list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be >caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice >anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to >settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever >complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive >an > d kicking. > >The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, >maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different >kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona >of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something >unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for >example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual. > >The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he >adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this >argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song >royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think >anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. >I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would. > >The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right >now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with >regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what >people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him >for doing it. > >A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, >always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's >work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined >make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages. > >Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last >album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, >makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos >with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It >must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene >Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity. > >Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album >"Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic >possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, >R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. >But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from >wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name: >? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface >escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light >? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter >annihilation in the early universe >? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes >? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using >semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole >? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside >universe is impossible >? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold >white dwarf > >These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light >doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant >metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he >posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's >work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider >our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading >of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us >to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I >read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and >what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. > >Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" >that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, >if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming >from different directions and locations. > >Kind regards, > >Annalisa From s.davis@cqu.edu.au Sun Jan 17 04:37:41 2016 From: s.davis@cqu.edu.au (Susan Davis) Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2016 12:37:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: <17C96EE1-31BF-4C06-B773-E0327542EE79@gmail.com> References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> , <17C96EE1-31BF-4C06-B773-E0327542EE79@gmail.com> Message-ID: Dear Henry, Thank you for your genuine reflections & revelations! We are all capable of late blooming & I think we are interesting times with the world facing a growth in an aging population, many of whom finally have the time to discover the possibilities of what they can do and who they might be ... Some agencies are recognising and supporting such flowering of creativity in the later years http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2015/sep/13/the-graffiti-grannies-of-lisbon Cheers Sue Sent from my iPhone > On 15 Jan 2016, at 2:08 pm, "HENRY SHONERD" wrote: > > Susan and Annalisa, > Thank you very much for your posts. I understand better at this moment art, performance and agency. Regarding Bowie's trans-generational narrative, I have fantasized that I am, at 72, capable of late blooming, even if that only means dying with dignity, and maybe a bit of panache. And maybe even juice for more than that. My favorite part of teaching has been reaching across generation gaps, whatever the cultural differences between my students and me. I have craved their respect and trust, even as I reflected on my shortcomings. Were I famous, would those I have injured speak ill of me? I have fantasized such fame and that I made my apologies before the infamy of public shaming. We, the unfamous, will go to our graves without fear that we will be publically outed. But we will still be disappointed in ourselves when we let go a chance to learn from our screw ups and do better the next time. Else what is perizhvanie for? > Henry > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkLE1Gno724 > > >> On Jan 14, 2016, at 4:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >> Hi, >> >> I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those insights/explanations. >> >> Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it. >> >> As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. >> >> It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against cancer. >> >> There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet back then. >> >> But after considering these things, there also appears to be several other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" concerning David Bowie's passing. >> >> One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive and kicking. >> >> The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual. >> >> The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would. >> >> The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him for doing it. >> >> A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages. >> >> Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity. >> >> Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album "Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. >> But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name: >> ? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light >> ? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter annihilation in the early universe >> ? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes >> ? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole >> ? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside universe is impossible >> ? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold white dwarf >> >> These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. >> >> Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming from different directions and locations. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sun Jan 17 07:11:37 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2016 17:11:37 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Roland Tharp In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Wonderful to hear about Roland Tharp. I was really moved to read his work in the Kamehameha Schools in the 1980s when I was working in black education during the apartheid years. The irony was that we couldn't do "indigenous" education, because that would be seen to be inferior, but it so much seemed to be the right thing to do. Perhaps we can still do it. But this year I would like to get started on a small step to bilingual education. Carol On 16 January 2016 at 17:12, Laure Kloetzer wrote: > Very inspiring life for all of us - thank you Gordon. I'll be happy to read > his latest MCA paper. > Warm regards, > LK > > > 2016-01-16 15:50 GMT+01:00 mike cole : > > > Thank you for telling us about Roland's passing, Gordon, and passing > along > > Lois Yamauchi message about him. > > An article he co-authored will be in the next issue of MCA. > > He will be missed. > > > > mike > > > > On Sat, Jan 16, 2016 at 6:16 AM, Gordon Wells > > wrote: > > > > > From: Lois Yamauchi > > > Date: Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 7:39 AM > > > Subject: Roland Tharp > > > To: coe-l@lists.hawaii.edu, edpsych-l@lists.hawaii.edu > > > Cc: Clifford O'Donnell > > > > > > > > > Dear Colleagues: > > > > > > A close friend and treasured colleague for over 45 years, Roland Tharp, > > > died on December 25th. He touched the lives of all who were privileged > to > > > know him with his kindness, generosity of spirit, and humanity. Roland > > was > > > a renaissance human being: scholar, theorist, researcher, educator, > poet, > > > writer, and film director. He combined scientific rigor with an > artistic > > > mind, appreciating the cultural, mystical and spiritual among the many > > ways > > > of knowing. > > > > > > For more than a decade, Roland taught a graduate seminar each summer in > > the > > > Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Hawai?i. He > was > > > Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the Universities of of Hawai?i and > > > California-Santa Cruz and was also a Research Professor, Senior > > Scientist, > > > and Director in the Graduate School of Education, University of > > > California-Berkeley. In his eight years at Berkeley, he received $32M > in > > > competitive awards. His multidisciplinary research and theory spanned > > over > > > 52 years and 250 publications. > > > > > > He began his professional career in Arizona where he founded the first > > > graduate program in Community Psychology (University of Arizona, Master > > of > > > Arts). In Arizona he formulated his Triadic Model of behavioral > > > intervention with family and community members as change agents. His > book > > > with Bud Wetzel based on this work, Behavior Modification in the > Natural > > > Environment, is a recurrent Citations Classic. For the last 30 years he > > > continued his work in Arizona by serving on the Board of Directors of > the > > > Intermountain Centers for Human Development providing community-based > > > residential and support services to at-risk individuals and persons > with > > > disabilities. > > > > > > At the University of Hawai?i, he created a system of educational reform > > > based on the cultural values and strengths of the Native Hawaiian > > community > > > (the Kamehameha Early Education Project). His book with Ronald > Gallimore > > > based on this work, Rousing Minds to Life: Teaching and Learning in > > Social > > > Context, won the prestigious Grawemeyer Award. This system of > educational > > > reform has been studied intensely and published widely for Native > > > Hawaiians, Navajo, Zuni, urban mixed ethnicity poverty neighborhoods in > > > Houston, Chicago and Indianapolis, Latino immigrant and migrant > > communities > > > in Northern California, Appalachian urban migrants in Louisville, and > in > > > the recent national educational reform in urban migrants in Louisville, > > and > > > in the recent national educational reform in Greenland. > > > > > > Also at the University of Hawai?i, he founded the Clinical Studies > > graduate > > > program, guided the program to APA accreditation, and became a > prominent > > > professor in our doctoral program in Community and Cultural Psychology. > > He > > > served as President of the Hawai?i Psychological Association and the > > > Hawai?i Literary Arts Council, and was awarded the Regents Medal for > > > Excellence in Teaching. > > > > > > In addition to his accomplishments in psychology and education, Roland > > > received major awards for his fiction, poetry and films. Among many > > others, > > > these include the Ida and Charles Freeman Short Story Award for > > Cat-House, > > > a Robert Frost Fellowship in Poetry, the Grand Prize, Atlantic Monthly > > > National Contest (Essay) for Romanesque Sculpture: A Study in the > > Hideous, > > > and the American Film Magazine Award, Hawai?i International Film > > Festival, > > > for his film My Aunt May. > > > > > > Roland maintained his intellectual curiosity right up to the end of his > > 85 > > > years. In his late 70s and early 80s he traveled frequently to > Greenland > > to > > > consult on their educational reforms. At 80 he published his last book > of > > > poetry, Mad With Flowers And Tears. At 82 he published his theory > > locating > > > the nexus of influence-for-change within the psychosocial systems and > > > social networks of communities: Delta: Toward a Unified and Universal > > > Theory and Practice of Influence and Change. > > > > > > In his last two years, several of his poems were set to music and > > released > > > as a CD, and the 10th edition of Self-Directed Behavior: Self > > Modification > > > for Personal Adjustment was published with David Watson. Roland's > latest > > > article, Cultural-Historical Activity Theory and Cultural Community > > > Psychology: The Potential for Greater Commonality is in the current > issue > > > of Mind, Culture, and Activity. > > > > > > Roland is listed in the Outstanding Educators of America, Who?s Who in > > > American Education, Poets of America, the International Who?s Who in > > > Poetry, and Poets? Encyclopedia. > > > > > > Let us celebrate his remarkable life and continue to be inspired by his > > > many works.* Please join us at a memorial service for Roland on* > > > > > > *Sunday, January 24 at Bishop Memorial Chapel, Kamehameha Schools, > > Kapalama > > > Campus, noon until 4 pm. * > > > Aloha, > > > > > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > > > Professor Emeritus, Psychology > > > > > > Lois A. Yamauchi, PhD, > > > Professor, Educational Psychology > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > -- Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Jan 17 16:55:07 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2016 17:55:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon-The art of dying In-Reply-To: References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> <17C96EE1-31BF-4C06-B773-E0327542EE79@gmail.com> Message-ID: <6B0CB689-977E-4530-8393-CA7DCD16D83D@gmail.com> Esteemed Susan, How cool is that: The Graffitti Grannies of Lisbon! Great example of late blooming! Though I?m probably not well grounded in thinking I could start up a chapter of the Lisbon project and call it Graffitti Grandpas of Albuquerque. Let me say that apart from the typical non-terminal, typical, geriatric iissues of people like me, I am getting older, not dying. But, I have been focusing lately on performance, usually on a small stage, when faced with death. It seems to me that it?s still about performance art, in a way. The art of dying, one might say. I am very uncomfortable with the submission to ?heroic measures? at the end of life. They tend to short circuit agency in dying, often reduce the quality of life, and suck up resources that could be used to make a better life for those we leave behind. This issue of competition for resources between the young and the old is raised by Lifecourse, for which Greg Thompson just gave us a link: https://lists.capalon.com/lists/listinfo/acyig_lifecourse I am wondering if there has been a chat thread on death and dying. I will be taking part in a book discussion group next week on Being Mortal by Atul Gawande I think it would be interesting to have a socio-cultural perspective. For starters, isn?t dying among the most impactful perizhvanie, both individually and culturally, however public the stage? Cheers to you, too, Susan! Henry > On Jan 17, 2016, at 5:37 AM, Susan Davis wrote: > > Dear Henry, > Thank you for your genuine reflections & revelations! We are all capable of late blooming & I think we are interesting times with the world facing a growth in an aging population, many of whom finally have the time to discover the possibilities of what they can do and who they might be ... Some agencies are recognising and supporting such flowering of creativity in the later years http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2015/sep/13/the-graffiti-grannies-of-lisbon > > Cheers > Sue > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 15 Jan 2016, at 2:08 pm, "HENRY SHONERD" wrote: >> >> Susan and Annalisa, >> Thank you very much for your posts. I understand better at this moment art, performance and agency. Regarding Bowie's trans-generational narrative, I have fantasized that I am, at 72, capable of late blooming, even if that only means dying with dignity, and maybe a bit of panache. And maybe even juice for more than that. My favorite part of teaching has been reaching across generation gaps, whatever the cultural differences between my students and me. I have craved their respect and trust, even as I reflected on my shortcomings. Were I famous, would those I have injured speak ill of me? I have fantasized such fame and that I made my apologies before the infamy of public shaming. We, the unfamous, will go to our graves without fear that we will be publically outed. But we will still be disappointed in ourselves when we let go a chance to learn from our screw ups and do better the next time. Else what is perizhvanie for? >> Henry >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkLE1Gno724 >> >> >>> On Jan 14, 2016, at 4:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those insights/explanations. >>> >>> Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it. >>> >>> As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. >>> >>> It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against cancer. >>> >>> There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet back then. >>> >>> But after considering these things, there also appears to be several other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" concerning David Bowie's passing. >>> >>> One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive and kicking. >>> >>> The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual. >>> >>> The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would. >>> >>> The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him for doing it. >>> >>> A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages. >>> >>> Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity. >>> >>> Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album "Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. >>> But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name: >>> ? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light >>> ? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter annihilation in the early universe >>> ? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes >>> ? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole >>> ? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside universe is impossible >>> ? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold white dwarf >>> >>> These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. >>> >>> Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming from different directions and locations. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jan 17 20:44:39 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2016 20:44:39 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] 62:3.5 billion Message-ID: Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as the bottom half of the world's population. Literally unimaginable. mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 17 21:07:06 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 16:07:06 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <569C72FA.1000607@mira.net> Kautsky certainly would have found this situation "unimaginable": We consider the breakdown of the present social system to be unavoidable, because we know that the economic evolution inevitably brings on conditions that will /compel/ the exploited classes to rise against this system of private ownership. We know that this system multiplies the number and the strength of the exploited, and diminishes the number and strength of the exploiting, classes, and that it will finally lead to such unbearable conditions for the mass of the population that they will have no choice but to go down into degradation or to overthrow the system of private property. (Kautsky, 1892) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 18/01/2016 3:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as > the bottom > half of the world's population. > > Literally unimaginable. > > mike > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Jan 17 21:31:43 2016 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 05:31:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: <569C72FA.1000607@mira.net> References: , <569C72FA.1000607@mira.net> Message-ID: <1453095102861.77802@iped.uio.no> Yeah... "unimaginable" but quite predictable, to our shame. What is more sad is that "imagining" how to reverse this situation seems so difficult, if not impossible, to most of us today. It reminds me Latour saying, "today it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism". He made this comment to point out that what classically had been thought of as "Nature", now appears less stable and secure than the "artificial", that is, than our economical/societal organization. It turns out that the latter is just as real and natural as the former... The good news, I guess, is that another way to do things should be just as imaginable as it is desirable to many of us. Alfredo. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 18 January 2016 06:07 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion Kautsky certainly would have found this situation "unimaginable": We consider the breakdown of the present social system to be unavoidable, because we know that the economic evolution inevitably brings on conditions that will /compel/ the exploited classes to rise against this system of private ownership. We know that this system multiplies the number and the strength of the exploited, and diminishes the number and strength of the exploiting, classes, and that it will finally lead to such unbearable conditions for the mass of the population that they will have no choice but to go down into degradation or to overthrow the system of private property. (Kautsky, 1892) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 18/01/2016 3:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as > the bottom > half of the world's population. > > Literally unimaginable. > > mike > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sun Jan 17 22:24:46 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 08:24:46 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: <1453095102861.77802@iped.uio.no> References: <569C72FA.1000607@mira.net> <1453095102861.77802@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: What makes the end of capitalism more likely is that the bottom half of the world *get to know* about those billionaires. However, I think at the height of Victorian capitalism, the *relative* differences were as great, at least in England. (I can't talk about the rest of the UK.) Carol On 18 January 2016 at 07:31, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Yeah... "unimaginable" but quite predictable, to our shame. What is more > sad is that "imagining" how to reverse this situation seems so difficult, > if not impossible, to most of us today. It reminds me Latour saying, "today > it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism". > He made this comment to point out that what classically had been thought of > as "Nature", now appears less stable and secure than the "artificial", that > is, than our economical/societal organization. It turns out that the latter > is just as real and natural as the former... The good news, I guess, is > that another way to do things should be just as imaginable as it is > desirable to many of us. > > Alfredo. > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Andy Blunden > Sent: 18 January 2016 06:07 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion > > Kautsky certainly would have found this situation > "unimaginable": > > We consider the breakdown of the present social system > to be unavoidable, because we know that the economic > evolution inevitably brings on conditions that will > /compel/ the exploited classes to rise against this > system of private ownership. We know that this system > multiplies the number and the strength of the exploited, > and diminishes the number and strength of the > exploiting, classes, and that it will finally lead to > such unbearable conditions for the mass of the > population that they will have no choice but to go down > into degradation or to overthrow the system of private > property. (Kautsky, 1892) > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 18/01/2016 3:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as > > the bottom > > half of the world's population. > > > > Literally unimaginable. > > > > mike > > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sun Jan 17 22:43:39 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 08:43:39 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Conferences in August-September 2016 Message-ID: Dear Colleagues I am wanting to go the UK and Iceland for a visit August or September and would like to combine this with a conference in the UK or Europe. Are there any that people know of in development/education/activity theory/cultural psychology? Thanks Carol -- Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sun Jan 17 22:43:39 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 08:43:39 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Conferences in August-September 2016 Message-ID: Dear Colleagues I am wanting to go the UK and Iceland for a visit August or September and would like to combine this with a conference in the UK or Europe. Are there any that people know of in development/education/activity theory/cultural psychology? Thanks Carol -- Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 17 23:25:53 2016 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 16:25:53 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: References: <569C72FA.1000607@mira.net> <1453095102861.77802@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: I think Andy's quote from Kautsky is a little misleading, and that its power to mislead doesn't stop at the obvious place--that is, the obviously false conclusion that the reason that the masses don't revolt is that they are not yet sufficiently oppressed. I think that Carol is trying to rectify that by saying that the reason that the masses don't revolt is that although they are objectively oppressed enough, they are not subjectively aware of their oppression or (what amounts to the same thing) they are not subjectively aware of how unoppressed the top half of the world is. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both points of view are wrong and neither point of view provides a really sound basis for understanding how Vygotsky exapts the term "crisis" to describe child development. Marx was, in his way, a great champion of capitalism: he had enormous respect for the productive power that the industrial revolution unleashed and saw immediately that the establishment of a world market meant that scarcity was no longer natural or necessary in any way in any part of the world without exception. Marx's explanation for capitalist crises is not an explanation that relies on under-production or on scarcity--quite the contrary, for Marx the crisis is a crisis of under-consumption. Capitalism has unleashed productive power that cannot be absorbed by workers, for if workers are paid the wherewithal to reappropriate the product of their labour, how can the capitalist appropriate surplus value? Where will the capitalist's reinvestment capital, not to mention his profit, come form without exploitation? You might say that the problem is easily solved: capitalist and worker, hand in hand, can export to the part of the world where Carol lives, and together live off the surplus value expropriated from rich and poor in the non-capitalist, or at least, extra-national capitalist, economy. But that would leave out Marx's second great insight, which is that the establishment of the world market transforms the whole world in the image of capital and makes scarcity into a historical, rather than a natural, law. South Africa must pay for its Apple computers somehow, and the only way it can do that is by becoming itself part of the world which is paid less than the value of its labor. The crisis is not done away with by extending it to the world market; quite the contrary. In a lot of the discussions of the various crises in child development that Vygotsky posits (see Volume Five of the Collected Works in English, or, better, the 2001 Lectures on Pedology) we can see the non-Vygotskyan idea that the crisis comes to the child from the outside, by some demand made by the social situation of development which the child does not yet have the means to meet. But if that is really what Vygotsky has in mind, why can't the crisis simply be abolished by eliminating those demands on the child that the child cannot meet or by meeting them, as Karpov and other "neo-Vygotskyans" insist? Why does Vygotsky say (on the very last page of Volume Five) that the crisis is always INTERNAL in nature? And why does the crisis seem to keep coming back in different guises? It seems to me that Vygotksy's exaptation of the Marxian notion of crisis is much better fitting than we have assumed. In fact, the crisis is always brought about the SUPERPRODUCTIVITY of the neoformation. For example, the child's "instinctive form of mental life" creates meaning potential (realized as visceral fears in adults) that the child cannot use at two months. The child's "autonomous speech" creates intonation and stress that, unanchored to lexis, cannot be used to communicate at twelve months. And at three, when the child learns negation, the child unlocks the vast store of meaning potential which Huw was discussing on another thread, and is simply unable to absorb it. That's the true origin of the crisis, just as the true origin of the crisis in our own time is the inability to reappropriate the products of labor and keep the market intact. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 3:24 PM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > What makes the end of capitalism more likely is that the bottom half of the > world *get to know* about those billionaires. > > However, I think at the height of Victorian capitalism, the *relative* > differences were as great, at least in England. (I can't talk about the > rest of the UK.) > > Carol > > On 18 January 2016 at 07:31, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Yeah... "unimaginable" but quite predictable, to our shame. What is more > > sad is that "imagining" how to reverse this situation seems so difficult, > > if not impossible, to most of us today. It reminds me Latour saying, > "today > > it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism". > > He made this comment to point out that what classically had been thought > of > > as "Nature", now appears less stable and secure than the "artificial", > that > > is, than our economical/societal organization. It turns out that the > latter > > is just as real and natural as the former... The good news, I guess, is > > that another way to do things should be just as imaginable as it is > > desirable to many of us. > > > > Alfredo. > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > Andy Blunden > > Sent: 18 January 2016 06:07 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion > > > > Kautsky certainly would have found this situation > > "unimaginable": > > > > We consider the breakdown of the present social system > > to be unavoidable, because we know that the economic > > evolution inevitably brings on conditions that will > > /compel/ the exploited classes to rise against this > > system of private ownership. We know that this system > > multiplies the number and the strength of the exploited, > > and diminishes the number and strength of the > > exploiting, classes, and that it will finally lead to > > such unbearable conditions for the mass of the > > population that they will have no choice but to go down > > into degradation or to overthrow the system of private > > property. (Kautsky, 1892) > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 18/01/2016 3:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth > as > > > the bottom > > > half of the world's population. > > > > > > Literally unimaginable. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Jan 18 01:36:05 2016 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (carolmacdon) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 11:36:05 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion Message-ID: And please explain how we do this reappropriation? ?I have been reading about the crowd in public life 1730 to 1848 and sense they are going to be the space of change. Modern protests, that is where the protesters have a visible, identifiable face. Right now South Africans are busy trying to bring down our President, ?and a lot has to do with protests.? And the latest crisis was driven by market concerns. The weak rand makes us a weak global player. But while he seems invincible we are turning on each other as well. Carol Sent from Samsung Mobile -------- Original message -------- From: David Kellogg Date: 18/01/2016 09:25 (GMT+02:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion I think Andy's quote from Kautsky is a little misleading, and that its power to mislead doesn't stop at the obvious place--that is, the obviously false conclusion that the reason that the masses don't revolt is that they are not yet sufficiently oppressed. I think that Carol is trying to rectify that by saying that the reason that the masses don't revolt is that although they are objectively oppressed enough, they are not subjectively aware of their oppression or (what amounts to the same thing) they are not subjectively aware of how unoppressed the top half of the world is. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both points of view are wrong and neither point of view provides a really sound basis for understanding how Vygotsky exapts the term "crisis" to describe child development. Marx was, in his way, a great champion of capitalism: he had enormous respect for the productive power that the industrial revolution unleashed and saw immediately that the establishment of a world market meant that scarcity was no longer natural or necessary in any way in any part of the world without exception. Marx's explanation for capitalist crises is not an explanation that relies on under-production or on scarcity--quite the contrary, for Marx the crisis is a crisis of under-consumption. Capitalism has unleashed productive power that cannot be absorbed by workers, for if workers are paid the wherewithal to reappropriate the product of their labour, how can the capitalist appropriate surplus value? Where will the capitalist's reinvestment capital, not to mention his profit, come form without exploitation? You might say that the problem is easily solved: capitalist and worker, hand in hand, can export to the part of the world where Carol lives, and together live off the surplus value expropriated from rich and poor in the non-capitalist, or at least, extra-national capitalist, economy. But that would leave out Marx's second great insight, which is that the establishment of the world market transforms the whole world in the image of capital and makes scarcity into a historical, rather than a natural, law. South Africa must pay for its Apple computers somehow, and the only way it can do that is by becoming itself part of the world which is paid less than the value of its labor. The crisis is not done away with by extending it to the world market; quite the contrary. In a lot of the discussions of the various crises in child development that Vygotsky posits (see Volume Five of the Collected Works in English, or, better, the 2001 Lectures on Pedology) we can see the non-Vygotskyan idea that the crisis comes to the child from the outside, by some demand made by the social situation of development which the child does not yet have the means to meet. But if that is really what Vygotsky has in mind, why can't the crisis simply be abolished by eliminating those demands on the child that the child cannot meet or by meeting them, as Karpov and other "neo-Vygotskyans" insist? Why does Vygotsky say (on the very last page of Volume Five) that the crisis is always INTERNAL in nature? And why does the crisis seem to keep coming back in different guises? It seems to me that Vygotksy's exaptation of the Marxian notion of crisis is much better fitting than we have assumed. In fact, the crisis is always brought about the SUPERPRODUCTIVITY of the neoformation. For example, the child's "instinctive form of mental life" creates meaning potential (realized as visceral fears in adults) that the child cannot use at two months. The child's "autonomous speech" creates intonation and stress that, unanchored to lexis, cannot be used to communicate at twelve months. And at three, when the child learns negation, the child unlocks the vast store of meaning potential which Huw was discussing on another thread, and is simply unable to absorb it. That's the true origin of the crisis, just as the true origin of the crisis in our own time is the inability to reappropriate the products of labor and keep the market intact. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 3:24 PM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > What makes the end of capitalism more likely is that the bottom half of the > world *get to know* about those billionaires. > > However, I think at the height of Victorian capitalism, the *relative* > differences were as great, at least in England. (I can't talk about the > rest of the UK.) > > Carol > > On 18 January 2016 at 07:31, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Yeah... "unimaginable" but quite predictable, to our shame. What is more > > sad is that "imagining" how to reverse this situation seems so difficult, > > if not impossible, to most of us today. It reminds me Latour saying, > "today > > it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism". > > He made this comment to point out that what classically had been thought > of > > as "Nature", now appears less stable and secure than the "artificial", > that > > is, than our economical/societal organization. It turns out that the > latter > > is just as real and natural as the former... The good news, I guess, is > > that another way to do things should be just as imaginable as it is > > desirable to many of us. > > > > Alfredo. > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > Andy Blunden > > Sent: 18 January 2016 06:07 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion > > > > Kautsky certainly would have found this situation > > "unimaginable": > > > >???? We consider the breakdown of the present social system > >???? to be unavoidable, because we know that the economic > >???? evolution inevitably brings on conditions that will > >???? /compel/ the exploited classes to rise against this > >???? system of private ownership. We know that this system > >???? multiplies the number and the strength of the exploited, > >???? and diminishes the number and strength of the > >???? exploiting, classes, and that it will finally lead to > >???? such unbearable conditions for the mass of the > >???? population that they will have no choice but to go down > >???? into degradation or to overthrow the system of private > >???? property. (Kautsky, 1892) > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 18/01/2016 3:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth > as > > > the bottom > > > half of the world's population. > > > > > > Literally unimaginable. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A? Macdonald PhD (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Jan 18 04:25:29 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 07:25:29 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Voodou Priests And Doctors Are On The Frontline Of Haiti's Mental Health Care Message-ID: Article: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/14/voodoo-haiti-mental-health_n_6471624.html Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Jan 18 04:33:01 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 07:33:01 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion Message-ID: I do not glorify the bottom half of the world's population as cornel west does because, as I see it, they are complicit in the perpetuation of the system established by the top 1 percent.... the bottom half want to be billionaires ?(I had to spend hours in line at the grocery store last week while the poor brown, black, and white folks of my neighborhood in south florida stood in line discussing the luxury items they are going to purchase should they win the power ball). Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: mike cole Date: 1/17/2016 11:44 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] 62:3.5 billion Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as the bottom half of the world's population. Literally unimaginable. mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Jan 18 04:45:04 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 07:45:04 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] BBC News: Oxfam says wealth of richest 1% equal to other 99% Message-ID: <2c4kyydjhusvmmy647ivrwds.1453121103641@email.android.com> Oxfam says wealth of richest 1% equal to other 99% - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35339475 Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Jan 18 04:54:19 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 14:54:19 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I think that emancipation of the poor is the work of people from outside of the poor, in whom they see not a humanity in a philantrophic manner, but a great force to change the world, to abolish capitalism. It is therefore most important not what poor think and don't think, but are the intellectuals able to think to abolish capitalism? The best examples are Marx and Lenin. Ulvi 18 Oca 2016 14:36 tarihinde "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" yazd?: > > > I do not glorify the bottom half of the world's population as cornel west > does because, as I see it, they are complicit in the perpetuation of the > system established by the top 1 percent.... the bottom half want to be > billionaires (I had to spend hours in line at the grocery store last week > while the poor brown, black, and white folks of my neighborhood in south > florida stood in line discussing the luxury items they are going to > purchase should they win the power ball). > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: mike cole > Date: 1/17/2016 11:44 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] 62:3.5 billion > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as > the bottom > half of the world's population. > > Literally unimaginable. > > mike > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Jan 18 06:17:03 2016 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 14:17:03 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <72269651.10833593.1453126623931.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> David, I have good reasons for my pauses and stops in writing . However , I'll send you two posts offlist regarding our previous debate . I'm sure you're , as always , somehow ! able to show where my confusions are . I now say I might not be able to reply in time . You'll be generous to accept my apologies?beforehand . >From what you have written , I think some sort of?a concept of 'innateness' could be drawn out . We were trying to digest : instruction?leads development . And?does not instruction come from the outside ? zpd , affordances ,?Internalization , etc. ? And you said previously using?Mike's epigraph that for one?type of good insight , mind as an 'object' makes history . Of course , I think , Mike presents this just as an epigraph (you removed psychology?like the natural sciences) liable to expansion and reasoning and penetration. In his latest endeavour on academia.edu with Peter and Braga he's quite fair and logical with what we might infer from?the content , connotation , metaphor of his epigraph . Most importantly?is his reliance on the Vygotsky SCHOOL . ?? ? You're alright with Marx as he says capitalism nourishes its destroyer within itself --capitalism is its grave-digger . And you're right with another phenomenon , development , by saying that in infancy?, there's potentialized moment of puberty . And?with the idea of?refreshment of 'contemplation' , that we should avoid activity ; otherwise , two opposite things (dualism?) get mixed , especial genus of contemplation loses independence ? Not only is Kautsky wrong , and not only is Carol?quite right (the oppressed are still being fooled by appearances , got nowhere with the essence , inner mechanism of 'capitalism' (she seems to be optimistic with another trend cz she thinks of cash resistances not speculations-get to know--my apologies)?, but also you're wrong with your notions , concepts. All in all , there are about 450 cases of quoting from Marx by Vygotsky which I'm sure are against the way you interpret . Marx says many times if you're satisfied with the appearances , then science will be superflous . By misinterpreting Vygotsky's understanding of Marx , you think you have superceded him in true cognition . Practice is the criterion for theory and theory is born from practice. With underconsumption , you think?you've distanced yourself from appearances ? For workers to reappropriate their products of labour , you didn't suggest a solution . What is the morsel for worker , is luxuries , swollen cottony breasts , insured milliony bottomline virtuosities in cabares for some elites and ... my sincere apologies, and you opt for some ambiguous way of reappropriation . Yes , production is enough for the ever-increasing multitudes but where's a pair of scales to weigh equally ? What's bad in 'social justice' that you come forth with underconsumption on behalf of the worker. Why don't you talk of mass destruction of the very products ? Monoply of scientific achievements is in the service of diminishing the number of morsel-users and preventing them from being converted in worker-theorist. What do you mean by keeping the market intact ? You forget the bail-outs ? Was it workers'will operating ? Is the Market just a Sale Site for supply and demand without versatile interventions on the part of huge banks and international capitalistic institutions (money in reserve for adulteration??) Does That mean workers for some instances of defect?and deliberately?don't purchase their products of their own labour ? To prove your misinterpretation , I momentarily give just three short quotes from Vygotsky in regard to your previous posts which is now also helpful : [[This type of complex, this form of concrete thinking, is predominant in both functional and genetic terms in the child?s actual thinking. Therefore, more detailed consideration must be given to this critical moment in the development of the child?s concepts, a moment which simultaneously separates and connects complexive and conceptual thinking.]] ... [[We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to represent the moments of this genetic process in their mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we have diverged from the complex and twisting path that characterizes the actual development of the child?s concepts.]]? [[Such forms of activity as modeling and building exercises, which by their very nature are designed to promote a child's [SENSORIMOTOR]?development, [can and must] be organized in such a way that they promote the child's discovery and knowledge of objects and help him to form [GENERALIZED IMAGES] which reflect the phenomena of real life correctly and in depth.]] I've gathered many and the reason is you twist the debate the way you like , in fact , you deviate from the main path not for constraints but for overproduction . [The crisis is not done away with by extending it to the world market; quite the contrary.] This really reminds us of your not believing in wholes , rational thinking and development even . Why not see it in the mechanism of the whole market . Generally speaking , opposites are cause for motion of any kind because , the way you argue , dialectics is in Nature itself . And Mind does not make history itself by itself ; it's the whole man who makes history . To make history man first of all engages with Nature , makes things?, makes himself until he enters history in the sense of cultural development . It's just for you , my mentor , to think of your "internalization" . If everything is there , why internalize ?? It's man who internalizes things not an ant or the amoeba let alone Capital . Then your SUPERPRODUCTIVITY of new formations and the OPERPRODUCTION of the capitalistic formation are two distinct things . As you practically experience empirical thinking achievements , you sense similarity between the two . We work out and operate on things with their indepth transformational interactional differences and particularities AS WELL . Hence the relevance of the THESES . Andy's referebce to Marx's bathing of colors as peculiarities to reach UNIversal as concrete . Best Haydi From: David Kellogg To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Monday, 18 January 2016, 10:55:53 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion I think Andy's quote from Kautsky is a little misleading, and that its power to mislead doesn't stop at the obvious place--that is, the obviously false conclusion that the reason that the masses don't revolt is that they are not yet sufficiently oppressed. I think that Carol is trying to rectify that by saying that the reason that the masses don't revolt is that although they are objectively oppressed enough, they are not subjectively aware of their oppression or (what amounts to the same thing) they are not subjectively aware of how unoppressed the top half of the world is. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both points of view are wrong and neither point of view provides a really sound basis for understanding how Vygotsky exapts the term "crisis" to describe child development. Marx was, in his way, a great champion of capitalism: he had enormous respect for the productive power that the industrial revolution unleashed and saw immediately that the establishment of a world market meant that scarcity was no longer natural or necessary in any way in any part of the world without exception. Marx's explanation for capitalist crises is not an explanation that relies on under-production or on scarcity--quite the contrary, for Marx the crisis is a crisis of under-consumption. Capitalism has unleashed productive power that cannot be absorbed by workers, for if workers are paid the wherewithal to reappropriate the product of their labour, how can the capitalist appropriate surplus value? Where will the capitalist's reinvestment capital, not to mention his profit, come form without exploitation? You might say that the problem is easily solved: capitalist and worker, hand in hand, can export to the part of the world where Carol lives, and together live off the surplus value expropriated from rich and poor in the non-capitalist, or at least, extra-national capitalist, economy. But that would leave out Marx's second great insight, which is that the establishment of the world market transforms the whole world in the image of capital and makes scarcity into a historical, rather than a natural, law. South Africa must pay for its Apple computers somehow, and the only way it can do that is by becoming itself part of the world which is paid less than the value of its labor. The crisis is not done away with by extending it to the world market; quite the contrary. In a lot of the discussions of the various crises in child development that Vygotsky posits (see Volume Five of the Collected Works in English, or, better, the 2001 Lectures on Pedology) we can see the non-Vygotskyan idea that the crisis comes to the child from the outside, by some demand made by the social situation of development which the child does not yet have the means to meet. But if that is really what Vygotsky has in mind, why can't the crisis simply be abolished by eliminating those demands on the child that the child cannot meet or by meeting them, as Karpov and other "neo-Vygotskyans" insist? Why does Vygotsky say (on the very last page of Volume Five) that the crisis is always INTERNAL in nature? And why does the crisis seem to keep coming back in different guises? It seems to me that Vygotksy's exaptation of the Marxian notion of crisis is much better fitting than we have assumed. In fact, the crisis is always brought about the SUPERPRODUCTIVITY of the neoformation. For example, the child's "instinctive form of mental life" creates meaning potential (realized as visceral fears in adults) that the child cannot use at two months. The child's "autonomous speech" creates intonation and stress that, unanchored to lexis, cannot be used to communicate at twelve months. And at three, when the child learns negation, the child unlocks the vast store of meaning potential which Huw was discussing on another thread, and is simply unable to absorb it. That's the true origin of the crisis, just as the true origin of the crisis in our own time is the inability to reappropriate the products of labor and keep the market intact. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 3:24 PM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > What makes the end of capitalism more likely is that the bottom half of the > world *get to know* about those billionaires. > > However, I think at the height of Victorian capitalism, the *relative* > differences were as great, at least in England. (I can't talk about the > rest of the UK.) > > Carol > > On 18 January 2016 at 07:31, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Yeah... "unimaginable" but quite predictable, to our shame. What is more > > sad is that "imagining" how to reverse this situation seems so difficult, > > if not impossible, to most of us today. It reminds me Latour saying, > "today > > it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism". > > He made this comment to point out that what classically had been thought > of > > as "Nature", now appears less stable and secure than the "artificial", > that > > is, than our economical/societal organization. It turns out that the > latter > > is just as real and natural as the former... The good news, I guess, is > > that another way to do things should be just as imaginable as it is > > desirable to many of us. > > > > Alfredo. > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > Andy Blunden > > Sent: 18 January 2016 06:07 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion > > > > Kautsky certainly would have found this situation > > "unimaginable": > > > >? ? We consider the breakdown of the present social system > >? ? to be unavoidable, because we know that the economic > >? ? evolution inevitably brings on conditions that will > >? ? /compel/ the exploited classes to rise against this > >? ? system of private ownership. We know that this system > >? ? multiplies the number and the strength of the exploited, > >? ? and diminishes the number and strength of the > >? ? exploiting, classes, and that it will finally lead to > >? ? such unbearable conditions for the mass of the > >? ? population that they will have no choice but to go down > >? ? into degradation or to overthrow the system of private > >? ? property. (Kautsky, 1892) > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 18/01/2016 3:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth > as > > > the bottom > > > half of the world's population. > > > > > > Literally unimaginable. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A? Macdonald PhD (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Jan 18 06:36:24 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 09:36:24 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion Message-ID: Ulvi, Another dictatorship of the proletariat? ?Sounds like "soviet Marxism" (marcuse's usage) all over again! Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Ulvi ??il Date: 1/18/2016 7:54 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion I think that emancipation of the poor is the work of people from outside of the poor, in whom they see not a humanity in a philantrophic manner, but a great force to change the world, to abolish capitalism. It is therefore most important not what poor think and don't think, but are the intellectuals able to think to abolish capitalism? The best examples are Marx and Lenin. Ulvi 18 Oca 2016 14:36 tarihinde "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" yazd?: > > > I do not glorify the bottom half of the world's population as cornel west > does because, as I see it, they are complicit in the perpetuation of the > system established by the top 1 percent.... the bottom half want to be > billionaires? (I had to spend hours in line at the grocery store last week > while the poor brown, black, and white folks of my neighborhood in south > florida stood in line discussing the luxury items they are going to > purchase should they win the power ball). > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: mike cole > Date: 1/17/2016? 11:44 PM? (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l]? 62:3.5 billion > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as > the bottom > half of the world's population. > > Literally unimaginable. > > mike > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Jan 18 06:49:00 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 16:49:00 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: absolutely, to demolish the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. I surely prefer the proletariat's. and it is proven that only a revolution of the october 1917 can save humanity from a total and final collapse? any real alternative? regards 18 Oca 2016 16:40 tarihinde "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" yazd?: > > > Ulvi, > Another dictatorship of the proletariat? Sounds like "soviet Marxism" > (marcuse's usage) all over again! > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Ulvi ??il > Date: 1/18/2016 7:54 AM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion > > I think that emancipation of the poor is the work of people from outside of > the poor, in whom they see not a humanity in a philantrophic manner, but a > great force to change the world, to abolish capitalism. It is therefore > most important not what poor think and don't think, but are the > intellectuals able to think to abolish capitalism? > The best examples are Marx and Lenin. > > Ulvi > 18 Oca 2016 14:36 tarihinde "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > yazd?: > > > > > > > I do not glorify the bottom half of the world's population as cornel west > > does because, as I see it, they are complicit in the perpetuation of the > > system established by the top 1 percent.... the bottom half want to be > > billionaires (I had to spend hours in line at the grocery store last > week > > while the poor brown, black, and white folks of my neighborhood in south > > florida stood in line discussing the luxury items they are going to > > purchase should they win the power ball). > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: mike cole > > Date: 1/17/2016 11:44 PM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] 62:3.5 billion > > > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as > > the bottom > > half of the world's population. > > > > Literally unimaginable. > > > > mike > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > From nataliag@sfu.ca Mon Jan 18 09:09:14 2016 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 09:09:14 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Call for AERA Cultural-Historical SIG officers election In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <712200786.11738242.1453136954327.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Dear XMCA members! On behalf of AERA Cultural-historical SIG and as its current Program Co-Chair, I strongly encourage you to put your name forward for our rapidly approaching SIG officers election. We have few positions (program co-chair and secretary) open this year for re-election. As you know, we are growing organization, devoted to CHAT, and we are asking people to support SIG by volunteering in different leadership capacities. Please, let me know if you have any additional questions. Thank you, Natalia. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Jan 18 12:09:11 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 15:09:11 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion Message-ID: The dictatorship of the proletariat looks a lot like the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Ulvi ??il Date: 1/18/2016 9:49 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion absolutely, to demolish the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. I surely prefer the proletariat's. and it is proven that only a revolution of the october 1917 can save humanity from a total and final collapse? any real alternative? regards 18 Oca 2016 16:40 tarihinde "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" yazd?: > > > Ulvi, > Another dictatorship of the proletariat?? Sounds like "soviet Marxism" > (marcuse's usage) all over again! > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Ulvi ??il > Date: 1/18/2016? 7:54 AM? (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion > > I think that emancipation of the poor is the work of people from outside of > the poor, in whom they see not a humanity in a philantrophic manner, but a > great force to change the world, to abolish capitalism. It is therefore > most important not what poor think and don't think, but are the > intellectuals able to think to abolish capitalism? > The best examples are Marx and Lenin. > > Ulvi > 18 Oca 2016 14:36 tarihinde "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > yazd?: > > > > > > > I do not glorify the bottom half of the world's population as cornel west > > does because, as I see it, they are complicit in the perpetuation of the > > system established by the top 1 percent.... the bottom half want to be > > billionaires? (I had to spend hours in line at the grocery store last > week > > while the poor brown, black, and white folks of my neighborhood in south > > florida stood in line discussing the luxury items they are going to > > purchase should they win the power ball). > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: mike cole > > Date: 1/17/2016? 11:44 PM? (GMT-05:00) > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l]? 62:3.5 billion > > > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth as > > the bottom > > half of the world's population. > > > > Literally unimaginable. > > > > mike > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Jan 18 13:03:37 2016 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 23:03:37 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It is probably that the proletariat could not manage cleverly enough the construction of a society based on social justice and equality. But this does not mean that it should give up, listen to capitalist imperialism which says that it is condemned to live in exploitation, and should not try much cleverly than in the past. Because, at least, humanity has a final chance with the proletariat, but with the bourgeoisie, it is surely completely lost. It deserves new trials. Because, the rest of the world put aside, the core now, even France, Belgium are collapsing. Humanity can only stand up with a socialist revolution. With capitalist imperialism, it is condemned to kneel down, to be afraid, to be desperate. Science, art, culture too can be saved only with social justice and equality. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJUkOLGLgwg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnFwR8G6u2g A better world is possible. Only with socialism. And I think this is a scientific truth. On 18 January 2016 at 22:09, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > The dictatorship of the proletariat looks a lot like the dictatorship of > the bourgeoisie. > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Ulvi ??il > Date: 1/18/2016 9:49 AM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion > > absolutely, to demolish the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. > I surely prefer the proletariat's. > and it is proven that only a revolution of the october 1917 > can save humanity from a total and final collapse? > any real alternative? > regards > 18 Oca 2016 16:40 tarihinde "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > yazd?: > > > > > > > Ulvi, > > Another dictatorship of the proletariat? Sounds like "soviet Marxism" > > (marcuse's usage) all over again! > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Ulvi ??il > > Date: 1/18/2016 7:54 AM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion > > > > I think that emancipation of the poor is the work of people from outside > of > > the poor, in whom they see not a humanity in a philantrophic manner, but > a > > great force to change the world, to abolish capitalism. It is therefore > > most important not what poor think and don't think, but are the > > intellectuals able to think to abolish capitalism? > > The best examples are Marx and Lenin. > > > > Ulvi > > 18 Oca 2016 14:36 tarihinde "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > > > > yazd?: > > > > > > > > > > > I do not glorify the bottom half of the world's population as cornel > west > > > does because, as I see it, they are complicit in the perpetuation of > the > > > system established by the top 1 percent.... the bottom half want to be > > > billionaires (I had to spend hours in line at the grocery store last > > week > > > while the poor brown, black, and white folks of my neighborhood in > south > > > florida stood in line discussing the luxury items they are going to > > > purchase should they win the power ball). > > > > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > > From: mike cole > > > Date: 1/17/2016 11:44 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] 62:3.5 billion > > > > > > Oxfam report: The world's 62 richest billionaires have as much wealth > as > > > the bottom > > > half of the world's population. > > > > > > Literally unimaginable. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jan 18 13:42:57 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 21:42:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 62:3.5 billion In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Perhaps the flood of currency is what will drown us all. I suppose there is always The Rapture? Or... pick your myth here: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/11/091106-2012-end-of-world-myths.html So many stories have already happened (the historical end of the world), that I'm going suggest that we are living in post-apocalyptic times?already! I hope everyone feels better about knowing that. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jan 18 16:30:10 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 00:30:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon In-Reply-To: References: <56971357.7030007@mira.net> <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu> , Message-ID: Hi Susan and others, It's taken me a little bit of time to digest all this rich material, and I had to also watch the Bowie Blackstar video another few times [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kszLwBaC4Sw]. What is striking is that I seem to find something new about the video each time I see it (I also am curious what my experience of just hearing the song without the visuals might be like, and that will be yet another unfolding of the text of the music, as sound-experience-beyond-words-without-pictures). Thanks so much Susan, for posting those articles, they are exactly the nourishment I was looking for. They are not definitive, but certainly helpful. Something else I learned is that the term Blackstar likely comes from a never-released song by Elvis called Blackstar, recorded in the 60's for a movie called Flaming Star, (into which the lyrics were changed). Here's the original lyrics: BLACKSTAR Every man has a black star A black star over his shoulder And when a man sees his black star He knows his time, his time has come Black star don't shine on me, black star Black star keep behind me, black star There's a lot of livin' I gotta do Give me time to make a few dreams come true, black star When I ride I feel that black star That black star over my shoulder So I ride in front of that black star Never lookin' around, never lookin' around Black star don't shine on me, black star Black star keep behind me, black star There's a lot of livin' I gotta do Give me time to make a few dreams come true, black star One fine day I'll see that black star That black star over my shoulder And when I see that old black star I'll know my time, my time has come Black star don't shine on me, black star Black star keep behind me, black star There's a lot of livin' I gotta do Give me time to make a few dreams come true, black star You can listen to both versions of Elvis's Blackstar and Flaming Star here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x0j1aR6b-ms I learned of this connection with the Elvis song in a recent interview with Simon Critchley in the NY Times (about 45 min): http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/arts/music/popcast-love-death-and-david-bowie.html After reading the Bambam article ("The great I AM?[http://www.popmatters.com/feature/the-great-i-am-magic-fascism-and-race-in-david-bowies/]) it appears Blackstar may also to have to do with understanding "what is whiteness," and now I have an entirely different POV on the work of David Bowie. Elvis after all is the quote-unquote-white-man-doing-black-soul-music. It would be a find to learn the story about that song, why they changed the lyrics, and did Elvis write this song himself? Then, what does it means that Bowie appropriated this symbol blackstar, and has layered so many other layers atop of THAT. The baphomet references in the Blackstar video is a rich link to unconventional (pagan) spirituality of Europe (Old Europe before the Romans, or the underground Europe after Christian conquests), and the footage of Bowie holding a text aloft in the video as if a puritan preacher seems to make references to Christian dogma. Perhaps, Bowie's "fascist fascinations" actually have to do with his connection to lost interpretations. The 1975 reprint of the Bowie phone interview also sheds light on this possibility. (http://thequietus.com/articles/03598-david-bowie-nme-interview-about-adolf-hitler-and-new-nazi-rock-movement) The part of the interview that raises the specter of Hitler is here: ---- "Oh, alright ... let's talk about the rest of the album. Very decadent this is [laughs]. 'Somebody Up There Likes Me' is a 'Watch out mate, Hitler's on his way back'... it's your rock and roll sociological bit." ---- He's talking about a song from the Young Americans album. It's his warning of approaching totalitarianism in regards to rock & roll, not that he advocates the principles of Mein Kampf! In everything that becomes totalitarian is the need to not only take control of interpretation, but to make all interpretations literal, which is basically removing any possibility for interpretation at all. It is a kind of death of the symbol (A blackstar). Also, there is something clairvoyant about what he said in that interview, namely: ----start of quote from article "Like the original aim of rock and roll when it first came out was to establish an alternative media speak voice for people who had neither the power nor advantage to infiltrate any other media or carry any weight and cornily enough, people really needed rock and roll. "And what we said was that we were only using rock and roll to express our vehement arguments against the conditions we find ourselves in, and we promise that we will do something to change the world from how it was. We will use rock and roll as a springboard. "But it's just become one more whirling deity, right? Going round that never-decreasing circle. And rock and roll is dead." Does he really believe that? "Absolutely. It's a toothless old woman. It's really embarrassing." So what's the next step? "Dictatorship," says Bowie. "There will be a political figure in the not too distant future who'll sweep this part of the world like early rock and roll did. "You probably hope I'm not right. But I am. My predictions are very accurate ... always." "You've got to have an extreme right front come up and sweep everything off its feet and tidy everything up. Then you can get a new form of liberalism. "There's some form of ghost force liberalism permeating the air in America, but it's got to go, because it's got no foundation at all, apart from a set of laws that were established way back in the bloody '50s and early '60s and have no bearing at all in the '70s. (The Supreme Court in America was at its most liberal in the late '50s, early '60s.) "So the best thing that can happen is for an extreme right Government to come. It'll do something positive at least to the cause commotion in people and they'll either accept the dictatorship or get rid of it. "It's like a kaleidoscope," says Bowie. "No matter how many little colours you put in it, that kaleidoscope will make those colours have a pattern ... and that's what happens with TV ? it doesn't matter who puts what in the TV, by the end of the year there's a whole format that the TV put together. The TV puts over its own plan. "Who says the space people have got no eyes? You have ? you've got one in every living room in the world. That's theoretical of course?" ----end of quote from article How he could have known that there would be as-if an TV eye watching everyone in their living rooms (the internet? cable television?), as well as the "fascism" of television as a machine that creates particular "kaleidoscope patterns" no matter what you put, all that is fairly uncanny. Now, not intending to read too much farther into this (I guess I am), but looking back at this interview there certainly is the possibility of matching his take with what has happened since then: that since the 70s/80s the Conservative right has taken over the political process, and is slowly eroding the rights of the ordinary person. It does appear to be a fair (and coherent) statement to say that a rising conservative government will cause a commotion that will mean either we accept it or we get rid of it. Can it create a new kind of liberalism? Could he have meant neoliberalism? These are just more connections (I'm making) that possibly indicate reasons why there was something that resembles a global perezhivanie upon his passing. Incidentally, I read someplace that he was told by a psychic in his youth that he would die when he was 69. And that seems to have happened. I'm not sure if I would want to know the date of my departure, but he seems to have had plenty of time to prepare for it and make his exit his own. Kind regards, Annalisa From preiss.xmca@gmail.com Mon Jan 18 17:53:21 2016 From: preiss.xmca@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 22:53:21 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Gavriel Salomon Message-ID: Dear colleagues, I just got this very sad news from EARLI. I was an admirer of Gavriel Salomon's work, although I never had the opportunity to interact with him in person. His work touched minds in places as far from Israel as South America. I am sure many people here was inspired by his work not only in technology but also in peace education. I am sorry to pass this really bad news. Best, David With deep regret I have to announce that one of the most important members >> of our association passed away at the beginning of the New Year. Professor >> Gavriel Salomon was one of the driving forces when EARLI was founded 30 >> years ago. He was a wonderful person, an active member of EARLI (Keynote >> speaker, EC member) and an extremely important researcher in our field. >> With his affiliations both in Israel and in the USA and his activities in >> Europe he exemplified through his own life the relevance and attractiveness >> of cross-border activities in research, thus epitomising the idea of EARLI. >> His research activities concerning educational technology, distributed >> cognition, and peace education always showed this attitude. He will >> continue to be remembered in EARLI. >> >> An obituary by David Berliner will be issued in a forthcoming EARLI >> Newsletter, a memorial special issue of Frontline Learning Research will be >> prepared by the Editors. >> >> Hans Gruber, >> >> EARLI President >> >> >> From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Jan 19 21:17:51 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 05:17:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] More on Davos Message-ID: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/19/davos-super-rich-wealth-inequality From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Jan 20 10:44:21 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 18:44:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: More on Davos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Art meets science meets gender meets technology meets class meets surveillance meets identity meets property meets?what else? http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/20/artist-creates-life-sized-models-chelsea-manning-face-davos-3d-printing-dna This is just all around bizarre. Kind regards, Annalisa From smago@uga.edu Thu Jan 21 13:32:31 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:32:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Share the JoLLE newsletter! In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello, all! The link below will allow you to share the JoLLE newsletter, including the new SSO, through social media such as FB, Twitter, Pinterest, etc. Share far and wide! Stephanie https://www.smore.com/yk5ms [https://d1zqayhc1yz6oo.cloudfront.net/569fa8ea3b6c74617dda8a91-screenshot-fb_wide.jpg?_v=1453411708] JoLLE@UGA www.smore.com January's Scholars Speak Out feature In his essay, Literacy and Conceptual Appropriation in One Page: Behind the LSLP Micro-Papers, Dr.... Stephanie Anne Shelton, Managing Editor Journal of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia Aderhold 315 Athens, GA 30602 jollesubmissions@uga.edu Follow JoLLE on Twitter: @Jolle_uga Follow JoLLE on Facebook: Journal of Language & Literacy Education http://jolle.coe.uga.edu/ From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Jan 21 15:41:40 2016 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 23:41:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: More on Davos In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: To add to my conversation with myself :) http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jan/21/george-soros-donald-trump-doing-work-isis From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jan 22 11:07:12 2016 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 11:07:12 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] UCSD position: Assistant Teaching Professor (Lecturer with Potential Security of Employment) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gedeon De?k* Date: Thursday, 21 January 2016 Subject: [COGDEVSOC] UCSD position: Assistant Teaching Professor (Lecturer with Potential Security of Employment) To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Cc: Camie Nguyen The Human Development Program at the University of California, San Diego, invites applications for a tenure-track Assistant Teaching Professor (LPSOE) position, specifically within the area of Socio-Cultural Lifespan Development, beginning July 1, 2016. This position emphasizes excellence in teaching and other instruction-related activities to undergraduate education. Assistant Teaching Professors are evaluated based on their teaching performance, engagement in professional activities and service related to the pedagogical mission of the Program and University. The Human Development Program (HDP) (http://hdp.ucsd.edu/) is located within the Division of Social Sciences at UC, San Diego and is committed to academic excellence and diversity within the faculty, staff and student body. HDP is an undergraduate program that provides students with a unique perspective that highlights the dynamics of lifespan development. The program reflects the interdisciplinary nature of research at UCSD. The profile of the HDP major reflects this perspective analytically and structurally. There are, accordingly, three lifespan concentrations available for majors: Biological Development, Language and Cognitive Development, and Socio-Cultural Development. The Program is seeking a candidate with a strong background in cross-cultural research, particularly focused on adolescence though late life development. Required qualifications include a Ph.D. in any of several relevant fields, for example, Anthropology, Psychology, Communications, Education, and Sociology, among others. Candidates will be favored who (1) have teaching expertise and a background in social-cultural topics, (2) have knowledge and expertise in advanced methods, including experimental methodology and quantitative analysis, qualitative and/or mixed methods designs. (3) have superlative accomplishments in the classroom or other instructional settings, (4) have shown potential or demonstrated educational leadership in areas contributing to diversity, equity, and inclusion, and (5) will contribute to instruction-related activities including curriculum development and employment of new technologies. Salary: Salary is commensurate with qualifications and based on University of California pay scales. Closing Date: Review of applications will begin February 22, 2016 and will continue until the position is filled. To Apply: Candidates should submit a cover letter, curriculum vitae, teaching statement, links to any documentation of teaching excellence (including instructional materials developed by the candidate, summaries of teaching evaluations, on-line instructional segments, reprints of scholarly articles particularly with a pedagogical focus), and a personal statement that summarizes their past or potential contributions to diversity (see http://facultyequity.ucsd.edu/Faculty-Applicant-C2D-Info.asp for further information). The candidate should also arrange for three to four letters of recommendation commenting on the candidate?s pedagogical skills, among other attributes to be submitted via the on-line application system. All materials should be submitted electronically via UCSD's Academic Personnel On-Line RECRUIT at https://apol-recruit.ucsd.edu/apply/JPF00986 Please apply to the following job posting: Assistant Teaching Professor?Lecturer with Potential Security of Employment The University of California is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age or protected veteran status. -- Gedeon O. De?k, Ph.D. Department of Cognitive Science 9500 Gilman Dr. Univ. CA, San Diego La Jolla, CA 92093-0515 cogdevlab.ucsd.edu http://www.gedeondeak.com/ http://ucsd.academia.edu/GedeonDe?k _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From smago@uga.edu Wed Jan 27 15:28:17 2016 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 23:28:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: For those who teach university research methods courses, or are attentive to research methods in other courses, or are doing research, or whatever, the following might be of interest. From: writcomm Written Communication [mailto:writcomm@umn.edu] Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 4:08 PM Subject: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching Dear Written Communication Editorial Board: I write regarding a relevant new development at Written Communication. We have recently released a set of teaching resources for instructors leading methods courses. These resources include an introduction, an overview of methods in the field, and 11 method descriptions listed below. The bulk of this synthetic work was done by WC?s former Editorial Assistant, Abigail Bakke, and current Editorial Assistant, Kira Dreher. Each method is accompanied by links to what we believe are exemplary articles demonstrating specific methods from Written Communication?s archive. We?ve sought to represent a variety of scholars, disciplines, countries, and topics. ? Concurrent Process Measures ? Diaries and Journals ? Ethnography and Ethnographic Tools and Methods ? Historical/Archival ? Interviews ? Linguistic and Discourse Analysis ? Quantitative ? Quasi-Experimental ? Rhetorical Analysis ? Surveys We hope that you help us to promote this resource in any way you deem appropriate. Perhaps you might choose to use this resource as a supplement for your own courses or recommend it to colleagues and/or graduate students. You might also promote it via other platforms, such as social media. I?d welcome any feedback you have on this set of resources. We?re in the process of developing similar resources for other courses, and I?d be interested in your ideas about what those might include, as well. As always, thank you for your support of Written Communication. Sincerely, Christina Haas -- Written Communication University of Minnesota College of Liberal Arts Department of Writing Studies follow us on twitter: @writtencomm ***CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*** The information in this message and any attachments is confidential and may be legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents is without authorization and is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error, immediately notify the sender and delete this copy from your computer system. Thank you. From ConneryMC@cwu.edu Wed Jan 27 17:32:09 2016 From: ConneryMC@cwu.edu (Mary Connery) Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 01:32:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <9ECD6E9E-D06A-4F95-A2E3-D9873368EAF6@cwu.edu> Hi Peter: Thanks for this wonderful resource! Best, Cathrene Dr. Cathrene Connery On Jan 27, 2016, at 3:30 PM, "Peter Smagorinsky" wrote: > For those who teach university research methods courses, or are attentive to research methods in other courses, or are doing research, or whatever, the following might be of interest. > > From: writcomm Written Communication [mailto:writcomm@umn.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 4:08 PM > Subject: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching > > Dear Written Communication Editorial Board: > > I write regarding a relevant new development at Written Communication. We have recently released a set of teaching resources for instructors leading methods courses. These resources include an introduction, an overview of methods in the field, and 11 method descriptions listed below. The bulk of this synthetic work was done by WC?s former Editorial Assistant, Abigail Bakke, and current Editorial Assistant, Kira Dreher. Each method is accompanied by links to what we believe are exemplary articles demonstrating specific methods from Written Communication?s archive. We?ve sought to represent a variety of scholars, disciplines, countries, and topics. > ? Concurrent Process Measures > ? Diaries and Journals > ? Ethnography and Ethnographic Tools and Methods > ? Historical/Archival > ? Interviews > ? Linguistic and Discourse Analysis > ? Quantitative > ? Quasi-Experimental > ? Rhetorical Analysis > ? Surveys > We hope that you help us to promote this resource in any way you deem appropriate. Perhaps you might choose to use this resource as a supplement for your own courses or recommend it to colleagues and/or graduate students. You might also promote it via other platforms, such as social media. > > I?d welcome any feedback you have on this set of resources. We?re in the process of developing similar resources for other courses, and I?d be interested in your ideas about what those might include, as well. > > As always, thank you for your support of Written Communication. > > Sincerely, > > Christina Haas > > -- > Written Communication > University of Minnesota > College of Liberal Arts > Department of Writing Studies > follow us on twitter: @writtencomm > > ***CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*** The information in this message and any attachments is confidential and may be legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents is without authorization and is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error, immediately notify the sender and delete this copy from your computer system. Thank you. From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jan 27 21:13:33 2016 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 22:13:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching In-Reply-To: <9ECD6E9E-D06A-4F95-A2E3-D9873368EAF6@cwu.edu> References: <9ECD6E9E-D06A-4F95-A2E3-D9873368EAF6@cwu.edu> Message-ID: <15A3DAB8-C628-48BF-9054-AEC6742EA972@gmail.com> Peter, This looks great! Henry > On Jan 27, 2016, at 6:32 PM, Mary Connery wrote: > > Hi Peter: > Thanks for this wonderful resource! > Best, > Cathrene > > Dr. Cathrene Connery > > > On Jan 27, 2016, at 3:30 PM, "Peter Smagorinsky" wrote: > >> For those who teach university research methods courses, or are attentive to research methods in other courses, or are doing research, or whatever, the following might be of interest. >> >> From: writcomm Written Communication [mailto:writcomm@umn.edu] >> Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 4:08 PM >> Subject: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching >> >> Dear Written Communication Editorial Board: >> >> I write regarding a relevant new development at Written Communication. We have recently released a set of teaching resources for instructors leading methods courses. These resources include an introduction, an overview of methods in the field, and 11 method descriptions listed below. The bulk of this synthetic work was done by WC?s former Editorial Assistant, Abigail Bakke, and current Editorial Assistant, Kira Dreher. Each method is accompanied by links to what we believe are exemplary articles demonstrating specific methods from Written Communication?s archive. We?ve sought to represent a variety of scholars, disciplines, countries, and topics. >> ? Concurrent Process Measures >> ? Diaries and Journals >> ? Ethnography and Ethnographic Tools and Methods >> ? Historical/Archival >> ? Interviews >> ? Linguistic and Discourse Analysis >> ? Quantitative >> ? Quasi-Experimental >> ? Rhetorical Analysis >> ? Surveys >> We hope that you help us to promote this resource in any way you deem appropriate. Perhaps you might choose to use this resource as a supplement for your own courses or recommend it to colleagues and/or graduate students. You might also promote it via other platforms, such as social media. >> >> I?d welcome any feedback you have on this set of resources. We?re in the process of developing similar resources for other courses, and I?d be interested in your ideas about what those might include, as well. >> >> As always, thank you for your support of Written Communication. >> >> Sincerely, >> >> Christina Haas >> >> -- >> Written Communication >> University of Minnesota >> College of Liberal Arts >> Department of Writing Studies >> follow us on twitter: @writtencomm >> >> ***CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*** The information in this message and any attachments is confidential and may be legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents is without authorization and is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error, immediately notify the sender and delete this copy from your computer system. Thank you. > From wendy.maples@outlook.com Thu Jan 28 02:45:43 2016 From: wendy.maples@outlook.com (Wendy Maples) Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 10:45:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Hi Peter, Thanks for this -- looks to be a great resource!Best wishes,Wendy > From: smago@uga.edu > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 23:28:17 +0000 > CC: Hillocks@LISTSERV.UGA.EDU > Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching > > For those who teach university research methods courses, or are attentive to research methods in other courses, or are doing research, or whatever, the following might be of interest. > > From: writcomm Written Communication [mailto:writcomm@umn.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 4:08 PM > Subject: Written Comm's New Methods Resources for Teaching > > Dear Written Communication Editorial Board: > > I write regarding a relevant new development at Written Communication. We have recently released a set of teaching resources for instructors leading methods courses. These resources include an introduction, an overview of methods in the field, and 11 method descriptions listed below. The bulk of this synthetic work was done by WC?s former Editorial Assistant, Abigail Bakke, and current Editorial Assistant, Kira Dreher. Each method is accompanied by links to what we believe are exemplary articles demonstrating specific methods from Written Communication?s archive. We?ve sought to represent a variety of scholars, disciplines, countries, and topics. > ? Concurrent Process Measures > ? Diaries and Journals > ? Ethnography and Ethnographic Tools and Methods > ? Historical/Archival > ? Interviews > ? Linguistic and Discourse Analysis > ? Quantitative > ? Quasi-Experimental > ? Rhetorical Analysis > ? Surveys > We hope that you help us to promote this resource in any way you deem appropriate. Perhaps you might choose to use this resource as a supplement for your own courses or recommend it to colleagues and/or graduate students. You might also promote it via other platforms, such as social media. > > I?d welcome any feedback you have on this set of resources. We?re in the process of developing similar resources for other courses, and I?d be interested in your ideas about what those might include, as well. > > As always, thank you for your support of Written Communication. > > Sincerely, > > Christina Haas > > -- > Written Communication > University of Minnesota > College of Liberal Arts > Department of Writing Studies > follow us on twitter: @writtencomm > > ***CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*** The information in this message and any attachments is confidential and may be legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents is without authorization and is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error, immediately notify the sender and delete this copy from your computer system. Thank you. From vklinin@informatik.umu.se Thu Jan 28 20:11:22 2016 From: vklinin@informatik.umu.se (Victor Kaptelinin) Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 05:11:22 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Mind, Culture, and Activity: Special issue on activity theory & human-technology interaction - Papers due May 15 Message-ID: <20160129051122.Horde.mj9HfTpXXBJPzztCDSEucWZ@www8.informatik.umu.se> ACTIVITY THEORY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN-TECHNOLOGY INTERACTION RESEARCH SPECIAL ISSUE OF MIND, CULTURE, AND ACTIVITY Special issue editors: Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie Nardi Activity theory, which was originally proposed by Alexey Leontiev as a theory in psychology, has developed in the past decades into an interdisciplinary approach, employed in various fields of research and practice such as education and organizational learning. Since the early 1990s, activity theory is also increasingly popular in research areas dealing with human-technology interaction, including human-computer interaction (HCI), interaction design, computer supported cooperative learning (CSCW), and technology-enhanced learning (TEL). This special issue aims to present a variety of current uses of activity theory in studies of human-technology interaction, with a particular focus on the potential and limitations of the theory as a conceptual foundation for the research, as well as implications of the research for further development of activity theory. We invite high quality original publications, ranging from empirical studies of technology-mediated activities and practices to comparative analyses of activity theory and other theories in HCI and related fields to design explorations informed by activity theory. Deadlines (firm, please) May 15, 2016 for submitted papers September 1 for reviews October 1 for revisions The special issue will appear in the first issue of Mind, Culture and Activity for 2017 Please let us know if you have questions! Victor and Bonnie From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 31 03:19:28 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 22:19:28 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] operations and practical consciousness Message-ID: <56ADEDC0.20605@mira.net> Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers? Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian structure of the personality: "basic security system", "practical consciousness" and "discursive consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego. I am involved in criticising this concept of "practical consciousness" and using Leontyev's three levels of activity. For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the practical intelligence which an infant acquires by handling objects or the ability to solve manual tasks, but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people to carry out routine functions, administrative tasks for example, whether social, practical or intellectual in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may have been acquired without ever passing through conscious awareness (although this is not a category he uses). In fact "without conscious awareness" would probably be the correct name for what he calls "practical". SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the Unconscious, it seems that "practical consciousness" is part of the Unconscious. My question is this? - Am I right that operations are not necessarily physical actions (like stepping over a curb without thinking, forming a letter when writing or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things like estimating a person's intentions from their expressions, greeting someone appropriately, filling out a routine form - that is, *not limited to the physical operations* we usually use as examples? According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did something (practical consciousness) then the subject will have to reflect on it and provide an explanation through discursive consciousness. But he says (correctly I think) that this discursive explanation could only be an *interpretation* of what they did under practical consciousness, i.e., "unconsciously," and do not normally formulate theories about. He says that there is no "barrier" between practical and discursive consciousness, but the movement between the two seems not to be theorised. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sun Jan 31 05:08:20 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 08:08:20 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness Message-ID: Andy, You are absolutely correct that in Giddens the movement between practical and discursive consciousness is not theorized. ?Giddens' structurationism is a "duality"--the internalization of the rules of conduct of a social structure, taken to be the nature of reality as such and recursively reorganized and reproduced as human praxis in a material resource framework-- and not a "dualism." ?Hence there is a direct parallel between Giddens' practical consciousness, bourdieu's notion of capital, and Marshall sahlins' mythopraxis. ?In structurationist sociology, habermas in his theory of communicative action is the only theorists, I believe, that does a masterful job in conceptualizing and theorizing about the movement between practical and discursive consciousness... this is where his work deviates from the dualism of marcuse, adorno, and horkimer. Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Andy Blunden Date: 1/31/2016 6:19 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] operations and practical consciousness Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers? Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian structure of the personality: "basic security system", "practical consciousness" and "discursive consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego. I am involved in criticising this concept of "practical consciousness" and using Leontyev's three levels of activity. For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the practical intelligence which an infant acquires by handling objects or the ability to solve manual tasks, but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people to carry out routine functions, administrative tasks for example, whether social, practical or intellectual in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may have been acquired without ever passing through conscious awareness (although this is not a category he uses). In fact "without conscious awareness" would probably be the correct name for what he calls "practical". SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the Unconscious, it seems that "practical consciousness" is part of the Unconscious. My question is this? - Am I right that operations are not necessarily physical actions (like stepping over a curb without thinking, forming a letter when writing or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things like estimating a person's intentions from their expressions, greeting someone appropriately, filling out a routine form - that is, *not limited to the physical operations* we usually use as examples? According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did something (practical consciousness) then the subject will have to reflect on it and provide an explanation through discursive consciousness. But he says (correctly? I think) that this discursive explanation could only be an *interpretation* of what they did under practical consciousness, i.e., "unconsciously," and do not normally formulate theories about. He says that there is no "barrier" between practical and discursive consciousness, but the movement between the two seems not to be theorised. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jan 31 06:47:48 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 06:47:48 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <56ae1ead.9110620a.21b40.ffffcfa9@mx.google.com> Paul, I am interested in your portrayal of Habermas and his portrayal of the movement between practical and discursive consciousness. Is there a book or article you could recommend that elaborates this theme? Thanks, Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Sent: ?2016-?01-?31 5:09 AM To: "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness Andy, You are absolutely correct that in Giddens the movement between practical and discursive consciousness is not theorized. ?Giddens' structurationism is a "duality"--the internalization of the rules of conduct of a social structure, taken to be the nature of reality as such and recursively reorganized and reproduced as human praxis in a material resource framework-- and not a "dualism." ?Hence there is a direct parallel between Giddens' practical consciousness, bourdieu's notion of capital, and Marshall sahlins' mythopraxis. ?In structurationist sociology, habermas in his theory of communicative action is the only theorists, I believe, that does a masterful job in conceptualizing and theorizing about the movement between practical and discursive consciousness... this is where his work deviates from the dualism of marcuse, adorno, and horkimer. Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Andy Blunden Date: 1/31/2016 6:19 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] operations and practical consciousness Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers? Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian structure of the personality: "basic security system", "practical consciousness" and "discursive consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego. I am involved in criticising this concept of "practical consciousness" and using Leontyev's three levels of activity. For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the practical intelligence which an infant acquires by handling objects or the ability to solve manual tasks, but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people to carry out routine functions, administrative tasks for example, whether social, practical or intellectual in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may have been acquired without ever passing through conscious awareness (although this is not a category he uses). In fact "without conscious awareness" would probably be the correct name for what he calls "practical". SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the Unconscious, it seems that "practical consciousness" is part of the Unconscious. My question is this? - Am I right that operations are not necessarily physical actions (like stepping over a curb without thinking, forming a letter when writing or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things like estimating a person's intentions from their expressions, greeting someone appropriately, filling out a routine form - that is, *not limited to the physical operations* we usually use as examples? According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did something (practical consciousness) then the subject will have to reflect on it and provide an explanation through discursive consciousness. But he says (correctly? I think) that this discursive explanation could only be an *interpretation* of what they did under practical consciousness, i.e., "unconsciously," and do not normally formulate theories about. He says that there is no "barrier" between practical and discursive consciousness, but the movement between the two seems not to be theorised. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sun Jan 31 07:09:18 2016 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 10:09:18 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness Message-ID: <933e4tawuk2tfadnwmr7rmfh.1454252670515@email.android.com> Larry, See volume 1 of habermas's theory of communicative action. ?Pay special attention to chapter 3, "intermediate reflections: social action, purposive activity, and communicarion." Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info? Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities? www.routledge.com/9780415714372 -------- Original message -------- From: Lplarry Date: 01/31/2016 9:47 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" , ablunden@mira.net Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness Paul, I am interested in your portrayal of Habermas and his portrayal of the movement between practical and discursive consciousness. Is there a book or article you could recommend that elaborates this theme? Thanks, Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Sent: ?2016-?01-?31 5:09 AM To: "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness Andy, You are absolutely correct that in Giddens the movement between practical and discursive consciousness is not theorized. Giddens' structurationism is a "duality"--the internalization of the rules of conduct of a social structure, taken to be the nature of reality as such and recursively reorganized and reproduced as human praxis in a material resource framework-- and not a "dualism." Hence there is a direct parallel between Giddens' practical consciousness, bourdieu's notion of capital, and Marshall sahlins' mythopraxis. In structurationist sociology, habermas in his theory of communicative action is the only theorists, I believe, that does a masterful job in conceptualizing and theorizing about the movement between practical and discursive consciousness... this is where his work deviates from the dualism of marcuse, adorno, and horkimer. Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Andy Blunden Date: 1/31/2016 6:19 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] operations and practical consciousness Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers? Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian structure of the personality: "basic security system", "practical consciousness" and "discursive consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego. I am involved in criticising this concept of "practical consciousness" and using Leontyev's three levels of activity. For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the practical intelligence which an infant acquires by handling objects or the ability to solve manual tasks, but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people to carry out routine functions, administrative tasks for example, whether social, practical or intellectual in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may have been acquired without ever passing through conscious awareness (although this is not a category he uses). In fact "without conscious awareness" would probably be the correct name for what he calls "practical". SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the Unconscious, it seems that "practical consciousness" is part of the Unconscious. My question is this? - Am I right that operations are not necessarily physical actions (like stepping over a curb without thinking, forming a letter when writing or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things like estimating a person's intentions from their expressions, greeting someone appropriately, filling out a routine form - that is, *not limited to the physical operations* we usually use as examples? According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did something (practical consciousness) then the subject will have to reflect on it and provide an explanation through discursive consciousness. But he says (correctly I think) that this discursive explanation could only be an *interpretation* of what they did under practical consciousness, i.e., "unconsciously," and do not normally formulate theories about. He says that there is no "barrier" between practical and discursive consciousness, but the movement between the two seems not to be theorised. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Jan 31 08:01:21 2016 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 16:01:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness In-Reply-To: <56ADEDC0.20605@mira.net> References: <56ADEDC0.20605@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy, Yes, operations needn't be physical actions (overt object-oriented). However, you may not need to refer to Leontyev if you're happier with Vygotksy. The distinction between involuntary attention and voluntary attention may be sufficient for you (vol. 4). Regarding giving explanations for involuntary activities, a secondary problem is that you may then find that these explanations are 'excuses' for involuntary activity and not necessary the conditions that brought these activities about for the subject. Hope that helps, Huw On 31 January 2016 at 11:19, Andy Blunden wrote: > Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers? > Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian structure of the > personality: "basic security system", "practical consciousness" and > "discursive consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego. > I am involved in criticising this concept of "practical consciousness" and > using Leontyev's three levels of activity. > For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the practical intelligence > which an infant acquires by handling objects or the ability to solve manual > tasks, but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people to carry out > routine functions, administrative tasks for example, whether social, > practical or intellectual in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may > have been acquired without ever passing through conscious awareness > (although this is not a category he uses). In fact "without conscious > awareness" would probably be the correct name for what he calls > "practical". SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the Unconscious, it > seems that "practical consciousness" is part of the Unconscious. > > My question is this? - Am I right that operations are not necessarily > physical actions (like stepping over a curb without thinking, forming a > letter when writing or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things > like estimating a person's intentions from their expressions, greeting > someone appropriately, filling out a routine form - that is, *not limited > to the physical operations* we usually use as examples? > > According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did something > (practical consciousness) then the subject will have to reflect on it and > provide an explanation through discursive consciousness. But he says > (correctly I think) that this discursive explanation could only be an > *interpretation* of what they did under practical consciousness, i.e., > "unconsciously," and do not normally formulate theories about. He says that > there is no "barrier" between practical and discursive consciousness, but > the movement between the two seems not to be theorised. > > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jan 31 08:22:37 2016 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 08:22:37 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness In-Reply-To: <933e4tawuk2tfadnwmr7rmfh.1454252670515@email.android.com> References: <933e4tawuk2tfadnwmr7rmfh.1454252670515@email.android.com> Message-ID: <56ae34e7.65a3420a.9ee85.fffff135@mx.google.com> Thanks Paul Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Sent: ?2016-?01-?31 7:11 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ; "ablunden@mira.net" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness Larry, See volume 1 of habermas's theory of communicative action. ?Pay special attention to chapter 3, "intermediate reflections: social action, purposive activity, and communicarion." Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info? Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities? www.routledge.com/9780415714372 -------- Original message -------- From: Lplarry Date: 01/31/2016 9:47 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" , ablunden@mira.net Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness Paul, I am interested in your portrayal of Habermas and his portrayal of the movement between practical and discursive consciousness. Is there a book or article you could recommend that elaborates this theme? Thanks, Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Sent: ?2016-?01-?31 5:09 AM To: "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness Andy, You are absolutely correct that in Giddens the movement between practical and discursive consciousness is not theorized. Giddens' structurationism is a "duality"--the internalization of the rules of conduct of a social structure, taken to be the nature of reality as such and recursively reorganized and reproduced as human praxis in a material resource framework-- and not a "dualism." Hence there is a direct parallel between Giddens' practical consciousness, bourdieu's notion of capital, and Marshall sahlins' mythopraxis. In structurationist sociology, habermas in his theory of communicative action is the only theorists, I believe, that does a masterful job in conceptualizing and theorizing about the movement between practical and discursive consciousness... this is where his work deviates from the dualism of marcuse, adorno, and horkimer. Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Andy Blunden Date: 1/31/2016 6:19 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] operations and practical consciousness Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers? Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian structure of the personality: "basic security system", "practical consciousness" and "discursive consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego. I am involved in criticising this concept of "practical consciousness" and using Leontyev's three levels of activity. For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the practical intelligence which an infant acquires by handling objects or the ability to solve manual tasks, but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people to carry out routine functions, administrative tasks for example, whether social, practical or intellectual in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may have been acquired without ever passing through conscious awareness (although this is not a category he uses). In fact "without conscious awareness" would probably be the correct name for what he calls "practical". SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the Unconscious, it seems that "practical consciousness" is part of the Unconscious. My question is this? - Am I right that operations are not necessarily physical actions (like stepping over a curb without thinking, forming a letter when writing or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things like estimating a person's intentions from their expressions, greeting someone appropriately, filling out a routine form - that is, *not limited to the physical operations* we usually use as examples? According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did something (practical consciousness) then the subject will have to reflect on it and provide an explanation through discursive consciousness. But he says (correctly I think) that this discursive explanation could only be an *interpretation* of what they did under practical consciousness, i.e., "unconsciously," and do not normally formulate theories about. He says that there is no "barrier" between practical and discursive consciousness, but the movement between the two seems not to be theorised. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jan 31 16:28:55 2016 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2016 11:28:55 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operations and practical consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <56ADEDC0.20605@mira.net> Message-ID: <56AEA6C7.8030407@mira.net> Thanks Paul, Huw and (off-line) Francine. Points all taken. :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 1/02/2016 3:01 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Andy, > > Yes, operations needn't be physical actions (overt > object-oriented). > > However, you may not need to refer to Leontyev if you're > happier with Vygotksy. The distinction between > involuntary attention and voluntary attention may be > sufficient for you (vol. 4). > > Regarding giving explanations for involuntary activities, > a secondary problem is that you may then find that these > explanations are 'excuses' for involuntary activity and > not necessary the conditions that brought these activities > about for the subject. > > Hope that helps, > Huw > > On 31 January 2016 at 11:19, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Can I get an opinion on this from xmca-ers? > Anthony Giddens has his own modified-Freudian > structure of the personality: "basic security system", > "practical consciousness" and "discursive > consciousness" instead of id, ego and superego. > I am involved in criticising this concept of > "practical consciousness" and using Leontyev's three > levels of activity. > For Giddens, "practical consciousness" is not the > practical intelligence which an infant acquires by > handling objects or the ability to solve manual tasks, > but simply the kind of knowledge which allows people > to carry out routine functions, administrative tasks > for example, whether social, practical or intellectual > in form. According to Giddens this knowledge may have > been acquired without ever passing through conscious > awareness (although this is not a category he uses). > In fact "without conscious awareness" would probably > be the correct name for what he calls "practical". > SInce Giddens accepts Freud's concept of the > Unconscious, it seems that "practical consciousness" > is part of the Unconscious. > > My question is this? - Am I right that operations are > not necessarily physical actions (like stepping over a > curb without thinking, forming a letter when writing > or tying your shoelaces), but can equally be things > like estimating a person's intentions from their > expressions, greeting someone appropriately, filling > out a routine form - that is, *not limited to the > physical operations* we usually use as examples? > > According to Giddens, if asked to explain why they did > something (practical consciousness) then the subject > will have to reflect on it and provide an explanation > through discursive consciousness. But he says > (correctly I think) that this discursive explanation > could only be an *interpretation* of what they did > under practical consciousness, i.e., "unconsciously," > and do not normally formulate theories about. He says > that there is no "barrier" between practical and > discursive consciousness, but the movement between the > two seems not to be theorised. > > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >