[Xmca-l] Re: Dynamics of Developmental Change

[Martin John Packer]

We're in agreement. The ToM debate is pointless.

:)

Martin

On Sep 11, 2015, at 6:57 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

> Yes.
> 
> But if we say that an Ur-Wir doesn't qualify as a ToM, then ToM debate
> becomes pointless. Firstly, ToM assumes a Piagetian, affectless mind, and
> as Vygotsky says affect is the "sputnik" (i.e. the companion god) of every
> psychic function, even the most intellectual. Secondly, it assumes an
> entirely individuated mind, and as long as language itself creates the so
> very many of the desires that it satisfies, such a mind is not possible,
> not even in adults.
> 
> That's why I think "intersubjectivity" is far more useful (and more
> contextualized) measurement. Some people on the list have queried my
> comments on vegetarianism. I wasn't trying to be flippant, but I think we
> often talk about the distinction between human intersubjectivity and animal
> intersubjectivity and the boundary intersubjectivity that is infant
> intersubjectivity in either in ways that are metaphysical ("soul", or maybe
> idioculture) or else in ways that suggest that no such "boundary subject"
> can exist simply because no such boundary exists.
> 
> But the boundaries exist, and they are visceral, even where they are
> obviously cultural. In China I would get terrible colds, and my class of
> doctors, all western trained, would prescribe traditional Chinese medicines
> (on the grounds that there was no cure, but medicine was a psychological
> need for a sick organism). One of the things they would prescribe was made
> from human placenta: too close to cannibalism for my taste. But one of my
> students, an obstetrician in her twenties with soft moosey eyes and a
> steely razor tongue, pointed out that most animals eat the placenta right
> after birth. "Anyway," she asked, "what do you think you ate before you
> were born?".
> 
> David Kellogg
> 
> On Sat, Sep 12, 2015 at 7:53 AM, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
>> wrote:
> 
>> "Vygotsky says this is
>> because the infant has already understood that her or his main way of
>> acting on the world is not directly but with the hands of others. "
>> 
>> "they both suggest (to me) that the infant actually STARTS from the point
>> of
>> view that affects exist, although they are not necessarily "minds" in the
>> sense of being individualized."
>> 
>> 
>> David,
>> 
>> I think you're absolutely right to say that these examples illustrate the
>> central role of emotion in the early interactions (intra-actions) of the
>> infant. But I don't think they show that the infant "understands," or "has
>> a point of view," but rather that the infant lives in an emotional world -
>> no, not even a world, because there are not yet stable objects, or stable
>> others, or stable self - lives *in* his or her emotionality *along with*
>> others. An object becomes interesting again when, although it is still out
>> of reach for the infant, a significant other can reach it, because the
>> infant does *not* yet realize that this other person is someone different
>> from him. An object close to them *is* an object close to him or her, or
>> simply an object 'at hand,' and hence interesting.
>> 
>> No?
>> 
>> Martin
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>