[Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Thu Jul 23 07:26:07 PDT 2015
Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity".
:( Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice again on
> this list.
> I understand what you are saying. I will try to better
> explain how I stand with A N Leontyev.
>
> I am a social theorist, that is I am interested in
> changing societal arrangements (to put it very politely),
> and I am one of few social theorists, properly so-called,
> who base themselves on Vygotsky's theories, and use
> Activity Theory as well. My position is a contradictory
> one because Vygotsky and Leontyev were psychologists (like
> you) and not social theorists. Social Theorists and
> Psychologists generally live in different buildings on the
> university campus, in different departments, publish in
> different journals, refer to different founding theorists,
> and altogether inhabit different universes. Social
> theorists have ideas about psychology, but generally not
> scientific ones, and vice versa.
> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an excellent
> foundation for social theory because he introduced into
> human development and every interaction between two
> individuals a culturally produced sign. But he only went
> so far. He showed how people acted and developed within
> their social situation, but he did not tackle the problem
> of how that situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of
> the Activity as a macro-unity of activity, made an
> epoch-making development which opened CHAT to become a
> fully developed social-and-psychological theory. But what
> he said himself on questions of social theory was of very
> poor quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the sort of
> ideas that would win any following among social theorists
> today. But he was after all a Psychologist and not a
> Social Theorist, so he is forgiven.
>
> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken "objective
> meaning" is not a psychological category at all for
> Leontyev. Yes? And personal sense is, as you eloquently
> explain, a fundamental Psychological category. So if what
> I said were to be interpreted to say that personal sense
> is a subset of objective meaning, that would be quite
> wrong. While I accept (as I must) a categorical difference
> between material objects/processes and their reflection in
> my mind, I do not at all understand societal processes as
> nonpsychological processes. I try to conceive of them
> together in one unit, and I think I am on my own there
> (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside).
> There remains of course the distinction between the
> individual (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein),
> mediated by the particular (Besonder). A human individual
> is something radically different from a number of
> individuals. For the human individual and how they erleben
> a social situation, I rely on my friends and
> collaborator-psychologists. I am interested in how the
> Activities go. In small part to avoid having arguments
> with followers of Leontyev I call activities "projects."
> So I reserve the right to say things about projects
> without a follower of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is
> not a mysterious or esoteric concept; every
> English-speaker knows what a project is, and if there is
> any confusion with projects as defined by Existentialists,
> I call them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people
> usually join them, not create them). These include
> capitalist firms, political parties, sporting clubs or
> indeed whole sports, a family, a professional career - all
> those things which gives our lives mening while we build
> the world we and our children must live in, what Fedor
> Vasilyuk called an отношение . A project is not a
> collection of people, it is an aggregate of actions (like
> an Activity) and the "logic" of projects is something
> different from Psychology, but it is inclusive of
> Psychology as well. A project is a kind of psychological
> phenomenon, but it is also much more than psychology,
> because, as you remind us, people regulate their own
> behaviour using signs created in the world beyond their
> ken. Projects are the material substance of Concepts, and
> I rely on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK?
>
> Everything you said (except how you characterised my
> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?!
>
> Andy
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
>> Hi Andy,
>> with great interest, I follow the discussion and your
>> interpretation of A N Leontyev's contradiction between
>> subjective sense and objective meaning. As far as I
>> interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the
>> relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective
>> sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as
>> you seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality
>> that emerges when a person uses societal signs and their
>> objective meanings in order to regulate his or her
>> socially embedded activity.
>> What happens is a transformation of societal meanings
>> into the personal sense of those involved. The personal
>> sense that an individual assigns to interactions, facts,
>> and experiences through the use of signs can be
>> conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but
>> as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two
>> psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to
>> the motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the
>> situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the
>> individual within the process of internalization.
>> a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their
>> meanings during social interactions in an impartial way.
>> They interpret and use them in the light of their
>> actually elicited motives along with
>> the motives they assign to the interaction partner. The
>> societal meaning of the used signs does not have to match
>> the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an
>> outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a
>> low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an
>> inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for
>> the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion of
>> self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive.
>> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by
>> the situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous
>> encounters in which the use of signs is (or was)
>> embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by
>> propositional phrases (e.g., “a dog is a mammal” or
>> “wide-open eyes signal fear”) but through their ties to
>> sensorially mediated and situated perceptions—as complex
>> as these interrelations may be (Leont’ev, 1978). For
>> example, two persons can use propositional phrases to
>> agree on the same definition of the term “dog” or “fear.”
>> These terms, however, will be situated very differently
>> and enriched with other sensory perceptions when one
>> person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the
>> other person experienced a highly dramatic episode with
>> an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog.
>> Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to
>> them are subject to an interpersonal process of
>> interpretation and coordination that more or less
>> successfully supports the embodiment
>> and expression of personal sense. People do not have a
>> private “speech” at their disposal that they can
>> construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore,
>> they depend on the appropriation
>> and use of conventionalized signs when they want to
>> communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in
>> social interactions.
>> By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize
>> and to become aware of his personal relation and sense of
>> the situation and the used signs, but also this
>> reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to
>> express this personal relations. So, this is the overall
>> tension between objective meaning of an event or an
>> object and its personal sense for a specific person.
>> Best
>> Manfred
>>
>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
>> Fliednerstr. 21
>> D-48149 Münster
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
>>
>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>>
>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>> Von:
>> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden
>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32
>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker
>> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects
>>
>> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response
>> to my post to take it from there, Mike, but I will try to
>> respond as best I can to the question about subjectivism
>> and objectivism.
>> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought
>> that A N Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten
>> Nissen remarked that that was odd, because in Europe
>> ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are!
>> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of
>> Psychology, and yet I want to use AT as a foundation for
>> social theory, so my claim does seem anomalous.
>>
>> What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in
>> interpreting contradictions between the "subjective sense"
>> and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of
>> the social vs. the individual. This reduces subjectivity
>> to a matter of the capriciousness of the individual mind
>> or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is hardly
>> objectionable in the domain of child development, but in
>> the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal position.
>> Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints
>> among which none have the right to claim unproblematic
>> "objective truth"
>> for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL
>> as giving too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other
>> hand, is different, but people's intentions are relegated
>> to "phenomenological investigation" which are preliminary
>> to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach
>> as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change
>> occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different
>> levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the
>> "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its
>> life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human
>> action to Activity Theory. The interpretation of purposes
>> and intentions in social science is a challenge, but I
>> believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met.
>>
>> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the
>> Subject!" though I know nothing at all of his work.
>>
>> The problem with your question about Boundary Objects,
>> Mike, is that though I knew nothing of them a little
>> while ago, I can now see 3 different meanings of the
>> term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to
>> answer this question, and I look forward to his answer.
>>
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote:
>>> Andy/Lubomir--
>>>
>>> I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be
>>> badly timed.
>>> But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered
>>> on the
>>> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT
>>> theory that give
>>> everything to the object.
>>>
>>> Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev
>>> schools'
>>> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the
>>> environment?
>>>
>>> Or?
>>>
>>> What is at stake here theoretically and practically?
>>> Mike
>>> PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted
>>> discussion of
>>> boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of
>>> joint mediated
>>> activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am
>>> pretty sure that
>>> not knowing the answer to this question is a result of
>>> the richness of
>>> the discussion.
>>>
>>> It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object??
>>> Mike
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden
>>> <ablunden@mira.net
>>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>>
>>> That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a
>>> humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism,
>>> structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory
>>> which give everything to the Object.
>>> Andy
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote:
>>>
>>> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The
>>> Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic
>>> of the subject.
>>>
>>> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early
>>> 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and
>>> "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more
>>> than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE
>>> conceiving of processes without subjects."
>>>
>>> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw
>>> the failure of phenomenology and the residual
>>> links between subjectivism and anthropology.
>>>
>>> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the
>>> philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an
>>> outmoded humanism.
>>>
>>> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new
>>> humanism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov
>>> <mailto:lspopov@bgsu.edu>
>>> Sent: 2015-07-22 8:55 AM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>; Andy Blunden
>>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>> Objects
>>>
>>> Hi Alfredo,
>>>
>>> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and
>>> the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on
>>> the motive and purpose of activity, the object can
>>> be approached in many different ways.
>>>
>>> It is true that the relationship between the
>>> object and the subject caries the
>>> purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This
>>> type of relationship might has several aspects and
>>> the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually,
>>> in AT, the teleological aspect is central one
>>> among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships.
>>>
>>> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at
>>> several levels with distinctive teleological
>>> phenomena: motivation, goal, etc.
>>>
>>> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure
>>> of activity with its three levels. I just tried to
>>> do that and in most cases I got the famous
>>> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English
>>> language texts where the authors evidently use
>>> that version of activity theory. The three
>>> structural levels of activity might be found in t
>>>
>>> Lubomir
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From:
>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil
>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>> Objects
>>>
>>> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks!
>>> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is
>>> very much in line with the notion of
>>> Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it.
>>>
>>> I have many questions, most of which I should find
>>> in the literature rather than bother here. But I
>>> would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote
>>> that the object "carries in itself the purpose and
>>> motive of the activity." What does "in itself"
>>> mean here?
>>> Thanks again for a very informative post,
>>> Alfredo
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From:
>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>> Objects
>>>
>>> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention
>>> to some
>>> distinctions in this field ... we have at least
>>> three
>>> different versions of Activity Theory involved
>>> here plus
>>> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories
>>> that have
>>> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is
>>> using the
>>> word "object" in a different way, all of them
>>> legitimate
>>> uses of the English word, but all indexing
>>> different
>>> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I
>>> will invent
>>> some different terms.
>>>
>>> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the
>>> object of
>>> labour, the material which is to be worked
>>> upon, the
>>> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may
>>> be a nail
>>> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a
>>> man with a
>>> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand.
>>> Engestrom
>>> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left
>>> side of the
>>> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it
>>> has been
>>> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer
>>> that the
>>> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now
>>> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether
>>> implicit or
>>> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex
>>> of the
>>> triangle.
>>>
>>> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the
>>> purpose
>>> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or
>>> motive" is
>>> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the
>>> OBJECT.
>>> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he
>>> talks about
>>> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a
>>> complex notion,
>>> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of
>>> the
>>> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process
>>> as such.
>>> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But
>>> this is what
>>> is motivating all the members of the design team
>>> when they
>>> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one
>>> of the
>>> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into
>>> the wood
>>> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the
>>> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs
>>> change in
>>> the course of collaboration and in the End an
>>> OBJECT Is
>>> *realised* which is the "truth" of the
>>> collaboration, to use
>>> Hegel's apt terminology here.
>>>
>>> Surely it is important to recognise that while
>>> everyone
>>> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up
>>> with Outcome
>>> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe
>>> the object
>>> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so
>>> clearly in
>>> Thinking and Speech. It is not the
>>> Arbeitsgegenstand or some
>>> problem carried within it alone which motivates
>>> action, but
>>> *the concept the subject makes of the
>>> Arbeitsgegenstand*!
>>>
>>> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as
>>> Lubomir astutely
>>> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the
>>> collaboration
>>> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that
>>> is, in
>>> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are
>>> naively
>>> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration.
>>> And Leigh
>>> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and
>>> Instruments are in fact residues of past
>>> collaborations
>>> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e.,
>>> realised OBJECTs
>>> of past collaborations. It is these one-time
>>> OBJECTs,
>>> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary
>>> Objects.
>>>
>>> But it seems that other have grasped the
>>> postmodern critique
>>> elements of this idea, that apparently
>>> ideologically neutral
>>> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially
>>> constructed
>>> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as
>>> things, or
>>> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised
>>> "systems of
>>> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a
>>> Boundary
>>> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has
>>> the same
>>> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved.
>>>
>>> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the
>>> Boundary Object
>>> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining
>>> two "systems
>>> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at
>>> cooperation
>>> but rather the conflict within the broader
>>> collaboration.
>>> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is
>>> deliberate and
>>> aimed to change the relation between Subject and
>>> obJECT
>>> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually
>>> rendered as
>>> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different
>>> strand of
>>> postmodern critique into the equation, namely
>>> Foucault's
>>> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great
>>> effect.
>>>
>>> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary
>>> Object,
>>> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the
>>> situation is
>>> almost as bad in Russian and German,
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>>> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir.
>>> >
>>> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I
>>> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the
>>> distinction between object and tool in activity
>>> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we
>>> were aware through the process, that what we
>>> describe in the paper has to do with how the
>>> object of design emerged and developed for the
>>> team in and as they were dealing with, developing,
>>> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I
>>> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a
>>> lack of a historical account of the object that
>>> goes over and above the particular instances
>>> analyzed. Although we provide with some
>>> ethnographic contextualization of the team's
>>> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion
>>> is grounded on concrete events and their
>>> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the
>>> distinction between object and means because it
>>> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then
>>> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what
>>> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori
>>> > ented towards anything beyond what was there
>>> in the meetings, it was in and through the
>>> meetings' means. How would then the distinction
>>> between means and object have added to our
>>> understanding of the events? (And this is not to
>>> doubt of the contribution from such a distinction,
>>> I really mean to ask this question for the purpose
>>> of growing and expanding; and as said before, part
>>> of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al.
>>> contribution).
>>> >
>>> > As to how we would position our contribution
>>> with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate
>>> what we said when introducing the paper for
>>> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working
>>> outside any particular framework and think, as we
>>> think Star did, broadly, drawing from several
>>> sources. These included cultural historical
>>> psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse
>>> analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in
>>> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the
>>> topic in this discussion were in the background
>>> all the time, but we did not operationalize them
>>> in terms of any particular theory. This is not to
>>> say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried
>>> our best to keep internal coherence between what
>>> we said about the data, and what the data was
>>> exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add
>>> to this.
>>> >
>>> > I think the questions you are rising about
>>> activity theory are very much in the spirit of
>>> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer
>>> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best
>>> places to be asking those questions.
>>> >
>>> > Alfredo
>>> > ________________________________________
>>> > From:
>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov
>>> <lspopov@bgsu.edu>
>>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16
>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>> Objects
>>> >
>>> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf,
>>> >
>>> > There are also a few other things that I would
>>> like to bring to this discussion.
>>> >
>>> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great
>>> article. It is a great example of an
>>> interpretativist approach to everyday life
>>> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It
>>> is all about our minds, culture, and activity.
>>> >
>>> > However, how is your approach related to classic
>>> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is
>>> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might
>>> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that
>>> emerge right now or have emerged in the last
>>> decades; still other people might look for
>>> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse
>>> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a
>>> template or categorize your methodology -- just
>>> raising a question about its connection to
>>> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that
>>> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify
>>> certain things for myself.
>>> >
>>> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries
>>> of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity
>>> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we
>>> gain when we infuse new methodological,
>>> epistemological, and ontological realities into
>>> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the
>>> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore?
>>> (I mean here Activity Theory as research
>>> methodology.) Do we need to call something
>>> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new
>>> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need
>>> to call it Activity Theory?
>>> >
>>> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking,
>>> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your
>>> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses
>>> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and
>>> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can
>>> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but
>>> after we assimilate them for use in our project,
>>> they will "change hands" and will change their
>>> particular discourse affiliation and will become
>>> completely different components of a completely
>>> different discourse. Mostly because the
>>> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and
>>> the concepts are very different despite of the
>>> similarities in ideas and words used to name these
>>> ideas.
>>> >
>>> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me
>>> understand better what is going on in the realm of
>>> CHAT.
>>> >
>>> > Thank you very much for this exciting
>>> discussion,
>>> >
>>> > Lubomir
>>> >
>>> > -----Original Message-----
>>> > From:
>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil
>>> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM
>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy
>>> Blunden
>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>> Objects
>>> >
>>> > Andy, all,
>>> > I just recently begun to read Engeström and
>>> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is
>>> very interesting. I have particular interest in
>>> the difference that they point out between
>>> boundary object on the one hand, and object and
>>> instrumentality as different aspects of activity
>>> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this
>>> distinction while writing our own paper. We
>>> noticed that the museum space, through multiple
>>> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a
>>> floor plan, performances of being in the room
>>> while not being there, etc), was a means, an
>>> instrument for achieving a final design product.
>>> >
>>> > At the same time, the museum space begun to
>>> become the object of the designers' activity.
>>> Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the
>>> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite
>>> interests, what seemed to be a common object for
>>> all them was the museum as place. Thus, most
>>> representations of it begun to be made in terms of
>>> narratives about being there. That was the
>>> orientation that seemed to stick them together.
>>> >
>>> > Thus, the museum space was both object and
>>> instrument. We wondered whether we should do
>>> connections to notions of object of activity and
>>> tools, but we felt that that road would take us
>>> away from the focus on body and experience. We
>>> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who
>>> differentiate between object of design, the design
>>> thing that work delivers, and the object's
>>> constituents (or means of presentation before the
>>> design thing is finished).
>>> >
>>> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into
>>> the picture, we could discuss the history of
>>> development of these relations between the
>>> different forms of presentations of the museum
>>> means towards the object without necessarily
>>> articulating the differences between the two. One
>>> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the
>>> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not
>>> about materials in themselves, but about
>>> consequences in action. From the point of view of
>>> the persons implicated in the process, the museum
>>> space as object of design was an issue in and
>>> through the working with some material, some form
>>> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and
>>> instrument seemed to be moments of a same
>>> experience. But I still want to learn what we may
>>> get out of making the distinction between object
>>> and tool, as Engeström and colleagues do (so I
>>> should perhaps read more carefully their study
>>> rather than be here thinking aloud).
>>> > Any thoughts?
>>> >
>>> > Alfredo
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > ________________________________________
>>> > From:
>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> <xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38
>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>>> Objects
>>> >
>>> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which
>>> play some
>>> > role in mediating the relation between subjects,
>>> probably a
>>> > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental
>>> role, too, and
>>> > one subject challenges that role and turns the
>>> object into
>>> > its opposite, and changes the terms of
>>> collaboration.
>>> > A number of examples spring to mind.
>>> >
>>> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such
>>> as Queer, are
>>> > embraced by a despised group who take
>>> control of the
>>> > word and assertively embrace it;
>>> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who
>>> deployed their
>>> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to
>>> magnificant effect;
>>> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into
>>> a weapon
>>> > against them by Kurdish women fighters
>>> (ISIS flee before
>>> > them rather than in shame);
>>> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's
>>> stamp which
>>> > put newspapers out of reach of workers
>>> against them by
>>> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped
>>> newspaper and
>>> > obliging workers to club together in groups
>>> to buy and
>>> > read it, thus making the paper into a
>>> glorious
>>> > organising tool;
>>> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied
>>> Territory /
>>> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of
>>> a shared
>>> > object (the land);
>>> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a
>>> weapon and tool
>>> > for Indian independence and
>>> self-sufficiency, raising it
>>> > from the status of obsolete and inferior
>>> technology to a
>>> > symbol of India.
>>> >
>>> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had
>>> in mind when
>>> > she introduced the term, but core point is
>>> that the
>>> > ideological construction placed upon an object
>>> is subject to
>>> > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking
>>> of an
>>> > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to
>>> subjectivity.
>>> >
>>> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary
>>> object" a
>>> > mediating artefact or the object of work
>>> > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is
>>> that in these
>>> > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or
>>> symbols according
>>> > to context. In principle it is not the Object
>>> in the
>>> > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to
>>> be.
>>> >
>>> > Andy
>>> >
>>> >
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> > *Andy Blunden*
>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>>> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy,
>>> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as
>>> boundary objects. What about video?
>>> >> Henry
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden
>>> <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to
>>> see that it was the photographs that Thomas was
>>> endeavouring to turn to use to recover his
>>> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was
>>> using the idea in relation to the subsistence
>>> farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn.
>>> >>> Thanks Rolf!
>>> >>> Andy
>>> >>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> >>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote:
>>> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also
>>> interpret the photographs as boundary objects as
>>> they support the coordination of therapy
>>> activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think
>>> it depends on the aspect of activity one is
>>> attempting to explore as opposed to the definite
>>> identification of what may or may not be a
>>> boundary object. This is only my opinion though!
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden
>>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>> wrote:
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in
>>> question is
>>> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject
>>> to an
>>> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by
>>> showing
>>> >>>> photographs of far away places and
>>> explaining how
>>> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an
>>> interpretation of
>>> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and
>>> experiences
>>> >>>> man-of-the-world.
>>> >>>> Does that make better sense?
>>> >>>> Andy
>>> >>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> >>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden
>>> wrote:
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in
>>> social theory
>>> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary
>>> objects." It
>>> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is
>>> introduce some
>>> >>>> social theory into domains of
>>> activity (scientific
>>> >>>> and work collaborations for example)
>>> where the
>>> >>>> participants naively think they are
>>> collaborating
>>> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just
>>> granularity,
>>> >>>> but also the ideological context.
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the
>>> home care workers
>>> >>>> collaborate with the old couple
>>> according to rules
>>> >>>> and regulations, communications
>>> resources,
>>> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which
>>> in the
>>> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are
>>> apparently
>>> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the
>>> case that here it
>>> >>>> is those rules and regulations,
>>> etc., which are
>>> >>>> the "boundary objects"?
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> Andy
>>> >>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> >>>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1
>>>
>>> [The entire original message is not included.]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> Both environment and species change in the course of
>>> time, and thus
>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever
>>> (Polotova & Storch,
>>> Ecological Niche, 2008)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
>
>
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