From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 08:29:30 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 08:29:30 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: <5F8E55CF-A680-4867-B23B-202FE0A827ED@gmail.com> <16E25ADD-3982-4CC2-AAD9-44C456C4A576@gmail.com> <60F2BB58-BE9B-4295-BE12-5A7A64E43E40@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5594076d.6a65420a.5953.7115@mx.google.com> Greg Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) IS a question I want to highlight. What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". We could focus on the "there" We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" We could focus on the "fore" Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices Or Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? I just ordered Lindquist's . I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" So where our focus abides is where we abide. Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? -----Original Message----- From: "Greg Thompson" Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan David, This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side Chicago code described below). http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think counterfactually. Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact that that there are things that one does and there are things that one doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here would be much appreciated. Best, greg p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Yes, I was trying to keep it short. > > The key text is: > > Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. > (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology > of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. > > Also: > > Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected > Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. > > The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native > speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" > insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as > opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. > That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the > future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack > you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion > "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty > and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of > those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine > one. > > Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). > > (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. > (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. > (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, > but that's in my Chinese copy). > > Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference > doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the > condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including > the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it > doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely > functional one. > > I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything > more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very > large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was > done by Ruqaiya's student: > > Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and > the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: > Continuum, pp. 31-65. > > She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", > "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", > "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in > "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and > the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). > > David Kellogg > > > On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > David, > > Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of > Halliday. > > Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... > > > > Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: > > > > 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use > of > > the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the > > parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside > > their face). > > > > 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more > direct > > links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and > the > > examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect > > vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when > > you write: > > "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the > orientation > > is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal > > solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated > > coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to > > individual motivation, and towards interdependence." > > > > There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read > > them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how > > these features were manifest in the examples. > > > > Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your > > multiple elaborations! > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > Everybody: > > > > > > First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. > > And > > > even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to > his > > > use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments > on > > > Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and > > > heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse > so > > > that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve > > > "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's > > > gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not > > only > > > an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have > > the > > > right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is > > called > > > "justice"). > > > > > > Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, > > and > > > I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's > > > Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it > relevant. > > > But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction > > > between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the > distinction > > > between competence and performance. > > > > > > Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: > > > > > > a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. > > > b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. > > > > > > The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the > > > semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the > > > "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly > > volitional: > > > you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also > > > choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the > > > inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is > > > voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed > raised > > > in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a > > > minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect > is a > > > guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), > > and > > > I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language > > > user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, > > > meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine > > > dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into > the > > > dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it > deliberately > > > as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful > > > (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you > could > > > have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect > > is > > > a distinction of the user, and not of the use. > > > > > > The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the > > > phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would > > > concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his > > > argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for > > > copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other > > factors > > > which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is > specified > > > while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now > > > rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the > > > consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although > > > unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a > > > threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. > > > > > > But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who > > grew > > > up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it > > > immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of > > > Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft > > > (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, > > > interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on > > what > > > you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your > > > ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding > > > orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective > rules > > > that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards > > > individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the > > > orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards > > > interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it > > sounds > > > and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated > > > coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike > > > register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is > > not > > > at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation > is a > > > pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic > > > variability, and it is related causally to class. > > > > > > Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and > > performance--in > > > fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of > > "communicative > > > competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something > > is > > > linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically > > > appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and > > > whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such > > dichotomies > > > are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not > > > available for marriage to material performances: we can never really > > know, > > > for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, > > > psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying > competence > > is > > > there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly > > > transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the > performed. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: > > > > > > > Greg, > > > > I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to > whether > > > > Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: > > > > > ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a > property > > of > > > > the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of > > > > code/style, speaker, and context.? > > > > I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an > actual > > > > use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would > > > like a > > > > theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes > > > > raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the > use > > > of a > > > > given code/style? > > > > > Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing > that > > > has > > > > properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. > > > > > As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that > > it > > > > was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to > > the > > > > contrary? > > > > > But this would make an important point that the efficacy of > > deployment > > > > of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the > > speaker > > > > but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. > > > > > Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? > > > > > David? > > > > > (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this > > should > > > > help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). > > > > > Greg > > > > > > > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > > > > > > > >> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. > Apparently, > > > > he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not > good > > > > enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so > > > disappointed > > > > with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this > > country, I > > > > didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. > > Maybe > > > > the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of > > > euphoria > > > > and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground > > where > > > > Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with > > those > > > > who ARE adequate representatives of African American English > > Vernacular? > > > > One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will > > always > > > > have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in > that > > > AME > > > > church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the > ?black > > > > prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. > > > > >> > > > > >> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion > > of > > > > issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol [The entire original message is not included.] From rohini.ng@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 09:04:55 2015 From: rohini.ng@gmail.com (Rohini Nag) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 21:34:55 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] lookiing for Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle Message-ID: Dear X-MCA, Can anyone help me with a copy of Tzvetan Todorov (1984) *Mikhail Bakhtin: The* *Dialogical Principle* .History of Literature vol. 13. The University of Minnesota Press? I have looked for it everywhere with all the available resources at my university and absolutely need it for my MPhil dissertation that engages with both Bakhtin and Vygotsky on the concept of dialogue. It will be of much help if I get any leads on this book. Best, Rohini Nag *Research Scholar* *Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies* *School of Social Sciences-II* *Jawaharlal Nehru University* *New Delhi-110067* From helenaworthen@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 09:25:22 2015 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 09:25:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: lookiing for Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I found it at the University of Iowa library 20 years ago. Really good and clear. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:04 AM, Rohini Nag wrote: > Dear X-MCA, > > Can anyone help me with a copy of Tzvetan Todorov (1984) *Mikhail Bakhtin: > The* *Dialogical Principle* .History of Literature vol. 13. The University > of Minnesota Press? > > I have looked for it everywhere with all the available resources at my > university and absolutely need it for my MPhil dissertation that engages > with both Bakhtin and Vygotsky on the concept of dialogue. It will be of > much help if I get any leads on this book. > > > Best, > Rohini Nag > > *Research Scholar* > *Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies* > *School of Social Sciences-II* > *Jawaharlal Nehru University* > *New Delhi-110067* From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Jul 1 09:47:15 2015 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 16:47:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: lookiing for Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6BF39E8E-3EC6-4444-B63A-9A1A7BAACF00@uniandes.edu.co> It's available in Google Books, Rohini... Martin On Jul 1, 2015, at 11:04 AM, Rohini Nag wrote: > Dear X-MCA, > > Can anyone help me with a copy of Tzvetan Todorov (1984) *Mikhail Bakhtin: > The* *Dialogical Principle* .History of Literature vol. 13. The University > of Minnesota Press? > > I have looked for it everywhere with all the available resources at my > university and absolutely need it for my MPhil dissertation that engages > with both Bakhtin and Vygotsky on the concept of dialogue. It will be of > much help if I get any leads on this book. > > > Best, > Rohini Nag > > *Research Scholar* > *Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies* > *School of Social Sciences-II* > *Jawaharlal Nehru University* > *New Delhi-110067* From rohini.ng@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 10:08:37 2015 From: rohini.ng@gmail.com (Rohini Nag) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 22:38:37 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: lookiing for Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle In-Reply-To: <6BF39E8E-3EC6-4444-B63A-9A1A7BAACF00@uniandes.edu.co> References: <6BF39E8E-3EC6-4444-B63A-9A1A7BAACF00@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Thank you Martin! I already did look it up everywhere. A section of the book/preview is available on scribd.com and google books. I was looking for a complete copy if it was available online. But it looks like the hard copy which is available on Amazon India is the only access. Its quite expensive to be bought immediately. It seems Todorov is quite a difficult find here in Delhi, with my accessible resources of course. Best Rohini *Research Scholar* *Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies* *School of Social Sciences-II* *Jawaharlal Nehru University* *New Delhi-110067* On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 10:17 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > It's available in Google Books, Rohini... > > < > https://books.google.com.co/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bR4NAQAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Tzvetan+Todorov+(1984)+*Mikhail+Bakhtin:%0AThe*+*Dialogical+Principle&ots=K_abN5CCC0&sig=ZrwGBue6Wts6610Warg-xSJW8tg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Tzvetan%20Todorov%20(1984)%20*Mikhail%20Bakhtin%3A%20The*%20*Dialogical%20Principle&f=false > > > > Martin > > On Jul 1, 2015, at 11:04 AM, Rohini Nag wrote: > > > Dear X-MCA, > > > > Can anyone help me with a copy of Tzvetan Todorov (1984) *Mikhail > Bakhtin: > > The* *Dialogical Principle* .History of Literature vol. 13. The > University > > of Minnesota Press? > > > > I have looked for it everywhere with all the available resources at my > > university and absolutely need it for my MPhil dissertation that engages > > with both Bakhtin and Vygotsky on the concept of dialogue. It will be of > > much help if I get any leads on this book. > > > > > > Best, > > Rohini Nag > > > > *Research Scholar* > > *Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies* > > *School of Social Sciences-II* > > *Jawaharlal Nehru University* > > *New Delhi-110067* > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 10:34:05 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 11:34:05 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: <5594076d.6a65420a.5953.7115@mx.google.com> References: <5F8E55CF-A680-4867-B23B-202FE0A827ED@gmail.com> <16E25ADD-3982-4CC2-AAD9-44C456C4A576@gmail.com> <60F2BB58-BE9B-4295-BE12-5A7A64E43E40@gmail.com> <5594076d.6a65420a.5953.7115@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <8833A5D1-79BB-4313-B15C-A78C1945FAAD@gmail.com> David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Greg > Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) > IS a question I want to highlight. > What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". > > We could focus on the "there" > We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" > We could focus on the "fore" > > Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices > > Or > > Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? > > I just ordered Lindquist's . > > I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" > > So where our focus abides is where we abide. > > Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? > Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Greg Thompson" > Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > David, > This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and > Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you > wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), > but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you > offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is > the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension > she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would > Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say > about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). > > Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the > south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, > I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to > the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is > probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side > Chicago code described below). > > http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 > In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side > of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist > takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people > don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that > this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long > chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely > done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that > broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think > counterfactually. > > Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example > in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. > > So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to > miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen > in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. > > But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, > be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. > Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness > of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind > of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as > evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have > a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., > because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of > their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most > commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). > People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - > working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are > working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx > "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. > Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith > who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason > why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness > of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the > "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was > the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent > properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much > closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). > > My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness > of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be > had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working > class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact > that that there are things that one does and there are things that one > doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do > is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you > talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to > choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine > different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires > and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or > take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the > bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual > snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white > working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take > up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it > like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? > > The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people > speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the > contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of > speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could > possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. > > And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of > the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of > Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems > a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But > I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here > would be much appreciated. > > Best, > greg > > p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >> >> The key text is: >> >> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >> >> Also: >> >> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >> >> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >> one. >> >> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >> >> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >> but that's in my Chinese copy). >> >> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >> functional one. >> >> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >> done by Ruqaiya's student: >> >> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >> >> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >> >> David Kellogg >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> David, >>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >> Halliday. >>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>> >>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>> >>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >> of >>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>> their face). >>> >>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >> direct >>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >> the >>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>> you write: >>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >> orientation >>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>> >>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>> >>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>> multiple elaborations! >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Everybody: >>>> >>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>> And >>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >> his >>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >> on >>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >> so >>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>> only >>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>> the >>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>> called >>>> "justice"). >>>> >>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>> and >>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >> relevant. >>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >> distinction >>>> between competence and performance. >>>> >>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>> >>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>> >>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>> volitional: >>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >> raised >>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >> is a >>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>> and >>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >> the >>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >> deliberately >>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >> could >>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>> is >>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>> >>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>> factors >>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >> specified >>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>> >>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>> grew >>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>> what >>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >> rules >>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>> sounds >>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>> not >>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >> is a >>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>> >>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>> performance--in >>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>> "communicative >>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>> is >>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>> dichotomies >>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>> know, >>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >> competence >>> is >>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >> performed. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Greg, >>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >> whether >>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >> property >>> of >>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >> actual >>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>> like a >>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >> use >>>> of a >>>>> given code/style? >>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >> that >>>> has >>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>> it >>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>> the >>>>> contrary? >>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>> deployment >>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>> speaker >>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>> David? >>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>> should >>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>> Greg >>>>>> >>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >> Apparently, >>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >> good >>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>> disappointed >>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>> country, I >>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>> Maybe >>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>> euphoria >>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>> where >>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>> those >>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>> Vernacular? >>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>> always >>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >> that >>>> AME >>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >> ?black >>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>> of >>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol > > > [The entire original message is not included.] From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 1 11:48:38 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 01 Jul 2015 14:48:38 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Message-ID: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. ?If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history? Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Greg > Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) > IS a question I want to highlight. > What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". > > We could focus on the "there" > We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" > We could focus on the "fore" > > Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices > > Or > > Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? > > I just ordered Lindquist's . > > I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" > > So where our focus abides is where we abide. > > Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? > Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Greg Thompson" > Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > David, > This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and > Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you > wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), > but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you > offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is > the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension > she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would > Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say > about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). > > Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the > south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, > I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to > the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is > probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side > Chicago code described below). > > http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 > In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side > of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist > takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people > don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that > this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long > chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely > done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that > broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think > counterfactually. > > Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example > in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. > > So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to > miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen > in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. > > But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, > be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. > Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness > of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind > of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as > evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have > a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., > because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of > their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most > commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). > People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - > working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are > working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx > "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. > Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith > who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason > why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness > of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the > "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was > the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent > properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much > closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). > > My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness > of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be > had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working > class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact > that that there are things that one does and there are things that one > doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do > is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you > talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to > choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine > different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires > and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or > take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the > bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual > snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white > working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take > up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it > like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? > > The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people > speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the > contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of > speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could > possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. > > And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of > the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of > Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems > a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But > I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here > would be much appreciated. > > Best, > greg > > p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >> >> The key text is: >> >> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >> >> Also: >> >> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >> >> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >> one. >> >> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >> >> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >> but that's in my Chinese copy). >> >> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >> functional one. >> >> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >> done by Ruqaiya's student: >> >> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >> >> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >> >> David Kellogg >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> David, >>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >> Halliday. >>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>> >>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>> >>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >> of >>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>> their face). >>> >>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >> direct >>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >> the >>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>> you write: >>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >> orientation >>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>> >>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>> >>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>> multiple elaborations! >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Everybody: >>>> >>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>> And >>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >> his >>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >> on >>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >> so >>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>> only >>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>> the >>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>> called >>>> "justice"). >>>> >>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>> and >>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >> relevant. >>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >> distinction >>>> between competence and performance. >>>> >>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>> >>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>> >>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>> volitional: >>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >> raised >>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >> is a >>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>> and >>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >> the >>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >> deliberately >>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >> could >>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>> is >>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>> >>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>> factors >>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >> specified >>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>> >>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>> grew >>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>> what >>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >> rules >>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>> sounds >>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>> not >>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >> is a >>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>> >>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>> performance--in >>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>> "communicative >>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>> is >>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>> dichotomies >>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>> know, >>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >> competence >>> is >>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >> performed. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Greg, >>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >> whether >>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >> property >>> of >>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >> actual >>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>> like a >>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >> use >>>> of a >>>>> given code/style? >>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >> that >>>> has >>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>> it >>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>> the >>>>> contrary? >>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>> deployment >>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>> speaker >>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>> David? >>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>> should >>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>> Greg >>>>>> >>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >> Apparently, >>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >> good >>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>> disappointed >>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>> country, I >>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>> Maybe >>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>> euphoria >>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>> where >>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>> those >>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>> Vernacular? >>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>> always >>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >> that >>>> AME >>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >> ?black >>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>> of >>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol > > > [The entire original message is not included.] From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 13:34:29 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2015 05:34:29 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> References: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> Message-ID: Greg: Consider the following two expressions. They are not made up. b) Brother Barack a) President Obama Toennies would say that the first reflects a Gemeinschaft orientation, because : 1. It suggests MECHANICAL unity?all of us are units of an identical type (?brothers?). 2. It suggests OUTWARDLY IMPOSED solidarity (?Me against my brother, but me and my brother against my cousin, and me, my brother and my cousin against the world.?) 3. It suggests that ?WE? is more important than ?I?; the rules of the collective over-rule the choices of the individual, and WHAT you are (a brother) is more important than WHO you are. In contrast, the second reflects a Gesellschaft orientation because: 1. It suggests an ORGANIC unity?a president is not a vice-president or supreme court justice, or a senator, or a voter, and is not interchangeable with any of them. 2. It suggests an INWARDLY-ESTABLISHED interdependence. A president is not the president because of some outside threat but instead is an individual function that depends on the functioning of the others inside society. 3. It suggests that INDIVIDUAL capacities are more important to this hierarchy than common shared capabilities: the president is a unique individual, not a brother like any other. The first, Gemeinschaft, orientation is an orientation towards a particular code. Ruqaiya makes some falsifiable predictions about this code orientation: 1. There will be a much higher frequency of exophoric reference (?this? and ?that? rather than common nouns). This is implicit in forms of cooperation that people in a Gemeinschaft use?they are more likely to be doing the same things with the same objects at the same time. 2. There will be a simpler structure in nominal groups (Deictics like ?the? and ?a? rather than epithets and classifiers like ?splendid? and ?electric?). This is implicit in the outwardly imposed solidarity, because common understandings of common objects imposed by common boundaries do not need to be articulated. 3. There will be an implicatory hierarchy. That is, ?Brother Barack? will have a narrower and more restricted use than ?President Obama?. This is implicit in the fact that a) uses a given name while b) uses a family name. Demonstrative examples, by definition, demonstrate some of the hypotheses we want to test. So for example ?Brother? is more exophoric in its reference than ?President?: ?Brother? is, as Vygotsky reminds us, a factual relationship rather than one which depends on an abstract definition. So its meaning lies in everyday contact with similar brothers rather than a verbal hierarchy. Similarly, ?Brother Barack? has a simpler structure than ?President Obama??the first consists of two morphemes (?Brother? and ?Barack?), while the second consists of at least three (?preside? ?!ent?, and ?Obama?), and possibly four (?pre~?). And of course ?Brother? does not refer to a legalistic hierarchy of concepts while ?President? does. Nevertheless, all these predictions are falsifiable. Yes, they are statements that are made on the basis of a theory (like Vygotsky?s experiments, Ruqaiya?s research was always theory driven). Yes, the demonstrative examples are chosen to demonstrate them (like Vygotsky?s examples, Ruqaiya?s tend to be cherry-picked with the theory in mind). So far this is no different from the articles by Lucy and Gaskins and Kockelmann that you sent me?the former is based on a theory-driven experiment and the latter a cherry-picked example. We don?t have to stay with theory-driven statements and cherry-picked examples. We can take a large amount of data and a willing graduate student, code the data and find out whether each one is true or false, and in fact that?s exactly what Ruqaiya did. I don?t think the same thing is true of this statement, from your last post: ?...(B)eware of putting too much about the way people speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of speaking.? How would we be able to falsify that a particular way of speaking was called forth by a context? How could we verify that it was some ideal essence of the person himself? I guess I feel the same way when you say that it is problematic to imagine that ?these ways of speaking limit how (working class people) could possibly speak/think.? I agree that it?s problematic, but not for the same reason that you do. It?s problematic because it implies that there is some infinite potential for speaking and thinking that has nothing to do with the way we actually do think and speak. It?s problematic for me because it seems to suggest that there is some other way of finding out how someone could possibly speak than by the way they speak. What? You say: ?It seems a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness.? That is, of course, precisely the argument that Vygotsky makes in Chapter Six of Thinking and Speech. I think it?s actually quite difficult to find people in the teaching profession that do not subscribe to this argument in one form or another.The argument you are making, that is, that consciousness cannot be shaped by teaching and learning, was eventually abandoned by even its most ardent defender, Jean Piaget. But let us say that you and Piaget are right, and that human consciousness is essentially inert to the process of teaching and learning. No, let us go further?let?s say that you and Piaget are right, and that human consciousness is essentially inert to the way people speak. What exactly is this consciousness you speak of, which cannot be shaped by either class or by classrooms or even by language? How might it be accessible? Certainly the ways that consciousness is accessed in the articles you sent me are crucially dependent on the use of language, both to access consciousness and to assess it. I?m afraid I think there is a much simpler explanation for your unease with Bernstein. As you surmise, he?s "Marxian". And as you write: ?Julie Lindquist takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people don't think counterfactually.? This statement assumes that such a Marxian notion exists to be taken up. After a life time spent amongst Marxians of almost every stripe, I can tell you that I have never heard this idea put out to be taken up by any of them. In fact, I find it pretty hard to understand how any Marxian could hold this view, since one of the basic tenets of Marxism is that working class people are uniquely capable of socialist consciousness, and of course socialist consciousness was counterfactual, even during the twelve years I lived in China (the Chinese government in the 1980s did not argue that China was a developed socialist society and in fact explicitly said that there would be at least a hundred years of pre-socialist development before we could speak of true socialism). Similarly: ?People on the left see it as evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism (that) working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party).? This assumes that when working class people rise up against their oppressors?e.g. when they do not vote for the Democratic Party?they somehow cease to be working class. I have never heard any leftist articulate any such point of view, and I am fairly sure that it does not exist. Like the previous statement, it is a "demonstrative" which contains an assumption which is demonstrably incompatible with Marxism, namely that consciousness determines being rather than the other way around. Similarly: ?Karl Marx ?saw? in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness.? This assumes that Marx considered workers not fully human. I have read a great deal of Marx?s work (that is what I was doing when I was working in South Chicago?I did frequent bars after work, but South Shore was a black working class neighborhood then, and although people did consider me weird for being red, they considered me a lot weirder for being white). I have never seen anything in Marx's work that suggests that he believed workers to be subhuman. And, once again, it is very hard to square with Marx?s belief that only the working class has both the social power and the interests to organize society in a rational and truly human way. Of course, this assumes that "interests" and "consciousness" can be causally related. Perhaps that's where you disagree? David Kellogg On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 3:48 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I > would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better > understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... > > > https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com>
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., > I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need > time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time > to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off > line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. > > I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me > that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from > looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. > Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of > words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about > what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting > to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention > to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there > has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an > explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete > intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. > > But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class > bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the > juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils > down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the > speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of > us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on > stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data > for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church > speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I > lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to > take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face > back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really > listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, > I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have > plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, > helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and > credible member of this community. This is important to me. > > This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or > playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using > Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I > hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David > argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I > realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful > to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always > know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this > chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys > probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for > exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may > be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman > (Lindquist). Hmmm?. > Henry > > > On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Greg > > Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" > transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our > interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) > > IS a question I want to highlight. > > What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". > > > > We could focus on the "there" > > We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" > > We could focus on the "fore" > > > > Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices > > > > Or > > > > Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" > consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual > practicing changes?? > > > > I just ordered Lindquist's . > > > > I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word > "focus" is "hearth/home" > > > > So where our focus abides is where we abide. > > > > Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another > "home"? > > Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "Greg Thompson" > > Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > > > David, > > This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and > > Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources > (you > > wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), > > but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you > > offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is > > the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension > > she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would > > Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say > > about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). > > > > Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from > the > > south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and > yes, > > I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign > to > > the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of > is > > probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side > > Chicago code described below). > > > > > http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 > > In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side > > of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie > Lindquist > > takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class > people > > don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say > that > > this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with > long > > chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely > > done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that > > broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think > > counterfactually. > > > > Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an > example > > in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. > > > > So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency > to > > miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course > happen > > in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. > > > > But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in > fact, > > be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. > > Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness > > of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a > kind > > of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as > > evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people > have > > a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., > > because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of > > their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most > > commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic > party). > > People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works > - > > working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they > are > > working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl > Marx > > "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. > > Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam > Smith > > who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason > > why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the > crassness > > of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that > the > > "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was > > the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent > > properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much > > closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). > > > > My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the > consciousness > > of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to > be > > had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working > > class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact > > that that there are things that one does and there are things that one > > doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't > do > > is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if > you > > talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to > > choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine > > different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple > repertoires > > and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn > or > > take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the > > bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual > > snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white > > working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take > > up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it > > like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? > > > > The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people > > speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the > > contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of > > speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could > > possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. > > > > And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title > of > > the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping > of > > Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It > seems > > a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. > But > > I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here > > would be much appreciated. > > > > Best, > > greg > > > > p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. > >> > >> The key text is: > >> > >> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. > >> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a > Sociology > >> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. > >> > >> Also: > >> > >> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected > >> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. > >> > >> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native > >> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" > >> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be > sayin" as > >> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. > >> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the > >> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll > smack > >> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion > >> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that > dirty > >> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is > one of > >> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a > genuine > >> one. > >> > >> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). > >> > >> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. > >> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. > >> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, > >> but that's in my Chinese copy). > >> > >> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the > difference > >> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the > >> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, > including > >> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it > >> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a > merely > >> functional one. > >> > >> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be > anything > >> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need > very > >> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This > was > >> done by Ruqaiya's student: > >> > >> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy > and > >> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: > >> Continuum, pp. 31-65. > >> > >> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", > >> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", > "prediction", > >> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in > >> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), > and > >> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney > test). > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> David, > >>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of > >> Halliday. > >>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... > >>> > >>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: > >>> > >>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use > >> of > >>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that > the > >>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside > >>> their face). > >>> > >>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more > >> direct > >>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and > >> the > >>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. > dialect > >>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer > when > >>> you write: > >>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the > >> orientation > >>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal > >>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an > elaborated > >>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to > >>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." > >>> > >>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read > >>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear > how > >>> these features were manifest in the examples. > >>> > >>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your > >>> multiple elaborations! > >>> > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> > >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Everybody: > >>>> > >>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. > >>> And > >>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to > >> his > >>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments > >> on > >>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and > >>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse > >> so > >>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve > >>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's > >>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not > >>> only > >>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have > >>> the > >>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is > >>> called > >>>> "justice"). > >>>> > >>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, > >>> and > >>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's > >>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it > >> relevant. > >>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction > >>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the > >> distinction > >>>> between competence and performance. > >>>> > >>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: > >>>> > >>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. > >>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. > >>>> > >>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the > >>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the > >>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly > >>> volitional: > >>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also > >>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the > >>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it > is > >>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed > >> raised > >>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a > >>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect > >> is a > >>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the > user), > >>> and > >>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second > language > >>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, > >>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine > >>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into > >> the > >>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it > >> deliberately > >>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful > >>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you > >> could > >>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a > dialect > >>> is > >>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. > >>>> > >>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include > the > >>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would > >>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his > >>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules > for > >>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other > >>> factors > >>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is > >> specified > >>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now > >>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the > >>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although > >>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a > >>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. > >>>> > >>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who > >>> grew > >>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it > >>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of > >>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft > >>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, > >>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on > >>> what > >>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your > >>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding > >>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective > >> rules > >>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not > towards > >>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the > >>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards > >>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it > >>> sounds > >>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create > elaborated > >>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike > >>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is > >>> not > >>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation > >> is a > >>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic > >>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. > >>>> > >>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and > >>> performance--in > >>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of > >>> "communicative > >>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not > something > >>> is > >>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically > >>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and > >>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such > >>> dichotomies > >>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not > >>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really > >>> know, > >>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, > >>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying > >> competence > >>> is > >>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly > >>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the > >> performed. > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Greg, > >>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to > >> whether > >>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: > >>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a > >> property > >>> of > >>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of > >>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? > >>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an > >> actual > >>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would > >>>> like a > >>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes > >>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the > >> use > >>>> of a > >>>>> given code/style? > >>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing > >> that > >>>> has > >>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. > >>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that > >>> it > >>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to > >>> the > >>>>> contrary? > >>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of > >>> deployment > >>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the > >>> speaker > >>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. > >>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? > >>>>>> David? > >>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this > >>> should > >>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). > >>>>>> Greg > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Sent from my iPhone > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. > >> Apparently, > >>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not > >> good > >>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so > >>>> disappointed > >>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this > >>> country, I > >>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. > >>> Maybe > >>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of > >>>> euphoria > >>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground > >>> where > >>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with > >>> those > >>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English > >>> Vernacular? > >>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will > >>> always > >>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in > >> that > >>>> AME > >>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the > >> ?black > >>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion > >>> of > >>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol > > > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 13:41:01 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 14:41:01 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> References: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> Message-ID: <7CC1D379-2854-4EF4-9063-46A771714C9A@gmail.com> Hi Paul and all those interested in this thread, Thank you! The radio podcast you linked me to is huge in scope, so I want to do my best to keep it relevant to the thread. The interviewee, human rights activist/lawyer/joiurnalist Ezili Danto, to me, is giving us enough history of the Haitian struggle for independence from the time of Jean Jacques Salin in 1804 to the present, for those not familiar with that struggle so that people like me can understand how one can perceive Bush (the first one), the Clintons and Obama as ?vampires? and ?war mongers?. As I confessed below, my positive response to Obama?s eulogy in Charleston was based on sound bites and not a very good analysis of the sound bites, at that. Sigh. One issue very focused on language was the decision by Danto and others to throw off their European names and take African ones is familiar to an American audience. Most of the podcast is much broader in scope, but I think it provides the ?ground? for the tough discussions on race that so many have called for. So Danto?s historical analysis IS about discourse and a theory of grammar has to be discourse based. Dialogic. (A thread on Bakhtin seems to have broken out.) Of course, such a theory has to taken into account the power of narrative. Danto?s historical narrative is essential to the dialog we are having. Here are issues in that ?ground? that Danto raises that are worth keepin in mind as more prototypically linguistic issues are discussed: 1) the world?s religions include those that have come out of Africa. This will bump up against what a "world religion" is, and that could be a useful discussion. 2) Respect for the mother as an essential part of the African world view as construed by Danto. I am thinking about the indigenous people I know best: the Navajos, matrilineal and matrilocal in their cultural practices. 3) The Haitian struggle for independence is still going on. In 1690 the Pueblos of New Mexico waged their own revolt. It was beat back during the reconquest of the Spanish in the decades that followed. But the Pueblos continue their struggle today in the form of claims to the waters of the Rio Grande. And much more. 4) 50 shades of Black. As per those that retook Haiti after the revolution of 1804, it?s better to be on the white side of the spectrum (Duvalier, Obama) than the black side of the spectrum (Aristide). Much the same thinking, I understand, haunts Brazil. Ads placed by Indian men (of India) in search of brides, at least until recently were full of explicit requests for light-skinned ladies. I doubt I have really moved the thread forward that much. Can anyone else take it up? Ruqaiya apparently had some really specific things in mind that someone smarter than me might be able to connect to. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... > > https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., > I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. > > I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. > > But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. > > This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. > Henry > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Greg >> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >> IS a question I want to highlight. >> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >> >> We could focus on the "there" >> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >> We could focus on the "fore" >> >> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >> >> Or >> >> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >> >> I just ordered Lindquist's . >> >> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >> >> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >> >> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Greg Thompson" >> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >> >> David, >> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >> >> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >> Chicago code described below). >> >> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >> counterfactually. >> >> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >> >> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >> >> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >> >> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >> >> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >> >> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >> would be much appreciated. >> >> Best, >> greg >> >> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>> >>> The key text is: >>> >>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>> >>> Also: >>> >>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>> >>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>> one. >>> >>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>> >>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>> >>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>> functional one. >>> >>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>> >>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>> >>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>> Halliday. >>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>> >>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>> >>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>> of >>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>> their face). >>>> >>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>> direct >>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>> the >>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>> you write: >>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>> orientation >>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>> >>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>> >>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>> multiple elaborations! >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Everybody: >>>>> >>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>> And >>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>> his >>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>> on >>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>> so >>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>> only >>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>> the >>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>> called >>>>> "justice"). >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>> and >>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>> relevant. >>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>> distinction >>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>> >>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>> >>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>> >>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>> volitional: >>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>> raised >>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>> is a >>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>> and >>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>> the >>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>> deliberately >>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>> could >>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>> is >>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>> >>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>> factors >>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>> specified >>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>> >>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>> grew >>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>> what >>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>> rules >>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>> sounds >>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>> not >>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>> is a >>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>> >>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>> performance--in >>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>> "communicative >>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>> is >>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>> dichotomies >>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>> know, >>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>> competence >>>> is >>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>> performed. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Greg, >>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>> whether >>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>> property >>>> of >>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>> actual >>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>> like a >>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>> use >>>>> of a >>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>> that >>>>> has >>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>> it >>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>> the >>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>> deployment >>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>> speaker >>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>> David? >>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>> should >>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>> Apparently, >>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>> good >>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>> disappointed >>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>> country, I >>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>> Maybe >>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>> euphoria >>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>> where >>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>> those >>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>> Vernacular? >>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>> always >>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>> that >>>>> AME >>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>> ?black >>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>> of >>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >> >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 1 13:06:14 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 01 Jul 2015 16:06:14 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Message-ID: Sorry a little background info on the speaker... ezili Danto was one of president aristides ' s attorney during his exile in the states in 1991. Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:07/01/2015 2:48 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Greg > Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) > IS a question I want to highlight. > What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". > > We could focus on the "there" > We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" > We could focus on the "fore" > > Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices > > Or > > Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? > > I just ordered Lindquist's . > > I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" > > So where our focus abides is where we abide. > > Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? > Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Greg Thompson" > Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > David, > This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and > Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you > wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), > but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you > offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is > the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension > she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would > Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say > about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). > > Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the > south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, > I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to > the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is > probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side > Chicago code described below). > > http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 > In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side > of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist > takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people > don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that > this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long > chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely > done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that > broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think > counterfactually. > > Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example > in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. > > So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to > miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen > in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. > > But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, > be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. > Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness > of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind > of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as > evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have > a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., > because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of > their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most > commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). > People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - > working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are > working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx > "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. > Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith > who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason > why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness > of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the > "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was > the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent > properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much > closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). > > My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness > of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be > had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working > class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact > that that there are things that one does and there are things that one > doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do > is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you > talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to > choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine > different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires > and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or > take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the > bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual > snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white > working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take > up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it > like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? > > The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people > speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the > contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of > speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could > possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. > > And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of > the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of > Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems > a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But > I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here > would be much appreciated. > > Best, > greg > > p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >> >> The key text is: >> >> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >> >> Also: >> >> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >> >> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >> one. >> >> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >> >> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >> but that's in my Chinese copy). >> >> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >> functional one. >> >> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >> done by Ruqaiya's student: >> >> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >> >> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >> >> David Kellogg >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> David, >>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >> Halliday. >>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>> >>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>> >>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >> of >>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>> their face). >>> >>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >> direct >>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >> the >>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>> you write: >>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >> orientation >>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>> >>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>> >>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>> multiple elaborations! >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Everybody: >>>> >>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>> And >>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >> his >>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >> on >>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >> so >>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>> only >>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>> the >>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>> called >>>> "justice"). >>>> >>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>> and >>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >> relevant. >>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >> distinction >>>> between competence and performance. >>>> >>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>> >>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>> >>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>> volitional: >>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >> raised >>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >> is a >>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>> and >>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >> the >>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >> deliberately >>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >> could >>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>> is >>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>> >>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>> factors >>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >> specified >>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>> >>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>> grew >>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>> what >>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >> rules >>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>> sounds >>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>> not >>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >> is a >>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>> >>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>> performance--in >>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>> "communicative >>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>> is >>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>> dichotomies >>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>> know, >>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >> competence >>> is >>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >> performed. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Greg, >>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >> whether >>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >> property >>> of >>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >> actual >>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>> like a >>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >> use >>>> of a >>>>> given code/style? >>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >> that >>>> has >>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>> it >>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>> the >>>>> contrary? >>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>> deployment >>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>> speaker >>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>> David? >>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>> should >>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>> Greg >>>>>> >>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >> Apparently, >>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >> good >>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>> disappointed >>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>> country, I >>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>> Maybe >>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>> euphoria >>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>> where >>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>> those >>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>> Vernacular? >>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>> always >>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >> that >>>> AME >>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >> ?black >>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>> of >>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol > > > [The entire original message is not included.] From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 1 14:30:05 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 01 Jul 2015 17:30:05 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Message-ID: <100fh2rdo4jg3ux7rhm2utnc.1435785555478@email.android.com> Hi henry, I have been traveling to and from haiti so i have not had the chance to draw the theoretical thread i am going to when i get home. ?I wanted everyone to have a little background to what i am about to say. ?I have been reading all of the threads, which range from classic sociological theory to labov and bakhtin. ?But the way i see the problem is that white academics, building on the critical race theory of the black bourgeoisie? (E. Franklin frazier's term), continue to see racial issues in terms of the politics of the body overlooking the fundamental differences among the souls of black folk. ? Obama is operating between language games....about to catch my flight, but i will finish this later on this evening. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info? Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities? www.routledge.com/9780415714372 -------- Original message -------- From: HENRY SHONERD Date: 07/01/2015 4:41 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Hi Paul and all those interested in this thread, Thank you! The radio podcast you linked me to is huge in scope, so I want to do my best to keep it relevant to the thread. The interviewee, human rights activist/lawyer/joiurnalist Ezili Danto, to me, is giving us enough history of the Haitian struggle for independence from the time of Jean Jacques Salin in 1804 to the present, for those not familiar with that struggle so that people like me can understand how one can perceive Bush (the first one), the Clintons and Obama as ?vampires? and ?war mongers?. As I confessed below, my positive response to Obama?s eulogy in Charleston was based on sound bites and not a very good analysis of the sound bites, at that. Sigh. One issue very focused on language was the decision by Danto and others to throw off their European names and take African ones is familiar to an American audience. Most of the podcast is much broader in scope, but I think it provides the ?ground? for the tough discussions on race that so many have called for. So Danto?s historical analysis IS about discourse and a theory of grammar has to be discourse based. Dialogic. (A thread on Bakhtin seems to have broken out.) Of course, such a theory has to taken into account the power of narrative. Danto?s historical narrative is essential to the dialog we are having. Here are issues in that ?ground? that Danto raises that are worth keepin in mind as more prototypically linguistic issues are discussed: 1) the world?s religions include those that have come out of Africa. This will bump up against what a "world religion" is, and that could be a useful discussion. 2) Respect for the mother as an essential part of the African world view as construed by Danto. I am thinking about the indigenous people I know best: the Navajos, matrilineal and matrilocal in their cultural practices. 3) The Haitian struggle for independence is still going on. In 1690 the Pueblos of New Mexico waged their own revolt. It was beat back during the reconquest of the Spanish in the decades that followed. But the Pueblos continue their struggle today in the form of claims to the waters of the Rio Grande. And much more. 4) 50 shades of Black. As per those that retook Haiti after the revolution of 1804, it?s better to be on the white side of the spectrum (Duvalier, Obama) than the black side of the spectrum (Aristide). Much the same thinking, I understand, haunts Brazil. Ads placed by Indian men (of India) in search of brides, at least until recently were full of explicit requests for light-skinned ladies. I doubt I have really moved the thread forward that much. Can anyone else take it up? Ruqaiya apparently had some really specific things in mind that someone smarter than me might be able to connect to. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... > > https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., > I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. > > I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. > > But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. > > This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. > Henry > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Greg >> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >> IS a question I want to highlight. >> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >> >> We could focus on the "there" >> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >> We could focus on the "fore" >> >> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >> >> Or >> >> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >> >> I just ordered Lindquist's . >> >> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >> >> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >> >> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Greg Thompson" >> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >> >> David, >> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >> >> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >> Chicago code described below). >> >> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >> counterfactually. >> >> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >> >> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >> >> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >> >> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >> >> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >> >> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >> would be much appreciated. >> >> Best, >> greg >> >> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>> >>> The key text is: >>> >>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>> >>> Also: >>> >>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>> >>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>> one. >>> >>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>> >>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>> >>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>> functional one. >>> >>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>> >>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>> >>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>> Halliday. >>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>> >>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>> >>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>> of >>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>> their face). >>>> >>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>> direct >>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>> the >>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>> you write: >>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>> orientation >>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>> >>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>> >>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>> multiple elaborations! >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Everybody: >>>>> >>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>> And >>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>> his >>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>> on >>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>> so >>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>> only >>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>> the >>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>> called >>>>> "justice"). >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>> and >>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>> relevant. >>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>> distinction >>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>> >>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>> >>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>> >>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>> volitional: >>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>> raised >>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>> is a >>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>> and >>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>> the >>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>> deliberately >>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>> could >>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>> is >>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>> >>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>> factors >>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>> specified >>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>> >>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>> grew >>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>> what >>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>> rules >>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>> sounds >>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>> not >>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>> is a >>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>> >>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>> performance--in >>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>> "communicative >>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>> is >>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>> dichotomies >>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>> know, >>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>> competence >>>> is >>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>> performed. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Greg, >>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>> whether >>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>> property >>>> of >>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>> actual >>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>> like a >>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>> use >>>>> of a >>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>> that >>>>> has >>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>> it >>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>> the >>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>> deployment >>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>> speaker >>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>> David? >>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>> should >>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>> Apparently, >>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>> good >>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>> disappointed >>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>> country, I >>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>> Maybe >>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>> euphoria >>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>> where >>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>> those >>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>> Vernacular? >>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>> always >>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>> that >>>>> AME >>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>> ?black >>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>> of >>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >> >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 1 15:15:53 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 01 Jul 2015 18:15:53 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Message-ID: What we fail to realize is that so-called blacks such as w.e.b Du bois,?aime cesaire, frantz fanon, booker t. Washington, and obama are white supremacists. ?That is, they were and are interpellated and embourgeoised by the ideology and ideological apparatuses of a racist social structure. ?As such, they saw and see the world as their former colonizers. ?For example, fanon and du bois viewed haitian vodou and practical consciousness in the same light as the white southern racists who constituted the american occupying force that occupied haiti from 1915-1934 (see laurent du bois's work, "haiti: the afterschock of history). ?They felt that they had to be civilized (be more white). ?It is in this same european ethnocentric ethos that obama sees the world. ? Hence, my comment that obama is a white man! ?He is no different from bill clinton, george bush, etc. Theoretically speaking, in vygotskyian/ bhabhaian parlance (yes in a sense i am equating homi bhabha's ambivalence space with vygotsky's zone of proximal development), it does not appear that whether in the bhabhaian ambivalent space or at the zone of proximial development these so-called black theorists were able to develop an alternative space or language game from which to utter confrontational utterances against the ideology of their colonizers, which they internalized to the point of reproducing it against other blacks who did not look and act like their former colonizers. ?(The latter point may speak to the issue of creativity you all have discussed in previous threads). The haitians were able to do it bcuz they were already equipped with the language game of a different social structure (albeit racist whites and blacks viewed it as primitive). ?At the start of the revolution over 70 percent of the haitians were directly from africa. ?As such, they attempted to recursively reorganize and reproduce their african agential moments against the western practical consciousness of europeans, the mulatto elites, and petit-bourgeois blacks with western education (so the subaltern is able to speak). I say all of this to say, in the age of globalization, the politic of the body is very dangerous. ?obama is paraded as a sign of diversity/multiculturalism based on his so-called race as opposed to his practical consciousness. ?I could care less if his skin-color would get him stopped by the cops, it does not negate the fact that he is a white/black man seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution with people who would lynch him! ?That is absurd, and demonstrates the lack of creativity of the black bourgeoisie... Delay gave me a moment! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info? Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities? www.routledge.com/9780415714372 -------- Original message -------- From: HENRY SHONERD Date: 07/01/2015 4:41 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Hi Paul and all those interested in this thread, Thank you! The radio podcast you linked me to is huge in scope, so I want to do my best to keep it relevant to the thread. The interviewee, human rights activist/lawyer/joiurnalist Ezili Danto, to me, is giving us enough history of the Haitian struggle for independence from the time of Jean Jacques Salin in 1804 to the present, for those not familiar with that struggle so that people like me can understand how one can perceive Bush (the first one), the Clintons and Obama as ?vampires? and ?war mongers?. As I confessed below, my positive response to Obama?s eulogy in Charleston was based on sound bites and not a very good analysis of the sound bites, at that. Sigh. One issue very focused on language was the decision by Danto and others to throw off their European names and take African ones is familiar to an American audience. Most of the podcast is much broader in scope, but I think it provides the ?ground? for the tough discussions on race that so many have called for. So Danto?s historical analysis IS about discourse and a theory of grammar has to be discourse based. Dialogic. (A thread on Bakhtin seems to have broken out.) Of course, such a theory has to taken into account the power of narrative. Danto?s historical narrative is essential to the dialog we are having. Here are issues in that ?ground? that Danto raises that are worth keepin in mind as more prototypically linguistic issues are discussed: 1) the world?s religions include those that have come out of Africa. This will bump up against what a "world religion" is, and that could be a useful discussion. 2) Respect for the mother as an essential part of the African world view as construed by Danto. I am thinking about the indigenous people I know best: the Navajos, matrilineal and matrilocal in their cultural practices. 3) The Haitian struggle for independence is still going on. In 1690 the Pueblos of New Mexico waged their own revolt. It was beat back during the reconquest of the Spanish in the decades that followed. But the Pueblos continue their struggle today in the form of claims to the waters of the Rio Grande. And much more. 4) 50 shades of Black. As per those that retook Haiti after the revolution of 1804, it?s better to be on the white side of the spectrum (Duvalier, Obama) than the black side of the spectrum (Aristide). Much the same thinking, I understand, haunts Brazil. Ads placed by Indian men (of India) in search of brides, at least until recently were full of explicit requests for light-skinned ladies. I doubt I have really moved the thread forward that much. Can anyone else take it up? Ruqaiya apparently had some really specific things in mind that someone smarter than me might be able to connect to. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... > > https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., > I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. > > I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. > > But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. > > This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. > Henry > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Greg >> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >> IS a question I want to highlight. >> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >> >> We could focus on the "there" >> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >> We could focus on the "fore" >> >> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >> >> Or >> >> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >> >> I just ordered Lindquist's . >> >> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >> >> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >> >> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Greg Thompson" >> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >> >> David, >> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >> >> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >> Chicago code described below). >> >> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >> counterfactually. >> >> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >> >> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >> >> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >> >> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >> >> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >> >> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >> would be much appreciated. >> >> Best, >> greg >> >> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>> >>> The key text is: >>> >>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>> >>> Also: >>> >>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>> >>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>> one. >>> >>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>> >>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>> >>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>> functional one. >>> >>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>> >>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>> >>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>> Halliday. >>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>> >>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>> >>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>> of >>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>> their face). >>>> >>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>> direct >>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>> the >>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>> you write: >>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>> orientation >>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>> >>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>> >>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>> multiple elaborations! >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Everybody: >>>>> >>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>> And >>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>> his >>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>> on >>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>> so >>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>> only >>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>> the >>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>> called >>>>> "justice"). >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>> and >>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>> relevant. >>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>> distinction >>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>> >>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>> >>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>> >>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>> volitional: >>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>> raised >>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>> is a >>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>> and >>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>> the >>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>> deliberately >>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>> could >>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>> is >>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>> >>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>> factors >>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>> specified >>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>> >>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>> grew >>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>> what >>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>> rules >>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>> sounds >>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>> not >>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>> is a >>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>> >>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>> performance--in >>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>> "communicative >>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>> is >>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>> dichotomies >>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>> know, >>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>> competence >>>> is >>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>> performed. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Greg, >>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>> whether >>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>> property >>>> of >>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>> actual >>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>> like a >>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>> use >>>>> of a >>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>> that >>>>> has >>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>> it >>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>> the >>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>> deployment >>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>> speaker >>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>> David? >>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>> should >>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>> Apparently, >>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>> good >>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>> disappointed >>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>> country, I >>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>> Maybe >>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>> euphoria >>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>> where >>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>> those >>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>> Vernacular? >>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>> always >>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>> that >>>>> AME >>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>> ?black >>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>> of >>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >> >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 16:22:26 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 17:22:26 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> Message-ID: David, Yes, what you say makes very good sense to me. But perhaps I'm not making as much sense to me, so let me clarify a few things to myself if no one else. This will involve some back tracking, a little back pedaling (I wanted to spell that "peddling" but caught myself - but perhaps there is truth there too! Ah, words!), and maybe some back stroking (just because it is 100+ degrees here and has been so for the last two weeks!). First, the back peddling So I probably shouldn't have mentioned the bit about too easily fitting data into a theory. I said that with this other author (Van Kleeck) in mind and without good knowledge of Hasan's (and even Bernstein's) work. Even as I wrote it, I was already thinking that it probably isn't apropos for their work. So my apologies for throwing in that red herring. My sense is that Hasan's work is extremely theoretically rigorous and I really didn't mean to suggest that it was otherwise (even though I did suggest this). Next, the back tracking: Two ideas that I need to revisit: methods for studying contexts, and whether or not there are other ways to get to cognition - other than schooling. First, with regard to the methods for studying contexts of talk and such, yes, it is true, this is not an easy thing to study. Contexts are entailed by talk itself and thus are not presupposable. The result is that measuring them can be difficult. As much art as science. And yet, as we go through our daily lives, with some not infrequent exceptions, we generally do very well at figuring out what kinds of contexts we are "in" in any given moment (whether an argument (heated or not), a discussion, a practical joke, or a thought experiment). So then, the question becomes, if we can do it (well enough to "get along" as Wittgenstein says), then why can't someone studying context do it? Linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists have come up with an answer, and it generally falls under the name of "contextualization." This points to the process by which contexts are indicated (cf. Gumperz' "contextualization cues"). Studying contextualization involves a theory of "enough-ness" - that is to say, that there is enough pointing to a given context being the most salient that one can reasonably conclude that it is likely to be the context that is constraining and enabling participants' acts-in-context. (Michael Silverstein's classic piece on contextualization - "The Indeterminacy of Contextualization: When is enough enough?" - lays out this approach - I have a copy in case anyone is interested - just email me). What this method lacks in big numbers data, it makes up for in meaningfulness. I think this is where the large corpus research is lacking. Large corpus research can show the distribution of different words or collections of words or grammatical features or whatever and how these correlate with other easily quantifiable features (e.g., income or wealth or education or some combination of whatever proxy you would use for indicating those persons who are "low-income" - and even here you'll get some who aren't what they seem to be...). But in counting distributions, you quickly lose meaningfulness. If you are going to do a count of the distribution of a given word, e.g. "this" in a massive corpus, it is highly unlikely that you will be able to document each instance of usage and what it means in that context, much less what that context means! Or, to put it more positively, what large corpus research lacks in meaningfulness, it makes up for in representativeness (i.e., we know that the data are highly representative of the population which they claim to represent, even if we don't really know what they "mean" for the users). What I'm saying here is a rather old story that everyone has heard before and probably in clearer terms than what I have introduced somewhat ad hoc (representativeness? really?) so I don't want to belabor the point. But I thought it worth mentioning that I happen to err on the side of being willing to sacrifice representativeness for meaningfulness (perhaps a result of a sense of disenchantment with my late capitalist context? or my whiteness? cf. Paul's emails). I'll choose the scale of a forty five minute interaction over the scale of 45 million interactions any day. As a result, I'm willing to lose some of the representativeness. You might say, I prefer the artfulness of analyzing talk over the science of it. But that's just me. And a caution, the big money is in the representativeness. Second, regarding whether or not there are other ways, other than schooling, to get to the types of capacities that everyone cares about ("cognition" as some describe it), what I am suggesting is simply that schooling might not be the only way to get to something like "scientific concepts." [please note that my point was not the Piagetian point that these capacities naturally unfold in time but rather that it may be the case that there are other ways of getting there - more Durkheim, and I like to think, Vygotsky, than Piaget]. I would call these cultural alternatives to schooling that nonetheless accomplish complex capacities. Thinking about this in terms of "scientific concepts" is a bit more radical of a way of thinking about the argument than what I had in mind, but I'll leave that as a potential to be developed (and maybe others have already made this case?). What I was thinking about were skills like meta-linguistic awareness (again I'm more engaged here with the Van Kleeck article than I am with Hasan or Bernstein; there is a long tradition in CHAT of finding other cultural ways of doing things that were thought to be the result of schooling - I have Lave and Wenger in mind here but there are many others). For example, there are types of talk that can provoke certain forms of metalinguistic awareness. Teasing is a cultural practice in which one's words are not what they denote. This can provoke a substantial reorganization of the child's understanding of what language IS as an object. If the child encounters this cultural practice enough (and has the minimal developments in discursive abilities to be able to grasp the sense of teasing - no, Piaget is not dead!), then one will realize that the word is not the thing. This is perhaps a more minimal form of metalinguistic awareness, but it is nonetheless an important accomplishment that can ground other more complex language usage abilities. And it isn't in schooling. So perhaps I should have said that I was simply suggesting that schooling isn't the ONLY way to get to these capacities. As for my readings of Marx, perhaps the point here is that we run in different circles (you in the authentic and genuine Marxist circles, me in the bourgeois Marxist circles!). (circles = contexts?). Or, perhaps, we just draw our circles differently. I had imagined drawing the Marxian circle a bit larger than the Marxist circle, and in the former I had included the likes of Paul Willis whose book Learning to Labour is, in part, an argument about why there has not yet been a revolution. The answer he offers is that working class culture has certain limitations that keep them from penetrating the dominant ideology. Along these lines I thought that the whole false consciousness, in all its variants - from Marx on down, was essentially a way of answering the question "why no revolution?" and perhaps it would be too strong to say that it does this by laying it at the feet of the proletariat, but it at least seems the case that the failings of the proletariat have something to do with our collective failure to realize the revolutionary transformations called for in Communism. [and yes, there is a robust history by Marxian (again, larger category) historian scholars who have tried to explain why so many union members voted for Reagan in the 80's. For another take on this, consider the book What's the Matter with Kansas? - a popular classic seeking to invoke false consciousness as the reason why so many poor and working class people in middle america vote Republican. But maybe this is a pastime of American Marxians? Again, different circles, whether lived or drawn...]. And with regard to Marx's view of the worker, I don't have my Marx-Engels reader with me but I seem to recall a number of places in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 in the sections on alienated/estranged labor where Marx suggests that the worker is essentially reduced to an animal - alienated from his species being. I understand that there are different ways to read this and imagine that you read it quite differently, but the words (or something to that effect) are there. But again, I fear that this may be a bit too much red herring for me as well. Not where I'm writing right now so I fear I'm not up to the task of extended discussion on the topic. Enough? Now on to the back-stroking.. (if only I could find a body of water in this drought blighted land...). -greg On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 2:34 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Greg: > > > Consider the following two expressions. They are not made up. > > > b) Brother Barack > > > a) President Obama > > > Toennies would say that the first reflects a Gemeinschaft orientation, > because : > > > 1. It suggests MECHANICAL unity?all of us are units of an identical type > (?brothers?). > > > 2. It suggests OUTWARDLY IMPOSED solidarity (?Me against my brother, but me > and my brother against my cousin, and me, my brother and my cousin against > the world.?) > > > 3. It suggests that ?WE? is more important than ?I?; the rules of the > collective over-rule the choices of the individual, and WHAT you are (a > brother) is more important than WHO you are. > > > In contrast, the second reflects a Gesellschaft orientation because: > > > 1. It suggests an ORGANIC unity?a president is not a vice-president or > supreme court justice, or a senator, or a voter, and is not interchangeable > with any of them. > > > 2. It suggests an INWARDLY-ESTABLISHED interdependence. A president is not > the president because of some outside threat but instead is an individual > function that depends on the functioning of the others inside society. > > > 3. It suggests that INDIVIDUAL capacities are more important to this > hierarchy than common shared capabilities: the president is a unique > individual, not a brother like any other. > > > The first, Gemeinschaft, orientation is an orientation towards a particular > code. Ruqaiya makes some falsifiable predictions about this code > orientation: > > > 1. There will be a much higher frequency of exophoric reference (?this? > and ?that? rather than common nouns). This is implicit in forms of > cooperation that people in a Gemeinschaft use?they are more likely to be > doing the same things with the same objects at the same time. > > > 2. There will be a simpler structure in nominal groups (Deictics like ?the? > and ?a? rather than epithets and classifiers like ?splendid? and > ?electric?). This is implicit in the outwardly imposed solidarity, because > common understandings of common objects imposed by common boundaries do not > need to be articulated. > > > 3. There will be an implicatory hierarchy. That is, ?Brother Barack? will > have a narrower and more restricted use than ?President Obama?. This is > implicit in the fact that a) uses a given name while b) uses a family name. > > > Demonstrative examples, by definition, demonstrate some of the hypotheses > we want to test. So for example ?Brother? is more exophoric in its > reference than ?President?: ?Brother? is, as Vygotsky reminds us, a > factual relationship rather than one which depends on an abstract > definition. So its meaning lies in everyday contact with similar brothers > rather than a verbal hierarchy. Similarly, ?Brother Barack? has a simpler > structure than ?President Obama??the first consists of two morphemes > (?Brother? and ?Barack?), while the second consists of at least three > (?preside? ?!ent?, and ?Obama?), and possibly four (?pre~?). And of course > ?Brother? does not refer to a legalistic hierarchy of concepts while > ?President? does. > > > Nevertheless, all these predictions are falsifiable. Yes, they are > statements that are made on the basis of a theory (like Vygotsky?s > experiments, Ruqaiya?s research was always theory driven). Yes, the > demonstrative examples are chosen to demonstrate them (like Vygotsky?s > examples, Ruqaiya?s tend to be cherry-picked with the theory in mind). So > far this is no different from the articles by Lucy and Gaskins and > Kockelmann that you sent me?the former is based on a theory-driven > experiment and the latter a cherry-picked example. > > > We don?t have to stay with theory-driven statements and cherry-picked > examples. We can take a large amount of data and a willing graduate > student, code the data and find out whether each one is true or false, and > in fact that?s exactly what Ruqaiya did. > > > I don?t think the same thing is true of this statement, from your last > post: > > > ?...(B)eware of putting too much about the way people speak into the > people themselves. It is more often the case that the contexts that people > habitually encounter call forth certain ways of speaking.? > > > How would we be able to falsify that a particular way of speaking was > called forth by a context? How could we verify that it was some ideal > essence of the person himself? > > > I guess I feel the same way when you say that it is problematic to imagine > that ?these ways of speaking limit how (working class people) could > possibly speak/think.? I agree that it?s problematic, but not for the same > reason that you do. It?s problematic because it implies that there is some > infinite potential for speaking and thinking that has nothing to do with > the way we actually do think and speak. It?s problematic for me because it > seems to suggest that there is some other way of finding out how someone > could possibly speak than by the way they speak. What? > > > You say: ?It seems a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape > consciousness.? > > > That is, of course, precisely the argument that Vygotsky makes in Chapter > Six of Thinking and Speech. I think it?s actually quite difficult to find > people in the teaching profession that do not subscribe to this argument in > one form or another.The argument you are making, that is, that > consciousness cannot be shaped by teaching and learning, was eventually > abandoned by even its most ardent defender, Jean Piaget. > > > > But let us say that you and Piaget are right, and that human consciousness > is essentially inert to the process of teaching and learning. No, let us go > further?let?s say that you and Piaget are right, and that human > consciousness is essentially inert to the way people speak. What exactly is > this consciousness you speak of, which cannot be shaped by either class or > by classrooms or even by language? How might it be accessible? Certainly > the ways that consciousness is accessed in the articles you sent me are > crucially dependent on the use of language, both to access consciousness > and to assess it. > > > I?m afraid I think there is a much simpler explanation for your unease with > Bernstein. As you surmise, he?s "Marxian". And as you write: > > ?Julie Lindquist takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that > working class people don't think counterfactually.? > > > This statement assumes that such a Marxian notion exists to be taken up. > After a life time spent amongst Marxians of almost every stripe, I can tell > you that I have never heard this idea put out to be taken up by any of > them. In fact, I find it pretty hard to understand how any Marxian could > hold this view, since one of the basic tenets of Marxism is that working > class people are uniquely capable of socialist consciousness, and of course > socialist consciousness was counterfactual, even during the twelve years I > lived in China (the Chinese government in the 1980s did not argue that > China was a developed socialist society and in fact explicitly said that > there would be at least a hundred years of pre-socialist development before > we could speak of true socialism). > > > Similarly: > > > ?People on the left see it as evidence of the malicious effects of > capitalism (that) working class people have a degraded consciousness and > that is why they are working class (i.e., because of their degraded > consciousness, they can't realize the nature of their oppression and/or how > to rise up against their oppressor, or, most commonly, they don't vote in > their interests - with the Democratic party).? > > > This assumes that when working class people rise up against their > oppressors?e.g. when they do not vote for the Democratic Party?they somehow > cease to be working class. I have never heard any leftist articulate any > such point of view, and I am fairly sure that it does not exist. Like the > previous statement, it is a "demonstrative" which contains an assumption > which is demonstrably incompatible with Marxism, namely that consciousness > determines being rather than the other way around. > > > Similarly: > > > ?Karl Marx ?saw? in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human > consciousness.? > > > This assumes that Marx considered workers not fully human. I have read a > great deal of Marx?s work (that is what I was doing when I was working in > South Chicago?I did frequent bars after work, but South Shore was a black > working class neighborhood then, and although people did consider me weird > for being red, they considered me a lot weirder for being white). I have > never seen anything in Marx's work that suggests that he believed workers > to be subhuman. And, once again, it is very hard to square with Marx?s > belief that only the working class has both the social power and the > interests to organize society in a rational and truly human way. > > > Of course, this assumes that "interests" and "consciousness" can be > causally related. Perhaps that's where you disagree? > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 3:48 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > wrote: > > > Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I > > would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better > > understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... > > > > > > > https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history > > > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com>
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
> >
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., > > I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need > > time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time > > to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going > off > > line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. > > > > I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me > > that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from > > looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. > > Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings > of > > words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking > about > > what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between > wanting > > to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call > attention > > to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there > > has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an > > explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete > > intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. > > > > But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class > > bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the > > juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often > boils > > down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the > > speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all > of > > us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on > > stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data > > for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church > > speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I > > lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to > > take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face > > back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really > > listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I > said, > > I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have > > plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, > > helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and > > credible member of this community. This is important to me. > > > > This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. > (Or > > playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using > > Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and > will, I > > hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David > > argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I > > realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful > > to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t > always > > know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with > this > > chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys > > probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for > > exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may > > be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman > > (Lindquist). Hmmm?. > > Henry > > > > > On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > > Greg > > > Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" > > transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our > > interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations > (contexts) > > > IS a question I want to highlight. > > > What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". > > > > > > We could focus on the "there" > > > We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" > > > We could focus on the "fore" > > > > > > Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices > > > > > > Or > > > > > > Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" > > consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual > > practicing changes?? > > > > > > I just ordered Lindquist's . > > > > > > I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word > > "focus" is "hearth/home" > > > > > > So where our focus abides is where we abide. > > > > > > Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another > > "home"? > > > Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: "Greg Thompson" > > > Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > > > > > David, > > > This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and > > > Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources > > (you > > > wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me > offline?), > > > but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you > > > offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what > is > > > the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever > dimension > > > she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would > > > Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say > > > about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). > > > > > > Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from > > the > > > south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and > > yes, > > > I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign > > to > > > the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak > of > > is > > > probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south > side > > > Chicago code described below). > > > > > > > > > http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 > > > In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South > Side > > > of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie > > Lindquist > > > takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class > > people > > > don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say > > that > > > this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with > > long > > > chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely > > > done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that > > > broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think > > > counterfactually. > > > > > > Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an > > example > > > in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. > > > > > > So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency > > to > > > miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course > > happen > > > in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. > > > > > > But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in > > fact, > > > be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class > bars. > > > Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the > consciousness > > > of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a > > kind > > > of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as > > > evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people > > have > > > a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., > > > because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature > of > > > their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, > most > > > commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic > > party). > > > People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy > works > > - > > > working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they > > are > > > working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl > > Marx > > > "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human > consciousness. > > > Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam > > Smith > > > who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the > reason > > > why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the > > crassness > > > of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that > > the > > > "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory > was > > > the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent > > > properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually > much > > > closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). > > > > > > My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the > > consciousness > > > of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are > to > > be > > > had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white > working > > > class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the > fact > > > that that there are things that one does and there are things that one > > > doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't > > do > > > is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if > > you > > > talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have > to > > > choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine > > > different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple > > repertoires > > > and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn > > or > > > take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in > the > > > bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent > intellectual > > > snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white > > > working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you > take > > > up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells > it > > > like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? > > > > > > The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people > > > speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the > > > contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of > > > speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could > > > possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. > > > > > > And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the > title > > of > > > the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping > > of > > > Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It > > seems > > > a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. > > But > > > I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights > here > > > would be much appreciated. > > > > > > Best, > > > greg > > > > > > p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > >> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. > > >> > > >> The key text is: > > >> > > >> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. > > >> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a > > Sociology > > >> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. > > >> > > >> Also: > > >> > > >> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In > Collected > > >> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. > > >> > > >> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native > > >> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" > > >> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be > > sayin" as > > >> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the > conditional. > > >> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then > the > > >> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll > > smack > > >> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion > > >> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that > > dirty > > >> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is > > one of > > >> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a > > genuine > > >> one. > > >> > > >> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). > > >> > > >> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. > > >> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. > > >> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. > 69, > > >> but that's in my Chinese copy). > > >> > > >> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the > > difference > > >> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the > > >> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, > > including > > >> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it > > >> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a > > merely > > >> functional one. > > >> > > >> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be > > anything > > >> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need > > very > > >> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This > > was > > >> done by Ruqaiya's student: > > >> > > >> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy > > and > > >> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: > > >> Continuum, pp. 31-65. > > >> > > >> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", > > >> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", > > "prediction", > > >> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in > > >> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), > > and > > >> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney > > test). > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> > > >> > > >> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> David, > > >>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of > > >> Halliday. > > >>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I > can... > > >>> > > >>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: > > >>> > > >>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the > use > > >> of > > >>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that > > the > > >>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child > upside > > >>> their face). > > >>> > > >>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more > > >> direct > > >>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples > and > > >> the > > >>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. > > dialect > > >>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer > > when > > >>> you write: > > >>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the > > >> orientation > > >>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal > > >>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an > > elaborated > > >>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to > > >>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." > > >>> > > >>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I > read > > >>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear > > how > > >>> these features were manifest in the examples. > > >>> > > >>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your > > >>> multiple elaborations! > > >>> > > >>> -greg > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg > > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Everybody: > > >>>> > > >>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's > rage. > > >>> And > > >>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due > to > > >> his > > >>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my > comments > > >> on > > >>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid > and > > >>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things > worse > > >> so > > >>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve > > >>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a > racist's > > >>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is > not > > >>> only > > >>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who > have > > >>> the > > >>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is > > >>> called > > >>>> "justice"). > > >>>> > > >>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and > Hymes, > > >>> and > > >>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's > > >>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it > > >> relevant. > > >>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction > > >>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the > > >> distinction > > >>>> between competence and performance. > > >>>> > > >>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year > olds: > > >>>> > > >>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. > > >>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. > > >>>> > > >>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the > > >>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology > (the > > >>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly > > >>> volitional: > > >>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can > also > > >>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the > > >>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it > > is > > >>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed > > >> raised > > >>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a > > >>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect > > >> is a > > >>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the > > user), > > >>> and > > >>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second > > language > > >>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, > > >>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; > genuine > > >>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born > into > > >> the > > >>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it > > >> deliberately > > >>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful > > >>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you > > >> could > > >>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a > > dialect > > >>> is > > >>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. > > >>>> > > >>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include > > the > > >>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would > > >>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his > > >>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules > > for > > >>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other > > >>> factors > > >>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is > > >> specified > > >>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and > now > > >>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the > > >>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although > > >>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as > a > > >>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. > > >>>> > > >>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, > who > > >>> grew > > >>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it > > >>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of > > >>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft > > >>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, > > >>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is > on > > >>> what > > >>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on > your > > >>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted > coding > > >>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective > > >> rules > > >>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not > > towards > > >>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the > > >>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards > > >>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it > > >>> sounds > > >>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create > > elaborated > > >>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike > > >>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it > is > > >>> not > > >>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation > > >> is a > > >>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic > > >>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. > > >>>> > > >>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and > > >>> performance--in > > >>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of > > >>> "communicative > > >>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not > > something > > >>> is > > >>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically > > >>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and > > >>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such > > >>> dichotomies > > >>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually > not > > >>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really > > >>> know, > > >>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, > > >>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying > > >> competence > > >>> is > > >>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly > > >>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the > > >> performed. > > >>>> > > >>>> David Kellogg > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > >>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Greg, > > >>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to > > >> whether > > >>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: > > >>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a > > >> property > > >>> of > > >>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of > > >>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? > > >>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an > > >> actual > > >>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya > would > > >>>> like a > > >>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage > event. > > >>>>> Henry > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that > Hymes > > >>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the > > >> use > > >>>> of a > > >>>>> given code/style? > > >>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing > > >> that > > >>>> has > > >>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. > > >>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was > that > > >>> it > > >>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence > to > > >>> the > > >>>>> contrary? > > >>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of > > >>> deployment > > >>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the > > >>> speaker > > >>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. > > >>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? > > >>>>>> David? > > >>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this > > >>> should > > >>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up > to). > > >>>>>> Greg > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Sent from my iPhone > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. > > >> Apparently, > > >>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not > > >> good > > >>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so > > >>>> disappointed > > >>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this > > >>> country, I > > >>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. > > >>> Maybe > > >>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of > > >>>> euphoria > > >>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground > > >>> where > > >>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with > > >>> those > > >>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English > > >>> Vernacular? > > >>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will > > >>> always > > >>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in > > >> that > > >>>> AME > > >>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the > > >> ?black > > >>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the > discussion > > >>> of > > >>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol > > > > > > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 16:25:11 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 17:25:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <59ECDF1E-87A3-4D29-84E9-F53AD7860B3F@gmail.com> Paul, Re the technology, no problem. The jumpiness befits the website: blockreportradio.com . And, yes, Counselor Danto (or could I say Sistern Elizi? Please see David?s most recent post to the thread) emphasized during the interview the work she had done with President Aristide. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 2:06 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Sorry a little background info on the speaker... ezili Danto was one of president aristides ' s attorney during his exile in the states in 1991. > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:07/01/2015 2:48 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>
Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... > > https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., > I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. > > I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. > > But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. > > This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. > Henry > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Greg >> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >> IS a question I want to highlight. >> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >> >> We could focus on the "there" >> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >> We could focus on the "fore" >> >> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >> >> Or >> >> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >> >> I just ordered Lindquist's . >> >> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >> >> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >> >> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Greg Thompson" >> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >> >> David, >> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >> >> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >> Chicago code described below). >> >> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >> counterfactually. >> >> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >> >> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >> >> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >> >> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >> >> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >> >> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >> would be much appreciated. >> >> Best, >> greg >> >> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>> >>> The key text is: >>> >>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>> >>> Also: >>> >>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>> >>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>> one. >>> >>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>> >>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>> >>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>> functional one. >>> >>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>> >>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>> >>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>> Halliday. >>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>> >>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>> >>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>> of >>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>> their face). >>>> >>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>> direct >>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>> the >>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>> you write: >>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>> orientation >>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>> >>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>> >>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>> multiple elaborations! >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Everybody: >>>>> >>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>> And >>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>> his >>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>> on >>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>> so >>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>> only >>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>> the >>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>> called >>>>> "justice"). >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>> and >>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>> relevant. >>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>> distinction >>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>> >>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>> >>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>> >>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>> volitional: >>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>> raised >>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>> is a >>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>> and >>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>> the >>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>> deliberately >>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>> could >>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>> is >>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>> >>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>> factors >>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>> specified >>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>> >>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>> grew >>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>> what >>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>> rules >>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>> sounds >>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>> not >>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>> is a >>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>> >>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>> performance--in >>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>> "communicative >>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>> is >>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>> dichotomies >>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>> know, >>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>> competence >>>> is >>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>> performed. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Greg, >>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>> whether >>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>> property >>>> of >>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>> actual >>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>> like a >>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>> use >>>>> of a >>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>> that >>>>> has >>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>> it >>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>> the >>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>> deployment >>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>> speaker >>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>> David? >>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>> should >>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>> Apparently, >>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>> good >>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>> disappointed >>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>> country, I >>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>> Maybe >>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>> euphoria >>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>> where >>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>> those >>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>> Vernacular? >>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>> always >>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>> that >>>>> AME >>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>> ?black >>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>> of >>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >> >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 16:39:15 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 17:39:15 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: <100fh2rdo4jg3ux7rhm2utnc.1435785555478@email.android.com> References: <100fh2rdo4jg3ux7rhm2utnc.1435785555478@email.android.com> Message-ID: <76627DE1-0071-4750-B85E-397276429148@gmail.com> Paul, I look forward to what comes of out of digesting at your leisure (if you have any) the threads. (Sorry if the metaphor is unappetizing.) I?ll wait for what you have to say about critical race theory, rather than try to get ready for what you have to say by reading up what white academics have to say about it. And if I just googled it, it would probably be by a white academic. I confess that since I wrote my first, starry-eyed take on Obama in Charleston I have been going back to my usual assumption that at any level of our ?leadership? in this country, it tends towards the heartless. I worry about that. My question is still how we as intellectual workers and players inform a dialog we would like to be part of. At any scale, in any domain. If we are Vygotskians, we are teachers, after all. Right? So our theory has to inform our teaching. And all in the ZPD, crises and all. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 3:30 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Hi henry, > > I have been traveling to and from haiti so i have not had the chance to draw the theoretical thread i am going to when i get home. I wanted everyone to have a little background to what i am about to say. I have been reading all of the threads, which range from classic sociological theory to labov and bakhtin. But the way i see the problem is that white academics, building on the critical race theory of the black bourgeoisie > (E. Franklin frazier's term), continue to see racial issues in terms of the politics of the body overlooking the fundamental differences among the souls of black folk. > > Obama is operating between language games....about to catch my flight, but i will finish this later on this evening. > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities > www.routledge.com/9780415714372 > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: HENRY SHONERD > Date: 07/01/2015 4:41 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > Hi Paul and all those interested in this thread, > Thank you! The radio podcast you linked me to is huge in scope, so I want to do my best to keep it relevant to the thread. > > The interviewee, human rights activist/lawyer/joiurnalist Ezili Danto, to me, is giving us enough history of the Haitian struggle for independence from the time of Jean Jacques Salin in 1804 to the present, for those not familiar with that struggle so that people like me can understand how one can perceive Bush (the first one), the Clintons and Obama as ?vampires? and ?war mongers?. As I confessed below, my positive response to Obama?s eulogy in Charleston was based on sound bites and not a very good analysis of the sound bites, at that. Sigh. One issue very focused on language was the decision by Danto and others to throw off their European names and take African ones is familiar to an American audience. Most of the podcast is much broader in scope, but I think it provides the ?ground? for the tough discussions on race that so many have called for. So Danto?s historical analysis IS about discourse and a theory of grammar has to be discourse based. Dialogic. (A thread on Bakhtin seems to have broken out.) Of course, such a theory has to taken into account the power of narrative. Danto?s historical narrative is essential to the dialog we are having. > > Here are issues in that ?ground? that Danto raises that are worth keepin in mind as more prototypically linguistic issues are discussed: 1) the world?s religions include those that have come out of Africa. This will bump up against what a "world religion" is, and that could be a useful discussion. 2) Respect for the mother as an essential part of the African world view as construed by Danto. I am thinking about the indigenous people I know best: the Navajos, matrilineal and matrilocal in their cultural practices. 3) The Haitian struggle for independence is still going on. In 1690 the Pueblos of New Mexico waged their own revolt. It was beat back during the reconquest of the Spanish in the decades that followed. But the Pueblos continue their struggle today in the form of claims to the waters of the Rio Grande. And much more. 4) 50 shades of Black. As per those that retook Haiti after the revolution of 1804, it?s better to be on the white side of the spectrum (Duvalier, Obama) than the black side of the spectrum (Aristide). Much the same thinking, I understand, haunts Brazil. Ads placed by Indian men (of India) in search of brides, at least until recently were full of explicit requests for light-skinned ladies. > > I doubt I have really moved the thread forward that much. Can anyone else take it up? Ruqaiya apparently had some really specific things in mind that someone smarter than me might be able to connect to. > > Henry > > > > > > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... >> >> https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., >> I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. >> >> I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. >> >> But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. >> >> This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. >> Henry >> >>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Greg >>> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >>> IS a question I want to highlight. >>> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >>> >>> We could focus on the "there" >>> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >>> We could focus on the "fore" >>> >>> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >>> >>> Or >>> >>> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >>> >>> I just ordered Lindquist's . >>> >>> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >>> >>> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >>> >>> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >>> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >>> >>> David, >>> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >>> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >>> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >>> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >>> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >>> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >>> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >>> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >>> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >>> >>> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >>> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >>> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >>> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >>> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >>> Chicago code described below). >>> >>> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >>> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >>> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >>> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >>> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >>> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >>> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >>> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >>> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >>> counterfactually. >>> >>> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >>> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >>> >>> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >>> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >>> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >>> >>> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >>> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >>> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >>> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >>> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >>> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >>> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >>> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >>> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >>> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >>> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >>> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >>> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >>> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >>> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >>> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >>> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >>> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >>> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >>> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >>> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >>> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >>> >>> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >>> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >>> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >>> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >>> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >>> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >>> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >>> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >>> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >>> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >>> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >>> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >>> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >>> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >>> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >>> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >>> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >>> >>> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >>> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >>> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >>> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >>> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >>> >>> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >>> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >>> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >>> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >>> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >>> would be much appreciated. >>> >>> Best, >>> greg >>> >>> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>>> >>>> The key text is: >>>> >>>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>>> >>>> Also: >>>> >>>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>>> >>>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>>> one. >>>> >>>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>>> >>>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>>> >>>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>>> functional one. >>>> >>>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>>> >>>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>>> >>>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>>> Halliday. >>>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>>> >>>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>>> of >>>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>>> their face). >>>>> >>>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>>> direct >>>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>>> the >>>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>>> you write: >>>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>>> orientation >>>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>>> >>>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>>> >>>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>>> multiple elaborations! >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Everybody: >>>>>> >>>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>>> And >>>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>>> his >>>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>>> on >>>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>>> so >>>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>>> only >>>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>>> the >>>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>>> called >>>>>> "justice"). >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>>> and >>>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>>> relevant. >>>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>>> distinction >>>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>>> >>>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>>> volitional: >>>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>>> raised >>>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>>> is a >>>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>>> and >>>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>>> the >>>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>>> deliberately >>>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>>> could >>>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>>> is >>>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>>> factors >>>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>>> specified >>>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>>> >>>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>>> grew >>>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>>> what >>>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>>> rules >>>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>>> sounds >>>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>>> not >>>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>>> is a >>>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>>> performance--in >>>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>>> "communicative >>>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>>> is >>>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>>> dichotomies >>>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>>> know, >>>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>>> competence >>>>> is >>>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>>> performed. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Greg, >>>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>>> whether >>>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>>> property >>>>> of >>>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>>> actual >>>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>>> like a >>>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>>> use >>>>>> of a >>>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>>> that >>>>>> has >>>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>>> it >>>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>>> the >>>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>>> deployment >>>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>>> speaker >>>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>>> David? >>>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>>> should >>>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>>> Apparently, >>>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>>> good >>>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>>> disappointed >>>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>>> country, I >>>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>>> Maybe >>>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>>> euphoria >>>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>>> where >>>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>>> those >>>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>>> Vernacular? >>>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>>> always >>>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>>> that >>>>>> AME >>>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>>> ?black >>>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>>> of >>>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >>> >>> >>> [The entire original message is not included.] >> >> > > From jennamcjenna@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 16:58:32 2015 From: jennamcjenna@gmail.com (Jenna McWilliams) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 17:58:32 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6C1C58D9-31BB-4A18-8AFF-3C1219199069@gmail.com> Paul, you write: "It is in this same european ethnocentric ethos that obama sees the world. Hence, my comment that obama is a white man! He is no different from bill clinton, george bush, etc.... I could care less if his skin-color would get him stopped by the cops, it does not negate the fact that he is a white/black man seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution with people who would lynch him!" There's a theoretical point made here, and then there's an in-the-street point: that skin color is directly correlated in America to a host of experiences. Regardless of Obama's politics, he is firmly placed among the segment of Americans who are at intensely heightened risk of both real and symbolic, psychic and physical, harm. Regardless of his skill with language, regardless of his ability to code switch, regardless of his beliefs about white culture or white superiority, Barack Obama has this in common with other Black Americans. To argue otherwise, or to claim that skin color and and the experiences that result from it are less important than epistemology in shaping what racial identities people have a right to claim, seems to me somewhat reckless--especially right at this particular American moment. Jacob (Jenna) McWilliams Educational Psychology and Learning Sciences Program University of Colorado Boulder > On Jul 1, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I could care less if his skin-color would get him stopped by the cops, it does not negate the fact that he is a white/black man seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution with people who would lynch him! From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 17:47:41 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 18:47:41 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> Message-ID: <204AA294-DED3-41B1-9AD6-E758FF166608@gmail.com> Greg and David, I?m going to jump in here in the interest of a data-rich, theory-driven research on discourse, the real deal. Like this thread. Here?s some of what I was thinking as I read David?s most recent posting to Greg. Itt would be interesting to see whether David?s Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft analysis of orientation could apply to Cornel West and Michael Eric Dyson when they are interviewed lately, now that a feud has broken out between them in the public eye. Ouch! In an interview with Laura Flanders, Professor West/ Brother Cornel used brother and sister a lot. I liked how he mixed orientations. He spoke of ?Brother Michael? as engaged in ?a form of narcissistic self-projection?. This mix reminds me of how we can damn with faint praise. Or give with one hand and take with the other. Something else I thought of when reading David on orientation was how ?companero/a? (masculine and feminine) became how Cubans addressed one another after the revolution that brought Fidel. This is not to say that rank and status was not expressible, just not the same way. In a similar vein, Cubans had two ways to refer to Castro, either just ?Fidel? or ?Comandante?. Context would certainly guide which could be used. Let?s say in watching Fidel speak on TV or in person (I?ve done both), you incant "Viva Fidel". Shaking hands with him you say ?Comandante?. I was also wondering when I read David if we aren?t, in this thread, crowd-sourcing the same data that we want that grad student doing. And I would like to suggest a tool I have found useful in analyzing any language use in context: repair. Especially self-corrections when you are writing an email. At that moment, it seems to me, you are focused on an element of language that drives your thinking. This is what I got from Vygotsky way back. The method is experimental, I think. Falsifiable, as David says. I was also wondering if large portions of David?s post are, finally, about Hope. Maybe he hardest thing to live without. Did Marx have it or not? Do teachers have it? Do students have it? I used to think, and maybe still do, that teaching and learning depend on respect and trust. It seems to me that hope grows from respect and trust, but not the other way round. One can have false hopes. But you only know that if your try. Damn! I?m caught in a turtles-all-the-way-down thing here. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 2:34 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Greg: > > > Consider the following two expressions. They are not made up. > > > b) Brother Barack > > > a) President Obama > > > Toennies would say that the first reflects a Gemeinschaft orientation, > because : > > > 1. It suggests MECHANICAL unity?all of us are units of an identical type > (?brothers?). > > > 2. It suggests OUTWARDLY IMPOSED solidarity (?Me against my brother, but me > and my brother against my cousin, and me, my brother and my cousin against > the world.?) > > > 3. It suggests that ?WE? is more important than ?I?; the rules of the > collective over-rule the choices of the individual, and WHAT you are (a > brother) is more important than WHO you are. > > > In contrast, the second reflects a Gesellschaft orientation because: > > > 1. It suggests an ORGANIC unity?a president is not a vice-president or > supreme court justice, or a senator, or a voter, and is not interchangeable > with any of them. > > > 2. It suggests an INWARDLY-ESTABLISHED interdependence. A president is not > the president because of some outside threat but instead is an individual > function that depends on the functioning of the others inside society. > > > 3. It suggests that INDIVIDUAL capacities are more important to this > hierarchy than common shared capabilities: the president is a unique > individual, not a brother like any other. > > > The first, Gemeinschaft, orientation is an orientation towards a particular > code. Ruqaiya makes some falsifiable predictions about this code > orientation: > > > 1. There will be a much higher frequency of exophoric reference (?this? > and ?that? rather than common nouns). This is implicit in forms of > cooperation that people in a Gemeinschaft use?they are more likely to be > doing the same things with the same objects at the same time. > > > 2. There will be a simpler structure in nominal groups (Deictics like ?the? > and ?a? rather than epithets and classifiers like ?splendid? and > ?electric?). This is implicit in the outwardly imposed solidarity, because > common understandings of common objects imposed by common boundaries do not > need to be articulated. > > > 3. There will be an implicatory hierarchy. That is, ?Brother Barack? will > have a narrower and more restricted use than ?President Obama?. This is > implicit in the fact that a) uses a given name while b) uses a family name. > > > Demonstrative examples, by definition, demonstrate some of the hypotheses > we want to test. So for example ?Brother? is more exophoric in its > reference than ?President?: ?Brother? is, as Vygotsky reminds us, a > factual relationship rather than one which depends on an abstract > definition. So its meaning lies in everyday contact with similar brothers > rather than a verbal hierarchy. Similarly, ?Brother Barack? has a simpler > structure than ?President Obama??the first consists of two morphemes > (?Brother? and ?Barack?), while the second consists of at least three > (?preside? ?!ent?, and ?Obama?), and possibly four (?pre~?). And of course > ?Brother? does not refer to a legalistic hierarchy of concepts while > ?President? does. > > > Nevertheless, all these predictions are falsifiable. Yes, they are > statements that are made on the basis of a theory (like Vygotsky?s > experiments, Ruqaiya?s research was always theory driven). Yes, the > demonstrative examples are chosen to demonstrate them (like Vygotsky?s > examples, Ruqaiya?s tend to be cherry-picked with the theory in mind). So > far this is no different from the articles by Lucy and Gaskins and > Kockelmann that you sent me?the former is based on a theory-driven > experiment and the latter a cherry-picked example. > > > We don?t have to stay with theory-driven statements and cherry-picked > examples. We can take a large amount of data and a willing graduate > student, code the data and find out whether each one is true or false, and > in fact that?s exactly what Ruqaiya did. > > > I don?t think the same thing is true of this statement, from your last post: > > > ?...(B)eware of putting too much about the way people speak into the > people themselves. It is more often the case that the contexts that people > habitually encounter call forth certain ways of speaking.? > > > How would we be able to falsify that a particular way of speaking was > called forth by a context? How could we verify that it was some ideal > essence of the person himself? > > > I guess I feel the same way when you say that it is problematic to imagine > that ?these ways of speaking limit how (working class people) could > possibly speak/think.? I agree that it?s problematic, but not for the same > reason that you do. It?s problematic because it implies that there is some > infinite potential for speaking and thinking that has nothing to do with > the way we actually do think and speak. It?s problematic for me because it > seems to suggest that there is some other way of finding out how someone > could possibly speak than by the way they speak. What? > > > You say: ?It seems a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape > consciousness.? > > > That is, of course, precisely the argument that Vygotsky makes in Chapter > Six of Thinking and Speech. I think it?s actually quite difficult to find > people in the teaching profession that do not subscribe to this argument in > one form or another.The argument you are making, that is, that > consciousness cannot be shaped by teaching and learning, was eventually > abandoned by even its most ardent defender, Jean Piaget. > > > > But let us say that you and Piaget are right, and that human consciousness > is essentially inert to the process of teaching and learning. No, let us go > further?let?s say that you and Piaget are right, and that human > consciousness is essentially inert to the way people speak. What exactly is > this consciousness you speak of, which cannot be shaped by either class or > by classrooms or even by language? How might it be accessible? Certainly > the ways that consciousness is accessed in the articles you sent me are > crucially dependent on the use of language, both to access consciousness > and to assess it. > > > I?m afraid I think there is a much simpler explanation for your unease with > Bernstein. As you surmise, he?s "Marxian". And as you write: > > ?Julie Lindquist takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that > working class people don't think counterfactually.? > > > This statement assumes that such a Marxian notion exists to be taken up. > After a life time spent amongst Marxians of almost every stripe, I can tell > you that I have never heard this idea put out to be taken up by any of > them. In fact, I find it pretty hard to understand how any Marxian could > hold this view, since one of the basic tenets of Marxism is that working > class people are uniquely capable of socialist consciousness, and of course > socialist consciousness was counterfactual, even during the twelve years I > lived in China (the Chinese government in the 1980s did not argue that > China was a developed socialist society and in fact explicitly said that > there would be at least a hundred years of pre-socialist development before > we could speak of true socialism). > > > Similarly: > > > ?People on the left see it as evidence of the malicious effects of > capitalism (that) working class people have a degraded consciousness and > that is why they are working class (i.e., because of their degraded > consciousness, they can't realize the nature of their oppression and/or how > to rise up against their oppressor, or, most commonly, they don't vote in > their interests - with the Democratic party).? > > > This assumes that when working class people rise up against their > oppressors?e.g. when they do not vote for the Democratic Party?they somehow > cease to be working class. I have never heard any leftist articulate any > such point of view, and I am fairly sure that it does not exist. Like the > previous statement, it is a "demonstrative" which contains an assumption > which is demonstrably incompatible with Marxism, namely that consciousness > determines being rather than the other way around. > > > Similarly: > > > ?Karl Marx ?saw? in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human > consciousness.? > > > This assumes that Marx considered workers not fully human. I have read a > great deal of Marx?s work (that is what I was doing when I was working in > South Chicago?I did frequent bars after work, but South Shore was a black > working class neighborhood then, and although people did consider me weird > for being red, they considered me a lot weirder for being white). I have > never seen anything in Marx's work that suggests that he believed workers > to be subhuman. And, once again, it is very hard to square with Marx?s > belief that only the working class has both the social power and the > interests to organize society in a rational and truly human way. > > > Of course, this assumes that "interests" and "consciousness" can be > causally related. Perhaps that's where you disagree? > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 3:48 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > >> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I >> would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better >> understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... >> >> >> https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history >> >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com>
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00) >>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., >> I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need >> time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time >> to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off >> line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. >> >> I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me >> that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from >> looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. >> Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of >> words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about >> what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting >> to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention >> to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there >> has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an >> explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete >> intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. >> >> But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class >> bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the >> juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils >> down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the >> speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of >> us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on >> stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data >> for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church >> speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I >> lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to >> take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face >> back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really >> listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, >> I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have >> plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, >> helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and >> credible member of this community. This is important to me. >> >> This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or >> playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using >> Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I >> hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David >> argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I >> realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful >> to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always >> know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this >> chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys >> probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for >> exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may >> be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman >> (Lindquist). Hmmm?. >> Henry >> >>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Greg >>> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" >> transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our >> interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >>> IS a question I want to highlight. >>> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >>> >>> We could focus on the "there" >>> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >>> We could focus on the "fore" >>> >>> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >>> >>> Or >>> >>> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" >> consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual >> practicing changes?? >>> >>> I just ordered Lindquist's . >>> >>> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word >> "focus" is "hearth/home" >>> >>> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >>> >>> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another >> "home"? >>> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >>> >>> David, >>> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >>> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources >> (you >>> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >>> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >>> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >>> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >>> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >>> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >>> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >>> >>> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from >> the >>> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and >> yes, >>> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign >> to >>> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of >> is >>> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >>> Chicago code described below). >>> >>> >> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >>> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >>> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie >> Lindquist >>> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class >> people >>> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say >> that >>> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with >> long >>> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >>> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >>> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >>> counterfactually. >>> >>> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an >> example >>> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >>> >>> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency >> to >>> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course >> happen >>> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >>> >>> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in >> fact, >>> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >>> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >>> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a >> kind >>> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >>> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people >> have >>> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >>> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >>> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >>> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic >> party). >>> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works >> - >>> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they >> are >>> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl >> Marx >>> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >>> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam >> Smith >>> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >>> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the >> crassness >>> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that >> the >>> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >>> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >>> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >>> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >>> >>> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the >> consciousness >>> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to >> be >>> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >>> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >>> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >>> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't >> do >>> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if >> you >>> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >>> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >>> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple >> repertoires >>> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn >> or >>> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >>> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >>> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >>> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >>> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >>> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >>> >>> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >>> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >>> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >>> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >>> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >>> >>> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title >> of >>> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping >> of >>> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It >> seems >>> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. >> But >>> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >>> would be much appreciated. >>> >>> Best, >>> greg >>> >>> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>>> >>>> The key text is: >>>> >>>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a >> Sociology >>>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>>> >>>> Also: >>>> >>>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>>> >>>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be >> sayin" as >>>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll >> smack >>>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that >> dirty >>>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is >> one of >>>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a >> genuine >>>> one. >>>> >>>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>>> >>>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>>> >>>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the >> difference >>>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, >> including >>>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a >> merely >>>> functional one. >>>> >>>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be >> anything >>>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need >> very >>>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This >> was >>>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>>> >>>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy >> and >>>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>>> >>>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", >> "prediction", >>>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), >> and >>>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney >> test). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>>> Halliday. >>>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>>> >>>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>>> of >>>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that >> the >>>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>>> their face). >>>>> >>>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>>> direct >>>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>>> the >>>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. >> dialect >>>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer >> when >>>>> you write: >>>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>>> orientation >>>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an >> elaborated >>>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>>> >>>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear >> how >>>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>>> >>>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>>> multiple elaborations! >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Everybody: >>>>>> >>>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>>> And >>>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>>> his >>>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>>> on >>>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>>> so >>>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>>> only >>>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>>> the >>>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>>> called >>>>>> "justice"). >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>>> and >>>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>>> relevant. >>>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>>> distinction >>>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>>> >>>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>>> volitional: >>>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it >> is >>>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>>> raised >>>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>>> is a >>>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the >> user), >>>>> and >>>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second >> language >>>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>>> the >>>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>>> deliberately >>>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>>> could >>>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a >> dialect >>>>> is >>>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include >> the >>>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules >> for >>>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>>> factors >>>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>>> specified >>>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>>> >>>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>>> grew >>>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>>> what >>>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>>> rules >>>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not >> towards >>>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>>> sounds >>>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create >> elaborated >>>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>>> not >>>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>>> is a >>>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>>> performance--in >>>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>>> "communicative >>>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not >> something >>>>> is >>>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>>> dichotomies >>>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>>> know, >>>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>>> competence >>>>> is >>>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>>> performed. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Greg, >>>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>>> whether >>>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>>> property >>>>> of >>>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>>> actual >>>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>>> like a >>>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>>> use >>>>>> of a >>>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>>> that >>>>>> has >>>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>>> it >>>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>>> the >>>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>>> deployment >>>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>>> speaker >>>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>>> David? >>>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>>> should >>>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>>> Apparently, >>>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>>> good >>>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>>> disappointed >>>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>>> country, I >>>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>>> Maybe >>>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>>> euphoria >>>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>>> where >>>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>>> those >>>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>>> Vernacular? >>>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>>> always >>>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>>> that >>>>>> AME >>>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>>> ?black >>>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>>> of >>>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >>> >>> >>> [The entire original message is not included.] >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 18:36:22 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 19:36:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <0B58F7C7-8B5E-444E-B949-8E87F76E6C76@gmail.com> Paul, It?s dangerous when you get a moment! Your parallel of homi bhaba?s ambivalence space and Vygtosky?s ZPD is just plain fun to think about. You say that the ?black theorists? were unable ?...to develop an alternative space or language game from which to utter confrontational utterances against the ideology of their colonizers?. I am not familar with any studies of any thing in French similar to African American Vernacular in English. But my understanding is that whatever is considered standard American English of today owes a huge amount to AAEV. The influence is overwhelming in song and dance, but those semiotic domains have bled enormously into language. AAEV, until now, has had mostly ?covert prestige? in the U.S. William Labov is seen as the white linguist who brougnt respectability fo AAEV, but Labov himself has acknowledged the debt he owes to the members of the AAEV speech community who generously opened their lives to him and gave him their time. The contributions of Black people and the Black communities of the English-speaking world have resulted in prestige that is no longer covert. In a way, Obama represents for a white liberal man like myself a hodge-podge of all of the tropes that come what I know about Black people in this country. It?s politics. I don?t know him as a person, but as an object we have created with our media. Do I fantasize a photo op with the guy, even dinner at Michelle?s side talking about good nutrition?what white liberal man wouldn?t? (The rest of you white brothers, back me up here!) But to just chew the fat with? You?d probably suggest Jean Jacques Salin or Aristide. Well, how about Che? But NOT Fidel! He goes on!!! With William Labov? Great. Unless he is as long winded as Fidel, El Comandante. With Chomsky, even though his grammar drives me crazy? No problem. With anyone on this chat? Sure, why the hell not? Don?t all show up at my house at once! Yikes! Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > What we fail to realize is that so-called blacks such as w.e.b Du bois, aime cesaire, frantz fanon, booker t. Washington, and obama are white supremacists. That is, they were and are interpellated and embourgeoised by the ideology and ideological apparatuses of a racist social structure. As such, they saw and see the world as their former colonizers. For example, fanon and du bois viewed haitian vodou and practical consciousness in the same light as the white southern racists who constituted the american occupying force that occupied haiti from 1915-1934 (see laurent du bois's work, "haiti: the afterschock of history). They felt that they had to be civilized (be more white). It is in this same european ethnocentric ethos that obama sees the world. Hence, my comment that obama is a white man! He is no different from bill clinton, george bush, etc. > > Theoretically speaking, in vygotskyian/ bhabhaian parlance (yes in a sense i am equating homi bhabha's ambivalence space with vygotsky's zone of proximal development), it does not appear that whether in the bhabhaian ambivalent space or at the zone of proximial development these so-called black theorists were able to develop an alternative space or language game from which to utter confrontational utterances against the ideology of their colonizers, which they internalized to the point of reproducing it against other blacks who did not look and act like their former colonizers. (The latter point may speak to the issue of creativity you all have discussed in previous threads). The haitians were able to do it bcuz they were already equipped with the language game of a different social structure (albeit racist whites and blacks viewed it as primitive). At the start of the revolution over 70 percent of the haitians were directly from africa. As such, they attempted to recursively reorganize and reproduce their african agential moments against the western practical consciousness of europeans, the mulatto elites, and petit-bourgeois blacks with western education (so the subaltern is able to speak). > > I say all of this to say, in the age of globalization, the politic of the body is very dangerous. obama is paraded as a sign of diversity/multiculturalism based on his so-called race as opposed to his practical consciousness. I could care less if his skin-color would get him stopped by the cops, it does not negate the fact that he is a white/black man seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution with people who would lynch him! That is absurd, and demonstrates the lack of creativity of the black bourgeoisie... > > Delay gave me a moment! > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities > www.routledge.com/9780415714372 > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: HENRY SHONERD > Date: 07/01/2015 4:41 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > Hi Paul and all those interested in this thread, > Thank you! The radio podcast you linked me to is huge in scope, so I want to do my best to keep it relevant to the thread. > > The interviewee, human rights activist/lawyer/joiurnalist Ezili Danto, to me, is giving us enough history of the Haitian struggle for independence from the time of Jean Jacques Salin in 1804 to the present, for those not familiar with that struggle so that people like me can understand how one can perceive Bush (the first one), the Clintons and Obama as ?vampires? and ?war mongers?. As I confessed below, my positive response to Obama?s eulogy in Charleston was based on sound bites and not a very good analysis of the sound bites, at that. Sigh. One issue very focused on language was the decision by Danto and others to throw off their European names and take African ones is familiar to an American audience. Most of the podcast is much broader in scope, but I think it provides the ?ground? for the tough discussions on race that so many have called for. So Danto?s historical analysis IS about discourse and a theory of grammar has to be discourse based. Dialogic. (A thread on Bakhtin seems to have broken out.) Of course, such a theory has to taken into account the power of narrative. Danto?s historical narrative is essential to the dialog we are having. > > Here are issues in that ?ground? that Danto raises that are worth keepin in mind as more prototypically linguistic issues are discussed: 1) the world?s religions include those that have come out of Africa. This will bump up against what a "world religion" is, and that could be a useful discussion. 2) Respect for the mother as an essential part of the African world view as construed by Danto. I am thinking about the indigenous people I know best: the Navajos, matrilineal and matrilocal in their cultural practices. 3) The Haitian struggle for independence is still going on. In 1690 the Pueblos of New Mexico waged their own revolt. It was beat back during the reconquest of the Spanish in the decades that followed. But the Pueblos continue their struggle today in the form of claims to the waters of the Rio Grande. And much more. 4) 50 shades of Black. As per those that retook Haiti after the revolution of 1804, it?s better to be on the white side of the spectrum (Duvalier, Obama) than the black side of the spectrum (Aristide). Much the same thinking, I understand, haunts Brazil. Ads placed by Indian men (of India) in search of brides, at least until recently were full of explicit requests for light-skinned ladies. > > I doubt I have really moved the thread forward that much. Can anyone else take it up? Ruqaiya apparently had some really specific things in mind that someone smarter than me might be able to connect to. > > Henry > > > > > > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... >> >> https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., >> I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. >> >> I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. >> >> But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. >> >> This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. >> Henry >> >>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Greg >>> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >>> IS a question I want to highlight. >>> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >>> >>> We could focus on the "there" >>> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >>> We could focus on the "fore" >>> >>> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >>> >>> Or >>> >>> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >>> >>> I just ordered Lindquist's . >>> >>> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >>> >>> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >>> >>> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >>> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >>> >>> David, >>> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >>> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >>> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >>> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >>> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >>> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >>> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >>> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >>> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >>> >>> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >>> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >>> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >>> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >>> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >>> Chicago code described below). >>> >>> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >>> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >>> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >>> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >>> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >>> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >>> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >>> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >>> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >>> counterfactually. >>> >>> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >>> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >>> >>> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >>> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >>> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >>> >>> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >>> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >>> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >>> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >>> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >>> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >>> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >>> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >>> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >>> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >>> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >>> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >>> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >>> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >>> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >>> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >>> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >>> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >>> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >>> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >>> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >>> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >>> >>> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >>> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >>> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >>> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >>> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >>> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >>> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >>> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >>> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >>> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >>> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >>> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >>> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >>> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >>> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >>> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >>> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >>> >>> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >>> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >>> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >>> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >>> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >>> >>> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >>> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >>> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >>> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >>> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >>> would be much appreciated. >>> >>> Best, >>> greg >>> >>> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>>> >>>> The key text is: >>>> >>>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>>> >>>> Also: >>>> >>>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>>> >>>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>>> one. >>>> >>>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>>> >>>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>>> >>>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>>> functional one. >>>> >>>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>>> >>>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>>> >>>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>>> Halliday. >>>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>>> >>>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>>> of >>>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>>> their face). >>>>> >>>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>>> direct >>>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>>> the >>>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>>> you write: >>>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>>> orientation >>>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>>> >>>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>>> >>>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>>> multiple elaborations! >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Everybody: >>>>>> >>>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>>> And >>>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>>> his >>>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>>> on >>>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>>> so >>>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>>> only >>>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>>> the >>>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>>> called >>>>>> "justice"). >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>>> and >>>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>>> relevant. >>>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>>> distinction >>>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>>> >>>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>>> volitional: >>>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>>> raised >>>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>>> is a >>>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>>> and >>>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>>> the >>>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>>> deliberately >>>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>>> could >>>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>>> is >>>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>>> factors >>>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>>> specified >>>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>>> >>>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>>> grew >>>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>>> what >>>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>>> rules >>>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>>> sounds >>>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>>> not >>>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>>> is a >>>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>>> performance--in >>>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>>> "communicative >>>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>>> is >>>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>>> dichotomies >>>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>>> know, >>>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>>> competence >>>>> is >>>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>>> performed. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Greg, >>>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>>> whether >>>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>>> property >>>>> of >>>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>>> actual >>>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>>> like a >>>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>>> use >>>>>> of a >>>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>>> that >>>>>> has >>>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>>> it >>>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>>> the >>>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>>> deployment >>>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>>> speaker >>>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>>> David? >>>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>>> should >>>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>>> Apparently, >>>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>>> good >>>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>>> disappointed >>>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>>> country, I >>>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>>> Maybe >>>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>>> euphoria >>>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>>> where >>>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>>> those >>>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>>> Vernacular? >>>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>>> always >>>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>>> that >>>>>> AME >>>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>>> ?black >>>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>>> of >>>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >>> >>> >>> [The entire original message is not included.] >> >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 18:46:46 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 19:46:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Ruqaiya Hasan References: <204AA294-DED3-41B1-9AD6-E758FF166608@gmail.com> Message-ID: Gente, While I was in the bathroom, I realized that I must make a repair to my post below. I talked about ?large portions of David?s posts? below. I should have said David?s AND Greg?s. This is a serious issue of orientation for me. (I hope I am using the term appropriately.) Henry > Begin forwarded message: > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > From: HENRY SHONERD > Date: July 1, 2015 at 6:47:41 PM MDT > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Greg and David, > I?m going to jump in here in the interest of a data-rich, theory-driven research on discourse, the real deal. Like this thread. Here?s some of what I was thinking as I read David?s most recent posting to Greg. > > Itt would be interesting to see whether David?s Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft analysis of orientation could apply to Cornel West and Michael Eric Dyson when they are interviewed lately, now that a feud has broken out between them in the public eye. Ouch! In an interview with Laura Flanders, Professor West/ Brother Cornel used brother and sister a lot. I liked how he mixed orientations. He spoke of ?Brother Michael? as engaged in ?a form of narcissistic self-projection?. This mix reminds me of how we can damn with faint praise. Or give with one hand and take with the other. Something else I thought of when reading David on orientation was how ?companero/a? (masculine and feminine) became how Cubans addressed one another after the revolution that brought Fidel. This is not to say that rank and status was not expressible, just not the same way. In a similar vein, Cubans had two ways to refer to Castro, either just ?Fidel? or ?Comandante?. Context would certainly guide which could be used. Let?s say in watching Fidel speak on TV or in person (I?ve done both), you incant "Viva Fidel". Shaking hands with him you say ?Comandante?. > > I was also wondering when I read David if we aren?t, in this thread, crowd-sourcing the same data that we want that grad student doing. And I would like to suggest a tool I have found useful in analyzing any language use in context: repair. Especially self-corrections when you are writing an email. At that moment, it seems to me, you are focused on an element of language that drives your thinking. This is what I got from Vygotsky way back. The method is experimental, I think. Falsifiable, as David says. > > I was also wondering if large portions of David?s post are, finally, about Hope. Maybe he hardest thing to live without. Did Marx have it or not? Do teachers have it? Do students have it? I used to think, and maybe still do, that teaching and learning depend on respect and trust. It seems to me that hope grows from respect and trust, but not the other way round. One can have false hopes. But you only know that if your try. Damn! I?m caught in a turtles-all-the-way-down thing here. > > Henry > > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 2:34 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Greg: >> >> >> Consider the following two expressions. They are not made up. >> >> >> b) Brother Barack >> >> >> a) President Obama >> >> >> Toennies would say that the first reflects a Gemeinschaft orientation, >> because : >> >> >> 1. It suggests MECHANICAL unity?all of us are units of an identical type >> (?brothers?). >> >> >> 2. It suggests OUTWARDLY IMPOSED solidarity (?Me against my brother, but me >> and my brother against my cousin, and me, my brother and my cousin against >> the world.?) >> >> >> 3. It suggests that ?WE? is more important than ?I?; the rules of the >> collective over-rule the choices of the individual, and WHAT you are (a >> brother) is more important than WHO you are. >> >> >> In contrast, the second reflects a Gesellschaft orientation because: >> >> >> 1. It suggests an ORGANIC unity?a president is not a vice-president or >> supreme court justice, or a senator, or a voter, and is not interchangeable >> with any of them. >> >> >> 2. It suggests an INWARDLY-ESTABLISHED interdependence. A president is not >> the president because of some outside threat but instead is an individual >> function that depends on the functioning of the others inside society. >> >> >> 3. It suggests that INDIVIDUAL capacities are more important to this >> hierarchy than common shared capabilities: the president is a unique >> individual, not a brother like any other. >> >> >> The first, Gemeinschaft, orientation is an orientation towards a particular >> code. Ruqaiya makes some falsifiable predictions about this code >> orientation: >> >> >> 1. There will be a much higher frequency of exophoric reference (?this? >> and ?that? rather than common nouns). This is implicit in forms of >> cooperation that people in a Gemeinschaft use?they are more likely to be >> doing the same things with the same objects at the same time. >> >> >> 2. There will be a simpler structure in nominal groups (Deictics like ?the? >> and ?a? rather than epithets and classifiers like ?splendid? and >> ?electric?). This is implicit in the outwardly imposed solidarity, because >> common understandings of common objects imposed by common boundaries do not >> need to be articulated. >> >> >> 3. There will be an implicatory hierarchy. That is, ?Brother Barack? will >> have a narrower and more restricted use than ?President Obama?. This is >> implicit in the fact that a) uses a given name while b) uses a family name. >> >> >> Demonstrative examples, by definition, demonstrate some of the hypotheses >> we want to test. So for example ?Brother? is more exophoric in its >> reference than ?President?: ?Brother? is, as Vygotsky reminds us, a >> factual relationship rather than one which depends on an abstract >> definition. So its meaning lies in everyday contact with similar brothers >> rather than a verbal hierarchy. Similarly, ?Brother Barack? has a simpler >> structure than ?President Obama??the first consists of two morphemes >> (?Brother? and ?Barack?), while the second consists of at least three >> (?preside? ?!ent?, and ?Obama?), and possibly four (?pre~?). And of course >> ?Brother? does not refer to a legalistic hierarchy of concepts while >> ?President? does. >> >> >> Nevertheless, all these predictions are falsifiable. Yes, they are >> statements that are made on the basis of a theory (like Vygotsky?s >> experiments, Ruqaiya?s research was always theory driven). Yes, the >> demonstrative examples are chosen to demonstrate them (like Vygotsky?s >> examples, Ruqaiya?s tend to be cherry-picked with the theory in mind). So >> far this is no different from the articles by Lucy and Gaskins and >> Kockelmann that you sent me?the former is based on a theory-driven >> experiment and the latter a cherry-picked example. >> >> >> We don?t have to stay with theory-driven statements and cherry-picked >> examples. We can take a large amount of data and a willing graduate >> student, code the data and find out whether each one is true or false, and >> in fact that?s exactly what Ruqaiya did. >> >> >> I don?t think the same thing is true of this statement, from your last post: >> >> >> ?...(B)eware of putting too much about the way people speak into the >> people themselves. It is more often the case that the contexts that people >> habitually encounter call forth certain ways of speaking.? >> >> >> How would we be able to falsify that a particular way of speaking was >> called forth by a context? How could we verify that it was some ideal >> essence of the person himself? >> >> >> I guess I feel the same way when you say that it is problematic to imagine >> that ?these ways of speaking limit how (working class people) could >> possibly speak/think.? I agree that it?s problematic, but not for the same >> reason that you do. It?s problematic because it implies that there is some >> infinite potential for speaking and thinking that has nothing to do with >> the way we actually do think and speak. It?s problematic for me because it >> seems to suggest that there is some other way of finding out how someone >> could possibly speak than by the way they speak. What? >> >> >> You say: ?It seems a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape >> consciousness.? >> >> >> That is, of course, precisely the argument that Vygotsky makes in Chapter >> Six of Thinking and Speech. I think it?s actually quite difficult to find >> people in the teaching profession that do not subscribe to this argument in >> one form or another.The argument you are making, that is, that >> consciousness cannot be shaped by teaching and learning, was eventually >> abandoned by even its most ardent defender, Jean Piaget. >> >> >> >> But let us say that you and Piaget are right, and that human consciousness >> is essentially inert to the process of teaching and learning. No, let us go >> further?let?s say that you and Piaget are right, and that human >> consciousness is essentially inert to the way people speak. What exactly is >> this consciousness you speak of, which cannot be shaped by either class or >> by classrooms or even by language? How might it be accessible? Certainly >> the ways that consciousness is accessed in the articles you sent me are >> crucially dependent on the use of language, both to access consciousness >> and to assess it. >> >> >> I?m afraid I think there is a much simpler explanation for your unease with >> Bernstein. As you surmise, he?s "Marxian". And as you write: >> >> ?Julie Lindquist takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that >> working class people don't think counterfactually.? >> >> >> This statement assumes that such a Marxian notion exists to be taken up. >> After a life time spent amongst Marxians of almost every stripe, I can tell >> you that I have never heard this idea put out to be taken up by any of >> them. In fact, I find it pretty hard to understand how any Marxian could >> hold this view, since one of the basic tenets of Marxism is that working >> class people are uniquely capable of socialist consciousness, and of course >> socialist consciousness was counterfactual, even during the twelve years I >> lived in China (the Chinese government in the 1980s did not argue that >> China was a developed socialist society and in fact explicitly said that >> there would be at least a hundred years of pre-socialist development before >> we could speak of true socialism). >> >> >> Similarly: >> >> >> ?People on the left see it as evidence of the malicious effects of >> capitalism (that) working class people have a degraded consciousness and >> that is why they are working class (i.e., because of their degraded >> consciousness, they can't realize the nature of their oppression and/or how >> to rise up against their oppressor, or, most commonly, they don't vote in >> their interests - with the Democratic party).? >> >> >> This assumes that when working class people rise up against their >> oppressors?e.g. when they do not vote for the Democratic Party?they somehow >> cease to be working class. I have never heard any leftist articulate any >> such point of view, and I am fairly sure that it does not exist. Like the >> previous statement, it is a "demonstrative" which contains an assumption >> which is demonstrably incompatible with Marxism, namely that consciousness >> determines being rather than the other way around. >> >> >> Similarly: >> >> >> ?Karl Marx ?saw? in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human >> consciousness.? >> >> >> This assumes that Marx considered workers not fully human. I have read a >> great deal of Marx?s work (that is what I was doing when I was working in >> South Chicago?I did frequent bars after work, but South Shore was a black >> working class neighborhood then, and although people did consider me weird >> for being red, they considered me a lot weirder for being white). I have >> never seen anything in Marx's work that suggests that he believed workers >> to be subhuman. And, once again, it is very hard to square with Marx?s >> belief that only the working class has both the social power and the >> interests to organize society in a rational and truly human way. >> >> >> Of course, this assumes that "interests" and "consciousness" can be >> causally related. Perhaps that's where you disagree? >> >> >> David Kellogg >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 3:48 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> wrote: >> >>> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I >>> would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better >>> understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... >>> >>> >>> https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00) >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>>>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., >>> I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need >>> time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time >>> to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off >>> line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. >>> >>> I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me >>> that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from >>> looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. >>> Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of >>> words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about >>> what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting >>> to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention >>> to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there >>> has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an >>> explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete >>> intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. >>> >>> But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class >>> bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the >>> juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils >>> down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the >>> speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of >>> us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on >>> stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data >>> for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church >>> speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I >>> lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to >>> take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face >>> back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really >>> listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, >>> I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have >>> plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, >>> helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and >>> credible member of this community. This is important to me. >>> >>> This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or >>> playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using >>> Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I >>> hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David >>> argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I >>> realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful >>> to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always >>> know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this >>> chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys >>> probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for >>> exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may >>> be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman >>> (Lindquist). Hmmm?. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>> >>>> Greg >>>> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" >>> transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our >>> interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >>>> IS a question I want to highlight. >>>> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >>>> >>>> We could focus on the "there" >>>> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >>>> We could focus on the "fore" >>>> >>>> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >>>> >>>> Or >>>> >>>> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" >>> consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual >>> practicing changes?? >>>> >>>> I just ordered Lindquist's . >>>> >>>> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word >>> "focus" is "hearth/home" >>>> >>>> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >>>> >>>> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another >>> "home"? >>>> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>>> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >>>> >>>> David, >>>> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >>>> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources >>> (you >>>> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >>>> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >>>> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >>>> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >>>> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >>>> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >>>> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >>>> >>>> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from >>> the >>>> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and >>> yes, >>>> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign >>> to >>>> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of >>> is >>>> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >>>> Chicago code described below). >>>> >>>> >>> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >>>> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >>>> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie >>> Lindquist >>>> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class >>> people >>>> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say >>> that >>>> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with >>> long >>>> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >>>> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >>>> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >>>> counterfactually. >>>> >>>> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an >>> example >>>> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >>>> >>>> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency >>> to >>>> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course >>> happen >>>> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >>>> >>>> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in >>> fact, >>>> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >>>> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >>>> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a >>> kind >>>> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >>>> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people >>> have >>>> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >>>> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >>>> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >>>> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic >>> party). >>>> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works >>> - >>>> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they >>> are >>>> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl >>> Marx >>>> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >>>> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam >>> Smith >>>> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >>>> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the >>> crassness >>>> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that >>> the >>>> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >>>> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >>>> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >>>> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >>>> >>>> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the >>> consciousness >>>> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to >>> be >>>> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >>>> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >>>> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >>>> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't >>> do >>>> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if >>> you >>>> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >>>> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >>>> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple >>> repertoires >>>> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn >>> or >>>> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >>>> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >>>> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >>>> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >>>> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >>>> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >>>> >>>> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >>>> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >>>> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >>>> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >>>> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >>>> >>>> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title >>> of >>>> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping >>> of >>>> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It >>> seems >>>> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. >>> But >>>> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >>>> would be much appreciated. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> greg >>>> >>>> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>>>> >>>>> The key text is: >>>>> >>>>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>>>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a >>> Sociology >>>>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>>>> >>>>> Also: >>>>> >>>>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>>>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>>>> >>>>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>>>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>>>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be >>> sayin" as >>>>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>>>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>>>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll >>> smack >>>>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>>>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that >>> dirty >>>>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is >>> one of >>>>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a >>> genuine >>>>> one. >>>>> >>>>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>>>> >>>>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>>>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>>>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>>>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>>>> >>>>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the >>> difference >>>>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>>>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, >>> including >>>>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>>>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a >>> merely >>>>> functional one. >>>>> >>>>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be >>> anything >>>>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need >>> very >>>>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This >>> was >>>>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>>>> >>>>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy >>> and >>>>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>>>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>>>> >>>>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>>>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", >>> "prediction", >>>>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>>>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), >>> and >>>>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney >>> test). >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson < >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David, >>>>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>>>> Halliday. >>>>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>>>> >>>>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>>>> of >>>>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that >>> the >>>>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>>>> their face). >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>>>> direct >>>>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>>>> the >>>>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. >>> dialect >>>>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer >>> when >>>>>> you write: >>>>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>>>> orientation >>>>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an >>> elaborated >>>>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>>>> >>>>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear >>> how >>>>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>>>> multiple elaborations! >>>>>> >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Everybody: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>>>> And >>>>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>>>> his >>>>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>>>> on >>>>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>>>> so >>>>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>>>> only >>>>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>>>> the >>>>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>>>> called >>>>>>> "justice"). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>>>> and >>>>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>>>> relevant. >>>>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>>>> distinction >>>>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>>>> volitional: >>>>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it >>> is >>>>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>>>> raised >>>>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>>>> is a >>>>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the >>> user), >>>>>> and >>>>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second >>> language >>>>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>>>> the >>>>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>>>> deliberately >>>>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>>>> could >>>>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a >>> dialect >>>>>> is >>>>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include >>> the >>>>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules >>> for >>>>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>>>> factors >>>>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>>>> specified >>>>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>>>> grew >>>>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>>>> what >>>>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>>>> rules >>>>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not >>> towards >>>>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>>>> sounds >>>>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create >>> elaborated >>>>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>>>> not >>>>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>>>> is a >>>>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>>>> performance--in >>>>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>>>> "communicative >>>>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not >>> something >>>>>> is >>>>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>>>> dichotomies >>>>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>>>> know, >>>>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>>>> competence >>>>>> is >>>>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>>>> performed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg, >>>>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>>>> whether >>>>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>>>> property >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>>>> actual >>>>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>>>> like a >>>>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>>>> use >>>>>>> of a >>>>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>>>> that >>>>>>> has >>>>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>>>> it >>>>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>>>> deployment >>>>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>>>> speaker >>>>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>>>> David? >>>>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>>>> should >>>>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>>>> Apparently, >>>>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>>>> good >>>>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>>>> disappointed >>>>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>>>> country, I >>>>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>>>> Maybe >>>>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>>>> euphoria >>>>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>>>> where >>>>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>>>> those >>>>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>>>> Vernacular? >>>>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>>>> always >>>>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>>>> that >>>>>>> AME >>>>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>>>> ?black >>>>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >>>> >>>> >>>> [The entire original message is not included.] >>> >>> >>> > From anamshane@gmail.com Wed Jul 1 18:47:47 2015 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 21:47:47 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Your help needed: "Bakhtin by and for educators" Message-ID: Dear colleagues? We need your help. We (Eugene, Ana, and Mikhail) are very excited to tell you that we got a book contract with Palgrave to develop a book with a tentative title ?Bakhtin by and for educators.? We imagine creating a book of dialogues among the Bakhtinian educational practitioners ? about their own practice: How does Bakhtin inspire your teaching? Why? What are the possibilities and what are the challenges? The book will have 3 parts. The first part involves interviews with ?seasoned? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. We defined ?seasoned? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners as those who claim that Bakhtin influences or inspires their own teaching. We hope to reach diverse seasoned Bakhtinian educational practitioners: teaching diverse academic subjects (e.g., language, literature, science, arts, physical education, math) at diverse Early Childhood Education to Graduate School levels from different countries. We will do interview via Skype. The second part of the book will involve commentaries and questions by ?novice? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. We defined ?novice? as those educators who may be interested in Bakhtin and they have either just started or are considering shaping their educational practice by Bakhtin?s philosophical approach. We imagine bringing the voices of the ?seasoned? Bakhtinian practitioners and those of the ?novices? into dialogues with each other. The third part of the book will be our analysis that will outline patterns of issues that are relevant for the practitioners, and our concluding remarks. We need your assistance in helping us to identify diverse ?seasoned? and ?novice? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. Please let us know if you know some and help us to contact them. Or let us know who may know them? Or maybe it is you ? please do not be shy to contact us! We appreciate your help, Eugene Matusov, University of Delaware, USA, ematusov@udel.edu Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Chestnut Hill College, USA, anamshane@gmail.com Mikhail Gradovski, University College of Telemark, Norway, mikhail.gradovski@hit.no ____________________________________ Ana Marjanovic-Shane Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Dialogic Pedagogy Journal Associate Professor of Education Chestnut Hill College Emails: anamshane@gmail.com shaneam@chc.edu Phone: 267-334-2905 From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 2 02:13:05 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 05:13:05 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Message-ID: Henry, The african in the Americas is a psychologically tormented and fractured human being who has not been given adequate time and space to heal from 400 years of mental and physical slavery (400 years of ptsd). ?They are constantly defining themselves in relation to their former slavemasters as opposed to defining themselves in relation to their history, culture, and fractured psyche. ?Dr. West and louis Farrakahn are praised by young blacks over al Sharpton, jesse jackson, and the foolishness of michael eric dyson (the so-called hip-hop academic) partly bcuz they appear to deal with the epistemological and ontological questions I am attempting to raise here. For example, following the earthquake in haiti, louis Farrakahn flew to haiti and did a ninety minute interview on haitian radio. ?He was asked why did he come to haiti... he replied, I wanted to know my history and understand better the vodou form that God took to liberate you all (he was referring to the vodou ceremony of Boi caiman and the haitian belief that God descended from the heavens to assist the haitians in their fight against white supremacy, christianity, and slavery). ?Outside of farrahkahn, not too many black leadership viewed haiti in this light, many, because of white jesus, assumed the position of pat robertson. ?Strangely, if one views the video in which Robertson uttered his statements, he is standing near an african american sister who appears to know nothing about what he is talking about. ?Her ignorance speaks to the "miseducation of the negro" highlighted by carter g. Woodson in his 1936 book that bears that title. As for critical race theory, whether the liberal strand (i would include kwame appiah in this group) that builds on du bois or the fanonian postmodern/poststructural strand (bell hooks, Patricia collins, and cornel west) both are defining themselves and the struggle of blacks in relation to whites. ?Herein lies the absurdity! ?? During Obama ' s initial campaign for the presidency, I was working as a visiting professor of philosophy and sociology at Bethune cookman university (hbcu). ?My students were excited and went to vote in bus loads (the university provided the buses for them). ?In my classes, I took the time to question my students about the euphoria. ?The overwhelming answer I got explaing the euphoria was that Obama was a black man and we think differently from white people...? Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 7:39 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
Paul, I look forward to what comes of out of digesting at your leisure (if you have any) the threads. (Sorry if the metaphor is unappetizing.) I?ll wait for what you have to say about critical race theory, rather than try to get ready for what you have to say by reading up what white academics have to say about it. And if I just googled it, it would probably be by a white academic. I confess that since I wrote my first, starry-eyed take on Obama in Charleston I have been going back to my usual assumption that at any level of our ?leadership? in this country, it tends towards the heartless. I worry about that. My question is still how we as intellectual workers and players inform a dialog we would like to be part of. At any scale, in any domain. If we are Vygotskians, we are teachers, after all. Right? So our theory has to inform our teaching. And all in the ZPD, crises and all. Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 3:30 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Hi henry, > > I have been traveling to and from haiti so i have not had the chance to draw the theoretical thread i am going to when i get home. I wanted everyone to have a little background to what i am about to say. I have been reading all of the threads, which range from classic sociological theory to labov and bakhtin. But the way i see the problem is that white academics, building on the critical race theory of the black bourgeoisie > (E. Franklin frazier's term), continue to see racial issues in terms of the politics of the body overlooking the fundamental differences among the souls of black folk. > > Obama is operating between language games....about to catch my flight, but i will finish this later on this evening. > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities > www.routledge.com/9780415714372 > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: HENRY SHONERD > Date: 07/01/2015 4:41 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > Hi Paul and all those interested in this thread, > Thank you! The radio podcast you linked me to is huge in scope, so I want to do my best to keep it relevant to the thread. > > The interviewee, human rights activist/lawyer/joiurnalist Ezili Danto, to me, is giving us enough history of the Haitian struggle for independence from the time of Jean Jacques Salin in 1804 to the present, for those not familiar with that struggle so that people like me can understand how one can perceive Bush (the first one), the Clintons and Obama as ?vampires? and ?war mongers?. As I confessed below, my positive response to Obama?s eulogy in Charleston was based on sound bites and not a very good analysis of the sound bites, at that. Sigh. One issue very focused on language was the decision by Danto and others to throw off their European names and take African ones is familiar to an American audience. Most of the podcast is much broader in scope, but I think it provides the ?ground? for the tough discussions on race that so many have called for. So Danto?s historical analysis IS about discourse and a theory of grammar has to be discourse based. Dialogic. (A thread on Bakhtin seems to have broken out.) Of course, such a theory has to taken into account the power of narrative. Danto?s historical narrative is essential to the dialog we are having. > > Here are issues in that ?ground? that Danto raises that are worth keepin in mind as more prototypically linguistic issues are discussed: 1) the world?s religions include those that have come out of Africa. This will bump up against what a "world religion" is, and that could be a useful discussion. 2) Respect for the mother as an essential part of the African world view as construed by Danto. I am thinking about the indigenous people I know best: the Navajos, matrilineal and matrilocal in their cultural practices. 3) The Haitian struggle for independence is still going on. In 1690 the Pueblos of New Mexico waged their own revolt. It was beat back during the reconquest of the Spanish in the decades that followed. But the Pueblos continue their struggle today in the form of claims to the waters of the Rio Grande. And much more. 4) 50 shades of Black. As per those that retook Haiti after the revolution of 1804, it?s better to be on the white side of the spectrum (Duvalier, Obama) than the black side of the spectrum (Aristide). Much the same thinking, I understand, haunts Brazil. Ads placed by Indian men (of India) in search of brides, at least until recently were full of explicit requests for light-skinned ladies. > > I doubt I have really moved the thread forward that much. Can anyone else take it up? Ruqaiya apparently had some really specific things in mind that someone smarter than me might be able to connect to. > > Henry > > > > > > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... >> >> https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., >> I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. >> >> I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. >> >> But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. >> >> This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. >> Henry >> >>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Greg >>> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >>> IS a question I want to highlight. >>> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >>> >>> We could focus on the "there" >>> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >>> We could focus on the "fore" >>> >>> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >>> >>> Or >>> >>> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >>> >>> I just ordered Lindquist's . >>> >>> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >>> >>> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >>> >>> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >>> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >>> >>> David, >>> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >>> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >>> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >>> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >>> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >>> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >>> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >>> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >>> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >>> >>> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >>> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >>> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >>> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >>> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >>> Chicago code described below). >>> >>> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >>> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >>> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >>> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >>> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >>> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >>> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >>> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >>> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >>> counterfactually. >>> >>> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >>> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >>> >>> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >>> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >>> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >>> >>> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >>> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >>> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >>> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >>> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >>> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >>> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >>> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >>> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >>> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >>> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >>> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >>> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >>> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >>> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >>> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >>> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >>> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >>> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >>> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >>> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >>> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >>> >>> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >>> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >>> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >>> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >>> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >>> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >>> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >>> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >>> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >>> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >>> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >>> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >>> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >>> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >>> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >>> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >>> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >>> >>> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >>> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >>> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >>> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >>> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >>> >>> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >>> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >>> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >>> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >>> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >>> would be much appreciated. >>> >>> Best, >>> greg >>> >>> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>>> >>>> The key text is: >>>> >>>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>>> >>>> Also: >>>> >>>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>>> >>>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>>> one. >>>> >>>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>>> >>>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>>> >>>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>>> functional one. >>>> >>>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>>> >>>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>>> >>>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>>> Halliday. >>>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>>> >>>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>>> of >>>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>>> their face). >>>>> >>>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>>> direct >>>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>>> the >>>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>>> you write: >>>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>>> orientation >>>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>>> >>>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>>> >>>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>>> multiple elaborations! >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Everybody: >>>>>> >>>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>>> And >>>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>>> his >>>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>>> on >>>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>>> so >>>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>>> only >>>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>>> the >>>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>>> called >>>>>> "justice"). >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>>> and >>>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>>> relevant. >>>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>>> distinction >>>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>>> >>>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>>> volitional: >>>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>>> raised >>>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>>> is a >>>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>>> and >>>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>>> the >>>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>>> deliberately >>>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>>> could >>>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>>> is >>>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>>> factors >>>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>>> specified >>>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>>> >>>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>>> grew >>>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>>> what >>>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>>> rules >>>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>>> sounds >>>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>>> not >>>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>>> is a >>>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>>> performance--in >>>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>>> "communicative >>>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>>> is >>>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>>> dichotomies >>>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>>> know, >>>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>>> competence >>>>> is >>>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>>> performed. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Greg, >>>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>>> whether >>>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>>> property >>>>> of >>>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>>> actual >>>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>>> like a >>>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>>> use >>>>>> of a >>>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>>> that >>>>>> has >>>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>>> it >>>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>>> the >>>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>>> deployment >>>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>>> speaker >>>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>>> David? >>>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>>> should >>>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>>> Apparently, >>>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>>> good >>>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>>> disappointed >>>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>>> country, I >>>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>>> Maybe >>>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>>> euphoria >>>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>>> where >>>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>>> those >>>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>>> Vernacular? >>>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>>> always >>>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>>> that >>>>>> AME >>>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>>> ?black >>>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>>> of >>>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >>> >>> >>> [The entire original message is not included.] >> >> > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 2 02:42:45 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 05:42:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Message-ID: Jenna, You are right, but we give more weight to the politic of the body over the ontological and epistemological problems black folk have neglected. ?For me, if we assume the stance of malcolm-x vis-a vis whites the former problem is negated leaving the ontological and epistemological problem of the "house and field nigger" metaphor evoked by malcolm to capture the latter problem. In her work, "hegel, haiti, and universal history," Susan buck - moss highlights the fear that whites had of jean-jacques dessalines bcuz of his retaliation against general rochambeau for his war crimes against his african prisoners of war. ?Dessalines treated his french prisoners of war the same way that rochambeau treated the black ones, which sent shock waves throughout the Western world given the status of white skin. ?Following the revolution, he also dealt with the epistemological and ontological problem by suggesting that as africans we must denounce everything that is french and redefine ourselves in relation to our africanness/blackness! ? Black folks (Du bois ' s so-called talented tenth) have not adequately dealt with the epistemological and ontological problem bcuz of our obsession with white people and integration. ?The politic of the body and the epistmological and ontological issues are two-different sides of the same coin. ?You can not deal with white oppression of your black body, while neglecting the fact that when you kneel to pray, white jesus and how you want to live in the world, is defined by those who oppress and oppressed you! ? Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: Jenna McWilliams
Date:07/01/2015 7:58 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
Paul, you write: "It is in this same european ethnocentric ethos that obama sees the world. Hence, my comment that obama is a white man! He is no different from bill clinton, george bush, etc.... I could care less if his skin-color would get him stopped by the cops, it does not negate the fact that he is a white/black man seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution with people who would lynch him!" There's a theoretical point made here, and then there's an in-the-street point: that skin color is directly correlated in America to a host of experiences. Regardless of Obama's politics, he is firmly placed among the segment of Americans who are at intensely heightened risk of both real and symbolic, psychic and physical, harm. Regardless of his skill with language, regardless of his ability to code switch, regardless of his beliefs about white culture or white superiority, Barack Obama has this in common with other Black Americans. To argue otherwise, or to claim that skin color and and the experiences that result from it are less important than epistemology in shaping what racial identities people have a right to claim, seems to me somewhat reckless--especially right at this particular American moment. Jacob (Jenna) McWilliams Educational Psychology and Learning Sciences Program University of Colorado Boulder > On Jul 1, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I could care less if his skin-color would get him stopped by the cops, it does not negate the fact that he is a white/black man seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution with people who would lynch him! From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 2 03:45:47 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 06:45:47 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan Message-ID: Henry, First, michel degraff (MIT) and the haitian academy of kreyol, which was created by the 1987 haitian constitution, are doing great works on kreyol that parallels what labov did for AAEV. ?The 3 percent of the haitian population that barely speaks french properly, looked down on kreyol and argued that it did not allow haitians to critically think (sounds familiar). ?Students were forbidden to speak kreyol in school even though 100 percent of the population speaks it. ?Kreyol, was viewed as parole and french as langue. ?Presently, with the MIT initiative, which translates textbooks for classroom use into kreyol, created by degraff, instructions in haiti now is in kreyol. ?The 1987 constitution created the haitian academy of kreyol and requires all government communique to be in both french and kreyol. Second, in regards to AAEV, many blacks still do not view it as a distinct linguistic system. ?Do you remember the uproar raised by the black bourgeoisie when the California school district wanted to incorporate AAEV in the schools as a means of teaching standard american english to inner-city students?? I am not black american, but as a person of African descent I sympathize with my brothers and sisters in america and the diaspora. ?I was fortunate enough to be raised in rural haiti where my worldview was/is african and vodou, my language was/is african, and my heroes were/and are african... i am baffled by the image of white jesus that black people pray to; I am blown away by the ignorance they have of their history or the romanticized version people like west and dyson have of that history (it's as though west forgets that the so called black church was against dr. King and his rebel rousing). In a 1979 version of "the wretched of the earth" by frantz fanon, jean Paul sartre wrote, and here I am paraphrasing, that the work is a psychological call to arms... whites should be very afraid of such a text. ?As a white liberal I think you have more in common with Obama than what you think. In a nutshell, I do advocate for separate schooling of black folks. ?That does not mean I hate white people or think being black is better, it simply means we ARE different. ?We have a different history, culture, and yes a different biology. ?We have to be taught the relationship ?between my melanin and how I experience the universe, the material resource framework, and how I know what I know. ?In the 60s and 70s, researchers, such as Amos Wilson, studying development among african children discovered that piaget ' s model was not veridical vis-a-vis ?their psychological development. ?We should be free to explore why without fear of being labeled racists etc. ?We must decenter whiteness and center african, not in the absurd reading of africa posited by afrocentric scholars. ?But within a sociohistorical/biological/genetic framework! ?Only then will we be able to sit at the table of all cultures without the ambivalent feeling of du boisian double consciousness. PS... before I adopt any idea, technology, etc. I ask myself how does this, whatever it is, impact my relationship to the earth, my ancestors, and my spiritual connection to the universe... my african/vodou worldview taught me to do that. Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 9:36 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
Paul, It?s dangerous when you get a moment! Your parallel of homi bhaba?s ambivalence space and Vygtosky?s ZPD is just plain fun to think about. You say that the ?black theorists? were unable ?...to develop an alternative space or language game from which to utter confrontational utterances against the ideology of their colonizers?. I am not familar with any studies of any thing in French similar to African American Vernacular in English. But my understanding is that whatever is considered standard American English of today owes a huge amount to AAEV. The influence is overwhelming in song and dance, but those semiotic domains have bled enormously into language. AAEV, until now, has had mostly ?covert prestige? in the U.S. William Labov is seen as the white linguist who brougnt respectability fo AAEV, but Labov himself has acknowledged the debt he owes to the members of the AAEV speech community who generously opened their lives to him and gave him their time. The contributions of Black people and the Black communities of the English-speaking world have resulted in prestige that is no longer covert. In a way, Obama represents for a white liberal man like myself a hodge-podge of all of the tropes that come what I know about Black people in this country. It?s politics. I don?t know him as a person, but as an object we have created with our media. Do I fantasize a photo op with the guy, even dinner at Michelle?s side talking about good nutrition?what white liberal man wouldn?t? (The rest of you white brothers, back me up here!) But to just chew the fat with? You?d probably suggest Jean Jacques Salin or Aristide. Well, how about Che? But NOT Fidel! He goes on!!! With William Labov? Great. Unless he is as long winded as Fidel, El Comandante. With Chomsky, even though his grammar drives me crazy? No problem. With anyone on this chat? Sure, why the hell not? Don?t all show up at my house at once! Yikes! Henry > On Jul 1, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > What we fail to realize is that so-called blacks such as w.e.b Du bois, aime cesaire, frantz fanon, booker t. Washington, and obama are white supremacists. That is, they were and are interpellated and embourgeoised by the ideology and ideological apparatuses of a racist social structure. As such, they saw and see the world as their former colonizers. For example, fanon and du bois viewed haitian vodou and practical consciousness in the same light as the white southern racists who constituted the american occupying force that occupied haiti from 1915-1934 (see laurent du bois's work, "haiti: the afterschock of history). They felt that they had to be civilized (be more white). It is in this same european ethnocentric ethos that obama sees the world. Hence, my comment that obama is a white man! He is no different from bill clinton, george bush, etc. > > Theoretically speaking, in vygotskyian/ bhabhaian parlance (yes in a sense i am equating homi bhabha's ambivalence space with vygotsky's zone of proximal development), it does not appear that whether in the bhabhaian ambivalent space or at the zone of proximial development these so-called black theorists were able to develop an alternative space or language game from which to utter confrontational utterances against the ideology of their colonizers, which they internalized to the point of reproducing it against other blacks who did not look and act like their former colonizers. (The latter point may speak to the issue of creativity you all have discussed in previous threads). The haitians were able to do it bcuz they were already equipped with the language game of a different social structure (albeit racist whites and blacks viewed it as primitive). At the start of the revolution over 70 percent of the haitians were directly from africa. As such, they attempted to recursively reorganize and reproduce their african agential moments against the western practical consciousness of europeans, the mulatto elites, and petit-bourgeois blacks with western education (so the subaltern is able to speak). > > I say all of this to say, in the age of globalization, the politic of the body is very dangerous. obama is paraded as a sign of diversity/multiculturalism based on his so-called race as opposed to his practical consciousness. I could care less if his skin-color would get him stopped by the cops, it does not negate the fact that he is a white/black man seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution with people who would lynch him! That is absurd, and demonstrates the lack of creativity of the black bourgeoisie... > > Delay gave me a moment! > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities > www.routledge.com/9780415714372 > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: HENRY SHONERD > Date: 07/01/2015 4:41 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > Hi Paul and all those interested in this thread, > Thank you! The radio podcast you linked me to is huge in scope, so I want to do my best to keep it relevant to the thread. > > The interviewee, human rights activist/lawyer/joiurnalist Ezili Danto, to me, is giving us enough history of the Haitian struggle for independence from the time of Jean Jacques Salin in 1804 to the present, for those not familiar with that struggle so that people like me can understand how one can perceive Bush (the first one), the Clintons and Obama as ?vampires? and ?war mongers?. As I confessed below, my positive response to Obama?s eulogy in Charleston was based on sound bites and not a very good analysis of the sound bites, at that. Sigh. One issue very focused on language was the decision by Danto and others to throw off their European names and take African ones is familiar to an American audience. Most of the podcast is much broader in scope, but I think it provides the ?ground? for the tough discussions on race that so many have called for. So Danto?s historical analysis IS about discourse and a theory of grammar has to be discourse based. Dialogic. (A thread on Bakhtin seems to have broken out.) Of course, such a theory has to taken into account the power of narrative. Danto?s historical narrative is essential to the dialog we are having. > > Here are issues in that ?ground? that Danto raises that are worth keepin in mind as more prototypically linguistic issues are discussed: 1) the world?s religions include those that have come out of Africa. This will bump up against what a "world religion" is, and that could be a useful discussion. 2) Respect for the mother as an essential part of the African world view as construed by Danto. I am thinking about the indigenous people I know best: the Navajos, matrilineal and matrilocal in their cultural practices. 3) The Haitian struggle for independence is still going on. In 1690 the Pueblos of New Mexico waged their own revolt. It was beat back during the reconquest of the Spanish in the decades that followed. But the Pueblos continue their struggle today in the form of claims to the waters of the Rio Grande. And much more. 4) 50 shades of Black. As per those that retook Haiti after the revolution of 1804, it?s better to be on the white side of the spectrum (Duvalier, Obama) than the black side of the spectrum (Aristide). Much the same thinking, I understand, haunts Brazil. Ads placed by Indian men (of India) in search of brides, at least until recently were full of explicit requests for light-skinned ladies. > > I doubt I have really moved the thread forward that much. Can anyone else take it up? Ruqaiya apparently had some really specific things in mind that someone smarter than me might be able to connect to. > > Henry > > > > > > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... >> >> https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., >> I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. >> >> I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. >> >> But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. >> >> This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. >> Henry >> >>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Greg >>> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >>> IS a question I want to highlight. >>> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >>> >>> We could focus on the "there" >>> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >>> We could focus on the "fore" >>> >>> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >>> >>> Or >>> >>> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >>> >>> I just ordered Lindquist's . >>> >>> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >>> >>> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >>> >>> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >>> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >>> >>> David, >>> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >>> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >>> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >>> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >>> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >>> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >>> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >>> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >>> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >>> >>> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >>> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >>> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >>> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >>> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >>> Chicago code described below). >>> >>> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >>> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >>> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >>> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >>> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >>> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >>> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >>> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >>> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >>> counterfactually. >>> >>> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >>> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >>> >>> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >>> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >>> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >>> >>> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >>> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >>> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >>> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >>> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >>> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >>> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >>> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >>> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >>> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >>> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >>> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >>> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >>> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >>> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >>> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >>> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >>> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >>> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >>> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >>> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >>> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >>> >>> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >>> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >>> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >>> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >>> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >>> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >>> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >>> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >>> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >>> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >>> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >>> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >>> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >>> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >>> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >>> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >>> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >>> >>> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >>> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >>> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >>> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >>> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >>> >>> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >>> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >>> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >>> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >>> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >>> would be much appreciated. >>> >>> Best, >>> greg >>> >>> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>>> >>>> The key text is: >>>> >>>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>>> >>>> Also: >>>> >>>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>>> >>>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>>> one. >>>> >>>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>>> >>>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>>> >>>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>>> functional one. >>>> >>>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>>> >>>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>>> >>>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>>> Halliday. >>>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>>> >>>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>>> of >>>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>>> their face). >>>>> >>>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>>> direct >>>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>>> the >>>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>>> you write: >>>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>>> orientation >>>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>>> >>>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>>> >>>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>>> multiple elaborations! >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Everybody: >>>>>> >>>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>>> And >>>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>>> his >>>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>>> on >>>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>>> so >>>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>>> only >>>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>>> the >>>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>>> called >>>>>> "justice"). >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>>> and >>>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>>> relevant. >>>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>>> distinction >>>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>>> >>>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>>> volitional: >>>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>>> raised >>>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>>> is a >>>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>>> and >>>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>>> the >>>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>>> deliberately >>>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>>> could >>>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>>> is >>>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>>> >>>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>>> factors >>>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>>> specified >>>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>>> >>>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>>> grew >>>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>>> what >>>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>>> rules >>>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>>> sounds >>>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>>> not >>>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>>> is a >>>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>>> performance--in >>>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>>> "communicative >>>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>>> is >>>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>>> dichotomies >>>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>>> know, >>>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>>> competence >>>>> is >>>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>>> performed. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Greg, >>>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>>> whether >>>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>>> property >>>>> of >>>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>>> actual >>>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>>> like a >>>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>>> use >>>>>> of a >>>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>>> that >>>>>> has >>>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>>> it >>>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>>> the >>>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>>> deployment >>>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>>> speaker >>>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>>> David? >>>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>>> should >>>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>>> Apparently, >>>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>>> good >>>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>>> disappointed >>>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>>> country, I >>>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>>> Maybe >>>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>>> euphoria >>>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>>> where >>>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>>> those >>>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>>> Vernacular? >>>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>>> always >>>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>>> that >>>>>> AME >>>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>>> ?black >>>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>>> of >>>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >>> >>> >>> [The entire original message is not included.] >> >> > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 2 03:59:30 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 06:59:30 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Google apologises for racist blunder Message-ID: Racist technology? Google apologises for racist blunder http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-33347866 Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 2 07:44:07 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 10:44:07 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. Message-ID: Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. ?This is an example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. ?The first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. ?100 percent of the population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand french! ?I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. ?Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying heavily on vygotskyian ?theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the adult reading programs are cubans). https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 ?(french) Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II From smago@uga.edu Thu Jul 2 08:56:43 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2015 15:56:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Quds day In-Reply-To: <7afe3b8447123d78eb0ff4aaa5c30d0b@148.251.231.41> References: <7afe3b8447123d78eb0ff4aaa5c30d0b@148.251.231.41> Message-ID: I got this today, and it maps onto Paul M?s recent posts on Haiti as a colonized land, at least in part. Important qualifier: I?m an atheist, so have no vested interest in whose religion makes its people the proper residents of a geographic area. Although my father?s family is Jewish, I had no Jewish religious upbringing (he was a scientist with no interest in a spiritual universe); my mother, a Catholic who fell from the church following Vatican II?s changes in its rituals, took us to an Episcopalian church when I was young, but aside from that, I?ve never felt the call to an Almighty being, even in the midst of my greatest life crises. I have a friend who?s a Palestinian Greek (Greek origins but resident of what Americans now call Israel before moving to the US) who always refers to that nation as Palestine, not Israel. Even at my ancient age, I keep learning more about how complex societies are. I wish to be clear that I do not intend to submit this note to xmca to start a verbal war over who has what rights to what lands. If I did, I?d start with saying that I live on Cherokee land, not Georgia, USA. Rather, I?m sharing something I got that I was not aware of that reaffirms that cultures do construct geography and its resident societies quite differently as they read its contours and history into the present. p From: usa [mailto:jessica.hall2016@yandex.com] Sent: Thursday, July 02, 2015 2:02 AM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: Quds day International Day of al-Quds is an annual event, supporting a just peace for Palestine, and opposing Apartheid Israel?s control of Jerusalem (al-Quds in Arabic: ????????), the international city that stands as a powerful symbol to three of the world?s great religious traditions. Pro-justice and anti-Zionist Apartheid demonstrations are held on this day in most Muslim and Arab countries and by Muslim and non-Muslim communities around the world, including the United States. It is held each year on the last Friday of the Muslim month of Ramadhan. The Day of al-Quds is also an opportunity to stand on the side of the oppressed worldwide, not just in the Holy Land. Jerusalem Day is not an Islamic religious event but rather a human rights event open to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Jul 2 14:46:42 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 06:46:42 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> Message-ID: Greg: Ruqaiya did a lot of work on describing context as a system (and not simply as "structure", which is the way it is described in Lucy and Gaskins). Her work is based on Malinowski's distinction between context of situation and context of culture, where the relationship between situation and culture is seen as analogous to the relationship between a text and a language. I think the key point in Ruqaiya's concept (as always) is choice--we choose things from the material environment for semanticization, and only those things chosen for our volitional semantics are rightly referred to as context. But of course any time you have choice, you necessarily have hierarchy (as Bernstein points out, speakers of elaborated code are all speakers of restricted code, but not vice versa). My sister-in-law is visiting from China, and I have just noticed that I refer to her by her name, and she refers to me using the intricate system of family names that Chinese uses--i.e. as her older sister's husband. When I asked my wife about this, she said I was doing it correctly--Chinese uses relational titles to refer to older and more powerful members of the family and given names can only be used to address people who are younger and less powerful. You can see from this that BOTH systems are essentially individuating, but they individuate in different ways: one relationally and grammatically and the other absolutely and lexically. The other thing I learned (this time from my brother in law) is that, thanks to Korean TV programmes, Chinese has a lot of loan words from Korean these days. Most amusing is "O-ba", a corruption of "O-ppa", a mildly flirtatious term that young girls use to address somewhat older men they would like to date on Korean TV. It is based on the relational term for a younger sister's older brother, which in Korea absolutely cannot be used by a male. But in China blokes use it the way that blacks use "brother"! This is undoubtedly a mistranslation--they assume that "O-ppa" is simply the Korean equivalent of "da ge" or "xiong", which certainly can be used that way. So we choose from text in much the same way we choose from context: not exactly freely, but in ways that in the long run will make us a little more free. (Maybe that's where hope comes from, Henry?) David Kellogg PS: Paul's videos from Haiti were a real eye opener--one announcer doesn't just speak French but actually speaks Parisian French, and the Parisian intonation contours are not entirely absent in the Kreyo either. On the other hand, you can see that Kreyo is developing its own orthography! Paul's views on black biology remind me a little of what Japanese scholars are always trying to claim...e.g. that Japanese-itude is due to having a small intestine that is--supposedly--four feet longer than normal, hence altered digestion, altered diet, altered culture, etc. In this view, culture is essentially determined, and determined from the inside outwards. I think I prefer the outside inwards idea that cultures are made up of millions and billions of choices. But of course if you accept this idea, you can't really turn around and then say that only the forty-five minute interaction is meaningful! dk On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:22 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > David, > Yes, what you say makes very good sense to me. > > But perhaps I'm not making as much sense to me, so let me clarify a few > things to myself if no one else. > > This will involve some back tracking, a little back pedaling (I wanted to > spell that "peddling" but caught myself - but perhaps there is truth there > too! Ah, words!), and maybe some back stroking (just because it is 100+ > degrees here and has been so for the last two weeks!). > > First, the back peddling > So I probably shouldn't have mentioned the bit about too easily fitting > data into a theory. I said that with this other author (Van Kleeck) in mind > and without good knowledge of Hasan's (and even Bernstein's) work. Even as > I wrote it, I was already thinking that it probably isn't apropos for their > work. So my apologies for throwing in that red herring. My sense is that > Hasan's work is extremely theoretically rigorous and I really didn't mean > to suggest that it was otherwise (even though I did suggest this). > > Next, the back tracking: > > Two ideas that I need to revisit: methods for studying contexts, and > whether or not there are other ways to get to cognition - other than > schooling. > > First, with regard to the methods for studying contexts of talk and such, > yes, it is true, this is not an easy thing to study. Contexts are entailed > by talk itself and thus are not presupposable. The result is that measuring > them can be difficult. As much art as science. > > And yet, as we go through our daily lives, with some not infrequent > exceptions, we generally do very well at figuring out what kinds of > contexts we are "in" in any given moment (whether an argument (heated or > not), a discussion, a practical joke, or a thought experiment). So then, > the question becomes, if we can do it (well enough to "get along" as > Wittgenstein says), then why can't someone studying context do it? > > Linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists have come up with an answer, > and it generally falls under the name of "contextualization." This points > to the process by which contexts are indicated (cf. Gumperz' > "contextualization cues"). Studying contextualization involves a theory of > "enough-ness" - that is to say, that there is enough pointing to a given > context being the most salient that one can reasonably conclude that it is > likely to be the context that is constraining and enabling participants' > acts-in-context. (Michael Silverstein's classic piece on contextualization > - "The Indeterminacy of Contextualization: When is enough enough?" - lays > out this approach - I have a copy in case anyone is interested - just email > me). > > What this method lacks in big numbers data, it makes up for in > meaningfulness. I think this is where the large corpus research is lacking. > Large corpus research can show the distribution of different words or > collections of words or grammatical features or whatever and how these > correlate with other easily quantifiable features (e.g., income or wealth > or education or some combination of whatever proxy you would use for > indicating those persons who are "low-income" - and even here you'll get > some who aren't what they seem to be...). But in counting distributions, > you quickly lose meaningfulness. If you are going to do a count of the > distribution of a given word, e.g. "this" in a massive corpus, it is highly > unlikely that you will be able to document each instance of usage and what > it means in that context, much less what that context means! Or, to put it > more positively, what large corpus research lacks in meaningfulness, it > makes up for in representativeness (i.e., we know that the data are highly > representative of the population which they claim to represent, even if we > don't really know what they "mean" for the users). > > What I'm saying here is a rather old story that everyone has heard before > and probably in clearer terms than what I have introduced somewhat ad hoc > (representativeness? really?) so I don't want to belabor the point. But I > thought it worth mentioning that I happen to err on the side of being > willing to sacrifice representativeness for meaningfulness (perhaps a > result of a sense of disenchantment with my late capitalist context? or my > whiteness? cf. Paul's emails). I'll choose the scale of a forty five minute > interaction over the scale of 45 million interactions any day. As a result, > I'm willing to lose some of the representativeness. You might say, I prefer > the artfulness of analyzing talk over the science of it. But that's just > me. And a caution, the big money is in the representativeness. > > Second, regarding whether or not there are other ways, other than > schooling, to get to the types of capacities that everyone cares about > ("cognition" as some describe it), what I am suggesting is simply that > schooling might not be the only way to get to something like "scientific > concepts." [please note that my point was not the Piagetian point that > these capacities naturally unfold in time but rather that it may be the > case that there are other ways of getting there - more Durkheim, and I like > to think, Vygotsky, than Piaget]. I would call these cultural alternatives > to schooling that nonetheless accomplish complex capacities. > > Thinking about this in terms of "scientific concepts" is a bit more radical > of a way of thinking about the argument than what I had in mind, but I'll > leave that as a potential to be developed (and maybe others have already > made this case?). What I was thinking about were skills like > meta-linguistic awareness (again I'm more engaged here with the Van Kleeck > article than I am with Hasan or Bernstein; there is a long tradition in > CHAT of finding other cultural ways of doing things that were thought to be > the result of schooling - I have Lave and Wenger in mind here but there are > many others). For example, there are types of talk that can provoke certain > forms of metalinguistic awareness. Teasing is a cultural practice in which > one's words are not what they denote. This can provoke a substantial > reorganization of the child's understanding of what language IS as an > object. If the child encounters this cultural practice enough (and has the > minimal developments in discursive abilities to be able to grasp the sense > of teasing - no, Piaget is not dead!), then one will realize that the word > is not the thing. This is perhaps a more minimal form of metalinguistic > awareness, but it is nonetheless an important accomplishment that can > ground other more complex language usage abilities. And it isn't in > schooling. So perhaps I should have said that I was simply suggesting that > schooling isn't the ONLY way to get to these capacities. > > As for my readings of Marx, perhaps the point here is that we run in > different circles (you in the authentic and genuine Marxist circles, me in > the bourgeois Marxist circles!). (circles = contexts?). > > Or, perhaps, we just draw our circles differently. I had imagined drawing > the Marxian circle a bit larger than the Marxist circle, and in the former > I had included the likes of Paul Willis whose book Learning to Labour is, > in part, an argument about why there has not yet been a revolution. The > answer he offers is that working class culture has certain limitations that > keep them from penetrating the dominant ideology. Along these lines I > thought that the whole false consciousness, in all its variants - from Marx > on down, was essentially a way of answering the question "why no > revolution?" and perhaps it would be too strong to say that it does this by > laying it at the feet of the proletariat, but it at least seems the case > that the failings of the proletariat have something to do with our > collective failure to realize the revolutionary transformations called for > in Communism. [and yes, there is a robust history by Marxian (again, larger > category) historian scholars who have tried to explain why so many union > members voted for Reagan in the 80's. For another take on this, consider > the book What's the Matter with Kansas? - a popular classic seeking to > invoke false consciousness as the reason why so many poor and working class > people in middle america vote Republican. But maybe this is a pastime of > American Marxians? Again, different circles, whether lived or drawn...]. > > And with regard to Marx's view of the worker, I don't have my Marx-Engels > reader with me but I seem to recall a number of places in the Economic and > Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 in the sections on alienated/estranged > labor where Marx suggests that the worker is essentially reduced to an > animal - alienated from his species being. I understand that there are > different ways to read this and imagine that you read it quite differently, > but the words (or something to that effect) are there. > > But again, I fear that this may be a bit too much red herring for me as > well. Not where I'm writing right now so I fear I'm not up to the task of > extended discussion on the topic. > > Enough? > > Now on to the back-stroking.. (if only I could find a body of water in this > drought blighted land...). > > -greg > > > > > On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 2:34 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Greg: > > > > > > Consider the following two expressions. They are not made up. > > > > > > b) Brother Barack > > > > > > a) President Obama > > > > > > Toennies would say that the first reflects a Gemeinschaft orientation, > > because : > > > > > > 1. It suggests MECHANICAL unity?all of us are units of an identical type > > (?brothers?). > > > > > > 2. It suggests OUTWARDLY IMPOSED solidarity (?Me against my brother, but > me > > and my brother against my cousin, and me, my brother and my cousin > against > > the world.?) > > > > > > 3. It suggests that ?WE? is more important than ?I?; the rules of the > > collective over-rule the choices of the individual, and WHAT you are (a > > brother) is more important than WHO you are. > > > > > > In contrast, the second reflects a Gesellschaft orientation because: > > > > > > 1. It suggests an ORGANIC unity?a president is not a vice-president or > > supreme court justice, or a senator, or a voter, and is not > interchangeable > > with any of them. > > > > > > 2. It suggests an INWARDLY-ESTABLISHED interdependence. A president is > not > > the president because of some outside threat but instead is an individual > > function that depends on the functioning of the others inside society. > > > > > > 3. It suggests that INDIVIDUAL capacities are more important to this > > hierarchy than common shared capabilities: the president is a unique > > individual, not a brother like any other. > > > > > > The first, Gemeinschaft, orientation is an orientation towards a > particular > > code. Ruqaiya makes some falsifiable predictions about this code > > orientation: > > > > > > 1. There will be a much higher frequency of exophoric reference (?this? > > and ?that? rather than common nouns). This is implicit in forms of > > cooperation that people in a Gemeinschaft use?they are more likely to be > > doing the same things with the same objects at the same time. > > > > > > 2. There will be a simpler structure in nominal groups (Deictics like > ?the? > > and ?a? rather than epithets and classifiers like ?splendid? and > > ?electric?). This is implicit in the outwardly imposed solidarity, > because > > common understandings of common objects imposed by common boundaries do > not > > need to be articulated. > > > > > > 3. There will be an implicatory hierarchy. That is, ?Brother Barack? will > > have a narrower and more restricted use than ?President Obama?. This is > > implicit in the fact that a) uses a given name while b) uses a family > name. > > > > > > Demonstrative examples, by definition, demonstrate some of the hypotheses > > we want to test. So for example ?Brother? is more exophoric in its > > reference than ?President?: ?Brother? is, as Vygotsky reminds us, a > > factual relationship rather than one which depends on an abstract > > definition. So its meaning lies in everyday contact with similar brothers > > rather than a verbal hierarchy. Similarly, ?Brother Barack? has a simpler > > structure than ?President Obama??the first consists of two morphemes > > (?Brother? and ?Barack?), while the second consists of at least three > > (?preside? ?!ent?, and ?Obama?), and possibly four (?pre~?). And of > course > > ?Brother? does not refer to a legalistic hierarchy of concepts while > > ?President? does. > > > > > > Nevertheless, all these predictions are falsifiable. Yes, they are > > statements that are made on the basis of a theory (like Vygotsky?s > > experiments, Ruqaiya?s research was always theory driven). Yes, the > > demonstrative examples are chosen to demonstrate them (like Vygotsky?s > > examples, Ruqaiya?s tend to be cherry-picked with the theory in mind). So > > far this is no different from the articles by Lucy and Gaskins and > > Kockelmann that you sent me?the former is based on a theory-driven > > experiment and the latter a cherry-picked example. > > > > > > We don?t have to stay with theory-driven statements and cherry-picked > > examples. We can take a large amount of data and a willing graduate > > student, code the data and find out whether each one is true or false, > and > > in fact that?s exactly what Ruqaiya did. > > > > > > I don?t think the same thing is true of this statement, from your last > > post: > > > > > > ?...(B)eware of putting too much about the way people speak into the > > people themselves. It is more often the case that the contexts that > people > > habitually encounter call forth certain ways of speaking.? > > > > > > How would we be able to falsify that a particular way of speaking was > > called forth by a context? How could we verify that it was some ideal > > essence of the person himself? > > > > > > I guess I feel the same way when you say that it is problematic to > imagine > > that ?these ways of speaking limit how (working class people) could > > possibly speak/think.? I agree that it?s problematic, but not for the > same > > reason that you do. It?s problematic because it implies that there is > some > > infinite potential for speaking and thinking that has nothing to do with > > the way we actually do think and speak. It?s problematic for me because > it > > seems to suggest that there is some other way of finding out how someone > > could possibly speak than by the way they speak. What? > > > > > > You say: ?It seems a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually > shape > > consciousness.? > > > > > > That is, of course, precisely the argument that Vygotsky makes in Chapter > > Six of Thinking and Speech. I think it?s actually quite difficult to find > > people in the teaching profession that do not subscribe to this argument > in > > one form or another.The argument you are making, that is, that > > consciousness cannot be shaped by teaching and learning, was eventually > > abandoned by even its most ardent defender, Jean Piaget. > > > > > > > > But let us say that you and Piaget are right, and that human > consciousness > > is essentially inert to the process of teaching and learning. No, let us > go > > further?let?s say that you and Piaget are right, and that human > > consciousness is essentially inert to the way people speak. What exactly > is > > this consciousness you speak of, which cannot be shaped by either class > or > > by classrooms or even by language? How might it be accessible? Certainly > > the ways that consciousness is accessed in the articles you sent me are > > crucially dependent on the use of language, both to access consciousness > > and to assess it. > > > > > > I?m afraid I think there is a much simpler explanation for your unease > with > > Bernstein. As you surmise, he?s "Marxian". And as you write: > > > > ?Julie Lindquist takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that > > working class people don't think counterfactually.? > > > > > > This statement assumes that such a Marxian notion exists to be taken up. > > After a life time spent amongst Marxians of almost every stripe, I can > tell > > you that I have never heard this idea put out to be taken up by any of > > them. In fact, I find it pretty hard to understand how any Marxian could > > hold this view, since one of the basic tenets of Marxism is that working > > class people are uniquely capable of socialist consciousness, and of > course > > socialist consciousness was counterfactual, even during the twelve years > I > > lived in China (the Chinese government in the 1980s did not argue that > > China was a developed socialist society and in fact explicitly said that > > there would be at least a hundred years of pre-socialist development > before > > we could speak of true socialism). > > > > > > Similarly: > > > > > > ?People on the left see it as evidence of the malicious effects of > > capitalism (that) working class people have a degraded consciousness and > > that is why they are working class (i.e., because of their degraded > > consciousness, they can't realize the nature of their oppression and/or > how > > to rise up against their oppressor, or, most commonly, they don't vote in > > their interests - with the Democratic party).? > > > > > > This assumes that when working class people rise up against their > > oppressors?e.g. when they do not vote for the Democratic Party?they > somehow > > cease to be working class. I have never heard any leftist articulate any > > such point of view, and I am fairly sure that it does not exist. Like the > > previous statement, it is a "demonstrative" which contains an assumption > > which is demonstrably incompatible with Marxism, namely that > consciousness > > determines being rather than the other way around. > > > > > > Similarly: > > > > > > ?Karl Marx ?saw? in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human > > consciousness.? > > > > > > This assumes that Marx considered workers not fully human. I have read a > > great deal of Marx?s work (that is what I was doing when I was working in > > South Chicago?I did frequent bars after work, but South Shore was a black > > working class neighborhood then, and although people did consider me > weird > > for being red, they considered me a lot weirder for being white). I have > > never seen anything in Marx's work that suggests that he believed workers > > to be subhuman. And, once again, it is very hard to square with Marx?s > > belief that only the working class has both the social power and the > > interests to organize society in a rational and truly human way. > > > > > > Of course, this assumes that "interests" and "consciousness" can be > > causally related. Perhaps that's where you disagree? > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 3:48 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > > wrote: > > > > > Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I > > > would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better > > > understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... > > > > > > > > > > > > https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com>
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00) > > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
> > >
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., > > > I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I > need > > > time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take > time > > > to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going > > off > > > line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. > > > > > > I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to > me > > > that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, > from > > > looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. > > > Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, > meanings > > of > > > words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking > > about > > > what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between > > wanting > > > to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call > > attention > > > to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, > there > > > has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an > > > explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete > > > intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. > > > > > > But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class > > > bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that > the > > > juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often > > boils > > > down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the > > > speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all > > of > > > us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always > ?on > > > stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is > data > > > for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church > > > speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I > > > lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not > to > > > take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little > face > > > back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not > really > > > listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I > > said, > > > I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I > have > > > plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I > hope, > > > helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and > > > credible member of this community. This is important to me. > > > > > > This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. > > (Or > > > playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using > > > Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and > > will, I > > > hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that > David > > > argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I > > > realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already > useful > > > to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t > > always > > > know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with > > this > > > chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys > > > probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for > > > exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you > may > > > be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a > woman > > > (Lindquist). Hmmm?. > > > Henry > > > > > > > On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > > > > Greg > > > > Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" > > > transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is > our > > > interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations > > (contexts) > > > > IS a question I want to highlight. > > > > What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". > > > > > > > > We could focus on the "there" > > > > We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" > > > > We could focus on the "fore" > > > > > > > > Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices > > > > > > > > Or > > > > > > > > Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" > > > consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual > > > practicing changes?? > > > > > > > > I just ordered Lindquist's . > > > > > > > > I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word > > > "focus" is "hearth/home" > > > > > > > > So where our focus abides is where we abide. > > > > > > > > Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another > > > "home"? > > > > Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: "Greg Thompson" > > > > Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM > > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan > > > > > > > > David, > > > > This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan > and > > > > Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these > sources > > > (you > > > > wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me > > offline?), > > > > but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that > you > > > > offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what > > is > > > > the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever > > dimension > > > > she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what > would > > > > Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to > say > > > > about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm > slow!). > > > > > > > > Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also > from > > > the > > > > south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. > (and > > > yes, > > > > I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would > assign > > > to > > > > the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak > > of > > > is > > > > probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south > > side > > > > Chicago code described below). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 > > > > In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South > > Side > > > > of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie > > > Lindquist > > > > takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class > > > people > > > > don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I > say > > > that > > > > this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description > with > > > long > > > > chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very > nicely > > > > done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments > that > > > > broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think > > > > counterfactually. > > > > > > > > Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an > > > example > > > > in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. > > > > > > > > So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a > tendency > > > to > > > > miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course > > > happen > > > > in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. > > > > > > > > But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in > > > fact, > > > > be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class > > bars. > > > > Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the > > consciousness > > > > of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a > > > kind > > > > of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it > as > > > > evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class > people > > > have > > > > a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class > (i.e., > > > > because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the > nature > > of > > > > their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, > > most > > > > commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic > > > party). > > > > People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy > > works > > > - > > > > working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why > they > > > are > > > > working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and > Karl > > > Marx > > > > "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human > > consciousness. > > > > Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam > > > Smith > > > > who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the > > reason > > > > why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the > > > crassness > > > > of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed > that > > > the > > > > "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory > > was > > > > the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent > > > > properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually > > much > > > > closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). > > > > > > > > My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the > > > consciousness > > > > of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are > > to > > > be > > > > had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white > > working > > > > class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the > > fact > > > > that that there are things that one does and there are things that > one > > > > doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) > doesn't > > > do > > > > is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked > if > > > you > > > > talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have > > to > > > > choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine > > > > different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple > > > repertoires > > > > and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to > learn > > > or > > > > take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in > > the > > > > bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent > > intellectual > > > > snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white > > > > working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you > > take > > > > up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells > > it > > > > like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? > > > > > > > > The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way > people > > > > speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the > > > > contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of > > > > speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could > > > > possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. > > > > > > > > And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the > > title > > > of > > > > the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the > Shaping > > > of > > > > Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It > > > seems > > > > a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape > consciousness. > > > But > > > > I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights > > here > > > > would be much appreciated. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > greg > > > > > > > > p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. > > > >> > > > >> The key text is: > > > >> > > > >> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, > B. > > > >> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a > > > Sociology > > > >> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. > > > >> > > > >> Also: > > > >> > > > >> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In > > Collected > > > >> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. > > > >> > > > >> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a > native > > > >> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" > > > >> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be > > > sayin" as > > > >> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the > > conditional. > > > >> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then > > the > > > >> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll > > > smack > > > >> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the > conjuntion > > > >> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that > > > dirty > > > >> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is > > > one of > > > >> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a > > > genuine > > > >> one. > > > >> > > > >> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). > > > >> > > > >> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. > > > >> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. > > > >> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. > > 69, > > > >> but that's in my Chinese copy). > > > >> > > > >> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the > > > difference > > > >> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the > > > >> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, > > > including > > > >> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course > it > > > >> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a > > > merely > > > >> functional one. > > > >> > > > >> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be > > > anything > > > >> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we > need > > > very > > > >> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. > This > > > was > > > >> done by Ruqaiya's student: > > > >> > > > >> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) > Pedagogy > > > and > > > >> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. > London: > > > >> Continuum, pp. 31-65. > > > >> > > > >> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", > > > >> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", > > > "prediction", > > > >> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came > in > > > >> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code > +), > > > and > > > >> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney > > > test). > > > >> > > > >> David Kellogg > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson < > > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > > >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> David, > > > >>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of > > > >> Halliday. > > > >>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I > > can... > > > >>> > > > >>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: > > > >>> > > > >>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the > > use > > > >> of > > > >>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was > that > > > the > > > >>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child > > upside > > > >>> their face). > > > >>> > > > >>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make > more > > > >> direct > > > >>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples > > and > > > >> the > > > >>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. > > > dialect > > > >>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer > > > when > > > >>> you write: > > > >>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the > > > >> orientation > > > >>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in > communal > > > >>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an > > > elaborated > > > >>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to > > > >>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." > > > >>> > > > >>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I > > read > > > >>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't > clear > > > how > > > >>> these features were manifest in the examples. > > > >>> > > > >>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for > your > > > >>> multiple elaborations! > > > >>> > > > >>> -greg > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>>> Everybody: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's > > rage. > > > >>> And > > > >>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due > > to > > > >> his > > > >>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my > > comments > > > >> on > > > >>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid > > and > > > >>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things > > worse > > > >> so > > > >>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't > deserve > > > >>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a > > racist's > > > >>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is > > not > > > >>> only > > > >>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who > > have > > > >>> the > > > >>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need > is > > > >>> called > > > >>>> "justice"). > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and > > Hymes, > > > >>> and > > > >>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading > Ruqaiya's > > > >>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it > > > >> relevant. > > > >>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful > distinction > > > >>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the > > > >> distinction > > > >>>> between competence and performance. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year > > olds: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. > > > >>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the > > > >>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology > > (the > > > >>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly > > > >>> volitional: > > > >>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can > > also > > > >>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the > > > >>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that > it > > > is > > > >>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed > > > >> raised > > > >>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites > were a > > > >>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a > dialect > > > >> is a > > > >>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the > > > user), > > > >>> and > > > >>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second > > > language > > > >>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, > > > >>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; > > genuine > > > >>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born > > into > > > >> the > > > >>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it > > > >> deliberately > > > >>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more > meaningful > > > >>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies > you > > > >> could > > > >>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a > > > dialect > > > >>> is > > > >>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not > include > > > the > > > >>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would > > > >>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of > his > > > >>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex > rules > > > for > > > >>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on > other > > > >>> factors > > > >>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is > > > >> specified > > > >>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and > > now > > > >>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the > > > >>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although > > > >>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance > as > > a > > > >>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, > > who > > > >>> grew > > > >>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it > > > >>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas > of > > > >>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft > > > >>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft > (society, > > > >>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis > is > > on > > > >>> what > > > >>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on > > your > > > >>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted > > coding > > > >>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective > > > >> rules > > > >>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not > > > towards > > > >>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), > the > > > >>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and > towards > > > >>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way > it > > > >>> sounds > > > >>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create > > > elaborated > > > >>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. > Unlike > > > >>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and > it > > is > > > >>> not > > > >>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding > orientation > > > >> is a > > > >>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls > semantic > > > >>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and > > > >>> performance--in > > > >>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of > > > >>> "communicative > > > >>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not > > > something > > > >>> is > > > >>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is > sociolinguistically > > > >>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, > and > > > >>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such > > > >>> dichotomies > > > >>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually > > not > > > >>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never > really > > > >>> know, > > > >>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, > > > >>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying > > > >> competence > > > >>> is > > > >>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a > highly > > > >>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the > > > >> performed. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Greg, > > > >>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to > > > >> whether > > > >>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: > > > >>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a > > > >> property > > > >>> of > > > >>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of > > > >>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? > > > >>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an > > > >> actual > > > >>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya > > would > > > >>>> like a > > > >>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage > > event. > > > >>>>> Henry > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that > > Hymes > > > >>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of > the > > > >> use > > > >>>> of a > > > >>>>> given code/style? > > > >>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing > > > >> that > > > >>>> has > > > >>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. > > > >>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was > > that > > > >>> it > > > >>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has > evidence > > to > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> contrary? > > > >>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of > > > >>> deployment > > > >>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the > > > >>> speaker > > > >>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and > context. > > > >>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? > > > >>>>>> David? > > > >>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this > > > >>> should > > > >>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up > > to). > > > >>>>>> Greg > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Sent from my iPhone > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. > > > >> Apparently, > > > >>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not > > > >> good > > > >>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so > > > >>>> disappointed > > > >>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this > > > >>> country, I > > > >>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more > charade. > > > >>> Maybe > > > >>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state > of > > > >>>> euphoria > > > >>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle > ground > > > >>> where > > > >>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect > with > > > >>> those > > > >>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English > > > >>> Vernacular? > > > >>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and > will > > > >>> always > > > >>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in > > > >> that > > > >>>> AME > > > >>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the > > > >> ?black > > > >>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code > shifting. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the > > discussion > > > >>> of > > > >>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol > > > > > > > > > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From cconnery@ithaca.edu Thu Jul 2 15:13:53 2015 From: cconnery@ithaca.edu (Cathrene Connery) Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2015 22:13:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Your help needed: "Bakhtin by and for educators" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Congratulations to the three of you! Best, Cathrene ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+cconnery=ithaca.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+cconnery=ithaca.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Ana Marjanovic-Shane [anamshane@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 01, 2015 9:47 PM To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Cc: Eugene Matusov; Mikhail Gradovski Subject: [Xmca-l] Your help needed: "Bakhtin by and for educators" Dear colleagues? We need your help. We (Eugene, Ana, and Mikhail) are very excited to tell you that we got a book contract with Palgrave to develop a book with a tentative title ?Bakhtin by and for educators.? We imagine creating a book of dialogues among the Bakhtinian educational practitioners ? about their own practice: How does Bakhtin inspire your teaching? Why? What are the possibilities and what are the challenges? The book will have 3 parts. The first part involves interviews with ?seasoned? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. We defined ?seasoned? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners as those who claim that Bakhtin influences or inspires their own teaching. We hope to reach diverse seasoned Bakhtinian educational practitioners: teaching diverse academic subjects (e.g., language, literature, science, arts, physical education, math) at diverse Early Childhood Education to Graduate School levels from different countries. We will do interview via Skype. The second part of the book will involve commentaries and questions by ?novice? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. We defined ?novice? as those educators who may be interested in Bakhtin and they have either just started or are considering shaping their educational practice by Bakhtin?s philosophical approach. We imagine bringing the voices of the ?seasoned? Bakhtinian practitioners and those of the ?novices? into dialogues with each other. The third part of the book will be our analysis that will outline patterns of issues that are relevant for the practitioners, and our concluding remarks. We need your assistance in helping us to identify diverse ?seasoned? and ?novice? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. Please let us know if you know some and help us to contact them. Or let us know who may know them? Or maybe it is you ? please do not be shy to contact us! We appreciate your help, Eugene Matusov, University of Delaware, USA, ematusov@udel.edu Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Chestnut Hill College, USA, anamshane@gmail.com Mikhail Gradovski, University College of Telemark, Norway, mikhail.gradovski@hit.no ____________________________________ Ana Marjanovic-Shane Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Dialogic Pedagogy Journal Associate Professor of Education Chestnut Hill College Emails: anamshane@gmail.com shaneam@chc.edu Phone: 267-334-2905 From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Jul 2 16:02:19 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2015 17:02:19 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Paul, I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this comment from your last post: "the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in elementary schools and the adult reading programs" What aspects of vygotskian theory are they drawing on? Some folks on this list have an interest in how Vygotsky gets taken up around the globe, so it would be interesting to hear about how Vygotsky is read in Haiti (via Cuba). -greg On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an > example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The > first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois > blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the > population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand > french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, > which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to > speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while > petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti > the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying > heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in > elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a > result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the > adult reading programs are cubans). > > https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) > > Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 2 16:21:16 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 19:21:16 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. Message-ID: I will greg... i have a couple of papers that were presented at a conference at the state university. ?I will upload them in a couple of days. ?One paper deals with the kreyol alphabet and teaching it to adults via rote memorization as opposed to teaching it via song to young people....? Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:07/02/2015 7:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
Paul, I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this comment from your last post: "the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in elementary schools and the adult reading programs" What aspects of vygotskian theory are they drawing on? Some folks on this list have an interest in how Vygotsky gets taken up around the globe, so it would be interesting to hear about how Vygotsky is read in Haiti (via Cuba). -greg On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an > example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The > first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois > blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the > population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand > french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, > which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to > speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while > petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti > the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying > heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in > elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a > result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the > adult reading programs are cubans). > > https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) > > Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 2 16:24:59 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. Message-ID: I will forward the papers... Watch "Alfab? krey?l 1 / Creole alphabet 1" on YouTube https://youtu.be/6F6yK1HOhWI Watch "Creole alphabet 2 / Alfab? krey?l 2 - VOD" on YouTube https://youtu.be/dW5LaUJ337U Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:07/02/2015 7:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
Paul, I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this comment from your last post: "the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in elementary schools and the adult reading programs" What aspects of vygotskian theory are they drawing on? Some folks on this list have an interest in how Vygotsky gets taken up around the globe, so it would be interesting to hear about how Vygotsky is read in Haiti (via Cuba). -greg On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an > example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The > first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois > blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the > population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand > french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, > which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to > speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while > petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti > the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying > heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in > elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a > result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the > adult reading programs are cubans). > > https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) > > Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 2 16:42:10 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 19:42:10 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. Message-ID: Professor serge madhere, argues synthesizing the kreyol language with the vodou culture to make it easier to teach the language to both adults and students. ?The instructor must establish the zone of proximal development (translated in kreyol as, "zon aprantisaj rapwoche" see attachment). ?I will translate the paper from kreyol to English if anyone is interested. Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:07/02/2015 7:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
Paul, I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this comment from your last post: "the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in elementary schools and the adult reading programs" What aspects of vygotskian theory are they drawing on? Some folks on this list have an interest in how Vygotsky gets taken up around the globe, so it would be interesting to hear about how Vygotsky is read in Haiti (via Cuba). -greg On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an > example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The > first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois > blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the > population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand > french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, > which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to > speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while > petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti > the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying > heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in > elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a > result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the > adult reading programs are cubans). > > https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) > > Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: FB_IMG_1435879902041.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 27471 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150702/72007095/attachment.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: FB_IMG_1435879926210.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 41210 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150702/72007095/attachment-0001.jpg From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 10:31:21 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 11:31:21 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5D58DA45-9700-4E3F-9A98-E17722525870@gmail.com> Paul, Thank you for the sources for Kreyol. I am familiar with the uproar about the proposal by some in the AA community in California that AAEV be the medium of instruction for African Americans and that ?...many blacks still do not view it as a distinct linguistic system.? For such a dialog, as contentious as it was, a theory of grammar, as per Ruqaiya, seems essential to me. Your experience of being brought up in rural Haiti is not not familiar to me, but I am familiar, from my time as a high school teacher life on the Navajo Reservation, where I was very tight with a particular family. That was very rural, in a Navajo way, and quite different from the experience of urban Navajos, who constitute over half of the population at the Native American Community Academy, where I am a substitute teacher here in Albuquerque. (Perhaps you knew white guys like me in who were in the Peace Corps in Haiti. My son just spent year in the Peace Corps in very rural Nicaragua.) The 8th graders there were especially hard on me, so I struck back by showing them artifacts of my time on the Rez, including a large Navajo rug woven for me by the matriarch of the family into which I was ?adopted?. No, it wasn?t legal in the Bilagaana (the Navajo word for white man) way, but she called me shiyaazh, ?my son?. So, I have two moms. I digress. But the point I want to make here about language and grammar is that Navajo is being lost on the Rez, but all but dead in the city. This represents a huge obstacle to intergenerational communion within the extended families of clan-based Navajo culture. When I was there in the late 70s and early 80s, I proposed we teach Navajo in the school but met the most resistance from Navajo parents, who thought their children should be learning standard English. So we come to Navajo English, a variety of Native American English, which has been reserached extensively by William Leap. Navajo English, the English vernacular of the young people I worked with, was saddled with stigma, and the young people were labeled as ?semi-lingual?. Which brings us, I think, to the ?language gap? discussed in another thread. I wrote an article critiquing this attacking this perspective during my doctoral study in the early 80s. If I had had Ruqaiya back then, it would have been a better article. Regarding separate schools for Black people or Native Americans, I would just say that I have made a life of learning different languages and trying to integrate myself in many speech communities, starting with my time as a military ?brat?, my mom pulling her children around the U.S. and the world after my dad, a career Navy man. There were many anxious moments, but I have finally found home turf here in New Mexico. I married a Jew (I was raised Christian), so I identify with diaspora both ontogentically and phylogentically I guess one might say. And, though I am happy to finally be at home, I really do believe we are all Africans. On the move. And as much as I value my Navajo connection, they weren?t always here. And language just will not stay put either. Ruqaiya makes clear that none of us work with a single variety of language. Our grammars leak. One more little thing: Greg?s link to bar talk (the Lindquist ethnography). I have suggested this chat is not unlike a bar, people coming and going. I thought it was remarkable that it was a woman that wrote the ethnograpy. I also think it is remarkable that Ruqaiya is a woman. Perhaps that is a good thing. We guys take ourselves so seriously. I am not suggesting we take up the theme right just this moment, but the color-blind perspective on race issues hasn?t worked to well, so a gender-blind perspective probably doesn?t either. Just saying. Henry > On Jul 2, 2015, at 4:45 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Henry, > > First, michel degraff (MIT) and the haitian academy of kreyol, which was created by the 1987 haitian constitution, are doing great works on kreyol that parallels what labov did for AAEV. The 3 percent of the haitian population that barely speaks french properly, looked down on kreyol and argued that it did not allow haitians to critically think (sounds familiar). Students were forbidden to speak kreyol in school even though 100 percent of the population speaks it. Kreyol, was viewed as parole and french as langue. Presently, with the MIT initiative, which translates textbooks for classroom use into kreyol, created by degraff, instructions in haiti now is in kreyol. The 1987 constitution created the haitian academy of kreyol and requires all government communique to be in both french and kreyol. > > Second, in regards to AAEV, many blacks still do not view it as a distinct linguistic system. Do you remember the uproar raised by the black bourgeoisie when the California school district wanted to incorporate AAEV in the schools as a means of teaching standard american english to inner-city students? > > I am not black american, but as a person of African descent I sympathize with my brothers and sisters in america and the diaspora. I was fortunate enough to be raised in rural haiti where my worldview was/is african and vodou, my language was/is african, and my heroes were/and are african... i am baffled by the image of white jesus that black people pray to; I am blown away by the ignorance they have of their history or the romanticized version people like west and dyson have of that history (it's as though west forgets that the so called black church was against dr. King and his rebel rousing). > > In a 1979 version of "the wretched of the earth" by frantz fanon, jean Paul sartre wrote, and here I am paraphrasing, that the work is a psychological call to arms... whites should be very afraid of such a text. As a white liberal I think you have more in common with Obama than what you think. > > In a nutshell, I do advocate for separate schooling of black folks. That does not mean I hate white people or think being black is better, it simply means we ARE different. We have a different history, culture, and yes a different biology. We have to be taught the relationship between my melanin and how I experience the universe, the material resource framework, and how I know what I know. In the 60s and 70s, researchers, such as Amos Wilson, studying development among african children discovered that piaget ' s model was not veridical vis-a-vis their psychological development. We should be free to explore why without fear of being labeled racists etc. We must decenter whiteness and center african, not in the absurd reading of africa posited by afrocentric scholars. But within a sociohistorical/biological/genetic framework! Only then will we be able to sit at the table of all cultures without the ambivalent feeling of du boisian double consciousness. > > PS... before I adopt any idea, technology, etc. I ask myself how does this, whatever it is, impact my relationship to the earth, my ancestors, and my spiritual connection to the universe... my african/vodou worldview taught me to do that. > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 9:36 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>
Paul, > It?s dangerous when you get a moment! Your parallel of homi bhaba?s ambivalence space and Vygtosky?s ZPD is just plain fun to think about. You say that the ?black theorists? were unable ?...to develop an alternative space or language game from which to utter confrontational utterances against the ideology of their colonizers?. I am not familar with any studies of any thing in French similar to African American Vernacular in English. But my understanding is that whatever is considered standard American English of today owes a huge amount to AAEV. The influence is overwhelming in song and dance, but those semiotic domains have bled enormously into language. AAEV, until now, has had mostly ?covert prestige? in the U.S. William Labov is seen as the white linguist who brougnt respectability fo AAEV, but Labov himself has acknowledged the debt he owes to the members of the AAEV speech community who generously opened their lives to him and gave him their time. The contributions of Black people and the Black communities of the English-speaking world have resulted in prestige that is no longer covert. > > In a way, Obama represents for a white liberal man like myself a hodge-podge of all of the tropes that come what I know about Black people in this country. It?s politics. I don?t know him as a person, but as an object we have created with our media. Do I fantasize a photo op with the guy, even dinner at Michelle?s side talking about good nutrition?what white liberal man wouldn?t? (The rest of you white brothers, back me up here!) But to just chew the fat with? You?d probably suggest Jean Jacques Salin or Aristide. Well, how about Che? But NOT Fidel! He goes on!!! With William Labov? Great. Unless he is as long winded as Fidel, El Comandante. With Chomsky, even though his grammar drives me crazy? No problem. With anyone on this chat? Sure, why the hell not? Don?t all show up at my house at once! > > Yikes! > > Henry > > > > > > >> On Jul 1, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >> What we fail to realize is that so-called blacks such as w.e.b Du bois, aime cesaire, frantz fanon, booker t. Washington, and obama are white supremacists. That is, they were and are interpellated and embourgeoised by the ideology and ideological apparatuses of a racist social structure. As such, they saw and see the world as their former colonizers. For example, fanon and du bois viewed haitian vodou and practical consciousness in the same light as the white southern racists who constituted the american occupying force that occupied haiti from 1915-1934 (see laurent du bois's work, "haiti: the afterschock of history). They felt that they had to be civilized (be more white). It is in this same european ethnocentric ethos that obama sees the world. Hence, my comment that obama is a white man! He is no different from bill clinton, george bush, etc. >> >> Theoretically speaking, in vygotskyian/ bhabhaian parlance (yes in a sense i am equating homi bhabha's ambivalence space with vygotsky's zone of proximal development), it does not appear that whether in the bhabhaian ambivalent space or at the zone of proximial development these so-called black theorists were able to develop an alternative space or language game from which to utter confrontational utterances against the ideology of their colonizers, which they internalized to the point of reproducing it against other blacks who did not look and act like their former colonizers. (The latter point may speak to the issue of creativity you all have discussed in previous threads). The haitians were able to do it bcuz they were already equipped with the language game of a different social structure (albeit racist whites and blacks viewed it as primitive). At the start of the revolution over 70 percent of the haitians were directly from africa. As such, they attempted to recursively reorganize and reproduce their african agential moments against the western practical consciousness of europeans, the mulatto elites, and petit-bourgeois blacks with western education (so the subaltern is able to speak). >> >> I say all of this to say, in the age of globalization, the politic of the body is very dangerous. obama is paraded as a sign of diversity/multiculturalism based on his so-called race as opposed to his practical consciousness. I could care less if his skin-color would get him stopped by the cops, it does not negate the fact that he is a white/black man seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution with people who would lynch him! That is absurd, and demonstrates the lack of creativity of the black bourgeoisie... >> >> Delay gave me a moment! >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >> >> >> Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities >> www.routledge.com/9780415714372 >> >> >> -------- Original message -------- >> From: HENRY SHONERD >> Date: 07/01/2015 4:41 PM (GMT-05:00) >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >> >> Hi Paul and all those interested in this thread, >> Thank you! The radio podcast you linked me to is huge in scope, so I want to do my best to keep it relevant to the thread. >> >> The interviewee, human rights activist/lawyer/joiurnalist Ezili Danto, to me, is giving us enough history of the Haitian struggle for independence from the time of Jean Jacques Salin in 1804 to the present, for those not familiar with that struggle so that people like me can understand how one can perceive Bush (the first one), the Clintons and Obama as ?vampires? and ?war mongers?. As I confessed below, my positive response to Obama?s eulogy in Charleston was based on sound bites and not a very good analysis of the sound bites, at that. Sigh. One issue very focused on language was the decision by Danto and others to throw off their European names and take African ones is familiar to an American audience. Most of the podcast is much broader in scope, but I think it provides the ?ground? for the tough discussions on race that so many have called for. So Danto?s historical analysis IS about discourse and a theory of grammar has to be discourse based. Dialogic. (A thread on Bakhtin seems to have broken out.) Of course, such a theory has to taken into account the power of narrative. Danto?s historical narrative is essential to the dialog we are having. >> >> Here are issues in that ?ground? that Danto raises that are worth keepin in mind as more prototypically linguistic issues are discussed: 1) the world?s religions include those that have come out of Africa. This will bump up against what a "world religion" is, and that could be a useful discussion. 2) Respect for the mother as an essential part of the African world view as construed by Danto. I am thinking about the indigenous people I know best: the Navajos, matrilineal and matrilocal in their cultural practices. 3) The Haitian struggle for independence is still going on. In 1690 the Pueblos of New Mexico waged their own revolt. It was beat back during the reconquest of the Spanish in the decades that followed. But the Pueblos continue their struggle today in the form of claims to the waters of the Rio Grande. And much more. 4) 50 shades of Black. As per those that retook Haiti after the revolution of 1804, it?s better to be on the white side of the spectrum (Duvalier, Obama) than the black side of the spectrum (Aristide). Much the same thinking, I understand, haunts Brazil. Ads placed by Indian men (of India) in search of brides, at least until recently were full of explicit requests for light-skinned ladies. >> >> I doubt I have really moved the thread forward that much. Can anyone else take it up? Ruqaiya apparently had some really specific things in mind that someone smarter than me might be able to connect to. >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 12:48 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... >>> >>> https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history >>> >>> >>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>>>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., >>> I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I need time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take time to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going off line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. >>> >>> I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to me that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, from looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, meanings of words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking about what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between wanting to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call attention to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, there has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. >>> >>> But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that the juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often boils down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all of us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always ?on stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is data for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not to take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little face back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not really listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I said, I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I have plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I hope, helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and credible member of this community. This is important to me. >>> >>> This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. (Or playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and will, I hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that David argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already useful to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t always know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with this chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you may be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a woman (Lindquist). Hmmm?. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>> >>>> Greg >>>> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is our interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations (contexts) >>>> IS a question I want to highlight. >>>> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >>>> >>>> We could focus on the "there" >>>> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >>>> We could focus on the "fore" >>>> >>>> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >>>> >>>> Or >>>> >>>> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual practicing changes?? >>>> >>>> I just ordered Lindquist's . >>>> >>>> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word "focus" is "hearth/home" >>>> >>>> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >>>> >>>> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another "home"? >>>> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>>> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >>>> >>>> David, >>>> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan and >>>> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these sources (you >>>> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me offline?), >>>> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that you >>>> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what is >>>> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever dimension >>>> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what would >>>> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to say >>>> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm slow!). >>>> >>>> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also from the >>>> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. (and yes, >>>> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would assign to >>>> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak of is >>>> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south side >>>> Chicago code described below). >>>> >>>> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >>>> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South Side >>>> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie Lindquist >>>> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class people >>>> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I say that >>>> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description with long >>>> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very nicely >>>> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments that >>>> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >>>> counterfactually. >>>> >>>> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an example >>>> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >>>> >>>> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a tendency to >>>> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course happen >>>> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >>>> >>>> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in fact, >>>> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class bars. >>>> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the consciousness >>>> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a kind >>>> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it as >>>> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class people have >>>> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class (i.e., >>>> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the nature of >>>> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, most >>>> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic party). >>>> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy works - >>>> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why they are >>>> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx >>>> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human consciousness. >>>> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam Smith >>>> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the reason >>>> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the crassness >>>> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed that the >>>> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory was >>>> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >>>> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually much >>>> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >>>> >>>> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the consciousness >>>> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are to be >>>> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white working >>>> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the fact >>>> that that there are things that one does and there are things that one >>>> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) doesn't do >>>> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked if you >>>> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have to >>>> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >>>> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple repertoires >>>> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to learn or >>>> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in the >>>> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent intellectual >>>> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >>>> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you take >>>> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells it >>>> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >>>> >>>> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way people >>>> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >>>> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >>>> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >>>> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >>>> >>>> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the title of >>>> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the Shaping of >>>> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It seems >>>> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape consciousness. But >>>> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights here >>>> would be much appreciated. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> greg >>>> >>>> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>>>> >>>>> The key text is: >>>>> >>>>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, B. >>>>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology >>>>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>>>> >>>>> Also: >>>>> >>>>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In Collected >>>>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>>>> >>>>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a native >>>>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>>>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be sayin" as >>>>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the conditional. >>>>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then the >>>>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll smack >>>>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the conjuntion >>>>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that dirty >>>>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is one of >>>>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a genuine >>>>> one. >>>>> >>>>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>>>> >>>>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>>>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>>>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. 69, >>>>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>>>> >>>>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the difference >>>>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>>>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, including >>>>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course it >>>>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a merely >>>>> functional one. >>>>> >>>>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be anything >>>>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we need very >>>>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. This was >>>>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>>>> >>>>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) Pedagogy and >>>>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. London: >>>>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>>>> >>>>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>>>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", "prediction", >>>>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came in >>>>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code +), and >>>>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney test). >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David, >>>>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>>>> Halliday. >>>>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I can... >>>>>> >>>>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the use >>>>> of >>>>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was that the >>>>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child upside >>>>>> their face). >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make more >>>>> direct >>>>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples and >>>>> the >>>>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. dialect >>>>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer when >>>>>> you write: >>>>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>>>> orientation >>>>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in communal >>>>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an elaborated >>>>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>>>> >>>>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I read >>>>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't clear how >>>>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for your >>>>>> multiple elaborations! >>>>>> >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Everybody: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's rage. >>>>>> And >>>>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due to >>>>> his >>>>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my comments >>>>> on >>>>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid and >>>>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things worse >>>>> so >>>>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't deserve >>>>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a racist's >>>>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is not >>>>>> only >>>>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who have >>>>>> the >>>>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need is >>>>>> called >>>>>>> "justice"). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and Hymes, >>>>>> and >>>>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading Ruqaiya's >>>>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>>>> relevant. >>>>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful distinction >>>>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>>>> distinction >>>>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year olds: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology (the >>>>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>>>> volitional: >>>>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can also >>>>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that it is >>>>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>>>> raised >>>>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites were a >>>>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a dialect >>>>> is a >>>>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the user), >>>>>> and >>>>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second language >>>>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; genuine >>>>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born into >>>>> the >>>>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>>>> deliberately >>>>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more meaningful >>>>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies you >>>>> could >>>>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a dialect >>>>>> is >>>>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not include the >>>>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of his >>>>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex rules for >>>>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on other >>>>>> factors >>>>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>>>> specified >>>>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and now >>>>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance as a >>>>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, who >>>>>> grew >>>>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas of >>>>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft (society, >>>>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis is on >>>>>> what >>>>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on your >>>>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted coding >>>>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>>>> rules >>>>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not towards >>>>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), the >>>>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and towards >>>>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way it >>>>>> sounds >>>>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create elaborated >>>>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. Unlike >>>>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and it is >>>>>> not >>>>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding orientation >>>>> is a >>>>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls semantic >>>>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>>>> performance--in >>>>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>>>> "communicative >>>>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not something >>>>>> is >>>>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is sociolinguistically >>>>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, and >>>>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>>>> dichotomies >>>>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually not >>>>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never really >>>>>> know, >>>>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>>>> competence >>>>>> is >>>>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a highly >>>>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>>>> performed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg, >>>>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>>>> whether >>>>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>>>> property >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>>>> actual >>>>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya would >>>>>>> like a >>>>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage event. >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that Hymes >>>>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of the >>>>> use >>>>>>> of a >>>>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>>>> that >>>>>>> has >>>>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was that >>>>>> it >>>>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has evidence to >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>>>> deployment >>>>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>>>> speaker >>>>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and context. >>>>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>>>> David? >>>>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>>>> should >>>>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up to). >>>>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>>>> Apparently, >>>>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>>>> good >>>>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>>>> disappointed >>>>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>>>> country, I >>>>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more charade. >>>>>> Maybe >>>>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state of >>>>>>> euphoria >>>>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle ground >>>>>> where >>>>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect with >>>>>> those >>>>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>>>> Vernacular? >>>>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and will >>>>>> always >>>>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>>>> that >>>>>>> AME >>>>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>>>> ?black >>>>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code shifting. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the discussion >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >>>> >>>> >>>> [The entire original message is not included.] >>> >>> >> >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 11:03:38 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 12:03:38 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <69512DC0-800A-45A1-9A58-B7C553594657@gmail.com> Paul, My ear isn?t that good in French as I wish it was, but tell me if this makes sense of the links to Haitian TV you sent us: Along the continuum of Standard French to Kreyol, the most standard, Parisian French is from the news anchor, even more ?perfect? than the French representative to the conference being covered. Then, going more and more ?native?: The prime minister, then the minister of public health. What I took to be Kreyol (though I am not absolutely sure) was interesting in that the phonetic and intonational ?flavor" was more French than the prime minister and health minister. The details on the ?flavor? would be based on a robust theory of grammar, as per Ruqaiya. The advertisement for Limacol, apparently a sort of listerine for the skin, was so much like a commercial in the U.S. And the skins were very light. Certainly there would be correlations between how such commercials use content and frame that content. Would this be an aspect of ?orientation? that David discusses. I?m sorry to be obsessed about grammar, but it?s what I know, if I know anything. Henry > On Jul 2, 2015, at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the adult reading programs are cubans). > > https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) > > Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 12:02:41 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 13:02:41 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Quds day In-Reply-To: References: <7afe3b8447123d78eb0ff4aaa5c30d0b@148.251.231.41> Message-ID: <1DA23FD7-0A43-4CDC-921A-8BB833D98A12@gmail.com> Peter, >From one ancient one to the other, thank you! The Navajo call us anasazi. It?s interesting in this neck of the woods to contrast the Navajo, a pastoral people, on the move, to the Pueblos (Hopi, Zuni, Keres, Jemez) spinkled throughout New Mexico and Arizona, I think CHAT would be an interesting venue for a discussion of what could be considered a just claim to land. Henry > On Jul 2, 2015, at 9:56 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > I got this today, and it maps onto Paul M?s recent posts on Haiti as a colonized land, at least in part. Important qualifier: I?m an atheist, so have no vested interest in whose religion makes its people the proper residents of a geographic area. Although my father?s family is Jewish, I had no Jewish religious upbringing (he was a scientist with no interest in a spiritual universe); my mother, a Catholic who fell from the church following Vatican II?s changes in its rituals, took us to an Episcopalian church when I was young, but aside from that, I?ve never felt the call to an Almighty being, even in the midst of my greatest life crises. > > I have a friend who?s a Palestinian Greek (Greek origins but resident of what Americans now call Israel before moving to the US) who always refers to that nation as Palestine, not Israel. Even at my ancient age, I keep learning more about how complex societies are. > > I wish to be clear that I do not intend to submit this note to xmca to start a verbal war over who has what rights to what lands. If I did, I?d start with saying that I live on Cherokee land, not Georgia, USA. Rather, I?m sharing something I got that I was not aware of that reaffirms that cultures do construct geography and its resident societies quite differently as they read its contours and history into the present. p > > From: usa [mailto:jessica.hall2016@yandex.com] > Sent: Thursday, July 02, 2015 2:02 AM > To: Peter Smagorinsky > Subject: Quds day > > International Day of al-Quds is an annual event, supporting a just peace for Palestine, and opposing Apartheid Israel?s control of Jerusalem (al-Quds in Arabic: ????????), the international city that stands as a powerful symbol to three of the world?s great religious traditions. Pro-justice and anti-Zionist Apartheid demonstrations are held on this day in most Muslim and Arab countries and by Muslim and non-Muslim communities around the world, including the United States. It is held each year on the last Friday of the Muslim month of Ramadhan. The Day of al-Quds is also an opportunity to stand on the side of the oppressed worldwide, not just in the Holy Land. Jerusalem Day is not an Islamic religious event but rather a human rights event open to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Fri Jul 3 12:06:02 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Fri, 03 Jul 2015 15:06:02 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. Message-ID: Henry, Yes... yes... yes...the majority of the so-called elite speak a bastardized version of french, which is unrecognizable in Paris. ?So in the capital what you find is a kreyol that is phonetically and intonationally french. ?I have requested, from dr. Serge Madhere, an english version of his paper on teaching kreyol within a vygotskyian framework. ?He does a masterful job highlighting your point. ?By the way, i find myself having great difficulties understanding malian and ivorian french when i travel to the continent. ?Albeit when i am in african villages in places like togo my kreyol enables me to understand the villagers. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info? Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities? www.routledge.com/9780415714372 -------- Original message -------- From: HENRY SHONERD Date: 07/03/2015 2:03 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. Paul, My ear isn?t that good in French as I wish it was, but tell me if this makes sense of the links to Haitian TV you sent us: Along the continuum of Standard French to Kreyol, the most standard, Parisian French is from the news anchor, even more ?perfect? than the French representative to the conference being covered. Then, going more and more ?native?: The prime minister, then the minister of public health. What I took to be Kreyol (though I am not absolutely sure) was interesting in that the phonetic and intonational ?flavor" was more French than the prime minister and health minister. The details on the ?flavor? would be based on a robust theory of grammar, as per Ruqaiya. The advertisement for Limacol, apparently a sort of listerine for the skin, was so much like a commercial in the U.S. And the skins were very light. Certainly there would be correlations between how such commercials use content and frame that content. Would this be an aspect of ?orientation? that David discusses. I?m sorry to be obsessed about grammar, but it?s what I know, if I know anything. Henry > On Jul 2, 2015, at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the adult reading programs are cubans). > > https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) > > Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 12:30:54 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 13:30:54 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Weekly F'Bomb: American Girl Dolls: The Action Movie with Anna Chlumsky/Ruqaiya and a Theory of Grammar References: <5d3d24a2-e94c-4c55-a246-4e6799ffc698@xtinmta4298.xt.local> Message-ID: <8B433D14-CA54-4E0D-8CDC-705930A2D102@gmail.com> Gente, In my humble opinion, the song here that maps its lyrics to specific text in U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia?s dissents to the majority rulings of the court re: same-sex marriage and health care, is the kind of robust linguistic analysis one would hope for in a usage-based theory of grammar that Ruquaiya might have envisioned. Scalia has been called a ?textualist? in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. My sense is that Scalia's semantics is not really usage based, in the same way that much grammatical analysis is not. Hence, would not stand the test of a theory of grammar relevant to CHAT. All hail, Halliday. Henry > Begin forwarded message: > > From: "Funny Or Die" > To: > Subject: Weekly F'Bomb: American Girl Dolls: The Action Movie with Anna Chlumsky > Date: July 2, 2015 at 12:01:31 PM MDT > Reply-To: "Funny Or Die" > > WEEKLY F'BOMB > > JULY 2 > > > > > > Coheed and Cambria Sing Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinions > > > > > > > > American Girl Dolls: The Action Movie with Anna Chlumsky > > > > John Cage: Gay Divorce Lawyer > > > > > > Who Said It: Chris Christie Or Buzz From 'Home Alone'? > > > > > > > > Tom Cruise Makes His Demands For 'Top Gun 2' > > > > > > 15 Pics With A Deep Sense Of Irony? > > > > > > > *sneeze once* God bless you! *sneeze twice* God bless you. *sneeze three times* Get your shit together, Steve. > > > > > > > Subway Long Jump Fail > > > > > > > CNN: It's About Time > > > > > > > Rowers Attacked by Flying Asian Carp > > > > > > > Gay Marriage Is Legal: It's About F*cking Time, Right? > > > > South Carolinians Defend The Confederate Flag > > > > > > > Will Ferrell Drunkenly Sells Fake Vodka During Bizarre Wimbledon Commercial > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This email was sent by: Funny Or Die, Inc. > 167 2nd Avenue San Mateo, CA, 94401, United States > Update Profile From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 13:26:06 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 14:26:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan In-Reply-To: References: <5x6yaas45xsejdyd58qip2ii.1435776518120@email.android.com> Message-ID: Gente, I think David has it right about hope, though I hadn?t connected it with freedom until now. The power of distributed cognition. To be explicit: You two blokes have chosen to engage each other (and me!) with respect in this thread. It would have been a shame otherwise, like a fight in Lindquist?s bar. Go macho and you lose a LOT of potential. That?s pessimism at work. However such respect comes with a price: I have to understand what you both say. Most of it, yes. Some of it, I don?t quite get. Greg, I think, expresses the same concern. I hope that what I do understand does justice to what David and Greg have to say. I am convinced that listening is more important than talking. So talking means recognizing what others have to say. I am on Greg?s turf here. In my humble opinion, the example of the borrowing from Korean into Chinese is priceless, ought to be in the book on a theory of grammar for us Vygotskians. Such examples, I think are the ?artful? side of linguistics that Greg evokes. Good teachers give good examples. I think Greg has it right that about art and science, which calls to mind qualitative and quantitative research paradigms (choice, as per Ruquaiya, as per David on ?paradigmatic?). I am sure that both approaches are essential for robust, credible theory and research. Like that tower in Italy I lean, massively, to qualitative. My problems with that issue got me into massive trouble during my dissertation defense. I didn?t graduate with distinction. So great was the trauma that until lately I have not felt myself worthy of engaging in a chat such as this. No kidding. Two more things: 1) Metalinguistic awareness (cf. Greg) was what I was referring to when I talked about the need to talk about talk, even though there is a tension between talk about talk and the need to get on with the dialog. 2) David beat me to the punch in his comment about Paul?s links to Haitian television. That?s okay. David left out the commercial. Henry > On Jul 2, 2015, at 3:46 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Greg: > > Ruqaiya did a lot of work on describing context as a system (and not simply > as "structure", which is the way it is described in Lucy and Gaskins). Her > work is based on Malinowski's distinction between context of situation and > context of culture, where the relationship between situation and culture is > seen as analogous to the relationship between a text and a language. I > think the key point in Ruqaiya's concept (as always) is choice--we choose > things from the material environment for semanticization, and only those > things chosen for our volitional semantics are rightly referred to as > context. But of course any time you have choice, you necessarily have > hierarchy (as Bernstein points out, speakers of elaborated code are all > speakers of restricted code, but not vice versa). > > My sister-in-law is visiting from China, and I have just noticed that I > refer to her by her name, and she refers to me using the intricate system > of family names that Chinese uses--i.e. as her older sister's husband. When > I asked my wife about this, she said I was doing it correctly--Chinese uses > relational titles to refer to older and more powerful members of the family > and given names can only be used to address people who are younger and less > powerful. You can see from this that BOTH systems are essentially > individuating, but they individuate in different ways: one relationally and > grammatically and the other absolutely and lexically. > > The other thing I learned (this time from my brother in law) is that, > thanks to Korean TV programmes, Chinese has a lot of loan words from Korean > these days. Most amusing is "O-ba", a corruption of "O-ppa", a mildly > flirtatious term that young girls use to address somewhat older men they > would like to date on Korean TV. It is based on the relational term for a > younger sister's older brother, which in Korea absolutely cannot be used by > a male. But in China blokes use it the way that blacks use "brother"! This > is undoubtedly a mistranslation--they assume that "O-ppa" is simply the > Korean equivalent of "da ge" or "xiong", which certainly can be used that > way. > > So we choose from text in much the same way we choose from context: not > exactly freely, but in ways that in the long run will make us a little more > free. (Maybe that's where hope comes from, Henry?) > > David Kellogg > > > PS: Paul's videos from Haiti were a real eye opener--one announcer doesn't > just speak French but actually speaks Parisian French, and the Parisian > intonation contours are not entirely absent in the Kreyo either. On the > other hand, you can see that Kreyo is developing its own orthography! > > Paul's views on black biology remind me a little of what Japanese scholars > are always trying to claim...e.g. that Japanese-itude is due to having a > small intestine that is--supposedly--four feet longer than normal, hence > altered digestion, altered diet, altered culture, etc. > > In this view, culture is essentially determined, and determined from the > inside outwards. I think I prefer the outside inwards idea that cultures > are made up of millions and billions of choices. But of course if you > accept this idea, you can't really turn around and then say that only the > forty-five minute interaction is meaningful! > > dk > > > On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:22 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> David, >> Yes, what you say makes very good sense to me. >> >> But perhaps I'm not making as much sense to me, so let me clarify a few >> things to myself if no one else. >> >> This will involve some back tracking, a little back pedaling (I wanted to >> spell that "peddling" but caught myself - but perhaps there is truth there >> too! Ah, words!), and maybe some back stroking (just because it is 100+ >> degrees here and has been so for the last two weeks!). >> >> First, the back peddling >> So I probably shouldn't have mentioned the bit about too easily fitting >> data into a theory. I said that with this other author (Van Kleeck) in mind >> and without good knowledge of Hasan's (and even Bernstein's) work. Even as >> I wrote it, I was already thinking that it probably isn't apropos for their >> work. So my apologies for throwing in that red herring. My sense is that >> Hasan's work is extremely theoretically rigorous and I really didn't mean >> to suggest that it was otherwise (even though I did suggest this). >> >> Next, the back tracking: >> >> Two ideas that I need to revisit: methods for studying contexts, and >> whether or not there are other ways to get to cognition - other than >> schooling. >> >> First, with regard to the methods for studying contexts of talk and such, >> yes, it is true, this is not an easy thing to study. Contexts are entailed >> by talk itself and thus are not presupposable. The result is that measuring >> them can be difficult. As much art as science. >> >> And yet, as we go through our daily lives, with some not infrequent >> exceptions, we generally do very well at figuring out what kinds of >> contexts we are "in" in any given moment (whether an argument (heated or >> not), a discussion, a practical joke, or a thought experiment). So then, >> the question becomes, if we can do it (well enough to "get along" as >> Wittgenstein says), then why can't someone studying context do it? >> >> Linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists have come up with an answer, >> and it generally falls under the name of "contextualization." This points >> to the process by which contexts are indicated (cf. Gumperz' >> "contextualization cues"). Studying contextualization involves a theory of >> "enough-ness" - that is to say, that there is enough pointing to a given >> context being the most salient that one can reasonably conclude that it is >> likely to be the context that is constraining and enabling participants' >> acts-in-context. (Michael Silverstein's classic piece on contextualization >> - "The Indeterminacy of Contextualization: When is enough enough?" - lays >> out this approach - I have a copy in case anyone is interested - just email >> me). >> >> What this method lacks in big numbers data, it makes up for in >> meaningfulness. I think this is where the large corpus research is lacking. >> Large corpus research can show the distribution of different words or >> collections of words or grammatical features or whatever and how these >> correlate with other easily quantifiable features (e.g., income or wealth >> or education or some combination of whatever proxy you would use for >> indicating those persons who are "low-income" - and even here you'll get >> some who aren't what they seem to be...). But in counting distributions, >> you quickly lose meaningfulness. If you are going to do a count of the >> distribution of a given word, e.g. "this" in a massive corpus, it is highly >> unlikely that you will be able to document each instance of usage and what >> it means in that context, much less what that context means! Or, to put it >> more positively, what large corpus research lacks in meaningfulness, it >> makes up for in representativeness (i.e., we know that the data are highly >> representative of the population which they claim to represent, even if we >> don't really know what they "mean" for the users). >> >> What I'm saying here is a rather old story that everyone has heard before >> and probably in clearer terms than what I have introduced somewhat ad hoc >> (representativeness? really?) so I don't want to belabor the point. But I >> thought it worth mentioning that I happen to err on the side of being >> willing to sacrifice representativeness for meaningfulness (perhaps a >> result of a sense of disenchantment with my late capitalist context? or my >> whiteness? cf. Paul's emails). I'll choose the scale of a forty five minute >> interaction over the scale of 45 million interactions any day. As a result, >> I'm willing to lose some of the representativeness. You might say, I prefer >> the artfulness of analyzing talk over the science of it. But that's just >> me. And a caution, the big money is in the representativeness. >> >> Second, regarding whether or not there are other ways, other than >> schooling, to get to the types of capacities that everyone cares about >> ("cognition" as some describe it), what I am suggesting is simply that >> schooling might not be the only way to get to something like "scientific >> concepts." [please note that my point was not the Piagetian point that >> these capacities naturally unfold in time but rather that it may be the >> case that there are other ways of getting there - more Durkheim, and I like >> to think, Vygotsky, than Piaget]. I would call these cultural alternatives >> to schooling that nonetheless accomplish complex capacities. >> >> Thinking about this in terms of "scientific concepts" is a bit more radical >> of a way of thinking about the argument than what I had in mind, but I'll >> leave that as a potential to be developed (and maybe others have already >> made this case?). What I was thinking about were skills like >> meta-linguistic awareness (again I'm more engaged here with the Van Kleeck >> article than I am with Hasan or Bernstein; there is a long tradition in >> CHAT of finding other cultural ways of doing things that were thought to be >> the result of schooling - I have Lave and Wenger in mind here but there are >> many others). For example, there are types of talk that can provoke certain >> forms of metalinguistic awareness. Teasing is a cultural practice in which >> one's words are not what they denote. This can provoke a substantial >> reorganization of the child's understanding of what language IS as an >> object. If the child encounters this cultural practice enough (and has the >> minimal developments in discursive abilities to be able to grasp the sense >> of teasing - no, Piaget is not dead!), then one will realize that the word >> is not the thing. This is perhaps a more minimal form of metalinguistic >> awareness, but it is nonetheless an important accomplishment that can >> ground other more complex language usage abilities. And it isn't in >> schooling. So perhaps I should have said that I was simply suggesting that >> schooling isn't the ONLY way to get to these capacities. >> >> As for my readings of Marx, perhaps the point here is that we run in >> different circles (you in the authentic and genuine Marxist circles, me in >> the bourgeois Marxist circles!). (circles = contexts?). >> >> Or, perhaps, we just draw our circles differently. I had imagined drawing >> the Marxian circle a bit larger than the Marxist circle, and in the former >> I had included the likes of Paul Willis whose book Learning to Labour is, >> in part, an argument about why there has not yet been a revolution. The >> answer he offers is that working class culture has certain limitations that >> keep them from penetrating the dominant ideology. Along these lines I >> thought that the whole false consciousness, in all its variants - from Marx >> on down, was essentially a way of answering the question "why no >> revolution?" and perhaps it would be too strong to say that it does this by >> laying it at the feet of the proletariat, but it at least seems the case >> that the failings of the proletariat have something to do with our >> collective failure to realize the revolutionary transformations called for >> in Communism. [and yes, there is a robust history by Marxian (again, larger >> category) historian scholars who have tried to explain why so many union >> members voted for Reagan in the 80's. For another take on this, consider >> the book What's the Matter with Kansas? - a popular classic seeking to >> invoke false consciousness as the reason why so many poor and working class >> people in middle america vote Republican. But maybe this is a pastime of >> American Marxians? Again, different circles, whether lived or drawn...]. >> >> And with regard to Marx's view of the worker, I don't have my Marx-Engels >> reader with me but I seem to recall a number of places in the Economic and >> Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 in the sections on alienated/estranged >> labor where Marx suggests that the worker is essentially reduced to an >> animal - alienated from his species being. I understand that there are >> different ways to read this and imagine that you read it quite differently, >> but the words (or something to that effect) are there. >> >> But again, I fear that this may be a bit too much red herring for me as >> well. Not where I'm writing right now so I fear I'm not up to the task of >> extended discussion on the topic. >> >> Enough? >> >> Now on to the back-stroking.. (if only I could find a body of water in this >> drought blighted land...). >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 2:34 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >>> Greg: >>> >>> >>> Consider the following two expressions. They are not made up. >>> >>> >>> b) Brother Barack >>> >>> >>> a) President Obama >>> >>> >>> Toennies would say that the first reflects a Gemeinschaft orientation, >>> because : >>> >>> >>> 1. It suggests MECHANICAL unity?all of us are units of an identical type >>> (?brothers?). >>> >>> >>> 2. It suggests OUTWARDLY IMPOSED solidarity (?Me against my brother, but >> me >>> and my brother against my cousin, and me, my brother and my cousin >> against >>> the world.?) >>> >>> >>> 3. It suggests that ?WE? is more important than ?I?; the rules of the >>> collective over-rule the choices of the individual, and WHAT you are (a >>> brother) is more important than WHO you are. >>> >>> >>> In contrast, the second reflects a Gesellschaft orientation because: >>> >>> >>> 1. It suggests an ORGANIC unity?a president is not a vice-president or >>> supreme court justice, or a senator, or a voter, and is not >> interchangeable >>> with any of them. >>> >>> >>> 2. It suggests an INWARDLY-ESTABLISHED interdependence. A president is >> not >>> the president because of some outside threat but instead is an individual >>> function that depends on the functioning of the others inside society. >>> >>> >>> 3. It suggests that INDIVIDUAL capacities are more important to this >>> hierarchy than common shared capabilities: the president is a unique >>> individual, not a brother like any other. >>> >>> >>> The first, Gemeinschaft, orientation is an orientation towards a >> particular >>> code. Ruqaiya makes some falsifiable predictions about this code >>> orientation: >>> >>> >>> 1. There will be a much higher frequency of exophoric reference (?this? >>> and ?that? rather than common nouns). This is implicit in forms of >>> cooperation that people in a Gemeinschaft use?they are more likely to be >>> doing the same things with the same objects at the same time. >>> >>> >>> 2. There will be a simpler structure in nominal groups (Deictics like >> ?the? >>> and ?a? rather than epithets and classifiers like ?splendid? and >>> ?electric?). This is implicit in the outwardly imposed solidarity, >> because >>> common understandings of common objects imposed by common boundaries do >> not >>> need to be articulated. >>> >>> >>> 3. There will be an implicatory hierarchy. That is, ?Brother Barack? will >>> have a narrower and more restricted use than ?President Obama?. This is >>> implicit in the fact that a) uses a given name while b) uses a family >> name. >>> >>> >>> Demonstrative examples, by definition, demonstrate some of the hypotheses >>> we want to test. So for example ?Brother? is more exophoric in its >>> reference than ?President?: ?Brother? is, as Vygotsky reminds us, a >>> factual relationship rather than one which depends on an abstract >>> definition. So its meaning lies in everyday contact with similar brothers >>> rather than a verbal hierarchy. Similarly, ?Brother Barack? has a simpler >>> structure than ?President Obama??the first consists of two morphemes >>> (?Brother? and ?Barack?), while the second consists of at least three >>> (?preside? ?!ent?, and ?Obama?), and possibly four (?pre~?). And of >> course >>> ?Brother? does not refer to a legalistic hierarchy of concepts while >>> ?President? does. >>> >>> >>> Nevertheless, all these predictions are falsifiable. Yes, they are >>> statements that are made on the basis of a theory (like Vygotsky?s >>> experiments, Ruqaiya?s research was always theory driven). Yes, the >>> demonstrative examples are chosen to demonstrate them (like Vygotsky?s >>> examples, Ruqaiya?s tend to be cherry-picked with the theory in mind). So >>> far this is no different from the articles by Lucy and Gaskins and >>> Kockelmann that you sent me?the former is based on a theory-driven >>> experiment and the latter a cherry-picked example. >>> >>> >>> We don?t have to stay with theory-driven statements and cherry-picked >>> examples. We can take a large amount of data and a willing graduate >>> student, code the data and find out whether each one is true or false, >> and >>> in fact that?s exactly what Ruqaiya did. >>> >>> >>> I don?t think the same thing is true of this statement, from your last >>> post: >>> >>> >>> ?...(B)eware of putting too much about the way people speak into the >>> people themselves. It is more often the case that the contexts that >> people >>> habitually encounter call forth certain ways of speaking.? >>> >>> >>> How would we be able to falsify that a particular way of speaking was >>> called forth by a context? How could we verify that it was some ideal >>> essence of the person himself? >>> >>> >>> I guess I feel the same way when you say that it is problematic to >> imagine >>> that ?these ways of speaking limit how (working class people) could >>> possibly speak/think.? I agree that it?s problematic, but not for the >> same >>> reason that you do. It?s problematic because it implies that there is >> some >>> infinite potential for speaking and thinking that has nothing to do with >>> the way we actually do think and speak. It?s problematic for me because >> it >>> seems to suggest that there is some other way of finding out how someone >>> could possibly speak than by the way they speak. What? >>> >>> >>> You say: ?It seems a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually >> shape >>> consciousness.? >>> >>> >>> That is, of course, precisely the argument that Vygotsky makes in Chapter >>> Six of Thinking and Speech. I think it?s actually quite difficult to find >>> people in the teaching profession that do not subscribe to this argument >> in >>> one form or another.The argument you are making, that is, that >>> consciousness cannot be shaped by teaching and learning, was eventually >>> abandoned by even its most ardent defender, Jean Piaget. >>> >>> >>> >>> But let us say that you and Piaget are right, and that human >> consciousness >>> is essentially inert to the process of teaching and learning. No, let us >> go >>> further?let?s say that you and Piaget are right, and that human >>> consciousness is essentially inert to the way people speak. What exactly >> is >>> this consciousness you speak of, which cannot be shaped by either class >> or >>> by classrooms or even by language? How might it be accessible? Certainly >>> the ways that consciousness is accessed in the articles you sent me are >>> crucially dependent on the use of language, both to access consciousness >>> and to assess it. >>> >>> >>> I?m afraid I think there is a much simpler explanation for your unease >> with >>> Bernstein. As you surmise, he?s "Marxian". And as you write: >>> >>> ?Julie Lindquist takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that >>> working class people don't think counterfactually.? >>> >>> >>> This statement assumes that such a Marxian notion exists to be taken up. >>> After a life time spent amongst Marxians of almost every stripe, I can >> tell >>> you that I have never heard this idea put out to be taken up by any of >>> them. In fact, I find it pretty hard to understand how any Marxian could >>> hold this view, since one of the basic tenets of Marxism is that working >>> class people are uniquely capable of socialist consciousness, and of >> course >>> socialist consciousness was counterfactual, even during the twelve years >> I >>> lived in China (the Chinese government in the 1980s did not argue that >>> China was a developed socialist society and in fact explicitly said that >>> there would be at least a hundred years of pre-socialist development >> before >>> we could speak of true socialism). >>> >>> >>> Similarly: >>> >>> >>> ?People on the left see it as evidence of the malicious effects of >>> capitalism (that) working class people have a degraded consciousness and >>> that is why they are working class (i.e., because of their degraded >>> consciousness, they can't realize the nature of their oppression and/or >> how >>> to rise up against their oppressor, or, most commonly, they don't vote in >>> their interests - with the Democratic party).? >>> >>> >>> This assumes that when working class people rise up against their >>> oppressors?e.g. when they do not vote for the Democratic Party?they >> somehow >>> cease to be working class. I have never heard any leftist articulate any >>> such point of view, and I am fairly sure that it does not exist. Like the >>> previous statement, it is a "demonstrative" which contains an assumption >>> which is demonstrably incompatible with Marxism, namely that >> consciousness >>> determines being rather than the other way around. >>> >>> >>> Similarly: >>> >>> >>> ?Karl Marx ?saw? in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human >>> consciousness.? >>> >>> >>> This assumes that Marx considered workers not fully human. I have read a >>> great deal of Marx?s work (that is what I was doing when I was working in >>> South Chicago?I did frequent bars after work, but South Shore was a black >>> working class neighborhood then, and although people did consider me >> weird >>> for being red, they considered me a lot weirder for being white). I have >>> never seen anything in Marx's work that suggests that he believed workers >>> to be subhuman. And, once again, it is very hard to square with Marx?s >>> belief that only the working class has both the social power and the >>> interests to organize society in a rational and truly human way. >>> >>> >>> Of course, this assumes that "interests" and "consciousness" can be >>> causally related. Perhaps that's where you disagree? >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 3:48 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> Henry... i would love to continue the thread. If you all have time, I >>>> would like you all to listen to this brief talk to get a better >>>> understanding of how I view Obama and white supremacy... >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> https://m.soundcloud.com/blockreportradio/ezili-danto-speaks-on-haitian-political-history >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
Date:07/01/2015 1:34 PM (GMT-05:00) >>>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < >>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan
>>>>
David, Greg, Paul, Carol, Larry, et. al., >>>> I am having difficulty staying up with this thread, partly because I >> need >>>> time to digest the posts, partly because the proffered readings take >> time >>>> to digest. But I would encourage you all to keep the thread from going >>> off >>>> line. Please let it die out where we can all be present. >>>> >>>> I find it helpful to think of dialog as a negotiation. And it seems to >> me >>>> that much of what is happening with this thread is just that. Also, >> from >>>> looking at a link to Greg?s work, it is also about recognition. >>>> Accordingly, the negotiation for recognition of points of view, >> meanings >>> of >>>> words, data, and probably much else, is very metalinguistic: talking >>> about >>>> what we are talking about. I think there is a tension here between >>> wanting >>>> to make language transparent, that is language that doesn?t call >>> attention >>>> to itself, and recognizing that for communication to happen at all, >> there >>>> has to be SOME attention to conversational repair, making language an >>>> explicit object during conversation. That can come off as effete >>>> intellectualism. At the very least, it takes time. >>>> >>>> But, I don?t think that that tension is present just in working-class >>>> bars. Many CHATters mays think this thread has gone on too long, that >> the >>>> juice has been squeezed out of it. The question, also I think, often >>> boils >>>> down to whether the repair is imposed on the speaker/writer or the >>>> speaker/writergets to repair their own talk. Face is a big deal for all >>> of >>>> us, which is why I think the recogntition/negotiation issue is always >> ?on >>>> stage? (Vygotsky?s term) in dialog. My involvement in this thread is >> data >>>> for me: I took issue with David?s construal of Obama?s Charleson church >>>> speech as ?heartless?; Paul and David responded with vigor and rigor. I >>>> lost a bit of face and cut my losses by (I think) wisely choosing not >> to >>>> take another turn in response. But I want to, I hope, gain a little >> face >>>> back by doing some self-repair right now in this dialog: I had not >> really >>>> listened to Obama?s eulogy, just sound bites. Mea culpa, but, like I >>> said, >>>> I am trying hard to keep up.I don?t think this is false humility. I >> have >>>> plenty to be humble about. But I want respect and my self-repair, I >> hope, >>>> helps just a little bit to establish my credibility as a serious and >>>> credible member of this community. This is important to me. >>>> >>>> This chat isn?t a working class bar, but it?s still all about working. >>> (Or >>>> playing, but play is serious stuff.) A researcher interested in using >>>> Ruqaiya?s thinking to look at language in the real world would (and >>> will, I >>>> hope) do the kind of large-scale data collection and analysis that >> David >>>> argues for. Still, I find that the ideas (as I understand them, and I >>>> realize that it?s pretty much my own fault if I don't) are already >> useful >>>> to me in understanding and negotiating the world, all of it. I don?t >>> always >>>> know immediately when a theory is useful in this way, but I stick with >>> this >>>> chat, well, for the same reason those guys (and they are mostly guys >>>> probably) kept going back to that bar in Chicago. Well, maybe not for >>>> exactly the same reasons. I?m not drinking right now. But some of you >> may >>>> be. Or something else. Funny that the ethnography was written by a >> woman >>>> (Lindquist). Hmmm?. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>>> On Jul 1, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Greg >>>>> Your questioning the assumption that pedagogy "does" or "does not" >>>> transform consciousness contrasted with the configuration that it is >> our >>>> interactional habitual turn taking within particular situations >>> (contexts) >>>>> IS a question I want to highlight. >>>>> What do we bring to the "fore" in the concept "there/fore". >>>>> >>>>> We could focus on the "there" >>>>> We could focus on the interval "/" between the "there" and the "fore" >>>>> We could focus on the "fore" >>>>> >>>>> Is where we "focus" habitual within places of situated practices >>>>> >>>>> Or >>>>> >>>>> Is where we "focus" emerge within pedogogy/bildung that "trans/forms" >>>> consciousness and in THIS shift in consciousness our places of habitual >>>> practicing changes?? >>>>> >>>>> I just ordered Lindquist's . >>>>> >>>>> I will pause here, but draw attention to the root/stem of the word >>>> "focus" is "hearth/home" >>>>> >>>>> So where our focus abides is where we abide. >>>>> >>>>> Does pedagogy "trans" form "focus" and there/fore carry us to another >>>> "home"? >>>>> Does "bildung" carry or "trans" form FOCUS? >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>>>> Sent: ?2015-?06-?30 10:58 PM >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ruqaiya Hasan >>>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> This is helpful for me and my very substantial naivete about Hassan >> and >>>>> Bernstein. I'm going to have to do some tracking down of these >> sources >>>> (you >>>>> wouldn't by any chance have PDF's that you could share with me >>> offline?), >>>>> but I fear that I'm still not understanding the demonstratives that >> you >>>>> offered. In the 10, 11, 12 example that you provided from Hasan, what >>> is >>>>> the point with regard to elaborated or restricted? (or whatever >>> dimension >>>>> she sees as relevant? or if no dimensions are relevant, then what >> would >>>>> Hasan have to say about these three examples and what they have to >> say >>>>> about anything? I'm still a little lost. I warned you that I'm >> slow!). >>>>> >>>>> Also, I thought I might summarize my concern with an example, also >> from >>>> the >>>>> south side of Chicago - but the other south side - the white one. >> (and >>>> yes, >>>>> I'm raising some questions about the relevant community we would >> assign >>>> to >>>>> the code - I suspect that the south side Chicago codes that you speak >>> of >>>> is >>>>> probably closer to the code spoken in Mississippi than to the south >>> side >>>>> Chicago code described below). >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> http://www.amazon.com/Place-Stand-Persuasion-Working-Class-Sociolinguistics/dp/0195140389 >>>>> In a wonderful ethnography of a white working class bar on the South >>> Side >>>>> of Chicago conducted while she was working as a bartender, Julie >>>> Lindquist >>>>> takes up, among other things, the Marxian notion that working class >>>> people >>>>> don't think counterfactually (and yes, I'm entirely sincere when I >> say >>>> that >>>>> this is a wonderful ethnography - fantastically thick description >> with >>>> long >>>>> chunks of transcripts of actual conversations at the bar - very >> nicely >>>>> done). In her book, she presents a number of examples of arguments >> that >>>>> broke out in the bar in which people appear to refuse to think >>>>> counterfactually. >>>>> >>>>> Unfortunately, in the material included in the book, she misses an >>>> example >>>>> in which the patrons do, in fact, employ counterfactuals. >>>>> >>>>> So that is caution #1 when doing this kind of work, there is a >> tendency >>>> to >>>>> miss examples that don't conform to one's theory. This can of course >>>> happen >>>>> in many different ways and typically for non-nefarious reasons. >>>>> >>>>> But there is another, perhaps more serious, concern here. It may, in >>>> fact, >>>>> be the case that you do see fewer counterfactuals in working class >>> bars. >>>>> Where this gets troubling is when this gets extended to the >>> consciousness >>>>> of "those" people. People on the political left and right both have a >>>> kind >>>>> of fascination with this kind of thinking. People on the left see it >> as >>>>> evidence of the malicious effects of capitalism - working class >> people >>>> have >>>>> a degraded consciousness and that is why they are working class >> (i.e., >>>>> because of their degraded consciousness, they can't realize the >> nature >>> of >>>>> their oppression and/or how to rise up against their oppressor, or, >>> most >>>>> commonly, they don't vote in their interests - with the Democratic >>>> party). >>>>> People on the right see it as evidence that capitalist meritocracy >>> works >>>> - >>>>> working class people have a degraded consciousness and that is why >> they >>>> are >>>>> working class. And perhaps it is telling that both Adam Smith and >> Karl >>>> Marx >>>>> "saw" in the working class a degraded and almost sub-human >>> consciousness. >>>>> Of course, it is likely that Marx got much of this insight from Adam >>>> Smith >>>>> who pointed out that this was a real problem of capitalism and the >>> reason >>>>> why capitalist nations need universal education (and despite the >>>> crassness >>>>> of his descriptions of working class people, Smith truly believed >> that >>>> the >>>>> "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the person working in the pin factory >>> was >>>>> the result of the nature of the work itself, not due to any inherent >>>>> properties of the working man himself - so his position was actually >>> much >>>>> closer to Marx's position than to the Republican position today). >>>>> >>>>> My concern, then, is that this isn't so much a matter as the >>>> consciousness >>>>> of a people as it is the practical stuff of the interactions that are >>> to >>>> be >>>>> had there. If you are at all familiar with the feeling of a white >>> working >>>>> class bar on the south side of Chicago, then you will appreciate the >>> fact >>>>> that that there are things that one does and there are things that >> one >>>>> doesn't do when in such a place. One thing that one (generally) >> doesn't >>>> do >>>>> is to speak "like an academic". You're likely to get your ass kicked >> if >>>> you >>>>> talk that way. So then you, as a speaker in a working class bar, have >>> to >>>>> choose (David, I like your idea of "volitional", but would imagine >>>>> different timescales of volitionalality, e.g., having multiple >>>> repertoires >>>>> and being able to choose among them in the moment vs. choosing to >> learn >>>> or >>>>> take on a different repertoire over a longer course of time). So, in >>> the >>>>> bar, do you choose to risk appearing like an effete impudent >>> intellectual >>>>> snob (David, I assume you recognize these words, and yes, these white >>>>> working class folks are largely Republican - Reagan-ites), or do you >>> take >>>>> up the pose of the self-respecting white working class man who "tells >>> it >>>>> like it is" (not how it "might be"!)? >>>>> >>>>> The point is simply to beware of putting too much about the way >> people >>>>> speak into the people themselves. It is more often the case that the >>>>> contexts that people habitually encounter call forth certain ways of >>>>> speaking. But to say that these ways of speaking limit how they could >>>>> possibly speak/think, that seems a bit problematic for me. >>>>> >>>>> And, without having read the pieces that you sent along David, the >>> title >>>> of >>>>> the book from which the Cloran piece is taken (Pedagogy and the >> Shaping >>>> of >>>>> Consciousness) leaves me very anxious about precisely this point. It >>>> seems >>>>> a bit too much to argue that pedagogy can actually shape >> consciousness. >>>> But >>>>> I may well be reading too much into the title. Any further insights >>> here >>>>> would be much appreciated. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> greg >>>>> >>>>> p.s., David, perhaps you have been in this very situation? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg >> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I was trying to keep it short. >>>>>> >>>>>> The key text is: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hasan, R. (1973). Code, Register, and Social Dialect. In Bernstein, >> B. >>>>>> (ed.) Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 2: Applied Studies towards a >>>> Sociology >>>>>> of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. >>>>>> >>>>>> Also: >>>>>> >>>>>> Halliday, M.A.K. (1972). Towards a Sociological Semantics. In >>> Collected >>>>>> Works of M.A.K. Halliday, vol. 3, London: Continuum, pp. 323-354. >>>>>> >>>>>> The examples I gave were made up especially for you. I am not a >> native >>>>>> speaker of South Chicago English, but I remember thinking that "be" >>>>>> insertion is sometimes a sign of counteractuality (as in "They be >>>> sayin" as >>>>>> opposed to "they said" or "they say"), and so a sign of the >>> conditional. >>>>>> That is, where North Chicago and Loop English will use "if" and then >>> the >>>>>> future tense to express conditionality ("If you get that dirty, I'll >>>> smack >>>>>> you") South Chicago English uses the more direct form, the >> conjuntion >>>>>> "and", and then "be" insertion to suggest the conditional ("Get that >>>> dirty >>>>>> and I be hit yo up side yo face"). But I don't really know; this is >>>> one of >>>>>> those situations where we need an authentic speaker and not just a >>>> genuine >>>>>> one. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here are Hasan's examples (also made up). >>>>>> >>>>>> (10) If you climb up that wall you may hurt yourself. >>>>>> (11) You climb up that wall and I'll take a stick to you. >>>>>> (12) If you climb up that wall you may ruin your nice new shirt. (p. >>> 69, >>>>>> but that's in my Chinese copy). >>>>>> >>>>>> Ruqaiya's point is that (10) and (12) differ in meaning but the >>>> difference >>>>>> doesn't cover the whole clause complex but only the result of the >>>>>> condition, whereas in (10) and (11) it covers the whole complex, >>>> including >>>>>> the way that the condition is worded: this suggests--but of course >> it >>>>>> doesn't prove--a more general, more genetic causation, rather than a >>>> merely >>>>>> functional one. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't think any examples--Ruqaiya's or my own--are meant to be >>>> anything >>>>>> more than demonstrative, Greg. In order to see real evidence, we >> need >>>> very >>>>>> large data bases and some way of looking at significant wordings. >> This >>>> was >>>>>> done by Ruqaiya's student: >>>>>> >>>>>> Cloran, C. (1999) Contexts for learning. In Christie, F. (Ed) >> Pedagogy >>>> and >>>>>> the shaping of consciousness: Linguistic and social processes. >> London: >>>>>> Continuum, pp. 31-65. >>>>>> >>>>>> She compares categories like "action", "commentary", "observation", >>>>>> "reflection", "report", "account", "generalization", "plan", >>>> "prediction", >>>>>> "conjecture" and "recount' (storytelling). The big differences came >> in >>>>>> "generalization" (elaborated code +) and "action" (restricted code >> +), >>>> and >>>>>> the differences were statistically highly significant (Mann Whitney >>>> test). >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Greg Thompson < >>>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> David, >>>>>>> Thanks for this elaboration (!) of Hasan, Bernstein, and a bit of >>>>>> Halliday. >>>>>>> Very dense and lots for me to learn. I'm absorbing it as best I >>> can... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Two clarification that might help me in my understanding: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. Are your a) and b) actual recorded examples of talk? I found the >>> use >>>>>> of >>>>>>> the habitual be to feel a bit out of place (unless the point was >> that >>>> the >>>>>>> parent was going to repeatedly (habitually) be hitting the child >>> upside >>>>>>> their face). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 2. If these are actual examples of talk, could you help me make >> more >>>>>> direct >>>>>>> links between what Bernstein/Hasan have to say about these examples >>> and >>>>>> the >>>>>>> examples themselves? I think I'm getting the point about code vs. >>>> dialect >>>>>>> vs. register but I'm confused about the specific analysis you offer >>>> when >>>>>>> you write: >>>>>>> "Accordingly, in a restricted coding orientation, like b), the >>>>>> orientation >>>>>>> is to sameness, to objective rules that bind us together in >> communal >>>>>>> solidarity, and therefore not towards individual choices.In an >>>> elaborated >>>>>>> coding orientation, like a), the orientation is to difference, to >>>>>>> individual motivation, and towards interdependence." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There is a leap here (perhaps justified) between the examples as I >>> read >>>>>>> them and the claims about orientation and as a result I wasn't >> clear >>>> how >>>>>>> these features were manifest in the examples. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sorry for being so restricted in my reading, and many thanks for >> your >>>>>>> multiple elaborations! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 3:44 PM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Everybody: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> First of all, I appreciate--nay, I share--every moment of Paul's >>> rage. >>>>>>> And >>>>>>>> even some of his incoherence, although I suspect some of it is due >>> to >>>>>> his >>>>>>>> use of a hand-held device. I really should have explained my >>> comments >>>>>> on >>>>>>>> Obama's speech much better. Yes, Henry--I did think it was stupid >>> and >>>>>>>> heartless. It was stupid in its lack of logic (God makes things >>> worse >>>>>> so >>>>>>>> that we'll make them better) and its lack of irony (we don't >> deserve >>>>>>>> "grace" but God gives it to us anyway--out of the barrel of a >>> racist's >>>>>>>> gun). It was heartless in its emphasis on healing (forgiveness is >>> not >>>>>>> only >>>>>>>> an impossible but an impudent demand, because the only people who >>> have >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> right to forgive the killer are dead; what the survivors now need >> is >>>>>>> called >>>>>>>> "justice"). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Secondly, I'm really in awe of Greg's exegeses on Bernstein and >>> Hymes, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> I don't think it at all beside the point. I am re-reading >> Ruqaiya's >>>>>>>> Collected Works right now, and there is a lot there, all of it >>>>>> relevant. >>>>>>>> But I want to extract only two points--Ruqaiya's careful >> distinction >>>>>>>> between dialect, register and code, and her rejection of the >>>>>> distinction >>>>>>>> between competence and performance. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Consider the following pair of sentences, spoken to two six year >>> olds: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a) If you get your new shirt dirty,you'll be sorry. >>>>>>>> b) Get dat dirty an I be hit you up side yo face. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The difference in dialect extends right down from the meaning (the >>>>>>>> semantics), to the wording (the lexicogrammar), to the phonology >>> (the >>>>>>>> "sounding"). It is also, contrary to what people think, mostly >>>>>>> volitional: >>>>>>>> you can choose to lose your dialect, and many people do. You can >>> also >>>>>>>> choose to acquire a new one, and when Paul complains about the >>>>>>>> inauthenticity of Obama's dialect he is pointing to the fact that >> it >>>> is >>>>>>>> voluntary (although I should point out that while Obama was indeed >>>>>> raised >>>>>>>> in a white family, he was also raised in a state where whites >> were a >>>>>>>> minority). Unlike Paul, I believe the voluntary quality of a >> dialect >>>>>> is a >>>>>>>> guarantee of its genuineness (that is, its meaningfulness to the >>>> user), >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> I am not a big fan of authenticity (since I am mostly a second >>>> language >>>>>>>> user myself). Authentic dialects have an essentially conventional, >>>>>>>> meaningless relationship to the people who are born into them; >>> genuine >>>>>>>> dialects have a relationship of choice (whether the user is born >>> into >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> dialect and chooses to retain it or the user has to learn it >>>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>> as an act of identity), and for that reason they are more >> meaningful >>>>>>>> (because for Ruqaiya meaning is always paradigmatic; it implies >> you >>>>>> could >>>>>>>> have done or said something else but you didn't). Either way, a >>>> dialect >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> a distinction of the user, and not of the use. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The difference in register is much more slight; it does not >> include >>>> the >>>>>>>> phonology but it certainly does include the wording. Labov would >>>>>>>> concentrate on the non-standard use of the copula (and a lot of >> his >>>>>>>> argument on the complexity of AAVE has to do with the complex >> rules >>>> for >>>>>>>> copula insertion and deletion). Halliday would concentrate on >> other >>>>>>> factors >>>>>>>> which are less formal: In one case, the newness of the shirt is >>>>>> specified >>>>>>>> while in the other it is left exotropic (that is, in the here and >>> now >>>>>>>> rather than encoded eternally in the language). In one case, the >>>>>>>> consequence is left somewhat vague: it is quite possible, although >>>>>>>> unlikely, that the six year old will not interpret the utterance >> as >>> a >>>>>>>> threat, while in the second it is much more specific and concrete. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But the difference in code orientation is very clear, and my wife, >>> who >>>>>>> grew >>>>>>>> up with the Chinese equivalent of b) in her ears, recognized it >>>>>>>> immediately. Bernstein derived coding orientation from the ideas >> of >>>>>>>> Toennies, and in particular his distinction between Gemeinschaft >>>>>>>> (community, solidarity, mechanical unity) and Gesellschaft >> (society, >>>>>>>> interdependence, organic unity). In a Gemeinschaft, the emphasis >> is >>> on >>>>>>> what >>>>>>>> you are not who you are, and in a Gesellschaft the emphasis is on >>> your >>>>>>>> ineffability and irreplacabitlity. Accordingly, in a restricted >>> coding >>>>>>>> orientation, like b), the orientation is to sameness, to objective >>>>>> rules >>>>>>>> that bind us together in communal solidarity, and therefore not >>>> towards >>>>>>>> individual choices.In an elaborated coding orientation, like a), >> the >>>>>>>> orientation is to difference, to individual motivation, and >> towards >>>>>>>> interdependence. Unlike dialect, it's not a difference in the way >> it >>>>>>> sounds >>>>>>>> and it's not restricted to the user: you could easily create >>>> elaborated >>>>>>>> coding orientations in South Chicago English, and people do. >> Unlike >>>>>>>> register, it's not a difference in the way things are worded and >> it >>> is >>>>>>> not >>>>>>>> at all a function of particular uses of language. Coding >> orientation >>>>>> is a >>>>>>>> pattern of meaning--it's an instance of what Ruqaiya calls >> semantic >>>>>>>> variability, and it is related causally to class. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hymes accepts Chomsky's distinction between competence and >>>>>>> performance--in >>>>>>>> fact, he multiplied it times four, because his construct of >>>>>>> "communicative >>>>>>>> competence" actually includes four categories: whether or not >>>> something >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> linguistically permissible, whether or not it is >> sociolinguistically >>>>>>>> appropriate, whether or not it is psycholinguistically feasible, >> and >>>>>>>> whether or not it is pragmatically done. But for Ruqaiya, such >>>>>>> dichotomies >>>>>>>> are dualisms--they imply an ideal competence divorced and actually >>> not >>>>>>>> available for marriage to material performances: we can never >> really >>>>>>> know, >>>>>>>> for example, in an instance of grammatical, sociolinguistic, >>>>>>>> psycholinguistic or pragmatic failure, whether the underlying >>>>>> competence >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> there or not. For Ruqaiya, the only bifurcation--and it is a >> highly >>>>>>>> transient, ever-shifting one--is between the potential and the >>>>>> performed. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 5:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD >> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg, >>>>>>>>> I ?m waiting on David too! And I would love your question as to >>>>>> whether >>>>>>>>> Ruqaiya answers your conjecture: >>>>>>>>>> ?...the efficacy of deployment of a code/style may not be a >>>>>> property >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> the code/style or of the speaker but rather of the combination of >>>>>>>>> code/style, speaker, and context.? >>>>>>>>> I especially like that this issue is raised in the context of an >>>>>> actual >>>>>>>>> use of code shifting in the public eye. I suspect that Ruqaiya >>> would >>>>>>>> like a >>>>>>>>> theory of grammar that can take on just such a language usage >>> event. >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 9:54 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Henry, this raises a question that is similar to the one that >>> Hymes >>>>>>>>> raises with regard to Bernstein, namely, what is the effect of >> the >>>>>> use >>>>>>>> of a >>>>>>>>> given code/style? >>>>>>>>>> Hymes' concern is that Bernstein assumes that a code is a thing >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>> properties all by itself, outside of the contexts of use. >>>>>>>>>> As for obamas eulogy, my sense from listening to the audio was >>> that >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> was VERY well received by the audience. Maybe someone has >> evidence >>> to >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> contrary? >>>>>>>>>> But this would make an important point that the efficacy of >>>>>>> deployment >>>>>>>>> of a code/style may not be a property of the code/style or of the >>>>>>> speaker >>>>>>>>> but rather of the combination of code/style, speaker, and >> context. >>>>>>>>>> Is this ground that is covered by Hasan? >>>>>>>>>> David? >>>>>>>>>> (And I wouldn't want to take away from that discussion but this >>>>>>> should >>>>>>>>> help provide more clarity with regard to what exactly she was up >>> to). >>>>>>>>>> Greg >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2015, at 12:25 AM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ouch! Paul blew my cover. And President Obama?s as well. >>>>>> Apparently, >>>>>>>>> he?s not the code shifter I thought he was and my ear is just not >>>>>> good >>>>>>>>> enough to hear it. Maybe I didn?t want to hear. I have been so >>>>>>>> disappointed >>>>>>>>> with what is happening with our political ?leadership? in this >>>>>>> country, I >>>>>>>>> didn?t want to believe the president?s eulogy was one more >> charade. >>>>>>> Maybe >>>>>>>>> the amazing Supreme Court decisions last week put me in a state >> of >>>>>>>> euphoria >>>>>>>>> and I just didn?t want to come down. But, is there no middle >> ground >>>>>>> where >>>>>>>>> Obama is at least seen to be trying, in good faith, to connect >> with >>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>> who ARE adequate representatives of African American English >>>>>>> Vernacular? >>>>>>>>> One might say that Obama learned AAEV as a second dialect and >> will >>>>>>> always >>>>>>>>> have a ?foreign accent? in it. I am wondering how the audience in >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> AME >>>>>>>>> church in Charleston, especially those who have truly lived the >>>>>> ?black >>>>>>>>> prophetic tradition", felt about Obama?s attempts at code >> shifting. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I hope this post is seen more as an attempt to move the >>> discussion >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> issues dear to Ruqaiya, especially code, than as a pol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> [The entire original message is not included.] >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 13:30:39 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 14:30:39 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Your help needed: "Bakhtin by and for educators" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <584B81C2-A0FD-4F78-B6C4-C6961CC51255@gmail.com> Congratulations! I?m a novice. But not a volunteer and not that anyone would have me. Henry > On Jul 2, 2015, at 4:13 PM, Cathrene Connery wrote: > > Congratulations to the three of you! > Best, > Cathrene > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+cconnery=ithaca.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+cconnery=ithaca.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Ana Marjanovic-Shane [anamshane@gmail.com] > Sent: Wednesday, July 01, 2015 9:47 PM > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Cc: Eugene Matusov; Mikhail Gradovski > Subject: [Xmca-l] Your help needed: "Bakhtin by and for educators" > > Dear colleagues? > > We need your help. We (Eugene, Ana, and Mikhail) are very excited to tell you that we got a book contract with Palgrave to develop a book with a tentative title ?Bakhtin by and for educators.? We imagine creating a book of dialogues among the Bakhtinian educational practitioners ? about their own practice: How does Bakhtin inspire your teaching? Why? What are the possibilities and what are the challenges? > > The book will have 3 parts. The first part involves interviews with ?seasoned? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. We defined ?seasoned? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners as those who claim that Bakhtin influences or inspires their own teaching. > We hope to reach diverse seasoned Bakhtinian educational practitioners: > teaching diverse academic subjects (e.g., language, literature, science, arts, physical education, math) at diverse Early Childhood Education to Graduate School levels from different countries. We will do interview via Skype. > > The second part of the book will involve commentaries and questions by ?novice? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. We defined ?novice? as those educators who may be interested in Bakhtin and they have either just started or are considering shaping their educational practice by Bakhtin?s philosophical approach. We imagine bringing the voices of the ?seasoned? Bakhtinian practitioners and those of the ?novices? into dialogues with each other. > > The third part of the book will be our analysis that will outline patterns of issues that are relevant for the practitioners, and our concluding remarks. > > We need your assistance in helping us to identify diverse ?seasoned? and ?novice? self-proclaimed Bakhtinian educational practitioners. Please let us know if you know some and help us to contact them. Or let us know who may know them? Or maybe it is you ? please do not be shy to contact us! > > We appreciate your help, > > Eugene Matusov, University of Delaware, USA, ematusov@udel.edu > Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Chestnut Hill College, USA, anamshane@gmail.com > Mikhail Gradovski, University College of Telemark, Norway, mikhail.gradovski@hit.no > > ____________________________________ > Ana Marjanovic-Shane > Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Dialogic Pedagogy Journal > Associate Professor of Education > Chestnut Hill College > Emails: anamshane@gmail.com > shaneam@chc.edu > Phone: 267-334-2905 > > > > > > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 13:40:02 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 14:40:02 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2BEDD74C-FFB3-417F-9A16-CDBC50F8C8FA@gmail.com> Good on ya, Paul. > On Jul 2, 2015, at 5:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I will greg... i have a couple of papers that were presented at a conference at the state university. I will upload them in a couple of days. One paper deals with the kreyol alphabet and teaching it to adults via rote memorization as opposed to teaching it via song to young people.... > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:07/02/2015 7:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
>
Paul, > I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this comment from your last > post: > "the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying > heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in > elementary schools and the adult reading programs" > > What aspects of vygotskian theory are they drawing on? Some folks on this > list have an interest in how Vygotsky gets taken up around the globe, so it > would be interesting to hear about how Vygotsky is read in Haiti (via Cuba). > > -greg > > On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > >> Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an >> example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The >> first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois >> blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the >> population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand >> french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, >> which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to >> speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while >> petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti >> the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying >> heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in >> elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a >> result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the >> adult reading programs are cubans). >> >> https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) >> >> Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube >> https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ >> >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 15:28:17 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 16:28:17 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I love this! The first link to ?l?alfabetique? (or is it with a ?ph??): Sesame Street 2.0. Freire with a beat. Works for adults too! I?m an adult. I think we underestimate adults. They go with materials created for materials too. But the second link really is adult! Not for children. This rreminds me of Freire, but with language tapes that contextualize the uses of the language. By the way, I wonder what you Haitians think of non-Haitians learning Kreyol. My son was terribly interested in learning English-based Creole when he was in Nicaragua. (He spent most of his time in the Spanish-speaking part of Nicaragua.) He is the member of band here in Albuquerque (Reviva) whose leader, also a former Peace Corps volunteer, speaks the creole of Nicaragua. One of Reviva?s hits is called ?Pearl Lagoon?, a beautiful place on the Caribbean where the creole is spoken. I was farther south in Costa Rica with my wife some years ago and learned a bit about the culture and language. The Miskito Coast of Nicaragua and Honduras deeply influenced by the Slave trade. They have made lemons into lemonade. Very juicy, with character. I got a tutorial on this from a young, well-educated, very beautiful, very black young woman who was a speaker of English, Spanish and Creole who worked for the retreat-in-the-forest where we were staying. That was in the ZPD for me. Henry > On Jul 2, 2015, at 5:24 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I will forward the papers... > > Watch "Alfab? krey?l 1 / Creole alphabet 1" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/6F6yK1HOhWI > > Watch "Creole alphabet 2 / Alfab? krey?l 2 - VOD" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/dW5LaUJ337U > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:07/02/2015 7:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
>
Paul, > I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this comment from your last > post: > "the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying > heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in > elementary schools and the adult reading programs" > > What aspects of vygotskian theory are they drawing on? Some folks on this > list have an interest in how Vygotsky gets taken up around the globe, so it > would be interesting to hear about how Vygotsky is read in Haiti (via Cuba). > > -greg > > On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > >> Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an >> example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The >> first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois >> blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the >> population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand >> french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, >> which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to >> speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while >> petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti >> the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying >> heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in >> elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a >> result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the >> adult reading programs are cubans). >> >> https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) >> >> Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube >> https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ >> >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From emailthis@ms3.lga2.nytimes.com Fri Jul 3 16:10:30 2015 From: emailthis@ms3.lga2.nytimes.com (hshonerd) Date: Fri, 03 Jul 2015 19:10:30 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] NYTimes.com: President Obama: Talk to Black America, Not at Us Message-ID: <55971666.0000002C@pmta04.ewr1.nytimes.com> From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Fri Jul 3 16:14:31 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Fri, 03 Jul 2015 19:14:31 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. Message-ID: <4bcl76wwx5a0yv0q4iftg3fi.1435965271522@email.android.com> All the white ngo workers learn kreyol over french...except the french ones of of course. ?They still think haiti is a francophone country (lol)... Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/03/2015 6:28 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
I love this! The first link to ?l?alfabetique? (or is it with a ?ph??): Sesame Street 2.0. Freire with a beat. Works for adults too! I?m an adult. I think we underestimate adults. They go with materials created for materials too. But the second link really is adult! Not for children. This rreminds me of Freire, but with language tapes that contextualize the uses of the language. By the way, I wonder what you Haitians think of non-Haitians learning Kreyol. My son was terribly interested in learning English-based Creole when he was in Nicaragua. (He spent most of his time in the Spanish-speaking part of Nicaragua.) He is the member of band here in Albuquerque (Reviva) whose leader, also a former Peace Corps volunteer, speaks the creole of Nicaragua. One of Reviva?s hits is called ?Pearl Lagoon?, a beautiful place on the Caribbean where the creole is spoken. I was farther south in Costa Rica with my wife some years ago and learned a bit about the culture and language. The Miskito Coast of Nicaragua and Honduras deeply influenced by the Slave trade. They have made lemons into lemonade. Very juicy, with character. I got a tutorial on this from a young, well-educated, very beautiful, very black young woman who was a speaker of English, Spanish and Creole who worked for the retreat-in-the-forest where we were staying. That was in the ZPD for me. Henry > On Jul 2, 2015, at 5:24 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I will forward the papers... > > Watch "Alfab? krey?l 1 / Creole alphabet 1" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/6F6yK1HOhWI > > Watch "Creole alphabet 2 / Alfab? krey?l 2 - VOD" on YouTube > https://youtu.be/dW5LaUJ337U > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:07/02/2015 7:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
>
Paul, > I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this comment from your last > post: > "the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying > heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in > elementary schools and the adult reading programs" > > What aspects of vygotskian theory are they drawing on? Some folks on this > list have an interest in how Vygotsky gets taken up around the globe, so it > would be interesting to hear about how Vygotsky is read in Haiti (via Cuba). > > -greg > > On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > >> Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an >> example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The >> first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois >> blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the >> population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand >> french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, >> which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to >> speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while >> petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti >> the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying >> heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in >> elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a >> result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the >> adult reading programs are cubans). >> >> https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) >> >> Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube >> https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ >> >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 16:44:56 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 17:44:56 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] You told me so. Message-ID: <6A2617AF-6953-420D-A0A3-7F6FC88D579E@gmail.com> Gente, I apologize for sending you all the link to the WHOLE NY Times for today. Like Paul, when I have a moment, I?m a dangerous man. I should have sent you the following link to an editorial in the paper about Obama that harkens back to emails here about very different constuals ot Obama?s Charleston talk. Okay, now that I have arrived at a higher level of consciousness thanks to Paul and David. Still, what to do with Michael Eric Dyson, a well educated, staunch defender of Obama, also a man of color. And with the audience, largely of color, at the AME church where he spoke? Is there hope? As if ?we" are all of color, except us white folk. Hmmm?That seems to be turning the single-drop-of-blood rule on its head. Colorless is NOT beautiful. A bunch of angry red necks is what you get. Who can be very difficult to listen to. Is there hope? http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/opinion/president-obama-talk-to-black-america-not-at-us.html?emc=edit_th_20150703&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=63154245 Here?s another aticle from today that was worth my while. Here?s an example of a red neck even dumber than me, which may mean there IS hope! http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/world/americas/donald-trump-gains-infamy-in-mexico-for-comments-on-immigrants.html?emc=edit_th_20150703&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=63154245 A Bilagaana?s Best Henry From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 3 17:08:11 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 18:08:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti. In-Reply-To: <4bcl76wwx5a0yv0q4iftg3fi.1435965271522@email.android.com> References: <4bcl76wwx5a0yv0q4iftg3fi.1435965271522@email.android.com> Message-ID: Ha, ha!! I thought the fact that the news anchor from the Haitian news program that you linked us to spoke French much better than the Frenchman who had been sent to represent some organization with an acronym that actually had a hyphen in it! You?d think there?d be a correlation between the loftiness of the title and the competence, at least linguistic competence. Chomsky might say his performance does not closely follow his competence. Ruquaiya might have said, ?Bullshit, Noam.? Lady that she was, if we are to believe David, she was still a woman of passion. I won?t belabor the point except to say that the French aren?t sending Haiti the sharpest tools in the shed. That would piss off a preacher. Even one with a red neck. Better you laugh, Paul. (LOLOLOLOL). One of my favorite songs is called ?Laughter and Tears? by Timbuk 3: www.timbuk3music.net/ Another good one from that group to give us hope about the future is ?The Future?s So Bright?, though with a knowing, ironic, post-modern orientation. David, stop me when I go out of bounds with this idea of orientation. I joke around, but I?m seriously interested in not getting my butt kicked again. Henry > On Jul 3, 2015, at 5:14 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > All the white ngo workers learn kreyol over french...except the french ones of of course. They still think haiti is a francophone country (lol)... > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/03/2015 6:28 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
>
I love this! The first link to ?l?alfabetique? (or is it with a ?ph??): Sesame Street 2.0. Freire with a beat. Works for adults too! I?m an adult. I think we underestimate adults. They go with materials created for materials too. But the second link really is adult! Not for children. This rreminds me of Freire, but with language tapes that contextualize the uses of the language. By the way, I wonder what you Haitians think of non-Haitians learning Kreyol. My son was terribly interested in learning English-based Creole when he was in Nicaragua. (He spent most of his time in the Spanish-speaking part of Nicaragua.) He is the member of band here in Albuquerque (Reviva) whose leader, also a former Peace Corps volunteer, speaks the creole of Nicaragua. One of Reviva?s hits is called ?Pearl Lagoon?, a beautiful place on the Caribbean where the creole is spoken. I was farther south in Costa Rica with my wife some years ago and learned a bit about the culture and language. The Miskito Coast of Nicaragua and Honduras deeply influenced by the Slave trade. They have made lemons into lemonade. Very juicy, with character. I got a tutorial on this from a young, well-educated, very beautiful, very black young woman who was a speaker of English, Spanish and Creole who worked for the retreat-in-the-forest where we were staying. That was in the ZPD for me. > Henry > > >> On Jul 2, 2015, at 5:24 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >> I will forward the papers... >> >> Watch "Alfab? krey?l 1 / Creole alphabet 1" on YouTube >> https://youtu.be/6F6yK1HOhWI >> >> Watch "Creole alphabet 2 / Alfab? krey?l 2 - VOD" on YouTube >> https://youtu.be/dW5LaUJ337U >> >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:07/02/2015 7:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky and adult literacy program in haiti.
>>
Paul, >> I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this comment from your last >> post: >> "the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying >> heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in >> elementary schools and the adult reading programs" >> >> What aspects of vygotskian theory are they drawing on? Some folks on this >> list have an interest in how Vygotsky gets taken up around the globe, so it >> would be interesting to hear about how Vygotsky is read in Haiti (via Cuba). >> >> -greg >> >> On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> wrote: >> >>> Example of what the haitian government views as the new haiti. This is an >>> example of the haitian news broadcast on the same channel in haiti. The >>> first broadcast is in french (for the mulatto elites and petit-bourgeois >>> blacks) and the second in kreyol for the masses. 100 percent of the >>> population speaks kreyol; less than 3 percent speak and or understand >>> french! I share this bcuz there is a new dynamic taking place in haiti, >>> which I am trying to understand, the mulatto elites are now more likely to >>> speak kreyol at state functions and professional occasions, while >>> petit-bourgeois blacks refuse. Moreover, as I visit the schools in haiti >>> the professors (from the faculty of applied linguistics) are relying >>> heavily on vygotskyian theory in the use of kreyol for instruction in >>> elementary schools and the adult reading programs (I am assuming this is a >>> result of the Cuban influence... the majority of the instructors in the >>> adult reading programs are cubans). >>> >>> https://youtu.be/cr-E3TNiPC8 (french) >>> >>> Watch "TELE SIGNAL 56:JOUNAL KREYOL 30 Juin 2015" on YouTube >>> https://youtu.be/-qLz9HTNpoQ >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Jul 4 07:05:46 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 04 Jul 2015 10:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: English version of Cultural Model Message-ID: Dr. Madhere ?has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent in a previous email. ?I am waiting for the paper. Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge"
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English version of Cultural Model
Mr Mocombe, As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides from my model on culture and education. Serge Madhere PhD -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: FB_IMG_1435879926210.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 41210 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150704/b6aa4d05/attachment.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: FB_IMG_1435879902041.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 27471 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150704/b6aa4d05/attachment-0001.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Slide2.JPG Type: image/jpeg Size: 66463 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150704/b6aa4d05/attachment.jpe -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Slide3.JPG Type: image/jpeg Size: 120733 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150704/b6aa4d05/attachment-0001.jpe From arips@optonline.net Sat Jul 4 16:55:33 2015 From: arips@optonline.net (Avram Rips) Date: Sat, 04 Jul 2015 23:55:33 -0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideological Footprint of Artifacts Message-ID: Seoul is number 15,and Karachi Pakistan is the second largest city on earth. On June 2, 2015, at 5:20 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Dear Larry: So Zinchenko says that if I go on a journey through the desert and choose to take a map instead of an ice-axe I am being an idealist! Of course, I know that by choosing an ice-axe, I am confusing the error of taking a tool instead of a symbol with taking the WRONG tool instead of the RIGHT symbol. But I also think that by choosing an ice-axe I am drawing some attention to the underlying dishonesty--the demagogy--of a lot of the criticisms made of Vygotsky--how they are reducible to name-calling ("Idealist!" "Subjectivist!" "Word-Fetishist!") I suppose the real problem with Zinchenko is the one that Andy's already pointed to. What makes humans human is that they don't live in an "environment" that is oblivious to them to which they must adapt or die. They have the ability to make the environment adapt to them and sometimes even die--as I am reminded by the potted plant withering on my window sill. Our nature is really not the same as the nature that animals live in. It's quite literally a "human' nature; a society is nature humanized by consciousness. Beyond the ficus dying on my window sill lies Seoul, the second largest city on earth. When I go out and do my grocery shopping, I don't take a tool or even a map; I take a mind full of symbols, and the same thing is true when I go out to "earn" my daily bread. So, as Andy says, the "environment" has to include an element of human consciousness, of my consciousness and the consciousness I must share with seventy-five million other Koreans every time I use a Korean word. If this be idealism, make the most of it! There was a good review of my book in the journal "System" recently (attached). When I got over the warm feeling brought about by the (apparently heartfelt) praise, I felt slightly irked by the attempt to link Vygotsky's reading of Hamlet with that of Florensky, who really WAS an idealist. Florensky's "Hamlet" came out when Vygotsky was nine years old! But of course the author is right--Florensky, later a priest, a Russian Orthodox theologian, and ultimately a victim of Stalin's goons, was one of the founders of the Symbolist movement, and Vygotsky could not help but have felt his long cool shadow as he wrestled with the question of whether Hamlet is a psycho-drama (and all the characters but Hamlet are only symbols) or a socio-drama (and all the characters--with the exception of the players--are flesh and blood). Saussure, who did more than anyone to make the insights of the Symbolists into a coherent world view, said that thought and language, both chaotic, organize each other through decomposing each other, and of course that's correct. Saussure's big mistake was to turn his back on the process by which this happens. And the strangest thing about this mistake is that it was the very process in which he'd made his own career--historical linguistics! David Kellogg On Tue, Jun 2, 2015 at 10:21 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > David, > A fascinating way to explore the long shadow that concepts entail back to > the sensory "ground" of concepts. > > I would like to ask how you situate a third term "symbol" in its > relationship to the "sensory sound" and the "conceptual" > > Zinchenko offers one approach to symbols [to prime the pumps of this > question] > > "The psychological theory of activity was concerned with the problem of > real [i.e. concrete] tools and objects that humans, also in accordance with > Marxism, place between themselves and nature. In other words, what makes a > human human? Symbol or thing? The crucifix or the hammer and sickle? If it > is the symbol then this is idealism. If it is the thing then this is > materialism or perhaps dialectical materialism" > > "Reading" this question through your response above I wonder if the answer > is unfinalizable and may depend on the "reciprocal" interpenetration of the > symbolic and sensory. I am assuming the symbolic as "figurative" and > "con/figurative" phenomena that expresses co-existence. > > I am Reading Jan Derry's 2013 book "Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education" and > Zinchenko's quote is on page 14. > > Larry > > On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 5:38 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > The other day I was listening to Gounod's "Romeo et Juliette". It's the > > wedding night, and they got to bed. Because they have no alarm clock, > they > > must listen carefully for the sound of the lark, else Romeo will be > > captured by the guards of Verona and hanged. > > > > Romeo is sleeping with one ear open, and he is the first to awake. Romeo > > hears a bird and tells Juliette, and Juliette replies: > > > > Non, ce n'est pas le jour. > > Ce n'est pas l'allouette. > > Dont le chant a frappe > > Ton orielle inquiete > > > > (No, it is not the day > > That is not the lark > > Whose song has struck > > Your sleepless ear) > > > > But of course the song persists. Juliette reassures him: > > > > C'est le doux rossignol > > Confidant d'amour! > > > > (It's the sweet nightengale > > The confidant of love!) > > > > And Romeo decides, for probably just for the sake of being able to > reverse > > roles and sing the song himself, that he will go along with Juliette's > idea > > and go back to sleep. So then Juliette hears the sound and realizes that > > you must leave, helas! And Romeo sings, "Non, ce n'est pas le jour...." > > > > All of which reminded me of the crucial fact that in the sixteenth > century > > they did not yet have alarm clocks. But when you hear the woodwinds come > in > > precisely at 1:47:35, what you hear, if you are a modern listener, is an > > electric alarm clock. > > > > Now of course, in Gounod's time they no more had electric alarm clocks > than > > in Shakespeare's. But such is the ideological footprint of artifacts; > they > > heard the sound of the woodwinds as that of a nightengale, and we hear it > > as battery powered alarm clock. Or is it the other way around, and the > > alarm is designed to mimick a lark? > > > > Last night we were working on ways of teaching vocabulary which are > > GENERALIZABLE. It is of course the case, as Vygotsky points out, that > > MEANINGS can be related easily to each other, in one way (hierarchically) > > when we teach scientific concepts and in another (sensually, > > experientially) when we are not. It's also true that the WORDINGS are > > related easily toe ach other, as nouns and verbs, as participants and > > processes, and as circumstances. But what kids want are to be able to > match > > the soundings and the imagery. In most languages this seems arbitrary and > > so vocabulary seems a piecemeal affair. > > > > It isn't. As Vygotsky points out, when you go back in time, you find that > > there are (at least) three kinds of associative links which must help the > > young vocabulary learner. We had the following list of Canadian animals > to > > teach brought in by a hakweon teacher from Canada: > > > > moose, goose, badger, beaver, eagle, porcupine > > > > With "moose" and "goose' the link is sounding--try bellowing the first > like > > a moose, and hooting the second like a goose. With "badger" and "beaver" > > the link is wording--badgers badger grubs and bother birds, while beavers > > are always beavering around with dams and nests. Eagle somehow > alliterates > > with "eye" and "spy", and "porcupine" suggests a piney, spiney, > > pineapple-pig. > > > > Of course, none of these are concepts. All are forms of complex. But all > of > > them are the ideological footprint, the long shadow, cast by an artefact > > down through history. > > > > If you want to hear the lark, you will have to wait to the end of the > > opera, where it takes on another meaning. As everybody knows, Romeo dies > > before Juliet awakes. But in Gounod's version, he drinks the poison, she > > awakes, and they are once again joyful in each other's arms, until he > > remembers the poison (a minor detail!) and dies singing...you guessed > > it...2:31:00. > > > > "No, it is not the day > > That is not the lark... > > It's the sweet nightengale > > The confidant of love!" > > > > Of course it's absurd (although not quite as absurd as the moment that > poor > > Rolando Villazon has to wipe the sweat off the end of his nose before he > > kisses Nina Machaidze). But it's also somewhat terrifying, as a raw > > demonstrating of the ideological footprint of artworks. A single sound > has > > the power to be a bird in one century, a piccolo in another, and a > digital > > alarm clock in our own. Artifacts cast a long shadow, even at night. > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmNULK87lK0 > > > > David Kellogg > > > From arips@optonline.net Sat Jul 4 16:57:34 2015 From: arips@optonline.net (Avram Rips) Date: Sat, 04 Jul 2015 23:57:34 -0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Play Hath Yet Its Toil Message-ID: https://radicalscholarship.wordpress.com/2015/05/24/beware-grade-level-reading-and-the-cult-of-proficiency/ On May 24, 2015, at 5:42 PM, mike cole wrote: While awaiting your translation of the problem of age in 2012 form, congrats on the prizes for your previous work David. Great work. Its memorial day holiday here. As for the preschool, so for the university, methinks, sometimes. mike On Sat, May 23, 2015 at 2:25 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > One of my graduate students found this editorial by David Kohn in the New > York Times and we have been discussing it: > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/opinion/sunday/let-the-kids-learn-through-play.html?_r=0 > > As you can see, a lot of the article is written in a tone Halliday would > call "childist": that is, there is the assumption that spontaneous, > naturalistic activities on the part of the child are inherently and > intrinsically developmental, and that activities which are involve doing > this that children do not spontaneously do themselves are inherently and > intrinsically anti-developmental. It's very easy to write this way, and > it's a crowd-pleaser. > > But it is the opposite of what Vygotsky writes. Yesterday we were puzzling > over the last part of "Problem of Age", where Vygotsky marshalls three > arguments, not against "The Younger the Better" but rather against the idea > that higher cognitive functions must develop along the lines of "The Older > the Better". > > First of all, the higher functions are always built WITH and not ON the > lower ones. So for example in language learning the child doesn't learn > vowels and consonants first and then go on to learn nouns and verbs next > and top it all off with sentences and paragraphs. No, the child must learn > all of them at the same time: as Saussure says, thinking and speech are > BOTH disorganized, but in their mutual decomposition they organize each > other. > > Secondly, even at preschool level, teachers understand that children learn > best when they are learning what they do not know how to do and not what > they already know how to do. So for example even the teachers who use Eric > Carle books to teach English to elementary school kids in Korea understand > perfectly well that they are not teaching the children anything they don't > know about colors or animals; they argue that they are teaching new foreign > language vocabulary and grammar (the problem is that they are NOT teaching > new word meanings!) > > Thirdly, and I think most germane to Kohn's article, Vygotsky argues that > neoformations are the consequence of lines of development and not their > cause: new functions are built, not on development, but on developING. I > don't think this invalidates what Kohn says--it actually gives it a > scientific rather than simply a rhetorical basis. Truly developed play > (e.g. rule based play with winners and losers) only emerges at the END of > preschool. But for that very reason it is not the activity on which we want > to build the child's primary school curriculum. (And...from the child's > point of view...the intense competiveness we sometimes see in academic work > is actually a realization of the attempt to build a primary school > curriculum on this form of play!) > > As Tennyson could have said but did not: Preschool hath yet its toil and > its honor. > > David Kellogg > > PS: I have some good news. Two of our Vygotsky books, the second volume of > HDHMF and the first volume of the Pedological Lectures, won the 2015 prize > for the top one hundred academic books in Korea. > > dk > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Jul 5 08:16:59 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2015 15:16:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The zone of proximal development Message-ID: A young boy learns to vote! http://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/542cda16a7091c14e470f13b49f63b8748212cdb/0_290_4928_2959/master/4928.jpg?w=620&q=85&auto=format&sharp=10&s=6bc2e4965fc3555233fd32c40eb00219 One hour more before the referendum polls! From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Jul 5 14:41:00 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2015 15:41:00 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> Clever boy! > On Jul 5, 2015, at 9:16 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > A young boy learns to vote! > > > http://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/542cda16a7091c14e470f13b49f63b8748212cdb/0_290_4928_2959/master/4928.jpg?w=620&q=85&auto=format&sharp=10&s=6bc2e4965fc3555233fd32c40eb00219 > > > One hour more before the referendum polls! > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Jul 5 14:52:57 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2015 21:52:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> References: , <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, Clever mom! This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for many many reasons! So thanks for letting me share it! Kind regards, Annalisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Jul 5 16:21:47 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2015 17:21:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <, > <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> Message-ID: <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Annalisa, Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. What a world! H > On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Henry, > > Clever mom! > > This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > > Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for many many reasons! > > So thanks for letting me share it! > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > From bodrozic@web.de Mon Jul 6 05:50:24 2015 From: bodrozic@web.de (Zlatko Bodrozic) Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 14:50:24 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Information about a petition in support for Greek people and Greek reactions to it In-Reply-To: References: <4bcl76wwx5a0yv0q4iftg3fi.1435965271522@email.android.com> Message-ID: <559A7990.1040106@web.de> Dear colleagues, some of you might be interested to hear about a petition in support for Greece (see below) which was initiated at a conference in Athens last week. Activity theorists have been among the initiators. The petition was sent to Greek media on Saturday. While this particular action is now finished, several Greek colleagues emphasized that our solidarity means a lot to them and will be crucial also in the days to come. May be this will inspire some of us to take part in some future actions of solidarity. Here two statements from Greek colleagues: "/Thanks very much for this; great to meet some of you in this historic week for Greece and Europe. After a proud NO from the Greek people, we need to continue supporting the Greek government in the negotiations that have already started, showing solidarity and mobilizing resources for a solution that respects democracy and ends austerity not only in Greece but across Europe/." "/To complement the terror sparked by the capital controls, the explicit interventions of EU and other European politicians directly demanding from Greek voters to vote against the government and in favor the austerity measures, the companies-to-employees threats, and the pressures from the local political and financial elites, the Greek and many international media (print and electronic) have been orchestrating a propaganda by constantly airing unsubstantiated claims by ?experts? and other ?representatives?, all of whom accidentally are in favor of the even more harsh austerity measures, and are quite interestingly associated ideologically with the conservative, neoliberal, right wing nomenclature around Europe and Greece. Their only argument is that if Greeks vote against these measures EU will kick Greece out of the euro and this equals a catastrophe even bigger than this that would take place if we simply accept another wave of austerity measures. Simply turn on any Greek TV channel and ask from a Greek colleague to tell you the opinions of members in any TV panel./// /For your records, at the moment:/ // * /unemployment in Greece is officially at 26% of the working population (1.4 mil. people ?unofficially they are more than 3 million If you take into consideration those that they have stopped reporting their employment state, and mostly those employed only a few hours per week gaining less than 200? per month), / * / another 3 million people live near the poverty limit (that is, they cannot afford buying all meals of the week, or pay their utilities, let alone their mortgages, or taxes), * and another 3 million people can hardly cover all of their mortgages and taxes, * leaving less than a couple of millions that can run a life of the average middle class in a western country * / /needless to refer to the few thousands that have built monumental fortunes by evading taxation and suppressing labor costs./ // /I expect that Greeks will vote ?NO? to the austerity measures by majority. But even if this is not the case, I hope that my description will help you see why.//Thank you and all the colleagues for contributing to this fight of Greek people.///" Best regards, Zlatko Bodrozic ------------------------------- Several of us are here in Athens at a conference of the European Group on Organization Studies ? one of the leading associations of management scholars. Angered by the brutal austerity policies being forced onto Greece by the Troika/Institutions, yesterday we launched a petition in protest ? see it below. We are still gathering signatures from people here as well as in our broader network, but we have already garnered the support of many leading scholars. Statement: Forcing austerity upon Greece has had devastating effects on its economy and on the most vulnerable members of the Greek society. While ministers of Finance of 18 Eurozone countries are trying to force further austerity upon Greece, the undersigned management scholars from these same countries and other countries stand in solidarity with the Greek government and people in rejecting such an economically counterproductive and inhuman approach. Last name First name Institutional affiliation Adler Paul University of Southern California Al-Amoudi Ismael University of Cardiff Allen David Leeds University Amburgey Terry University of Toronto Antonacopoulou Elena GNOSIS, University of Liverpool Aquino Alves Mario FGV-EAESP Armstrong Peter Leicester University Asami Watanabe Faculty of Business Administration, Aomori University Bamber Greg Monash University, Australia/Newcastle University, England banerjee bobby cass business school Baralou Evangelia ALBA Graduate Business School Barros Marcos Grenoble ??cole de Management Berlinguer Marco IGOP/UAB Beverungen Armin Leuphana University Beynon Huw Cardiff University Bodrozic Zlatko University of Belgrade Burawoy Michael University of California, Berkeley Caliandro Alessandro State University of Milano Callinicos Alex King's College London Cheney George University of Colorado Colorado Springs Chris Tilly UCLA Clarke Thomas UTS Sydney Cooren Fran??ois Universit?? de Montr??al Cornelissen Joep Erasmus University Rotterdam Couto Beatriz Universidade federal de minas geraiscoutpc Daskalaki Maria Kingston University Davenne Patrick Delmestri Giuseppe WU Vienna Dentoni Domenico Wageningen University Diniz Eduardo Fundacao Getulio Vargas Dionysiou Dionysios ALBA Graduate Business School at the American College of Greece Doellgast Virginia Cornell University Donnelly Eddy london school of Economics Eidlin Barry McGill University Elger Tony Sociology, University of Warwick Evans Martin G. Evans Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto Fotaki Marianna Warwick Business School Gelis-Filho Antonio FGV-EAESP Georgios Vardaxoglou The University of Leeds Godard John University of Manitoba Golsorkhi Damon Grenoble Ecole de Management Hanlon Gerard Queen mary University of London Helms Mills Jean Saint Mary's University Hyman Richard LSE Ingvaldsen Jonas A. Norwegian university of science and technology Jacobs David Morgan State University Jamison Elizabeth Virginia Tech Jingqi Zhu Newcastle University Business School K??rreman Dan CBS Kazana Ioulia University of Surrey, UK Kenney Martin University of California, Davis Kiyomiya Toru Seinan Gakuin University Komporozos-Athanasiou Aris King's College London Kwon Hyunji SNU LECA BERNARD University Paris Dauphine Levin Morten Norwewgian Universeity of Science and Technology Levy David University of Massachusetts, Boston Loacker Bernadette Lancaster University Management School Lounsbury Michael University of Alberta Luyckx Joost KU Leuven Marquez Sara Cass Business School Martineau R??gis ESC Troyes Masquelier Charles University of Surrey McMurray Robert University of Durham Miettinen Reijo Professor Mills Albert Saint Mary's University Muniesa Fabian Ecole des Mines de Paris Munir Kamal University of Cambridge Muselli Laure Telecom Paristech Mutch Alistair Nottingham Trent University Naccache Philippe Newbery Robert Plymouth University Nyland Chris Monash University O'Reilly Dermot Lancaster University Ozdemir Kaya Didem Derya Warwick Business School Palmer Donald University of California, Davis Peck Jamie University of British Columbia Pullen Alison Macquarie University Rowlinson Michael Queen Mary University of London Rozas David University of Surrey Sannino Annalisa University of Helsinki Schwartz Gregory University of Bristol Stookey Sarah Central Connecticut State University stuart Mark University of Leeds Subramanian Balaji Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, India Swann Thomas University of Leicester Taylor Steven Worcester Polytechnic Institute Vidal Matt King's College London Yu Kyoung-Hee UNSW Business School Zanoni Patrizia Hasselt University --- Diese E-Mail wurde von Avast Antivirus-Software auf Viren gepr?ft. https://www.avast.com/antivirus From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Jul 6 06:41:33 2015 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 16:41:33 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Information about a petition in support for Greek people and Greek reactions to it In-Reply-To: <559A7990.1040106@web.de> References: <4bcl76wwx5a0yv0q4iftg3fi.1435965271522@email.android.com> <559A7990.1040106@web.de> Message-ID: only a socialist revolution can save the greek people and can grant her an honorable, sustainable human life, as advocated by kke, cpg. all options other than this are either a lie or an illusion, which does conceal today's capitalism's realities or concsiously deceive the working masses. syriza govt is managing this crisis for capital and tries to keep the country in the line of interests for greek and international capital, not for the working class. like podemos in spain. capitalist europe is shrinking in all respects and it is time for working peoples to search for other, much more realistic options. otherwise, peoples will miss these days. ulvi (istanbul) 6 Tem 2015 15:52 tarihinde "Zlatko Bodrozic" yazd?: > Dear colleagues, > > some of you might be interested to hear about a petition in support for > Greece (see below) which was initiated at a conference in Athens last week. > Activity theorists have been among the initiators. The petition was sent to > Greek media on Saturday. While this particular action is now finished, > several Greek colleagues emphasized that our solidarity means a lot to them > and will be crucial also in the days to come. May be this will inspire > some of us to take part in some future actions of solidarity. Here two > statements from Greek colleagues: > > "/Thanks very much for this; great to meet some of you in this historic > week for Greece and Europe. After a proud NO from the Greek people, we > need to continue supporting the Greek government in the negotiations that > have already started, showing solidarity and mobilizing resources for a > solution that respects democracy and ends austerity not only in Greece but > across Europe/." > > "/To complement the terror sparked by the capital controls, the explicit > interventions of EU and other European politicians directly demanding from > Greek voters to vote against the government and in favor the austerity > measures, the companies-to-employees threats, and the pressures from the > local political and financial elites, the Greek and many international > media (print and electronic) have been orchestrating a propaganda by > constantly airing unsubstantiated claims by ?experts? and other > ?representatives?, all of whom accidentally are in favor of the even more > harsh austerity measures, and are quite interestingly associated > ideologically with the conservative, neoliberal, right wing nomenclature > around Europe and Greece. Their only argument is that if Greeks vote > against these measures EU will kick Greece out of the euro and this equals > a catastrophe even bigger than this that would take place if we simply > accept another wave of austerity measures. Simply turn on any Greek TV > channel and ask from a Greek colleague to tell you the opinions of members > in any TV panel./// > > /For your records, at the moment:/ > > // > > * > > /unemployment in Greece is officially at 26% of the working > population (1.4 mil. people ?unofficially they are more than 3 > million If you take into consideration those that they have stopped > reporting their employment state, and mostly those employed only a > few hours per week gaining less than 200? per month), / > > * / > > another 3 million people live near the poverty limit (that is, they > cannot afford buying all meals of the week, or pay their utilities, > let alone their mortgages, or taxes), > > * > > and another 3 million people can hardly cover all of their mortgages > and taxes, > > * > > leaving less than a couple of millions that can run a life of the > average middle class in a western country > > * / > > /needless to refer to the few thousands that have built monumental > fortunes by evading taxation and suppressing labor costs./ > > // > > /I expect that Greeks will vote ?NO? to the austerity measures by > majority. But even if this is not the case, I hope that my description will > help you see why.//Thank you and all the colleagues for contributing to > this fight of Greek people.///" > > > Best regards, > Zlatko Bodrozic > > ------------------------------- > Several of us are here in Athens at a conference of the European Group on > Organization Studies ? one of the leading associations of management > scholars. Angered by the brutal austerity policies being forced onto Greece > by the Troika/Institutions, yesterday we launched a petition in protest ? > see it below. We are still gathering signatures from people here as well as > in our broader network, but we have already garnered the support of many > leading scholars. > > Statement: > > Forcing austerity upon Greece has had devastating effects on its economy > and on the most vulnerable members of the Greek society. While ministers of > Finance of 18 Eurozone countries are trying to force further austerity upon > Greece, the undersigned management scholars from these same countries and > other countries stand in solidarity with the Greek government and people in > rejecting such an economically counterproductive and inhuman approach. > > > > Last name > > > > First name > > > > Institutional affiliation > > > > > > Adler > > > > Paul > > > > University of Southern California > > Al-Amoudi > > > > Ismael > > > > University of Cardiff > > Allen > > > > David > > > > Leeds University > > Amburgey > > > > Terry > > > > University of Toronto > > Antonacopoulou > > > > Elena > > > > GNOSIS, University of Liverpool > > Aquino Alves > > > > Mario > > > > FGV-EAESP > > Armstrong > > > > Peter > > > > Leicester University > > Asami > > > > Watanabe > > > > Faculty of Business Administration, Aomori University > > Bamber > > > > Greg > > > > Monash University, Australia/Newcastle University, England > > banerjee > > > > bobby > > > > cass business school > > Baralou > > > > Evangelia > > > > ALBA Graduate Business School > > Barros > > > > Marcos > > > > Grenoble ??cole de Management > > Berlinguer > > > > Marco > > > > IGOP/UAB > > Beverungen > > > > Armin > > > > Leuphana University > > Beynon > > > > Huw > > > > Cardiff University > > Bodrozic > > > > Zlatko > > > > University of Belgrade > > Burawoy > > > > Michael > > > > University of California, Berkeley > > Caliandro > > > > Alessandro > > > > State University of Milano > > Callinicos > > > > Alex > > > > King's College London > > Cheney > > > > George > > > > University of Colorado Colorado Springs > > Chris > > > > Tilly > > > > UCLA > > Clarke > > > > Thomas > > > > UTS Sydney > > Cooren > > > > Fran??ois > > > > Universit?? de Montr??al > > Cornelissen > > > > Joep > > > > Erasmus University Rotterdam > > Couto > > > > Beatriz > > > > Universidade federal de minas geraiscoutpc > > Daskalaki > > > > Maria > > > > Kingston University > > Davenne > > > > Patrick > > > > Delmestri > > > > Giuseppe > > > > WU Vienna > > Dentoni > > > > Domenico > > > > Wageningen University > > Diniz > > > > Eduardo > > > > Fundacao Getulio Vargas > > Dionysiou > > > > Dionysios > > > > ALBA Graduate Business School at the American College of Greece > > Doellgast > > > > Virginia > > > > Cornell University > > Donnelly > > > > Eddy > > > > london school of Economics > > Eidlin > > > > Barry > > > > McGill University > > Elger > > > > Tony > > > > Sociology, University of Warwick > > Evans > > > > Martin G. Evans > > > > Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto > > Fotaki > > > > Marianna > > > > Warwick Business School > > Gelis-Filho > > > > Antonio > > > > FGV-EAESP > > Georgios > > > > Vardaxoglou > > > > The University of Leeds > > Godard > > > > John > > > > University of Manitoba > > Golsorkhi > > > > Damon > > > > Grenoble Ecole de Management > > Hanlon > > > > Gerard > > > > Queen mary University of London > > Helms Mills > > > > Jean > > > > Saint Mary's University > > Hyman > > > > Richard > > > > LSE > > Ingvaldsen > > > > Jonas A. > > > > Norwegian university of science and technology > > Jacobs > > > > David > > > > Morgan State University > > Jamison > > > > Elizabeth > > > > Virginia Tech > > Jingqi > > > > Zhu > > > > Newcastle University Business School > > K??rreman > > > > Dan > > > > CBS > > Kazana > > > > Ioulia > > > > University of Surrey, UK > > Kenney > > > > Martin > > > > University of California, Davis > > Kiyomiya > > > > Toru > > > > Seinan Gakuin University > > Komporozos-Athanasiou > > > > Aris > > > > King's College London > > Kwon > > > > Hyunji > > > > SNU > > LECA > > > > BERNARD > > > > University Paris Dauphine > > Levin > > > > Morten > > > > Norwewgian Universeity of Science and Technology > > Levy > > > > David > > > > University of Massachusetts, Boston > > Loacker > > > > Bernadette > > > > Lancaster University Management School > > Lounsbury > > > > Michael > > > > University of Alberta > > Luyckx > > > > Joost > > > > KU Leuven > > Marquez > > > > Sara > > > > Cass Business School > > Martineau > > > > R??gis > > > > ESC Troyes > > Masquelier > > > > Charles > > > > University of Surrey > > McMurray > > > > Robert > > > > University of Durham > > Miettinen > > > > Reijo > > > > Professor > > Mills > > > > Albert > > > > Saint Mary's University > > Muniesa > > > > Fabian > > > > Ecole des Mines de Paris > > Munir > > > > Kamal > > > > University of Cambridge > > Muselli > > > > Laure > > > > Telecom Paristech > > Mutch > > > > Alistair > > > > Nottingham Trent University > > Naccache > > > > Philippe > > > > Newbery > > > > Robert > > > > Plymouth University > > Nyland > > > > Chris > > > > Monash University > > O'Reilly > > > > Dermot > > > > Lancaster University > > Ozdemir Kaya > > > > Didem Derya > > > > Warwick Business School > > Palmer > > > > Donald > > > > University of California, Davis > > Peck > > > > Jamie > > > > University of British Columbia > > Pullen > > > > Alison > > > > Macquarie University > > Rowlinson > > > > Michael > > > > Queen Mary University of London > > Rozas > > > > David > > > > University of Surrey > > Sannino > > > > Annalisa > > > > University of Helsinki > > Schwartz > > > > Gregory > > > > University of Bristol > > Stookey > > > > Sarah > > > > Central Connecticut State University > > stuart > > > > Mark > > > > University of Leeds > > Subramanian > > > > Balaji > > > > Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, India > > Swann > > > > Thomas > > > > University of Leicester > > Taylor > > > > Steven > > > > Worcester Polytechnic Institute > > Vidal > > > > Matt > > > > King's College London > > Yu > > > > Kyoung-Hee > > > > UNSW Business School > > Zanoni > > > > Patrizia > > > > Hasselt University > > > > --- > Diese E-Mail wurde von Avast Antivirus-Software auf Viren gepr?ft. > https://www.avast.com/antivirus > From bodrozic@web.de Mon Jul 6 07:03:49 2015 From: bodrozic@web.de (Zlatko Bodrozic) Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 16:03:49 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Information about a petition in support for Greek people and Greek reactions to it In-Reply-To: References: <4bcl76wwx5a0yv0q4iftg3fi.1435965271522@email.android.com> <559A7990.1040106@web.de> Message-ID: <559A8AC5.7030602@web.de> This petition was meant to create a broad consensus among colleagues about rejecting inhuman and counterproductive austerity policies in Greece and beyond. May be this is only a small step for humankind, but a big step for some of the Greek people we have met last week. Regards Zlatko > only a socialist revolution can save the greek people and can grant her an > honorable, sustainable human life, as advocated by kke, cpg. > all options other than this are either a lie or an illusion, which does > conceal today's capitalism's realities or concsiously deceive the working > masses. > syriza govt is managing this crisis for capital and tries to > keep the country in the line of interests for greek and international > capital, not for the working class. like podemos in spain. > capitalist europe is shrinking in all respects and it is time for working > peoples to search for other, much more realistic options. > otherwise, peoples will miss these days. > > ulvi > (istanbul) > 6 Tem 2015 15:52 tarihinde "Zlatko Bodrozic" yazd?: > >> Dear colleagues, >> >> some of you might be interested to hear about a petition in support for >> Greece (see below) which was initiated at a conference in Athens last week. >> Activity theorists have been among the initiators. The petition was sent to >> Greek media on Saturday. While this particular action is now finished, >> several Greek colleagues emphasized that our solidarity means a lot to them >> and will be crucial also in the days to come. May be this will inspire >> some of us to take part in some future actions of solidarity. Here two >> statements from Greek colleagues: >> >> "/Thanks very much for this; great to meet some of you in this historic >> week for Greece and Europe. After a proud NO from the Greek people, we >> need to continue supporting the Greek government in the negotiations that >> have already started, showing solidarity and mobilizing resources for a >> solution that respects democracy and ends austerity not only in Greece but >> across Europe/." >> >> "/To complement the terror sparked by the capital controls, the explicit >> interventions of EU and other European politicians directly demanding from >> Greek voters to vote against the government and in favor the austerity >> measures, the companies-to-employees threats, and the pressures from the >> local political and financial elites, the Greek and many international >> media (print and electronic) have been orchestrating a propaganda by >> constantly airing unsubstantiated claims by ?experts? and other >> ?representatives?, all of whom accidentally are in favor of the even more >> harsh austerity measures, and are quite interestingly associated >> ideologically with the conservative, neoliberal, right wing nomenclature >> around Europe and Greece. Their only argument is that if Greeks vote >> against these measures EU will kick Greece out of the euro and this equals >> a catastrophe even bigger than this that would take place if we simply >> accept another wave of austerity measures. Simply turn on any Greek TV >> channel and ask from a Greek colleague to tell you the opinions of members >> in any TV panel./// >> >> /For your records, at the moment:/ >> >> // >> >> * >> >> /unemployment in Greece is officially at 26% of the working >> population (1.4 mil. people ?unofficially they are more than 3 >> million If you take into consideration those that they have stopped >> reporting their employment state, and mostly those employed only a >> few hours per week gaining less than 200? per month), / >> >> * / >> >> another 3 million people live near the poverty limit (that is, they >> cannot afford buying all meals of the week, or pay their utilities, >> let alone their mortgages, or taxes), >> >> * >> >> and another 3 million people can hardly cover all of their mortgages >> and taxes, >> >> * >> >> leaving less than a couple of millions that can run a life of the >> average middle class in a western country >> >> * / >> >> /needless to refer to the few thousands that have built monumental >> fortunes by evading taxation and suppressing labor costs./ >> >> // >> >> /I expect that Greeks will vote ?NO? to the austerity measures by >> majority. But even if this is not the case, I hope that my description will >> help you see why.//Thank you and all the colleagues for contributing to >> this fight of Greek people.///" >> >> >> Best regards, >> Zlatko Bodrozic >> >> ------------------------------- >> Several of us are here in Athens at a conference of the European Group on >> Organization Studies ? one of the leading associations of management >> scholars. Angered by the brutal austerity policies being forced onto Greece >> by the Troika/Institutions, yesterday we launched a petition in protest ? >> see it below. We are still gathering signatures from people here as well as >> in our broader network, but we have already garnered the support of many >> leading scholars. >> >> Statement: >> >> Forcing austerity upon Greece has had devastating effects on its economy >> and on the most vulnerable members of the Greek society. While ministers of >> Finance of 18 Eurozone countries are trying to force further austerity upon >> Greece, the undersigned management scholars from these same countries and >> other countries stand in solidarity with the Greek government and people in >> rejecting such an economically counterproductive and inhuman approach. >> >> >> >> Last name >> >> >> >> First name >> >> >> >> Institutional affiliation >> >> >> >> >> >> Adler >> >> >> >> Paul >> >> >> >> University of Southern California >> >> Al-Amoudi >> >> >> >> Ismael >> >> >> >> University of Cardiff >> >> Allen >> >> >> >> David >> >> >> >> Leeds University >> >> Amburgey >> >> >> >> Terry >> >> >> >> University of Toronto >> >> Antonacopoulou >> >> >> >> Elena >> >> >> >> GNOSIS, University of Liverpool >> >> Aquino Alves >> >> >> >> Mario >> >> >> >> FGV-EAESP >> >> Armstrong >> >> >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> Leicester University >> >> Asami >> >> >> >> Watanabe >> >> >> >> Faculty of Business Administration, Aomori University >> >> Bamber >> >> >> >> Greg >> >> >> >> Monash University, Australia/Newcastle University, England >> >> banerjee >> >> >> >> bobby >> >> >> >> cass business school >> >> Baralou >> >> >> >> Evangelia >> >> >> >> ALBA Graduate Business School >> >> Barros >> >> >> >> Marcos >> >> >> >> Grenoble ??cole de Management >> >> Berlinguer >> >> >> >> Marco >> >> >> >> IGOP/UAB >> >> Beverungen >> >> >> >> Armin >> >> >> >> Leuphana University >> >> Beynon >> >> >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> Cardiff University >> >> Bodrozic >> >> >> >> Zlatko >> >> >> >> University of Belgrade >> >> Burawoy >> >> >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> University of California, Berkeley >> >> Caliandro >> >> >> >> Alessandro >> >> >> >> State University of Milano >> >> Callinicos >> >> >> >> Alex >> >> >> >> King's College London >> >> Cheney >> >> >> >> George >> >> >> >> University of Colorado Colorado Springs >> >> Chris >> >> >> >> Tilly >> >> >> >> UCLA >> >> Clarke >> >> >> >> Thomas >> >> >> >> UTS Sydney >> >> Cooren >> >> >> >> Fran??ois >> >> >> >> Universit?? de Montr??al >> >> Cornelissen >> >> >> >> Joep >> >> >> >> Erasmus University Rotterdam >> >> Couto >> >> >> >> Beatriz >> >> >> >> Universidade federal de minas geraiscoutpc >> >> Daskalaki >> >> >> >> Maria >> >> >> >> Kingston University >> >> Davenne >> >> >> >> Patrick >> >> >> >> Delmestri >> >> >> >> Giuseppe >> >> >> >> WU Vienna >> >> Dentoni >> >> >> >> Domenico >> >> >> >> Wageningen University >> >> Diniz >> >> >> >> Eduardo >> >> >> >> Fundacao Getulio Vargas >> >> Dionysiou >> >> >> >> Dionysios >> >> >> >> ALBA Graduate Business School at the American College of Greece >> >> Doellgast >> >> >> >> Virginia >> >> >> >> Cornell University >> >> Donnelly >> >> >> >> Eddy >> >> >> >> london school of Economics >> >> Eidlin >> >> >> >> Barry >> >> >> >> McGill University >> >> Elger >> >> >> >> Tony >> >> >> >> Sociology, University of Warwick >> >> Evans >> >> >> >> Martin G. Evans >> >> >> >> Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto >> >> Fotaki >> >> >> >> Marianna >> >> >> >> Warwick Business School >> >> Gelis-Filho >> >> >> >> Antonio >> >> >> >> FGV-EAESP >> >> Georgios >> >> >> >> Vardaxoglou >> >> >> >> The University of Leeds >> >> Godard >> >> >> >> John >> >> >> >> University of Manitoba >> >> Golsorkhi >> >> >> >> Damon >> >> >> >> Grenoble Ecole de Management >> >> Hanlon >> >> >> >> Gerard >> >> >> >> Queen mary University of London >> >> Helms Mills >> >> >> >> Jean >> >> >> >> Saint Mary's University >> >> Hyman >> >> >> >> Richard >> >> >> >> LSE >> >> Ingvaldsen >> >> >> >> Jonas A. >> >> >> >> Norwegian university of science and technology >> >> Jacobs >> >> >> >> David >> >> >> >> Morgan State University >> >> Jamison >> >> >> >> Elizabeth >> >> >> >> Virginia Tech >> >> Jingqi >> >> >> >> Zhu >> >> >> >> Newcastle University Business School >> >> K??rreman >> >> >> >> Dan >> >> >> >> CBS >> >> Kazana >> >> >> >> Ioulia >> >> >> >> University of Surrey, UK >> >> Kenney >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> University of California, Davis >> >> Kiyomiya >> >> >> >> Toru >> >> >> >> Seinan Gakuin University >> >> Komporozos-Athanasiou >> >> >> >> Aris >> >> >> >> King's College London >> >> Kwon >> >> >> >> Hyunji >> >> >> >> SNU >> >> LECA >> >> >> >> BERNARD >> >> >> >> University Paris Dauphine >> >> Levin >> >> >> >> Morten >> >> >> >> Norwewgian Universeity of Science and Technology >> >> Levy >> >> >> >> David >> >> >> >> University of Massachusetts, Boston >> >> Loacker >> >> >> >> Bernadette >> >> >> >> Lancaster University Management School >> >> Lounsbury >> >> >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> University of Alberta >> >> Luyckx >> >> >> >> Joost >> >> >> >> KU Leuven >> >> Marquez >> >> >> >> Sara >> >> >> >> Cass Business School >> >> Martineau >> >> >> >> R??gis >> >> >> >> ESC Troyes >> >> Masquelier >> >> >> >> Charles >> >> >> >> University of Surrey >> >> McMurray >> >> >> >> Robert >> >> >> >> University of Durham >> >> Miettinen >> >> >> >> Reijo >> >> >> >> Professor >> >> Mills >> >> >> >> Albert >> >> >> >> Saint Mary's University >> >> Muniesa >> >> >> >> Fabian >> >> >> >> Ecole des Mines de Paris >> >> Munir >> >> >> >> Kamal >> >> >> >> University of Cambridge >> >> Muselli >> >> >> >> Laure >> >> >> >> Telecom Paristech >> >> Mutch >> >> >> >> Alistair >> >> >> >> Nottingham Trent University >> >> Naccache >> >> >> >> Philippe >> >> >> >> Newbery >> >> >> >> Robert >> >> >> >> Plymouth University >> >> Nyland >> >> >> >> Chris >> >> >> >> Monash University >> >> O'Reilly >> >> >> >> Dermot >> >> >> >> Lancaster University >> >> Ozdemir Kaya >> >> >> >> Didem Derya >> >> >> >> Warwick Business School >> >> Palmer >> >> >> >> Donald >> >> >> >> University of California, Davis >> >> Peck >> >> >> >> Jamie >> >> >> >> University of British Columbia >> >> Pullen >> >> >> >> Alison >> >> >> >> Macquarie University >> >> Rowlinson >> >> >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> Queen Mary University of London >> >> Rozas >> >> >> >> David >> >> >> >> University of Surrey >> >> Sannino >> >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> University of Helsinki >> >> Schwartz >> >> >> >> Gregory >> >> >> >> University of Bristol >> >> Stookey >> >> >> >> Sarah >> >> >> >> Central Connecticut State University >> >> stuart >> >> >> >> Mark >> >> >> >> University of Leeds >> >> Subramanian >> >> >> >> Balaji >> >> >> >> Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, India >> >> Swann >> >> >> >> Thomas >> >> >> >> University of Leicester >> >> Taylor >> >> >> >> Steven >> >> >> >> Worcester Polytechnic Institute >> >> Vidal >> >> >> >> Matt >> >> >> >> King's College London >> >> Yu >> >> >> >> Kyoung-Hee >> >> >> >> UNSW Business School >> >> Zanoni >> >> >> >> Patrizia >> >> >> >> Hasselt University >> >> >> >> --- >> Diese E-Mail wurde von Avast Antivirus-Software auf Viren gepr?ft. >> https://www.avast.com/antivirus >> -- ----------------------------------------------------- Dr. Zlatko Bodro?i? Email: bodrozic@web.de Tel.: +381-62-1769594 Tel.: +49-172-4712341 --- Diese E-Mail wurde von Avast Antivirus-Software auf Viren gepr?ft. https://www.avast.com/antivirus From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Mon Jul 6 14:50:02 2015 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 22:50:02 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Information about a petition in support for Greek people and Greek reactions to it In-Reply-To: References: <4bcl76wwx5a0yv0q4iftg3fi.1435965271522@email.android.com> <559A7990.1040106@web.de> Message-ID: I support the Greek people to the hilt, but ulvi's analysis and strictures are correct, and need to be said clearly as he does! IMO Tom Richardson Middlesbrough UK On 6 July 2015 at 14:41, Ulvi ??il wrote: > only a socialist revolution can save the greek people and can grant her an > honorable, sustainable human life, as advocated by kke, cpg. > all options other than this are either a lie or an illusion, which does > conceal today's capitalism's realities or concsiously deceive the working > masses. > syriza govt is managing this crisis for capital and tries to > keep the country in the line of interests for greek and international > capital, not for the working class. like podemos in spain. > capitalist europe is shrinking in all respects and it is time for working > peoples to search for other, much more realistic options. > otherwise, peoples will miss these days. > > ulvi > (istanbul) > 6 Tem 2015 15:52 tarihinde "Zlatko Bodrozic" yazd?: > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > some of you might be interested to hear about a petition in support for > > Greece (see below) which was initiated at a conference in Athens last > week. > > Activity theorists have been among the initiators. The petition was sent > to > > Greek media on Saturday. While this particular action is now finished, > > several Greek colleagues emphasized that our solidarity means a lot to > them > > and will be crucial also in the days to come. May be this will inspire > > some of us to take part in some future actions of solidarity. Here two > > statements from Greek colleagues: > > > > "/Thanks very much for this; great to meet some of you in this historic > > week for Greece and Europe. After a proud NO from the Greek people, we > > need to continue supporting the Greek government in the negotiations that > > have already started, showing solidarity and mobilizing resources for a > > solution that respects democracy and ends austerity not only in Greece > but > > across Europe/." > > > > "/To complement the terror sparked by the capital controls, the explicit > > interventions of EU and other European politicians directly demanding > from > > Greek voters to vote against the government and in favor the austerity > > measures, the companies-to-employees threats, and the pressures from the > > local political and financial elites, the Greek and many international > > media (print and electronic) have been orchestrating a propaganda by > > constantly airing unsubstantiated claims by ?experts? and other > > ?representatives?, all of whom accidentally are in favor of the even more > > harsh austerity measures, and are quite interestingly associated > > ideologically with the conservative, neoliberal, right wing nomenclature > > around Europe and Greece. Their only argument is that if Greeks vote > > against these measures EU will kick Greece out of the euro and this > equals > > a catastrophe even bigger than this that would take place if we simply > > accept another wave of austerity measures. Simply turn on any Greek TV > > channel and ask from a Greek colleague to tell you the opinions of > members > > in any TV panel./// > > > > /For your records, at the moment:/ > > > > // > > > > * > > > > /unemployment in Greece is officially at 26% of the working > > population (1.4 mil. people ?unofficially they are more than 3 > > million If you take into consideration those that they have stopped > > reporting their employment state, and mostly those employed only a > > few hours per week gaining less than 200? per month), / > > > > * / > > > > another 3 million people live near the poverty limit (that is, they > > cannot afford buying all meals of the week, or pay their utilities, > > let alone their mortgages, or taxes), > > > > * > > > > and another 3 million people can hardly cover all of their mortgages > > and taxes, > > > > * > > > > leaving less than a couple of millions that can run a life of the > > average middle class in a western country > > > > * / > > > > /needless to refer to the few thousands that have built monumental > > fortunes by evading taxation and suppressing labor costs./ > > > > // > > > > /I expect that Greeks will vote ?NO? to the austerity measures by > > majority. But even if this is not the case, I hope that my description > will > > help you see why.//Thank you and all the colleagues for contributing to > > this fight of Greek people.///" > > > > > > Best regards, > > Zlatko Bodrozic > > > > ------------------------------- > > Several of us are here in Athens at a conference of the European Group on > > Organization Studies ? one of the leading associations of management > > scholars. Angered by the brutal austerity policies being forced onto > Greece > > by the Troika/Institutions, yesterday we launched a petition in protest ? > > see it below. We are still gathering signatures from people here as well > as > > in our broader network, but we have already garnered the support of many > > leading scholars. > > > > Statement: > > > > Forcing austerity upon Greece has had devastating effects on its economy > > and on the most vulnerable members of the Greek society. While ministers > of > > Finance of 18 Eurozone countries are trying to force further austerity > upon > > Greece, the undersigned management scholars from these same countries and > > other countries stand in solidarity with the Greek government and people > in > > rejecting such an economically counterproductive and inhuman approach. > > > > > > > > Last name > > > > > > > > First name > > > > > > > > Institutional affiliation > > > > > > > > > > > > Adler > > > > > > > > Paul > > > > > > > > University of Southern California > > > > Al-Amoudi > > > > > > > > Ismael > > > > > > > > University of Cardiff > > > > Allen > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > Leeds University > > > > Amburgey > > > > > > > > Terry > > > > > > > > University of Toronto > > > > Antonacopoulou > > > > > > > > Elena > > > > > > > > GNOSIS, University of Liverpool > > > > Aquino Alves > > > > > > > > Mario > > > > > > > > FGV-EAESP > > > > Armstrong > > > > > > > > Peter > > > > > > > > Leicester University > > > > Asami > > > > > > > > Watanabe > > > > > > > > Faculty of Business Administration, Aomori University > > > > Bamber > > > > > > > > Greg > > > > > > > > Monash University, Australia/Newcastle University, England > > > > banerjee > > > > > > > > bobby > > > > > > > > cass business school > > > > Baralou > > > > > > > > Evangelia > > > > > > > > ALBA Graduate Business School > > > > Barros > > > > > > > > Marcos > > > > > > > > Grenoble ??cole de Management > > > > Berlinguer > > > > > > > > Marco > > > > > > > > IGOP/UAB > > > > Beverungen > > > > > > > > Armin > > > > > > > > Leuphana University > > > > Beynon > > > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > Cardiff University > > > > Bodrozic > > > > > > > > Zlatko > > > > > > > > University of Belgrade > > > > Burawoy > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > University of California, Berkeley > > > > Caliandro > > > > > > > > Alessandro > > > > > > > > State University of Milano > > > > Callinicos > > > > > > > > Alex > > > > > > > > King's College London > > > > Cheney > > > > > > > > George > > > > > > > > University of Colorado Colorado Springs > > > > Chris > > > > > > > > Tilly > > > > > > > > UCLA > > > > Clarke > > > > > > > > Thomas > > > > > > > > UTS Sydney > > > > Cooren > > > > > > > > Fran??ois > > > > > > > > Universit?? de Montr??al > > > > Cornelissen > > > > > > > > Joep > > > > > > > > Erasmus University Rotterdam > > > > Couto > > > > > > > > Beatriz > > > > > > > > Universidade federal de minas geraiscoutpc > > > > Daskalaki > > > > > > > > Maria > > > > > > > > Kingston University > > > > Davenne > > > > > > > > Patrick > > > > > > > > Delmestri > > > > > > > > Giuseppe > > > > > > > > WU Vienna > > > > Dentoni > > > > > > > > Domenico > > > > > > > > Wageningen University > > > > Diniz > > > > > > > > Eduardo > > > > > > > > Fundacao Getulio Vargas > > > > Dionysiou > > > > > > > > Dionysios > > > > > > > > ALBA Graduate Business School at the American College of Greece > > > > Doellgast > > > > > > > > Virginia > > > > > > > > Cornell University > > > > Donnelly > > > > > > > > Eddy > > > > > > > > london school of Economics > > > > Eidlin > > > > > > > > Barry > > > > > > > > McGill University > > > > Elger > > > > > > > > Tony > > > > > > > > Sociology, University of Warwick > > > > Evans > > > > > > > > Martin G. Evans > > > > > > > > Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto > > > > Fotaki > > > > > > > > Marianna > > > > > > > > Warwick Business School > > > > Gelis-Filho > > > > > > > > Antonio > > > > > > > > FGV-EAESP > > > > Georgios > > > > > > > > Vardaxoglou > > > > > > > > The University of Leeds > > > > Godard > > > > > > > > John > > > > > > > > University of Manitoba > > > > Golsorkhi > > > > > > > > Damon > > > > > > > > Grenoble Ecole de Management > > > > Hanlon > > > > > > > > Gerard > > > > > > > > Queen mary University of London > > > > Helms Mills > > > > > > > > Jean > > > > > > > > Saint Mary's University > > > > Hyman > > > > > > > > Richard > > > > > > > > LSE > > > > Ingvaldsen > > > > > > > > Jonas A. > > > > > > > > Norwegian university of science and technology > > > > Jacobs > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > Morgan State University > > > > Jamison > > > > > > > > Elizabeth > > > > > > > > Virginia Tech > > > > Jingqi > > > > > > > > Zhu > > > > > > > > Newcastle University Business School > > > > K??rreman > > > > > > > > Dan > > > > > > > > CBS > > > > Kazana > > > > > > > > Ioulia > > > > > > > > University of Surrey, UK > > > > Kenney > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > University of California, Davis > > > > Kiyomiya > > > > > > > > Toru > > > > > > > > Seinan Gakuin University > > > > Komporozos-Athanasiou > > > > > > > > Aris > > > > > > > > King's College London > > > > Kwon > > > > > > > > Hyunji > > > > > > > > SNU > > > > LECA > > > > > > > > BERNARD > > > > > > > > University Paris Dauphine > > > > Levin > > > > > > > > Morten > > > > > > > > Norwewgian Universeity of Science and Technology > > > > Levy > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > University of Massachusetts, Boston > > > > Loacker > > > > > > > > Bernadette > > > > > > > > Lancaster University Management School > > > > Lounsbury > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > University of Alberta > > > > Luyckx > > > > > > > > Joost > > > > > > > > KU Leuven > > > > Marquez > > > > > > > > Sara > > > > > > > > Cass Business School > > > > Martineau > > > > > > > > R??gis > > > > > > > > ESC Troyes > > > > Masquelier > > > > > > > > Charles > > > > > > > > University of Surrey > > > > McMurray > > > > > > > > Robert > > > > > > > > University of Durham > > > > Miettinen > > > > > > > > Reijo > > > > > > > > Professor > > > > Mills > > > > > > > > Albert > > > > > > > > Saint Mary's University > > > > Muniesa > > > > > > > > Fabian > > > > > > > > Ecole des Mines de Paris > > > > Munir > > > > > > > > Kamal > > > > > > > > University of Cambridge > > > > Muselli > > > > > > > > Laure > > > > > > > > Telecom Paristech > > > > Mutch > > > > > > > > Alistair > > > > > > > > Nottingham Trent University > > > > Naccache > > > > > > > > Philippe > > > > > > > > Newbery > > > > > > > > Robert > > > > > > > > Plymouth University > > > > Nyland > > > > > > > > Chris > > > > > > > > Monash University > > > > O'Reilly > > > > > > > > Dermot > > > > > > > > Lancaster University > > > > Ozdemir Kaya > > > > > > > > Didem Derya > > > > > > > > Warwick Business School > > > > Palmer > > > > > > > > Donald > > > > > > > > University of California, Davis > > > > Peck > > > > > > > > Jamie > > > > > > > > University of British Columbia > > > > Pullen > > > > > > > > Alison > > > > > > > > Macquarie University > > > > Rowlinson > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > Queen Mary University of London > > > > Rozas > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > University of Surrey > > > > Sannino > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > University of Helsinki > > > > Schwartz > > > > > > > > Gregory > > > > > > > > University of Bristol > > > > Stookey > > > > > > > > Sarah > > > > > > > > Central Connecticut State University > > > > stuart > > > > > > > > Mark > > > > > > > > University of Leeds > > > > Subramanian > > > > > > > > Balaji > > > > > > > > Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, India > > > > Swann > > > > > > > > Thomas > > > > > > > > University of Leicester > > > > Taylor > > > > > > > > Steven > > > > > > > > Worcester Polytechnic Institute > > > > Vidal > > > > > > > > Matt > > > > > > > > King's College London > > > > Yu > > > > > > > > Kyoung-Hee > > > > > > > > UNSW Business School > > > > Zanoni > > > > > > > > Patrizia > > > > > > > > Hasselt University > > > > > > > > --- > > Diese E-Mail wurde von Avast Antivirus-Software auf Viren gepr?ft. > > https://www.avast.com/antivirus > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jul 6 17:42:19 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 09:42:19 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of proximal learning? And for whom? Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding and the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one moment--but a rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, but not a zone of proximal development. The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation is a cell for capitalism. Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of his examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical divisions of labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter and subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and radical restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out to be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone of proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" of the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds more or less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the subjective (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except that it is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in Kangweondo. Here's the English version! https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from Korean education!) David Kellogg On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Annalisa, > Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. What > a world! > H > > > On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Henry, > > > > Clever mom! > > > > This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > > > > Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for > many many reasons! > > > > So thanks for letting me share it! > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jul 6 18:45:52 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 19:45:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: About what David has just written: Seeing scaffolding as a moment in a zone of proximal learning works for me, but why is it ?a rather extrreme and externalized moment"? I like the return to freedom a lot. Can?t talk about that too much. But I couldn?t pull up the paper he linked us up to, not a single one of the 33,000 words! What?s wrong with me? Henry > On Jul 6, 2015, at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg ,om> wrote: > > Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of proximal > learning? And for whom? > > Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding and > the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one moment--but a > rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, but > not a zone of proximal development. > > The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the > respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that > collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not > involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making > decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, > collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation is a > cell for capitalism. > > Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of his > examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical divisions of > labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter and > subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and radical > restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision > maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out to > be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone of > proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. > > I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" of > the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds more or > less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the subjective > (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except that it > is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. > > We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in > Kangweondo. Here's the English version! > > https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools > > (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from > Korean education!) > > David Kellogg > > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Annalisa, >> Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. What >> a world! >> H >> >>> On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Henry, >>> >>> Clever mom! >>> >>> This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. >>> >>> Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for >> many many reasons! >>> >>> So thanks for letting me share it! >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >> >> >> From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 6 18:56:29 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 19:56:29 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: I've been reading, with some interest, Martin Packer's 2011 paper "Schooling: Domestication or Ontological Construction" which speaks to this issue of an asymmetrical relationship and is somewhat critical of the long-standing CHAT assumptions with regard to this asymmetry. His paper can be found under his papers on his academia.edu page: https://uniandes.academia.edu/MartinPacker I should add that I think that Nicaraguan Sign language may hold particular potential for seeing just how creative (poietic) children can be on their own - a case in which the end was not present in the beginning, but the whole was present before the parts ("whole" in the very Durkheimian sense of the whole community). That's just me musing. Also, David, I just tried to download the piece you linked to and it says it is missing. Any suggestions? -greg On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of proximal > learning? And for whom? > > Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding and > the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one moment--but a > rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, but > not a zone of proximal development. > > The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the > respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that > collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not > involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making > decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, > collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation is a > cell for capitalism. > > Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of his > examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical divisions of > labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter and > subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and radical > restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision > maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out to > be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone of > proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. > > I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" of > the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds more or > less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the subjective > (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except that it > is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. > > We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in > Kangweondo. Here's the English version! > > > https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools > > (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from > Korean education!) > > David Kellogg > > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > Annalisa, > > Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. > What > > a world! > > H > > > > > On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > Clever mom! > > > > > > This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > > > > > > Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for > > many many reasons! > > > > > > So thanks for letting me share it! > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jul 6 19:52:19 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 11:52:19 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: Sorry, everybody. Try this link. http://www.academia.edu/13725202/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools If that doesn't work, shoot me an e-mail, and I'll send the pdf. David Kellogg On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 10:56 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > I've been reading, with some interest, Martin Packer's 2011 paper > "Schooling: Domestication or Ontological Construction" which speaks to this > issue of an asymmetrical relationship and is somewhat critical of the > long-standing CHAT assumptions with regard to this asymmetry. His paper can > be found under his papers on his academia.edu page: > https://uniandes.academia.edu/MartinPacker > > I should add that I think that Nicaraguan Sign language may hold particular > potential for seeing just how creative (poietic) children can be on their > own - a case in which the end was not present in the beginning, but the > whole was present before the parts ("whole" in the very Durkheimian sense > of the whole community). That's just me musing. > > Also, David, I just tried to download the piece you linked to and it says > it is missing. Any suggestions? > > -greg > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of proximal > > learning? And for whom? > > > > Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding and > > the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one > moment--but a > > rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, > but > > not a zone of proximal development. > > > > The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the > > respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that > > collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not > > involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making > > decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, > > collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation is > a > > cell for capitalism. > > > > Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of > his > > examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical divisions > of > > labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter > and > > subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and > radical > > restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision > > maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out to > > be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone of > > proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. > > > > I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" of > > the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds more > or > > less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the > subjective > > (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except that > it > > is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. > > > > We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in > > Kangweondo. Here's the English version! > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools > > > > (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from > > Korean education!) > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > > > Annalisa, > > > Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. > > What > > > a world! > > > H > > > > > > > On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > > > Clever mom! > > > > > > > > This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > > > > > > > > Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for > > > many many reasons! > > > > > > > > So thanks for letting me share it! > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jul 6 21:00:48 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 04:00:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> , Message-ID: Well! I see that this thread's been hijacked?or scrummed? The idea is not to slice terms, but to make reference to the unification of learning and its corresponding scientific concept of VOTING. I loved the photograph because it is an instance of a mother sharing the experience of voting, even to the COLLABORATION and COOPERATION of carrying the voting envelope from the booth to the ballot box. It isn't a moment of learning, but a zone of development, because this will be the starting point of learning about the meaning of VOTING, for the son, not just the activity of voting, as in carrying the envelope to the ballot box, but what it means. The activity of voting on one's own will not be that much of a "zone for learning:" mark "oxi," and put the ballot in the envelope and walk it to the ballot box. If only that's all that was required to understand voting! :) What I am enamored by is that I'm sure the little boy will make the connections to his (helping his mother to) vote and all the people demonstrating in the street, and all the long lines and people talking about voting. And even that he will one day learn that he is a citizen of a country where democracy was born. It is a zone of proximal development that encompasses his entire world and his future as a Greek citizen (to be). And his mom is helping him understand that. :D Sorry, I thought it was an obvious (and beautiful) instance of a ZPD, as the mother carries her son who carries the ballot. Though I expect a little resistance to my argument. Still, that's what I see and I'm sticking to it. Who will you believe? Me or your eyes? Me and your eyes! Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jul 6 21:25:26 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 04:25:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Russian Spinozists Message-ID: Hello esteemed others! I just got my hands on this Maidansky paper (2003) On the Russian Spinozists, and I'm very intrigued by this paper. (mike) I actually used the google search box on the lchc homepage to see if anyone had already commented upon it, and I see that the fine screen of CHATers did catch this moth to the flame. Unfortunately, a link that had been posted to more English translations has gone 404, so I was also wondering about other work by Maidansky that anyone might recommend. Yes. I confess I'm on a Spinoza kick now, what can I say? It seemed a problem to me (and I apologize if I'm lighting a fuse here), that he was equating Vygotsky with activity theory. But I presume that that is how Vygotsky is known in Russia? As the father of AT? I wasn't sure. Then, I was also curious about the connection of Vygotsky and Spinoza, and how Spinoza has been rebranded "Marx without a beard," which seemed weird to me. I'd have said Marx was "Spinoza with a beard" (and then some), just because of the chronology of history. But OK, not meaning to kickstart a controversy here on the list. I also consider that Spinoza is misunderstood when he is branded an atheist, and that his philosophy has been appropriated incorrectly, which is too bad. It's a deep philosophical argument I'm considering that requires careful unfolding. I haven't done it yet, but I think I shall. Kind regards, Annalisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jul 6 22:20:47 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 23:20:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8C71FE9F-6965-4116-82CD-9AABD49CEB14@gmail.com> Thanks to Greg! Just started Martin?s article. A good start. Henry > On Jul 6, 2015, at 7:56 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > I've been reading, with some interest, Martin Packer's 2011 paper > "Schooling: Domestication or Ontological Construction" which speaks to this > issue of an asymmetrical relationship and is somewhat critical of the > long-standing CHAT assumptions with regard to this asymmetry. His paper can > be found under his papers on his academia.edu page: > https://uniandes.academia.edu/MartinPacker > > I should add that I think that Nicaraguan Sign language may hold particular > potential for seeing just how creative (poietic) children can be on their > own - a case in which the end was not present in the beginning, but the > whole was present before the parts ("whole" in the very Durkheimian sense > of the whole community). That's just me musing. > > Also, David, I just tried to download the piece you linked to and it says > it is missing. Any suggestions? > > -greg > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of proximal >> learning? And for whom? >> >> Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding and >> the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one moment--but a >> rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, but >> not a zone of proximal development. >> >> The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the >> respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that >> collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not >> involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making >> decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, >> collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation is a >> cell for capitalism. >> >> Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of his >> examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical divisions of >> labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter and >> subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and radical >> restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision >> maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out to >> be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone of >> proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. >> >> I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" of >> the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds more or >> less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the subjective >> (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except that it >> is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. >> >> We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in >> Kangweondo. Here's the English version! >> >> >> https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools >> >> (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from >> Korean education!) >> >> David Kellogg >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Annalisa, >>> Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. >> What >>> a world! >>> H >>> >>>> On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Henry, >>>> >>>> Clever mom! >>>> >>>> This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. >>>> >>>> Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for >>> many many reasons! >>>> >>>> So thanks for letting me share it! >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jul 6 22:51:40 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 23:51:40 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Russian Spinozists In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8F2FDC25-6139-4F52-8F0C-5CD220569E3E@gmail.com> I?m with Annalisa. I would like to hear from anyone else who has been bitten by the Spinoza bug. Spinoza and Vygtosky rhyme with each other. Spinoza was an excommunicated Jew, died at 44, of T.B. I?ve heard Spinoza challenged Descartes right as the Enlightenment was getting started. Hegel is supposed to have said, ?You?re either a Spinozist or you aren?t a philosopher.? I know this has been discussed lately on the CHAT and readings on Spinoza have been proffered. It?s late. zzzzzzzz. Henry > On Jul 6, 2015, at 10:25 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hello esteemed others! > > > I just got my hands on this Maidansky paper (2003) On the Russian Spinozists, and I'm very intrigued by this paper. > > > (mike) I actually used the google search box on the lchc homepage to see if anyone had already commented upon it, and I see that the fine screen of CHATers did catch this moth to the flame. > > > Unfortunately, a link that had been posted to more English translations has gone 404, so I was also wondering about other work by Maidansky that anyone might recommend. > > > Yes. I confess I'm on a Spinoza kick now, what can I say? > > > It seemed a problem to me (and I apologize if I'm lighting a fuse here), that he was equating Vygotsky with activity theory. But I presume that that is how Vygotsky is known in Russia? As the father of AT? I wasn't sure. > > > Then, I was also curious about the connection of Vygotsky and Spinoza, and how Spinoza has been rebranded "Marx without a beard," which seemed weird to me. I'd have said Marx was "Spinoza with a beard" (and then some), just because of the chronology of history. > > > But OK, not meaning to kickstart a controversy here on the list. > > > I also consider that Spinoza is misunderstood when he is branded an atheist, and that his philosophy has been appropriated incorrectly, which is too bad. > > > It's a deep philosophical argument I'm considering that requires careful unfolding. I haven't done it yet, but I think I shall. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 7 06:48:02 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 06:48:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Russian Spinozists In-Reply-To: <8F2FDC25-6139-4F52-8F0C-5CD220569E3E@gmail.com> References: <8F2FDC25-6139-4F52-8F0C-5CD220569E3E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Annalisa, Henry, I am interested in what Jan Derry calls a "stream" or "line" or "tradition" leading through Spinoza, towards Hegel, then Marx, Vygotsky, McDowell, Brandom, and Bakhurst. The tension between "construction" as creative free will in contrast to "will" as a development of "self-determination" [the concept of development in this lineage as a "system" within a "space of reasons". The concept "will" for Leslie Farber is a very general term which can be used as a synonym for: "decision, choice, intention, passion, spirit, determination, control, or volition." Leslie's general use of the term "will" can include all these synonyms as the category through which we examine that aspect of our life which is the MOVER OF our life. That aspect UPON WHICH we are moved. The construction metaphor may be focussed more on the theme of moving "for" [the "in order to" realm]. The notion of "prime" mover as "construction" Derry says is a misguided reading "of" [upon which] Vygotsky through the stream "of" representative thinking as "abstract" reasoning. Derry's book is an attempt to make explicit how she "reads" this version of neo-Vygotskian research as a misconstrual. Derry is making a case that locating Vygotsky as a constructive philosopher is mis-representing him as a representational thinker caught in the construction metaphor. Derry argues that to understand Vygotsky we must return him to the Spinozian/Hegelian/ Marxist/Bakhurst stream of thought that sees the "prime mover" as "self-determination which develops through "bildung" within a "space of reasons". Annalisa, Henry, [and others] who are not clear on the EXPLICIT contrasts OF : 1]"abstract representational systems of thought as construction AND 2] the Spinoza/Hegel version that focuses a notion of "prime mover" [will] as developing within a "space of reasons" through a process of learning/bildung Derry "reads" Wertsch and Lave as working within the construction representational paradigm and in her critique she opens a space OF [upon which] conversation which can facilitate becoming clear and explicit on the contrasting paradigms of [1] and [2] above. I hope I have done justice to my "reading" of Derry on this theme. For Spinoza "will" develops THROUGH acquiring "self-determination" which in contemporary language [Brandom, Bakhurst] develops WITHIN a "space of reasons" which is NOT ABSTRACT reason. It is also NOT construction but exists within a "system" OF [upon which] reasons that GENERATE inferences. Self-determination is the result of this development. What is "developing" within a ZPD? Is what is developing a generative act as creative "free will" or is a "system" developing as a space of reasons which generates self-determination. Derry's project is to make this question more explicit. Larry . On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 10:51 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I?m with Annalisa. I would like to hear from anyone else who has been > bitten by the Spinoza bug. Spinoza and Vygtosky rhyme with each other. > Spinoza was an excommunicated Jew, died at 44, of T.B. I?ve heard Spinoza > challenged Descartes right as the Enlightenment was getting started. Hegel > is supposed to have said, ?You?re either a Spinozist or you aren?t a > philosopher.? I know this has been discussed lately on the CHAT and > readings on Spinoza have been proffered. It?s late. zzzzzzzz. > Henry > > > > On Jul 6, 2015, at 10:25 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Hello esteemed others! > > > > > > I just got my hands on this Maidansky paper (2003) On the Russian > Spinozists, and I'm very intrigued by this paper. > > > > > > (mike) I actually used the google search box on the lchc homepage to see > if anyone had already commented upon it, and I see that the fine screen of > CHATers did catch this moth to the flame. > > > > > > Unfortunately, a link that had been posted to more English translations > has gone 404, so I was also wondering about other work by Maidansky that > anyone might recommend. > > > > > > Yes. I confess I'm on a Spinoza kick now, what can I say? > > > > > > It seemed a problem to me (and I apologize if I'm lighting a fuse here), > that he was equating Vygotsky with activity theory. But I presume that that > is how Vygotsky is known in Russia? As the father of AT? I wasn't sure. > > > > > > Then, I was also curious about the connection of Vygotsky and Spinoza, > and how Spinoza has been rebranded "Marx without a beard," which seemed > weird to me. I'd have said Marx was "Spinoza with a beard" (and then some), > just because of the chronology of history. > > > > > > But OK, not meaning to kickstart a controversy here on the list. > > > > > > I also consider that Spinoza is misunderstood when he is branded an > atheist, and that his philosophy has been appropriated incorrectly, which > is too bad. > > > > > > It's a deep philosophical argument I'm considering that requires careful > unfolding. I haven't done it yet, but I think I shall. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Jul 7 07:38:17 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:38:17 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, >From recollection, a key difference is the lack of conception of motive with respect to a scaffold. Goals are a function of motive and as such are distinct from appointed goals that a teacher/manager may provide. The 'scaffold' is a (re)structuring that helps to achieve the goal or the appointed 'goal'. Hence it is external to the dynamics of the subject's own motive. Best, Huw On 7 July 2015 at 02:45, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > About what David has just written: > > Seeing scaffolding as a moment in a zone of proximal learning works for > me, but why is it ?a rather extrreme and externalized moment"? > > I like the return to freedom a lot. Can?t talk about that too much. > > But I couldn?t pull up the paper he linked us up to, not a single one of > the 33,000 words! What?s wrong with me? > > Henry > > > On Jul 6, 2015, at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg dkellogg60@gmail.c>,om> wrote: > > > > Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of proximal > > learning? And for whom? > > > > Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding and > > the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one > moment--but a > > rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, > but > > not a zone of proximal development. > > > > The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the > > respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that > > collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not > > involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making > > decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, > > collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation is > a > > cell for capitalism. > > > > Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of > his > > examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical divisions > of > > labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter > and > > subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and > radical > > restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision > > maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out to > > be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone of > > proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. > > > > I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" of > > the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds more > or > > less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the > subjective > > (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except that > it > > is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. > > > > We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in > > Kangweondo. Here's the English version! > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools > > > > (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from > > Korean education!) > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> Annalisa, > >> Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. > What > >> a world! > >> H > >> > >>> On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>> > >>> Henry, > >>> > >>> Clever mom! > >>> > >>> This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > >>> > >>> Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for > >> many many reasons! > >>> > >>> So thanks for letting me share it! > >>> > >>> Kind regards, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 7 08:18:22 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 08:18:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: <8C71FE9F-6965-4116-82CD-9AABD49CEB14@gmail.com> References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> <8C71FE9F-6965-4116-82CD-9AABD49CEB14@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, Greg, I also have just started Martin's article. I want to draw your attention to what Martin calls "a key to focus on" Martin comments" "To understand the interaction it is key to focus on the way the graph paper BEGINS AS figure in the children's activity but ENDS by being a ground. That is to say, at the start of the session the graph paper is the OBJECT that is discussed, while by the end it is a TAKEN FOR GRANTED background or field UPON WHICH lies the object OF joint attention. This is what I later call an ONTOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION" This comment jumped out and grabbed my attention [and my shared focus with Martin]. What begins as an "object" BE/comes a "FIELD" {UPON WHICH} . In other words a field "of". The "of" BE/comes the "key"as the "upon which" which BE/comes the "field OF" or BE/comes the "space OF" AS TAKEN-for-granted reality. The object is TRANS/formed in THIS ontological construction [as such]. Can THIS shift be considered a "prime mover" or a "prime motive"?? The children with joint activity enter an "ambiguous space" of "objects" that THROUGH their engagement together "WITH" the "objects" become "the field" UPON WHICH they operate together within this "taken-for-granted" FIELD that has become ontological GROUND. Has become a field "OF" within which we "live" I "read" Martin's key ontological notion of construction as shifting play within the "in order to" realm TO the "upon which" realm. I am returning to finish Martin's commentary and I hope I am possibly getting clearer on this ambiguous exploration of "subjects" "objects" and taken-for-granted "fields" which develop within historically specific times and places. Larry On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 10:20 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Thanks to Greg! Just started Martin?s article. A good start. > Henry > > > On Jul 6, 2015, at 7:56 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > I've been reading, with some interest, Martin Packer's 2011 paper > > "Schooling: Domestication or Ontological Construction" which speaks to > this > > issue of an asymmetrical relationship and is somewhat critical of the > > long-standing CHAT assumptions with regard to this asymmetry. His paper > can > > be found under his papers on his academia.edu page: > > https://uniandes.academia.edu/MartinPacker > > > > I should add that I think that Nicaraguan Sign language may hold > particular > > potential for seeing just how creative (poietic) children can be on their > > own - a case in which the end was not present in the beginning, but the > > whole was present before the parts ("whole" in the very Durkheimian sense > > of the whole community). That's just me musing. > > > > Also, David, I just tried to download the piece you linked to and it says > > it is missing. Any suggestions? > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > >> Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of proximal > >> learning? And for whom? > >> > >> Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding and > >> the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one > moment--but a > >> rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, > but > >> not a zone of proximal development. > >> > >> The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the > >> respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that > >> collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not > >> involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making > >> decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, > >> collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation > is a > >> cell for capitalism. > >> > >> Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of > his > >> examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical > divisions of > >> labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter > and > >> subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and > radical > >> restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision > >> maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out > to > >> be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone > of > >> proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. > >> > >> I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" of > >> the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds > more or > >> less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the > subjective > >> (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except > that it > >> is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. > >> > >> We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in > >> Kangweondo. Here's the English version! > >> > >> > >> > https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools > >> > >> (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from > >> Korean education!) > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >> > >>> Annalisa, > >>> Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. > >> What > >>> a world! > >>> H > >>> > >>>> On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Henry, > >>>> > >>>> Clever mom! > >>>> > >>>> This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > >>>> > >>>> Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for > >>> many many reasons! > >>>> > >>>> So thanks for letting me share it! > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards, > >>>> > >>>> Annalisa > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 01:36:59 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 17:36:59 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry: I guess I think that "cooperation", where there is strong, well classified division of labor, is external, extra-mental, because the decision making function is not internalized by the child yet. But "collaboration", ideally, represents a moment where each child has internalized the "decision taker". But of course there's more to it than that--"cooperation" seems to be associated with Bernstein's elaborated code, and "collaboration" with the restricted one. Basil Bernstein was a working class kid himself, and he had a strong sense that he and other working class kids were at a strong LINGUISTIC disadvantage in school. It was as if the working class kids were attending school in a foreign language, while the middle class kids could just use the language that they used at home. But the vocabulary and a lot of the grammar really looked the same. So it wasn't until he met Michael Halliday that it became possible to describe some of the big SEMANTIC differences, which Bernstein described as differences in "coding orientation". If you are part of a social group that is mostly composed of identical, interchangeable units (that is laboring "collaborators" and not operating "cooperators") then you have certain linguistic tendencies: a) Encoding circumstances that are "here" and "now" (that is, talking about things that we can all see). b) Encoding participants that are either the speaker or hearer or very similar to the speaker and hearer (that is, talking about "me and you" or talking about others who are just like us). c) Encoding material processes and mental processes rather than relational or existential ones (that is, using lots of concrete actions rather than abstract relations, lots more verbs like "make up" than verbs like "constitute"). d) More use of "the", "this", "that", "there", "then", and "thus". Less complex noun phrases. e) More use of the direct and factual. Less use of the hypothetical and conditional. Bernstein called this collaborative orientation a "restricted" code, because it is a subset of the "elaborated code" that people use when they talk about things that are not in the visual purview, people who are not part of our world, abstract relations rather than concrete actions, and hypothetical and conditional worlds as well as the real one. Last week I pointed out the difference between: "Brother Barack" (assumes that we are all equal, interchangeable, "collaborators") "President Obama" (assumes that we are all individuated, noninterchangeable "coooperators") Consider the following two talks that Obama gave after the Charleston shootings, and you will see the difference: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9IGyidtfGI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPMYqURt9V0 In the first one, we hear the voice of "Brother Barack", while in the second you can hear "President Obama". Brother Barack speaks a restricted code--even his poetic language, e.g. "they believed in things unseen" avoids conditionals and hypotheticals, and draws heavily on concrete and graphic language. But President Obama uses a lot more modulation, a lot more hypothetical orientation. You won't be surprised to learn that Ruqaiya was very interested in Vygotsky and Luria. She thought that Vygotsky was too focused on word meanings (the difference between restricted and elaborated codes goes WELL beyond "everyday" and "academic" words). She also thought that Luria's work with Uzbek peasants and Uzbek school teachers showed different coding orientations, and not different vocabularies. I think there are really TWO ways of approaching the problem of coding orientation: a) We can try to make the home language more like school language. That is, use the language of "cooperation" and not collaboration at home. This was Vygotsky's way. b) We can also try to make school language much more like working class home language: concrete, vivid, here and now, factual. That is, use the language of "collaboration" and not simply cooperation at school. As Mike argues, it is possible to form concepts using everyday language. If it were not possible, then so-called primitives would never have concepts--but they do. (And if it were not possible, we primitive Western Europeans would never have bloody developed concepts either because for most of us the word is only ready when the concept is.) Of course, good parents do a lot of a) whenever they read to their children (this is probably why television is so bad for kids--it's all restricted code!) and good teachers do a lot of b) anyway (a good teaching example is always a pretty immediate, concrete, factual one that is meaningful to speaker and hearer and visualizable). And of course cooperation and collaboration are really just two different moments in the internalization of a function: first there is the division of labor between the decision-maker and the decision-obeyer, and only later is their fusion between the two. So what difference would b) really make in the classroom? A big difference. If we accept that b) is our goal, then we are going to have to accept that the main danger in teaching is that children will take the restricted, collaborative code we offer and stop there--that they will never learn to use that restricted, collaborated code to academic concepts and instead remain at the level of concrete, everyday thinking in concrete, everyday language. David Kellogg On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 10:45 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > About what David has just written: > > Seeing scaffolding as a moment in a zone of proximal learning works for > me, but why is it ?a rather extrreme and externalized moment"? > > I like the return to freedom a lot. Can?t talk about that too much. > > But I couldn?t pull up the paper he linked us up to, not a single one of > the 33,000 words! What?s wrong with me? > > Henry > > > On Jul 6, 2015, at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg dkellogg60@gmail.c>,om> wrote: > > > > Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of proximal > > learning? And for whom? > > > > Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding and > > the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one > moment--but a > > rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, > but > > not a zone of proximal development. > > > > The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the > > respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that > > collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not > > involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making > > decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, > > collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation is > a > > cell for capitalism. > > > > Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of > his > > examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical divisions > of > > labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter > and > > subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and > radical > > restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision > > maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out to > > be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone of > > proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. > > > > I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" of > > the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds more > or > > less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the > subjective > > (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except that > it > > is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. > > > > We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in > > Kangweondo. Here's the English version! > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools > > > > (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from > > Korean education!) > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> Annalisa, > >> Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. > What > >> a world! > >> H > >> > >>> On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>> > >>> Henry, > >>> > >>> Clever mom! > >>> > >>> This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > >>> > >>> Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for > >> many many reasons! > >>> > >>> So thanks for letting me share it! > >>> > >>> Kind regards, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Jul 8 07:55:02 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 14:55:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> , Message-ID: Sometimes a ZPD is just a scrum. Did you hear the one: "How many Vygotskian scholars does it take to change a lightbulb?" "None. The lightbulb has to want to change." :) I suppose the scholars can keep trying. I didn't know that children do not know how to cooperate or collaborate. I seem to see them doing it far more often than European politicians, that's for sure. Kind regards, Annalisa From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Wed Jul 8 08:19:18 2015 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (R.J.S.Parsons) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 15:19:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> , Message-ID: <559D3F74.2010502@open.ac.uk> Completely off topic, but, for what it's worth, my favourite is still the folk singer version. Q: How many folk singers does it take to change a lightbulb? A: Five. One to change it, and four to sing about how much nicer the old one was. To bring it slightly back on topic, I have just absorbed a presentation on emotional competencies in teaching, and I am pondering the role of humour in a zpd. Rob On 08/07/2015 15:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Sometimes a ZPD is just a scrum. > > Did you hear the one: > > "How many Vygotskian scholars does it take to change a lightbulb?" > > "None. The lightbulb has to want to change." > > :) > > I suppose the scholars can keep trying. > > I didn't know that children do not know how to cooperate or collaborate. I seem to see them doing it far more often than European politicians, that's for sure. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 08:47:08 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 09:47:08 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the first black republic and the first central American nation to declare independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. And yet, it happened. In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, innovation, and the "new"? With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian approach seems to be that the new development comes from the already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in the Haitian revolution. This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from without? I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or Haiti. Please. -greg ? On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent > in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > version of Cultural Model
>
Mr Mocombe, > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides > from my model on culture and education. > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 8 09:51:26 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 12:51:26 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model Message-ID: I agree greg with your assessment of newness in Vygotsky's model. ?I am tackling this in an article and forthcoming book titled, "the vodou ethic and the spirit of communism." In the work, I argue against the traditional understanding put forth by CLR JAMES that the leaders of the revolution were all "black jacobbins." ?I disagree, and argue that the newness of the haitian revolution stems from not the universal history of the west, but from the african metaphysical system of vodou and the subsistence agriculture ?and komes (what the haitian sociologist jean Casimir calls the counter-plantation system) it refied and recursively organized and reproduced. In writing this paper, I began to question the origins of new discourse or alternative structuring structures within Vygotsky as well as chomsky. ?In my view, the haitians who adopted the discourse of their former colonial slavemasters became a francophile neocolonial oligarchy, who discriminated against, as their white counterparts did, the african masses who embodied what I am calling the vodou ethic and the spirit of communism. ?It took the American occupation by racist southern whites for the haitian elite to recognize their own prejudices and racism towards the masses! Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:07/08/2015 11:47 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the first black republic and the first central American nation to declare independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. And yet, it happened. In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, innovation, and the "new"? With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian approach seems to be that the new development comes from the already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in the Haitian revolution. This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from without? I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or Haiti. Please. -greg ? On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent > in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > version of Cultural Model
>
Mr Mocombe, > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides > from my model on culture and education. > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 8 09:56:07 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 09:56:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my understanding to the question you pose. Your question : *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from without? * We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its bare bones to to its live performance. Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. mike PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the > Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of > History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to > the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the > first black republic and the first central American nation to declare > independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never > happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was > truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an > impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > And yet, it happened. > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this > might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, > innovation, and the "new"? > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So > then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian > approach seems to be that the new development comes from the > already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the > unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being > dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to > me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in > the Haitian revolution. > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece > as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the > "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from > without? > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or > Haiti. Please. > > -greg > > ? > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > wrote: > > > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent > > in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" > >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > > version of Cultural Model
> >
Mr Mocombe, > > > > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides > > from my model on culture and education. > > > > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: rose.felton.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1450821 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150708/5edcd495/attachment-0001.pdf From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 10:06:14 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 11:06:14 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I was going to read more carefully all of the readings that have been proferred lately, including: Martin?s piece, ?Schooling: Domestication or Ontolgical Construction (proffered by Greg), David?s piece, ?Between Lessons: The ZPD in Korean Schools?, but the dialog is moving along at such a pace that I wanted to jump in with something that just occurred to me: David has talked of collaboration and cooperation, but what about competition? That?s what a scrum is about, at least as it applies to rugby.(Thank you Annalisa!) That would raise the issue of who is on which ?side?. And how seriously we take the game, which likely depends on how serious and permanent the effects of winning and losing. Recognition and resilience have to be part of this. And culture. Has Vygotsky ever talked about the ZPD in as it plays out in a real classroom, where cooperation, collaboration and competition take place? For example, is the functional method of double stimulation done always with individual children? Come to think of it, did Piaget?s method involve working with more than one child? Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 9:47 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the > Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of > History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to > the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the > first black republic and the first central American nation to declare > independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never > happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was > truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an > impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > And yet, it happened. > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this > might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, > innovation, and the "new"? > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So > then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian > approach seems to be that the new development comes from the > already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the > unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being > dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to > me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in > the Haitian revolution. > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece > as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the > "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from without? > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or > Haiti. Please. > > -greg > > ? > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > >> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent >> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English >> version of Cultural Model
>>
Mr Mocombe, >> >> >> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides >> from my model on culture and education. >> >> >> Serge Madhere PhD >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 10:32:44 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 11:32:44 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: David, I think I'm beginning to understand what all the Bernsteinian hullabaloo is about. I have three thoughts about this. First, I wonder where we might place one of the most important orations (and perhaps the most important orator) of the 20th century in terms of elaborated vs. restricted codes. I'm thinking here of MLK and his "I have a dream" speech. Linguistically speaking, he is reporting his dream as if it were an actual existent - not a hypothetical. He presents the counterfactuals as a real and present factitive - a dream. And yet, at the same time, the content of his dream is entirely counterfactual. His idea of Mississippi as "an oasis of freedom and justice" is nothing if not counterfactual (in 1963, but perhaps still today). And yet, this is not the linguistic mode (code?) of "let's imagine" or "I hypothesize" or "what if?" as in some hypothetical non-present existent. Linguistically speaking, Mississippi IS an oasis of freedom and justice in a here and now existence - even if that existence is only in a dream. So, what do we make of this speech, given the notion of elaborated and restricted codes? As a code, I assume it is a restricted code. And yet it is doing all the counterfactual work of an elaborated code. [and if anyone wants to revisit the factitive counterfactual (or is it counterfactual facticity?) genius of the talk, here is a link to the transcript plus the original audio: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm] Second, you gave two options for remedying the problem of difference between the elaborated codes of the school and the restricted codes of the working class home - get parents to use elaborated codes in the home or get teachers to use restricted codes in the schools. I wonder about a third alternative to deal with this situation - acting lessons. I'm only half joking here - Lois Holzman has an institute that does very much the sort of thing that I have in mind here. But here I need to do some more back-tracking to some points where I (think I) disagree with Bernstein's (and Hasan's?) assumptions. Instead of assuming that these are abilities of the individuals in question, I would propose an identitarian approach to the restricted and elaborated codes problem. In this view, this difference has everything to do with who one sees oneself as (which has everything to do with who others see one as, as well as what kinds of inhabitable identities are "see-able" - recognition). Thus, the problem of elaborated vs. restricted codes is much more an issue of the kinds of talk that feel "natural" to the speaker (and Franz Fanon has dealt with the problem of speaking, bodies, and recognition very nicely in Black Skins, White Masks). Certain ways of using language (codes) will feel awkward to the speaker. I wonder if explicit teaching and practice can transform individuals such that they will be willing to feel comfortable (if only as an "actor" at first) in speaking codes that might feel awkward or even problematic for them. This follows the well-known logic of "fake it 'til you make it". I can specifically recall when I was presenting my master's thesis at a conference for the first time. When I got to the height of the performance of the high academic register of academic-ese (not easy!), I recall stumbling over the words "semiotic fecundity" - words which had been so easy to write but which now, as I performed them in front of an audience became quite a mouthful. And this is precisely the point - the challenge of "performing" in front of an audience - with all of the expectations that this brings - again, note the role of "recognition". There is a poetics to the matching of the "who we are" with the "how we talk" precisely because the latter is so often taken as a diagrammatic icon of the former. Take, for example, the many screeds that have been written about "bad" language - whether of the creeping variety of novel and youthful linguistic forms that pay no respect to tradition (like "like") or of the alternative varieties of "just bad language" such as African-American English - with its supposed illogics of double negation and copula deletions! So, the question then is: how do you get a child who has grown up feeling natural in one code to inhabit the identity that comes with speaking a different code? I think acting classes are one very important possibility. Finally, I came across an example that might help us think about the role of context with regard to restricted and elaborated codes. The example comes from Michael Silverstein's consideration of Don Brenneis' work among a Hindi speaking community in Fiji (they were brought there from India as migrant workers by British colonial powers). Brenneis documents two modes of talk that are used - one is for the formal pancayat context (the ritual governing body of the community), the other is used in the informal talanoa context (basically, "men's gossip"). Note that the type of talk used in the informal talanoa context (called jangli bat, or "jungle talk") is highly presupposing and involves "a low degree of explicit, orderly, and complete descriptive information, the kind, say, we claim we value in expository communication and inculcate in institutions of learning" (Silverstein 2013). Indeed, Brenneis notes that if you you only had transcripts of the conversation and were not a party to the talk and, more importantly, to the social life of those talking, you would have no idea what was happening in the conversations. Additionally, there is a discourse marker that is repeatedly used "bole", which means "says." Note that this is just a generic metapragmatic reportative and no indication is given with regard to WHO says (or even the specifics of WHAT exactly was said) just a narration of events that were "said" to have happened. This is about as restricted as a code can get. Yet, with regard to the context of this kind of talk, these "restrictions" of the code are precisely the point of this form of talk. They are highly functional and accomplish at least two things. First, they afford the speakers a certain amount of plausible deniability in the potentially profaning act (for object and for speaker...) of gossip. By poetically punctuating their speech with "says" without indicating who says (and certainly not the speaker who "says" this!), they remove themselves from the role of author or principal of the talk and all the responsibility that comes authoring gossip. Second, the use of "says" creates a sense in which the speaker is just reporting what is common knowledge in the community (and, of course, gossip always both is and isn't common knowledge). So, the point here is that the restricted code is entirely appropriate (even essential) in this context. To speak otherwise would be foolish. A bit too elaborate? -greg On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 2:36 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Henry: > > I guess I think that "cooperation", where there is strong, well classified > division of labor, is external, extra-mental, because the decision making > function is not internalized by the child yet. But "collaboration", > ideally, represents a moment where each child has internalized the > "decision taker". But of course there's more to it than that--"cooperation" > seems to be associated with Bernstein's elaborated code, and > "collaboration" with the restricted one. > > Basil Bernstein was a working class kid himself, and he had a strong sense > that he and other working class kids were at a strong LINGUISTIC > disadvantage in school. It was as if the working class kids were attending > school in a foreign language, while the middle class kids could just use > the language that they used at home. But the vocabulary and a lot of the > grammar really looked the same. So it wasn't until he met Michael Halliday > that it became possible to describe some of the big SEMANTIC differences, > which Bernstein described as differences in "coding orientation". If you > are part of a social group that is mostly composed of identical, > interchangeable units (that is laboring "collaborators" and not operating > "cooperators") then you have certain linguistic tendencies: > > > a) Encoding circumstances that are "here" and "now" (that is, talking about > things that we can all see). > > > b) Encoding participants that are either the speaker or hearer or very > similar to the speaker and hearer (that is, talking about "me and you" or > talking about others who are just like us). > > > c) Encoding material processes and mental processes rather than relational > or existential ones (that is, using lots of concrete actions rather than > abstract relations, lots more verbs like "make up" than verbs like > "constitute"). > > > d) More use of "the", "this", "that", "there", "then", and "thus". Less > complex noun phrases. > > > e) More use of the direct and factual. Less use of the hypothetical and > conditional. > > > Bernstein called this collaborative orientation a "restricted" code, > because it is a subset of the "elaborated code" that people use when they > talk about things that are not in the visual purview, people who are not > part of our world, abstract relations rather than concrete actions, and > hypothetical and conditional worlds as well as the real one. > > > Last week I pointed out the difference between: > > > "Brother Barack" (assumes that we are all equal, interchangeable, > "collaborators") > > > > "President Obama" (assumes that we are all individuated, noninterchangeable > "coooperators") > > > Consider the following two talks that Obama gave after the Charleston > shootings, and you will see the difference: > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9IGyidtfGI > > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPMYqURt9V0 > > > > > > In the first one, we hear the voice of "Brother Barack", while in the > second you can hear "President Obama". Brother Barack speaks a restricted > code--even his poetic language, e.g. "they believed in things unseen" > avoids conditionals and hypotheticals, and draws heavily on concrete and > graphic language. But President Obama uses a lot more modulation, a lot > more hypothetical orientation. > > > > You won't be surprised to learn that Ruqaiya was very interested in > Vygotsky and Luria. She thought that Vygotsky was too focused on word > meanings (the difference between restricted and elaborated codes goes WELL > beyond "everyday" and "academic" words). She also thought that Luria's work > with Uzbek peasants and Uzbek school teachers showed different coding > orientations, and not different vocabularies. > > > I think there are really TWO ways of approaching the problem of coding > orientation: > > > a) We can try to make the home language more like school language. That is, > use the language of "cooperation" and not collaboration at home. This was > Vygotsky's way. > > > b) We can also try to make school language much more like working class > home language: concrete, vivid, here and now, factual. That is, use the > language of "collaboration" and not simply cooperation at school. As Mike > argues, it is possible to form concepts using everyday language. If it were > not possible, then so-called primitives would never have concepts--but they > do. (And if it were not possible, we primitive Western Europeans would > never have bloody developed concepts either because for most of us the word > is only ready when the concept is.) > > > Of course, good parents do a lot of a) whenever they read to their children > (this is probably why television is so bad for kids--it's all restricted > code!) and good teachers do a lot of b) anyway (a good teaching example is > always a pretty immediate, concrete, factual one that is meaningful to > speaker and hearer and visualizable). > > > And of course cooperation and collaboration are really just two different > moments in the internalization of a function: first there is the division > of labor between the decision-maker and the decision-obeyer, and only later > is their fusion between the two. So what difference would b) really make in > the classroom? > > > A big difference. If we accept that b) is our goal, then we are going to > have to accept that the main danger in teaching is that children will take > the restricted, collaborative code we offer and stop there--that they will > never learn to use that restricted, collaborated code to academic concepts > and instead remain at the level of concrete, everyday thinking in concrete, > everyday language. > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 10:45 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > About what David has just written: > > > > Seeing scaffolding as a moment in a zone of proximal learning works for > > me, but why is it ?a rather extrreme and externalized moment"? > > > > I like the return to freedom a lot. Can?t talk about that too much. > > > > But I couldn?t pull up the paper he linked us up to, not a single one of > > the 33,000 words! What?s wrong with me? > > > > Henry > > > > > On Jul 6, 2015, at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg > dkellogg60@gmail.c>,om> wrote: > > > > > > Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of > proximal > > > learning? And for whom? > > > > > > Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding > and > > > the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one > > moment--but a > > > rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal learning, > > but > > > not a zone of proximal development. > > > > > > The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the > > > respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that > > > collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does not > > > involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making > > > decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, > > > collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation > is > > a > > > cell for capitalism. > > > > > > Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all of > > his > > > examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical > divisions > > of > > > labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, experimenter > > and > > > subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and > > radical > > > restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the decision > > > maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn out > to > > > be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a zone > of > > > proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. > > > > > > I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" > of > > > the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds > more > > or > > > less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the > > subjective > > > (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except > that > > it > > > is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. > > > > > > We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop in > > > Kangweondo. Here's the English version! > > > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools > > > > > > (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are from > > > Korean education!) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: > > > > > >> Annalisa, > > >> Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto Rico. > > What > > >> a world! > > >> H > > >> > > >>> On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Henry, > > >>> > > >>> Clever mom! > > >>> > > >>> This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > > >>> > > >>> Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... for > > >> many many reasons! > > >>> > > >>> So thanks for letting me share it! > > >>> > > >>> Kind regards, > > >>> > > >>> Annalisa > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 8 10:42:32 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 13:42:32 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model Message-ID: Mike, What I am interested in is the HOW would the new come from within a community of novices? ?W.E.B Du Bois (1803) suggested his "talented tenth" program for black america. ?That is, the talented tenth of black america educated in western society would be the new leaders of the community leading them to a "new" modernity without racism (as the old modernity was built of the intellectual inferiority of the so-called negro) . ?E. Franklin Frazier (1936) argued instead they became a simulacra of white folks, "the black bourgeoisie." ?Carter g. Woodson (1933) took it further and argued they became miseducated. ? Historically speaking, in the african diaspora, the majority of the african novices in modernity did not create anything new. ?The majority reproduced the discourse and discursive practices of their former colonial masters, what frantz fanon called black - skinned white masked individuals. Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:07/08/2015 12:56 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my understanding to the question you pose. Your question : *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from without? * We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its bare bones to to its live performance. Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. mike PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the > Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of > History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to > the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the > first black republic and the first central American nation to declare > independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never > happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was > truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an > impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > And yet, it happened. > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this > might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, > innovation, and the "new"? > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So > then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian > approach seems to be that the new development comes from the > already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the > unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being > dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to > me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in > the Haitian revolution. > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece > as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the > "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from > without? > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or > Haiti. Please. > > -greg > > ? > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > wrote: > > > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent > > in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" > >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > > version of Cultural Model
> >
Mr Mocombe, > > > > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides > > from my model on culture and education. > > > > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 10:49:42 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 11:49:42 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This may add absolutely nothing to this discussion, so I will keep it short: One might have thought that the French of the court and the church during the centuries-long Norman occupation of England beginning with the Norman conquest in 1066 would have resulted in French as the national language. Yet the Elizabethan miracle, Shakespeare and all, was an English one. Today English is as much the lingua franca of the world as Latin was of Europe back when. How did this happen? AAEV has had a tremendous impact on world English through popular music. Who could have known this would be a major outcome of slavery? What is taken as the ideal over the long haul of history, how do we predict that? In the meantime, what should schools be doing if not getting youth ready for the future? But how can we possibly do this if we don?t leafve a space for spontaneous in conceptual development? Potential. Creativity. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:56 AM, mike cole wrote: > > I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am > not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so > can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many > knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. > > > I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my > understanding to the question you pose. Your question : > > *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) > rather than from without? * > > We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation > is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural > Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton > (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has > been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems > to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of > novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's > description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to > watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors > of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems > like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its > bare bones to to its live performance. > > Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence > Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. > > mike > > > PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. > > someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and > > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the >> Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of >> History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to >> the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the >> first black republic and the first central American nation to declare >> independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. >> In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never >> happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was >> truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an >> impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. >> >> And yet, it happened. >> >> In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the >> (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this >> might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, >> innovation, and the "new"? >> >> With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So >> then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian >> approach seems to be that the new development comes from the >> already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the >> unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being >> dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to >> me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in >> the Haitian revolution. >> >> This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece >> as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the >> "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from >> without? >> >> I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or >> Haiti. Please. >> >> -greg >> >> ? >> >> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com >>> wrote: >> >>> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent >>> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. >>> >>> >>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >>>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English >>> version of Cultural Model
>>>
Mr Mocombe, >>> >>> >>> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides >>> from my model on culture and education. >>> >>> >>> Serge Madhere PhD >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > > -- > > All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 8 10:53:11 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 10:53:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Perhaps your response is more relevant to Greg's question than my answer, Paul. So far as i know, analysis of the work I refer to has not been extended to include conditions of interaction where power differentials emerge and are important to the shape of things to come. Nor do I recall anything about the levels of intra-group consensus. Maybe the majority were mute! mike On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 10:42 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Mike, > > What I am interested in is the HOW would the new come from within a > community of novices? W.E.B Du Bois (1803) suggested his "talented tenth" > program for black america. That is, the talented tenth of black america > educated in western society would be the new leaders of the community > leading them to a "new" modernity without racism (as the old modernity was > built of the intellectual inferiority of the so-called negro) . E. > Franklin Frazier (1936) argued instead they became a simulacra of white > folks, "the black bourgeoisie." Carter g. Woodson (1933) took it further > and argued they became miseducated. > > Historically speaking, in the african diaspora, the majority of the > african novices in modernity did not create anything new. The majority > reproduced the discourse and discursive practices of their former colonial > masters, what frantz fanon called black - skinned white masked individuals. > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:07/08/2015 12:56 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
>
I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, > Greg. I am > not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so > can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many > knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. > > > I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my > understanding to the question you pose. Your question : > > *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) > rather than from without? * > > We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation > is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural > Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton > (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has > been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems > to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of > novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's > description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to > watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors > of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems > like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its > bare bones to to its live performance. > > Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence > Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. > > mike > > > PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. > > someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and > > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the > > Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of > > History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points > to > > the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the > > first black republic and the first central American nation to declare > > independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. > > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it > never > > happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was > > truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an > > impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > > > And yet, it happened. > > > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this > > might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, > > innovation, and the "new"? > > > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. > So > > then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian > > approach seems to be that the new development comes from the > > already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the > > unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being > > dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to > > me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in > > the Haitian revolution. > > > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece > > as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the > > "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from > > without? > > > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or > > Haiti. Please. > > > > -greg > > > > ? > > > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > > wrote: > > > > > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I > sent > > > in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, > Serge" > > >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) > > >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > > > version of Cultural Model
> > >
Mr Mocombe, > > > > > > > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the > slides > > > from my model on culture and education. > > > > > > > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > > All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jul 8 10:59:46 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 17:59:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD380A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Paul, Gregg, Mike and all, Everett Rogers, who I am coming to like more and more, suggests that innovation, which I guess I am using as a stand in for newness, does not come so much from the size of the group as the structure of the group - that is do they have a smaller group that they give and time and resources to experiment and then the status to disseminate the newness to the larger social group. Rogers also differentiates between centralized diffusion of innovations and decentralized diffusion of innovations. In centralized diffusion of innovation the core experimenters are considered to have specific status within the society and any innovation must progress top down from these institutional/social groups. I like the Finnish Activity Theory reading on this (and let me be clear I am a novice on this and I get it more from Hakkarainen than Engestrom) that experimenters then have to work or find a way to convince these top down institutional gatekeepers of the value of the innovation to the larger society (something Rogers found it was very difficult for outsiders to actually do, making me question this idea of training others outside of the cultural group perhaps speaking to Paul's post. Decentralized innovation is much more difficult in static communities but I think is more possible in more targeted specific groups. This Rogers suggests is dependent on a non-hierarchical development of innovations, passing both experimentation and dissemination of positive developments back and forth between group members rather than depending of on top down. The danger in this is that all members of the group have to be able to work together in managing both the experimental and the diffusion processes. Rogers suggests this for instance occurs in heavily agricultural communities, and reading some of the history of agricultural reform in South America this sounds extremely plausible. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2015 1:43 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Madhere, Serge Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model Mike, What I am interested in is the HOW would the new come from within a community of novices? ?W.E.B Du Bois (1803) suggested his "talented tenth" program for black america. ?That is, the talented tenth of black america educated in western society would be the new leaders of the community leading them to a "new" modernity without racism (as the old modernity was built of the intellectual inferiority of the so-called negro) . ?E. Franklin Frazier (1936) argued instead they became a simulacra of white folks, "the black bourgeoisie." ?Carter g. Woodson (1933) took it further and argued they became miseducated. ? Historically speaking, in the african diaspora, the majority of the african novices in modernity did not create anything new. ?The majority reproduced the discourse and discursive practices of their former colonial masters, what frantz fanon called black - skinned white masked individuals. Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:07/08/2015 12:56 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my understanding to the question you pose. Your question : *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from without? * We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its bare bones to to its live performance. Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. mike PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on > the Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production > of History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot > points to the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - > here was the first black republic and the first central American > nation to declare independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it > never happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its > happening, it was truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black > populace was an impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > And yet, it happened. > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if > this might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis > creativity, innovation, and the "new"? > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into > being. So then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default > Vygotsky-ian approach seems to be that the new development comes from > the already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down > the unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as > being dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This > seems to me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was > "nothing new" in the Haitian revolution. > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's > piece as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we > imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather > than from without? > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, > and/or Haiti. Please. > > -greg > > ? > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > wrote: > > > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I > > sent in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" > >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM > > (GMT-05:00) > >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > > version of Cultural Model
Mr Mocombe, > > > > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the > > slides from my model on culture and education. > > > > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 11:00:46 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 12:00:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Henry, I guess I was wondering less about collaboration, cooperation, or even competition and more about "collusion"! What happens when supposed novices "collude"? (whether in the case of Haiti or NSL). -greg On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 11:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I was going to read more carefully all of the readings that have been > proferred lately, including: Martin?s piece, ?Schooling: Domestication or > Ontolgical Construction (proffered by Greg), David?s piece, ?Between > Lessons: The ZPD in Korean Schools?, but the dialog is moving along at such > a pace that I wanted to jump in with something that just occurred to me: > David has talked of collaboration and cooperation, but what about > competition? That?s what a scrum is about, at least as it applies to > rugby.(Thank you Annalisa!) That would raise the issue of who is on which > ?side?. And how seriously we take the game, which likely depends on how > serious and permanent the effects of winning and losing. Recognition and > resilience have to be part of this. And culture. Has Vygotsky ever talked > about the ZPD in as it plays out in a real classroom, where cooperation, > collaboration and competition take place? For example, is the functional > method of double stimulation done always with individual children? Come to > think of it, did Piaget?s method involve working with more than one child? > > Henry > > > > > On Jul 8, 2015, at 9:47 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the > > Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of > > History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points > to > > the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the > > first black republic and the first central American nation to declare > > independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. > > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it > never > > happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was > > truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an > > impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > > > And yet, it happened. > > > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this > > might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, > > innovation, and the "new"? > > > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. > So > > then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian > > approach seems to be that the new development comes from the > > already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the > > unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being > > dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to > > me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in > > the Haitian revolution. > > > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece > > as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the > > "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from > without? > > > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or > > Haiti. Please. > > > > -greg > > > > ? > > > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > >> wrote: > > > >> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I > sent > >> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > >> > >> > >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >> > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" > >>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) > >>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > >> version of Cultural Model
> >>
Mr Mocombe, > >> > >> > >> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides > >> from my model on culture and education. > >> > >> > >> Serge Madhere PhD > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 11:06:17 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 12:06:17 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7A1C1FF9-0A73-40E3-8B57-7191334656F5@gmail.com> I wonder if there is a connection here with the ?unschooling? movements out there amongst the mainstream, or the ?deschooling? of Ivan Illich. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 11:53 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Perhaps your response is more relevant to Greg's question than my answer, > Paul. > > So far as i know, analysis of the work I refer to has not been extended to > include conditions of interaction where power differentials emerge and are > important to the shape of things to come. Nor do I recall anything about > the levels of intra-group consensus. Maybe the majority were mute! > mike > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 10:42 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >> Mike, >> >> What I am interested in is the HOW would the new come from within a >> community of novices? W.E.B Du Bois (1803) suggested his "talented tenth" >> program for black america. That is, the talented tenth of black america >> educated in western society would be the new leaders of the community >> leading them to a "new" modernity without racism (as the old modernity was >> built of the intellectual inferiority of the so-called negro) . E. >> Franklin Frazier (1936) argued instead they became a simulacra of white >> folks, "the black bourgeoisie." Carter g. Woodson (1933) took it further >> and argued they became miseducated. >> >> Historically speaking, in the african diaspora, the majority of the >> african novices in modernity did not create anything new. The majority >> reproduced the discourse and discursive practices of their former colonial >> masters, what frantz fanon called black - skinned white masked individuals. >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:07/08/2015 12:56 PM (GMT-05:00) >>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: >> [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
>>
I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, >> Greg. I am >> not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so >> can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many >> knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. >> >> >> I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my >> understanding to the question you pose. Your question : >> >> *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) >> rather than from without? * >> >> We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation >> is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural >> Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton >> (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has >> been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems >> to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of >> novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's >> description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to >> watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors >> of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems >> like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its >> bare bones to to its live performance. >> >> Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence >> Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. >> >> mike >> >> >> PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. >> >> someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the >>> Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of >>> History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points >> to >>> the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the >>> first black republic and the first central American nation to declare >>> independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. >>> In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it >> never >>> happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was >>> truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an >>> impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. >>> >>> And yet, it happened. >>> >>> In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the >>> (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this >>> might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, >>> innovation, and the "new"? >>> >>> With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. >> So >>> then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian >>> approach seems to be that the new development comes from the >>> already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the >>> unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being >>> dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to >>> me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in >>> the Haitian revolution. >>> >>> This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece >>> as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the >>> "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from >>> without? >>> >>> I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or >>> Haiti. Please. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> ? >>> >>> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I >> sent >>>> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. >>>> >>>> >>>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, >> Serge" >>>>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English >>>> version of Cultural Model
>>>>
Mr Mocombe, >>>> >>>> >>>> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the >> slides >>>> from my model on culture and education. >>>> >>>> >>>> Serge Madhere PhD >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* >> > > > > -- > > All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 11:17:38 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 12:17:38 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, I see your point. But what about recognition? And if we?re talking about dissemination, ?change the narrative? with some collusion that catches the popular eye? I have wondered if the Fifth Dimension isn?t meant to be like that. At least from the perspective of the youth. Heroes. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 12:00 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Henry, > I guess I was wondering less about collaboration, cooperation, or even > competition and more about "collusion"! > > What happens when supposed novices "collude"? > (whether in the case of Haiti or NSL). > > -greg > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 11:06 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> I was going to read more carefully all of the readings that have been >> proferred lately, including: Martin?s piece, ?Schooling: Domestication or >> Ontolgical Construction (proffered by Greg), David?s piece, ?Between >> Lessons: The ZPD in Korean Schools?, but the dialog is moving along at such >> a pace that I wanted to jump in with something that just occurred to me: >> David has talked of collaboration and cooperation, but what about >> competition? That?s what a scrum is about, at least as it applies to >> rugby.(Thank you Annalisa!) That would raise the issue of who is on which >> ?side?. And how seriously we take the game, which likely depends on how >> serious and permanent the effects of winning and losing. Recognition and >> resilience have to be part of this. And culture. Has Vygotsky ever talked >> about the ZPD in as it plays out in a real classroom, where cooperation, >> collaboration and competition take place? For example, is the functional >> method of double stimulation done always with individual children? Come to >> think of it, did Piaget?s method involve working with more than one child? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Jul 8, 2015, at 9:47 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >>> >>> ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the >>> Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of >>> History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points >> to >>> the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the >>> first black republic and the first central American nation to declare >>> independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. >>> In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it >> never >>> happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was >>> truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an >>> impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. >>> >>> And yet, it happened. >>> >>> In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the >>> (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this >>> might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, >>> innovation, and the "new"? >>> >>> With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. >> So >>> then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian >>> approach seems to be that the new development comes from the >>> already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the >>> unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being >>> dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to >>> me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in >>> the Haitian revolution. >>> >>> This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece >>> as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the >>> "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from >> without? >>> >>> I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or >>> Haiti. Please. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> ? >>> >>> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I >> sent >>>> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. >>>> >>>> >>>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >>>>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English >>>> version of Cultural Model
>>>>
Mr Mocombe, >>>> >>>> >>>> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides >>>> from my model on culture and education. >>>> >>>> >>>> Serge Madhere PhD >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 8 11:24:06 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 14:24:06 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model Message-ID: <31x9fvypul5d8v6miwqesg49.1436379823037@email.android.com> Henry, That is the vision the haitian academy of kreyol has for the kreyol language and culture... a sphere of influence dominated ?by haiti... Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/08/2015 1:49 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model
This may add absolutely nothing to this discussion, so I will keep it short: One might have thought that the French of the court and the church during the centuries-long Norman occupation of England beginning with the Norman conquest in 1066 would have resulted in French as the national language. Yet the Elizabethan miracle, Shakespeare and all, was an English one. Today English is as much the lingua franca of the world as Latin was of Europe back when. How did this happen? AAEV has had a tremendous impact on world English through popular music. Who could have known this would be a major outcome of slavery? What is taken as the ideal over the long haul of history, how do we predict that? In the meantime, what should schools be doing if not getting youth ready for the future? But how can we possibly do this if we don?t leafve a space for spontaneous in conceptual development? Potential. Creativity. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:56 AM, mike cole wrote: > > I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am > not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so > can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many > knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. > > > I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my > understanding to the question you pose. Your question : > > *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) > rather than from without? * > > We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation > is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural > Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton > (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has > been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems > to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of > novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's > description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to > watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors > of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems > like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its > bare bones to to its live performance. > > Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence > Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. > > mike > > > PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. > > someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and > > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the >> Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of >> History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to >> the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the >> first black republic and the first central American nation to declare >> independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. >> In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never >> happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was >> truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an >> impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. >> >> And yet, it happened. >> >> In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the >> (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this >> might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, >> innovation, and the "new"? >> >> With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So >> then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian >> approach seems to be that the new development comes from the >> already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the >> unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being >> dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to >> me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in >> the Haitian revolution. >> >> This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece >> as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the >> "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from >> without? >> >> I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or >> Haiti. Please. >> >> -greg >> >> ? >> >> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com >>> wrote: >> >>> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent >>> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. >>> >>> >>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >>>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English >>> version of Cultural Model
>>>
Mr Mocombe, >>> >>> >>> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides >>> from my model on culture and education. >>> >>> >>> Serge Madhere PhD >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > > -- > > All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 8 11:25:28 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 14:25:28 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model Message-ID: <5wyph4xxc296n8r6rvgib64v.1436379928251@email.android.com> I raise the question to you mike bcuz I am trying to understand how education and schooling is not an ideological apparatus? Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:07/08/2015 1:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
Perhaps your response is more relevant to Greg's question than my answer, Paul. So far as i know, analysis of the work I refer to has not been extended to include conditions of interaction where power differentials emerge and are important to the shape of things to come. Nor do I recall anything about the levels of intra-group consensus. Maybe the majority were mute! mike On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 10:42 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Mike, > > What I am interested in is the HOW would the new come from within a > community of novices? W.E.B Du Bois (1803) suggested his "talented tenth" > program for black america. That is, the talented tenth of black america > educated in western society would be the new leaders of the community > leading them to a "new" modernity without racism (as the old modernity was > built of the intellectual inferiority of the so-called negro) . E. > Franklin Frazier (1936) argued instead they became a simulacra of white > folks, "the black bourgeoisie." Carter g. Woodson (1933) took it further > and argued they became miseducated. > > Historically speaking, in the african diaspora, the majority of the > african novices in modernity did not create anything new. The majority > reproduced the discourse and discursive practices of their former colonial > masters, what frantz fanon called black - skinned white masked individuals. > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:07/08/2015 12:56 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
>
I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, > Greg. I am > not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so > can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many > knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. > > > I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my > understanding to the question you pose. Your question : > > *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) > rather than from without? * > > We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation > is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural > Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton > (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has > been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems > to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of > novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's > description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to > watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors > of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems > like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its > bare bones to to its live performance. > > Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence > Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. > > mike > > > PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. > > someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and > > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the > > Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of > > History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points > to > > the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the > > first black republic and the first central American nation to declare > > independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. > > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it > never > > happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was > > truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an > > impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > > > And yet, it happened. > > > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this > > might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, > > innovation, and the "new"? > > > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. > So > > then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian > > approach seems to be that the new development comes from the > > already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the > > unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being > > dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to > > me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in > > the Haitian revolution. > > > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece > > as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the > > "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from > > without? > > > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or > > Haiti. Please. > > > > -greg > > > > ? > > > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > > wrote: > > > > > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I > sent > > > in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, > Serge" > > >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) > > >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > > > version of Cultural Model
> > >
Mr Mocombe, > > > > > > > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the > slides > > > from my model on culture and education. > > > > > > > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > > All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 8 11:27:24 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 14:27:24 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model Message-ID: Michael g.. interesting reading, which I think fits the haitian model. Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: "Glassman, Michael"
Date:07/08/2015 1:59 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
Paul, Gregg, Mike and all, Everett Rogers, who I am coming to like more and more, suggests that innovation, which I guess I am using as a stand in for newness, does not come so much from the size of the group as the structure of the group - that is do they have a smaller group that they give and time and resources to experiment and then the status to disseminate the newness to the larger social group. Rogers also differentiates between centralized diffusion of innovations and decentralized diffusion of innovations. In centralized diffusion of innovation the core experimenters are considered to have specific status within the society and any innovation must progress top down from these institutional/social groups. I like the Finnish Activity Theory reading on this (and let me be clear I am a novice on this and I get it more from Hakkarainen than Engestrom) that experimenters then have to work or find a way to convince these top down institutional gatekeepers of the value of the innovation to the larger society (something Rogers found it was very difficult for outsiders to actually do, making me question this idea of training others outside of the cultural group perhaps speaking to Paul's post. Decentralized innovation is much more difficult in static communities but I think is more possible in more targeted specific groups. This Rogers suggests is dependent on a non-hierarchical development of innovations, passing both experimentation and dissemination of positive developments back and forth between group members rather than depending of on top down. The danger in this is that all members of the group have to be able to work together in managing both the experimental and the diffusion processes. Rogers suggests this for instance occurs in heavily agricultural communities, and reading some of the history of agricultural reform in South America this sounds extremely plausible. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2015 1:43 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Madhere, Serge Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model Mike, What I am interested in is the HOW would the new come from within a community of novices? W.E.B Du Bois (1803) suggested his "talented tenth" program for black america. That is, the talented tenth of black america educated in western society would be the new leaders of the community leading them to a "new" modernity without racism (as the old modernity was built of the intellectual inferiority of the so-called negro) . E. Franklin Frazier (1936) argued instead they became a simulacra of white folks, "the black bourgeoisie." Carter g. Woodson (1933) took it further and argued they became miseducated. Historically speaking, in the african diaspora, the majority of the african novices in modernity did not create anything new. The majority reproduced the discourse and discursive practices of their former colonial masters, what frantz fanon called black - skinned white masked individuals. Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:07/08/2015 12:56 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my understanding to the question you pose. Your question : *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from without? * We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its bare bones to to its live performance. Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. mike PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on > the Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production > of History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot > points to the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - > here was the first black republic and the first central American > nation to declare independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it > never happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its > happening, it was truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black > populace was an impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > And yet, it happened. > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if > this might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis > creativity, innovation, and the "new"? > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into > being. So then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default > Vygotsky-ian approach seems to be that the new development comes from > the already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down > the unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as > being dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This > seems to me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was > "nothing new" in the Haitian revolution. > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's > piece as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we > imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather > than from without? > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, > and/or Haiti. Please. > > -greg > > ? > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > wrote: > > > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I > > sent in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" > >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM > > (GMT-05:00) > >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > > version of Cultural Model
Mr Mocombe, > > > > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the > > slides from my model on culture and education. > > > > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 8 11:34:44 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 11:34:44 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: <5wyph4xxc296n8r6rvgib64v.1436379928251@email.android.com> References: <5wyph4xxc296n8r6rvgib64v.1436379928251@email.android.com> Message-ID: How could education and schooling note be an ideological practice, Paul? As i said, I appear to have responded to Greg's message at the wrong level or in the wrong way. mike On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 11:25 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > I raise the question to you mike bcuz I am trying to understand how > education and schooling is not an ideological apparatus? > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:07/08/2015 1:53 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Cc: "Madhere, Serge"
Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
>
Perhaps your response is more relevant to Greg's question than my > answer, > Paul. > > So far as i know, analysis of the work I refer to has not been extended to > include conditions of interaction where power differentials emerge and are > important to the shape of things to come. Nor do I recall anything about > the levels of intra-group consensus. Maybe the majority were mute! > mike > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 10:42 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > Mike, > > > > What I am interested in is the HOW would the new come from within a > > community of novices? W.E.B Du Bois (1803) suggested his "talented > tenth" > > program for black america. That is, the talented tenth of black america > > educated in western society would be the new leaders of the community > > leading them to a "new" modernity without racism (as the old modernity > was > > built of the intellectual inferiority of the so-called negro) . E. > > Franklin Frazier (1936) argued instead they became a simulacra of white > > folks, "the black bourgeoisie." Carter g. Woodson (1933) took it further > > and argued they became miseducated. > > > > Historically speaking, in the african diaspora, the majority of the > > african novices in modernity did not create anything new. The majority > > reproduced the discourse and discursive practices of their former > colonial > > masters, what frantz fanon called black - skinned white masked > individuals. > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:07/08/2015 12:56 PM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >
Cc: "Madhere, Serge" >
Subject: > > [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: English version of Cultural Model
> >
I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, > > Greg. I am > > not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, > so > > can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many > > knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. > > > > > > I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my > > understanding to the question you pose. Your question : > > > > *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) > > rather than from without? * > > > > We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct > observation > > is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural > > Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton > > (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which > has > > been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it > seems > > to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of > > novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen > Fine's > > description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to > > watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors > > of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems > > like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its > > bare bones to to its live performance. > > > > Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence > > Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. > > > > mike > > > > > > PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. > > > > someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on > the > > > Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of > > > History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points > > to > > > the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was > the > > > first black republic and the first central American nation to declare > > > independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about > it. > > > In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it > > never > > > happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it > was > > > truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an > > > impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. > > > > > > And yet, it happened. > > > > > > In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the > > > (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if > this > > > might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, > > > innovation, and the "new"? > > > > > > With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into > being. > > So > > > then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default > Vygotsky-ian > > > approach seems to be that the new development comes from the > > > already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the > > > unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being > > > dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems > to > > > me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" > in > > > the Haitian revolution. > > > > > > This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's > piece > > > as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the > > > "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from > > > without? > > > > > > I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, > and/or > > > Haiti. Please. > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > ? > > > > > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I > > sent > > > > in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, > > Serge" > > > >
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM > (GMT-05:00) > > > >
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English > > > > version of Cultural Model
> > > >
Mr Mocombe, > > > > > > > > > > > > As you requested, please find attached the English version of the > > slides > > > > from my model on culture and education. > > > > > > > > > > > > Serge Madhere PhD > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > > you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > > that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* > > > > > > -- > > All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 8 12:26:59 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 12:26:59 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Spinoza-- the movie Message-ID: Complements of Ilya Garber. mike https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zbDGDdoq-o -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Jul 8 14:01:59 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 21:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza-- the movie In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks for the CANDY! :) From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 14:06:34 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 15:06:34 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: <31x9fvypul5d8v6miwqesg49.1436379823037@email.android.com> References: <31x9fvypul5d8v6miwqesg49.1436379823037@email.android.com> Message-ID: <9122A57E-71B0-4A23-AD4E-EE9919F05544@gmail.com> Paul and all, Could I say that the Haitian Academy (top down) of Kreyol (bottom up) is a cultural experiment at a large scale, while the work of Rose Felton and Mike Cole is at a smaller scale? What seems to me is that Martin is suggesting we take the bottom up more seriously and leadership less seriously. Balance things out. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 12:24 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Henry, > > That is the vision the haitian academy of kreyol has for the kreyol language and culture... a sphere of influence dominated by haiti... > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/08/2015 1:49 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model
>
This may add absolutely nothing to this discussion, so I will keep it short: > > One might have thought that the French of the court and the church during the centuries-long Norman occupation of England beginning with the Norman conquest in 1066 would have resulted in French as the national language. Yet the Elizabethan miracle, Shakespeare and all, was an English one. Today English is as much the lingua franca of the world as Latin was of Europe back when. How did this happen? AAEV has had a tremendous impact on world English through popular music. Who could have known this would be a major outcome of slavery? > > What is taken as the ideal over the long haul of history, how do we predict that? In the meantime, what should schools be doing if not getting youth ready for the future? But how can we possibly do this if we don?t leafve a space for spontaneous in conceptual development? Potential. Creativity. > > Henry > > > > >> On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:56 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am >> not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so >> can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many >> knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. >> >> >> I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my >> understanding to the question you pose. Your question : >> >> *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) >> rather than from without? * >> >> We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation >> is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural >> Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton >> (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has >> been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems >> to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of >> novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's >> description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to >> watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors >> of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems >> like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its >> bare bones to to its live performance. >> >> Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence >> Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. >> >> mike >> >> >> PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. >> >> someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the >>> Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of >>> History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to >>> the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the >>> first black republic and the first central American nation to declare >>> independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. >>> In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never >>> happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was >>> truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an >>> impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. >>> >>> And yet, it happened. >>> >>> In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the >>> (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this >>> might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, >>> innovation, and the "new"? >>> >>> With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So >>> then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian >>> approach seems to be that the new development comes from the >>> already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the >>> unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being >>> dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to >>> me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in >>> the Haitian revolution. >>> >>> This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece >>> as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the >>> "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from >>> without? >>> >>> I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or >>> Haiti. Please. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> ? >>> >>> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent >>>> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. >>>> >>>> >>>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >>>>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English >>>> version of Cultural Model
>>>>
Mr Mocombe, >>>> >>>> >>>> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides >>>> from my model on culture and education. >>>> >>>> >>>> Serge Madhere PhD >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 14:28:59 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 06:28:59 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> Message-ID: Greg: Consider the following several ways of stating the same idea: a) Is is the was of what shall be. b) The child is father of the man. c) Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. I think that at bottom all of these propositions merely state the idea which you appear to impute to Vygotsky: that the only means of breaching the gap between the interpersonal and the social is through highly asymmetrical forms of interaction that confront the beginning of development with its end. That this is not what Vygotsky meant at all is clear from "The Problem of the Environment", where he clearly says that the confrontation of the beginning and the end of development is what makes onotogeny different from phylogeny, and from the easily overlooked fact (I just overlooked it) that Vygotsky does not say "confront" but rather "guide". But they state it in very different ways, and as a result the idea is not exactly the same. The first one a) uses a kind of reification--the verb "is" is made into an entity that we can reflect on, transform and talk about. Halliday calls this grammatical metaphor--he means that a wording which is canonically used to do one thing is used to do something quite different. In this case, a process is made to do the job of an entity. In interpersonal metaphors, a question can be used to do the job of a command ("May I have your attention--please!!") and similar grammatical feints were used by Newton in the Opticks ("For those Convex glasses supply the defect of Plumpness in the Eye, and by increasing the Refraction make the Rays converge sooner') and are used today, e.g. when we speak of "increased crack growth rate" in scientific papers (Examples all from Halliday, 2006, the Language of Science). The second one b) is closer to your "I have a dream" speech. There is no grammatical metaphor going on here, but there's a lot of lexical metaphor. The reason why it's so hard to understand is that we are used to hearing "man" as the general lexical metaphor that stands in for me and you, and instead we first hear "the child". But of course that difficulty in understanding is precisely what makes it satisfying and memorable when we do understand. More on this delayed gratification later, because I think ultimately it's that side that you (that is, Greg) will recognize from your own work on how anodyne forms of counseling which merely reinforce what children already know can actually retard development. As Greg points out, this is figurative language--and figurative language absolutely does have the meaning potential to form true concepts, just as imaginary roles have the meaning potential to be transformed into abstract rules. The third one is both grammatical and lexical metaphor. That is, the process of "to grow" is grammatically reified as "growth" and then relexicalized as "ontogeny", and something fairly similar is happening with "phylogeny" on a different time scale. Were it not for the crucial, qualitative, difference that Vygotsky notes, ontogeny and phylogeny would be related the way that weather and climate are related--they are the same process viewed from two different standpoints, one close and one far away. Do these three formulations really contain one and the same idea? Yes and no--you can see that you can get to the third idea through the first two. But you can also see that it's laborious and the meaning changes quite a bit along the way. It seems to me that the major danger--in counselling education, but also in education quite generally--is that when we give ideas like this rather "child friendly" interpretations, the child will sometimes assume that we are simply teaching what the child already knows, and remain at the level of commonsense language and commonsense thinking. As P.G. Wodehouse puts it: "The boy is the father of the man." She appeared not to have heard. "The boy," I repeated, not wishing her to miss that one, "is the father of the man." "What are you talking about?" "I'm talking about this Glossop." "I thought you said something about somebody's father." "I said the boy was the father of the man." "What boy?" "The boy Glossop." "He hasn't got a father." "I never said he had. I said he was the father of the boy--or, rather, of the man." "What man?" I saw that the conversation had reached a point where, unless care was taken, we should be muddled. (Right Ho, Jeeves) David Kellogg b) It's always dangerous to disagree before you've actually read anything. On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 at 2:32 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > David, > I think I'm beginning to understand what all the Bernsteinian hullabaloo is > about. I have three thoughts about this. > > First, I wonder where we might place one of the most important orations > (and perhaps the most important orator) of the 20th century in terms of > elaborated vs. restricted codes. I'm thinking here of MLK and his "I have a > dream" speech. Linguistically speaking, he is reporting his dream as if it > were an actual existent - not a hypothetical. He presents the > counterfactuals as a real and present factitive - a dream. And yet, at the > same time, the content of his dream is entirely counterfactual. His idea of > Mississippi as "an oasis of freedom and justice" is nothing if not > counterfactual (in 1963, but perhaps still today). And yet, this is not the > linguistic mode (code?) of "let's imagine" or "I hypothesize" or "what if?" > as in some hypothetical non-present existent. Linguistically speaking, > Mississippi IS an oasis of freedom and justice in a here and now existence > - even if that existence is only in a dream. > > So, what do we make of this speech, given the notion of elaborated and > restricted codes? As a code, I assume it is a restricted code. And yet it > is doing all the counterfactual work of an elaborated code. [and if anyone > wants to revisit the factitive counterfactual (or is it counterfactual > facticity?) genius of the talk, here is a link to the transcript plus the > original audio: > http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm] > > Second, you gave two options for remedying the problem of difference > between the elaborated codes of the school and the restricted codes of the > working class home - get parents to use elaborated codes in the home or get > teachers to use restricted codes in the schools. I wonder about a third > alternative to deal with this situation - acting lessons. I'm only half > joking here - Lois Holzman has an institute that does very much the sort of > thing that I have in mind here. But here I need to do some more > back-tracking to some points where I (think I) disagree with Bernstein's > (and Hasan's?) assumptions. Instead of assuming that these are abilities of > the individuals in question, I would propose an identitarian approach to > the restricted and elaborated codes problem. In this view, this difference > has everything to do with who one sees oneself as (which has everything to > do with who others see one as, as well as what kinds of inhabitable > identities are "see-able" - recognition). Thus, the problem of elaborated > vs. restricted codes is much more an issue of the kinds of talk that feel > "natural" to the speaker (and Franz Fanon has dealt with the problem of > speaking, bodies, and recognition very nicely in Black Skins, White Masks). > Certain ways of using language (codes) will feel awkward to the speaker. I > wonder if explicit teaching and practice can transform individuals such > that they will be willing to feel comfortable (if only as an "actor" at > first) in speaking codes that might feel awkward or even problematic for > them. This follows the well-known logic of "fake it 'til you make it". > > I can specifically recall when I was presenting my master's thesis at a > conference for the first time. When I got to the height of the performance > of the high academic register of academic-ese (not easy!), I recall > stumbling over the words "semiotic fecundity" - words which had been so > easy to write but which now, as I performed them in front of an audience > became quite a mouthful. And this is precisely the point - the challenge of > "performing" in front of an audience - with all of the expectations that > this brings - again, note the role of "recognition". There is a poetics to > the matching of the "who we are" with the "how we talk" precisely because > the latter is so often taken as a diagrammatic icon of the former. Take, > for example, the many screeds that have been written about "bad" language - > whether of the creeping variety of novel and youthful linguistic forms that > pay no respect to tradition (like "like") or of the alternative varieties > of "just bad language" such as African-American English - with its supposed > illogics of double negation and copula deletions! So, the question then is: > how do you get a child who has grown up feeling natural in one code to > inhabit the identity that comes with speaking a different code? I think > acting classes are one very important possibility. > > Finally, I came across an example that might help us think about the role > of context with regard to restricted and elaborated codes. The example > comes from Michael Silverstein's consideration of Don Brenneis' work among > a Hindi speaking community in Fiji (they were brought there from India as > migrant workers by British colonial powers). Brenneis documents two modes > of talk that are used - one is for the formal pancayat context (the ritual > governing body of the community), the other is used in the informal talanoa > context (basically, "men's gossip"). Note that the type of talk used in the > informal talanoa context (called jangli bat, or "jungle talk") is highly > presupposing and involves "a low degree of explicit, orderly, and complete > descriptive information, the kind, say, we claim we value in expository > communication and inculcate in institutions of learning" (Silverstein > 2013). Indeed, Brenneis notes that if you you only had transcripts of the > conversation and were not a party to the talk and, more importantly, to the > social life of those talking, you would have no idea what was happening in > the conversations. Additionally, there is a discourse marker that is > repeatedly used "bole", which means "says." Note that this is just a > generic metapragmatic reportative and no indication is given with regard to > WHO says (or even the specifics of WHAT exactly was said) just a narration > of events that were "said" to have happened. This is about as restricted as > a code can get. > > Yet, with regard to the context of this kind of talk, these "restrictions" > of the code are precisely the point of this form of talk. They are highly > functional and accomplish at least two things. First, they afford the > speakers a certain amount of plausible deniability in the potentially > profaning act (for object and for speaker...) of gossip. By poetically > punctuating their speech with "says" without indicating who says (and > certainly not the speaker who "says" this!), they remove themselves from > the role of author or principal of the talk and all the responsibility that > comes authoring gossip. Second, the use of "says" creates a sense in which > the speaker is just reporting what is common knowledge in the community > (and, of course, gossip always both is and isn't common knowledge). > > So, the point here is that the restricted code is entirely appropriate > (even essential) in this context. To speak otherwise would be foolish. > > A bit too elaborate? > -greg > > > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 2:36 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Henry: > > > > I guess I think that "cooperation", where there is strong, well > classified > > division of labor, is external, extra-mental, because the decision making > > function is not internalized by the child yet. But "collaboration", > > ideally, represents a moment where each child has internalized the > > "decision taker". But of course there's more to it than > that--"cooperation" > > seems to be associated with Bernstein's elaborated code, and > > "collaboration" with the restricted one. > > > > Basil Bernstein was a working class kid himself, and he had a strong > sense > > that he and other working class kids were at a strong LINGUISTIC > > disadvantage in school. It was as if the working class kids were > attending > > school in a foreign language, while the middle class kids could just use > > the language that they used at home. But the vocabulary and a lot of the > > grammar really looked the same. So it wasn't until he met Michael > Halliday > > that it became possible to describe some of the big SEMANTIC differences, > > which Bernstein described as differences in "coding orientation". If you > > are part of a social group that is mostly composed of identical, > > interchangeable units (that is laboring "collaborators" and not operating > > "cooperators") then you have certain linguistic tendencies: > > > > > > a) Encoding circumstances that are "here" and "now" (that is, talking > about > > things that we can all see). > > > > > > b) Encoding participants that are either the speaker or hearer or very > > similar to the speaker and hearer (that is, talking about "me and you" or > > talking about others who are just like us). > > > > > > c) Encoding material processes and mental processes rather than > relational > > or existential ones (that is, using lots of concrete actions rather than > > abstract relations, lots more verbs like "make up" than verbs like > > "constitute"). > > > > > > d) More use of "the", "this", "that", "there", "then", and "thus". Less > > complex noun phrases. > > > > > > e) More use of the direct and factual. Less use of the hypothetical and > > conditional. > > > > > > Bernstein called this collaborative orientation a "restricted" code, > > because it is a subset of the "elaborated code" that people use when they > > talk about things that are not in the visual purview, people who are not > > part of our world, abstract relations rather than concrete actions, and > > hypothetical and conditional worlds as well as the real one. > > > > > > Last week I pointed out the difference between: > > > > > > "Brother Barack" (assumes that we are all equal, interchangeable, > > "collaborators") > > > > > > > > "President Obama" (assumes that we are all individuated, > noninterchangeable > > "coooperators") > > > > > > Consider the following two talks that Obama gave after the Charleston > > shootings, and you will see the difference: > > > > > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9IGyidtfGI > > > > > > > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPMYqURt9V0 > > > > > > > > > > > > In the first one, we hear the voice of "Brother Barack", while in the > > second you can hear "President Obama". Brother Barack speaks a restricted > > code--even his poetic language, e.g. "they believed in things unseen" > > avoids conditionals and hypotheticals, and draws heavily on concrete and > > graphic language. But President Obama uses a lot more modulation, a lot > > more hypothetical orientation. > > > > > > > > You won't be surprised to learn that Ruqaiya was very interested in > > Vygotsky and Luria. She thought that Vygotsky was too focused on word > > meanings (the difference between restricted and elaborated codes goes > WELL > > beyond "everyday" and "academic" words). She also thought that Luria's > work > > with Uzbek peasants and Uzbek school teachers showed different coding > > orientations, and not different vocabularies. > > > > > > I think there are really TWO ways of approaching the problem of coding > > orientation: > > > > > > a) We can try to make the home language more like school language. That > is, > > use the language of "cooperation" and not collaboration at home. This was > > Vygotsky's way. > > > > > > b) We can also try to make school language much more like working class > > home language: concrete, vivid, here and now, factual. That is, use the > > language of "collaboration" and not simply cooperation at school. As Mike > > argues, it is possible to form concepts using everyday language. If it > were > > not possible, then so-called primitives would never have concepts--but > they > > do. (And if it were not possible, we primitive Western Europeans would > > never have bloody developed concepts either because for most of us the > word > > is only ready when the concept is.) > > > > > > Of course, good parents do a lot of a) whenever they read to their > children > > (this is probably why television is so bad for kids--it's all restricted > > code!) and good teachers do a lot of b) anyway (a good teaching example > is > > always a pretty immediate, concrete, factual one that is meaningful to > > speaker and hearer and visualizable). > > > > > > And of course cooperation and collaboration are really just two different > > moments in the internalization of a function: first there is the division > > of labor between the decision-maker and the decision-obeyer, and only > later > > is their fusion between the two. So what difference would b) really make > in > > the classroom? > > > > > > A big difference. If we accept that b) is our goal, then we are going to > > have to accept that the main danger in teaching is that children will > take > > the restricted, collaborative code we offer and stop there--that they > will > > never learn to use that restricted, collaborated code to academic > concepts > > and instead remain at the level of concrete, everyday thinking in > concrete, > > everyday language. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 10:45 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > > > About what David has just written: > > > > > > Seeing scaffolding as a moment in a zone of proximal learning works for > > > me, but why is it ?a rather extrreme and externalized moment"? > > > > > > I like the return to freedom a lot. Can?t talk about that too much. > > > > > > But I couldn?t pull up the paper he linked us up to, not a single one > of > > > the 33,000 words! What?s wrong with me? > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > On Jul 6, 2015, at 6:42 PM, David Kellogg > > dkellogg60@gmail.c>,om> wrote: > > > > > > > > Ah, but is it a zone of proximal development--or just a zone of > > proximal > > > > learning? And for whom? > > > > > > > > Henry asked--some time ago--about the difference between scaffolding > > and > > > > the zoped, and I argued that scaffolding could be seen as one > > > moment--but a > > > > rather extreme and externalized moment--of a zone of proximal > learning, > > > but > > > > not a zone of proximal development. > > > > > > > > The shape this problem takes in Korea is really a debate over the > > > > respective merits of collaboration and cooperation. The idea is that > > > > collaboration (which conspicuously contains the word "labor") does > not > > > > involve the division of labor and does not involve one party making > > > > decisions and the other executing them, while cooperation does; ergo, > > > > collaboration is a kind of cell for the ideal society and cooperation > > is > > > a > > > > cell for capitalism. > > > > > > > > Needless to say, Vygotsky doesn't agree with this at all: almost all > of > > > his > > > > examples are, on the contrary, examples of highly asymmetrical > > divisions > > > of > > > > labor (mother and child, teacher and child doing homework, > experimenter > > > and > > > > subject, etc.). It is only through the revolutionary graspture and > > > radical > > > > restructuring and interior redecoration of the function of the > decision > > > > maker that we get free will. So cooperation and collaboration turn > out > > to > > > > be moments of the same process, but that process is, after all, a > zone > > of > > > > proximal learning and not necessarily a zone of proximal development. > > > > > > > > I guess I find it useful to distinguish between an "everyday concept" > > of > > > > the Zoped and a "scientific concept" of the Zoped. This corresponds > > more > > > or > > > > less the distinction that Seth Chaiklin (2003) makes between the > > > subjective > > > > (child by child) zoped and the objective (age cohort) zoped, except > > that > > > it > > > > is functional and genetic in its description rather than structural. > > > > > > > > We are presenting a longish paper on this on Saturday at a workshop > in > > > > Kangweondo. Here's the English version! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/13724420/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools > > > > > > > > (Warning--it's 33,000 words long, and almost all the examples are > from > > > > Korean education!) > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 8:21 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> Annalisa, > > > >> Thanks for sharing! There may be a similar referendum in Puerto > Rico. > > > What > > > >> a world! > > > >> H > > > >> > > > >>> On Jul 5, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>> Henry, > > > >>> > > > >>> Clever mom! > > > >>> > > > >>> This will likely be a very memorable event for the both of them. > > > >>> > > > >>> Actually, I found this photograph quite moving, because, well... > for > > > >> many many reasons! > > > >>> > > > >>> So thanks for letting me share it! > > > >>> > > > >>> Kind regards, > > > >>> > > > >>> Annalisa > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Jul 8 14:40:02 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 21:40:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Russian Spinozists In-Reply-To: References: <8F2FDC25-6139-4F52-8F0C-5CD220569E3E@gmail.com>, Message-ID: Hi Larry, Am not familiar with all of these thinkers, however I wonder if we can actually say there is a tradition that runs through? Unless there is a personal connection, I wondered if it is possible to carry on a tradition, in the sense that one would be taught personally by a teacher a certain body of thought, and then that student, eventually becoming a teacher would then also teach a student and so on. That to me is a tradition. How might this be different from one who just reads the works of? In that case it seems to me we would be borrowing thoughts, concepts, and ideas, if those might be proper classifications for thinking, in essence, appropriation, but not a tradition. We have the notion that what is taught is passed as if like a family heirloom (such as a great and beautiful book), that can be enjoyed from whatever viewpoint one stands, but I wonder if it is more like the game of telephone, in which there are distortions and misconstruals, whereby things that were not thought by the originator are held to be thought by the originator. This of course can happen even during the life of the originator! I write all that because I sense that Spinoza is one of those thinkers who was misunderstood, as if anyone can take what they want or what resonates and leave what they do not like, like a cafeteria smorgasbord. I'm not sure that that is a fair thing to do, though while I say I am not sure if there is any way to prevent it. IN any case, it dawned upon me that the notion of will as Spinoza presents it could be matched with the belief of karma, in that if one chooses good acts to do, one will reap good results, and so how one chooses becomes paramount to how one acts in the world, toward oneself and others. One can point the bow wherever one chooses, but once the arrow leaves the bow, it is the physical laws that determine the rest. Given that Spinoza seems to have a deterministic flavor in his rendering of will, this seems to me the only way to make sense of it. If I do X and I will get the family of Y as a result, then I should be sure to do X if I want anything resembling Y to result. If I do W and I get the family of Z to result, and it is not Z that I care for, then I should refrain from ever doing W. What is always strange is when people do W and they expect Y to happen, which is perhaps what magical thinking is. I believe that this might be why the ethics (which was the title of Spinoza's last work) then becomes a concern of study, because one wants to do what is good but how can one know what is good? So, I'm thinking, a space of reason, would likely line up with the Hindu understanding of dharma, which is hard to translate into English, but I see definite parallels of dharma to Spinoza's space of reason, if space of reason isn't abstract, but stands in the world as material cause and effects. Dharma is the order that is here, and the ethical code (which is truly stunted and oversimplified if we only see it in terms of good and bad, but instead a kind of physics of causes and effects) would be to live in dharma, meaning, to be in harmony with the larger order that is here. Further, because the dharma is of the manifest and unmanifest world, it is not something we construct, but which constructs us, in the sense that there are as-if laws that operate based upon activities that result in certain (sometimes understandable) ways. This is why I'm not sure about using the word "construct," because it makes it seem that we are authors of what we do, when it is a dynamic of the world acting upon us and us upon the world dialectically. (nature AND nurture!) I agree with Henry that Vygotsky and Spinoza rhyme, and I like that rendering of their thought, that they rhyme! Apparently Marx and Spinoza rhyme as well, and it appears that Spinoza's philosophy was not only about existence, but also commitment to the polis. It seems to me there is much communistic thought in Spinoza's philosophy, as might be seen when he verbalized his projects with his Collegiant peers, similar to what Vygotsky did with his own community of peers. The Collegiants are actually quite an interesting historical group. I'm enjoying learning about them. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Jul 8 14:53:14 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 21:53:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development In-Reply-To: <559D3F74.2010502@open.ac.uk> References: <9AFE8CAD-F7E4-43F1-B6C8-BFB994490DC0@gmail.com> <226355DC-9EE3-4E5D-9EEF-B19AB8CCC452@gmail.com> , , <559D3F74.2010502@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: I love this Rob! It's like knock-knock jokes. Say, anyone have any good Vygotsky knock-knock jokes? I would say that humor is essential in a ZPD as it dresses up the environment and all its problems much nicer than a plant. Humor works through recognition of something as something else. Such as a young boy acting as a Greek referendum voter (with his mother). And thus it delights us to see two things at the same time in one thing. Of course joy is connected to humor, as long as it isn't at someone else's expense (when lightbulbs tend to blow out and must be changed by maudlin folk singers). We know that learning and joy are connected in the most optimum learning environments, or rather zopeds. Perhaps humor is important because it is a moment when the mind is relaxed and open. Thus allowing a facility to grasp something novel, much like an infant will grasp his father's finger when the finger is introduced to him for the first time. A recognition is made when a connection is made. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of R.J.S.Parsons Sent: Wednesday, July 8, 2015 9:19:18 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The zone of proximal development Completely off topic, but, for what it's worth, my favourite is still the folk singer version. Q: How many folk singers does it take to change a lightbulb? A: Five. One to change it, and four to sing about how much nicer the old one was. To bring it slightly back on topic, I have just absorbed a presentation on emotional competencies in teaching, and I am pondering the role of humour in a zpd. Rob On 08/07/2015 15:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Sometimes a ZPD is just a scrum. > > Did you hear the one: > > "How many Vygotskian scholars does it take to change a lightbulb?" > > "None. The lightbulb has to want to change." > > :) > > I suppose the scholars can keep trying. > > I didn't know that children do not know how to cooperate or collaborate. I seem to see them doing it far more often than European politicians, that's for sure. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 8 15:30:27 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 18:30:27 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model Message-ID: Henry, We have brilliant haitian intellects (jacques roumain and jean price-mars) who suggested your point. ?Roumain established the bureau of ethnology to collect and preserve the taino/african culture of the provinces. ?The bureau presently is under the directorship of the oungan erol josue. ? Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/08/2015 5:06 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model
Paul and all, Could I say that the Haitian Academy (top down) of Kreyol (bottom up) is a cultural experiment at a large scale, while the work of Rose Felton and Mike Cole is at a smaller scale? What seems to me is that Martin is suggesting we take the bottom up more seriously and leadership less seriously. Balance things out. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 12:24 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Henry, > > That is the vision the haitian academy of kreyol has for the kreyol language and culture... a sphere of influence dominated by haiti... > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/08/2015 1:49 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model
>
This may add absolutely nothing to this discussion, so I will keep it short: > > One might have thought that the French of the court and the church during the centuries-long Norman occupation of England beginning with the Norman conquest in 1066 would have resulted in French as the national language. Yet the Elizabethan miracle, Shakespeare and all, was an English one. Today English is as much the lingua franca of the world as Latin was of Europe back when. How did this happen? AAEV has had a tremendous impact on world English through popular music. Who could have known this would be a major outcome of slavery? > > What is taken as the ideal over the long haul of history, how do we predict that? In the meantime, what should schools be doing if not getting youth ready for the future? But how can we possibly do this if we don?t leafve a space for spontaneous in conceptual development? Potential. Creativity. > > Henry > > > > >> On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:56 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am >> not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so >> can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many >> knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. >> >> >> I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my >> understanding to the question you pose. Your question : >> >> *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) >> rather than from without? * >> >> We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation >> is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural >> Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton >> (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has >> been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems >> to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of >> novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's >> description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to >> watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors >> of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems >> like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its >> bare bones to to its live performance. >> >> Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence >> Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. >> >> mike >> >> >> PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. >> >> someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the >>> Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of >>> History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to >>> the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the >>> first black republic and the first central American nation to declare >>> independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. >>> In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never >>> happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was >>> truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an >>> impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. >>> >>> And yet, it happened. >>> >>> In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the >>> (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this >>> might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, >>> innovation, and the "new"? >>> >>> With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So >>> then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian >>> approach seems to be that the new development comes from the >>> already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the >>> unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being >>> dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to >>> me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in >>> the Haitian revolution. >>> >>> This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece >>> as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the >>> "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from >>> without? >>> >>> I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or >>> Haiti. Please. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> ? >>> >>> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent >>>> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. >>>> >>>> >>>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >>>>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English >>>> version of Cultural Model
>>>>
Mr Mocombe, >>>> >>>> >>>> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides >>>> from my model on culture and education. >>>> >>>> >>>> Serge Madhere PhD >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 15:44:03 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 16:44:03 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2A02FF93-D6F5-442F-BC8E-B2A31986E6F7@gmail.com> Paul, I?m not so good at brilliant. Does that make sense to you? Mike might not think it does. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 4:30 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Henry, > We have brilliant haitian intellects (jacques roumain and jean price-mars) who suggested your point. Roumain established the bureau of ethnology to collect and preserve the taino/african culture of the provinces. The bureau presently is under the directorship of the oungan erol josue. > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/08/2015 5:06 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model
>
Paul and all, > Could I say that the Haitian Academy (top down) of Kreyol (bottom up) is a cultural experiment at a large scale, while the work of Rose Felton and Mike Cole is at a smaller scale? What seems to me is that Martin is suggesting we take the bottom up more seriously and leadership less seriously. Balance things out. > Henry > >> On Jul 8, 2015, at 12:24 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >> Henry, >> >> That is the vision the haitian academy of kreyol has for the kreyol language and culture... a sphere of influence dominated by haiti... >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >> >> >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/08/2015 1:49 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: English version of Cultural Model
>>
This may add absolutely nothing to this discussion, so I will keep it short: >> >> One might have thought that the French of the court and the church during the centuries-long Norman occupation of England beginning with the Norman conquest in 1066 would have resulted in French as the national language. Yet the Elizabethan miracle, Shakespeare and all, was an English one. Today English is as much the lingua franca of the world as Latin was of Europe back when. How did this happen? AAEV has had a tremendous impact on world English through popular music. Who could have known this would be a major outcome of slavery? >> >> What is taken as the ideal over the long haul of history, how do we predict that? In the meantime, what should schools be doing if not getting youth ready for the future? But how can we possibly do this if we don?t leafve a space for spontaneous in conceptual development? Potential. Creativity. >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:56 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> I have no idea where you get your reading of LSV and creativity, Greg. I am >>> not sure who the person with the correct interpretation of Vygotsky is, so >>> can't help there.With respect to his ideas on creativity many >>> knowledgeable folk are "present" on xmca and can perhaps help. >>> >>> >>> I think I might be able to provide an answer that accords with my >>> understanding to the question you pose. Your question : >>> >>> *Can we imagine the "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) >>> rather than from without? * >>> >>> We do not have to imagine this happening in so far as as direct observation >>> is infused with imagining. We can rely upon empirical data. In *Cultural >>> Psychology *and elsewhere I have turned to the work of Rose and Felton >>> (1955) on creation and diffusion of culture in small groups, work which has >>> been extended in Schaller and Crandall (2004). Very bare bones but it seems >>> to be an illustration of the "new" coming from within a community of >>> novices. I have taken these bare bones and added to them Gary Allen Fine's >>> description of the formation of idioculture and applied that idea to >>> watching the genesis of a new 5thDimension from rumors >>> of one that existed once somewhere by people in a new her and now. Seems >>> like I see a thread of joint mediated action-in-activity running from its >>> bare bones to to its live performance. >>> >>> Also seems like a way to approach the study of language emergence >>> Nicaraguan sign, a contested history. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> PS-- Rose and Felton attached. Do not know if a pdf of the book exists. >>> >>> someoneone calling our "wildfire is down" and >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> ?A colleague was just telling me of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book on the >>>> Haitian Revolution, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of >>>> History*. One of the things that he mentioned was that Trouillot points to >>>> the general non-recognizability of what happened in Haiti - here was the >>>> first black republic and the first central American nation to declare >>>> independence from colonialism and yet almost no one had written about it. >>>> In the historical consciousness (of North Americans), it was as if it never >>>> happened - an "unthinkable history". At the time of its happening, it was >>>> truly unthinkable - notions of liberty among a Black populace was an >>>> impossible thing for white Europeans to imagine. >>>> >>>> And yet, it happened. >>>> >>>> In connection with questions about "the end in the beginning" and the >>>> (seeming?) necessity of the expert-novice relationship, I wonder if this >>>> might be a blind spot for Vygotsky-ian theorizing vis a vis creativity, >>>> innovation, and the "new"? >>>> >>>> With respect to Haiti, it seems like something new is coming into being. So >>>> then, how do we imagine this new-ness of being? The default Vygotsky-ian >>>> approach seems to be that the new development comes from the >>>> already-fully-formed. In the case of Haiti, this could lead down the >>>> unfortunate path of seeing the Haitian situation (the new) as being >>>> dependent upon the European colonizers (the fully-formed). This seems to >>>> me, in a sense, to return us to the view that there was "nothing new" in >>>> the Haitian revolution. >>>> >>>> This is a potential blind spot that I was pointing to with Packer's piece >>>> as well as in the case of Nicaraguan sign language. Can we imagine the >>>> "new" coming from within a community (of novices!) rather than from >>>> without? >>>> >>>> I'd welcome corrections here to my thinking about Vygotsky, CHAT, and/or >>>> Haiti. Please. >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:05 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >>>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com >>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Dr. Madhere has provided the English version of the kreyol charts I sent >>>>> in a previous email. I am waiting for the paper. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Madhere, Serge" >>>>>
Date:07/04/2015 9:36 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: English >>>>> version of Cultural Model
>>>>>
Mr Mocombe, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As you requested, please find attached the English version of the slides >>>>> from my model on culture and education. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Serge Madhere PhD >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >>> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >>> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* >>> >> >> > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 8 16:05:07 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 19:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Watch "What does CARIFESTA looks like?" on YouTube Message-ID: <3ytw2g3ebge497vald2uo55l.1436396707983@email.android.com> Since we have been writing about haiti, I would like to take this time to invite you all to visit the island for carifesta, August 21-30. ? https://youtu.be/q2XGI6xgK90 Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 16:46:20 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 17:46:20 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Laisse les bons temps roule! In-Reply-To: <3ytw2g3ebge497vald2uo55l.1436396707983@email.android.com> References: <3ytw2g3ebge497vald2uo55l.1436396707983@email.android.com> Message-ID: <204E9F96-2D73-420E-9123-AD9760BD57A6@gmail.com> Paul, I?d have to see more of the food to make a decision. That?s just me. Was that a giant crayfish I saw in what you sent us? Once in my life I have eaten good cajun-cooked crayfish. I think I would swim to Haiti to eat anything that good again. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 5:05 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Since we have been writing about haiti, I would like to take this time to invite you all to visit the island for carifesta, August 21-30. > > https://youtu.be/q2XGI6xgK90 > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 17:27:05 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 18:27:05 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza-- the movie In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6E0700FC-59B4-4810-A4FB-E44449434F91@gmail.com> I?m with Annalisa. Great stuff, Mike! With subtitles in Portuguese. Cool! The movie raised the issue: How long would Spinoza and Vygotsky have lived, even with T.B., if they had not been subjected to such stress. But then, would their ideas burn as brightly today if they had had a comfortable life? Anyway, I think of them first as heroes, only secondarily as martyrs. I think they would want to be recognized that way too. But that's just me. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 3:01 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Thanks for the CANDY! :) From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Jul 8 17:12:12 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 20:12:12 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Laisse les bons temps roule! Message-ID: Yes henry...once you get to haiti, you will not want to leave! Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/08/2015 7:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Laisse les bons temps roule!
Paul, I?d have to see more of the food to make a decision. That?s just me. Was that a giant crayfish I saw in what you sent us? Once in my life I have eaten good cajun-cooked crayfish. I think I would swim to Haiti to eat anything that good again. Henry > On Jul 8, 2015, at 5:05 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Since we have been writing about haiti, I would like to take this time to invite you all to visit the island for carifesta, August 21-30. > > https://youtu.be/q2XGI6xgK90 > > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 17:59:54 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 18:59:54 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Laisse les bons temps roule! In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <74221A38-D933-46FD-B74A-B2D08AE410EC@gmail.com> I learned to sail from my dad, a Navy man. We won a trophy for competitive sailing he and I did together one summer. That was the closest I have ever been to my dad. Paul and all, I?ll bet you mean there?s more than just good food, so that not leaving might not be a bad thing. I?m retired, so, as a taker, I don?t have the obligations most of you givers do. But I have a proposal that might fit the schedule of even the most dedicated young salary worker out there: Sailing the Caribbean between ports in Mexico (e.g. the Yucatan), Cuba (e.g. Havana), and Haiti (e.g. Port-au-Prince), maybe even the U.S. (e.g. Miami). Anybody want to take part in planning it? My guess is that all of those places will be for laissing les bons temps role, maybe even Miami. Paul thinks anyone who gets to Haiti won?t bother going on to Miami anyway. Henry P.S. Does it matter whether I am serious about this or not? Wouldn?t it be a good idea either way, if it?s a good idea at all? Sleep on it. Starting in > On Jul 8, 2015, at 6:12 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Yes henry...once you get to haiti, you will not want to leave! > > > Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > >
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:07/08/2015 7:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Laisse les bons temps roule!
>
Paul, > I?d have to see more of the food to make a decision. That?s just me. Was that a giant crayfish I saw in what you sent us? Once in my life I have eaten good cajun-cooked crayfish. I think I would swim to Haiti to eat anything that good again. > Henry > >> On Jul 8, 2015, at 5:05 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >> Since we have been writing about haiti, I would like to take this time to invite you all to visit the island for carifesta, August 21-30. >> >> https://youtu.be/q2XGI6xgK90 >> >> >> >> Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 8 22:51:29 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 22:51:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Russian Spinozists In-Reply-To: References: <8F2FDC25-6139-4F52-8F0C-5CD220569E3E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Annalisa, You wrote, Unless there is a personal connection, I wondered if it is possible to carry on a tradition, in the sense that one would be taught personally by a teacher a certain body of thought, and then that student, eventually becoming a teacher would then also teach a student and so on. That to me is a tradition. How might this be different from one who just reads the works of? In that case it seems to me we would be borrowing thoughts, concepts, and ideas, if those might be proper classifications for thinking, in essence, appropriation, but not a tradition. Annalisa, I am using the term "tradition" as a way to express how concepts are situated within a background [a taken-for-granted assumption of meanings]. Traditions can be implicit and what Jan Derry is attempting to do is make clear and explicit what is usually an invisible taken-for-granted background. Here is a specific example of Derry using the term tradition: "The concept of freedom has different meanings in different traditions OF thought. The sense in which we commonly think of ourselves as free actors owes much to Descartes modernist separation of mind and world. To understand the sense of free will that informs Vygotsky's work, by contrast, it is NECESSARY to get to grips with the sense that derives FROM Spinoza and Hegel." [page 87] Derry is arguing that the way we "read works OF" is actually a way of reading "UPON WHICH" that is assuming a taken-for-granted invisible "ground". Martin Packer's article that Greg mentioned explores a notion of "construction" that also challenges "construction" metaphors as focussed merely on being OF "knowledge". In other words construction of knowing that is separated from the "knower" [who is also being ontologically constructed in the process OF coming to know] The concept "of" can be "read" as "upon which" that points to "traditons" OF thought. "Reading" Jan Derry or "reading" Martin Packer I am suggesting may be understood as entering a "reading OF" process as a reading UPON WHICH [ a process that often includes a taken-for-granted invisible "ground" emerging within a tradition] Both Jan Derry and Martin Packer are inviting us to "see through" taken-for-granted ground(s)upon which we "read" an author's work. The upon which OF an author's concepts [such as the concept OF "free will"] is developing [and extending] from within a particular "tradition" that is often implicit and invisible. What I am suggesting may only be a "moment" in a sociocultural "process" that Martin articulates as including both objects AND ground(s). Traditions can be understood as emerging forms within a "process" and as "plural" [not universal or relative]. Traditons are not "static" or "objects of", they are the taken-for-granted "ground" upon which meaning and sense emerge as both knowing and knower transform. I am questioning the contrast between the "object FOR" [the object used "in order to"] and the other notion "object OF" [the object "upon which" now becoming ground which has been transformed FROM the object that was used "in order to"]. Martin asks "What is the "object/artifact" in his article. Is the object describing "the paper" [which transforms into the taken-for-granted invisible ground] or the "distribution" and its qualities? His answer is that there is no static "object" or "artifact" but rather a sociocultural "process" of becoming AS IF. THIS answer emerges within a radically different "tradition" Larry On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Larry, > > Am not familiar with all of these thinkers, however I wonder if we can > actually say there is a tradition that runs through? > > Unless there is a personal connection, I wondered if it is possible to > carry on a tradition, in the sense that one would be taught personally by a > teacher a certain body of thought, and then that student, eventually > becoming a teacher would then also teach a student and so on. That to me is > a tradition. > > How might this be different from one who just reads the works of? In that > case it seems to me we would be borrowing thoughts, concepts, and ideas, if > those might be proper classifications for thinking, in essence, > appropriation, but not a tradition. > > We have the notion that what is taught is passed as if like a family > heirloom (such as a great and beautiful book), that can be enjoyed from > whatever viewpoint one stands, but I wonder if it is more like the game of > telephone, in which there are distortions and misconstruals, whereby things > that were not thought by the originator are held to be thought by the > originator. This of course can happen even during the life of the > originator! > > I write all that because I sense that Spinoza is one of those thinkers who > was misunderstood, as if anyone can take what they want or what resonates > and leave what they do not like, like a cafeteria smorgasbord. I'm not sure > that that is a fair thing to do, though while I say I am not sure if there > is any way to prevent it. > > IN any case, it dawned upon me that the notion of will as Spinoza presents > it could be matched with the belief of karma, in that if one chooses good > acts to do, one will reap good results, and so how one chooses becomes > paramount to how one acts in the world, toward oneself and others. One can > point the bow wherever one chooses, but once the arrow leaves the bow, it > is the physical laws that determine the rest. Given that Spinoza seems to > have a deterministic flavor in his rendering of will, this seems to me the > only way to make sense of it. If I do X and I will get the family of Y as a > result, then I should be sure to do X if I want anything resembling Y to > result. If I do W and I get the family of Z to result, and it is not Z that > I care for, then I should refrain from ever doing W. > > What is always strange is when people do W and they expect Y to happen, > which is perhaps what magical thinking is. > > I believe that this might be why the ethics (which was the title of > Spinoza's last work) then becomes a concern of study, because one wants to > do what is good but how can one know what is good? > > So, I'm thinking, a space of reason, would likely line up with the Hindu > understanding of dharma, which is hard to translate into English, but I see > definite parallels of dharma to Spinoza's space of reason, if space of > reason isn't abstract, but stands in the world as material cause and > effects. Dharma is the order that is here, and the ethical code (which is > truly stunted and oversimplified if we only see it in terms of good and > bad, but instead a kind of physics of causes and effects) would be to live > in dharma, meaning, to be in harmony with the larger order that is here. > > Further, because the dharma is of the manifest and unmanifest world, it is > not something we construct, but which constructs us, in the sense that > there are as-if laws that operate based upon activities that result in > certain (sometimes understandable) ways. This is why I'm not sure about > using the word "construct," because it makes it seem that we are authors of > what we do, when it is a dynamic of the world acting upon us and us upon > the world dialectically. > > (nature AND nurture!) > > I agree with Henry that Vygotsky and Spinoza rhyme, and I like that > rendering of their thought, that they rhyme! > > Apparently Marx and Spinoza rhyme as well, and it appears that Spinoza's > philosophy was not only about existence, but also commitment to the polis. > It seems to me there is much communistic thought in Spinoza's philosophy, > as might be seen when he verbalized his projects with his Collegiant peers, > similar to what Vygotsky did with his own community of peers. > > The Collegiants are actually quite an interesting historical group. I'm > enjoying learning about them. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 9 10:58:43 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 10:58:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Russian Spinozists In-Reply-To: References: <8F2FDC25-6139-4F52-8F0C-5CD220569E3E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Annalisa, I am trying to become clearer on the way Jan Derry is drawing a contrast between what she labels the "conventional representationalist epistemological paradigm " AND the contrasting paradigm emerging from Hegel, Marx, and Vygotsky. Derry's target is to critique what she calls the contemporary "post-Vygotskian" readings of Vygotsky that do not enter the "space of reasons" within which Vygotsky operated and got his bearings. Her intent is to make explicit what is usually taken-for-granted and invisible background. David Kellogg on the other thread mentioned grammatical metaphor and I am pointing to one example of reading "of" as metaphor. This way of reading the term "of" translated as "upon which" to try to understand Jan Derry. I want to mention that Jan Derry and Martin Packer both are critiquing Wertsch's post-Vygotskian constructivist paradigm. On page 32 of her book Derry tries to make clear the distinction withinin the two dominant ways of "reading" Vygotsky and suggests the post-Vygotskian turn towards construction as a metaphor is actually a mis-reading of where Vygotsky was trying to lead us. Derry is making a case that the philosophical ground that be/comes background [and therefore invisible and taken-for-granted] IS significant for reading Vygotsky and blindness to the clear differences of these alternative traditions OF "knowing" has significant consequences for understanding learning as bildung. I am aware of the baggage and shadow side generated by the concept "bildung" but wonder if it still has a place in our reflections exploring plural traditions? Derry's project is to help the reader become clear on the tradition of much contemporary post-Vygotskian re-search. This tradition operates within the "representational paradigm" [as Brandom uses this concept] Derry uses this concept to show that post-vygotskian studies [contemporary studies] "INHABIT" this representational paradigm. This inhabitation has profound consequences for how we understand the underlying issues of freedom and agency. Derry says to take the idea "of" [a paradigm of representation] to frame an argument about HOW sociogenetic explanations might develop is not a straightforward matter. It requires detours. Derry acknowledges that most post-Vygotskian studies do reject the correspondence theory of truth [the mirror theory of truth that representations reflect the real world] BUT Derry also makes the case that the representational paradigm continues to remain dualistic [separating mind and world] THIS implicit dualism is the target of Derry's critique. The most salient feature of the "representational paradigm" is its referring TO a particular epistemological position involving taken-for-granted invisible assumptions about the human condition AND the relation OF [mind and world]. This paradigm FOREcloses certain possibilities [the "as if" realm] and that when incorporated without a consideration of philosophical PREsuppositions the GROUNDS for the FOREclosure recede into the background and what is "seen" be/comes self-evident. In Derry's own words, "The representationalist paradigm presents the relation OF mind to world as one in which knowledge is caused by SENSE experience is made meaningful by the constructions that are put UPON it. [the sense experience]. The mind is understood to create meaning in a disenchanted world OF brute nature or in circumstances where whatever 'reality' there might be is unknowable. Sellars called this representational paradigm "The Myth of the Given" in which experience is understood as something which cannot be a tribunal AND YET must also somehow stand in judgement over our thinking. This idea, at the HEART OF the representational paradigm OF the world as independent of mind and made meaningful BY the constructions PLACED ON the world by mind is made EXPLICIT by Hegel to show what we take to be the means by which we acquire our knowledge - the UNDERSTANDING - falls far short of explaining HOW knowledge actually arises. [is dis-closed and fore-closed]. Although it may be thought that an epistemology simply describes HOW knowledge arises, much more is in fact involved. This becomes CLEAR once we make EXPLICIT the additional weight of what has to be carried by the very DELIMITATIONS that we assume IN ORDER TO explain how knowledge is possible." Annalisa, Jan Derry here makes clear her intent to differentiate alternative readings of Vygotsky and contemporary post-Vygotskian paradigms whichare operating within contrasting paradigms/traditions. Operating within different "spaces of reason". It is not simply a matter of "translation" between concepts. It is actually different "language games" developing different plural phenomenology. As Martin says construction is not merely epistemological but actually ontological changing the kinds of persons we "are". I personally take from Derry's presentation a sensitivity to different ways OF "reading". I also "read" Martin Packer's exploring "artifacts" not as substances or merely objects but as processes arising [dis-closing] within ontological constructions OF knowing AND knower as exploring the plural nature of traditions AS facts. The "as if" realm of possibilities WITHIN traditions. Larry On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 10:51 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Annalisa, > > You wrote, > > Unless there is a personal connection, I wondered if it is possible to > carry on a tradition, in the sense that one would be taught personally by a > teacher a certain body of thought, and then that student, eventually > becoming a teacher would then also teach a student and so on. That to me is > a tradition. > > How might this be different from one who just reads the works of? In that > case it seems to me we would be borrowing thoughts, concepts, and ideas, if > those might be proper classifications for thinking, in essence, > appropriation, but not a tradition. > > Annalisa, I am using the term "tradition" as a way to express how concepts > are situated within a background [a taken-for-granted assumption of > meanings]. Traditions can be implicit and what Jan Derry is attempting to > do is make clear and explicit what is usually an > invisible taken-for-granted background. > > Here is a specific example of Derry using the term tradition: > "The concept of freedom has different meanings in different traditions OF > thought. The sense in which we commonly think of ourselves as free actors > owes much to Descartes modernist separation of mind and world. To > understand the sense of free will that informs Vygotsky's work, by > contrast, it is NECESSARY to get to grips with the sense that derives FROM > Spinoza and Hegel." [page 87] > > Derry is arguing that the way we "read works OF" is actually a way of > reading "UPON WHICH" that is assuming a taken-for-granted invisible > "ground". > > Martin Packer's article that Greg mentioned explores a notion of > "construction" that also challenges "construction" metaphors as focussed > merely on being OF "knowledge". > In other words construction of knowing that is separated from the "knower" > [who is also being ontologically constructed in the process OF coming to > know] > > The concept "of" can be "read" as "upon which" that points to "traditons" > OF thought. > > "Reading" Jan Derry or "reading" Martin Packer I am suggesting may be > understood as entering a "reading OF" process as a reading UPON WHICH [ a > process that often includes a taken-for-granted invisible "ground" emerging > within a tradition] > Both Jan Derry and Martin Packer are inviting us to "see through" > taken-for-granted ground(s)upon which we "read" an author's work. The upon > which OF an author's concepts [such as the concept OF "free will"] > is developing [and extending] from within a particular "tradition" that is > often implicit and invisible. > > What I am suggesting may only be a "moment" in a sociocultural "process" > that Martin articulates as including both objects AND ground(s). Traditions > can be understood as emerging forms within a "process" and as "plural" [not > universal or relative]. Traditons are not "static" or "objects of", they > are the taken-for-granted "ground" upon which meaning and sense emerge as > both knowing and knower transform. > > I am questioning the contrast between the "object FOR" [the object used > "in order to"] and the other notion "object OF" [the object "upon which" > now becoming ground which has been transformed FROM the object that was > used "in order to"]. > Martin asks "What is the "object/artifact" in his article. Is the object > describing "the paper" [which transforms into the taken-for-granted > invisible ground] or the "distribution" and its qualities? His answer is > that there is no static "object" or "artifact" but rather a sociocultural > "process" of becoming AS IF. > THIS answer emerges within a radically different "tradition" > Larry > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Larry, >> >> Am not familiar with all of these thinkers, however I wonder if we can >> actually say there is a tradition that runs through? >> >> Unless there is a personal connection, I wondered if it is possible to >> carry on a tradition, in the sense that one would be taught personally by a >> teacher a certain body of thought, and then that student, eventually >> becoming a teacher would then also teach a student and so on. That to me is >> a tradition. >> >> How might this be different from one who just reads the works of? In that >> case it seems to me we would be borrowing thoughts, concepts, and ideas, if >> those might be proper classifications for thinking, in essence, >> appropriation, but not a tradition. >> >> We have the notion that what is taught is passed as if like a family >> heirloom (such as a great and beautiful book), that can be enjoyed from >> whatever viewpoint one stands, but I wonder if it is more like the game of >> telephone, in which there are distortions and misconstruals, whereby things >> that were not thought by the originator are held to be thought by the >> originator. This of course can happen even during the life of the >> originator! >> >> I write all that because I sense that Spinoza is one of those thinkers >> who was misunderstood, as if anyone can take what they want or what >> resonates and leave what they do not like, like a cafeteria smorgasbord. >> I'm not sure that that is a fair thing to do, though while I say I am not >> sure if there is any way to prevent it. >> >> IN any case, it dawned upon me that the notion of will as Spinoza >> presents it could be matched with the belief of karma, in that if one >> chooses good acts to do, one will reap good results, and so how one chooses >> becomes paramount to how one acts in the world, toward oneself and others. >> One can point the bow wherever one chooses, but once the arrow leaves the >> bow, it is the physical laws that determine the rest. Given that Spinoza >> seems to have a deterministic flavor in his rendering of will, this seems >> to me the only way to make sense of it. If I do X and I will get the family >> of Y as a result, then I should be sure to do X if I want anything >> resembling Y to result. If I do W and I get the family of Z to result, and >> it is not Z that I care for, then I should refrain from ever doing W. >> >> What is always strange is when people do W and they expect Y to happen, >> which is perhaps what magical thinking is. >> >> I believe that this might be why the ethics (which was the title of >> Spinoza's last work) then becomes a concern of study, because one wants to >> do what is good but how can one know what is good? >> >> So, I'm thinking, a space of reason, would likely line up with the Hindu >> understanding of dharma, which is hard to translate into English, but I see >> definite parallels of dharma to Spinoza's space of reason, if space of >> reason isn't abstract, but stands in the world as material cause and >> effects. Dharma is the order that is here, and the ethical code (which is >> truly stunted and oversimplified if we only see it in terms of good and >> bad, but instead a kind of physics of causes and effects) would be to live >> in dharma, meaning, to be in harmony with the larger order that is here. >> >> Further, because the dharma is of the manifest and unmanifest world, it >> is not something we construct, but which constructs us, in the sense that >> there are as-if laws that operate based upon activities that result in >> certain (sometimes understandable) ways. This is why I'm not sure about >> using the word "construct," because it makes it seem that we are authors of >> what we do, when it is a dynamic of the world acting upon us and us upon >> the world dialectically. >> >> (nature AND nurture!) >> >> I agree with Henry that Vygotsky and Spinoza rhyme, and I like that >> rendering of their thought, that they rhyme! >> >> Apparently Marx and Spinoza rhyme as well, and it appears that Spinoza's >> philosophy was not only about existence, but also commitment to the polis. >> It seems to me there is much communistic thought in Spinoza's philosophy, >> as might be seen when he verbalized his projects with his Collegiant peers, >> similar to what Vygotsky did with his own community of peers. >> >> The Collegiants are actually quite an interesting historical group. I'm >> enjoying learning about them. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Thu Jul 9 13:39:36 2015 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 16:39:36 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Invitation to contribute pragmatic chunks of language Message-ID: Hi Everyone, A friend of mine is collecting what he calls preformulated concepts of language that can be useful in English acquisition. This might be a useful project for some of your students and for everyone who is interested in conceptual blending. Here is the link to a website that is just getting off the ground. http://formulaics.net/Default.aspx *Robert* From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Jul 9 19:20:32 2015 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 02:20:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries on classical psychological studies: Martin From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jul 10 09:09:52 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 09:09:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Discussion of Article From Leigh Star Issue Message-ID: Dear Colleagues- If you missed the announcement of a full free issue of MCA, it is all to be found here: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/current#.VZ_pGflVhBc The special issue is devoted to essays about the work of Leigh Star, long a friend, too briefly a member of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition and the Communication Department here at UCSD. The fact that she and Geoff Bowker were active LCHC faculty indexes an overlap between the theoretical ideas and empirical research of LCHC and Science Studies, an overlap that seems to be worth exploring more systematically. The Editors are proposing for discussion the article by Alfredo Jornet and Rolf Steier which is attached. They develop the concept of boundary object, long associated with Leigh?s work in a manner that links it up to those streams of ideas associated with Embodied, situated, cognition. Their article also provides a bridge between the discourses associated with the cultural-historical/activity approach from which MCA emerged with those of performance theory, and hence linkages to the use of the dramatic metaphor. A lot of relevant linkages. As they summarize their work in the abstract: *The authors? analyses identify and describe bodily and discursive practices of place? making and place-imagining that the participants perform as they attempt to maintain continuity across these shifting material forms and occasions.* Seems well worth recommending for discussion. The authors become free to join some time next week, so we might expect a start up some time next week for those who have the time and inclination. mike -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: jornet.steier.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 548196 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150710/cf3bd527/attachment.pdf From smago@uga.edu Fri Jul 10 16:08:40 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 23:08:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Apprentice in a Changing Trade In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This one looks interesting. From: Information Age Publishing [mailto:marketing@infoagepub.com] Sent: Friday, July 10, 2015 4:25 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: Apprentice in a Changing Trade [News update from Information Age Publishing] [http://www.infoagepub.com/assets/images/covers/p4d86bcee9196e.gif] Published 2011 ORDER ONLINE AT WWW.INFOAGEPUB.COM Paperback 978-1-61735-411-3 $45.99 Hardcover 978-1-61735-412-0 $85.99 eBook 9781617354137 Apprentice in a Changing Trade Edited by: Jean-Fran?ois Perret Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont Dani?le Golay Schilter Claude Kaiser Luc-Olivier Pochon A volume in Advances in Cultural Psychology: Constructing Human Development This book is a result of a major research project in Switzerland that brings together the fields of Education and Socio-Cultural Psychology. It is focused on how culture is involved in very concrete educational practices. The reader is invited to follow the research group in a Swiss technical college that trains young people in precision mechanics during a period of major technological change: the arrival of automated manufacturing systems. This transition in the trade is an opportunity to explore the educational and psychological challenges of vocational training from a perspective inspired by activity theory and the consideration of social interactions and semiotic or other technical mediations as crucial to the formation of professional identities and competencies. What are the most appropriate settings for learning? There is no simple answer to this question. What can lead a pupil to become engaged, even if this is within a school, with all the seriousness of a future professional? Under which conditions is an internship in a company genuinely formative? Is it necessary to possess the most recent technologies in order to offer high quality training? What do we know about the relation between doing and knowing in the construction of new competences? How can it be planned and informed to become an object of reflection and make sense in the eyes of the learner? Dealing with such qustions, this study explores new working hypotheses on the manner in which the young experience their training and on the significant role for them of professional specialization. CONTENTS: Series Editor's Preface: Learning from the Trade School- Learning for Living. Author's Introduction to the International Edition General Introduction 1. Restructuring of Vocational Competence 2. Where Can Professional Knowledge and Skills Be Acquired? 3. Introduction of Manufacturing Systems into a College: The Views of the Teachers Involved 4. What Happens in the Course of Practical Work? 5. Interacting and Succeeding 6. Alternative Interpretations of Learning Activities 7. Occupational Motivations and Their Relation to Learning Situations 8. Facing Up to the Introduction of New Technologies: Identifying the Dimensions Involved 9. General Conclusions: Learning Spaces for Creative Initiative and the Taking of Responsibility References. See Also: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/bern-washington_swiss-us-agree-on-vocational-training-and-bio-products/41540368 Information Age Publishing | P.O. Box 79049 | Charlotte, NC 28271-7047 T: 704.752.9125 | F: 704.752.9113 | E: info@infoagepub.com ------------------------------------------------------------------- This e-mail was sent to smago@uga.edu because you are subscribed to at least one of our mailing lists. If at any time you would like to remove yourself from our mailing list, please feel free to do so by visiting: http://infoagepub.net/lm/public/unsubscribe.php?g=139&addr=smago@uga.edu From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Jul 10 20:14:29 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2015 03:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] This is really painful for American Psychologists Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD3EE6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/11/us/psychologists-shielded-us-torture-program-report-finds.html?_r=0 Of which I am one, although not a member of the APA. I think the fact that members of the APA hierarchy tried to claim they were in the bathroom when this all happened just makes it so much worse. Sigh, Michael From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Jul 11 08:50:19 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2015 08:50:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Release of the Final Report of the Special Investigator In-Reply-To: <87219-1553309651.1436616181069.JavaMail.LMAIL2R$@LMAIL2R> References: <87219-1553309651.1436616181069.JavaMail.LMAIL2R$@LMAIL2R> Message-ID: Here is the APA notice sent out to association members that compliments Michael Glassman's earlier note from the Times. At a recent conference on cultural evolution, a number of the participants were identified institutionally as being attached to research arms of the military. The purchase of academics was not invented by W and not ended by Obama and not limited to the United States. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Governance Affairs Office Date: Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 5:00 AM Subject: Release of the Final Report of the Special Investigator To: mcole@ucsd.edu Dear Members, The APA Board of Directors commissioned Mr. David Hoffman of Sidley Austin to do a thorough and independent review related to allegations of a relationship the APA and Bush Administration related to the use of abusive interrogation techniques during the War on Terror. The report was recently received confidentially by Council who were in the process of providing recommendations to the Board when it was leaked to the New York Times. We had planned on a public release this coming week after Council?s input, but we have now posted the complete report on the APA website along with a press release that includes the Board?s initial recommendations. The supporting documents will be made available on our website this weekend. The conclusions of the Independent Review report are deeply disturbing. Mr. Hoffman found evidence of an ongoing pattern of collusion between a small group of APA representatives and the Department of Defense. The Hoffman report states that the intent of the individuals who participated in the collusion was to "curry favor" with the Defense Department, and that may have enabled the government's use of abusive interrogation techniques. As a result, the 2005 PENS report became a document based at least as much on the desires of the DoD as on the needs of the psychology profession and the APA's commitment to human rights. Mr. Hoffman did not find evidence of collusion with the CIA or in the 2002 change to our Code of Ethics. The Hoffman report clearly writes a difficult chapter in our organization?s history. We sincerely apologize for the actions, policies and lack of independence from governmental influence detailed in the report. Our members, our organization, our profession, and the public expected and deserved better. We have announced a series of corrective actions related to policies and procedures to strengthen our organization and demonstrate our commitment to ethics and human rights. We realize it is a lengthy document, but encourage you to read the full report. Although the Executive Summary thoroughly overviews the findings, the specific details that provide the background (emails and interview data) are in the actual document. Reading the full document will help you to better understand how Mr. Hoffman came to his conclusions. As troubling as the findings are, it is important that they have come to light so we can address them in a systematic and thoughtful way. As a result of the report, there will be significant changes in the organization, in terms of both policies and procedures. Dr. Stephen Behnke is no longer an employee of APA as a result of the findings in the Hoffman report, and other personnel actions are under consideration. APA as an organization is a tremendous force for good in the world. Our members and our staff include so many talented, committed, and ethical psychologists. Our task now is to use what we have learned to ensure that something like this can never happen again, to return to a focus on our core values in everything we do, and to work to regain the trust of both our members and the public. The months ahead will be very challenging for the association. We have much work ahead of us to address the findings of the report and to move toward healing. Nothing will *ever* undo what was done in the past, and we cannot deny that it is a stain on the honor of ?Psychology,? but we must and we will return to our roots to rebuild a new organization of which all of us can be proud. With your patience, support and engagement, we truly believe that we can come through this painful time an even stronger organization. Sincerely, Drs. Nadine Kaslow and Susan McDaniel The APA Independent Review?s Special Committee -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Jul 11 11:11:25 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2015 18:11:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Donate to Prolepsis to feed Greek children Message-ID: Hello esteemed xmcars, I thought I'd let you all know about Prolepsis, a non-gov public agency in Greece that helps feed Greek school children. I learned about it from this NYTimes article: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/world/europe/more-children-in-greece-start-to-go-hungry.html Apparently schoolchildren in Greece typically do not have lunch programs and many with the recent turn of events are going to school hungry. So here's the link to Prolepsis: http://www.prolepsis.gr/new/en/ If you click the "I would like to help children in Greece" you can donate through Paypal (in Euros). This is one way we can show that our concern and empathy during this time of uncertainty. It's not much to do from so far away, but then again, every little bit helps, like $5 or $10? I find the name "prolepsis" ? "the representation of something in the future as if it already existed or had occurred" to be relevant to us... and Greece! [?] Kind regards, Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OutlookEmoji-?.png Type: image/png Size: 488 bytes Desc: =?utf-8?B?T3V0bG9va0Vtb2ppLfCfmIoucG5n?= Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150711/83a72a51/attachment.png From cconnery@ithaca.edu Sat Jul 11 18:50:00 2015 From: cconnery@ithaca.edu (Cathrene Connery) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2015 01:50:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Donate to Prolepsis to feed Greek children In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dr. Cathrene Connery Associate Professor of Education Ithaca College Department of Education 194B Phillips Hall Annex 953 Danby Road Ithaca, New York 14850 Cconnery@ithaca.edu On Jul 11, 2015, at 2:12 PM, "Annalisa Aguilar" wrote: > Hello esteemed xmcars, > > > I thought I'd let you all know about Prolepsis, a non-gov public agency in Greece that helps feed Greek school children. I learned about it from this NYTimes article: > > http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/world/europe/more-children-in-greece-start-to-go-hungry.html > > > Apparently schoolchildren in Greece typically do not have lunch programs and many with the recent turn of events are going to school hungry. > > > So here's the link to Prolepsis: > > http://www.prolepsis.gr/new/en/ > > > If you click the "I would like to help children in Greece" you can donate through Paypal (in Euros). > > > This is one way we can show that our concern and empathy during this time of uncertainty. It's not much to do from so far away, but then again, every little bit helps, like $5 or $10? > > > I find the name "prolepsis" ? "the representation of something in the future as if it already existed or had occurred" to be relevant to us... and Greece! [?] > > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Jul 11 21:20:54 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2015 21:20:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Donate to Prolepsis to feed Greek children In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: our children are our future, Annalisa. Ask anyone **. So an organization called prolepsis that is involved in preventative medicine and acting as if a feeding someone now as a representation of the future seems entirely fitting. mike ** Sadly, by the same token, killing their children has a proleptic affect as well. And worse. On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 6:50 PM, Cathrene Connery wrote: > > > Dr. Cathrene Connery > Associate Professor of Education > Ithaca College > Department of Education > 194B Phillips Hall Annex > 953 Danby Road > Ithaca, New York 14850 > Cconnery@ithaca.edu > > On Jul 11, 2015, at 2:12 PM, "Annalisa Aguilar" wrote: > > > Hello esteemed xmcars, > > > > > > I thought I'd let you all know about Prolepsis, a non-gov public agency > in Greece that helps feed Greek school children. I learned about it from > this NYTimes article: > > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/world/europe/more-children-in-greece-start-to-go-hungry.html > > > > > > Apparently schoolchildren in Greece typically do not have lunch programs > and many with the recent turn of events are going to school hungry. > > > > > > So here's the link to Prolepsis: > > > > http://www.prolepsis.gr/new/en/ > > > > > > If you click the "I would like to help > children in Greece" you can donate through Paypal (in Euros). > > > > > > This is one way we can show that our concern and empathy during this > time of uncertainty. It's not much to do from so far away, but then again, > every little bit helps, like $5 or $10? > > > > > > I find the name "prolepsis" ? "the representation of something in the > future as if it already existed or had occurred" to be relevant to us... > and Greece! [?] > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jul 12 11:23:50 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2015 11:23:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [ISCAR] Dear colleagues, I share my latest publication... In-Reply-To: <914242588645670-528157013920898@groups.facebook.com> References: <914242588645670-528157013920898@groups.facebook.com> <914242588645670-528157013920898@groups.facebook.com> Message-ID: fyi ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Malba Barahona Date: Sun, Jul 12, 2015 at 11:02 AM Subject: [ISCAR] Dear colleagues, I share my latest publication... To: ISCAR <528157013920898@groups.facebook.com> Malba Barahona July 12 at 11:02am Dear colleagues, I share my latest publication with you. I hope it contributes to your work. Thanks! http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9781138915954/ English Language Teacher Education in Chile: A cultural historical activity theory perspective... www.routledge.com Over the last two decades, Chile has been driven by an economic imperative to build the capability o... Like Comment Share ISCAR Malba Barahona July 12 at 11:02am Dear colleagues, I share my latest publication with you. I hope it contributes to your work. Thanks! http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9781138915954/ English Language Teacher Education in Chile: A cultural historical activity theory perspective... www.routledge.com Over the last two decades, Chile has been driven by an economic imperative to build the capability o... Like Comment Share View Post Edit Email Settings Reply to this email to comment on this post. This message was sent to lchcmike@gmail.com. If you don't want to receive these emails from Facebook in the future, please unsubscribe . Facebook, Inc., Attention: Department 415, PO Box 10005, Palo Alto, CA 94303 -- All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jul 12 20:45:08 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden House and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very IDEOLOGICAL they are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of reinforcing whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of the dominant class, and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate schools devise an experiment that is designed to show how life-affirming and life-enhancing consumer choice is and how life-denying and life-deadening it is to be taken care of by people. Amusingly, the BBC then has to re-present this experiment by gushing that the two graduate students had absolutely no idea of what they would find (because of course even the BBC understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, it's not very significant in the history of psychology). The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the same model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and "attachment" (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a terry-cloth towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC re-presents this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the big debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely innate or entirely learned, something that has not been true of psychology since Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of Harlow--but much of it has to do with animal rights! The best critique came from Harlow himself, who assessing his own work, remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer sadism and at no inconsiderable government expense, in convincing psychologists of something everybody else has known for thousands of years. David Kellogg On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries on > classical psychological studies: > > > > Martin > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jul 12 21:08:56 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2015 22:08:56 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David, I would love to see the experiment replicated in Korea, except the two groups would be: 1. One group is assigned a plant and told that this was the plant that their family had chosen specifically for them. 2. The other group is told that they can choose a plant. My guess is that the 1's would live longer. The North Korean variation looks like this: 1. One group is assigned a plant and told that this was the plant that the Great Leader chose specifically for them. 2. The other group is told that they can choose a plant. This one is a little more interesting in terms of the implications that it has, but I'm guessing that the 1's would again live longer. The second experiment may be taking things a little too far, but my point is simply that this is also entirely ideological in the sense of cultural ideology. Whereas the lament late in the life course in the U.S. is a lack of autonomy, I suspect that the lament late in the life course in Korea is the lack of connectedness (my Korean in-laws think that sending old folks to old folks homes is tantamount to elderly abuse). The result is, I suspect, that the findings would be turned on their head. Anyone out there wanna give my little experiment a go? -greg On Sun, Jul 12, 2015 at 9:45 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden House > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very IDEOLOGICAL they > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of reinforcing > whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of the dominant class, > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate schools > devise an experiment that is designed to show how life-affirming and > life-enhancing consumer choice is and how life-denying and life-deadening > it is to be taken care of by people. Amusingly, the BBC then has to > re-present this experiment by gushing that the two graduate students had > absolutely no idea of what they would find (because of course even the BBC > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, it's > not very significant in the history of psychology). > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the same > model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and "attachment" > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a terry-cloth > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC re-presents > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the big > debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely innate or > entirely learned, something that has not been true of psychology since > Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of Harlow--but much of it > has to do with animal rights! The best critique came from Harlow himself, > who assessing his own work, remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer > sadism and at no inconsiderable government expense, in convincing > psychologists of something everybody else has known for thousands of years. > > David Kellogg > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries on > > classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > Martin > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Sun Jul 12 23:31:35 2015 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 01:31:35 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: , , Message-ID: Message from Francine: Hi David, In regard to the BBC's crediting Harlow with making a breakthrough in the nature-nuture debate: XMCAr's who where not educated in American psychology departments in the post WWII era don't realize how peculiar the intellectual climate was back then. B. F. Skinner's Behaviorism dominated American psychology from the 1950's through the 1970's as a rigid Stimulus-Response Psychology. So much so, that American psychologists were proclaiming a Cognitive Revolution in psychology in the 1980's - not realizing that Vygotsky had already pioneered the study of cognitive processes mediating between stimulus and response. In 1924, when Vygotsky first presented his theory, he had then credited Pavlov's later writings on the second signal system. Since Mind in Society was first published in 1978, American psychologists were only beginning to understand Vygotskian theory - and just beginning to think in terms of dialectical psychology (such as nature-nurture interactions). In my pre-Vygotsky days, as a graduate student at the University of Chicago during the 1970's Skinnerian behaviorism dominated the field, Piaget's theory was the hottest new theory (imagine cognitive developmental stages !!!), and Humanistic Psychology was the third Force in psychology as an alternative to Behaviorism and orthodox Freudian Psychoanalysis. I knew there had to be something more - gradually I discovered books on ego psychology (neo-Freudians) that the School for Social Work Administration assigned as texts for their courses. Then in 1976, when I was hired full-time as a community college professor, I found two books in that library that were just awesome - Klaus Reigel's Dialectical Psychology - and Werner and Kaplan's Symbol Formation. One of my professor's at U.C. actually told me that I did think like an American psychologist (meaning that I don't fit in the department) - he said "you think like a European psychologist." In 1984-1985 I translated the three Vygotsky papers on the development of imagination and creativity and became a Vygotskian (or neo-Vygotskian, whatever). And now American psychologists are just waking up to the fact that the rest of the world has never used the American Psychiatric Association's DSM system for diagnosis of psychiatric or psychological disorders. Effective this October the ICD 10 (International Classification of Diseases) has to be used to be in compliance with HIPAA - I wonder what will happen to all those Abnormal Psychology textbooks that are based exclusively on the DSM's five axes categorical system. > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden House > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very IDEOLOGICAL they > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of reinforcing > whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of the dominant class, > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate schools > devise an experiment that is designed to show how life-affirming and > life-enhancing consumer choice is and how life-denying and life-deadening > it is to be taken care of by people. Amusingly, the BBC then has to > re-present this experiment by gushing that the two graduate students had > absolutely no idea of what they would find (because of course even the BBC > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, it's > not very significant in the history of psychology). > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the same > model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and "attachment" > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a terry-cloth > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC re-presents > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the big > debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely innate or > entirely learned, something that has not been true of psychology since > Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of Harlow--but much of it > has to do with animal rights! The best critique came from Harlow himself, > who assessing his own work, remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer > sadism and at no inconsiderable government expense, in convincing > psychologists of something everybody else has known for thousands of years. > > David Kellogg > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries on > > classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > Martin > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 13 07:24:00 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 08:24:00 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Francine, Don't forget that there was also that guy John Dewey that published The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology in 1896. An important critique of behaviorism before it was cool. I once heard that Vygotsky might have read Dewey, but I've never seen evidence of this. Anyone? -greg On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 12:31 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > Hi David, > > In regard to the BBC's crediting Harlow with making a breakthrough in the > nature-nuture debate: XMCAr's who where not educated in American > psychology departments in the post WWII era don't realize how peculiar the > intellectual climate was back then. > > B. F. Skinner's Behaviorism dominated American psychology from the 1950's > through the 1970's as a rigid Stimulus-Response Psychology. So much so, > that American psychologists were proclaiming a Cognitive Revolution in > psychology in the 1980's - not realizing that Vygotsky had already > pioneered the study of cognitive processes mediating between stimulus and > response. In 1924, when Vygotsky first presented his theory, he had then > credited Pavlov's later writings on the second signal system. Since Mind in > Society was first published in 1978, American psychologists were only > beginning to understand Vygotskian theory - and just beginning to think in > terms of dialectical psychology (such as nature-nurture interactions). > > In my pre-Vygotsky days, as a graduate student at the University of > Chicago during the 1970's > Skinnerian behaviorism dominated the field, Piaget's theory was the > hottest new theory > (imagine cognitive developmental stages !!!), and Humanistic Psychology > was the third Force > in psychology as an alternative to Behaviorism and orthodox Freudian > Psychoanalysis. > I knew there had to be something more - gradually I discovered books on > ego psychology > (neo-Freudians) that the School for Social Work Administration assigned > as texts for their courses. Then in 1976, when I was hired full-time as a > community college professor, I found two books in that library that were > just awesome - Klaus Reigel's Dialectical Psychology - and Werner and > Kaplan's Symbol Formation. One of my professor's at U.C. actually told me > that I did think like an American psychologist (meaning that I don't fit in > the department) - he said "you think like a European psychologist." In > 1984-1985 I translated the three Vygotsky papers on the development of > imagination and creativity and became a Vygotskian (or neo-Vygotskian, > whatever). > > And now American psychologists are just waking up to the fact that the > rest of the world > has never used the American Psychiatric Association's DSM system for > diagnosis of psychiatric or psychological disorders. Effective this October > the ICD 10 (International Classification of Diseases) has to be used to be > in compliance with HIPAA - I wonder what will happen to all > those Abnormal Psychology textbooks that are based exclusively on the > DSM's five axes > categorical system. > > > > > > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden > House > > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very IDEOLOGICAL > they > > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of reinforcing > > whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of the dominant > class, > > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate schools > > devise an experiment that is designed to show how life-affirming and > > life-enhancing consumer choice is and how life-denying and life-deadening > > it is to be taken care of by people. Amusingly, the BBC then has to > > re-present this experiment by gushing that the two graduate students had > > absolutely no idea of what they would find (because of course even the > BBC > > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, it's > > not very significant in the history of psychology). > > > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the same > > model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and "attachment" > > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a > terry-cloth > > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC > re-presents > > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the big > > debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely innate or > > entirely learned, something that has not been true of psychology since > > Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of Harlow--but much of it > > has to do with animal rights! The best critique came from Harlow himself, > > who assessing his own work, remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer > > sadism and at no inconsiderable government expense, in convincing > > psychologists of something everybody else has known for thousands of > years. > > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries on > > > classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Mon Jul 13 08:06:52 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 15:06:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, as far as I know, the evidence is shaky, which hasn't stopped speculation. One such effort: Richard Prawat: Dewey Meets the ?Mozart of Psychology? in Moscow: The Untold Story American Educational Research Journal September 21, 2000 37: 663-696, I remember when it came out, it got some attention on xmca, which you can find in the archives I'm sure. p -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 10:24 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers Francine, Don't forget that there was also that guy John Dewey that published The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology in 1896. An important critique of behaviorism before it was cool. I once heard that Vygotsky might have read Dewey, but I've never seen evidence of this. Anyone? -greg On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 12:31 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > Hi David, > > In regard to the BBC's crediting Harlow with making a breakthrough in > the nature-nuture debate: XMCAr's who where not educated in American > psychology departments in the post WWII era don't realize how peculiar > the intellectual climate was back then. > > B. F. Skinner's Behaviorism dominated American psychology from the > 1950's through the 1970's as a rigid Stimulus-Response Psychology. So > much so, that American psychologists were proclaiming a Cognitive > Revolution in psychology in the 1980's - not realizing that Vygotsky > had already pioneered the study of cognitive processes mediating > between stimulus and response. In 1924, when Vygotsky first presented > his theory, he had then credited Pavlov's later writings on the second > signal system. Since Mind in Society was first published in 1978, > American psychologists were only beginning to understand Vygotskian > theory - and just beginning to think in terms of dialectical psychology (such as nature-nurture interactions). > > In my pre-Vygotsky days, as a graduate student at the University of > Chicago during the 1970's Skinnerian behaviorism dominated the field, > Piaget's theory was the hottest new theory (imagine cognitive > developmental stages !!!), and Humanistic Psychology was the third > Force in psychology as an alternative to Behaviorism and orthodox > Freudian Psychoanalysis. > I knew there had to be something more - gradually I discovered books > on ego psychology > (neo-Freudians) that the School for Social Work Administration > assigned as texts for their courses. Then in 1976, when I was hired > full-time as a community college professor, I found two books in that > library that were just awesome - Klaus Reigel's Dialectical Psychology > - and Werner and Kaplan's Symbol Formation. One of my professor's at > U.C. actually told me that I did think like an American psychologist > (meaning that I don't fit in the department) - he said "you think > like a European psychologist." In > 1984-1985 I translated the three Vygotsky papers on the development of > imagination and creativity and became a Vygotskian (or neo-Vygotskian, > whatever). > > And now American psychologists are just waking up to the fact that the > rest of the world has never used the American Psychiatric > Association's DSM system for diagnosis of psychiatric or psychological > disorders. Effective this October the ICD 10 (International > Classification of Diseases) has to be used to be in compliance with > HIPAA - I wonder what will happen to all those Abnormal Psychology > textbooks that are based exclusively on the DSM's five axes > categorical system. > > > > > > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden > House > > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very > > IDEOLOGICAL > they > > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of > > reinforcing whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of > > the dominant > class, > > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate > > schools devise an experiment that is designed to show how > > life-affirming and life-enhancing consumer choice is and how > > life-denying and life-deadening it is to be taken care of by people. > > Amusingly, the BBC then has to re-present this experiment by gushing > > that the two graduate students had absolutely no idea of what they > > would find (because of course even the > BBC > > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, > > it's not very significant in the history of psychology). > > > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the > > same model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and "attachment" > > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a > terry-cloth > > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC > re-presents > > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the > > big debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely > > innate or entirely learned, something that has not been true of > > psychology since Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of > > Harlow--but much of it has to do with animal rights! The best > > critique came from Harlow himself, who assessing his own work, > > remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer sadism and at no > > inconsiderable government expense, in convincing psychologists of > > something everybody else has known for thousands of > years. > > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries > > > on classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Jul 13 08:14:42 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 08:14:42 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: The evidence of LSV having read at least some of Dewey is clear. Check the indexes of his collected work in English. Their meeting is, as Peter says, a matter of speculation. The similarities of their ideas in many respects is a matter of considerable interest/debate. mike On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 8:06 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Greg, as far as I know, the evidence is shaky, which hasn't stopped > speculation. One such effort: > Richard Prawat: Dewey Meets the ?Mozart of Psychology? in Moscow: The > Untold Story American Educational Research Journal September 21, 2000 37: > 663-696, > > I remember when it came out, it got some attention on xmca, which you can > find in the archives I'm sure. p > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 10:24 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > Francine, > Don't forget that there was also that guy John Dewey that published The > Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology in 1896. > An important critique of behaviorism before it was cool. > I once heard that Vygotsky might have read Dewey, but I've never seen > evidence of this. Anyone? > -greg > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 12:31 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > > Message from Francine: > > > > Hi David, > > > > In regard to the BBC's crediting Harlow with making a breakthrough in > > the nature-nuture debate: XMCAr's who where not educated in American > > psychology departments in the post WWII era don't realize how peculiar > > the intellectual climate was back then. > > > > B. F. Skinner's Behaviorism dominated American psychology from the > > 1950's through the 1970's as a rigid Stimulus-Response Psychology. So > > much so, that American psychologists were proclaiming a Cognitive > > Revolution in psychology in the 1980's - not realizing that Vygotsky > > had already pioneered the study of cognitive processes mediating > > between stimulus and response. In 1924, when Vygotsky first presented > > his theory, he had then credited Pavlov's later writings on the second > > signal system. Since Mind in Society was first published in 1978, > > American psychologists were only beginning to understand Vygotskian > > theory - and just beginning to think in terms of dialectical psychology > (such as nature-nurture interactions). > > > > In my pre-Vygotsky days, as a graduate student at the University of > > Chicago during the 1970's Skinnerian behaviorism dominated the field, > > Piaget's theory was the hottest new theory (imagine cognitive > > developmental stages !!!), and Humanistic Psychology was the third > > Force in psychology as an alternative to Behaviorism and orthodox > > Freudian Psychoanalysis. > > I knew there had to be something more - gradually I discovered books > > on ego psychology > > (neo-Freudians) that the School for Social Work Administration > > assigned as texts for their courses. Then in 1976, when I was hired > > full-time as a community college professor, I found two books in that > > library that were just awesome - Klaus Reigel's Dialectical Psychology > > - and Werner and Kaplan's Symbol Formation. One of my professor's at > > U.C. actually told me that I did think like an American psychologist > > (meaning that I don't fit in the department) - he said "you think > > like a European psychologist." In > > 1984-1985 I translated the three Vygotsky papers on the development of > > imagination and creativity and became a Vygotskian (or neo-Vygotskian, > > whatever). > > > > And now American psychologists are just waking up to the fact that the > > rest of the world has never used the American Psychiatric > > Association's DSM system for diagnosis of psychiatric or psychological > > disorders. Effective this October the ICD 10 (International > > Classification of Diseases) has to be used to be in compliance with > > HIPAA - I wonder what will happen to all those Abnormal Psychology > > textbooks that are based exclusively on the DSM's five axes > > categorical system. > > > > > > > > > > > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 > > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > > > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden > > House > > > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very > > > IDEOLOGICAL > > they > > > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of > > > reinforcing whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of > > > the dominant > > class, > > > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > > > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > > > > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate > > > schools devise an experiment that is designed to show how > > > life-affirming and life-enhancing consumer choice is and how > > > life-denying and life-deadening it is to be taken care of by people. > > > Amusingly, the BBC then has to re-present this experiment by gushing > > > that the two graduate students had absolutely no idea of what they > > > would find (because of course even the > > BBC > > > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, > > > it's not very significant in the history of psychology). > > > > > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the > > > same model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and > "attachment" > > > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a > > terry-cloth > > > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC > > re-presents > > > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the > > > big debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely > > > innate or entirely learned, something that has not been true of > > > psychology since Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of > > > Harlow--but much of it has to do with animal rights! The best > > > critique came from Harlow himself, who assessing his own work, > > > remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer sadism and at no > > > inconsiderable government expense, in convincing psychologists of > > > something everybody else has known for thousands of > > years. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > > > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries > > > > on classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 13 08:20:01 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 09:20:01 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks Message-ID: Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks if anyone is interested: http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From glassman.13@osu.edu Mon Jul 13 08:34:02 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 15:34:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am really confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. Almost all the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, Self and Society - which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told in graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a few years ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could remember the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - search Mead if you are interested) which included a number of articles including contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of them and they were really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what Blumer came to call symbolic interactionism. I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In the end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks if anyone is interested: http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Mon Jul 13 10:14:11 2015 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:14:11 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , , Message-ID: Message from Francine: The similarities between Vygotsky's theory and John Dewey's colleague George Herbert Mead's theory are even more striking. One thing that Vygotsky added, that Mead did not have, was the process of the internalization of speech (that could could be studied empirically (microgenetic)). Didn't Luria make a trip to the USA in the 1920s and presented a paper he co-authored with Vygotsky at a conference? I seem to recall reading that Vygotsky could not enter the USA because of his TB. Since papers are reviewed prior to acceptance there might have been some correspondence with members of a group like the APA. Both Dewey and his colleague J. R. Angell (founder of the psychology department at the University of Chicago) were both prominent members of the APA (also serving as its Presidents). Also Vygotsky traveled across Europe in the 1920s to present a paper in London (which I understand was never presented) - doubtless he had contact with several prominent psychologists (who might have read his paper as reviewers (and then rejected it ???)). Of course there might just have been a Zeitgeist. > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 08:14:42 -0700 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > The evidence of LSV having read at least some of Dewey is clear. Check the > indexes of his collected work in English. > > Their meeting is, as Peter says, a matter of speculation. The similarities > of their ideas in many respects is a matter of considerable interest/debate. > mike > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 8:06 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > > Greg, as far as I know, the evidence is shaky, which hasn't stopped > > speculation. One such effort: > > Richard Prawat: Dewey Meets the ?Mozart of Psychology? in Moscow: The > > Untold Story American Educational Research Journal September 21, 2000 37: > > 663-696, > > > > I remember when it came out, it got some attention on xmca, which you can > > find in the archives I'm sure. p > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 10:24 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > Francine, > > Don't forget that there was also that guy John Dewey that published The > > Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology in 1896. > > An important critique of behaviorism before it was cool. > > I once heard that Vygotsky might have read Dewey, but I've never seen > > evidence of this. Anyone? > > -greg > > > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 12:31 AM, larry smolucha > > wrote: > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > Hi David, > > > > > > In regard to the BBC's crediting Harlow with making a breakthrough in > > > the nature-nuture debate: XMCAr's who where not educated in American > > > psychology departments in the post WWII era don't realize how peculiar > > > the intellectual climate was back then. > > > > > > B. F. Skinner's Behaviorism dominated American psychology from the > > > 1950's through the 1970's as a rigid Stimulus-Response Psychology. So > > > much so, that American psychologists were proclaiming a Cognitive > > > Revolution in psychology in the 1980's - not realizing that Vygotsky > > > had already pioneered the study of cognitive processes mediating > > > between stimulus and response. In 1924, when Vygotsky first presented > > > his theory, he had then credited Pavlov's later writings on the second > > > signal system. Since Mind in Society was first published in 1978, > > > American psychologists were only beginning to understand Vygotskian > > > theory - and just beginning to think in terms of dialectical psychology > > (such as nature-nurture interactions). > > > > > > In my pre-Vygotsky days, as a graduate student at the University of > > > Chicago during the 1970's Skinnerian behaviorism dominated the field, > > > Piaget's theory was the hottest new theory (imagine cognitive > > > developmental stages !!!), and Humanistic Psychology was the third > > > Force in psychology as an alternative to Behaviorism and orthodox > > > Freudian Psychoanalysis. > > > I knew there had to be something more - gradually I discovered books > > > on ego psychology > > > (neo-Freudians) that the School for Social Work Administration > > > assigned as texts for their courses. Then in 1976, when I was hired > > > full-time as a community college professor, I found two books in that > > > library that were just awesome - Klaus Reigel's Dialectical Psychology > > > - and Werner and Kaplan's Symbol Formation. One of my professor's at > > > U.C. actually told me that I did think like an American psychologist > > > (meaning that I don't fit in the department) - he said "you think > > > like a European psychologist." In > > > 1984-1985 I translated the three Vygotsky papers on the development of > > > imagination and creativity and became a Vygotskian (or neo-Vygotskian, > > > whatever). > > > > > > And now American psychologists are just waking up to the fact that the > > > rest of the world has never used the American Psychiatric > > > Association's DSM system for diagnosis of psychiatric or psychological > > > disorders. Effective this October the ICD 10 (International > > > Classification of Diseases) has to be used to be in compliance with > > > HIPAA - I wonder what will happen to all those Abnormal Psychology > > > textbooks that are based exclusively on the DSM's five axes > > > categorical system. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 > > > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > > > > > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden > > > House > > > > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very > > > > IDEOLOGICAL > > > they > > > > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of > > > > reinforcing whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of > > > > the dominant > > > class, > > > > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > > > > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > > > > > > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate > > > > schools devise an experiment that is designed to show how > > > > life-affirming and life-enhancing consumer choice is and how > > > > life-denying and life-deadening it is to be taken care of by people. > > > > Amusingly, the BBC then has to re-present this experiment by gushing > > > > that the two graduate students had absolutely no idea of what they > > > > would find (because of course even the > > > BBC > > > > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, > > > > it's not very significant in the history of psychology). > > > > > > > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the > > > > same model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and > > "attachment" > > > > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a > > > terry-cloth > > > > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC > > > re-presents > > > > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the > > > > big debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely > > > > innate or entirely learned, something that has not been true of > > > > psychology since Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of > > > > Harlow--but much of it has to do with animal rights! The best > > > > critique came from Harlow himself, who assessing his own work, > > > > remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer sadism and at no > > > > inconsiderable government expense, in convincing psychologists of > > > > something everybody else has known for thousands of > > > years. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > > > > > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries > > > > > on classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 13 11:36:08 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:36:08 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hegelian (zeit)geist perhaps? Hegel might have been a major link here - whether directly (as with Dewey and Mead) or indirectly via Marx (as with Vygotsky - and maybe directly too). (and I know that the Hegel-Vygotsky connections have been a big deal on this listserve so I meant to leave it ambiguous - I'm not well enough read to intelligently take sides on this issue...) -greg On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:14 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > The similarities between Vygotsky's theory and John Dewey's colleague > George > Herbert Mead's theory are even more striking. One thing that Vygotsky > added, that Mead did not have, was the process of the internalization of > speech (that could could be studied empirically (microgenetic)). > > Didn't Luria make a trip to the USA in the 1920s and presented a paper he > co-authored with Vygotsky at a conference? I seem to recall reading that > Vygotsky could not enter the USA because of his TB. Since papers are > reviewed prior to acceptance there might have been some correspondence with > members of a group like the APA. Both Dewey and his colleague J. R. Angell > (founder of the psychology department at the University of Chicago) were > both prominent members of the APA (also serving as its Presidents). Also > Vygotsky traveled across Europe in the 1920s to present a paper in London > (which I understand was never presented) - doubtless he had contact with > several prominent psychologists (who might have read his paper as reviewers > (and then rejected it ???)). > > Of course there might just have been a Zeitgeist. > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 08:14:42 -0700 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > The evidence of LSV having read at least some of Dewey is clear. Check > the > > indexes of his collected work in English. > > > > Their meeting is, as Peter says, a matter of speculation. The > similarities > > of their ideas in many respects is a matter of considerable > interest/debate. > > mike > > > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 8:06 AM, Peter Smagorinsky > wrote: > > > > > Greg, as far as I know, the evidence is shaky, which hasn't stopped > > > speculation. One such effort: > > > Richard Prawat: Dewey Meets the ?Mozart of Psychology? in Moscow: The > > > Untold Story American Educational Research Journal September 21, 2000 > 37: > > > 663-696, > > > > > > I remember when it came out, it got some attention on xmca, which you > can > > > find in the archives I'm sure. p > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg > Thompson > > > Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 10:24 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > > > Francine, > > > Don't forget that there was also that guy John Dewey that published The > > > Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology in 1896. > > > An important critique of behaviorism before it was cool. > > > I once heard that Vygotsky might have read Dewey, but I've never seen > > > evidence of this. Anyone? > > > -greg > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 12:31 AM, larry smolucha < > lsmolucha@hotmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > > > Hi David, > > > > > > > > In regard to the BBC's crediting Harlow with making a breakthrough in > > > > the nature-nuture debate: XMCAr's who where not educated in American > > > > psychology departments in the post WWII era don't realize how > peculiar > > > > the intellectual climate was back then. > > > > > > > > B. F. Skinner's Behaviorism dominated American psychology from the > > > > 1950's through the 1970's as a rigid Stimulus-Response Psychology. So > > > > much so, that American psychologists were proclaiming a Cognitive > > > > Revolution in psychology in the 1980's - not realizing that Vygotsky > > > > had already pioneered the study of cognitive processes mediating > > > > between stimulus and response. In 1924, when Vygotsky first presented > > > > his theory, he had then credited Pavlov's later writings on the > second > > > > signal system. Since Mind in Society was first published in 1978, > > > > American psychologists were only beginning to understand Vygotskian > > > > theory - and just beginning to think in terms of dialectical > psychology > > > (such as nature-nurture interactions). > > > > > > > > In my pre-Vygotsky days, as a graduate student at the University of > > > > Chicago during the 1970's Skinnerian behaviorism dominated the field, > > > > Piaget's theory was the hottest new theory (imagine cognitive > > > > developmental stages !!!), and Humanistic Psychology was the third > > > > Force in psychology as an alternative to Behaviorism and orthodox > > > > Freudian Psychoanalysis. > > > > I knew there had to be something more - gradually I discovered books > > > > on ego psychology > > > > (neo-Freudians) that the School for Social Work Administration > > > > assigned as texts for their courses. Then in 1976, when I was hired > > > > full-time as a community college professor, I found two books in that > > > > library that were just awesome - Klaus Reigel's Dialectical > Psychology > > > > - and Werner and Kaplan's Symbol Formation. One of my professor's at > > > > U.C. actually told me that I did think like an American psychologist > > > > (meaning that I don't fit in the department) - he said "you think > > > > like a European psychologist." In > > > > 1984-1985 I translated the three Vygotsky papers on the development > of > > > > imagination and creativity and became a Vygotskian (or > neo-Vygotskian, > > > > whatever). > > > > > > > > And now American psychologists are just waking up to the fact that > the > > > > rest of the world has never used the American Psychiatric > > > > Association's DSM system for diagnosis of psychiatric or > psychological > > > > disorders. Effective this October the ICD 10 (International > > > > Classification of Diseases) has to be used to be in compliance with > > > > HIPAA - I wonder what will happen to all those Abnormal Psychology > > > > textbooks that are based exclusively on the DSM's five axes > > > > categorical system. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 > > > > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > > > > > > > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them > (Arden > > > > House > > > > > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very > > > > > IDEOLOGICAL > > > > they > > > > > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of > > > > > reinforcing whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of > > > > > the dominant > > > > class, > > > > > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > > > > > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > > > > > > > > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate > > > > > schools devise an experiment that is designed to show how > > > > > life-affirming and life-enhancing consumer choice is and how > > > > > life-denying and life-deadening it is to be taken care of by > people. > > > > > Amusingly, the BBC then has to re-present this experiment by > gushing > > > > > that the two graduate students had absolutely no idea of what they > > > > > would find (because of course even the > > > > BBC > > > > > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, > > > > > it's not very significant in the history of psychology). > > > > > > > > > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less > the > > > > > same model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and > > > "attachment" > > > > > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a > > > > terry-cloth > > > > > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC > > > > re-presents > > > > > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the > > > > > big debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely > > > > > innate or entirely learned, something that has not been true of > > > > > psychology since Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of > > > > > Harlow--but much of it has to do with animal rights! The best > > > > > critique came from Harlow himself, who assessing his own work, > > > > > remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer sadism and at no > > > > > inconsiderable government expense, in convincing psychologists of > > > > > something everybody else has known for thousands of > > > > years. > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries > > > > > > on classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From scullyru@gwu.edu Mon Jul 13 12:32:11 2015 From: scullyru@gwu.edu (Ellen Scully-Russ) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 15:32:11 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael - others This is a great site for all things Mead --- http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will find an extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. Enjoy.... Ellen On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am really > confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. Almost all > the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, Self and Society - > which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told in > graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a few years > ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could remember > the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - search Mead > if you are interested) which included a number of articles including > contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of them and they were > really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what Blumer > came to call symbolic interactionism. > > I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In the > end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. > > Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > > Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks if > anyone is interested: > http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning The Graduate School of Education and Human Development The George Washington University 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 Ashburn, VA 20147 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 13 15:54:17 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 15:54:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Conversation OF gestures and Conversational analysis Message-ID: Greg, I read with interest the article "The Interactionist Perspectives of Herbert Mead and Harvey Sacks. I want to focus on the last end note #9 which sums up why this article was written. "one reason for writing this paper is to try to understand why those approaches based on Mead, e.g. symbolic interactionism, are not interested in the detailed study of interaction as a process, in conversational interaction as a topic, and on the study of how MEANINGS are ongoingly constituted, i.e. the process of meaning CONSTRUCTION. I think that conversational analyses, [now referred to as CA] such as that developed by Sacks, have important and significantly different contributions to make to the study of the social process which the Meadian perspective is unable to accomplish. The conclusion is that these approaches are different epistemological and methodological approaches Greg, interaction is a focus of both approaches, as is the focus on "meaning construction" in ongoing social contexts, but they approach this focus from different "traditions". Mead is focused on the "generalized" typical conversation of gestures. Sacks is focused on micro observation of empirical "facts". The question that arises is if there are other competing "traditions" which focus on the "generation of "meaning" that do not take as their model "construction of meaning". Traditions that re-cognize that "meaning" is existing within historically developed traditions AND through a process of "enculturation" through generations pass on what has become "meaning" [now independent of the specific local taking of roles and empirical micro processes. This "tradition" proposes that there is also a "conservation" of meaning that exists "beyond" either Mead's generalized conversation of gestures and the method of conversational analysis/construction. This "sense" of "traditons of meaning development. In particular I am drawing attention to the "tradition" that understands "meaning" as historically constituted and residing in the "subject matter" that continues to "develop" but already existed before I as an individual existed. I appreciated the contrast that this article highlighted between Mead's "conversation of gestures" [typical and general] and Sacks empirical phenomenological notions of meaning "construction". What needs to be added to both these approaches is the "historically constituted meaning" that is passed on between the generations through processes of "bildung" that also contributes to personal "meaning". This is a third "tradition" moving beyond "construction" and "building block" metaphors. In some sense the "home" already exists and we are "re-modelling" what already exists. We may be re-using building blocks for [in order to] another "purpose" but we are re-using previously constructed building blocks [upon which] new structures are transformed. Larry From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jul 13 16:24:37 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 17:24:37 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found Prefactory Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found this: "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity of Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as a problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. There was no common language because there was no common object of reference. His problem did not fall into the categories and classifications of either idealism or realism. He was talking about something which the rest of us did not see.? Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike Cole?s posts: All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? Interesting. Henry > On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ wrote: > > Michael - others > > This is a great site for all things Mead --- > http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ > > If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will find an > extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. > > Enjoy.... > > Ellen > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am really >> confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. Almost all >> the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, Self and Society - >> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told in >> graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a few years >> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could remember >> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - search Mead >> if you are interested) which included a number of articles including >> contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of them and they were >> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what Blumer >> came to call symbolic interactionism. >> >> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In the >> end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. >> >> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Greg Thompson >> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM >> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >> >> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks if >> anyone is interested: >> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf >> >> -greg >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> > > > -- > Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. > Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning > The Graduate School of Education and Human Development > The George Washington University > 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 > Ashburn, VA 20147 From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Jul 13 17:29:16 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 17:29:16 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead and Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is probably worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for representing the phenomena when communicating with others about them. Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he was working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for being able to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have talking movies and if he had a tape recorder, it was an early model. The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all chat-minded folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth Burke and dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the list, but rarely discussed. Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with Dilthey (as I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an explanatory psychology. Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? mike On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found Prefactory > Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found this: > > "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity of > Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as a > problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. There was > no common language because there was no common object of reference. His > problem did not fall into the categories and classifications of either > idealism or realism. He was talking about something which the rest of us > did not see.? > > Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike Cole?s > posts: > > All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? > > Interesting. > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ wrote: > > > > Michael - others > > > > This is a great site for all things Mead --- > > http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ > > > > If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will find an > > extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. > > > > Enjoy.... > > > > Ellen > > > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael > > > wrote: > > > >> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am really > >> confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. Almost all > >> the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, Self and > Society - > >> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told in > >> graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a few > years > >> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could > remember > >> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - search > Mead > >> if you are interested) which included a number of articles including > >> contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of them and they > were > >> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what > Blumer > >> came to call symbolic interactionism. > >> > >> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In the > >> end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. > >> > >> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On > >> Behalf Of Greg Thompson > >> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM > >> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > >> > >> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > if > >> anyone is interested: > >> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. > > Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning > > The Graduate School of Education and Human Development > > The George Washington University > > 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 > > Ashburn, VA 20147 > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jul 13 18:38:10 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 19:38:10 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, if I am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest work, which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of language in real time. This is late in coming from cognitive linguistics, but seems to tap into a something rich with potential, not just for how we use language, but how we learn it and how language changes over time. The point you make about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. Henry > On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. > Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. > > In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead and > Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is probably > worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for representing the > phenomena when communicating with others about them. > Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he was > working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for being able > to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have talking movies and if he > had a tape recorder, it was an early model. > > The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all chat-minded > folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth Burke and > dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the list, but rarely > discussed. > > Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with Dilthey (as > I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an explanatory psychology. > > Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? > > mike > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found Prefactory >> Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found this: >> >> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity of >> Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as a >> problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. There was >> no common language because there was no common object of reference. His >> problem did not fall into the categories and classifications of either >> idealism or realism. He was talking about something which the rest of us >> did not see.? >> >> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike Cole?s >> posts: >> >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? >> >> Interesting. >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ wrote: >>> >>> Michael - others >>> >>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- >>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ >>> >>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will find an >>> extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. >>> >>> Enjoy.... >>> >>> Ellen >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am really >>>> confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. Almost all >>>> the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, Self and >> Society - >>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told in >>>> graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a few >> years >>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could >> remember >>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - search >> Mead >>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles including >>>> contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of them and they >> were >>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what >> Blumer >>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. >>>> >>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In the >>>> end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. >>>> >>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> On >>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson >>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM >>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >>>> >>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >> if >>>> anyone is interested: >>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. >>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning >>> The Graduate School of Education and Human Development >>> The George Washington University >>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 >>> Ashburn, VA 20147 >> >> > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jul 13 21:35:07 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 13:35:07 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike is a survivor of the long night of behaviorism in twentieth century psychology, and weirdly enough I had a walk on (or perhaps a crawl on) part in it myself. My mother, who had previously been a graduate student in physics and chemistry and then one of the first computer coders, began studying child psychology at the University of Minnesota as a way of wiling away the long hours I spent in their nursery school, which back in the early sixties was the only place that you could really get day care. I remember having to do rat-maze experiments and getting rewarded with M&Ms, and my dad says that it was only his personal intervention that prevented me from being raised in a Skinner box. But my point stands: behaviorists were never divided over the question of whether ALL behavior was inherited or ALL behavior was conditioned. It was always a matter of determining how much. It is interesting that the the Arden House experiments and the Harlow experiments have diametrically counterposed codas (one hesitates to draw them as conclusions). One argues that being taken care of is life denying, while the other finds it life-affirming. Not only does it never occur to the programme presenters that these two things might both be true at different developmental stages (since Arden House takes place at the close of life and the Harlow experiments are supposed to deal with the commencement), it doesn't even appear that they have noticed that they are in contradiction. The third programme, on the Hawthorne effect, is even more hilarious. I had always assumed that the Hawthorne effect was for psychology what the placebo effect was in medicine. But that's not the case at all. It's the late 1920s. There's a gigantic plant for manufacturing telephone relays on the outskirts of Chicago. The bosses want to find out how to increase productivity--increase the room temperature, decrease it, increase lighting, decrease it, more breaks, fewer breaks, what have you. It turns out that the answer is...what have you. No matter what the bosses do, productivity goes up. And no wonder. When two girls do NOT increase productivity, they are removed from the study on suspicion that they have "gone Bolshevik". David Kellogg and On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 3:31 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > Hi David, > > In regard to the BBC's crediting Harlow with making a breakthrough in the > nature-nuture debate: XMCAr's who where not educated in American > psychology departments in the post WWII era don't realize how peculiar the > intellectual climate was back then. > > B. F. Skinner's Behaviorism dominated American psychology from the 1950's > through the 1970's as a rigid Stimulus-Response Psychology. So much so, > that American psychologists were proclaiming a Cognitive Revolution in > psychology in the 1980's - not realizing that Vygotsky had already > pioneered the study of cognitive processes mediating between stimulus and > response. In 1924, when Vygotsky first presented his theory, he had then > credited Pavlov's later writings on the second signal system. Since Mind in > Society was first published in 1978, American psychologists were only > beginning to understand Vygotskian theory - and just beginning to think in > terms of dialectical psychology (such as nature-nurture interactions). > > In my pre-Vygotsky days, as a graduate student at the University of > Chicago during the 1970's > Skinnerian behaviorism dominated the field, Piaget's theory was the > hottest new theory > (imagine cognitive developmental stages !!!), and Humanistic Psychology > was the third Force > in psychology as an alternative to Behaviorism and orthodox Freudian > Psychoanalysis. > I knew there had to be something more - gradually I discovered books on > ego psychology > (neo-Freudians) that the School for Social Work Administration assigned > as texts for their courses. Then in 1976, when I was hired full-time as a > community college professor, I found two books in that library that were > just awesome - Klaus Reigel's Dialectical Psychology - and Werner and > Kaplan's Symbol Formation. One of my professor's at U.C. actually told me > that I did think like an American psychologist (meaning that I don't fit in > the department) - he said "you think like a European psychologist." In > 1984-1985 I translated the three Vygotsky papers on the development of > imagination and creativity and became a Vygotskian (or neo-Vygotskian, > whatever). > > And now American psychologists are just waking up to the fact that the > rest of the world > has never used the American Psychiatric Association's DSM system for > diagnosis of psychiatric or psychological disorders. Effective this October > the ICD 10 (International Classification of Diseases) has to be used to be > in compliance with HIPAA - I wonder what will happen to all > those Abnormal Psychology textbooks that are based exclusively on the > DSM's five axes > categorical system. > > > > > > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden > House > > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very IDEOLOGICAL > they > > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of reinforcing > > whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of the dominant > class, > > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate schools > > devise an experiment that is designed to show how life-affirming and > > life-enhancing consumer choice is and how life-denying and life-deadening > > it is to be taken care of by people. Amusingly, the BBC then has to > > re-present this experiment by gushing that the two graduate students had > > absolutely no idea of what they would find (because of course even the > BBC > > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, it's > > not very significant in the history of psychology). > > > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the same > > model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and "attachment" > > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a > terry-cloth > > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC > re-presents > > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the big > > debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely innate or > > entirely learned, something that has not been true of psychology since > > Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of Harlow--but much of it > > has to do with animal rights! The best critique came from Harlow himself, > > who assessing his own work, remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer > > sadism and at no inconsiderable government expense, in convincing > > psychologists of something everybody else has known for thousands of > years. > > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries on > > > classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 13 22:05:04 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 23:05:04 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> Message-ID: Mike, Thanks for the Dilthey and Mead connection. Funny, I went to google it but accidentally typed in "Dilthey and Dewey" and was surprised to find one of the first hits was "The Anthropology of Experience" - a summary of a book by Victor Turner and F. Bruner, and it also happens to be the name of a class that I'm teaching this fall (I discovered this book shortly after I had decided on the title of the class - or so I thought). Anyway, when I finally corrected my search and searched for "Dilthey and Mead", at the bottom of the page I found a like to an XMCA post in 2013 by one Greg Thompson, asking about links from Vygotsky to Dilthey (for those interested in that thread, here it is: http://xmca.ucsd.edu/yarns/14853?keywords=) (oh, and btw, kudos to those managing the listserve - it is much easier to read through entire threads than it used to be - very cool!). Michael notes in his post in that thread that it was William James who suggested that Mead go to study with Dilthey, but Michael notes that he (Mead?) never got his PhD while there. I also came across another piece that said that Mead took a couple classes from Dilthey but never acknowledged Dilthey in any of his work. Maybe just forgot about him. Speaking of forgetting, to my surprise, there in my post from two years ago I found the title of the book after which I recently unwittingly had named my class - the Anthropology of Experience. Is it just me or is forgetting an important part of academic work? As Michael Glassman noted in his comment - very incestuous group of ideas here. -greg On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 7:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, if I > am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human > interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest work, > which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of language in > real time. This is late in coming from cognitive linguistics, but seems to > tap into a something rich with potential, not just for how we use language, > but how we learn it and how language changes over time. The point you make > about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. > Henry > > > On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. > > Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. > > > > In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead and > > Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is probably > > worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for representing > the > > phenomena when communicating with others about them. > > Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he was > > working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for being > able > > to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have talking movies and if > he > > had a tape recorder, it was an early model. > > > > The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all chat-minded > > folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth Burke and > > dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the list, but rarely > > discussed. > > > > Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with Dilthey > (as > > I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an explanatory > psychology. > > > > Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? > > > > mike > > > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found > Prefactory > >> Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found this: > >> > >> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity of > >> Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as a > >> problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. There > was > >> no common language because there was no common object of reference. His > >> problem did not fall into the categories and classifications of either > >> idealism or realism. He was talking about something which the rest of us > >> did not see.? > >> > >> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike > Cole?s > >> posts: > >> > >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > >> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? > >> > >> Interesting. > >> > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ > wrote: > >>> > >>> Michael - others > >>> > >>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- > >>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ > >>> > >>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will find > an > >>> extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. > >>> > >>> Enjoy.... > >>> > >>> Ellen > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael < > glassman.13@osu.edu > >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am > really > >>>> confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. Almost > all > >>>> the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, Self and > >> Society - > >>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told in > >>>> graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a few > >> years > >>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could > >> remember > >>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - search > >> Mead > >>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles including > >>>> contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of them and they > >> were > >>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what > >> Blumer > >>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. > >>>> > >>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In > the > >>>> end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. > >>>> > >>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> On > >>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson > >>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM > >>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > >>>> > >>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey > Sacks > >> if > >>>> anyone is interested: > >>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf > >>>> > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. > >>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning > >>> The Graduate School of Education and Human Development > >>> The George Washington University > >>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 > >>> Ashburn, VA 20147 > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 00:19:15 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:19:15 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian Message-ID: We're working through Vygotsky's very long chapter on infancy in the "Child Development" book he was working towards the end of his life. He has just introduced Blonsky's partitioning of infancy into three stages, on the basis of the presence or absence of teeth. Then, the Russian Collected Works (foot of p. 303) has this: "?? 2-? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????????? ????????? ?????????? ? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? ??????????????, ?????? ?????????????, ???????? ??????????????." The English Collected works renders this as: "In the second year of life, the child is equal to the adult in a room in a situation where little movement is required and between them a relation of cooperation, although elementary and simple, is established." But this doesn't make any sense at all, at least not in English. Is it possible that it's a misprint? David Kellogg From smago@uga.edu Tue Jul 14 03:27:16 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 10:27:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> Message-ID: By coincidence, someone just sent me a link to https://vimeo.com/57250619 which is a talk by Nikolai Veresov, with whom I'd been unfamiliar. He emphasizes LSV's integration of his love for theater and his insistence on the drama of everyday life as a principal tension in human development. In case you're interested, I also make these points in: Smagorinsky, P. (2011). Vygotsky's stage theory: The psychology of art and the actor under the direction of perezhivanie. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 18, 319-341. Available at http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/MCA/MCA2011.pdf -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 9:38 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, if I am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest work, which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of language in real time. This is late in coming from cognitive linguistics, but seems to tap into a something rich with potential, not just for how we use language, but how we learn it and how language changes over time. The point you make about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. Henry > On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. > Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. > > In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead > and Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is probably > worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for representing > the phenomena when communicating with others about them. > Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he was > working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for being > able to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have talking movies > and if he had a tape recorder, it was an early model. > > The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all > chat-minded folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth > Burke and dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the > list, but rarely discussed. > > Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with > Dilthey (as I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an explanatory psychology. > > Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? > > mike > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found >> Prefactory Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found this: >> >> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity >> of Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as >> a problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. >> There was no common language because there was no common object of >> reference. His problem did not fall into the categories and >> classifications of either idealism or realism. He was talking about >> something which the rest of us did not see.? >> >> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike >> Cole?s >> posts: >> >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? >> >> Interesting. >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ wrote: >>> >>> Michael - others >>> >>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- >>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ >>> >>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will >>> find an extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. >>> >>> Enjoy.... >>> >>> Ellen >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am >>>> really confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. >>>> Almost all the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, >>>> Self and >> Society - >>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told >>>> in graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a >>>> few >> years >>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could >> remember >>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - >>>> search >> Mead >>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles >>>> including contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of >>>> them and they >> were >>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what >> Blumer >>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. >>>> >>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In >>>> the end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. >>>> >>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.ed >>>> u] >> On >>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson >>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM >>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >>>> >>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey >>>> Sacks >> if >>>> anyone is interested: >>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. >>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning The Graduate >>> School of Education and Human Development The George Washington >>> University >>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 >>> Ashburn, VA 20147 >> >> > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Jul 14 06:57:55 2015 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 13:57:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4B767A45-CCF3-475B-973E-1AAD739382C9@uniandes.edu.co> One thing I liked about these documentaries, David, was that they were not a simple celebration of these studies. The warts became evident, such as the one you remark on here. The point was made about Harlow's studies, for example, that Bowlby had already written about children who were abandoned during the war, so why was experimental animal research needed? Martin On Jul 13, 2015, at 11:35 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > And no wonder. When two girls do NOT increase productivity, they are > removed from the study on suspicion that they have "gone Bolshevik". From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Jul 14 08:17:44 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 11:17:44 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: RE: Flyer with book image Message-ID: Fyi... Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II
-------- Original message --------
From: Holly Buchanan
Date:07/13/2015 3:59 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Subject: RE: Flyer with book image
Hello Paul, Yes, a US and international Flyer are attached here. Please let me know if you would like anything changed. Best wishes, Holly From: Dr. Paul C. Mocombe [mailto:pmocombe@mocombeian.com] Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 3:27 PM To: Holly Buchanan Cc: Dr Carol Tomlin; info@caroltomlin.com; Victoria Showunmi; Cecile Wright Subject: RE: Flyer with book image Good morning holly, Are you able to get a copy of our flyer with the book image on it? Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II -------- Original message -------- From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Date:06/15/2015 10:55 AM (GMT-05:00) To: Holly Buchanan Subject: RE: Flyer with book image Thank you... Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Mocombe_jesus in the streets_international1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 120508 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150714/2aff2b11/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Mocombe_jesus in the streets1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 86805 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150714/2aff2b11/attachment-0001.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: FB_IMG_1436818973052.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 71092 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150714/2aff2b11/attachment.jpg From lspopov@bgsu.edu Tue Jul 14 09:01:54 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:01:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi David, It seems to me that the translation is reasonable. My interpretation is that a two-year old child is capable of elementary and simple cooperation with and adult. If we exclude locomotion capabilities, the child might be considered somewhat on par with the adult regarding simple cooperation. I am not sure how the child development experts will view this statement. I am not an expert in that area. Also, I am not sure what are the minimal criteria for cooperation and how cooperation is construed by the authors. It is also possible that the authors use criteria that are very different than the criteria in the literature we use. It is a matter of different conceptualizations, paradigms, and traditions. Best, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 3:19 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian We're working through Vygotsky's very long chapter on infancy in the "Child Development" book he was working towards the end of his life. He has just introduced Blonsky's partitioning of infancy into three stages, on the basis of the presence or absence of teeth. Then, the Russian Collected Works (foot of p. 303) has this: "?? 2-? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????????? ????????? ?????????? ? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? ??????????????, ?????? ?????????????, ???????? ??????????????." The English Collected works renders this as: "In the second year of life, the child is equal to the adult in a room in a situation where little movement is required and between them a relation of cooperation, although elementary and simple, is established." But this doesn't make any sense at all, at least not in English. Is it possible that it's a misprint? David Kellogg From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 09:04:44 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 10:04:44 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> Message-ID: Peter, Love the word play(!), but couldn't access the paper. (it says the site is under construction). Could you send it directly to me? Or let us know when the site is fixed? Thanks, greg On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > By coincidence, someone just sent me a link to https://vimeo.com/57250619 > which is a talk by Nikolai Veresov, with whom I'd been unfamiliar. He > emphasizes LSV's integration of his love for theater and his insistence on > the drama of everyday life as a principal tension in human development. > > In case you're interested, I also make these points in: > > Smagorinsky, P. (2011). Vygotsky's stage theory: The psychology of art and > the actor under the direction of perezhivanie. Mind, Culture, and Activity, > 18, 319-341. Available at > http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/MCA/MCA2011.pdf > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 9:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > > Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, if I > am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human > interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest work, > which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of language in > real time. This is late in coming from cognitive linguistics, but seems to > tap into a something rich with potential, not just for how we use language, > but how we learn it and how language changes over time. The point you make > about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. > Henry > > > On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. > > Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. > > > > In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead > > and Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is probably > > worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for representing > > the phenomena when communicating with others about them. > > Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he was > > working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for being > > able to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have talking movies > > and if he had a tape recorder, it was an early model. > > > > The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all > > chat-minded folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth > > Burke and dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the > > list, but rarely discussed. > > > > Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with > > Dilthey (as I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an > explanatory psychology. > > > > Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? > > > > mike > > > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found > >> Prefactory Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found > this: > >> > >> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity > >> of Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as > >> a problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. > >> There was no common language because there was no common object of > >> reference. His problem did not fall into the categories and > >> classifications of either idealism or realism. He was talking about > >> something which the rest of us did not see.? > >> > >> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike > >> Cole?s > >> posts: > >> > >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something > >> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? > >> > >> Interesting. > >> > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ > wrote: > >>> > >>> Michael - others > >>> > >>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- > >>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ > >>> > >>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will > >>> find an extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. > >>> > >>> Enjoy.... > >>> > >>> Ellen > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael > >>> >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am > >>>> really confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. > >>>> Almost all the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, > >>>> Self and > >> Society - > >>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told > >>>> in graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a > >>>> few > >> years > >>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could > >> remember > >>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - > >>>> search > >> Mead > >>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles > >>>> including contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of > >>>> them and they > >> were > >>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what > >> Blumer > >>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. > >>>> > >>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In > >>>> the end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. > >>>> > >>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.ed > >>>> u] > >> On > >>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson > >>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM > >>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > >>>> > >>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey > >>>> Sacks > >> if > >>>> anyone is interested: > >>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf > >>>> > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. > >>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning The Graduate > >>> School of Education and Human Development The George Washington > >>> University > >>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 > >>> Ashburn, VA 20147 > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Tue Jul 14 09:34:35 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:34:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> Message-ID: I'll attach it and fix the site later. Thx for alerting me to the problem. p -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 12:05 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks Peter, Love the word play(!), but couldn't access the paper. (it says the site is under construction). Could you send it directly to me? Or let us know when the site is fixed? Thanks, greg On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > By coincidence, someone just sent me a link to > https://vimeo.com/57250619 which is a talk by Nikolai Veresov, with > whom I'd been unfamiliar. He emphasizes LSV's integration of his love > for theater and his insistence on the drama of everyday life as a principal tension in human development. > > In case you're interested, I also make these points in: > > Smagorinsky, P. (2011). Vygotsky's stage theory: The psychology of art > and the actor under the direction of perezhivanie. Mind, Culture, and > Activity, 18, 319-341. Available at > http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/MCA/MCA2011.pdf > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY > xmca-l-bounces+SHONERD > Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 9:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > > Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, > if I am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human > interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest > work, which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of > language in real time. This is late in coming from cognitive > linguistics, but seems to tap into a something rich with potential, > not just for how we use language, but how we learn it and how language > changes over time. The point you make about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. > Henry > > > On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. > > Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. > > > > In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead > > and Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is > > probably worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for > > representing the phenomena when communicating with others about them. > > Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he > > was working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for > > being able to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have > > talking movies and if he had a tape recorder, it was an early model. > > > > The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all > > chat-minded folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth > > Burke and dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the > > list, but rarely discussed. > > > > Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with > > Dilthey (as I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an > explanatory psychology. > > > > Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? > > > > mike > > > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found > >> Prefactory Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and > >> found > this: > >> > >> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming > >> obscurity of Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw > >> something as a problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. > >> There was no common language because there was no common object of > >> reference. His problem did not fall into the categories and > >> classifications of either idealism or realism. He was talking about > >> something which the rest of us did not see.? > >> > >> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike > >> Cole?s > >> posts: > >> > >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes > >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see > >> something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? > >> > >> Interesting. > >> > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ > wrote: > >>> > >>> Michael - others > >>> > >>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- > >>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ > >>> > >>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will > >>> find an extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. > >>> > >>> Enjoy.... > >>> > >>> Ellen > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael > >>> >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am > >>>> really confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. > >>>> Almost all the work cited in the article comes from the book > >>>> Mind, Self and > >> Society - > >>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also > >>>> told in graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. > >>>> Yet a few > >> years > >>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I > >>>> could > >> remember > >>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - > >>>> search > >> Mead > >>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles > >>>> including contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few > >>>> of them and they > >> were > >>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of > >>>> what > >> Blumer > >>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. > >>>> > >>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. > >>>> In the end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. > >>>> > >>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd. > >>>> ed > >>>> u] > >> On > >>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson > >>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM > >>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > >>>> > >>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey > >>>> Sacks > >> if > >>>> anyone is interested: > >>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf > >>>> > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. > >>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning The > >>> Graduate School of Education and Human Development The George > >>> Washington University > >>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 > >>> Ashburn, VA 20147 > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: MCA2011-Psychology of Art.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 164342 bytes Desc: MCA2011-Psychology of Art.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150714/1600cea4/attachment.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 10:05:08 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 10:05:08 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> Message-ID: <55a5415a.036f440a.4456.4468@mx.google.com> I have been reflecting on the way we "know" how to move through a flowing crowd as described by Mead. Also reflecting on the micro movement of conversational analysis. I am pondering this "constructive" movement in relation to vygotsky's understanding that thought is not expressed in the word but is "completed" in the word. Where does meaning exist in this contrast between process and completion? Does meaning reside in the relation of word and thought as a relation of "representation" BETWEEN thought and word continually constructing this relation of something as something else. (always new and novel and unique and singular construction of meaning). Or is the relation to focus our attention that thought is COMPLETED in the word. One can speak of this relation AS the "becoming" coming to the "fore" in the notion of "therefore". The unity of being and nonbeing. The relation of thought and word as not a relation of one "thing" standing in place of another "thing" as objects of interchange as representing each other. The relation of thought to word is a process of becoming emerging into being/form. Buber describes this process of "becoming" coming to the "fore" as the process of this "unconscious" process becoming "conscious" the coming to the "fore" is a later higher development of focus. In other words the unity of being and becoming and focus on the aspect of "becoming completed" as the process of coming into existence. Can empiricism measure this process or does it focus on the "representations" (the completed products) (UPON WHICH) the more inclusive unity of being/becoming ( more than just completed form) can become concealed. Now once completed we "have" artifacts that have been completed and they become included (historically) as we are moving forward. The relation of "being WITH becoming" is a unity but this unity includes the being of artifacts. This is where the question of enculturation (bildung) as productive existence is an aspect of the unity OF being/becoming. This being/existing is the being of "completed becoming." Another way of recognizing completed becoming is as "traditions" that enter the "zone of meaning". When we bring the completed products of becoming to the "fore" we have empiricism as what becomes "visible" to chart and measure. When we bring the process of becoming (in itself) to the "fore" we are bringing another epistemology and another aspect of ontology to the "fore" AS CONSCIOUS "therefore". We can "prejudge" what becomes "therefore". We can focus upon either the completed products as primary (key) or we can focus upon the "coming/becoming" into "form" as the primary (key) A third alternative is to focus on the UNITY upon which the completed products (of our acts) and the process of becoming "completed" are not two different representational elements (things) as something representing something. In other words not one completed word representing another completed word as representing "things" that already exist and can be observed as "facts". It may be there exists a primary "world" that historically exists and through "bildung" we come to know the "meaning of" this world and it is possible to bring this aspect of the unity of being/becoming to the "fore" (through focus). We can also bring to the "fore" (through focus) the micro movements of conversational analysis. This move focuses on the becoming aspect of the unity of being/becoming. Historical focus and micro focus are intimately united. What we bring to the "fore" depends on our biases and traditions. Mead focused on the general while Sacks focused on the micro aspects of meaning coming into being. The question of the relation of thinking to the COMPLETION in the word can be generalized to the relation of thinking to the completion of artifacts in general. Artifacts becoming formations as an unconscious primary "ground" UPON WHICH we come to focus our attention on various aspects of the unity of thinking with completed forms. (as figure). Note what is figure and what is ground are not elements or predetermined substances. Each comes into being depending on where we focus our attention and in bringing an aspect to the "fore" as conscious awareness or as "thinking" what was previously figure recedes to the back "ground" The "key" is to question the notion of "completed" word and the place of this completed word within the micro and historically focused "subject matter". Where does meaning reside? Our answers seem to hinge on this question "traditions" (to be entered into) as counterpoints to micro analysis of the empirical. Always to be "completed" in the zone of the "not yet but possibly" coming into existence developing within historically constituted realms of focused attention. The unity of being/becoming as a dance of the "not yet formed" and the "completed form" without end. -----Original Message----- From: "Peter Smagorinsky" Sent: ?2015-?07-?14 3:29 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks By coincidence, someone just sent me a link to https://vimeo.com/57250619 which is a talk by Nikolai Veresov, with whom I'd been unfamiliar. He emphasizes LSV's integration of his love for theater and his insistence on the drama of everyday life as a principal tension in human development. In case you're interested, I also make these points in: Smagorinsky, P. (2011). Vygotsky's stage theory: The psychology of art and the actor under the direction of perezhivanie. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 18, 319-341. Available at http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/MCA/MCA2011.pdf -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 9:38 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, if I am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest work, which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of language in real time. This is late in coming from cognitive linguistics, but seems to tap into a something rich with potential, not just for how we use language, but how we learn it and how language changes over time. The point you make about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. Henry > On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. > Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. > > In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead > and Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is probably > worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for representing > the phenomena when communicating with others about them. > Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he was > working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for being > able to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have talking movies > and if he had a tape recorder, it was an early model. > > The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all > chat-minded folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth > Burke and dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the > list, but rarely discussed. > > Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with > Dilthey (as I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an explanatory psychology. > > Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? > > mike > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found >> Prefactory Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found this: >> >> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity >> of Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as >> a problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. >> There was no common language because there was no common object of >> reference. His problem did not fall into the categories and >> classifications of either idealism or realism. He was talking about >> something which the rest of us did not see.? >> >> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike >> Cole?s >> posts: >> >> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? >> >> Interesting. >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ wrote: >>> >>> Michael - others >>> >>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- >>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ >>> >>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will >>> find an extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. >>> >>> Enjoy.... >>> >>> Ellen >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am >>>> really confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. >>>> Almost all the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, >>>> Self and >> Society - >>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told >>>> in graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a >>>> few >> years >>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could >> remember >>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - >>>> search >> Mead >>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles >>>> including contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of >>>> them and they >> were >>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what >> Blumer >>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. >>>> >>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In >>>> the end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. >>>> >>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.ed >>>> u] >> On >>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson >>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM >>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >>>> >>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey >>>> Sacks >> if >>>> anyone is interested: >>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. >>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning The Graduate >>> School of Education and Human Development The George Washington >>> University >>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 >>> Ashburn, VA 20147 >> >> > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) From bazerman@education.ucsb.edu Tue Jul 14 09:59:09 2015 From: bazerman@education.ucsb.edu (Charles Bazerman) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 09:59:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: One anecdote: Before our son could form recognizable words and before he could crawl, but when he could locomote in a wheeled chair (this would place him probably around twelve months), he, my wife and I were all in our kitchen. My wife and I were looking for a cooking implement (I think it was a spaghetti colander, opening cabinets and discussing where it might be. Our son kept rolling toward a lower cabinet and bumping up against it while gesturing and making some burbling sounds. We opened up the cabinet door and voila, there it was. From his ground level perspective he saw things that escaped our vision, and he knew what was in the lower cabinets. He also understood what we were doing and how he could help. Chuck ----- Original Message ----- From: Lubomir Savov Popov Date: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 9:03 am Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Hi David, > > It seems to me that the translation is reasonable. My interpretation > is that a two-year old child is capable of elementary and simple > cooperation with and adult. If we exclude locomotion capabilities, the > child might be considered somewhat on par with the adult regarding > simple cooperation. > > I am not sure how the child development experts will view this > statement. I am not an expert in that area. Also, I am not sure what > are the minimal criteria for cooperation and how cooperation is > construed by the authors. It is also possible that the authors use > criteria that are very different than the criteria in the literature > we use. It is a matter of different conceptualizations, paradigms, and > traditions. > > Best, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > David Kellogg > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 3:19 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian > > We're working through Vygotsky's very long chapter on infancy in the > "Child Development" book he was working towards the end of his life. > He has just introduced Blonsky's partitioning of infancy into three > stages, on the basis of the presence or absence of teeth. Then, the > Russian Collected Works (foot of p. 303) has this: > > "?? 2-? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????????? > ????????? ?????????? ? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? > ??????????????, ?????? ?????????????, ???????? ??????????????." > > The English Collected works renders this as: > > "In the second year of life, the child is equal to the adult in a room > in a situation where little movement is required and between them a > relation of cooperation, although elementary and simple, is established." > > But this doesn't make any sense at all, at least not in English. Is it > possible that it's a misprint? > > David Kellogg > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 10:11:41 2015 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 19:11:41 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Good for him, Chuck! I am always so proud of very young children - as a developmental psycholinguist and as a doter on small children generally. I am waiting to see what others say about the Russian translation and interpretation. Carol On 14 July 2015 at 18:59, Charles Bazerman wrote: > One anecdote: > Before our son could form recognizable words and before he could crawl, > but when he could locomote in a wheeled chair (this would place him > probably around twelve months), he, my wife and I were all in our kitchen. > My wife and I were looking for a cooking implement (I think it was a > spaghetti colander, opening cabinets and discussing where it might be. Our > son kept rolling toward a lower cabinet and bumping up against it while > gesturing and making some burbling sounds. We opened up the cabinet door > and voila, there it was. From his ground level perspective he saw things > that escaped our vision, and he knew what was in the lower cabinets. He > also understood what we were doing and how he could help. > Chuck > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Date: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 9:03 am > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Hi David, > > > > It seems to me that the translation is reasonable. My interpretation > > is that a two-year old child is capable of elementary and simple > > cooperation with and adult. If we exclude locomotion capabilities, the > > child might be considered somewhat on par with the adult regarding > > simple cooperation. > > > > I am not sure how the child development experts will view this > > statement. I am not an expert in that area. Also, I am not sure what > > are the minimal criteria for cooperation and how cooperation is > > construed by the authors. It is also possible that the authors use > > criteria that are very different than the criteria in the literature > > we use. It is a matter of different conceptualizations, paradigms, and > > traditions. > > > > Best, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > > David Kellogg > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 3:19 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian > > > > We're working through Vygotsky's very long chapter on infancy in the > > "Child Development" book he was working towards the end of his life. > > He has just introduced Blonsky's partitioning of infancy into three > > stages, on the basis of the presence or absence of teeth. Then, the > > Russian Collected Works (foot of p. 303) has this: > > > > "?? 2-? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????????? > > ????????? ?????????? ? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? > > ??????????????, ?????? ?????????????, ???????? ??????????????." > > > > The English Collected works renders this as: > > > > "In the second year of life, the child is equal to the adult in a room > > in a situation where little movement is required and between them a > > relation of cooperation, although elementary and simple, is established." > > > > But this doesn't make any sense at all, at least not in English. Is it > > possible that it's a misprint? > > > > David Kellogg > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jul 14 10:17:28 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 10:17:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Emergence of Boundary Objects Message-ID: If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of boundary objects. So, to start the discussion. I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes involved. Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? mike PS-- For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: jornet.steier.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 548196 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150714/4bd6853a/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jul 14 10:23:11 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 10:23:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Interesting, Chuck. So comprehension before production for language medium but production based on comprehension at the level of/along the axis of coordinated movement with a common (non present, hence, in some sense imagined) objective/object. Reminiscent of Alfredo and Rolf's article, methinks. mike On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 9:59 AM, Charles Bazerman < bazerman@education.ucsb.edu> wrote: > One anecdote: > Before our son could form recognizable words and before he could crawl, > but when he could locomote in a wheeled chair (this would place him > probably around twelve months), he, my wife and I were all in our kitchen. > My wife and I were looking for a cooking implement (I think it was a > spaghetti colander, opening cabinets and discussing where it might be. Our > son kept rolling toward a lower cabinet and bumping up against it while > gesturing and making some burbling sounds. We opened up the cabinet door > and voila, there it was. From his ground level perspective he saw things > that escaped our vision, and he knew what was in the lower cabinets. He > also understood what we were doing and how he could help. > Chuck > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Date: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 9:03 am > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Hi David, > > > > It seems to me that the translation is reasonable. My interpretation > > is that a two-year old child is capable of elementary and simple > > cooperation with and adult. If we exclude locomotion capabilities, the > > child might be considered somewhat on par with the adult regarding > > simple cooperation. > > > > I am not sure how the child development experts will view this > > statement. I am not an expert in that area. Also, I am not sure what > > are the minimal criteria for cooperation and how cooperation is > > construed by the authors. It is also possible that the authors use > > criteria that are very different than the criteria in the literature > > we use. It is a matter of different conceptualizations, paradigms, and > > traditions. > > > > Best, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > > David Kellogg > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 3:19 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian > > > > We're working through Vygotsky's very long chapter on infancy in the > > "Child Development" book he was working towards the end of his life. > > He has just introduced Blonsky's partitioning of infancy into three > > stages, on the basis of the presence or absence of teeth. Then, the > > Russian Collected Works (foot of p. 303) has this: > > > > "?? 2-? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????????? > > ????????? ?????????? ? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? > > ??????????????, ?????? ?????????????, ???????? ??????????????." > > > > The English Collected works renders this as: > > > > "In the second year of life, the child is equal to the adult in a room > > in a situation where little movement is required and between them a > > relation of cooperation, although elementary and simple, is established." > > > > But this doesn't make any sense at all, at least not in English. Is it > > possible that it's a misprint? > > > > David Kellogg > > > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Tue Jul 14 11:43:30 2015 From: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no (Rolf Steier) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 20:43:30 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hello All, I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place as the participants construct representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. I'm looking forward to the discussion! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Mike and all, > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try to say > a bit about the article. > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we begun > talking about notions of space as central in our respective projects. During > the last year, we shared office and had much more time to discuss. We had > always wanted to write something together and the MCA special issue on > Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > The design meetings involved many participants from different backgrounds, > from education to architecture and software engineering, and sometimes it > was difficult for the teams to advance towards definite solutions. I > remember watching the videos from the first months of design work, hoping > to find something for writing a first paper. I found different interesting > issues to pursue, but one episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a > design meeting, after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead > ends, in which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It > stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important > in making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to be > relevant. > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our analyses > as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation despite lack > of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive understandings, > what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was being able to orient > towards and perform specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, > gone through). We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining > to emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > place and finding one's ways around it. > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective theses/defenses, > and we wanted to do something that should feel fun and free. We felt that > Star's work was broad and were encouraged to connect different ideas from > different scholars. The schedule was tight, and, although I think we > managed to put together some ideas, we may have taken many risks in > bridging across the different frameworks. I hope that those risks taken may > now open space for questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I > look forward to learn a lot from them. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu> > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time in > the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > boundary objects. > > So, to start the discussion. > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think about > some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The entire > discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces into places > (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been > writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, which > is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the ineluctable > gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes involved. > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > mike > > PS-- > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Tue Jul 14 12:55:24 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 19:55:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Dear Rolf and Alfredo, What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of different ways; it is just mindboggling. Thanks, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hello All, I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place as the participants construct representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. I'm looking forward to the discussion! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Mike and all, > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > to say a bit about the article. > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together and > the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software engineering, > and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance towards > definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the first > months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a first > paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one episode > clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, after many > meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in which a > discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space unexpectedly > appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It stroke > me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important in > making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to be relevant. > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation > despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive > understandings, what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was > being able to orient towards and perform specific situations that were > lived-in (experienced, gone through). We recur to the notions of > place-making and place-imagining to emphasize this per-formative > aspect that has to do with inhabiting a place and finding one's ways around it. > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, we > may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward to learn a lot from them. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike cole > < mcole@ucsd.edu> > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > boundary objects. > > So, to start the discussion. > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces > into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in directly > with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been writing > about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes involved. > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > mike > > PS-- > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jul 14 13:20:12 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 13:20:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: This message may not have made it through to the list. We are working on the connectivity. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Date: Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 10:38 AM Subject: Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects To: mike cole , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> Cc: Rolf Steier , "lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" < lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> Hi Mike and all, thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try to say a bit about the article. Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. The design meetings involved many participants from different backgrounds, from education to architecture and software engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to be relevant. In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a place and finding one's ways around it. We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. I hope that those risks taken may now open space for questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward to learn a lot from them. Thanks, Alfredo ------------------------------ *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of boundary objects. So, to start the discussion. I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes involved. Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? mike PS-- For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jul 14 13:20:57 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 13:20:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Second message that might not have made it through. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Rolf Steier Date: Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:43 AM Subject: Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: mike cole , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>, "lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Hello All, I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place as the participants construct representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. I'm looking forward to the discussion! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Mike and all, > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try to say > a bit about the article. > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we begun > talking about notions of space as central in our respective projects. During > the last year, we shared office and had much more time to discuss. We had > always wanted to write something together and the MCA special issue on > Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > The design meetings involved many participants from different backgrounds, > from education to architecture and software engineering, and sometimes it > was difficult for the teams to advance towards definite solutions. I > remember watching the videos from the first months of design work, hoping > to find something for writing a first paper. I found different interesting > issues to pursue, but one episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a > design meeting, after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead > ends, in which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It > stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important > in making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to be > relevant. > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our analyses > as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation despite lack > of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive understandings, > what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was being able to orient > towards and perform specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, > gone through). We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining > to emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > place and finding one's ways around it. > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective theses/defenses, > and we wanted to do something that should feel fun and free. We felt that > Star's work was broad and were encouraged to connect different ideas from > different scholars. The schedule was tight, and, although I think we > managed to put together some ideas, we may have taken many risks in > bridging across the different frameworks. I hope that those risks taken may > now open space for questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I > look forward to learn a lot from them. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu> > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time in > the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > boundary objects. > > So, to start the discussion. > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think about > some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The entire > discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces into places > (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been > writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, which > is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the ineluctable > gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes involved. > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > mike > > PS-- > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From lspopov@bgsu.edu Tue Jul 14 14:06:17 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 21:06:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> , <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thank you Alfredo, By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what is the difference between the process of performing an activity in space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Dear Lubomir, thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing Cresswell about place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents going on in a given situation. I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: Lubomir Savov Popov Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Dear Rolf and Alfredo, What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of different ways; it is just mindboggling. Thanks, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hello All, I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place as the participants construct representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. I'm looking forward to the discussion! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Mike and all, > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > to say a bit about the article. > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together and > the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software engineering, > and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance towards > definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the first > months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a first > paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one episode > clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, after many > meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in which a > discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space unexpectedly > appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It stroke > me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important in > making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to be relevant. > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation > despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive > understandings, what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was > being able to orient towards and perform specific situations that were > lived-in (experienced, gone through). We recur to the notions of > place-making and place-imagining to emphasize this per-formative > aspect that has to do with inhabiting a place and finding one's ways around it. > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, we > may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward to learn a lot from them. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike cole > < mcole@ucsd.edu> > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > boundary objects. > > So, to start the discussion. > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces > into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in directly > with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been writing > about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes involved. > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > mike > > PS-- > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 14:24:55 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 14:24:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo and Rolf, This theme of spaces and places and what is formed performed and preformed is a topic that does open up a space for reflection. I will focus on the comment Alfredo offered in his introduction when he wrote: In this paper the aim was to consider boundary objects from the perspective of the participants "bodies" which stood out in our analysis as particularly relevant [and revealing] for the achievement of cooperation despite lack OF "substantive agreement". I read "substantive agreement" as referring to a shared "subject matter" The ability to "inhabit" a space and constitute a "place" without agreement on the subject matter at hand. A different way of "inhabiting this space to form a sense of place. Is this the same type of process that Mead was referring to when he described how we navigate through a crowd with a way of "knowing" that is more performance than substantive. This bodily way of "knowing" [tacit or implicit knowing that is "not yet" conscious" as PRIOR to coming to know in a more "substantive" way of understanding the "subject matter at hand". In fact could the focus on trying to come to an agreement on the "subject matter" before "inhabiting" the space becoming "place" be counter productive??. What about the wall that was "banal" [and possibly therefore more neutral uninhabited "ground"] allowing a "space" to open in which the participants could arrive at a shared place PRIOR to finding subject matter agreement. A "bodily" and "phenomenological" entering and inhabiting a space BECOMING place. This type of bodily "knowing" and its relation to the "subject matter" at hand seems to open a space/place for a lively conversation. What is forming is an image of the "table" as a metaphor. We gather to share a meal and wine prior to focusing on the subject matter at hand. The table invites us to share a space becoming place around the meal. Is this "table" banal or significant in arriving at a shared place? On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 1:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > Second message that might not have made it through. > mike > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Rolf Steier > Date: Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:43 AM > Subject: Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: mike cole , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>, "lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" < > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and I'm > looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think that > Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I don't > have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very much of > interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat > 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a > space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the > place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a > transformation from space to place as the participants construct > representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with > an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to > bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out > these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try to > say > > a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we begun > > talking about notions of space as central in our respective projects. > During > > the last year, we shared office and had much more time to discuss. We had > > always wanted to write something together and the MCA special issue on > > Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > backgrounds, > > from education to architecture and software engineering, and sometimes it > > was difficult for the teams to advance towards definite solutions. I > > remember watching the videos from the first months of design work, hoping > > to find something for writing a first paper. I found different > interesting > > issues to pursue, but one episode clearly stood out from the rest. It > was a > > design meeting, after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead > > ends, in which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. > It > > stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important > > in making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to > be > > relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > analyses > > as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation despite lack > > of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive understandings, > > what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was being able to orient > > towards and perform specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, > > gone through). We recur to the notions of place-making and > place-imagining > > to emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > > place and finding one's ways around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective theses/defenses, > > and we wanted to do something that should feel fun and free. We felt that > > Star's work was broad and were encouraged to connect different ideas from > > different scholars. The schedule was tight, and, although I think we > > managed to put together some ideas, we may have taken many risks in > > bridging across the different frameworks. I hope that those risks taken > may > > now open space for questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I > > look forward to learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time in > > the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think about > > some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The entire > > discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces into > places > > (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been > > writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, > but > > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > which > > is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the ineluctable > > gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes > involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 16:06:35 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 17:06:35 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> Message-ID: <17A97373-8671-43A5-991E-8C36C93954F3@gmail.com> Peter, Getting your article ?Vygotsky?s Stage Theory:?? was really worth the short wait. Sweet! Very clear and very helpful in understanding why Vygotsky is so important, even if he is hard to grok at times. Your article, for me, makes all the ?tedious investigation? ?Vygotsky?s, yours, and the rest of the Vygtotskian scholars ? relevant and bearable. The potential in ?stage? is amazing. Henry > On Jul 14, 2015, at 10:34 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > I'll attach it and fix the site later. Thx for alerting me to the problem. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 12:05 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > > Peter, > Love the word play(!), but couldn't access the paper. > (it says the site is under construction). > Could you send it directly to me? > Or let us know when the site is fixed? > Thanks, > greg > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> By coincidence, someone just sent me a link to >> https://vimeo.com/57250619 which is a talk by Nikolai Veresov, with >> whom I'd been unfamiliar. He emphasizes LSV's integration of his love >> for theater and his insistence on the drama of everyday life as a principal tension in human development. >> >> In case you're interested, I also make these points in: >> >> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). Vygotsky's stage theory: The psychology of art >> and the actor under the direction of perezhivanie. Mind, Culture, and >> Activity, 18, 319-341. Available at >> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/MCA/MCA2011.pdf >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY >> xmca-l-bounces+SHONERD >> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 9:38 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >> >> Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, >> if I am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human >> interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest >> work, which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of >> language in real time. This is late in coming from cognitive >> linguistics, but seems to tap into a something rich with potential, >> not just for how we use language, but how we learn it and how language >> changes over time. The point you make about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. >> Henry >> >>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. >>> Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. >>> >>> In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead >>> and Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is >>> probably worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for >>> representing the phenomena when communicating with others about them. >>> Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he >>> was working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for >>> being able to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have >>> talking movies and if he had a tape recorder, it was an early model. >>> >>> The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all >>> chat-minded folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth >>> Burke and dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the >>> list, but rarely discussed. >>> >>> Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with >>> Dilthey (as I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an >> explanatory psychology. >>> >>> Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>> >>>> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found >>>> Prefactory Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and >>>> found >> this: >>>> >>>> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming >>>> obscurity of Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw >>>> something as a problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. >>>> There was no common language because there was no common object of >>>> reference. His problem did not fall into the categories and >>>> classifications of either idealism or realism. He was talking about >>>> something which the rest of us did not see.? >>>> >>>> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike >>>> Cole?s >>>> posts: >>>> >>>> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >>>> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see >>>> something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? >>>> >>>> Interesting. >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Michael - others >>>>> >>>>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- >>>>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ >>>>> >>>>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will >>>>> find an extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. >>>>> >>>>> Enjoy.... >>>>> >>>>> Ellen >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>>> >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am >>>>>> really confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. >>>>>> Almost all the work cited in the article comes from the book >>>>>> Mind, Self and >>>> Society - >>>>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also >>>>>> told in graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. >>>>>> Yet a few >>>> years >>>>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I >>>>>> could >>>> remember >>>>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - >>>>>> search >>>> Mead >>>>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles >>>>>> including contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few >>>>>> of them and they >>>> were >>>>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of >>>>>> what >>>> Blumer >>>>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. >>>>>> >>>>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. >>>>>> In the end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd. >>>>>> ed >>>>>> u] >>>> On >>>>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson >>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM >>>>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >>>>>> >>>>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey >>>>>> Sacks >>>> if >>>>>> anyone is interested: >>>>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf >>>>>> >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. >>>>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning The >>>>> Graduate School of Education and Human Development The George >>>>> Washington University >>>>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 >>>>> Ashburn, VA 20147 >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 16:08:37 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 08:08:37 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks, all. So the child is the peer of the adult so long as they are indoors and so long as they have an elementary collaborative relation. Actually, this confirms Vygotsky's criticism of Blonsky's scheme. Blonsky is obsessed with teething, and everything has to be somehow related to teeth and to feeding. So there is a kind of "energy economy", whereby higher forms of sociality are only enabled by the child's energy surpluses. I guess that's why they have to be indoors and inactive in order to be peers. What Vygotsky says is that this scheme of things works okay for the first year but not for the second. David Kellogg On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 1:01 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi David, > > It seems to me that the translation is reasonable. My interpretation is > that a two-year old child is capable of elementary and simple cooperation > with and adult. If we exclude locomotion capabilities, the child might be > considered somewhat on par with the adult regarding simple cooperation. > > I am not sure how the child development experts will view this statement. > I am not an expert in that area. Also, I am not sure what are the minimal > criteria for cooperation and how cooperation is construed by the authors. > It is also possible that the authors use criteria that are very different > than the criteria in the literature we use. It is a matter of different > conceptualizations, paradigms, and traditions. > > Best, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David > Kellogg > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 3:19 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian > > We're working through Vygotsky's very long chapter on infancy in the > "Child Development" book he was working towards the end of his life. He has > just introduced Blonsky's partitioning of infancy into three stages, on the > basis of the presence or absence of teeth. Then, the Russian Collected > Works (foot of p. 303) has this: > > "?? 2-? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????????? ????????? > ?????????? ? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? ??????????????, > ?????? ?????????????, ???????? ??????????????." > > The English Collected works renders this as: > > "In the second year of life, the child is equal to the adult in a room in > a situation where little movement is required and between them a relation > of cooperation, although elementary and simple, is established." > > But this doesn't make any sense at all, at least not in English. Is it > possible that it's a misprint? > > David Kellogg > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 16:20:22 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 17:20:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: <55a5415a.036f440a.4456.4468@mx.google.com> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> <55a5415a.036f440a.4456.4468@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, For me, Burke's ?dramatism" and Peter?s article on Vygotsky?s stage theory provide a means to investigate what you describe as: "The unity of being/becoming as a dance of the "not yet formed" and the "completed form" without end.? Vygotsky?s logocentrism is not determinant, if we see drama as gesture, verbal gesture being part of the larger fabric of the art and everyday life of drama. And music too. (?Fabric? seems too static, to capture what you have in mind. Words fail.) Henry > On Jul 14, 2015, at 11:05 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > I have been reflecting on the way we "know" how to move through a flowing crowd as described by Mead. Also reflecting on the micro movement of conversational analysis. > I am pondering this "constructive" movement in relation to vygotsky's understanding that thought is not expressed in the word but is "completed" in the word. > Where does meaning exist in this contrast between process and completion? > > Does meaning reside in the relation of word and thought as a relation of "representation" BETWEEN thought and word continually constructing this relation of something as something else. (always new and novel and unique and singular construction of meaning). > > Or is the relation to focus our attention that thought is COMPLETED in the word. One can speak of this relation AS the "becoming" coming to the "fore" in the notion of "therefore". The unity of being and nonbeing. > The relation of thought and word as not a relation of one "thing" standing in place of another "thing" as objects of interchange as representing each other. > The relation of thought to word is a process of becoming emerging into being/form. > > Buber describes this process of "becoming" coming to the "fore" as the process of this "unconscious" process becoming "conscious" the coming to the "fore" is a later higher development of focus. > > In other words the unity of being and becoming and focus on the aspect of "becoming completed" as the process of coming into existence. > Can empiricism measure this process or does it focus on the "representations" (the completed products) (UPON WHICH) the more inclusive unity of being/becoming ( more than just completed form) can become concealed. > > Now once completed we "have" artifacts that have been completed and they become included (historically) as we are moving forward. The relation of "being WITH becoming" is a unity but this unity includes the being of artifacts. > > This is where the question of enculturation (bildung) as productive existence is an aspect of the unity OF being/becoming. > This being/existing is the being of "completed becoming." Another way of recognizing completed becoming is as "traditions" that enter the "zone of meaning". > When we bring the completed products of becoming to the "fore" we have empiricism as what becomes "visible" to chart and measure. > > When we bring the process of becoming (in itself) to the "fore" we are bringing another epistemology and another aspect of ontology to the "fore" AS CONSCIOUS "therefore". > > We can "prejudge" what becomes "therefore". We can focus upon either the completed products as primary (key) or we can focus upon the "coming/becoming" into "form" as the primary (key) > > A third alternative is to focus on the UNITY upon which the completed products (of our acts) and the process of becoming "completed" are not two different representational elements (things) as something representing something. In other words not one completed word representing another completed word as representing "things" that already exist and can be observed as "facts". > > It may be there exists a primary "world" that historically exists and through "bildung" we come to know the "meaning of" this world and it is possible to bring this aspect of the unity of being/becoming to the "fore" (through focus). > > We can also bring to the "fore" (through focus) the micro movements of conversational analysis. This move focuses on the becoming aspect of the unity of being/becoming. > > Historical focus and micro focus are intimately united. What we bring to the "fore" depends on our biases and traditions. > > Mead focused on the general while Sacks focused on the micro aspects of meaning coming into being. > The question of the relation of thinking to the COMPLETION in the word can be generalized to the relation of thinking to the completion of artifacts in general. > > Artifacts becoming formations as an unconscious primary "ground" UPON WHICH we come to focus our attention on various aspects of the unity of thinking with completed forms. (as figure). > > Note what is figure and what is ground are not elements or predetermined substances. Each comes into being depending on where we focus our attention and in bringing an aspect to the "fore" as conscious awareness or as "thinking" what was previously figure recedes to the back "ground" > The "key" is to question the notion of "completed" word and the place of this completed word within the micro and historically focused "subject matter". > > Where does meaning reside? Our answers seem to hinge on this question > > "traditions" (to be entered into) as counterpoints to micro analysis of the empirical. > Always to be "completed" in the zone of the "not yet but possibly" coming into existence developing within historically constituted realms of focused attention. > > The unity of being/becoming as a dance of the "not yet formed" and the "completed form" without end. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Peter Smagorinsky" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?14 3:29 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > > By coincidence, someone just sent me a link to https://vimeo.com/57250619 which is a talk by Nikolai Veresov, with whom I'd been unfamiliar. He emphasizes LSV's integration of his love for theater and his insistence on the drama of everyday life as a principal tension in human development. > > In case you're interested, I also make these points in: > > Smagorinsky, P. (2011). Vygotsky's stage theory: The psychology of art and the actor under the direction of perezhivanie. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 18, 319-341. Available at http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/MCA/MCA2011.pdf > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 9:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > > Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, if I am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest work, which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of language in real time. This is late in coming from cognitive linguistics, but seems to tap into a something rich with potential, not just for how we use language, but how we learn it and how language changes over time. The point you make about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. > Henry > >> On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. >> Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. >> >> In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead >> and Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is probably >> worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for representing >> the phenomena when communicating with others about them. >> Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he was >> working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for being >> able to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have talking movies >> and if he had a tape recorder, it was an early model. >> >> The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all >> chat-minded folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth >> Burke and dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the >> list, but rarely discussed. >> >> Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with >> Dilthey (as I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an explanatory psychology. >> >> Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? >> >> mike >> >> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found >>> Prefactory Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found this: >>> >>> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity >>> of Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as >>> a problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. >>> There was no common language because there was no common object of >>> reference. His problem did not fall into the categories and >>> classifications of either idealism or realism. He was talking about >>> something which the rest of us did not see.? >>> >>> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike >>> Cole?s >>> posts: >>> >>> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >>> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >>> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? >>> >>> Interesting. >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ wrote: >>>> >>>> Michael - others >>>> >>>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- >>>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ >>>> >>>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will >>>> find an extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. >>>> >>>> Enjoy.... >>>> >>>> Ellen >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am >>>>> really confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. >>>>> Almost all the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, >>>>> Self and >>> Society - >>>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told >>>>> in graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a >>>>> few >>> years >>>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could >>> remember >>>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - >>>>> search >>> Mead >>>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles >>>>> including contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of >>>>> them and they >>> were >>>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what >>> Blumer >>>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. >>>>> >>>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In >>>>> the end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.ed >>>>> u] >>> On >>>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM >>>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >>>>> >>>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey >>>>> Sacks >>> if >>>>> anyone is interested: >>>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. >>>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning The Graduate >>>> School of Education and Human Development The George Washington >>>> University >>>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 >>>> Ashburn, VA 20147 >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> >> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >> Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 14 17:55:32 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 17:55:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD425A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <8954B660-1854-4970-BEE5-EE6355C2A4DB@gmail.com> <55a5415a.036f440a.4456.4468@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <55a5af94.c3c8440a.86e39.6e8d@mx.google.com> Henry Yes the metaphors of drama, stage, actors acting, and performance and our current exploration of "place" making through moving through "spaces" that "be/come place" are pregnant with potential. I am looking forward to hearing how others imagine "space" and "place" I am ambivalent about the notion of designing spaces/places as focusing on themes of willfully forming spaces/places. Here the theme of imaginal spaces/places may be a counterpoint. The themes of place/home as where we "come to rest" and become involved is also a notion of "place" that is experiential and phenomenological in contrast to the notion of "space" as more -----Original Message----- From: "HENRY SHONERD" Sent: ?2015-?07-?14 4:23 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks Larry, For me, Burke's ?dramatism" and Peter?s article on Vygotsky?s stage theory provide a means to investigate what you describe as: "The unity of being/becoming as a dance of the "not yet formed" and the "completed form" without end.? Vygotsky?s logocentrism is not determinant, if we see drama as gesture, verbal gesture being part of the larger fabric of the art and everyday life of drama. And music too. (?Fabric? seems too static, to capture what you have in mind. Words fail.) Henry > On Jul 14, 2015, at 11:05 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > I have been reflecting on the way we "know" how to move through a flowing crowd as described by Mead. Also reflecting on the micro movement of conversational analysis. > I am pondering this "constructive" movement in relation to vygotsky's understanding that thought is not expressed in the word but is "completed" in the word. > Where does meaning exist in this contrast between process and completion? > > Does meaning reside in the relation of word and thought as a relation of "representation" BETWEEN thought and word continually constructing this relation of something as something else. (always new and novel and unique and singular construction of meaning). > > Or is the relation to focus our attention that thought is COMPLETED in the word. One can speak of this relation AS the "becoming" coming to the "fore" in the notion of "therefore". The unity of being and nonbeing. > The relation of thought and word as not a relation of one "thing" standing in place of another "thing" as objects of interchange as representing each other. > The relation of thought to word is a process of becoming emerging into being/form. > > Buber describes this process of "becoming" coming to the "fore" as the process of this "unconscious" process becoming "conscious" the coming to the "fore" is a later higher development of focus. > > In other words the unity of being and becoming and focus on the aspect of "becoming completed" as the process of coming into existence. > Can empiricism measure this process or does it focus on the "representations" (the completed products) (UPON WHICH) the more inclusive unity of being/becoming ( more than just completed form) can become concealed. > > Now once completed we "have" artifacts that have been completed and they become included (historically) as we are moving forward. The relation of "being WITH becoming" is a unity but this unity includes the being of artifacts. > > This is where the question of enculturation (bildung) as productive existence is an aspect of the unity OF being/becoming. > This being/existing is the being of "completed becoming." Another way of recognizing completed becoming is as "traditions" that enter the "zone of meaning". > When we bring the completed products of becoming to the "fore" we have empiricism as what becomes "visible" to chart and measure. > > When we bring the process of becoming (in itself) to the "fore" we are bringing another epistemology and another aspect of ontology to the "fore" AS CONSCIOUS "therefore". > > We can "prejudge" what becomes "therefore". We can focus upon either the completed products as primary (key) or we can focus upon the "coming/becoming" into "form" as the primary (key) > > A third alternative is to focus on the UNITY upon which the completed products (of our acts) and the process of becoming "completed" are not two different representational elements (things) as something representing something. In other words not one completed word representing another completed word as representing "things" that already exist and can be observed as "facts". > > It may be there exists a primary "world" that historically exists and through "bildung" we come to know the "meaning of" this world and it is possible to bring this aspect of the unity of being/becoming to the "fore" (through focus). > > We can also bring to the "fore" (through focus) the micro movements of conversational analysis. This move focuses on the becoming aspect of the unity of being/becoming. > > Historical focus and micro focus are intimately united. What we bring to the "fore" depends on our biases and traditions. > > Mead focused on the general while Sacks focused on the micro aspects of meaning coming into being. > The question of the relation of thinking to the COMPLETION in the word can be generalized to the relation of thinking to the completion of artifacts in general. > > Artifacts becoming formations as an unconscious primary "ground" UPON WHICH we come to focus our attention on various aspects of the unity of thinking with completed forms. (as figure). > > Note what is figure and what is ground are not elements or predetermined substances. Each comes into being depending on where we focus our attention and in bringing an aspect to the "fore" as conscious awareness or as "thinking" what was previously figure recedes to the back "ground" > The "key" is to question the notion of "completed" word and the place of this completed word within the micro and historically focused "subject matter". > > Where does meaning reside? Our answers seem to hinge on this question > > "traditions" (to be entered into) as counterpoints to micro analysis of the empirical. > Always to be "completed" in the zone of the "not yet but possibly" coming into existence developing within historically constituted realms of focused attention. > > The unity of being/becoming as a dance of the "not yet formed" and the "completed form" without end. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Peter Smagorinsky" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?14 3:29 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > > By coincidence, someone just sent me a link to https://vimeo.com/57250619 which is a talk by Nikolai Veresov, with whom I'd been unfamiliar. He emphasizes LSV's integration of his love for theater and his insistence on the drama of everyday life as a principal tension in human development. > > In case you're interested, I also make these points in: > > Smagorinsky, P. (2011). Vygotsky's stage theory: The psychology of art and the actor under the direction of perezhivanie. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 18, 319-341. Available at http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/MCA/MCA2011.pdf > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 9:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks > > Thanks for the Kenneth Burke connection, Mike. Fascinating. Vygotsky, if I am not mistaken, uses the metaphor of being ?on stage? in human interaction? Langacker uses precisely the same term in his latest work, which attempts to apply cognitive grammar to the actual use of language in real time. This is late in coming from cognitive linguistics, but seems to tap into a something rich with potential, not just for how we use language, but how we learn it and how language changes over time. The point you make about the technologies we have to analyze language use is a good one. > Henry > >> On Jul 13, 2015, at 6:29 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Harvey Sach's was also famous for his "seeming obscurity", Henry. >> Its difficult to describe a dynamic tangle in linear language. >> >> In thinking about the levels of analysis said to differentiate Mead >> and Sachs (the first more macro, the other more micro) it is probably >> worthwhile to keep in mind the different technologies for representing >> the phenomena when communicating with others about them. >> Harvey work the top end of digital recording as it existed when he was >> working, and ethnomethodologists depend hugely on their work for being >> able to make the fleeting repeatable. Mead did not have talking movies >> and if he had a tape recorder, it was an early model. >> >> The link to symbolic interactionism is one that it seems all >> chat-minded folks might keep in mind. It brings us around to Kenneth >> Burke and dramatism, a topic of direct interest to several on the >> list, but rarely discussed. >> >> Mead, it seems interesting to note, got his PhD in Germany with >> Dilthey (as I recall), the alter-ego of Vygotsky's vision of an explanatory psychology. >> >> Hmmm, what is there some sort of family resemblance here? >> >> mike >> >> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:24 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> I followed Ellen?s suggestion, went to the Mead Project, found >>> Prefactory Remarks to Mead?s ?The Philosophy of the Present? and found this: >>> >>> "As I look back I can see that a great deal of the seeming obscurity >>> of Mr. Mead's expression was due to the fact that he saw something as >>> a problem which had not presented itself at all to the other minds. >>> There was no common language because there was no common object of >>> reference. His problem did not fall into the categories and >>> classifications of either idealism or realism. He was talking about >>> something which the rest of us did not see.? >>> >>> Compare that to the ?saying? that always appears at the end of Mike >>> Cole?s >>> posts: >>> >>> All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes >>> you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something >>> that isn't even visible. N. McLean, "A River Runs Through it? >>> >>> Interesting. >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Jul 13, 2015, at 1:32 PM, Ellen Scully-Russ wrote: >>>> >>>> Michael - others >>>> >>>> This is a great site for all things Mead --- >>>> http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ >>>> >>>> If you go to the project inventory and then to the M's, you will >>>> find an extensive list of Mead's publications with links to the text. >>>> >>>> Enjoy.... >>>> >>>> Ellen >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Taking a first look at the article there is something that, I am >>>>> really confused about, maybe others can help clear up this mystery. >>>>> Almost all the work cited in the article comes from the book Mind, >>>>> Self and >>> Society - >>>>> which was published posthumously by his students. I was also told >>>>> in graduate school Mead didn't publish very much on its own. Yet a >>>>> few >>> years >>>>> ago I went to a Mead archive (it is no longer open, I wish I could >>> remember >>>>> the link, it is actually back somewhere in the xmca archive - >>>>> search >>> Mead >>>>> if you are interested) which included a number of articles >>>>> including contemporaneous reviews and rejoinders. I read a few of >>>>> them and they >>> were >>>>> really, really good - and I got a much better understanding of what >>> Blumer >>>>> came to call symbolic interactionism. >>>>> >>>>> I would also argue against the author's interpretation of Mead. In >>>>> the end he was an instrumental Pragmatist and was focused on process. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, anybody who has insight please let me know. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.ed >>>>> u] >>> On >>>>> Behalf Of Greg Thompson >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 11:20 AM >>>>> To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] G. H. Mead and Harvey Sacks >>>>> >>>>> Interesting article by George Psathas about G. H. Mead and Harvey >>>>> Sacks >>> if >>>>> anyone is interested: >>>>> http://www.todayscience.org/SST/article/sst.v1i1p24.pdf >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Ellen Scully-Russ, Ed.D. >>>> Associate Professor, Human and Organizational Learning The Graduate >>>> School of Education and Human Development The George Washington >>>> University >>>> 44983 Knoll Square, Suite 147 >>>> Ashburn, VA 20147 >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> >> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >> Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Jul 14 17:42:27 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 20:42:27 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] "Carifesta XII Sites in Port-au-Prince, Haiti" on YouTube Message-ID: Come learn about haiti's, History Vodou religion Heroes ?of independence Culture For my colleagues and academic friends who have yet to decide on a vacation spot, I hope these two videos will entice you to visit the land of papa dessalines! (The videos are in english) https://youtu.be/pEWhLH8qeC8 Watch "What is Carifesta?" on YouTube https://youtu.be/Yr_3eGXf0C8 Sent on a Sprint Samsung Galaxy Note? II From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 02:19:34 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 10:19:34 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: That's probably quite reasonable when you include the effects of teething upon the primary care givers too. :) Humour aside, from a developmental perspective I would expect teething and similar painful episodes to constitute important periods in an infant's social development with respect to attachment and learning how to deal with pain etc. Best, Huw On 15 July 2015 at 00:08, David Kellogg wrote: > Thanks, all. So the child is the peer of the adult so long as they are > indoors and so long as they have an elementary collaborative relation. > > Actually, this confirms Vygotsky's criticism of Blonsky's scheme. Blonsky > is obsessed with teething, and everything has to be somehow related to > teeth and to feeding. So there is a kind of "energy economy", whereby > higher forms of sociality are only enabled by the child's energy surpluses. > I guess that's why they have to be indoors and inactive in order to be > peers. > > What Vygotsky says is that this scheme of things works okay for the first > year but not for the second. > > David Kellogg > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 1:01 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: > > > Hi David, > > > > It seems to me that the translation is reasonable. My interpretation is > > that a two-year old child is capable of elementary and simple cooperation > > with and adult. If we exclude locomotion capabilities, the child might be > > considered somewhat on par with the adult regarding simple cooperation. > > > > I am not sure how the child development experts will view this statement. > > I am not an expert in that area. Also, I am not sure what are the minimal > > criteria for cooperation and how cooperation is construed by the authors. > > It is also possible that the authors use criteria that are very different > > than the criteria in the literature we use. It is a matter of different > > conceptualizations, paradigms, and traditions. > > > > Best, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David > > Kellogg > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 3:19 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian > > > > We're working through Vygotsky's very long chapter on infancy in the > > "Child Development" book he was working towards the end of his life. He > has > > just introduced Blonsky's partitioning of infancy into three stages, on > the > > basis of the presence or absence of teeth. Then, the Russian Collected > > Works (foot of p. 303) has this: > > > > "?? 2-? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????????? ????????? > > ?????????? ? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? ??????????????, > > ?????? ?????????????, ???????? ??????????????." > > > > The English Collected works renders this as: > > > > "In the second year of life, the child is equal to the adult in a room in > > a situation where little movement is required and between them a relation > > of cooperation, although elementary and simple, is established." > > > > But this doesn't make any sense at all, at least not in English. Is it > > possible that it's a misprint? > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > From rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Wed Jul 15 03:57:54 2015 From: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no (Rolf Steier) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 12:57:54 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that?s really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *?Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast.?* There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - *?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks and > answer that, the difference between the process of performing an activity > in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the difference > between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort of > objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence "performing > an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about geometrical > practices, for example; one may think that in some engineering practices, > it is possible to orient to space as space, as a coordinate. BUT still, the > experience of being doing such practice, if it has import to further > development in the person, it must be refracted through the person's > experience; there must be involvement, and therefore placemaking. In the > second case, we might think of us performing some activity within taking > much of it, without noticing we are doing. It is in this sense that I do > the bridge with operations versus actions. > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be careful if > doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed nature of the process > that placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for your > article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what is the > difference between the process of performing an activity in space and > developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in terms of > appropriation of space in the process of human activity and the subsequent > meaning making which has existential importance for the individual. The > phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of meaning and > placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How do you position > yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS > of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, from > geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called place-based > education. I must also admit that we did not work with a carefully > operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, but I can of > course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about the > difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of space versus > a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing Cresswell about > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". This is > precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that whatever practices > were involved in getting things done together in an interdisciplinary > group, they involved a process of becoming involved, experientially, > emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents going on in a given > situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space and > place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, experience is > not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place is about space as > it is refracted in intelligible experience; not about an abstraction over > an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > Gil > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? I > ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and > I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think > that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I > don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very > much of interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat > 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a > space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the > place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a > transformation from space to place as the participants construct > representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with > an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to > bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out > these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together and > > the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software engineering, > > and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance towards > > definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the first > > months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a first > > paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one episode > > clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, after many > > meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in which a > > discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space unexpectedly > > appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It stroke > > me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important in > > making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to > be relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation > > despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive > > understandings, what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was > > being able to orient towards and perform specific situations that were > > lived-in (experienced, gone through). We recur to the notions of > > place-making and place-imagining to emphasize this per-formative > > aspect that has to do with inhabiting a place and finding one's ways > around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, we > > may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward to > learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike cole > > < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces > > into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in directly > > with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been writing > > about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but > > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > processes involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Jul 15 07:33:43 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 14:33:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi Rolf, You mention in your previous mail: Lubomir, you asked - ?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! I would suggest that only individual consciousness is a place maker. Exception ? the collective consciousness, but this is another aspect. Architects can only facilitate that process, but they are not the main factors. They believe they imbed particular meanings of the environment through the process of design. My positions is that they only believe. What they embed as a meaningful physical component or a sign can be and is interpreted very differently by the building users. In one case, the architects tried to design a space-age caf? with build of dozens of sculptured modules. The local hippies called it ?the funeral home? because the modules reminds them of coffins. So much about placemaking. However, the caf? became a place for the hippies ? they started using it as a meeting place because of its location and affordable prices; it became a locality where they can find support, share their problems, make fun, get excited, and so on; they endowed the physical entity with their own meaning, and so on. Placemaking is an intimate personal process. Even the ugliest environment can make a wonderful place for the individuals that feel at home there, that draw strength from that environment, and really enjoy it. What are your thoughts about this? I am already confronting the architects with this conceptualization. I need to see how this way of thinking is perceived by social scientists. Best Lubomir From: rolfsteier@gmail.com [mailto:rolfsteier@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: Lubomir Savov Popov; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; lpscholar2@gmail.com Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that?s really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold (Making) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - ?Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast.? There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - ?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: Thanks a lot, Lubomir! On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, if it has import to further development in the person, it must be refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. Hope this helps Alfredo ________________________________________ From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you Alfredo, By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what is the difference between the process of performing an activity in space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Dear Lubomir, thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing Cresswell about place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents going on in a given situation. I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Dear Rolf and Alfredo, What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of different ways; it is just mindboggling. Thanks, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hello All, I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place as the participants construct representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. I'm looking forward to the discussion! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > Hi Mike and all, > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > to say a bit about the article. > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together and > the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software engineering, > and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance towards > definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the first > months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a first > paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one episode > clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, after many > meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in which a > discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space unexpectedly > appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It stroke > me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important in > making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to be relevant. > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation > despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive > understandings, what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was > being able to orient towards and perform specific situations that were > lived-in (experienced, gone through). We recur to the notions of > place-making and place-imagining to emphasize this per-formative > aspect that has to do with inhabiting a place and finding one's ways around it. > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, we > may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward to learn a lot from them. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com > on behalf of mike cole > < mcole@ucsd.edu> > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > boundary objects. > > So, to start the discussion. > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces > into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in directly > with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been writing > about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes involved. > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > mike > > PS-- > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > From alfredoj@uvic.ca Wed Jul 15 08:12:58 2015 From: alfredoj@uvic.ca (Alfredo Jornetgil) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 15:12:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Message-ID: <1436973178686.31557@uvic.ca> Thanks, Larry, for your very interesting reading of the topics in our article. I like very much your metaphor of the table, which points out the organizational aspect that we aimed to describe with regard to boundary objects. Rolf has done an excellent case about this in his previous e-mail. I'd like also to pick up on your comments about subject matter. Indeed, the title of the paper, "The Matter of Space" was intended precisely as a play on words that was to mark the issue of space both as matter, and as subject matter. As to the connections with Mead, I have only recently begun to read him, and actually motivated by some of the last e-mails in this list about Mead. But I definitely think that one of the points was what I heard Jean Lave say in a lecture that Andy uploaded here( https://vimeo.com/28855105 ): "We always learn what we are already doing". So, one question we set up for ourselves in this paper was: how is the doing, which is primary, and the coming along a trajectory of conceptual development related to each other? Thanks, Alfredo ((Sorry I write outside of the thread of e-mails, but I am having some troubles to publish in xmca from my e-mail address and I must do some tests. The e-mail below aimed to address Larry's last e-mail on the article's discussion thread. This e-mail may end up appearing several times. Apologies...)) From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jul 15 09:04:48 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 16:04:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). Okay, too much I know. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that?s really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *?Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast.?* There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - *?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > Cresswell about > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > going on in a given situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > Gil > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > as the participants construct representations and begin to > collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > > towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > > first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > > first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > > episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > > after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > > which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > > team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > > been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > > shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > > read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > > figure of Leigh Star begun to > be relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > > specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > > place and finding one's ways > around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > > we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > to > learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > > spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > > been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > > idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > processes involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 15 09:15:02 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 09:15:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi Lubomir -- Could you elaborate on the following from your earlier note? I would suggest that only individual consciousness is a place maker. Exception ? the collective consciousness, but this is another aspect. Specifically, this phrasing put me in mind of the circumstance that consciousness is so - znanie, co-knowing. Is this the other aspect you are referring to? mike On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 7:33 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Rolf, > > > > You mention in your previous mail: > > Lubomir, you asked - *?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? *I think this is > difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the > place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and > meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place > potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only > thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > > I would suggest that only individual consciousness is a place maker. > Exception ? the collective consciousness, but this is another aspect. > Architects can only facilitate that process, but they are not the main > factors. They believe they imbed particular meanings of the environment > through the process of design. My positions is that they only believe. What > they embed as a meaningful physical component or a sign can be and is > interpreted very differently by the building users. In one case, the > architects tried to design a space-age caf? with build of dozens of > sculptured modules. The local hippies called it ?the funeral home? because > the modules reminds them of coffins. So much about placemaking. However, > the caf? became a place for the hippies ? they started using it as a > meeting place because of its location and affordable prices; it became a > locality where they can find support, share their problems, make fun, get > excited, and so on; they endowed the physical entity with their own > meaning, and so on. > > Placemaking is an intimate personal process. Even the ugliest environment > can make a wonderful place for the individuals that feel at home there, > that draw strength from that environment, and really enjoy it. > > What are your thoughts about this? I am already confronting the architects > with this conceptualization. I need to see how this way of thinking is > perceived by social scientists. > > Best > > > > Lubomir > > > > *From:* rolfsteier@gmail.com [mailto:rolfsteier@gmail.com] *On Behalf Of *Rolf > Steier > *Sent:* Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil > *Cc:* Lubomir Savov Popov; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; lpscholar2@gmail.com > > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > > I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I > think that?s really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared > meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star > might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the > task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from > our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the > researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. > The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery > in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is > in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able > to share his vision for the gallery. > > This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( > *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the > facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *?Everyday design > catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography > for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you > sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in > enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you > are designing breakfast.?* > > There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation > work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down > to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the > multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is > designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, > design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their > collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition > space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design > ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining > the future exhibition. > > Lubomir, you asked - *?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? *I think this is > difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the > place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and > meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place > potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only > thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > > Rolf > > > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks and > answer that, the difference between the process of performing an activity > in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the difference > between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort of > objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence "performing > an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about geometrical > practices, for example; one may think that in some engineering practices, > it is possible to orient to space as space, as a coordinate. BUT still, the > experience of being doing such practice, if it has import to further > development in the person, it must be refracted through the person's > experience; there must be involvement, and therefore placemaking. In the > second case, we might think of us performing some activity within taking > much of it, without noticing we are doing. It is in this sense that I do > the bridge with operations versus actions. > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be careful if > doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed nature of the process > that placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for your > article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what is the > difference between the process of performing an activity in space and > developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in terms of > appropriation of space in the process of human activity and the subsequent > meaning making which has existential importance for the individual. The > phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of meaning and > placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How do you position > yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS > of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, from > geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called place-based > education. I must also admit that we did not work with a carefully > operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, but I can of > course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about the > difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of space versus > a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing Cresswell about > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". This is > precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that whatever practices > were involved in getting things done together in an interdisciplinary > group, they involved a process of becoming involved, experientially, > emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents going on in a given > situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space and > place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, experience is > not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place is about space as > it is refracted in intelligible experience; not about an abstraction over > an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > Gil > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? I > ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and > I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think > that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I > don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very > much of interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat > 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a > space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the > place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a > transformation from space to place as the participants construct > representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with > an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to > bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out > these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together and > > the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software engineering, > > and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance towards > > definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the first > > months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a first > > paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one episode > > clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, after many > > meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in which a > > discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space unexpectedly > > appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It stroke > > me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important in > > making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to > be relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation > > despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive > > understandings, what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was > > being able to orient towards and perform specific situations that were > > lived-in (experienced, gone through). We recur to the notions of > > place-making and place-imagining to emphasize this per-formative > > aspect that has to do with inhabiting a place and finding one's ways > around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, we > > may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward to > learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike cole > > < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces > > into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in directly > > with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been writing > > about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but > > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > processes involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 15 09:29:14 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 09:29:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects In-Reply-To: <1436973178686.31557@uvic.ca> References: <1436973178686.31557@uvic.ca> Message-ID: You are coming through bright and clear, Alfredo. The invocation of Ingold in the discussion seems entirely fitting. Many of us have read, others read in, Making and his earlier writings. The focus on design also reminded of this comment by Herb Simon that Martin and I have been thinking about : "Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones.? mike On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:12 AM, Alfredo Jornetgil wrote: > Thanks, Larry, for your very interesting reading of the topics in our > article. I like very much your metaphor of the table, which points out the > organizational aspect that we aimed to describe with regard to boundary > objects. Rolf has done an excellent case about this in his previous e-mail. > > I'd like also to pick up on your comments about subject matter. Indeed, > the title of the paper, "The Matter of Space" was intended precisely as a > play on words that was to mark the issue of space both as matter, and as > subject matter. As to the connections with Mead, I have only recently begun > to read him, and actually motivated by some of the last e-mails in this > list about Mead. But I definitely think that one of the points was what I > heard Jean Lave say in a lecture that Andy uploaded here( > https://vimeo.com/28855105 ): "We always learn what we are already > doing". So, one question we set up for ourselves in this paper was: how is > the doing, which is primary, and the coming along a trajectory of > conceptual development related to each other? > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > > ((Sorry I write outside of the thread of e-mails, but I am having some > troubles to publish in xmca from my e-mail address and I must do some > tests. The e-mail below aimed to address Larry's last e-mail on the > article's discussion thread. This e-mail may end up appearing several > times. Apologies...)) > > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 15 09:37:47 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 16:37:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. Best wishes, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). Okay, too much I know. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that?s really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *?Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast.?* There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - *?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > Cresswell about > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > going on in a given situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > Gil > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > as the participants construct representations and begin to > collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > > towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > > first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > > first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > > episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > > after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > > which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > > team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > > been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > > shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > > read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > > figure of Leigh Star begun to > be relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > > specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > > place and finding one's ways > around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > > we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > to > learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > > spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > > been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > > idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > processes involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 09:41:24 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 09:41:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects In-Reply-To: <1436973178686.31557@uvic.ca> References: <1436973178686.31557@uvic.ca> Message-ID: <55a68d38.2314460a.119b.ffffdf6b@mx.google.com> Well I am now hooked on this topic I am pro-foundly curious about "living the question" and your question is calling me to the "depths" of my shared question. "How is the doing, which is primary AND the coming along a trajectory conceptual development related to each other. In other words, how are place/place-making and "meaning" related? I will now move to focus attention on the relation of "making" and "design". The design team must first design/engage in a place-making activity FOR (in order to) their collaborative setting. In other words attend to taking "care" and focusing this design moment prior to attending to future imaginal design moments. I want to share a word in Japanese that I find relevant to this topic/narrative of place/meaning. It is the word "ma" which can be translated as "interval" An example: In greeting another you bow down and then arise. However there is an interval/pause between the bowing down and arising. The design performance INCLUDES this interval BETWEEN movements. This pause is PRIMARY in expressing the doing of place-making. I share this focus on "ma" as a way of expanding the movements of "repair" to include the "tarrying in place" (the place of rest and stillness) in our notions of "care" and "repair". I am exploring this notion of "making/construction" as focused on the active doing. place-abiding (as meaning) may also consider the place of rest (the interval as a form of "care". I am now translating (and entering your question). It may overlap with per-forming and de-sign as another aspect of meaning/place. The "/" can be read as an interval, a moment of stillness and coming to rest in our "making" and "doing" The place of "ma" as the interval in time. I am deeply moved by your profound way of "living the question" which opens a space for focusing our awareness on performance and coming into existence what has been previously imagined. I will pause at this place and listen with care to others reflections. Thank you for this opportunity to think out loud Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornetgil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 8:18 AM To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Thanks, Larry, for your very interesting reading of the topics in our article. I like very much your metaphor of the table, which points out the organizational aspect that we aimed to describe with regard to boundary objects. Rolf has done an excellent case about this in his previous e-mail. I'd like also to pick up on your comments about subject matter. Indeed, the title of the paper, "The Matter of Space" was intended precisely as a play on words that was to mark the issue of space both as matter, and as subject matter. As to the connections with Mead, I have only recently begun to read him, and actually motivated by some of the last e-mails in this list about Mead. But I definitely think that one of the points was what I heard Jean Lave say in a lecture that Andy uploaded here( https://vimeo.com/28855105 ): "We always learn what we are already doing". So, one question we set up for ourselves in this paper was: how is the doing, which is primary, and the coming along a trajectory of conceptual development related to each other? Thanks, Alfredo ((Sorry I write outside of the thread of e-mails, but I am having some troubles to publish in xmca from my e-mail address and I must do some tests. The e-mail below aimed to address Larry's last e-mail on the article's discussion thread. This e-mail may end up appearing several times. Apologies...)) From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 15 10:06:06 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 17:06:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects In-Reply-To: <55a68d38.2314460a.119b.ffffdf6b@mx.google.com> References: <1436973178686.31557@uvic.ca>, <55a68d38.2314460a.119b.ffffdf6b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1436979966027.76788@iped.uio.no> Thanks a lot for your engagement in the conversation. I find your example of the Japanese greeting, which includes not just a movement but a set of several connected movements, really interesting. I think that it goes into the core of what we were after in our article: a bodily performance, unlike an abstract propositio, message, meaning, or intention, has TEMPORAL EXTENSION. That is, in my view, the performative dimension in boundary objects that you may miss if you focus only on the object(s). And that is why we bring, building on Bowker and Star, the notion of experience and experiencing forward in the article. Performances have consequences. And, as Bowker and Star remind us, "the materiality of anything ... is drawn from the consequences of its situation". In our paper, we point out that bodily action has import not just because things are shown or referred to, but also because they allow to go through, to experience in the deep sense, so that possibilities that could not be directly intended because they did not yet exist (the museum space is being designed), came into being through being experienced. And, at the same time, because going through together does not require of a prior substantial understanding (but, as we argue, a shared affectivity and orientation towards further experiences), performances are core to the organizational and collaborative aspects of boundary objects. Best Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lplarry Sent: 15 July 2015 18:41 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Well I am now hooked on this topic I am pro-foundly curious about "living the question" and your question is calling me to the "depths" of my shared question. "How is the doing, which is primary AND the coming along a trajectory conceptual development related to each other. In other words, how are place/place-making and "meaning" related? I will now move to focus attention on the relation of "making" and "design". The design team must first design/engage in a place-making activity FOR (in order to) their collaborative setting. In other words attend to taking "care" and focusing this design moment prior to attending to future imaginal design moments. I want to share a word in Japanese that I find relevant to this topic/narrative of place/meaning. It is the word "ma" which can be translated as "interval" An example: In greeting another you bow down and then arise. However there is an interval/pause between the bowing down and arising. The design performance INCLUDES this interval BETWEEN movements. This pause is PRIMARY in expressing the doing of place-making. I share this focus on "ma" as a way of expanding the movements of "repair" to include the "tarrying in place" (the place of rest and stillness) in our notions of "care" and "repair". I am exploring this notion of "making/construction" as focused on the active doing. place-abiding (as meaning) may also consider the place of rest (the interval as a form of "care". I am now translating (and entering your question). It may overlap with per-forming and de-sign as another aspect of meaning/place. The "/" can be read as an interval, a moment of stillness and coming to rest in our "making" and "doing" The place of "ma" as the interval in time. I am deeply moved by your profound way of "living the question" which opens a space for focusing our awareness on performance and coming into existence what has been previously imagined. I will pause at this place and listen with care to others reflections. Thank you for this opportunity to think out loud Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornetgil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 8:18 AM To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Thanks, Larry, for your very interesting reading of the topics in our article. I like very much your metaphor of the table, which points out the organizational aspect that we aimed to describe with regard to boundary objects. Rolf has done an excellent case about this in his previous e-mail. I'd like also to pick up on your comments about subject matter. Indeed, the title of the paper, "The Matter of Space" was intended precisely as a play on words that was to mark the issue of space both as matter, and as subject matter. As to the connections with Mead, I have only recently begun to read him, and actually motivated by some of the last e-mails in this list about Mead. But I definitely think that one of the points was what I heard Jean Lave say in a lecture that Andy uploaded here( https://vimeo.com/28855105 ): "We always learn what we are already doing". So, one question we set up for ourselves in this paper was: how is the doing, which is primary, and the coming along a trajectory of conceptual development related to each other? Thanks, Alfredo ((Sorry I write outside of the thread of e-mails, but I am having some troubles to publish in xmca from my e-mail address and I must do some tests. The e-mail below aimed to address Larry's last e-mail on the article's discussion thread. This e-mail may end up appearing several times. Apologies...)) From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 10:36:26 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 11:36:26 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Movie on hand-clapping Message-ID: Speaking of the creativity of children, this found its way into my in-box and thought that others might appreciate it. Costly DVD, but the trailer looks great. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cXHzX6PJsak It is a video about hand-clapping games that girls play. -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 10:58:36 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 10:58:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects In-Reply-To: <1436979966027.76788@iped.uio.no> References: <1436973178686.31557@uvic.ca>, <55a68d38.2314460a.119b.ffffdf6b@mx.google.com> <1436979966027.76788@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55a69f4f.2784460a.1707.ffffe35d@mx.google.com> This focus on "requires" (necessity) shared affectivity and orientation BEFORE we can go on together as the " heart" of meaning as we "go through" experiences together. I will share a personal example I witnessed. On stage a girl approximately 8 years old was awkwardly trying to coordinate her dancing and singing. The rehearsal went over the same routine and each time the girl seemed to be not capable of learning the routine. Then in a moment between rehearsals two other girls noticed the girl had her hair disheveled and spontaneously reached out and adjusted her hair. This happened in a split second and would for most have gone unnoticed. There was no conversation no eye contact but that moment (of care/repair) transformed the girls performance. She came alive, fluidly dancing and singing. The magic of that " encounter" a moment (less than a second) transformed the affectivity and orientation. That moment (of learning) for myself is a touchstone in my memory of the truth of shared living through experiences as movements of inclusion. To perform on stage (and in the world) requires (the necessity of) shared affectivity and orientation. That act of adjusting her hair transformed the kind of person she became and her way of participating on "stage". It was transformative and happened within a micro moment extending "time" -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornet Gil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 10:07 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Thanks a lot for your engagement in the conversation. I find your example of the Japanese greeting, which includes not just a movement but a set of several connected movements, really interesting. I think that it goes into the core of what we were after in our article: a bodily performance, unlike an abstract propositio, message, meaning, or intention, has TEMPORAL EXTENSION. That is, in my view, the performative dimension in boundary objects that you may miss if you focus only on the object(s). And that is why we bring, building on Bowker and Star, the notion of experience and experiencing forward in the article. Performances have consequences. And, as Bowker and Star remind us, "the materiality of anything ... is drawn from the consequences of its situation". In our paper, we point out that bodily action has import not just because things are shown or referred to, but also because they allow to go through, to experience in the deep sense, so that possibilities that could not be directly intended because they did not yet exist (the museum space is being designed), came into being through being experienced. And, at the same time, because going through together does not require of a prior substantial understanding (but, as we argue, a shared affectivity and orientation towards further experiences), performances are core to the organizational and collaborative aspects of boundary objects. Best Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lplarry Sent: 15 July 2015 18:41 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Well I am now hooked on this topic I am pro-foundly curious about "living the question" and your question is calling me to the "depths" of my shared question. "How is the doing, which is primary AND the coming along a trajectory conceptual development related to each other. In other words, how are place/place-making and "meaning" related? I will now move to focus attention on the relation of "making" and "design". The design team must first design/engage in a place-making activity FOR (in order to) their collaborative setting. In other words attend to taking "care" and focusing this design moment prior to attending to future imaginal design moments. I want to share a word in Japanese that I find relevant to this topic/narrative of place/meaning. It is the word "ma" which can be translated as "interval" An example: In greeting another you bow down and then arise. However there is an interval/pause between the bowing down and arising. The design performance INCLUDES this interval BETWEEN movements. This pause is PRIMARY in expressing the doing of place-making. I share this focus on "ma" as a way of expanding the movements of "repair" to include the "tarrying in place" (the place of rest and stillness) in our notions of "care" and "repair". I am exploring this notion of "making/construction" as focused on the active doing. place-abiding (as meaning) may also consider the place of rest (the interval as a form of "care". I am now translating (and entering your question). It may overlap with per-forming and de-sign as another aspect of meaning/place. The "/" can be read as an interval, a moment of stillness and coming to rest in our "making" and "doing" The place of "ma" as the interval in time. I am deeply moved by your profound way of "living the question" which opens a space for focusing our awareness on performance and coming into existence what has been previously imagined. I will pause at this place and listen with care to others reflections. Thank you for this opportunity to think out loud Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornetgil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 8:18 AM To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Thanks, Larry, for your very interesting reading of the topics in our article. I like very much your metaphor of the table, which points out the organizational aspect that we aimed to describe with regard to boundary objects. Rolf has done an excellent case about this in his previous e-mail. I'd like also to pick up on your comments about subject matter. Indeed, the title of the paper, "The Matter of Space" was intended precisely as a play on words that was to mark the issue of space both as matter, and as subject matter. As to the connections with Mead, I have only recently begun to read him, and actually motivated by some of the last e-mails in this list about Mead. But I definitely think that one of the points was what I heard Jean Lave say in a lecture that Andy uploaded here( https://vimeo.com/28855105 ): "We always learn what we are already doing". So, one question we set up for ourselves in this paper was: how is the doing, which is primary, and the coming along a trajectory of conceptual development related to each other? Thanks, Alfredo ((Sorry I write outside of the thread of e-mails, but I am having some troubles to publish in xmca from my e-mail address and I must do some tests. The e-mail below aimed to address Larry's last e-mail on the article's discussion thread. This e-mail may end up appearing several times. Apologies...)) From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 15 11:07:00 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:07:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects In-Reply-To: <55a69f4f.2784460a.1707.ffffe35d@mx.google.com> References: <1436973178686.31557@uvic.ca>, <55a68d38.2314460a.119b.ffffdf6b@mx.google.com> <1436979966027.76788@iped.uio.no>, <55a69f4f.2784460a.1707.ffffe35d@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1436983620066.92002@iped.uio.no> That is a beautiful experience! And INCLUSION is surely an issue here that we did not develop and of which we should take note; an issue that, on the other hand, is well present in the fragment from our article (excpert 3) that Rolf was discussing. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lplarry Sent: 15 July 2015 19:58 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects This focus on "requires" (necessity) shared affectivity and orientation BEFORE we can go on together as the " heart" of meaning as we "go through" experiences together. I will share a personal example I witnessed. On stage a girl approximately 8 years old was awkwardly trying to coordinate her dancing and singing. The rehearsal went over the same routine and each time the girl seemed to be not capable of learning the routine. Then in a moment between rehearsals two other girls noticed the girl had her hair disheveled and spontaneously reached out and adjusted her hair. This happened in a split second and would for most have gone unnoticed. There was no conversation no eye contact but that moment (of care/repair) transformed the girls performance. She came alive, fluidly dancing and singing. The magic of that " encounter" a moment (less than a second) transformed the affectivity and orientation. That moment (of learning) for myself is a touchstone in my memory of the truth of shared living through experiences as movements of inclusion. To perform on stage (and in the world) requires (the necessity of) shared affectivity and orientation. That act of adjusting her hair transformed the kind of person she became and her way of participating on "stage". It was transformative and happened within a micro moment extending "time" -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornet Gil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 10:07 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Thanks a lot for your engagement in the conversation. I find your example of the Japanese greeting, which includes not just a movement but a set of several connected movements, really interesting. I think that it goes into the core of what we were after in our article: a bodily performance, unlike an abstract propositio, message, meaning, or intention, has TEMPORAL EXTENSION. That is, in my view, the performative dimension in boundary objects that you may miss if you focus only on the object(s). And that is why we bring, building on Bowker and Star, the notion of experience and experiencing forward in the article. Performances have consequences. And, as Bowker and Star remind us, "the materiality of anything ... is drawn from the consequences of its situation". In our paper, we point out that bodily action has import not just because things are shown or referred to, but also because they allow to go through, to experience in the deep sense, so that possibilities that could not be directly intended because they did not yet exist (the museum space is being designed), came into being through being experienced. And, at the same time, because going through together does not require of a prior substantial understanding (but, as we argue, a shared affectivity and orientation towards further experiences), performances are core to the organizational and collaborative aspects of boundary objects. Best Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lplarry Sent: 15 July 2015 18:41 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Well I am now hooked on this topic I am pro-foundly curious about "living the question" and your question is calling me to the "depths" of my shared question. "How is the doing, which is primary AND the coming along a trajectory conceptual development related to each other. In other words, how are place/place-making and "meaning" related? I will now move to focus attention on the relation of "making" and "design". The design team must first design/engage in a place-making activity FOR (in order to) their collaborative setting. In other words attend to taking "care" and focusing this design moment prior to attending to future imaginal design moments. I want to share a word in Japanese that I find relevant to this topic/narrative of place/meaning. It is the word "ma" which can be translated as "interval" An example: In greeting another you bow down and then arise. However there is an interval/pause between the bowing down and arising. The design performance INCLUDES this interval BETWEEN movements. This pause is PRIMARY in expressing the doing of place-making. I share this focus on "ma" as a way of expanding the movements of "repair" to include the "tarrying in place" (the place of rest and stillness) in our notions of "care" and "repair". I am exploring this notion of "making/construction" as focused on the active doing. place-abiding (as meaning) may also consider the place of rest (the interval as a form of "care". I am now translating (and entering your question). It may overlap with per-forming and de-sign as another aspect of meaning/place. The "/" can be read as an interval, a moment of stillness and coming to rest in our "making" and "doing" The place of "ma" as the interval in time. I am deeply moved by your profound way of "living the question" which opens a space for focusing our awareness on performance and coming into existence what has been previously imagined. I will pause at this place and listen with care to others reflections. Thank you for this opportunity to think out loud Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornetgil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 8:18 AM To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The emergence of Boundary Ojbects Thanks, Larry, for your very interesting reading of the topics in our article. I like very much your metaphor of the table, which points out the organizational aspect that we aimed to describe with regard to boundary objects. Rolf has done an excellent case about this in his previous e-mail. I'd like also to pick up on your comments about subject matter. Indeed, the title of the paper, "The Matter of Space" was intended precisely as a play on words that was to mark the issue of space both as matter, and as subject matter. As to the connections with Mead, I have only recently begun to read him, and actually motivated by some of the last e-mails in this list about Mead. But I definitely think that one of the points was what I heard Jean Lave say in a lecture that Andy uploaded here( https://vimeo.com/28855105 ): "We always learn what we are already doing". So, one question we set up for ourselves in this paper was: how is the doing, which is primary, and the coming along a trajectory of conceptual development related to each other? Thanks, Alfredo ((Sorry I write outside of the thread of e-mails, but I am having some troubles to publish in xmca from my e-mail address and I must do some tests. The e-mail below aimed to address Larry's last e-mail on the article's discussion thread. This e-mail may end up appearing several times. Apologies...)) From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jul 15 11:32:03 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:32:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Alfredo, I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. Best wishes, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). Okay, too much I know. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > Cresswell about > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > going on in a given situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > Gil > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > as the participants construct representations and begin to > collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > > towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > > first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > > first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > > episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > > after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > > which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > > team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > > been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > > shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > > read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > > figure of Leigh Star begun to > be relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > > specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > > place and finding one's ways > around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > > we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > to > learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > > spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > > been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > > idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > processes involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 15 12:00:51 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 19:00:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> Thanks Michael, I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the notion of ecology to address these issues. If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your position here better. Thanks! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Alfredo, I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. Best wishes, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). Okay, too much I know. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > Cresswell about > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > going on in a given situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > Gil > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > as the participants construct representations and begin to > collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > > towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > > first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > > first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > > episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > > after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > > which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > > team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > > been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > > shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > > read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > > figure of Leigh Star begun to > be relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > > specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > > place and finding one's ways > around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > > we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > to > learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > > spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > > been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > > idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > processes involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > From rolfsteier@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 12:26:04 2015 From: rolfsteier@gmail.com (Rolf Steier) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 21:26:04 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Wow - many interesting threads emerging here! One issue seems to be this tension between the designer's or architect's role in informing the experience of the user, and the level of intentionality they are able to impart. Are the decisions of the designers introducing affordances to a setting? constraints? meaning potentials? A second theme is about the social practices of orientation, "inclusion," and perhaps the ongoing nature of these shared performances (including the "ma" - Larry, I will have to explore this concept more as I find it lovely). In relation to this first issue, I suspect that my perspective may differ from many of you here, but we shall see. Lubomir - you suggest that *"**What they embed as a meaningful physical component or a sign can be and is interpreted very differently by the building users."* Michael's experience with Jackson Pollack at MOMA seems consistent with this view, and I think that I largely agree. That is, that designers cannot impose particular experiences on users - that unintended affordances emerge and are inevitable. However, I don't think that this is inconsistent with the possibility that a designer can influence the possible experiences of users in meaningful ways. In an earlier email - I mentioned the architect's role the placemaking experience of the user as connecting to the introducing of placemaking potentials, or meaning potentials (I'm using this concept very generally - based loosely on Rommetveit and Bakhtin). I view these as possible meanings or possible experiences that the architects intend to facilitate, but not necessarily impose. Part of this has to do with the level at which we view the intentionality of the designer. Michael - in your experience at MOMA, I agree that an architect/curator team could not possibly plan for the significance of your experience at that time in your life. At the same time, we could perhaps imagine these designers intending to build a place that supports personal reflection at a more general level (by controlling the sound, lighting, physical configurations of the artifacts, etc). The actual "placemaking" is still not realized until the users actually inhabit this space, but I view the designers as a fundamental part of this development. I view the role of designers as more imaginative than predictive. They are imagining possible experiences, and then building the spaces that hopefully (but not necessarily) support those experiences. I also want to return to the second theme mentioned above, but I need a little more time to think it through. I'm really enjoying this discussion so far, Rolf On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:32 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Alfredo, > > I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson > along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears > conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you > have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... > > I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more > physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the > pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I > think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger > feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as > MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a > system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. > > This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into > an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking > place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to > cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also > likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an > attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in > terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some > way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are > taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will > take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the > larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no > assumption about trajectory. > > I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an > interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain > things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want > light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are > more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is > very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that > even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking > about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of > transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create > a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. > But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on > needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these > discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his > life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). > > I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but > about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are > constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction > has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the > mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the > individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is > important, but limited. > > The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to > me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a > group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But > we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson > might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying > Alfredo. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not > affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed > by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether > museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. > > What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson > Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere > (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I > think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up > for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your > experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. > > I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with > Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations > and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed > that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same > as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that > physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) > transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we > can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take > based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In > living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a > pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of > the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, > at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a > different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of > mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not > direct, but mediated. > > So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, > consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume > as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how > a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations > within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social > relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without > intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not > about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I > think. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to > think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, > especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not > understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both > as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in > the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived > affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has > potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment > (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning > those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the > historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with > the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, > but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs > of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization > and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this > point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own > meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a > potential trails for others. > > An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used > to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to > try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson > Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I > would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed > and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At > that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the > paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the > next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this > affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but > my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been > at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a > socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said > stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and > whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. > > Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as > perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived > affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my > need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a > general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, > to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to > eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at > that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the > article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for > perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this > because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. > The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as > recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen > many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the > Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a > museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. > > Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum > of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most > of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in > many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your > thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, > understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as > well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain > types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of > food). > > Okay, too much I know. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Rolf Steier > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > > I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I > think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared > meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star > might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the > task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from > our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the > researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. > The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery > in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is > in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able > to share his vision for the gallery. > > This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( > *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the > facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches > the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the > ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down > to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling > into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are > designing breakfast."* > > There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation > work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down > to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the > multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is > designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, > design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their > collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition > space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design > ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining > the future exhibition. > > Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is > difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the > place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and > meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place > potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only > thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > > difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of > "an" > > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > > geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > > a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > > if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > > refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > > and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > > performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > > are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations > versus actions. > > > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > > > Hope this helps > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Thank you Alfredo, > > > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > > terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > > the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > > individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > > meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > > do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Dear Lubomir, > > > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > > but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > > Cresswell about > > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > > interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > > experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > > going on in a given situation. > > > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > > and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > > experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > > is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > > about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a > perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > > Gil > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > > > Thanks, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Hello All, > > > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > > study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > > up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > > related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > > as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > > museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > > is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > > as the participants construct representations and begin to > > collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > > trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > > so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > > Rolf > > > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > wrote: > > > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > > > towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > > > first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > > > first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > > > episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > > > after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > > > which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > > > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > > > team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > > > been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > > > shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > > > read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > > > figure of Leigh Star begun to > > be relevant. > > > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > > > specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > > > place and finding one's ways > > around it. > > > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > > > we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different > frameworks. > > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > > to > > learn a lot from them. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > > boundary objects. > > > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > > > spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > > > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > > > been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > > > idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary > object. > > > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of > imagination" > > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > > processes involved. > > > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > > > mike > > > > > > PS-- > > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Jul 15 12:42:31 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 19:42:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi Mike, I am referring in my previous mail, as you said, to so?znanie , actually soznanie, which is a Historical Materialist concept that is difficult to translate. I am not sure I can explain it in English with the existing English words and social science terminology, but I will make my best. Soznanie is not exactly ?consciousness? or ?mind? but it is somewhere there. The opposite or complementary to soznanie is podsoznanite (under-consciousness). I went to Wikipedia and found that the English explanation of soznanie is absolutely incorrect. Soznanie comes from social philosophy and is assimilated in psychology and sociology. Soznanie is about human ability to create ideal/mental images (otrazhenie) of the material world by the individual, including the mechanisms of this reflection (otrazhenie). In a different way: Soznanie is about the subjective perezhivanie of and reflection on the external world by the individual. As you see, I cannot translate perezhivanie in English. I found some definitions in Russian, but cannot translate them in English so that they sound true to the original. The problem is that those definitions are worded with terms/concepts that also do not have direct translation in Anglo psychology and philosophy. The definion of soznanie in psychology and sociology is slightly different because it has to be adapted to the major thematic circles of these disciplines. In psychology they emphasize the psychological activity regarding creating mental images of reality as well as building plans for action. In sociology the emphasis is more on the mental life of society. Now, I translate in English and probably make major errors because it is almost impossible to find analogous words for everything that I mention here. My belief is that soznanie can easier be translated in German because the idea comes from Classical German philosophy via Marx. Soznanie is a major category of Historical Materialism. One of the adages of Marx is that the Being/Living/Existance (Bitie) experience (not well translated) produces/shapes Soznanie. I have to confess that I am not in my best shape right now and not the best expert on this issue. On the one hand, professed Historical Materialists do not work in English and do not understand well the terminology in English. On the other hand, the terminology and the conceptual systems in the Anglo world are very different from Historical Materialism. I am currently working in a Symbolic Interactionist perspective and refer to Historical Materialism as something from a past world. By the way, the transition among these paradigms and also, Positivism, is quite of a challenge and pain. One and the same word stands for a different term and concept, in many cases overlapping, but not the same; and in many cases they are confusingly different. Best wishes, Lubomir From: lchcmike@gmail.com [mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:15 PM To: Lubomir Savov Popov Cc: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no; Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; lpscholar2@gmail.com Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Lubomir -- Could you elaborate on the following from your earlier note? I would suggest that only individual consciousness is a place maker. Exception ? the collective consciousness, but this is another aspect. Specifically, this phrasing put me in mind of the circumstance that consciousness is so - znanie, co-knowing. Is this the other aspect you are referring to? mike On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 7:33 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: Hi Rolf, You mention in your previous mail: Lubomir, you asked - ?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! I would suggest that only individual consciousness is a place maker. Exception ? the collective consciousness, but this is another aspect. Architects can only facilitate that process, but they are not the main factors. They believe they imbed particular meanings of the environment through the process of design. My positions is that they only believe. What they embed as a meaningful physical component or a sign can be and is interpreted very differently by the building users. In one case, the architects tried to design a space-age caf? with build of dozens of sculptured modules. The local hippies called it ?the funeral home? because the modules reminds them of coffins. So much about placemaking. However, the caf? became a place for the hippies ? they started using it as a meeting place because of its location and affordable prices; it became a locality where they can find support, share their problems, make fun, get excited, and so on; they endowed the physical entity with their own meaning, and so on. Placemaking is an intimate personal process. Even the ugliest environment can make a wonderful place for the individuals that feel at home there, that draw strength from that environment, and really enjoy it. What are your thoughts about this? I am already confronting the architects with this conceptualization. I need to see how this way of thinking is perceived by social scientists. Best Lubomir From: rolfsteier@gmail.com [mailto:rolfsteier@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: Lubomir Savov Popov; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; lpscholar2@gmail.com Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that?s really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold (Making) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - ?Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast.? There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - ?who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?? I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered ?place potentials?) that only emerge through the activity of the users. I?m only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: Thanks a lot, Lubomir! On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, if it has import to further development in the person, it must be refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. Hope this helps Alfredo ________________________________________ From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you Alfredo, By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what is the difference between the process of performing an activity in space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Dear Lubomir, thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing Cresswell about place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents going on in a given situation. I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Dear Rolf and Alfredo, What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of different ways; it is just mindboggling. Thanks, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hello All, I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place as the participants construct representations and begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. I'm looking forward to the discussion! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > Hi Mike and all, > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > to say a bit about the article. > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together and > the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software engineering, > and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance towards > definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the first > months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a first > paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one episode > clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, after many > meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in which a > discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space unexpectedly > appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design team. It stroke > me that something as banal and simple as a wall had been important in > making it possible for the participants to achieve shared perspectives > on the task and go on. I remembered then to have read something about > boundary objects, and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to be relevant. > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of co-operation > despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than shared substantive > understandings, what seemed to allow the participants to proceed was > being able to orient towards and perform specific situations that were > lived-in (experienced, gone through). We recur to the notions of > place-making and place-imagining to emphasize this per-formative > aspect that has to do with inhabiting a place and finding one's ways around it. > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, we > may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward to learn a lot from them. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com > on behalf of mike cole > < mcole@ucsd.edu> > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > boundary objects. > > So, to start the discussion. > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming spaces > into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in directly > with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have been writing > about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but > which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the processes involved. > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > mike > > PS-- > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Wed Jul 15 13:02:56 2015 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 15:02:56 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: , , Message-ID: Message from Francine: Hi David, The English translation eliminated one word from the Russian '???' that means 'already' the cooperative relationship is already established although elementary and simple. The small room and a simple cooperative relationship that is already established is what Charles Bazerman described in the example where his child was able to see the spaghetti colander in the cabinet that his parents were searching for (the one-year-old child in a walker has a different line of sight into the cabinet). I read somewhere that comprehension of language (related to concrete imagery) precedes the spoken language equivalents in early childhood. Animals can also retrieve objects and perform actions prompted by verbal 'commands' even though they do not speak. Example: saying to a dog "Time for a walk, get your leash." This is not to diminish Charles charming anecdote. Even though the child > Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 08:08:37 +0900 > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian > > Thanks, all. So the child is the peer of the adult so long as they are > indoors and so long as they have an elementary collaborative relation. > > Actually, this confirms Vygotsky's criticism of Blonsky's scheme. Blonsky > is obsessed with teething, and everything has to be somehow related to > teeth and to feeding. So there is a kind of "energy economy", whereby > higher forms of sociality are only enabled by the child's energy surpluses. > I guess that's why they have to be indoors and inactive in order to be > peers. > > What Vygotsky says is that this scheme of things works okay for the first > year but not for the second. > > David Kellogg > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 1:01 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: > > > Hi David, > > > > It seems to me that the translation is reasonable. My interpretation is > > that a two-year old child is capable of elementary and simple cooperation > > with and adult. If we exclude locomotion capabilities, the child might be > > considered somewhat on par with the adult regarding simple cooperation. > > > > I am not sure how the child development experts will view this statement. > > I am not an expert in that area. Also, I am not sure what are the minimal > > criteria for cooperation and how cooperation is construed by the authors. > > It is also possible that the authors use criteria that are very different > > than the criteria in the literature we use. It is a matter of different > > conceptualizations, paradigms, and traditions. > > > > Best, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David > > Kellogg > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 3:19 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian > > > > We're working through Vygotsky's very long chapter on infancy in the > > "Child Development" book he was working towards the end of his life. He has > > just introduced Blonsky's partitioning of infancy into three stages, on the > > basis of the presence or absence of teeth. Then, the Russian Collected > > Works (foot of p. 303) has this: > > > > "?? 2-? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????????? ????????? > > ?????????? ? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? ??????????????, > > ?????? ?????????????, ???????? ??????????????." > > > > The English Collected works renders this as: > > > > "In the second year of life, the child is equal to the adult in a room in > > a situation where little movement is required and between them a relation > > of cooperation, although elementary and simple, is established." > > > > But this doesn't make any sense at all, at least not in English. Is it > > possible that it's a misprint? > > > > David Kellogg > > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Jul 15 13:06:26 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 20:06:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: About affordance and constraints: These categories are used very often in design research and design thinking. Over there, they talk about environmental affordance (as opposed to social affordance). In that case, affordance means that the environment provides many possibilities for different actions and/or courses of actions. The notion comes from the concepts of environmental determinism, possibilism, and probabilism. The notion of constraint can be seen as something that hinders the action or the course of actions. In design, there is more attention paid to constraints because they have much bigger impact on the potential performance of the design object. People rarely take advantage of affordance/possibilities; people are often affected by the constraints. Activity Theory can contribute a lot in clarifying these concepts and relationships. They are important for design theory and in particular for user needs research and design. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:26 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Wow - many interesting threads emerging here! One issue seems to be this tension between the designer's or architect's role in informing the experience of the user, and the level of intentionality they are able to impart. Are the decisions of the designers introducing affordances to a setting? constraints? meaning potentials? A second theme is about the social practices of orientation, "inclusion," and perhaps the ongoing nature of these shared performances (including the "ma" - Larry, I will have to explore this concept more as I find it lovely). In relation to this first issue, I suspect that my perspective may differ from many of you here, but we shall see. Lubomir - you suggest that *"**What they embed as a meaningful physical component or a sign can be and is interpreted very differently by the building users."* Michael's experience with Jackson Pollack at MOMA seems consistent with this view, and I think that I largely agree. That is, that designers cannot impose particular experiences on users - that unintended affordances emerge and are inevitable. However, I don't think that this is inconsistent with the possibility that a designer can influence the possible experiences of users in meaningful ways. In an earlier email - I mentioned the architect's role the placemaking experience of the user as connecting to the introducing of placemaking potentials, or meaning potentials (I'm using this concept very generally - based loosely on Rommetveit and Bakhtin). I view these as possible meanings or possible experiences that the architects intend to facilitate, but not necessarily impose. Part of this has to do with the level at which we view the intentionality of the designer. Michael - in your experience at MOMA, I agree that an architect/curator team could not possibly plan for the significance of your experience at that time in your life. At the same time, we could perhaps imagine these designers intending to build a place that supports personal reflection at a more general level (by controlling the sound, lighting, physical configurations of the artifacts, etc). The actual "placemaking" is still not realized until the users actually inhabit this space, but I view the designers as a fundamental part of this development. I view the role of designers as more imaginative than predictive. They are imagining possible experiences, and then building the spaces that hopefully (but not necessarily) support those experiences. I also want to return to the second theme mentioned above, but I need a little more time to think it through. I'm really enjoying this discussion so far, Rolf On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:32 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Alfredo, > > I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson > along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original > Sears > conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the > "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... > > I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more > physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace > the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback > loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response > within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what > Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback > loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. > > This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed > into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions > are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's > relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl > it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of > hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her > confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad > hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into > the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, > because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need > objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but > not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. > > I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an > interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do > certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark > room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet > that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need > them. But I think that is very different from the idea of > specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized > experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he > makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. > Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. > But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on > needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for > these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for > most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). > > I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but > about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are > constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your > direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the > road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the > trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on > trajectories of action is important, but limited. > > The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it > seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an > individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an > individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints > for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. > Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not > affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints > presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes > sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. > > What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the > Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being > somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be > INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to > those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could > not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. > > I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue > with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical > relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory > Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in > physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in > communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are > the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a > billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed > and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that > is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the > things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I > think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is > not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at > least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a > different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of > mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. > > So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and > Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, > and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) > category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted > through the social relations within which we engage, the most > designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving > afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed > meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to > interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning > to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple > with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do > not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the > table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). > It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, > perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the > study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural > historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum > sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going > to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up > to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the > individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across > objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular > journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and > externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this > point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their > own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, > leaving a potential trails for others. > > An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I > used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in > large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often > visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be > meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after > graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever > been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense > to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that > could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. > There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was > based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I > think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that > moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a > socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that > said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. > > Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as > perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of > perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape > makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from > cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a > sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory > of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow > sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look > for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about > perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived > affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. > The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such > as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have > seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s > to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art > objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. > > Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan > Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where > I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very > carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I > think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a > certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits > together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the > table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior > (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). > > Okay, too much I know. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Rolf Steier > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > > I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I > think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the > shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps > Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) > that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is > design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn > 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. > The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing > gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. > The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the > same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. > > This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( > *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the > facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design > catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of > choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from > the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as > laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, > milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* > > There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative > orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations > of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider > the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the > same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective > of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a > place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to > attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the > table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some > coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. > > Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or > the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this > is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in > the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if > place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered > 'place > potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm > only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to > > the difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part > > of > "an" > > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking > > about geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, > > as a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such > > practice, if it has import to further development in the person, it > > must be refracted through the person's experience; there must be > > involvement, and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might > > think of us performing some activity within taking much of it, > > without noticing we are doing. It is in this sense that I do the > > bridge with operations > versus actions. > > > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > > > Hope this helps > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Thank you Alfredo, > > > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place > > in terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity > > and the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance > > for the individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the > > phenomenon of meaning and placemaking is a process on par with > > meaning making. How do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Dear Lubomir, > > > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the > > paper, but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) > > citing Cresswell about > > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in > > an interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming > > involved, experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials > > and currents going on in a given situation. > > > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between > > space and place in terms of space being a reality substance and > > place being constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my > > view, experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. > > And place is about space as it is refracted in intelligible > > experience; not about an abstraction over an objective field, but > > more related to a > perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > > Gil > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens > > of different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > > > Thanks, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Hello All, > > > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of > > our study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike > > brings up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite > > closely related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this > > instance as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist > > yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this > > design work is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from > > space to place as the participants construct representations and > > begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an > > illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't > > able to bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > > Rolf > > > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > wrote: > > > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can > > > try to say a bit about the article. > > > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had > > > a science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to > > > advance towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos > > > from the first months of design work, hoping to find something for > > > writing a first paper. I found different interesting issues to > > > pursue, but one episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a > > > design meeting, after many meetings with lots of disagreements and > > > dead ends, in which a discussion that concerned a wall in the > > > museum space unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas > > > in the design team. It stroke me that something as banal and > > > simple as a wall had been important in making it possible for the > > > participants to achieve shared perspectives on the task and go on. > > > I remembered then to have read something about boundary objects, > > > and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to > > be relevant. > > > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from > > > the perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in > > > our analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and > > > perform specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting > > > a place and finding one's ways > > around it. > > > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel > > > fun and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were > > > encouraged to connect different ideas from different scholars. The > > > schedule was tight, and, although I think we managed to put > > > together some ideas, we may have taken many risks in bridging > > > across the different > frameworks. > > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > > to > > learn a lot from them. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some > > > time in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the > > > emergence of boundary objects. > > > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. > > > The entire discussion leading up to the formulation of > > > transforming spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the > > > process) locks in directly with our current work on the 5th > > > Dimension, which i have been writing about for some time as a > > > tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but which most certainly > > > fits the concept of a boundary > object. > > > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of > imagination" > > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed > > > imagination, which is most certainly going to require imagination > > > to fill in the ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight > > > insight into the > > processes involved. > > > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > > > mike > > > > > > PS-- > > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and > > > thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova > > > & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jul 15 13:23:11 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 20:23:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4870@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Lubomir, I am currently trying to think of a good example for differentiating between affordance and constraint. I'm not so sure I can, or even sure I have this right, so we will see. You are right - a lot of design people use affordance and constraint the way the you describe. However it was Don Norman I believe who introduced the concept of affordance into design I think, and after he saw that the way it was being used he seemed to regret it. For any affordance in design it is important to put in perceived as a modifier, because design is by definition in expectation of certain environmental issues that might be open to specific objects that individuals might be ready to recognize in those circumstances. But in both cases, affordance and perceived affordance, it is about individuals moving through the ecology and perceiving different objects as fitting their needs based on where and when they are. I think hindering action might be too harsh. I think perhaps a better adjective is it canalizes action, sets it on specific trajectories determined to one extent or another by the system of constraints within the ecology. Constraints aren't negative, they just aren't enmeshed with the movement and perceptions of the agent. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lubomir Savov Popov Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 4:06 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects About affordance and constraints: These categories are used very often in design research and design thinking. Over there, they talk about environmental affordance (as opposed to social affordance). In that case, affordance means that the environment provides many possibilities for different actions and/or courses of actions. The notion comes from the concepts of environmental determinism, possibilism, and probabilism. The notion of constraint can be seen as something that hinders the action or the course of actions. In design, there is more attention paid to constraints because they have much bigger impact on the potential performance of the design object. People rarely take advantage of affordance/possibilities; people are often affected by the constraints. Activity Theory can contribute a lot in clarifying these concepts and relationships. They are important for design theory and in particular for user needs research and design. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:26 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Wow - many interesting threads emerging here! One issue seems to be this tension between the designer's or architect's role in informing the experience of the user, and the level of intentionality they are able to impart. Are the decisions of the designers introducing affordances to a setting? constraints? meaning potentials? A second theme is about the social practices of orientation, "inclusion," and perhaps the ongoing nature of these shared performances (including the "ma" - Larry, I will have to explore this concept more as I find it lovely). In relation to this first issue, I suspect that my perspective may differ from many of you here, but we shall see. Lubomir - you suggest that *"**What they embed as a meaningful physical component or a sign can be and is interpreted very differently by the building users."* Michael's experience with Jackson Pollack at MOMA seems consistent with this view, and I think that I largely agree. That is, that designers cannot impose particular experiences on users - that unintended affordances emerge and are inevitable. However, I don't think that this is inconsistent with the possibility that a designer can influence the possible experiences of users in meaningful ways. In an earlier email - I mentioned the architect's role the placemaking experience of the user as connecting to the introducing of placemaking potentials, or meaning potentials (I'm using this concept very generally - based loosely on Rommetveit and Bakhtin). I view these as possible meanings or possible experiences that the architects intend to facilitate, but not necessarily impose. Part of this has to do with the level at which we view the intentionality of the designer. Michael - in your experience at MOMA, I agree that an architect/curator team could not possibly plan for the significance of your experience at that time in your life. At the same time, we could perhaps imagine these designers intending to build a place that supports personal reflection at a more general level (by controlling the sound, lighting, physical configurations of the artifacts, etc). The actual "placemaking" is still not realized until the users actually inhabit this space, but I view the designers as a fundamental part of this development. I view the role of designers as more imaginative than predictive. They are imagining possible experiences, and then building the spaces that hopefully (but not necessarily) support those experiences. I also want to return to the second theme mentioned above, but I need a little more time to think it through. I'm really enjoying this discussion so far, Rolf On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:32 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Alfredo, > > I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson > along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original > Sears > conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the > "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... > > I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more > physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace > the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback > loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response > within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what > Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback > loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. > > This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed > into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions > are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's > relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl > it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of > hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her > confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad > hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into > the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, > because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need > objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but > not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. > > I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an > interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do > certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark > room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet > that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need > them. But I think that is very different from the idea of > specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized > experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he > makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. > Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. > But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on > needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for > these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for > most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). > > I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but > about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are > constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your > direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the > road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the > trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on > trajectories of action is important, but limited. > > The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it > seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an > individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an > individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints > for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. > Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not > affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints > presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes > sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. > > What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the > Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being > somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be > INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to > those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could > not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. > > I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue > with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical > relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory > Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in > physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in > communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are > the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a > billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed > and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that > is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the > things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I > think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is > not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at > least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a > different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of > mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. > > So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and > Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, > and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) > category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted > through the social relations within which we engage, the most > designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving > afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed > meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to > interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning > to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple > with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do > not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the > table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). > It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, > perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the > study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural > historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum > sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going > to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up > to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the > individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across > objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular > journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and > externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this > point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their > own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, > leaving a potential trails for others. > > An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I > used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in > large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often > visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be > meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after > graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever > been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense > to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that > could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. > There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was > based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I > think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that > moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a > socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that > said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. > > Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as > perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of > perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape > makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from > cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a > sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory > of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow > sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look > for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about > perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived > affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. > The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such > as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have > seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s > to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art > objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. > > Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan > Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where > I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very > carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I > think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a > certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits > together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the > table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior > (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). > > Okay, too much I know. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Rolf Steier > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > > I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I > think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the > shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps > Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) > that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is > design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn > 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. > The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing > gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. > The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the > same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. > > This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( > *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the > facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design > catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of > choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from > the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as > laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, > milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* > > There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative > orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations > of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider > the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the > same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective > of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a > place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to > attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the > table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some > coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. > > Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or > the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this > is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in > the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if > place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered > 'place > potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm > only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to > > the difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part > > of > "an" > > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking > > about geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, > > as a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such > > practice, if it has import to further development in the person, it > > must be refracted through the person's experience; there must be > > involvement, and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might > > think of us performing some activity within taking much of it, > > without noticing we are doing. It is in this sense that I do the > > bridge with operations > versus actions. > > > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > > > Hope this helps > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Thank you Alfredo, > > > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place > > in terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity > > and the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance > > for the individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the > > phenomenon of meaning and placemaking is a process on par with > > meaning making. How do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Dear Lubomir, > > > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the > > paper, but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) > > citing Cresswell about > > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in > > an interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming > > involved, experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials > > and currents going on in a given situation. > > > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between > > space and place in terms of space being a reality substance and > > place being constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my > > view, experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. > > And place is about space as it is refracted in intelligible > > experience; not about an abstraction over an objective field, but > > more related to a > perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > > Gil > > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens > > of different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > > > Thanks, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Hello All, > > > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of > > our study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike > > brings up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite > > closely related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this > > instance as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist > > yet (the museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this > > design work is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from > > space to place as the participants construct representations and > > begin to collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an > > illustration of these trajectories as merging, though we weren't > > able to bring it together - so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > > Rolf > > > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > wrote: > > > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can > > > try to say a bit about the article. > > > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had > > > a science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to > > > advance towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos > > > from the first months of design work, hoping to find something for > > > writing a first paper. I found different interesting issues to > > > pursue, but one episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a > > > design meeting, after many meetings with lots of disagreements and > > > dead ends, in which a discussion that concerned a wall in the > > > museum space unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas > > > in the design team. It stroke me that something as banal and > > > simple as a wall had been important in making it possible for the > > > participants to achieve shared perspectives on the task and go on. > > > I remembered then to have read something about boundary objects, > > > and it was then that the figure of Leigh Star begun to > > be relevant. > > > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from > > > the perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in > > > our analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and > > > perform specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting > > > a place and finding one's ways > > around it. > > > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel > > > fun and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were > > > encouraged to connect different ideas from different scholars. The > > > schedule was tight, and, although I think we managed to put > > > together some ideas, we may have taken many risks in bridging > > > across the different > frameworks. > > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > > to > > learn a lot from them. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some > > > time in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the > > > emergence of boundary objects. > > > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. > > > The entire discussion leading up to the formulation of > > > transforming spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the > > > process) locks in directly with our current work on the 5th > > > Dimension, which i have been writing about for some time as a > > > tertiary artifact and an idioculture, but which most certainly > > > fits the concept of a boundary > object. > > > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of > imagination" > > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed > > > imagination, which is most certainly going to require imagination > > > to fill in the ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight > > > insight into the > > processes involved. > > > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > > > mike > > > > > > PS-- > > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and > > > thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova > > > & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jul 15 14:30:19 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 21:30:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Alfredo, I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I had done every previous time coming upon them. The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thanks Michael, I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the notion of ecology to address these issues. If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your position here better. Thanks! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Alfredo, I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. Best wishes, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). Okay, too much I know. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > Cresswell about > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > going on in a given situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > Gil > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > as the participants construct representations and begin to > collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > > towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > > first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > > first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > > episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > > after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > > which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > > team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > > been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > > shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > > read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > > figure of Leigh Star begun to > be relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > > specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > > place and finding one's ways > around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > > we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > to > learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > > spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > > been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > > idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > processes involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 15 16:29:30 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 23:29:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining others. I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions become entangled into particular trajectories. In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry into design work. Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the level of generic social processes, and given a particular cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Alfredo, I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I had done every previous time coming upon them. The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thanks Michael, I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the notion of ecology to address these issues. If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your position here better. Thanks! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Alfredo, I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. Best wishes, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). Okay, too much I know. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you for your thoughts Larry, I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! Rolf On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" > experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. > > I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. > > For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > Cresswell about > place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > going on in a given situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet > Gil > Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > different ways; it is just mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > as the participants construct representations and begin to > collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > Hi Mike and all, > > > > > > thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > > anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > > to say a bit about the article. > > > > Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > > science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > > technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > > begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > > projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > > time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > > and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > > > > The design meetings involved many participants from different > > backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > > engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > > towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > > first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > > first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > > episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > > after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > > which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > > unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > > team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > > been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > > shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > > read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > > figure of Leigh Star begun to > be relevant. > > > > In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > > perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > > analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > > co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > > shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > > participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > > specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > > We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > > emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > > place and finding one's ways > around it. > > > > We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > > theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > > and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > > connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > > tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > > we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. > > I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > > questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > > to > learn a lot from them. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > > in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > > boundary objects. > > > > So, to start the discussion. > > > > I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > > about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > > entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > > spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > > directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > > been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > > idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. > > > > Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" > > and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > > installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. > > And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > > which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > > ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > processes involved. > > > > Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- > > For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 15 16:57:08 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 16:57:08 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Having an experience Message-ID: Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's paper. I found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for the old guys. mike -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Having An Experience.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 81289 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150715/5efe4092/attachment.bin From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 20:33:54 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 20:33:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike, I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience is focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" Here is a link to explain this concept: https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma.html Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of INTERVALS, periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and preparing" Here is another example from the Dewey article: "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, and dead centers when we have an experience. There are PAUSES, PLACES OF REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" movement. They sum up what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is NOT passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an active process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having "an" experience this is an act of "surrender" Here is Dewey exploring this theme" The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with other matters, as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of answering activity, we do not perceive that which bears us down. :We must summon energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching this energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this phenomena of "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject matter" as undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is translated as "tarrying" I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into there cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only "dis-ordered will". In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using this older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" within "lived through experience" On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's > paper. I found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for the > old guys. > mike > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 15 20:43:42 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 03:43:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> Larry, when you mentioned the "ma" case today, I immediately thought of Dewey's "an" experience, because it involves the unity of the different moments that you described in "ma". I never came along Gadamer, but, after reading your e-mail, I will definitely have a look. Is there a particular text you would recommend? Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 16 July 2015 05:33 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Mike, I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience is focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" Here is a link to explain this concept: https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma.html Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of INTERVALS, periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and preparing" Here is another example from the Dewey article: "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, and dead centers when we have an experience. There are PAUSES, PLACES OF REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" movement. They sum up what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is NOT passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an active process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having "an" experience this is an act of "surrender" Here is Dewey exploring this theme" The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with other matters, as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of answering activity, we do not perceive that which bears us down. :We must summon energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching this energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this phenomena of "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject matter" as undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is translated as "tarrying" I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into there cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only "dis-ordered will". In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using this older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" within "lived through experience" On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's > paper. I found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for the > old guys. > mike > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 21:01:30 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 22:01:30 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Movie on hand-clapping In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, Beautiful! Henry > On Jul 15, 2015, at 11:36 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Speaking of the creativity of children, this found its way into my in-box > and thought that others might appreciate it. Costly DVD, but the trailer > looks great. > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cXHzX6PJsak > > It is a video about hand-clapping games that girls play. > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 21:01:30 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 22:01:30 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Movie on hand-clapping In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, Beautiful! Henry > On Jul 15, 2015, at 11:36 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Speaking of the creativity of children, this found its way into my in-box > and thought that others might appreciate it. Costly DVD, but the trailer > looks great. > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cXHzX6PJsak > > It is a video about hand-clapping games that girls play. > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 21:12:34 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 21:12:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo, Here is another Wikipedia link to "ma" [as space] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) An article by Sheila Ross "The Temporality of Tarrying in Gadamer" in the journal *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 2006, Volume 23 (1): Pages 104-123 is where I encountered this idea. I am personally linking Dewey, Gadamer, and the concept of "ma". I will point out that Gadamer's focus on tarrying is to focus an experience of the "subject matter" through living conversations. My readings on this topic are idiosyncratic but I personally sense/perceive a shared sensibility and "disposition" in these notions of "agentic" receptivity and undergoing phenomena. [which is not passive] I also believe this disposition to perceive the "pregnant pause" in ongoing activity can be "cultivated/grown". Thanks for inviting me to think out loud with you. Larry Your article is moving deeper into the multimodal with bodily gesture but I believe my comments add to the complexity of the "aspects" you are exploring as place-making/meaning. On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Larry, > > when you mentioned the "ma" case today, I immediately thought of Dewey's > "an" experience, because it involves the unity of the different moments > that you described in "ma". I never came along Gadamer, but, after reading > your e-mail, I will definitely have a look. Is there a particular text you > would recommend? > > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry Purss > Sent: 16 July 2015 05:33 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Mike, > > I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience is > focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" > Here is a link to explain this concept: > > https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma.html > > Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: > Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their > succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of INTERVALS, > periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and > preparing" > > Here is another example from the Dewey article: > > "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, > and dead centers when we have an experience. There are PAUSES, PLACES OF > REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" movement. They sum up > what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. > > So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which > develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" > > Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is NOT > passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an active > process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having "an" > experience this is an act of "surrender" > Here is Dewey exploring this theme" > > The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves > surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a > controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse > with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of > expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with > other matters, as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the > going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To > steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When > we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of answering > activity, we do not perceive that which bears us down. :We must summon > energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." > > Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching this > energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". > > If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this phenomena of > "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject matter" as > undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is translated as > "tarrying" > > I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into there > cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. > > Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and > "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. > Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only > "dis-ordered will". > > In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using this > older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" > within "lived through experience" > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's > > paper. I found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for the > > old guys. > > mike > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 15 22:33:10 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 05:33:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> Thanks a lot for the links! The ideas you are writing about sound really interesting. I have also thought/written about Dewey, and right now I am finishing a paper on "learning transfer" where we propose a "transactional approach" that builds precisely on the ideas that you mention about receptivity and undergoing as moments of experience. These ideas become particularly challenging to classical notions of transfer because transfer is typically thought of as the bringing of prior knowledge into a new situation, without the surrender, affectivity, and going through that (an) experience in the Deweyan sense implies. Thanks once more, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 16 July 2015 06:12 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Alfredo, Here is another Wikipedia link to "ma" [as space] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) An article by Sheila Ross "The Temporality of Tarrying in Gadamer" in the journal *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 2006, Volume 23 (1): Pages 104-123 is where I encountered this idea. I am personally linking Dewey, Gadamer, and the concept of "ma". I will point out that Gadamer's focus on tarrying is to focus an experience of the "subject matter" through living conversations. My readings on this topic are idiosyncratic but I personally sense/perceive a shared sensibility and "disposition" in these notions of "agentic" receptivity and undergoing phenomena. [which is not passive] I also believe this disposition to perceive the "pregnant pause" in ongoing activity can be "cultivated/grown". Thanks for inviting me to think out loud with you. Larry Your article is moving deeper into the multimodal with bodily gesture but I believe my comments add to the complexity of the "aspects" you are exploring as place-making/meaning. On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Larry, > > when you mentioned the "ma" case today, I immediately thought of Dewey's > "an" experience, because it involves the unity of the different moments > that you described in "ma". I never came along Gadamer, but, after reading > your e-mail, I will definitely have a look. Is there a particular text you > would recommend? > > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry Purss > Sent: 16 July 2015 05:33 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Mike, > > I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience is > focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" > Here is a link to explain this concept: > > https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma.html > > Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: > Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their > succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of INTERVALS, > periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and > preparing" > > Here is another example from the Dewey article: > > "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, > and dead centers when we have an experience. There are PAUSES, PLACES OF > REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" movement. They sum up > what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. > > So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which > develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" > > Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is NOT > passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an active > process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having "an" > experience this is an act of "surrender" > Here is Dewey exploring this theme" > > The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves > surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a > controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse > with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of > expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with > other matters, as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the > going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To > steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When > we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of answering > activity, we do not perceive that which bears us down. :We must summon > energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." > > Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching this > energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". > > If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this phenomena of > "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject matter" as > undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is translated as > "tarrying" > > I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into there > cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. > > Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and > "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. > Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only > "dis-ordered will". > > In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using this > older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" > within "lived through experience" > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's > > paper. I found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for the > > old guys. > > mike > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 22:48:16 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 23:48:16 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> Alfredo, you say: "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? Henry > On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining others. > > I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions become entangled into particular trajectories. > > In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry into design work. > > Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the level of generic social processes, and given a particular cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I had done every previous time coming upon them. > > The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thanks Michael, > > I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. > > But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the notion of ecology to address these issues. > > If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. > > Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your position here better. > > Thanks! > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... > > I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. > > This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. > > I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). > > I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. > > The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. > > What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. > > I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. > > So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. > > An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. > > Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. > > Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). > > Okay, too much I know. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > > I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. > The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. > > This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( > *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* > > There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. > > Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place > potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >> >> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks >> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an >> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the >> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. >> >> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort >> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" >> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence >> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about >> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some >> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as >> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, >> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be >> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, >> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us >> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we >> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. >> >> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and >> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be >> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed >> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. >> >> Hope this helps >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thank you Alfredo, >> >> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for >> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. >> >> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the >> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what >> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in >> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in >> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and >> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the >> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of >> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How >> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? >> >> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the >> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? >> >> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and >> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] >> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM >> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Dear Lubomir, >> >> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been >> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, >> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called >> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a >> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, >> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. >> >> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of >> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly >> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about >> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of >> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing >> Cresswell about >> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". >> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that >> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an >> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, >> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents >> going on in a given situation. >> >> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space >> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being >> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, >> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place >> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not >> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet >> Gil >> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, >> >> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? >> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of >> different ways; it is just mindboggling. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf >> xmca-l-bounces+Steier >> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hello All, >> >> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, >> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. >> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our >> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings >> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely >> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance >> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the >> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work >> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place >> as the participants construct representations and begin to >> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these >> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - >> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. >> >> I'm looking forward to the discussion! >> Rolf >> >> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Mike and all, >>> >>> >>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to >>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try >>> to say a bit about the article. >>> >>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a >>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of >>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we >>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective >>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more >>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together >>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. >>> >>> The design meetings involved many participants from different >>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software >>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance >>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the >>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a >>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one >>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, >>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in >>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space >>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design >>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had >>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve >>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have >>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the >>> figure of Leigh Star begun to >> be relevant. >>> >>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the >>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our >>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of >>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than >>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the >>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform >>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). >>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to >>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a >>> place and finding one's ways >> around it. >>> >>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective >>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun >>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to >>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was >>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, >>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. >>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for >>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward >>> to >> learn a lot from them. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Alfredo >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike >>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> >>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 >>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time >>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of >>> boundary objects. >>> >>> So, to start the discussion. >>> >>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think >>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The >>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming >>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in >>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have >>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an >>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. >>> >>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" >>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two >>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. >>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, >>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the >>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the >> processes involved. >>> >>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS-- >>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>> >>> >>> >> > > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Jul 15 23:05:07 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 00:05:07 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Larry, The clues are all there with regard to "ma". Dewey and ma point us to Mike's paper with Etienne Pelaprat titled "Mind the Gap" - the Dewey link should be obvious in the text, but at the bottom of the wikipedia page you shared about "ma", one finds (strangely!) a link to "Mind the Gap" - not Mike's essay but the phrase to which the essay refers. So, yes indeed, mind the gap! -greg On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 11:33 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot for the links! The ideas you are writing about sound really > interesting. I have also thought/written about Dewey, and right now I am > finishing a paper on "learning transfer" where we propose a "transactional > approach" that builds precisely on the ideas that you mention about > receptivity and undergoing as moments of experience. These ideas become > particularly challenging to classical notions of transfer because transfer > is typically thought of as the bringing of prior knowledge into a new > situation, without the surrender, affectivity, and going through that (an) > experience in the Deweyan sense implies. > > Thanks once more, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry Purss > Sent: 16 July 2015 06:12 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Alfredo, > Here is another Wikipedia link to "ma" [as space] > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) > > An article by Sheila Ross "The Temporality of Tarrying in Gadamer" in the > journal *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 2006, Volume 23 (1): Pages 104-123 is > where I encountered this idea. > > I am personally linking Dewey, Gadamer, and the concept of "ma". I will > point out that Gadamer's focus on tarrying is to focus an experience of > the "subject matter" through living conversations. My readings on this > topic are idiosyncratic but I personally sense/perceive a shared > sensibility and "disposition" in these notions of "agentic" receptivity and > undergoing phenomena. [which is not passive] > I also believe this disposition to perceive the "pregnant pause" in ongoing > activity can be "cultivated/grown". > > Thanks for inviting me to think out loud with you. > Larry > > > > Your article is moving deeper into the multimodal with bodily gesture but I > believe my comments add to the complexity of the "aspects" you are > exploring as place-making/meaning. > > > > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Larry, > > > > when you mentioned the "ma" case today, I immediately thought of Dewey's > > "an" experience, because it involves the unity of the different moments > > that you described in "ma". I never came along Gadamer, but, after > reading > > your e-mail, I will definitely have a look. Is there a particular text > you > > would recommend? > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > Larry Purss > > Sent: 16 July 2015 05:33 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > Mike, > > > > I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience is > > focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" > > Here is a link to explain this concept: > > > > > https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma.html > > > > Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: > > Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. > Their > > succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of INTERVALS, > > periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and > > preparing" > > > > Here is another example from the Dewey article: > > > > "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, > > and dead centers when we have an experience. There are PAUSES, PLACES OF > > REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" movement. They sum > up > > what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. > > > > So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which > > develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" > > > > Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is NOT > > passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an active > > process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having > "an" > > experience this is an act of "surrender" > > Here is Dewey exploring this theme" > > > > The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves > > surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a > > controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse > > with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of > > expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with > > other matters, as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the > > going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To > > steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When > > we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of > answering > > activity, we do not perceive that which bears us down. :We must summon > > energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." > > > > Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching this > > energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". > > > > If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this phenomena > of > > "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject matter" as > > undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is translated as > > "tarrying" > > > > I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into there > > cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. > > > > Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and > > "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. > > Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only > > "dis-ordered will". > > > > In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using this > > older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" > > within "lived through experience" > > > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > > > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's > > > paper. I found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for > the > > > old guys. > > > mike > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 15 23:18:16 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 06:18:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no>, <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very familiar with high-stakes standardized testing (as different to standardized testing in general) or with common core (which I quickly read is an issue in US). But I would say that, if (school) curricula were to be consistent with the view of education as the practice of creating conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge--which is what I was suggesting in the paragraph you copy--curricula would not be so much about standardized contents, but about human sensitivities and relations. So, I would say, no, standardized testing is not in principle in line with what I was trying to say. I was trying to make a distinction between trying to design someone's particular experience, and trying to design conditions for the development of attitudes and orientations. The first is likely impossible. The second seems to make more sense. One may of course wonder whether those attitudes and orientations can be considered general, and then form part of standardize measures instead of the traditional "contents and skills". But measuring assumes some quantitative increment in a particular aspect as the result of learning. Growth and development, however, are about qualitative change. So, as soon as you start measuring you would be missing growth and development. So, again, no. I would not say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with what I was trying to say. I hope I have answered your question, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Alfredo, you say: "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? Henry > On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining others. > > I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions become entangled into particular trajectories. > > In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry into design work. > > Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the level of generic social processes, and given a particular cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I had done every previous time coming upon them. > > The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thanks Michael, > > I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. > > But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the notion of ecology to address these issues. > > If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. > > Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your position here better. > > Thanks! > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... > > I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. > > This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. > > I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). > > I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. > > The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. > > What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. > > I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. > > So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. > > An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. > > Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. > > Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). > > Okay, too much I know. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > > I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. > The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. > > This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( > *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* > > There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. > > Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place > potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >> >> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks >> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an >> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the >> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. >> >> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort >> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" >> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence >> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about >> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some >> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as >> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, >> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be >> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, >> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us >> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we >> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. >> >> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and >> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be >> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed >> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. >> >> Hope this helps >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thank you Alfredo, >> >> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for >> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. >> >> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the >> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what >> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in >> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in >> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and >> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the >> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of >> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How >> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? >> >> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the >> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? >> >> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and >> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] >> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM >> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Dear Lubomir, >> >> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been >> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, >> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called >> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a >> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, >> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. >> >> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of >> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly >> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about >> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of >> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing >> Cresswell about >> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". >> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that >> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an >> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, >> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents >> going on in a given situation. >> >> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space >> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being >> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, >> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place >> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not >> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet >> Gil >> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, >> >> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? >> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of >> different ways; it is just mindboggling. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf >> xmca-l-bounces+Steier >> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hello All, >> >> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, >> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. >> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our >> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings >> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely >> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance >> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the >> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work >> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place >> as the participants construct representations and begin to >> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these >> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - >> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. >> >> I'm looking forward to the discussion! >> Rolf >> >> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Mike and all, >>> >>> >>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to >>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try >>> to say a bit about the article. >>> >>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a >>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of >>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we >>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective >>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more >>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together >>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. >>> >>> The design meetings involved many participants from different >>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software >>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance >>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the >>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a >>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one >>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, >>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in >>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space >>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design >>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had >>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve >>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have >>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the >>> figure of Leigh Star begun to >> be relevant. >>> >>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the >>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our >>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of >>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than >>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the >>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform >>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). >>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to >>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a >>> place and finding one's ways >> around it. >>> >>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective >>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun >>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to >>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was >>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, >>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. >>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for >>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward >>> to >> learn a lot from them. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Alfredo >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike >>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> >>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 >>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time >>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of >>> boundary objects. >>> >>> So, to start the discussion. >>> >>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think >>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The >>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming >>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in >>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have >>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an >>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. >>> >>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" >>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two >>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. >>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, >>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the >>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the >> processes involved. >>> >>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS-- >>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>> >>> >>> >> > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 16 00:50:47 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 00:50:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> Greg, Alfredo, Yes mike's article on minding the gap also offers profound clues to this aspect of experience. The exploration of the gap weaves through multimodal themes and focuses at the micro level of "seeing" the gap. What I appreciated in Dewey's notion of an experience is the way of framing will/doing that is out of balance actually dissipates an experience. Too much doing becomes dis-ordered will. Too much receptivity leads also to loss of an experience. Dewey describes this process of living through experience as "like" breathing. Breath as metaphor has a very extensive history. Yes this challenges classical notions of "transfer" of knowledge but opens a space for cultivating dispositions of actively "taking in" as actively receptive. Creating an experience as animated and vital and lived through. As Dewey says more than just analyzing transactional relationships. Place-making as actually developing an experience. Only afterwards when reflected on can we characterize the experience as emotional, or intellectual, depending on which characteristic is dominant in our reflection retrospectively. In actual fact the experience as lived through is not the experience reflected upon. This seems to be a key distinction. The dominant characteristic in reflection comes to be identified as "the" characteristic of the experience when in actual fact it is merely an aspect of the unity of the experience. Lived through experience and reflective considerations of this lived through experience feature different characteristics. Dewey believed at the end he could not overcome the misunderstanding of what he meant by using the term "experience" The work on place-making is another opportunity to understand experience as lived through INCLUDING both doing and receptivity. -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornet Gil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 10:34 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Thanks a lot for the links! The ideas you are writing about sound really interesting. I have also thought/written about Dewey, and right now I am finishing a paper on "learning transfer" where we propose a "transactional approach" that builds precisely on the ideas that you mention about receptivity and undergoing as moments of experience. These ideas become particularly challenging to classical notions of transfer because transfer is typically thought of as the bringing of prior knowledge into a new situation, without the surrender, affectivity, and going through that (an) experience in the Deweyan sense implies. Thanks once more, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 16 July 2015 06:12 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Alfredo, Here is another Wikipedia link to "ma" [as space] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) An article by Sheila Ross "The Temporality of Tarrying in Gadamer" in the journal *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 2006, Volume 23 (1): Pages 104-123 is where I encountered this idea. I am personally linking Dewey, Gadamer, and the concept of "ma". I will point out that Gadamer's focus on tarrying is to focus an experience of the "subject matter" through living conversations. My readings on this topic are idiosyncratic but I personally sense/perceive a shared sensibility and "disposition" in these notions of "agentic" receptivity and undergoing phenomena. [which is not passive] I also believe this disposition to perceive the "pregnant pause" in ongoing activity can be "cultivated/grown". Thanks for inviting me to think out loud with you. Larry Your article is moving deeper into the multimodal with bodily gesture but I believe my comments add to the complexity of the "aspects" you are exploring as place-making/meaning. On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Larry, > > when you mentioned the "ma" case today, I immediately thought of Dewey's > "an" experience, because it involves the unity of the different moments > that you described in "ma". I never came along Gadamer, but, after reading > your e-mail, I will definitely have a look. Is there a particular text you > would recommend? > > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry Purss > Sent: 16 July 2015 05:33 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Mike, > > I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience is > focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" > Here is a link to explain this concept: > > https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma.html > > Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: > Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their > succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of INTERVALS, > periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and > preparing" > > Here is another example from the Dewey article: > > "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, > and dead centers when we have an experience. There are PAUSES, PLACES OF > REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" movement. They sum up > what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. > > So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which > develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" > > Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is NOT > passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an active > process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having "an" > experience this is an act of "surrender" > Here is Dewey exploring this theme" > > The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves > surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a > controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse > with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of > expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with > other matters, as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the > going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To > steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When > we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of answering > activity, we do not perceive that which bears us down. :We must summon > energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." > > Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching this > energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". > > If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this phenomena of > "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject matter" as > undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is translated as > "tarrying" > > I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into there > cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. > > Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and > "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. > Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only > "dis-ordered will". > > In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using this > older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" > within "lived through experience" > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's > > paper. I found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for the > > old guys. > > mike > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Thu Jul 16 08:19:14 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 15:19:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Larry and all, I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more in his writing). The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there because my activities become stilted and artificial. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of historical experiences. Anyway, my take. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lplarry Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 3:51 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Greg, Alfredo, Yes mike's article on minding the gap also offers profound clues to this aspect of experience. The exploration of the gap weaves through multimodal themes and focuses at the micro level of "seeing" the gap. What I appreciated in Dewey's notion of an experience is the way of framing will/doing that is out of balance actually dissipates an experience. Too much doing becomes dis-ordered will. Too much receptivity leads also to loss of an experience. Dewey describes this process of living through experience as "like" breathing. Breath as metaphor has a very extensive history. Yes this challenges classical notions of "transfer" of knowledge but opens a space for cultivating dispositions of actively "taking in" as actively receptive. Creating an experience as animated and vital and lived through. As Dewey says more than just analyzing transactional relationships. Place-making as actually developing an experience. Only afterwards when reflected on can we characterize the experience as emotional, or intellectual, depending on which characteristic is dominant in our reflection retrospectively. In actual fact the experience as lived through is not the experience reflected upon. This seems to be a key distinction. The dominant characteristic in reflection comes to be identified as "the" characteristic of the experience when in actual fact it is merely an aspect of the unity of the experience. Lived through experience and reflective considerations of this lived through experience feature different characteristics. Dewey believed at the end he could not overcome the misunderstanding of what he meant by using the term "experience" The work on place-making is another opportunity to understand experience as lived through INCLUDING both doing and receptivity. -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornet Gil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 10:34 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Thanks a lot for the links! The ideas you are writing about sound really interesting. I have also thought/written about Dewey, and right now I am finishing a paper on "learning transfer" where we propose a "transactional approach" that builds precisely on the ideas that you mention about receptivity and undergoing as moments of experience. These ideas become particularly challenging to classical notions of transfer because transfer is typically thought of as the bringing of prior knowledge into a new situation, without the surrender, affectivity, and going through that (an) experience in the Deweyan sense implies. Thanks once more, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 16 July 2015 06:12 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Alfredo, Here is another Wikipedia link to "ma" [as space] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) An article by Sheila Ross "The Temporality of Tarrying in Gadamer" in the journal *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 2006, Volume 23 (1): Pages 104-123 is where I encountered this idea. I am personally linking Dewey, Gadamer, and the concept of "ma". I will point out that Gadamer's focus on tarrying is to focus an experience of the "subject matter" through living conversations. My readings on this topic are idiosyncratic but I personally sense/perceive a shared sensibility and "disposition" in these notions of "agentic" receptivity and undergoing phenomena. [which is not passive] I also believe this disposition to perceive the "pregnant pause" in ongoing activity can be "cultivated/grown". Thanks for inviting me to think out loud with you. Larry Your article is moving deeper into the multimodal with bodily gesture but I believe my comments add to the complexity of the "aspects" you are exploring as place-making/meaning. On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Larry, > > when you mentioned the "ma" case today, I immediately thought of > Dewey's "an" experience, because it involves the unity of the > different moments that you described in "ma". I never came along > Gadamer, but, after reading your e-mail, I will definitely have a > look. Is there a particular text you would recommend? > > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry Purss > Sent: 16 July 2015 05:33 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Mike, > > I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience > is focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" > Here is a link to explain this concept: > > https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma. > html > > Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: > Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. > Their succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of > INTERVALS, periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is > inchoate and preparing" > > Here is another example from the Dewey article: > > "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical > junctions, and dead centers when we have an experience. There are > PAUSES, PLACES OF REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" > movement. They sum up what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. > > So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which > develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" > > Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is > NOT passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an > active process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having "an" > experience this is an act of "surrender" > Here is Dewey exploring this theme" > > The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It > involves surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only > through a controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our > intercourse with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if > only of expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from > preoccupation with other matters, as in the case of recognition. > Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive, > not a withholding of energy. To steep ourselves in a subject-matter we > have first to plunge into it. When we are only passive to a scene, it > overwhelms us and, for lack of answering activity, we do not perceive > that which bears us down. :We must summon energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." > > Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching > this energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". > > If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this > phenomena of "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject > matter" as undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is > translated as "tarrying" > > I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into > there cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. > > Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and > "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. > Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only > "dis-ordered will". > > In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using > this older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" > within "lived through experience" > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's paper. I > > found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for the old > > guys. > > mike > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 16 09:04:11 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 02:04:11 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your museum-going, when you had an experience. Was that planned? (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, Michael ... just some number actually) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Larry and all, > > I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more in his writing). > > The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there because my activities become stilted and artificia > l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of historical experiences. > > Anyway, my take. > > Michael > > - From glassman.13@osu.edu Thu Jul 16 09:09:48 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 16:09:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from Yiddish), Man plans, God laughs. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your museum-going, when you had an experience. Was that planned? (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, Michael ... just some number actually) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Larry and all, > > I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more in his writing). > > The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there because my activities become stilted and artificia > l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of historical experiences. > > Anyway, my take. > > Michael > > - From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 16 09:21:04 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 02:21:04 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the paintings..." I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have that experience? RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from Yiddish), > > Man plans, God laughs. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your museum-going, when you had an experience. Was that planned? > (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, Michael ... just some number actually) > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> Hi Larry and all, >> >> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more in his writing). >> >> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there because my activities become stilted and artificia >> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of historical experiences. >> >> Anyway, my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jul 16 09:29:40 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:29:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: No gaps, no time for the essential process of imagination to work its synthetic magic, mike On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 12:50 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Greg, Alfredo, > > Yes mike's article on minding the gap also offers profound clues to this > aspect of experience. The exploration of the gap weaves through multimodal > themes and focuses at the micro level of "seeing" the gap. > > What I appreciated in Dewey's notion of an experience is the way of > framing will/doing that is out of balance actually dissipates an > experience. Too much doing becomes dis-ordered will. > Too much receptivity leads also to loss of an experience. > > Dewey describes this process of living through experience as "like" > breathing. > > Breath as metaphor has a very extensive history. > > Yes this challenges classical notions of "transfer" of knowledge but opens > a space for cultivating dispositions of actively "taking in" as actively > receptive. > > Creating an experience as animated and vital and lived through. As Dewey > says more than just analyzing transactional relationships. Place-making as > actually developing an experience. Only afterwards when reflected on can we > characterize the experience as emotional, or intellectual, depending on > which characteristic is dominant in our reflection retrospectively. > In actual fact the experience as lived through is not the experience > reflected upon. This seems to be a key distinction. > The dominant characteristic in reflection comes to be identified as "the" > characteristic of the experience when in actual fact it is merely an aspect > of the unity of the experience. Lived through experience and reflective > considerations of this lived through experience feature different > characteristics. > Dewey believed at the end he could not overcome the misunderstanding of > what he meant by using the term "experience" > The work on place-making is another opportunity to understand experience > as lived through INCLUDING both doing and receptivity. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Alfredo Jornet Gil" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 10:34 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Thanks a lot for the links! The ideas you are writing about sound really > interesting. I have also thought/written about Dewey, and right now I am > finishing a paper on "learning transfer" where we propose a "transactional > approach" that builds precisely on the ideas that you mention about > receptivity and undergoing as moments of experience. These ideas become > particularly challenging to classical notions of transfer because transfer > is typically thought of as the bringing of prior knowledge into a new > situation, without the surrender, affectivity, and going through that (an) > experience in the Deweyan sense implies. > > Thanks once more, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry Purss > Sent: 16 July 2015 06:12 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Alfredo, > Here is another Wikipedia link to "ma" [as space] > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) > > An article by Sheila Ross "The Temporality of Tarrying in Gadamer" in the > journal *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 2006, Volume 23 (1): Pages 104-123 is > where I encountered this idea. > > I am personally linking Dewey, Gadamer, and the concept of "ma". I will > point out that Gadamer's focus on tarrying is to focus an experience of > the "subject matter" through living conversations. My readings on this > topic are idiosyncratic but I personally sense/perceive a shared > sensibility and "disposition" in these notions of "agentic" receptivity and > undergoing phenomena. [which is not passive] > I also believe this disposition to perceive the "pregnant pause" in ongoing > activity can be "cultivated/grown". > > Thanks for inviting me to think out loud with you. > Larry > > > > Your article is moving deeper into the multimodal with bodily gesture but I > believe my comments add to the complexity of the "aspects" you are > exploring as place-making/meaning. > > > > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Larry, > > > > when you mentioned the "ma" case today, I immediately thought of Dewey's > > "an" experience, because it involves the unity of the different moments > > that you described in "ma". I never came along Gadamer, but, after > reading > > your e-mail, I will definitely have a look. Is there a particular text > you > > would recommend? > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > Larry Purss > > Sent: 16 July 2015 05:33 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > Mike, > > > > I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience is > > focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" > > Here is a link to explain this concept: > > > > > https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma.html > > > > Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: > > Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. > Their > > succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of INTERVALS, > > periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is inchoate and > > preparing" > > > > Here is another example from the Dewey article: > > > > "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, > > and dead centers when we have an experience. There are PAUSES, PLACES OF > > REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" movement. They sum > up > > what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. > > > > So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which > > develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" > > > > Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is NOT > > passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an active > > process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having > "an" > > experience this is an act of "surrender" > > Here is Dewey exploring this theme" > > > > The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves > > surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a > > controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse > > with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of > > expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with > > other matters, as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the > > going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To > > steep ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When > > we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of > answering > > activity, we do not perceive that which bears us down. :We must summon > > energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." > > > > Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching this > > energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". > > > > If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this phenomena > of > > "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject matter" as > > undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is translated as > > "tarrying" > > > > I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into there > > cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. > > > > Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and > > "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. > > Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only > > "dis-ordered will". > > > > In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using this > > older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" > > within "lived through experience" > > > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > > > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's > > > paper. I found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for > the > > > old guys. > > > mike > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From glassman.13@osu.edu Thu Jul 16 09:32:49 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 16:32:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Andy, I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have that experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done so before. But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the paintings..." I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have that experience? RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has > something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from > Yiddish), > > Man plans, God laughs. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your museum-going, when you had an experience. Was that planned? > (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, > Michael ... just some number actually) > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> Hi Larry and all, >> >> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more in his writing). >> >> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there because my activities become stilted and artificia >> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of historical experiences. >> >> Anyway, my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 16 10:48:15 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 10:48:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <55a7ee6e.2721460a.d50e6.7349@mx.google.com> Michael, Your bringing in our bias to emphasize meta-cognition be considered reflection on reflection. I ask because of Dewey's emphasis that reflection on "something" (cognition reflection etc) is not "an" experience. This is after the fact of the "completed" experience. It has different features that come "to be" dominant when in fact the actual experience is an integral phenomenological experience. The actual experience is an undergoing phenomena taking in the subject matter -----Original Message----- From: "Glassman, Michael" Sent: ?2015-?07-?16 8:24 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Hi Larry and all, I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more in his writing). The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there because my activities become stilted and artificial. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of historical experiences. Anyway, my take. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lplarry Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 3:51 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Greg, Alfredo, Yes mike's article on minding the gap also offers profound clues to this aspect of experience. The exploration of the gap weaves through multimodal themes and focuses at the micro level of "seeing" the gap. What I appreciated in Dewey's notion of an experience is the way of framing will/doing that is out of balance actually dissipates an experience. Too much doing becomes dis-ordered will. Too much receptivity leads also to loss of an experience. Dewey describes this process of living through experience as "like" breathing. Breath as metaphor has a very extensive history. Yes this challenges classical notions of "transfer" of knowledge but opens a space for cultivating dispositions of actively "taking in" as actively receptive. Creating an experience as animated and vital and lived through. As Dewey says more than just analyzing transactional relationships. Place-making as actually developing an experience. Only afterwards when reflected on can we characterize the experience as emotional, or intellectual, depending on which characteristic is dominant in our reflection retrospectively. In actual fact the experience as lived through is not the experience reflected upon. This seems to be a key distinction. The dominant characteristic in reflection comes to be identified as "the" characteristic of the experience when in actual fact it is merely an aspect of the unity of the experience. Lived through experience and reflective considerations of this lived through experience feature different characteristics. Dewey believed at the end he could not overcome the misunderstanding of what he meant by using the term "experience" The work on place-making is another opportunity to understand experience as lived through INCLUDING both doing and receptivity. -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornet Gil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?15 10:34 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Thanks a lot for the links! The ideas you are writing about sound really interesting. I have also thought/written about Dewey, and right now I am finishing a paper on "learning transfer" where we propose a "transactional approach" that builds precisely on the ideas that you mention about receptivity and undergoing as moments of experience. These ideas become particularly challenging to classical notions of transfer because transfer is typically thought of as the bringing of prior knowledge into a new situation, without the surrender, affectivity, and going through that (an) experience in the Deweyan sense implies. Thanks once more, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 16 July 2015 06:12 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Alfredo, Here is another Wikipedia link to "ma" [as space] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) An article by Sheila Ross "The Temporality of Tarrying in Gadamer" in the journal *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 2006, Volume 23 (1): Pages 104-123 is where I encountered this idea. I am personally linking Dewey, Gadamer, and the concept of "ma". I will point out that Gadamer's focus on tarrying is to focus an experience of the "subject matter" through living conversations. My readings on this topic are idiosyncratic but I personally sense/perceive a shared sensibility and "disposition" in these notions of "agentic" receptivity and undergoing phenomena. [which is not passive] I also believe this disposition to perceive the "pregnant pause" in ongoing activity can be "cultivated/grown". Thanks for inviting me to think out loud with you. Larry Your article is moving deeper into the multimodal with bodily gesture but I believe my comments add to the complexity of the "aspects" you are exploring as place-making/meaning. On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Larry, > > when you mentioned the "ma" case today, I immediately thought of > Dewey's "an" experience, because it involves the unity of the > different moments that you described in "ma". I never came along > Gadamer, but, after reading your e-mail, I will definitely have a > look. Is there a particular text you would recommend? > > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry Purss > Sent: 16 July 2015 05:33 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Mike, > > I wanted to show how I read Dewey's focusing on having "an" experience > is focusing on the same theme as the Japanese concept of "ma" > Here is a link to explain this concept: > > https://wawaza.com/pages/when-less-is-more-the-concept-of-japanese-ma. > html > > Here is Dewey exploring similar themes: > Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. > Their succession is PUNCTUATED and made a rhythm by the existence of > INTERVALS, periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is > inchoate and preparing" > > Here is another example from the Dewey article: > > "Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical > junctions, and dead centers when we have an experience. There are > PAUSES, PLACES OF REST but they punctuate and define the "quality of" > movement. They sum up what has been UNDERGONE and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. > > So for Dewey the aspect of "an" experience includes "undergoing" which > develops "perception" [which Dewey contrasts with mere "recognition" > > Now I want to highlight that this undergoing is "receptive" which is > NOT passive. I see this as the essence of "ma" To "be" receptive is an > active process of undergoing and consolidation as "intaking" aspect of having "an" > experience this is an act of "surrender" > Here is Dewey exploring this theme" > > The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It > involves surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only > through a controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our > intercourse with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if > only of expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from > preoccupation with other matters, as in the case of recognition. > Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive, > not a withholding of energy. To steep ourselves in a subject-matter we > have first to plunge into it. When we are only passive to a scene, it > overwhelms us and, for lack of answering activity, we do not perceive > that which bears us down. :We must summon energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to *take *in." > > Dewey describes receptive surrender as summoning energy and pitching > this energy at a responsive key IN ORDER TO "take in". > > If others are interested Gadamer shares the centrality of this > phenomena of "taking in" receptively and surrender to "the subject > matter" as undergoing. In German the term is "verweiling" which is > translated as "tarrying" > > I mention Japanese "ma" as this concept is deeply integrated into > there cultural fabric as a valued "disposition" and attitude. > > Dewey is showing that to be manically "making" and "constructing" and > "working" is actually a "dis-order" of will. > Without the pause/interval there is no integral experience but only > "dis-ordered will". > > In other words willing what cannot be willed. I purposely am using > this older term "will" to contrast with the notion of "receptive undergoing" > within "lived through experience" > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 4:57 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Andy suggested I read this a couple of weeks back and it seems quite > > appropriate to the conversation around Alfredo and Rolf's paper. I > > found it thought provoking from the get go. Lets hear it for the old > > guys. > > mike > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Jul 16 10:54:41 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 11:54:41 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <, > <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo, Yes, you have answered my question very nicely! I especially appreciate that you were willing to wrestle with my question, despite your lack of familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. Am I wrong, or are you Catalan? In which case your experience in Catalunya would take you to a different place in critiquing schooling there, though not necessarily unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on boundary objects. I just met for the second day in a row with a friend who is the liaison between our public school district and a children?s science museum called Explora. I feel like I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a mixed metaphor! Henry > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very familiar with high-stakes standardized testing (as different to standardized testing in general) or with common core (which I quickly read is an issue in US). But I would say that, if (school) curricula were to be consistent with the view of education as the practice of creating conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge--which is what I was suggesting in the paragraph you copy--curricula would not be so much about standardized contents, but about human sensitivities and relations. So, I would say, no, standardized testing is not in principle in line with what I was trying to say. > > I was trying to make a distinction between trying to design someone's particular experience, and trying to design conditions for the development of attitudes and orientations. The first is likely impossible. The second seems to make more sense. > > One may of course wonder whether those attitudes and orientations can be considered general, and then form part of standardize measures instead of the traditional "contents and skills". But measuring assumes some quantitative increment in a particular aspect as the result of learning. Growth and development, however, are about qualitative change. So, as soon as you start measuring you would be missing growth and development. So, again, no. I would not say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with what I was trying to say. > > I hope I have answered your question, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, you say: > > "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." > > Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? > > Henry > > > > > > >> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining others. >> >> I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions become entangled into particular trajectories. >> >> In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry into design work. >> >> Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the level of generic social processes, and given a particular cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I had done every previous time coming upon them. >> >> The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thanks Michael, >> >> I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. >> >> But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the notion of ecology to address these issues. >> >> If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. >> >> Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your position here better. >> >> Thanks! >> Alfredo >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... >> >> I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. >> >> This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. >> >> I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). >> >> I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. >> >> The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. >> >> What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. >> >> I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. >> >> So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. >> >> An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. >> >> Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. >> >> Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). >> >> Okay, too much I know. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thank you for your thoughts Larry, >> >> I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. >> The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. >> >> This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( >> *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* >> >> There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. >> >> Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place >> potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! >> >> Rolf >> >> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >> >>> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >>> >>> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks >>> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an >>> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the >>> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. >>> >>> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort >>> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" >>> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence >>> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about >>> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some >>> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as >>> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, >>> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be >>> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, >>> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us >>> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we >>> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. >>> >>> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and >>> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be >>> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed >>> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. >>> >>> Hope this helps >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thank you Alfredo, >>> >>> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for >>> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. >>> >>> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the >>> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what >>> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in >>> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in >>> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and >>> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the >>> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of >>> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How >>> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? >>> >>> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the >>> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? >>> >>> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and >>> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] >>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM >>> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Dear Lubomir, >>> >>> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been >>> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, >>> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called >>> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a >>> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, >>> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. >>> >>> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of >>> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly >>> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about >>> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of >>> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing >>> Cresswell about >>> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". >>> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that >>> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an >>> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, >>> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents >>> going on in a given situation. >>> >>> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space >>> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being >>> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, >>> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place >>> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not >>> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet >>> Gil >>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, >>> >>> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? >>> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of >>> different ways; it is just mindboggling. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf >>> xmca-l-bounces+Steier >>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM >>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >>> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hello All, >>> >>> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, >>> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. >>> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our >>> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings >>> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely >>> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance >>> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the >>> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work >>> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place >>> as the participants construct representations and begin to >>> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these >>> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - >>> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. >>> >>> I'm looking forward to the discussion! >>> Rolf >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Mike and all, >>>> >>>> >>>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to >>>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try >>>> to say a bit about the article. >>>> >>>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a >>>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of >>>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we >>>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective >>>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more >>>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together >>>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. >>>> >>>> The design meetings involved many participants from different >>>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software >>>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance >>>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the >>>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a >>>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one >>>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, >>>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in >>>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space >>>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design >>>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had >>>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve >>>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have >>>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the >>>> figure of Leigh Star begun to >>> be relevant. >>>> >>>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the >>>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our >>>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of >>>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than >>>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the >>>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform >>>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). >>>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to >>>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a >>>> place and finding one's ways >>> around it. >>>> >>>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective >>>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun >>>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to >>>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was >>>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, >>>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. >>>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for >>>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward >>>> to >>> learn a lot from them. >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> Alfredo >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike >>>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 >>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time >>>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of >>>> boundary objects. >>>> >>>> So, to start the discussion. >>>> >>>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think >>>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The >>>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming >>>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in >>>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have >>>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an >>>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. >>>> >>>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" >>>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two >>>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. >>>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, >>>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the >>>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the >>> processes involved. >>>> >>>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS-- >>>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jul 16 11:13:00 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 18:13:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <, > <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> Well, you could say that I am partly Catalan. I grew up in the province of Valencia, where Catalan language is official language together with Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the county) and Catalonia are different regional counties, Catalan is spoken in Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balear Islands. Some call the three together as the Catalan Countries. I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy cultural diversity. Standardized testing, and the whole assumptions behind it, are an issue also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education has been so battered during the last years of right-wing government that I the debate have been more about means and access than about contents and aims. Which in some sense may be good because it moves the debates away from performance. But I have been living outside of Spain for eight years now, so I am not the best to update you on this either. Best wishes, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Alfredo, Yes, you have answered my question very nicely! I especially appreciate that you were willing to wrestle with my question, despite your lack of familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. Am I wrong, or are you Catalan? In which case your experience in Catalunya would take you to a different place in critiquing schooling there, though not necessarily unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on boundary objects. I just met for the second day in a row with a friend who is the liaison between our public school district and a children?s science museum called Explora. I feel like I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a mixed metaphor! Henry > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very familiar with high-stakes standardized testing (as different to standardized testing in general) or with common core (which I quickly read is an issue in US). But I would say that, if (school) curricula were to be consistent with the view of education as the practice of creating conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge--which is what I was suggesting in the paragraph you copy--curricula would not be so much about standardized contents, but about human sensitivities and relations. So, I would say, no, standardized testing is not in principle in line with what I was trying to say. > > I was trying to make a distinction between trying to design someone's particular experience, and trying to design conditions for the development of attitudes and orientations. The first is likely impossible. The second seems to make more sense. > > One may of course wonder whether those attitudes and orientations can be considered general, and then form part of standardize measures instead of the traditional "contents and skills". But measuring assumes some quantitative increment in a particular aspect as the result of learning. Growth and development, however, are about qualitative change. So, as soon as you start measuring you would be missing growth and development. So, again, no. I would not say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with what I was trying to say. > > I hope I have answered your question, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, you say: > > "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." > > Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? > > Henry > > > > > > >> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining others. >> >> I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions become entangled into particular trajectories. >> >> In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry into design work. >> >> Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the level of generic social processes, and given a particular cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I had done every previous time coming upon them. >> >> The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thanks Michael, >> >> I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. >> >> But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the notion of ecology to address these issues. >> >> If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. >> >> Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your position here better. >> >> Thanks! >> Alfredo >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... >> >> I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. >> >> This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. >> >> I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). >> >> I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. >> >> The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. >> >> What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. >> >> I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. >> >> So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. >> >> An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. >> >> Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. >> >> Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). >> >> Okay, too much I know. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thank you for your thoughts Larry, >> >> I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. >> The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. >> >> This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( >> *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* >> >> There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. >> >> Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place >> potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! >> >> Rolf >> >> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >> >>> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >>> >>> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks >>> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an >>> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the >>> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. >>> >>> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort >>> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" >>> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence >>> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about >>> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some >>> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as >>> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, >>> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be >>> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, >>> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us >>> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we >>> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. >>> >>> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and >>> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be >>> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed >>> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. >>> >>> Hope this helps >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thank you Alfredo, >>> >>> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for >>> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. >>> >>> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the >>> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what >>> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in >>> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in >>> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and >>> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the >>> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of >>> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How >>> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? >>> >>> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the >>> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? >>> >>> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and >>> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] >>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM >>> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Dear Lubomir, >>> >>> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been >>> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, >>> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called >>> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a >>> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, >>> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. >>> >>> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of >>> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly >>> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about >>> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of >>> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing >>> Cresswell about >>> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". >>> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that >>> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an >>> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, >>> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents >>> going on in a given situation. >>> >>> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space >>> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being >>> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, >>> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place >>> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not >>> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet >>> Gil >>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, >>> >>> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? >>> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of >>> different ways; it is just mindboggling. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf >>> xmca-l-bounces+Steier >>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM >>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >>> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hello All, >>> >>> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, >>> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. >>> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our >>> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings >>> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely >>> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance >>> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the >>> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work >>> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place >>> as the participants construct representations and begin to >>> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these >>> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - >>> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. >>> >>> I'm looking forward to the discussion! >>> Rolf >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Mike and all, >>>> >>>> >>>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to >>>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try >>>> to say a bit about the article. >>>> >>>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a >>>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of >>>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we >>>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective >>>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more >>>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together >>>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. >>>> >>>> The design meetings involved many participants from different >>>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software >>>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance >>>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the >>>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a >>>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one >>>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, >>>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in >>>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space >>>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design >>>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had >>>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve >>>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have >>>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the >>>> figure of Leigh Star begun to >>> be relevant. >>>> >>>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the >>>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our >>>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of >>>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than >>>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the >>>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform >>>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). >>>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to >>>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a >>>> place and finding one's ways >>> around it. >>>> >>>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective >>>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun >>>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to >>>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was >>>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, >>>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. >>>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for >>>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward >>>> to >>> learn a lot from them. >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> Alfredo >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike >>>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 >>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time >>>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of >>>> boundary objects. >>>> >>>> So, to start the discussion. >>>> >>>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think >>>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The >>>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming >>>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in >>>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have >>>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an >>>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. >>>> >>>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" >>>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two >>>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. >>>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, >>>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the >>>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the >>> processes involved. >>>> >>>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS-- >>>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Jul 16 12:37:03 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 13:37:03 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <, > <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <, > <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> Alfredo, Thank you very much for the sketch of your roots. I taught English in Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in the early 70s, just before Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the plane back to the U.S.) Place and language are interesting, especially where language varieties meet. Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity with the music of Catalunya and Mallorca that the speech communities in each of those places treasure their unique languages (Catalan and Mallorquin), yet see a commonality vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian Spanish, the national language of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel between your work on boundary objects, where individual persons collaborate to create spaces, AND boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of people who live in real spaces. I am thinking, among other things, of indigeneity, a big topic here in New Mexico, with so many Native Americans. Assymetries of power. Bullying. Testing and curriculum become instruments of war by other means. I hope my tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the optimism created by this thread. Yet I think that optimism is so precious because of the ground (the world) of the dialog. Henry > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Well, you could say that I am partly Catalan. I grew up in the province of Valencia, where Catalan language is official language together with Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the county) and Catalonia are different regional counties, Catalan is spoken in Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balear Islands. Some call the three together as the Catalan Countries. I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy cultural diversity. > > Standardized testing, and the whole assumptions behind it, are an issue also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education has been so battered during the last years of right-wing government that I the debate have been more about means and access than about contents and aims. Which in some sense may be good because it moves the debates away from performance. But I have been living outside of Spain for eight years now, so I am not the best to update you on this either. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, > Yes, you have answered my question very nicely! I especially appreciate that you were willing to wrestle with my question, despite your lack of familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. Am I wrong, or are you Catalan? In which case your experience in Catalunya would take you to a different place in critiquing schooling there, though not necessarily unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on boundary objects. I just met for the second day in a row with a friend who is the liaison between our public school district and a children?s science museum called Explora. I feel like I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a mixed metaphor! > Henry > > >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very familiar with high-stakes standardized testing (as different to standardized testing in general) or with common core (which I quickly read is an issue in US). But I would say that, if (school) curricula were to be consistent with the view of education as the practice of creating conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge--which is what I was suggesting in the paragraph you copy--curricula would not be so much about standardized contents, but about human sensitivities and relations. So, I would say, no, standardized testing is not in principle in line with what I was trying to say. >> >> I was trying to make a distinction between trying to design someone's particular experience, and trying to design conditions for the development of attitudes and orientations. The first is likely impossible. The second seems to make more sense. >> >> One may of course wonder whether those attitudes and orientations can be considered general, and then form part of standardize measures instead of the traditional "contents and skills". But measuring assumes some quantitative increment in a particular aspect as the result of learning. Growth and development, however, are about qualitative change. So, as soon as you start measuring you would be missing growth and development. So, again, no. I would not say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with what I was trying to say. >> >> I hope I have answered your question, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, you say: >> >> "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." >> >> Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>> >>> Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining others. >>> >>> I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions become entangled into particular trajectories. >>> >>> In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry into design work. >>> >>> Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the level of generic social processes, and given a particular cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I had done every previous time coming upon them. >>> >>> The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thanks Michael, >>> >>> I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. >>> >>> But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the notion of ecology to address these issues. >>> >>> If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. >>> >>> Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your position here better. >>> >>> Thanks! >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... >>> >>> I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. >>> >>> This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no assumption about trajectory. >>> >>> I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). >>> >>> I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is important, but limited. >>> >>> The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are saying Alfredo. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. >>> >>> What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. >>> >>> I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not direct, but mediated. >>> >>> So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, but not about how to interpret something, but about going about interpreting. I think. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a potential trails for others. >>> >>> An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. >>> >>> Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. >>> >>> Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of food). >>> >>> Okay, too much I know. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf Steier >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM >>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thank you for your thoughts Larry, >>> >>> I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. >>> The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table to be able to share his vision for the gallery. >>> >>> This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( >>> *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are designing breakfast."* >>> >>> There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task of imagining the future exhibition. >>> >>> Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place >>> potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! >>> >>> Rolf >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >>>> >>>> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks >>>> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an >>>> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the >>>> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. >>>> >>>> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort >>>> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part of "an" >>>> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence >>>> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about >>>> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some >>>> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as >>>> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, >>>> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be >>>> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, >>>> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us >>>> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we >>>> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations versus actions. >>>> >>>> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and >>>> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be >>>> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed >>>> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. >>>> >>>> Hope this helps >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Thank you Alfredo, >>>> >>>> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for >>>> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. >>>> >>>> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the >>>> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what >>>> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in >>>> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in >>>> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and >>>> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the >>>> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of >>>> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How >>>> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? >>>> >>>> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the >>>> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? >>>> >>>> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and >>>> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Lubomir >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM >>>> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Dear Lubomir, >>>> >>>> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been >>>> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, >>>> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called >>>> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a >>>> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, >>>> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand it. >>>> >>>> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of >>>> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly >>>> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about >>>> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of >>>> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing >>>> Cresswell about >>>> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". >>>> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that >>>> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an >>>> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, >>>> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents >>>> going on in a given situation. >>>> >>>> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space >>>> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being >>>> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, >>>> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place >>>> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not >>>> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 >>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo Jornet >>>> Gil >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, >>>> >>>> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? >>>> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of >>>> different ways; it is just mindboggling. >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> Lubomir >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf >>>> xmca-l-bounces+Steier >>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM >>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >>>> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Hello All, >>>> >>>> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, >>>> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. >>>> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our >>>> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings >>>> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely >>>> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance >>>> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the >>>> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work >>>> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place >>>> as the participants construct representations and begin to >>>> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these >>>> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - >>>> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. >>>> >>>> I'm looking forward to the discussion! >>>> Rolf >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Mike and all, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to >>>>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try >>>>> to say a bit about the article. >>>>> >>>>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a >>>>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of >>>>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we >>>>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective >>>>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more >>>>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together >>>>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. >>>>> >>>>> The design meetings involved many participants from different >>>>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software >>>>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance >>>>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the >>>>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a >>>>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one >>>>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, >>>>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in >>>>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space >>>>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design >>>>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had >>>>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve >>>>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have >>>>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the >>>>> figure of Leigh Star begun to >>>> be relevant. >>>>> >>>>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the >>>>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our >>>>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of >>>>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than >>>>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the >>>>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform >>>>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). >>>>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to >>>>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a >>>>> place and finding one's ways >>>> around it. >>>>> >>>>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective >>>>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun >>>>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to >>>>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was >>>>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, >>>>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different frameworks. >>>>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for >>>>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward >>>>> to >>>> learn a lot from them. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike >>>>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 >>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time >>>>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of >>>>> boundary objects. >>>>> >>>>> So, to start the discussion. >>>>> >>>>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think >>>>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The >>>>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming >>>>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in >>>>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have >>>>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an >>>>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary object. >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of imagination" >>>>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two >>>>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create them. >>>>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, >>>>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the >>>>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the >>>> processes involved. >>>>> >>>>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> PS-- >>>>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From rolfsteier@gmail.com Thu Jul 16 15:45:45 2015 From: rolfsteier@gmail.com (Rolf Steier) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 00:45:45 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> Message-ID: Are we allowed to ask questions about our paper as well? I hope so! For a little context -in our paper, we identified particular kinds of episodes in which participants from different disciplines seek coherence and continuity of shared representations through bodily action. These actions include gesture, movement and physical performance linking the present material artifacts to objects of design. Most of these episodes seem to involve some form of improvisation, resourcefulness or creativity, and I'm not fully sure how to characterize these aspects of the interactions. In most cases, the participants seem to be searching for the best words or material representation to convey a particular intention - when this becomes problematic or limiting - they almost fall back on what is available - these improvised bodily performances - as a way of maintaining continuity, and of inviting co-participants into a shared and imagined space. These bodily actions don't seem to begin the proposals, but are in a sense *discovered* by the participants. I think there is something really fascinating about this kind of creativity and resourcefulness in interaction that could be explored more deeply - and that I'm having trouble articulating. Maybe some of you have some thoughts on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked about this a bit before so maybe you can add a little clarity to my question. On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Alfredo, > Thank you very much for the sketch of your roots. I taught English in > Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in the early 70s, just before > Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the plane back to the U.S.) Place > and language are interesting, especially where language varieties meet. > Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity with the music of Catalunya > and Mallorca that the speech communities in each of those places treasure > their unique languages (Catalan and Mallorquin), yet see a commonality > vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian Spanish, the national language > of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel between your work on boundary > objects, where individual persons collaborate to create spaces, AND > boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of people who live in real spaces. > I am thinking, among other things, of indigeneity, a big topic here in New > Mexico, with so many Native Americans. Assymetries of power. Bullying. > Testing and curriculum become instruments of war by other means. I hope my > tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the optimism created by this > thread. Yet I think that optimism is so precious because of the ground (the > world) of the dialog. > Henry > > > > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > > Well, you could say that I am partly Catalan. I grew up in the province > of Valencia, where Catalan language is official language together with > Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the county) and Catalonia are > different regional counties, Catalan is spoken in Catalonia, Valencia, and > the Balear Islands. Some call the three together as the Catalan Countries. > I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy cultural diversity. > > > > Standardized testing, and the whole assumptions behind it, are an issue > also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education has been so battered during > the last years of right-wing government that I the debate have been more > about means and access than about contents and aims. Which in some sense > may be good because it moves the debates away from performance. But I have > been living outside of Spain for eight years now, so I am not the best to > update you on this either. > > > > Best wishes, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > > Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Alfredo, > > Yes, you have answered my question very nicely! I especially appreciate > that you were willing to wrestle with my question, despite your lack of > familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. Am I wrong, or are you > Catalan? In which case your experience in Catalunya would take you to a > different place in critiquing schooling there, though not necessarily > unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on boundary objects. I just met for > the second day in a row with a friend who is the liaison between our public > school district and a children?s science museum called Explora. I feel like > I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a mixed metaphor! > > Henry > > > > > >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> > >> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very familiar with high-stakes > standardized testing (as different to standardized testing in general) or > with common core (which I quickly read is an issue in US). But I would say > that, if (school) curricula were to be consistent with the view of > education as the practice of creating conditions for certain attitudes and > dispositions to emerge--which is what I was suggesting in the paragraph you > copy--curricula would not be so much about standardized contents, but about > human sensitivities and relations. So, I would say, no, standardized > testing is not in principle in line with what I was trying to say. > >> > >> I was trying to make a distinction between trying to design someone's > particular experience, and trying to design conditions for the development > of attitudes and orientations. The first is likely impossible. The second > seems to make more sense. > >> > >> One may of course wonder whether those attitudes and orientations can > be considered general, and then form part of standardize measures instead > of the traditional "contents and skills". But measuring assumes some > quantitative increment in a particular aspect as the result of learning. > Growth and development, however, are about qualitative change. So, as soon > as you start measuring you would be missing growth and development. So, > again, no. I would not say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line > with what I was trying to say. > >> > >> I hope I have answered your question, > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > >> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >> > >> Alfredo, you say: > >> > >> "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular > situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot > intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the > students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the > conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." > >> > >> Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with > your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? > >> > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >>> > >>> Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that > designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I > see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things > done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for > place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of > what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial > features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining > others. > >>> > >>> I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction > problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is > experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct > way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and > negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual > and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and > constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder > whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," > might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions > become entangled into particular trajectories. > >>> > >>> In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study > indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus > prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry > into design work. > >>> > >>> Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here > has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be > expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the > level of generic social processes, and given a particular > cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some > generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more > or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at > determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about > EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the > content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to > create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. > >>> > >>> Alfredo > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> Hi Alfredo, > >>> > >>> I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences > between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the > designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a > long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I > remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, > I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The > lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in > many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there > was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings > were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on > three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints > - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was > impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one > time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social > interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson > Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers > would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that > canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had > only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I > had done every previous time coming upon them. > >>> > >>> The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the > nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my > abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be > designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to > happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was > also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his > water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was > large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went > somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an > obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water > lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of > the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was > actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer > anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the > lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the > perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo > Jornet Gil > >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> Thanks Michael, > >>> > >>> I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or > less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used > the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves > the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the > case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the > energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within > which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in > that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend > the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were > connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum > of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his > inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. > >>> > >>> But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they > relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the > notion of ecology to address these issues. > >>> > >>> If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), > you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions > and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? > That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design > for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a > similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on > general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular > (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to > consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. > >>> > >>> Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can > design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one > presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual > experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how > the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the > same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for > cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as > asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, > texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an > affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are > within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the > road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that > carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its > environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the > possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long > enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your > position here better. > >>> > >>> Thanks! > >>> Alfredo > >>> > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> Hi Alfredo, > >>> > >>> I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson > along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears > conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you > have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... > >>> > >>> I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more > physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the > pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I > think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger > feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as > MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a > system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. > >>> > >>> This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed > into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are > taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to > cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also > likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an > attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in > terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some > way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are > taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will > take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the > larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no > assumption about trajectory. > >>> > >>> I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an > interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain > things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want > light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are > more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is > very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that > even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking > about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of > transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create > a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. > But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on > needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these > discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his > life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). > >>> > >>> I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but > about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are > constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction > has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the > mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the > individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is > important, but limited. > >>> > >>> The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it > seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's > and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. > But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think > Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are > saying Alfredo. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM > >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not > affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed > by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether > museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. > >>> > >>> What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the > Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being > somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be > INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those > who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee > what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. > >>> > >>> I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue > with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical > relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson > noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not > the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed > that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) > transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we > can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take > based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In > living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a > pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of > the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, > at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a > different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of > mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not > direct, but mediated. > >>> > >>> So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and > Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and > we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and > that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social > relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster > social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, > without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, > but not about how to interpret something, but about going about > interpreting. I think. > >>> > >>> Best wishes, > >>> Alfredo > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning > to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, > especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not > understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both > as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in > the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived > affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has > potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment > (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning > those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the > historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with > the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, > but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs > of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization > and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this > point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own > meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a > potential trails for others. > >>> > >>> An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I > used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large > part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the > Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to > me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and > unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same > paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch > - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear > to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have > planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the > museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might > have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization > perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture > also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that > included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. > >>> > >>> Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as > perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived > affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my > need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a > general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, > to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to > eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at > that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the > article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for > perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this > because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. > The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as > recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen > many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the > Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a > museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. > >>> > >>> Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan > Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I > spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so > that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain > your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of > art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here > as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain > types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of > food). > >>> > >>> Okay, too much I know. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Rolf Steier > >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > >>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > >>> > >>> I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I > think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared > meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star > might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the > task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from > our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the > researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. > >>> The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing > gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The > curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table > to be able to share his vision for the gallery. > >>> > >>> This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( > >>> *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the > facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches > the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the > ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down > to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling > into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are > designing breakfast."* > >>> > >>> There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative > orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of > sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the > workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way > that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. > That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for > their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the > exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches > and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task > of imagining the future exhibition. > >>> > >>> Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or > the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is > difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the > place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and > meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place > >>> potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm > only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > >>> > >>> Rolf > >>> > >>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > >>>> > >>>> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > >>>> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > >>>> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > >>>> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > >>>> > >>>> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > >>>> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part > of "an" > >>>> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > >>>> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > >>>> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > >>>> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > >>>> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > >>>> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > >>>> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > >>>> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > >>>> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > >>>> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations > versus actions. > >>>> > >>>> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > >>>> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > >>>> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > >>>> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > >>>> > >>>> Hope this helps > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov > >>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > >>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>> > >>>> Thank you Alfredo, > >>>> > >>>> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > >>>> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > >>>> > >>>> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > >>>> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > >>>> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > >>>> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > >>>> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > >>>> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > >>>> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > >>>> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > >>>> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > >>>> > >>>> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > >>>> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > >>>> > >>>> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > >>>> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > >>>> > >>>> Best wishes, > >>>> > >>>> Lubomir > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > >>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > >>>> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>> > >>>> Dear Lubomir, > >>>> > >>>> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > >>>> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > >>>> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > >>>> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > >>>> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > >>>> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand > it. > >>>> > >>>> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > >>>> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > >>>> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > >>>> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > >>>> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > >>>> Cresswell about > >>>> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > >>>> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > >>>> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > >>>> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > >>>> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > >>>> going on in a given situation. > >>>> > >>>> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > >>>> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > >>>> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > >>>> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > >>>> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > >>>> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a > perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > >>>> > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov > >>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > >>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo > Jornet > >>>> Gil > >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>> > >>>> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > >>>> > >>>> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > >>>> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > >>>> different ways; it is just mindboggling. > >>>> > >>>> Thanks, > >>>> > >>>> Lubomir > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > >>>> xmca-l-bounces+Steier > >>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > >>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > >>>> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>> > >>>> Hello All, > >>>> > >>>> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > >>>> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > >>>> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > >>>> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > >>>> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > >>>> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > >>>> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > >>>> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > >>>> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > >>>> as the participants construct representations and begin to > >>>> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > >>>> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > >>>> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > >>>> > >>>> I'm looking forward to the discussion! > >>>> Rolf > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Mike and all, > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > >>>>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > >>>>> to say a bit about the article. > >>>>> > >>>>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > >>>>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > >>>>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > >>>>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > >>>>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > >>>>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > >>>>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > >>>>> > >>>>> The design meetings involved many participants from different > >>>>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > >>>>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > >>>>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > >>>>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > >>>>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > >>>>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > >>>>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > >>>>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > >>>>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > >>>>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > >>>>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > >>>>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > >>>>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > >>>>> figure of Leigh Star begun to > >>>> be relevant. > >>>>> > >>>>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > >>>>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > >>>>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > >>>>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > >>>>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > >>>>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > >>>>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > >>>>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > >>>>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > >>>>> place and finding one's ways > >>>> around it. > >>>>> > >>>>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > >>>>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > >>>>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > >>>>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > >>>>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > >>>>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different > frameworks. > >>>>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > >>>>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > >>>>> to > >>>> learn a lot from them. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks, > >>>>> Alfredo > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > >>>>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > >>>>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > >>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>>> > >>>>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > >>>>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > >>>>> boundary objects. > >>>>> > >>>>> So, to start the discussion. > >>>>> > >>>>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > >>>>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > >>>>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > >>>>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > >>>>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > >>>>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > >>>>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary > object. > >>>>> > >>>>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of > imagination" > >>>>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > >>>>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create > them. > >>>>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > >>>>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > >>>>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > >>>> processes involved. > >>>>> > >>>>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > >>>>> > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> PS-- > >>>>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> > >>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > >>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > >>>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 16 20:22:56 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 13:22:56 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no>, <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he is raising here is the completeness of an experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and this cannot be created by assembling together parts in the way a modern building is planned. An experience - the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an original or prior unity, not a combination, and this is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, something which can only be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an experience. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Andy, > > I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have that experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done so before. > > But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the paintings..." > > I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have that experience? > RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from >> Yiddish), >> >> Man plans, God laughs. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your museum-going, when you had an experience. Was that planned? >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, >> Michael ... just some number actually) >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> Hi Larry and all, >>> >>> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more in his writing). >>> >>> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there because my activities become stilted and artificia >>> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of historical experiences. >>> >>> Anyway, my take. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> - From bferholt@gmail.com Thu Jul 16 22:00:08 2015 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 01:00:08 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> Message-ID: Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on a small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. Beth On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing this question you > raised about Dewey's saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval > buildings arises from their not being "planned" like buildings are > nowadays. He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan of, and > pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he is raising here is the > completeness of an experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > this cannot be created by assembling together parts in the way a modern > building is planned. An experience - the kind of thing which sticks in your > mind - is an original or prior unity, not a combination, and this is what > gives a work of art that ineffable quality, something which can only be > transmitted by reproducing that whole of an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have that >> experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long time ago, >> but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an indiscriminate >> activity, probably, I had done so before. >> >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy >> Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the paintings..." >> >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have that >> experience? >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things >> indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has >>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from >>> Yiddish), >>> >>> Man plans, God laughs. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your museum-going, >>> when you had an experience. Was that planned? >>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, >>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>> >>>> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what >>>> does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have >>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed >>>> (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him >>>> raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and >>>> Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as >>>> Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how >>>> art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more >>>> in his writing). >>>> >>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the >>>> dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate >>>> what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of >>>> meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from >>>> Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing >>>> against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered >>>> activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring >>>> in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't >>>> want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is >>>> perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I >>>> can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his >>>> paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was >>>> the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there >>>> because my activities become stilted and artificia >>>> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at >>>> pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random >>>> threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was >>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to >>>> enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. >>>> I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not >>>> just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that >>>> experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of >>>> historical experiences. >>>> >>>> Anyway, my take. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> - >>>> >>> > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jul 16 22:39:54 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 05:39:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436895499567.2089@iped.uio.no> <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com>, Message-ID: <1437111592555.66605@iped.uio.no> Rolf, I think that what you are rising is a question about creativity, which we, focusing on boundary objects and cooperation, might not have directly addressed in the paper. To me, one of the most fascinating aspects of what you are saying is precisely that those gestures, movements, and physical performances that you mention are, as you say, both produced and *discovered* by the designers. There is intention, but also improvisation. So, how can I *do* something that I don't yet know? How can I conceive what I have never thought about before? And, how can I go about designing for this not-yet-known thing along with others that do not think/know as I do? We begin our paper with a quotation about experience: ?To experience, to undergo, is to be certain. To hear of someone else?s experience is to be uncertain.? I think that experience has been a recurrent topic in this xmca discussion, and has become clearer and clearer that Dewey's notion of *an* experience addresses much of what we are asking about: those gestures, movements, and physical performances have (or rather achieve) both intentional and receptive import precisely because they are moments of one single experience that, in its unfolding, unites what otherwise may had been random, inchoate gestures, movements, and performances. When people have gone through an experience, and only after the fact, can reflect upon what they have just done/gone through and thus keep on building on, in a process of place-making, or of form-making (of per-forming?). I think that in our paper we accomplish a little of this project of specifying the relation between doing and undergoing in interdisciplinary design work, and how, by being able to refer back to a history of shared performances (rather than to prior knowledge or shared concepts), goes on despite lack of substantive agreement. But we have not yet asked the questions in terms of creativity, which is what I think you are suggesting now. Only few days ago I begun reading Mike Cole's recent work about imagination and creativity and, although only having had a quick look, I see an issue that they bring forth that may be of help here. They distinguish between Imagination and Creativity, which are related, but point to different aspects of the individual/collective relation: whereas imagination is about individual development, creativity is about cultural change. I haven't read it carefully enough (I hope Mike can help here), but I think there is something about cultural change that we are leaving unaddressed, or rather remains tacit in our paper, and which may shed light beyond the issue of experience. So, I will try another question: What else (if anything) is there to experience that does not come in/from experience? And how does that relate to human design/artistry/innovation? In our paper we suggest that there is a mutual constitution between material configurations and bodily orientations and dispositions; and that materials become infrastructure because of a history of such orientations and dispositions that become a sort of habit. But, is that all? When I read about cultural-historical literature, and find such notions such as object of activity, or projects, I always wonder how something that is not yet in the participants' experience nonetheless is assumed to be part of the explanation of how and why people is doing what they are doing. Does this have relation with the distinction between imagination and creativity? More questions, rather than answers, are also welcome! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Rolf Steier Sent: 17 July 2015 00:45 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Are we allowed to ask questions about our paper as well? I hope so! For a little context -in our paper, we identified particular kinds of episodes in which participants from different disciplines seek coherence and continuity of shared representations through bodily action. These actions include gesture, movement and physical performance linking the present material artifacts to objects of design. Most of these episodes seem to involve some form of improvisation, resourcefulness or creativity, and I'm not fully sure how to characterize these aspects of the interactions. In most cases, the participants seem to be searching for the best words or material representation to convey a particular intention - when this becomes problematic or limiting - they almost fall back on what is available - these improvised bodily performances - as a way of maintaining continuity, and of inviting co-participants into a shared and imagined space. These bodily actions don't seem to begin the proposals, but are in a sense *discovered* by the participants. I think there is something really fascinating about this kind of creativity and resourcefulness in interaction that could be explored more deeply - and that I'm having trouble articulating. Maybe some of you have some thoughts on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked about this a bit before so maybe you can add a little clarity to my question. On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Alfredo, > Thank you very much for the sketch of your roots. I taught English in > Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in the early 70s, just before > Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the plane back to the U.S.) Place > and language are interesting, especially where language varieties meet. > Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity with the music of Catalunya > and Mallorca that the speech communities in each of those places treasure > their unique languages (Catalan and Mallorquin), yet see a commonality > vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian Spanish, the national language > of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel between your work on boundary > objects, where individual persons collaborate to create spaces, AND > boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of people who live in real spaces. > I am thinking, among other things, of indigeneity, a big topic here in New > Mexico, with so many Native Americans. Assymetries of power. Bullying. > Testing and curriculum become instruments of war by other means. I hope my > tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the optimism created by this > thread. Yet I think that optimism is so precious because of the ground (the > world) of the dialog. > Henry > > > > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > > Well, you could say that I am partly Catalan. I grew up in the province > of Valencia, where Catalan language is official language together with > Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the county) and Catalonia are > different regional counties, Catalan is spoken in Catalonia, Valencia, and > the Balear Islands. Some call the three together as the Catalan Countries. > I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy cultural diversity. > > > > Standardized testing, and the whole assumptions behind it, are an issue > also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education has been so battered during > the last years of right-wing government that I the debate have been more > about means and access than about contents and aims. Which in some sense > may be good because it moves the debates away from performance. But I have > been living outside of Spain for eight years now, so I am not the best to > update you on this either. > > > > Best wishes, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > > Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Alfredo, > > Yes, you have answered my question very nicely! I especially appreciate > that you were willing to wrestle with my question, despite your lack of > familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. Am I wrong, or are you > Catalan? In which case your experience in Catalunya would take you to a > different place in critiquing schooling there, though not necessarily > unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on boundary objects. I just met for > the second day in a row with a friend who is the liaison between our public > school district and a children?s science museum called Explora. I feel like > I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a mixed metaphor! > > Henry > > > > > >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> > >> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very familiar with high-stakes > standardized testing (as different to standardized testing in general) or > with common core (which I quickly read is an issue in US). But I would say > that, if (school) curricula were to be consistent with the view of > education as the practice of creating conditions for certain attitudes and > dispositions to emerge--which is what I was suggesting in the paragraph you > copy--curricula would not be so much about standardized contents, but about > human sensitivities and relations. So, I would say, no, standardized > testing is not in principle in line with what I was trying to say. > >> > >> I was trying to make a distinction between trying to design someone's > particular experience, and trying to design conditions for the development > of attitudes and orientations. The first is likely impossible. The second > seems to make more sense. > >> > >> One may of course wonder whether those attitudes and orientations can > be considered general, and then form part of standardize measures instead > of the traditional "contents and skills". But measuring assumes some > quantitative increment in a particular aspect as the result of learning. > Growth and development, however, are about qualitative change. So, as soon > as you start measuring you would be missing growth and development. So, > again, no. I would not say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line > with what I was trying to say. > >> > >> I hope I have answered your question, > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > >> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >> > >> Alfredo, you say: > >> > >> "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular > situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot > intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the > students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the > conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." > >> > >> Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with > your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? > >> > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >>> > >>> Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that > designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I > see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things > done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for > place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of > what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial > features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining > others. > >>> > >>> I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction > problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is > experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct > way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and > negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual > and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and > constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder > whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," > might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions > become entangled into particular trajectories. > >>> > >>> In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study > indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus > prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry > into design work. > >>> > >>> Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here > has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be > expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the > level of generic social processes, and given a particular > cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some > generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more > or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at > determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about > EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the > content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to > create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. > >>> > >>> Alfredo > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> Hi Alfredo, > >>> > >>> I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences > between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the > designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a > long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I > remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, > I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The > lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in > many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there > was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings > were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on > three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints > - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was > impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one > time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social > interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson > Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers > would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that > canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had > only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I > had done every previous time coming upon them. > >>> > >>> The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the > nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my > abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be > designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to > happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was > also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his > water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was > large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went > somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an > obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water > lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of > the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was > actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer > anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the > lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the > perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo > Jornet Gil > >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> Thanks Michael, > >>> > >>> I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or > less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used > the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves > the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the > case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the > energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within > which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in > that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend > the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were > connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum > of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his > inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. > >>> > >>> But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they > relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the > notion of ecology to address these issues. > >>> > >>> If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), > you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions > and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? > That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design > for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a > similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on > general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular > (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to > consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. > >>> > >>> Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can > design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one > presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual > experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how > the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the > same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for > cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as > asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, > texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an > affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are > within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the > road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that > carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its > environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the > possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long > enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your > position here better. > >>> > >>> Thanks! > >>> Alfredo > >>> > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> Hi Alfredo, > >>> > >>> I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson > along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears > conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you > have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... > >>> > >>> I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more > physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the > pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I > think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger > feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as > MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a > system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. > >>> > >>> This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed > into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are > taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to > cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also > likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an > attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in > terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some > way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are > taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will > take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the > larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no > assumption about trajectory. > >>> > >>> I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an > interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain > things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want > light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are > more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is > very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that > even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking > about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of > transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create > a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. > But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on > needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these > discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his > life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). > >>> > >>> I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but > about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are > constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction > has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the > mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the > individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is > important, but limited. > >>> > >>> The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it > seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's > and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. > But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think > Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are > saying Alfredo. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM > >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not > affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed > by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether > museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. > >>> > >>> What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the > Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being > somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be > INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those > who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee > what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. > >>> > >>> I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue > with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical > relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson > noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not > the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed > that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) > transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we > can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take > based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In > living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a > pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of > the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, > at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a > different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of > mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not > direct, but mediated. > >>> > >>> So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and > Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and > we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and > that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social > relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster > social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, > without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, > but not about how to interpret something, but about going about > interpreting. I think. > >>> > >>> Best wishes, > >>> Alfredo > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning > to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, > especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not > understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both > as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in > the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived > affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has > potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment > (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning > those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the > historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with > the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, > but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs > of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization > and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this > point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own > meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a > potential trails for others. > >>> > >>> An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I > used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large > part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the > Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to > me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and > unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same > paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch > - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear > to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have > planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the > museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might > have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization > perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture > also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that > included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. > >>> > >>> Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as > perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived > affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my > need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a > general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, > to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to > eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at > that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the > article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for > perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this > because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. > The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as > recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen > many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the > Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a > museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. > >>> > >>> Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan > Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I > spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so > that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain > your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of > art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here > as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain > types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of > food). > >>> > >>> Okay, too much I know. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Rolf Steier > >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > >>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>> > >>> Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > >>> > >>> I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I > think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared > meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star > might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the > task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from > our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the > researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. > >>> The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing > gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The > curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table > to be able to share his vision for the gallery. > >>> > >>> This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( > >>> *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the > facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches > the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the > ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down > to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling > into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are > designing breakfast."* > >>> > >>> There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative > orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of > sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the > workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way > that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. > That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for > their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the > exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches > and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task > of imagining the future exhibition. > >>> > >>> Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or > the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is > difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the > place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and > meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place > >>> potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm > only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! > >>> > >>> Rolf > >>> > >>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > >>>> > >>>> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks > >>>> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an > >>>> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the > >>>> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. > >>>> > >>>> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort > >>>> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part > of "an" > >>>> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence > >>>> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about > >>>> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some > >>>> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as > >>>> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, > >>>> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be > >>>> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, > >>>> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us > >>>> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we > >>>> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations > versus actions. > >>>> > >>>> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and > >>>> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be > >>>> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed > >>>> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. > >>>> > >>>> Hope this helps > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov > >>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > >>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>> > >>>> Thank you Alfredo, > >>>> > >>>> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for > >>>> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. > >>>> > >>>> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the > >>>> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what > >>>> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in > >>>> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in > >>>> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and > >>>> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the > >>>> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of > >>>> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How > >>>> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? > >>>> > >>>> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the > >>>> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? > >>>> > >>>> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and > >>>> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. > >>>> > >>>> Best wishes, > >>>> > >>>> Lubomir > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] > >>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM > >>>> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>> > >>>> Dear Lubomir, > >>>> > >>>> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been > >>>> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, > >>>> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called > >>>> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a > >>>> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, > >>>> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand > it. > >>>> > >>>> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of > >>>> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly > >>>> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about > >>>> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of > >>>> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing > >>>> Cresswell about > >>>> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". > >>>> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that > >>>> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an > >>>> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, > >>>> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents > >>>> going on in a given situation. > >>>> > >>>> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space > >>>> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being > >>>> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, > >>>> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place > >>>> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not > >>>> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a > perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > >>>> > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov > >>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > >>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo > Jornet > >>>> Gil > >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>> > >>>> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > >>>> > >>>> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? > >>>> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of > >>>> different ways; it is just mindboggling. > >>>> > >>>> Thanks, > >>>> > >>>> Lubomir > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf > >>>> xmca-l-bounces+Steier > >>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM > >>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; > >>>> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>> > >>>> Hello All, > >>>> > >>>> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, > >>>> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. > >>>> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our > >>>> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings > >>>> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely > >>>> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance > >>>> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the > >>>> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work > >>>> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place > >>>> as the participants construct representations and begin to > >>>> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these > >>>> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - > >>>> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. > >>>> > >>>> I'm looking forward to the discussion! > >>>> Rolf > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > >>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Mike and all, > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to > >>>>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try > >>>>> to say a bit about the article. > >>>>> > >>>>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a > >>>>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of > >>>>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we > >>>>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective > >>>>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more > >>>>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together > >>>>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. > >>>>> > >>>>> The design meetings involved many participants from different > >>>>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software > >>>>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance > >>>>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the > >>>>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a > >>>>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one > >>>>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, > >>>>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in > >>>>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space > >>>>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design > >>>>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had > >>>>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve > >>>>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have > >>>>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the > >>>>> figure of Leigh Star begun to > >>>> be relevant. > >>>>> > >>>>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the > >>>>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our > >>>>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of > >>>>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than > >>>>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the > >>>>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform > >>>>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). > >>>>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to > >>>>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a > >>>>> place and finding one's ways > >>>> around it. > >>>>> > >>>>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective > >>>>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun > >>>>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to > >>>>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was > >>>>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, > >>>>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different > frameworks. > >>>>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for > >>>>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward > >>>>> to > >>>> learn a lot from them. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks, > >>>>> Alfredo > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike > >>>>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> > >>>>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > >>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects > >>>>> > >>>>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time > >>>>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of > >>>>> boundary objects. > >>>>> > >>>>> So, to start the discussion. > >>>>> > >>>>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think > >>>>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The > >>>>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming > >>>>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in > >>>>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have > >>>>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an > >>>>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary > object. > >>>>> > >>>>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of > imagination" > >>>>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two > >>>>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create > them. > >>>>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, > >>>>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the > >>>>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the > >>>> processes involved. > >>>>> > >>>>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? > >>>>> > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> PS-- > >>>>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> > >>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > >>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > >>>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 16 22:45:31 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 15:45:31 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> Message-ID: <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. In going over an experience in mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to recognise that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories you abstract from an experience. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a > fractal? I think it is the similarity across scales that > makes an experience proleptic, or gives that 'bliss > conferred at the beginning of the road to redemption" that > Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several > timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having > an experience. This is what I am thinking about after > reading both the paper of Dewey's and your recent piece on > perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on a small > piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is > only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what > is bothering me. Beth > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing > this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the > aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from > their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. > He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan > of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle > he is raising here is the completeness of an > experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > this cannot be created by assembling together parts in > the way a modern building is planned. An experience - > the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an > original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, > something which can only be transmitted by reproducing > that whole of an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Andy, > > I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set > out to have that experience, that morning...no, I > don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm > pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as > an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done > so before. > > But I am guessing you're getting a something here > Andy? > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience > with the paintings..." > > I mean that was an experience. Did you set out > that morning to have that experience? > RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says > you can't do things indiscriminately and have > vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Well I'm not sure I understand your question > Andy, but perhaps it has > something to do with my grandfather's favorite > saying (translated from > Yiddish), > > Man plans, God laughs. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > =ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > So Michael, there was just that one occasion, > in all your museum-going, when you had an > experience. Was that planned? > (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number > of such experiences, > Michael ... just some number actually) > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hi Larry and all, > > I think this is one of the most complex > aspects of experience, what does he mean > when he says you can't do things > indiscriminately and have vital > experience, but you also can't plan > things? I have discussed (argued) about > this a lot with my students. I have > especially seen him raise this point in at > least two of his great works, Democracy > and Education and Experience and Nature - > and again of course in Art as Experience > (notice he is not saying how Art enters > into experience but how art is experience > - I have come to notice these little > things more and more in his writing). > > The difficulty we have, at least in the > United States because of the dominance of > the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > often translate what individuals are > bringing in to experience to organize it > as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind > of possible to make that interpretation > from Democracy and Education, although > what I think he is doing more is arguing > against misinterpretations of his work as > random, child centered activities. I > think he is clearer in Experience and > Nature that we bring in who we are at the > moment into the activity, and use who we > are (I don't want to say identity) as an > organizing principle for what we do. It > is perhaps one of the places where Dewey > and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use > the same Jackson Pollock example. The > first few times I saw his paintings I was > trying to "apprecitate" them because I was > told that was the best way to experience > them. Dewey says no vital experience > there because my activities become stilted > and artificia > l. Sometimes I went through the > museum and just looked at pictures, one to > the other. No vital experience there, > just random threads. But that time I had > the experience with the paintings I was > allowing who I was, what had been built up > in the trajectory of my life to enter into > my experience with the painting, making it > a vital experience. I think Dewey makes > the argument in Experience and Nature that > it is not just the experience the moment > before, but the experiences leading to > that experience, the context of my life, > of my parent's life, of a long line of > historical experiences. > > Anyway, my take. > > Michael > > - > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From bferholt@gmail.com Thu Jul 16 23:13:22 2015 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 02:13:22 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> Message-ID: But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing the whole entirely in the process of reflection. Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, something about having an artist on every research team. I have been thinking about this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" then this is who we need to tell us which property is the one that can characterize the experience as a whole. No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is prior but how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- sort of like the empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you study the bowl itself then you miss the whole point. I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating things?: "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." and ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of art take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain art, *and to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not kill the emotion*.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of how I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their students and the activities with these students with such art, and how I am getting better at creating classroom spaces that support this description -- but am still not clear about how to consistently create spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation and reflection. This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and thinking about Leigh Star's work. Beth On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for these > terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse */about/ > *an experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. > In going over an experience in mind /*after/ *its occurrence, we may find > that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that it > characterizes the experience as a whole. " > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to recognise > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories you > abstract from an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to > redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several > timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's > and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on a > small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only > itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. Beth > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing this question you >> raised about Dewey's saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval >> buildings arises from their not being "planned" like buildings are >> nowadays. He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan of, and >> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he is raising here is the >> completeness of an experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in the way a modern >> building is planned. An experience - the kind of thing which sticks in your >> mind - is an original or prior unity, not a combination, and this is what >> gives a work of art that ineffable quality, something which can only be >> transmitted by reproducing that whole of an experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have that >>> experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long time ago, >>> but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an indiscriminate >>> activity, probably, I had done so before. >>> >>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy >>> Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the paintings..." >>> >>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have that >>> experience? >>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things >>> indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has >>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from >>>> Yiddish), >>>> >>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>> >>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your museum-going, >>>> when you had an experience. Was that planned? >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, >>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>>> >>>>> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what >>>>> does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have >>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed >>>>> (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him >>>>> raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and >>>>> Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as >>>>> Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how >>>>> art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more >>>>> in his writing). >>>>> >>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the >>>>> dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate >>>>> what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of >>>>> meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from >>>>> Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing >>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered >>>>> activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring >>>>> in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't >>>>> want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is >>>>> perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I >>>>> can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his >>>>> paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was >>>>> the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there >>>>> because my activities become stilted and artificia >>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at >>>>> pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random >>>>> threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was >>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to >>>>> enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. >>>>> I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not >>>>> just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that >>>>> experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of >>>>> historical experiences. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, my take. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>> >> > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 16 23:47:33 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 16:47:33 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> Message-ID: <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> Beth. yes, when you reflect on something, it is already past. If you want to reproduce it, then as a human being you will have to analyse it. The trade of being an artist is the capacity to synthesise the elements and give you something of the ineffable. But I love that quote you have from Vygotsky, where he claims that art not only excites the experience in the reader, but also /explains/ it. I think that is actually setting a high standard for art. Dickens did not explain Dickensian London, but he represented it so faithfully. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 4:13 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so > without loosing the whole entirely in the process of > reflection. > > Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related > question, something about having an artist on every > research team. I have been thinking about this. If the > "artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not > only especially gifted in powers of execution but in > unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" then this > is who we need to tell us which property is the one that > can characterize the experience as a whole. > > No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The > unity is prior but how to study the object if this unity > is its essence? -- sort of like the empty space in the > bowl being the bowl, so when you study the bowl itself > then you miss the whole point. > > I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am > conflating things?: > > "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, > because there is a unity of experience that can be > expressed only as an experience." and > > ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the > effect of art take shape and excite the reader or > spectator but also to explain art, /and to explain it in > such a way that the explanation does not kill the > emotion/.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) > > > I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, > thinking of how I am always speaking to preschool teachers > who describe their students and the activities with these > students with such art, and how I am getting better at > creating classroom spaces that support this description -- > but am still not clear about how to consistently create > spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation > and reflection. > > > This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf > paper, and thinking about Leigh Star's work. > > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions > that reflection can make within it. In > discourse//about//an experience, we must make use > of these adjectives of interpretation. In going > over an experience in mind//after/ /its > occurrence, we may find that one property rather > than another was sufficiently dominant so that it > characterizes the experience as a whole." > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these > distinction when we *reflect* on an experience. And > perhaps we include the experience in our > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it > scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and > synthesis. But it is important to recognise that the > unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > cognition (for example) but also of attention and will > - and any other categories you abstract from an > experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? >> Like a fractal? I think it is the similarity across >> scales that makes an experience proleptic, or gives >> that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an >> experience on several timescales and so a sense of >> deja-vu is central to having an experience. This is >> what I am thinking about after reading both the paper >> of Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, >> Andy, although I am picking up on a small piece of >> the last email in this chain -- : If something is >> only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is >> what is bothering me. Beth >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just >> pursuing this question you raised about Dewey's >> saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval >> buildings arises from their not being "planned" >> like buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say >> "Every work of art follows the plan of, and >> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he >> is raising here is the completeness of an >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, >> and this cannot be created by assembling together >> parts in the way a modern building is planned. An >> experience - the kind of thing which sticks in >> your mind - is an original or prior unity, not a >> combination, and this is what gives a work of art >> that ineffable quality, something which can only >> be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an >> experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did >> I set out to have that experience, that >> morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long >> time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I >> have just treated it as an indiscriminate >> activity, probably, I had done so before. >> >> But I am guessing you're getting a something >> here Andy? >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf >> Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the >> experience with the paintings..." >> >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set >> out that morning to have that experience? >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he >> says you can't do things indiscriminately and >> have vital experience, but you also can't >> plan things?" >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Well I'm not sure I understand your >> question Andy, but perhaps it has >> something to do with my grandfather's >> favorite saying (translated from >> Yiddish), >> >> Man plans, God laughs. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> =ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> So Michael, there was just that one >> occasion, in all your museum-going, when >> you had an experience. Was that planned? >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a >> number of such experiences, >> Michael ... just some number actually) >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and all, >> >> I think this is one of the most >> complex aspects of experience, what >> does he mean when he says you can't >> do things indiscriminately and have >> vital experience, but you also can't >> plan things? I have discussed >> (argued) about this a lot with my >> students. I have especially seen him >> raise this point in at least two of >> his great works, Democracy and >> Education and Experience and Nature - >> and again of course in Art as >> Experience (notice he is not saying >> how Art enters into experience but >> how art is experience - I have come >> to notice these little things more >> and more in his writing). >> >> The difficulty we have, at least in >> the United States because of the >> dominance of the idea of >> meta-cognition, is that we too often >> translate what individuals are >> bringing in to experience to organize >> it as a form of meta-cognition. It >> is kind of possible to make that >> interpretation from Democracy and >> Education, although what I think he >> is doing more is arguing against >> misinterpretations of his work as >> random, child centered activities. I >> think he is clearer in Experience and >> Nature that we bring in who we are at >> the moment into the activity, and use >> who we are (I don't want to say >> identity) as an organizing principle >> for what we do. It is perhaps one of >> the places where Dewey and Vygotsky >> are close. Perhaps I can use the >> same Jackson Pollock example. The >> first few times I saw his paintings I >> was trying to "apprecitate" them >> because I was told that was the best >> way to experience them. Dewey says >> no vital experience there because my >> activities become stilted and artificia >> l. Sometimes I went through the >> museum and just looked at pictures, >> one to the other. No vital >> experience there, just random >> threads. But that time I had the >> experience with the paintings I was >> allowing who I was, what had been >> built up in the trajectory of my life >> to enter into my experience with the >> painting, making it a vital >> experience. I think Dewey makes the >> argument in Experience and Nature >> that it is not just the experience >> the moment before, but the >> experiences leading to that >> experience, the context of my life, >> of my parent's life, of a long line >> of historical experiences. >> >> Anyway, my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Fri Jul 17 00:19:36 2015 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 07:19:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311023327F1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Apologies again for coming late into a conversation but I was interested by a disparity between my reading of Beth's quote from Vygotsky and (what I understand as being) Andy's reading of the same quote. Andy seems to read the quote as saying that art BOTH produces (or perhaps catalyses) an experience in the observer AND explains this experience but I read the quote (and Beth's use of it) as suggesting that it is imperative BOTH for art to bring on the experience AND that that experience should be explained (it is imperative ... to explain it) - though not necessarily explained BY the art itself. The reason why I was intrigued by this difference in interpretations is that it made me reflect on what is achieved when an experience is explained. I suspect that we tend to focus too much, even exclusively, on what the explanation brings to (and out from) the experience but isn't it also true that the process of explaining an experience also affects the medium in which the explanation is expressed. A language which is bent into the service of explaining experiences is bent by that process, becoming enriched by the ways it has been used, acquiring a patina of use which is carried into other situations. A system of categories can perhaps be given heart if people struggle with the task of hacking it to describe, represent and explain things which it may not (yet) be fit to explain - so language comes to echo and resonate with the experiences of the people who use it - a kind of frohWian process (that's Whorf in reverse). All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 17 July 2015 07:48 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Beth. yes, when you reflect on something, it is already past. If you want to reproduce it, then as a human being you will have to analyse it. The trade of being an artist is the capacity to synthesise the elements and give you something of the ineffable. But I love that quote you have from Vygotsky, where he claims that art not only excites the experience in the reader, but also /explains/ it. I think that is actually setting a high standard for art. Dickens did not explain Dickensian London, but he represented it so faithfully. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 4:13 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing > the whole entirely in the process of reflection. > > Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, > something about having an artist on every research team. I have been > thinking about this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, > is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in > unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" then this is who we > need to tell us which property is the one that can characterize the > experience as a whole. > > No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is > prior but how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- > sort of like the empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you > study the bowl itself then you miss the whole point. > > I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating > things?: > > "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is > a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." > and > > ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of > art take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain > art, /and to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not > kill the emotion/.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) > > > I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of > how I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their > students and the activities with these students with such art, and how > I am getting better at creating classroom spaces that support this > description -- but am still not clear about how to consistently create > spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation and > reflection. > > > This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and > thinking about Leigh Star's work. > > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions > that reflection can make within it. In > discourse//about//an experience, we must make use > of these adjectives of interpretation. In going > over an experience in mind//after/ /its > occurrence, we may find that one property rather > than another was sufficiently dominant so that it > characterizes the experience as a whole." > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these > distinction when we *reflect* on an experience. And > perhaps we include the experience in our > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it > scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and > synthesis. But it is important to recognise that the > unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > cognition (for example) but also of attention and will > - and any other categories you abstract from an > experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? >> Like a fractal? I think it is the similarity across >> scales that makes an experience proleptic, or gives >> that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an >> experience on several timescales and so a sense of >> deja-vu is central to having an experience. This is >> what I am thinking about after reading both the paper >> of Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, >> Andy, although I am picking up on a small piece of >> the last email in this chain -- : If something is >> only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is >> what is bothering me. Beth >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just >> pursuing this question you raised about Dewey's >> saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval >> buildings arises from their not being "planned" >> like buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say >> "Every work of art follows the plan of, and >> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he >> is raising here is the completeness of an >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, >> and this cannot be created by assembling together >> parts in the way a modern building is planned. An >> experience - the kind of thing which sticks in >> your mind - is an original or prior unity, not a >> combination, and this is what gives a work of art >> that ineffable quality, something which can only >> be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an >> experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did >> I set out to have that experience, that >> morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long >> time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I >> have just treated it as an indiscriminate >> activity, probably, I had done so before. >> >> But I am guessing you're getting a something >> here Andy? >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf >> Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the >> experience with the paintings..." >> >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set >> out that morning to have that experience? >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he >> says you can't do things indiscriminately and >> have vital experience, but you also can't >> plan things?" >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Well I'm not sure I understand your >> question Andy, but perhaps it has >> something to do with my grandfather's >> favorite saying (translated from >> Yiddish), >> >> Man plans, God laughs. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> =ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> So Michael, there was just that one >> occasion, in all your museum-going, when >> you had an experience. Was that planned? >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a >> number of such experiences, >> Michael ... just some number actually) >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and all, >> >> I think this is one of the most >> complex aspects of experience, what >> does he mean when he says you can't >> do things indiscriminately and have >> vital experience, but you also can't >> plan things? I have discussed >> (argued) about this a lot with my >> students. I have especially seen him >> raise this point in at least two of >> his great works, Democracy and >> Education and Experience and Nature - >> and again of course in Art as >> Experience (notice he is not saying >> how Art enters into experience but >> how art is experience - I have come >> to notice these little things more >> and more in his writing). >> >> The difficulty we have, at least in >> the United States because of the >> dominance of the idea of >> meta-cognition, is that we too often >> translate what individuals are >> bringing in to experience to organize >> it as a form of meta-cognition. It >> is kind of possible to make that >> interpretation from Democracy and >> Education, although what I think he >> is doing more is arguing against >> misinterpretations of his work as >> random, child centered activities. I >> think he is clearer in Experience and >> Nature that we bring in who we are at >> the moment into the activity, and use >> who we are (I don't want to say >> identity) as an organizing principle >> for what we do. It is perhaps one of >> the places where Dewey and Vygotsky >> are close. Perhaps I can use the >> same Jackson Pollock example. The >> first few times I saw his paintings I >> was trying to "apprecitate" them >> because I was told that was the best >> way to experience them. Dewey says >> no vital experience there because my >> activities become stilted and artificia >> l. Sometimes I went through the >> museum and just looked at pictures, >> one to the other. No vital >> experience there, just random >> threads. But that time I had the >> experience with the paintings I was >> allowing who I was, what had been >> built up in the trajectory of my life >> to enter into my experience with the >> painting, making it a vital >> experience. I think Dewey makes the >> argument in Experience and Nature >> that it is not just the experience >> the moment before, but the >> experiences leading to that >> experience, the context of my life, >> of my parent's life, of a long line >> of historical experiences. >> >> Anyway, my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City > University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 17 00:24:37 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 17:24:37 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311023327F1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311023327F1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <55A8ADB5.8050800@mira.net> You may be right, Rod. Perhaps Beth could give us the quote in context so we have a better chance of understanding it? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 5:19 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > Apologies again for coming late into a conversation but I was interested by a disparity between my reading of Beth's quote from Vygotsky and (what I understand as being) Andy's reading of the same quote. Andy seems to read the quote as saying that art BOTH produces (or perhaps catalyses) an experience in the observer AND explains this experience but I read the quote (and Beth's use of it) as suggesting that it is imperative BOTH for art to bring on the experience AND that that experience should be explained (it is imperative ... to explain it) - though not necessarily explained BY the art itself. The reason why I was intrigued by this difference in interpretations is that it made me reflect on what is achieved when an experience is explained. I suspect that we tend to focus too much, even exclusively, on what the explanation brings to (and out from) the experience but isn't it also true that the process of explaining an experience also affects the medium in which the explanation is expressed. A language which is bent into the service of explaining experiences is bent by that process, becoming enriched by the ways it has been used, acquiring a patina of use which is carried into other situations. A system of categories can perhaps be given heart if people struggle with the task of hacking it to describe, represent and explain things which it may not (yet) be fit to explain - so language comes to echo and resonate with the experiences of the people who use it - a kind of frohWian process (that's Whorf in reverse). > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 17 July 2015 07:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Beth. yes, when you reflect on something, it is already past. If you want to reproduce it, then as a human being you will have to analyse it. > The trade of being an artist is the capacity to synthesise the elements and give you something of the ineffable. But I love that quote you have from Vygotsky, where he claims that art not only excites the experience in the reader, but also /explains/ it. I think that is actually setting a high standard for art. Dickens did not explain Dickensian London, but he represented it so faithfully. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 4:13 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing >> the whole entirely in the process of reflection. >> >> Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, >> something about having an artist on every research team. I have been >> thinking about this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, >> is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in >> unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" then this is who we >> need to tell us which property is the one that can characterize the >> experience as a whole. >> >> No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is >> prior but how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- >> sort of like the empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you >> study the bowl itself then you miss the whole point. >> >> I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating >> things?: >> >> "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is >> a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." >> and >> >> ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of >> art take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain >> art, /and to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not >> kill the emotion/.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) >> >> >> I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of >> how I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their >> students and the activities with these students with such art, and how >> I am getting better at creating classroom spaces that support this >> description -- but am still not clear about how to consistently create >> spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation and >> reflection. >> >> >> This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and >> thinking about Leigh Star's work. >> >> >> Beth >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >> >> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions >> that reflection can make within it. In >> discourse//about//an experience, we must make use >> of these adjectives of interpretation. In going >> over an experience in mind//after/ /its >> occurrence, we may find that one property rather >> than another was sufficiently dominant so that it >> characterizes the experience as a whole." >> >> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these >> distinction when we *reflect* on an experience. And >> perhaps we include the experience in our >> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it >> scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and >> synthesis. But it is important to recognise that the >> unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >> cognition (for example) but also of attention and will >> - and any other categories you abstract from an >> experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? >>> Like a fractal? I think it is the similarity across >>> scales that makes an experience proleptic, or gives >>> that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to >>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an >>> experience on several timescales and so a sense of >>> deja-vu is central to having an experience. This is >>> what I am thinking about after reading both the paper >>> of Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, >>> Andy, although I am picking up on a small piece of >>> the last email in this chain -- : If something is >>> only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is >>> what is bothering me. Beth >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>> >>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just >>> pursuing this question you raised about Dewey's >>> saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval >>> buildings arises from their not being "planned" >>> like buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say >>> "Every work of art follows the plan of, and >>> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he >>> is raising here is the completeness of an >>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, >>> and this cannot be created by assembling together >>> parts in the way a modern building is planned. An >>> experience - the kind of thing which sticks in >>> your mind - is an original or prior unity, not a >>> combination, and this is what gives a work of art >>> that ineffable quality, something which can only >>> be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an >>> experience. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did >>> I set out to have that experience, that >>> morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long >>> time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I >>> have just treated it as an indiscriminate >>> activity, probably, I had done so before. >>> >>> But I am guessing you're getting a something >>> here Andy? >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] On Behalf >>> Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the >>> experience with the paintings..." >>> >>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set >>> out that morning to have that experience? >>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he >>> says you can't do things indiscriminately and >>> have vital experience, but you also can't >>> plan things?" >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>> Well I'm not sure I understand your >>> question Andy, but perhaps it has >>> something to do with my grandfather's >>> favorite saying (translated from >>> Yiddish), >>> >>> Man plans, God laughs. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>> =ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] >>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> So Michael, there was just that one >>> occasion, in all your museum-going, when >>> you had an experience. Was that planned? >>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a >>> number of such experiences, >>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Larry and all, >>> >>> I think this is one of the most >>> complex aspects of experience, what >>> does he mean when he says you can't >>> do things indiscriminately and have >>> vital experience, but you also can't >>> plan things? I have discussed >>> (argued) about this a lot with my >>> students. I have especially seen him >>> raise this point in at least two of >>> his great works, Democracy and >>> Education and Experience and Nature - >>> and again of course in Art as >>> Experience (notice he is not saying >>> how Art enters into experience but >>> how art is experience - I have come >>> to notice these little things more >>> and more in his writing). >>> >>> The difficulty we have, at least in >>> the United States because of the >>> dominance of the idea of >>> meta-cognition, is that we too often >>> translate what individuals are >>> bringing in to experience to organize >>> it as a form of meta-cognition. It >>> is kind of possible to make that >>> interpretation from Democracy and >>> Education, although what I think he >>> is doing more is arguing against >>> misinterpretations of his work as >>> random, child centered activities. I >>> think he is clearer in Experience and >>> Nature that we bring in who we are at >>> the moment into the activity, and use >>> who we are (I don't want to say >>> identity) as an organizing principle >>> for what we do. It is perhaps one of >>> the places where Dewey and Vygotsky >>> are close. Perhaps I can use the >>> same Jackson Pollock example. The >>> first few times I saw his paintings I >>> was trying to "apprecitate" them >>> because I was told that was the best >>> way to experience them. Dewey says >>> no vital experience there because my >>> activities become stilted and artificia >>> l. Sometimes I went through the >>> museum and just looked at pictures, >>> one to the other. No vital >>> experience there, just random >>> threads. But that time I had the >>> experience with the paintings I was >>> allowing who I was, what had been >>> built up in the trajectory of my life >>> to enter into my experience with the >>> painting, making it a vital >>> experience. I think Dewey makes the >>> argument in Experience and Nature >>> that it is not just the experience >>> the moment before, but the >>> experiences leading to that >>> experience, the context of my life, >>> of my parent's life, of a long line >>> of historical experiences. >>> >>> Anyway, my take. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> - >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Beth Ferholt >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>> >>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> >>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City >> University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 00:32:54 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 00:32:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> Message-ID: <55a8afb8.31c4420a.43f07.ffffc3d2@mx.google.com> Beth in your question: "how to study the object which is the unity of the experience? Is it possible that to study the "object" (which is the unity) is another category error. In other words the unity (as integral) is PRIOR to the "object OF" and also prior to the "subject OF" "an" experience The "recognizing" objects (as Dewey contrasts with the concept "perceiving" is not "an" experience. "an" experience has a particular quality of "having" an experience which is not POSSESSIVE. Having an experience is "undergoing" an experience. I am proposing that these contrasting concepts of "having" (possessing and undergoing) are subtle shifts (slants) that Dewey is bringing to the "fore". Andy says Dewey uses "beautiful" scientific language to explore this phenomena. Beautiful as receptively "taking in" dewey's meaning. THIS beauty "hinges" on "an" experience being an experience of undergoing or grasping or taking in "an" experience (as a unity of being completed through becoming completed. Being is the completed form that exists (is completed) prior to subjects and objects forming and prior to emotion and intellect forming and prior to intuition and reflection forming their multimodal qualities. Qualities of these various multimodal "aspects" of the unity of "having" "an" experience. These aspects are various ways //about// reflecting and RE-presenting "an" already completed and existing experience after first undergoing the experience. As Andy emphasizes the unity is prior to distinguishing the multiple modes that can then be recognized. The unity of "an" experience when undergone is "perceived" not "recognized" (as Dewey meant this contrast in terms. Therefore is place-making contrasted with place-undergoing?? In Buddhism is undergoing the key phenomena of unity as "dependent arising"? Yes beautiful and a particular phenomenal/imaginal slant "/" Poetic -----Original Message----- From: "Beth Ferholt" Sent: ?2015-?07-?16 11:15 PM To: "Andy Blunden" Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing the whole entirely in the process of reflection. Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, something about having an artist on every research team. I have been thinking about this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" then this is who we need to tell us which property is the one that can characterize the experience as a whole. No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is prior but how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- sort of like the empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you study the bowl itself then you miss the whole point. I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating things?: "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." and ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of art take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain art, *and to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not kill the emotion*.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of how I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their students and the activities with these students with such art, and how I am getting better at creating classroom spaces that support this description -- but am still not clear about how to consistently create spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation and reflection. This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and thinking about Leigh Star's work. Beth On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for these > terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse */about/ > *an experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. > In going over an experience in mind /*after/ *its occurrence, we may find > that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that it > characterizes the experience as a whole. " > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to recognise > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories you > abstract from an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to > redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several > timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's > and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on a > small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only > itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. Beth > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing this question you >> raised about Dewey's saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval >> buildings arises from their not being "planned" like buildings are >> nowadays. He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan of, and >> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he is raising here is the >> completeness of an experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in the way a modern >> building is planned. An experience - the kind of thing which sticks in your >> mind - is an original or prior unity, not a combination, and this is what >> gives a work of art that ineffable quality, something which can only be >> transmitted by reproducing that whole of an experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have that >>> experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long time ago, >>> but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an indiscriminate >>> activity, probably, I had done so before. >>> >>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy >>> Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the paintings..." >>> >>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have that >>> experience? >>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things >>> indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has >>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from >>>> Yiddish), >>>> >>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>> >>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your museum-going, >>>> when you had an experience. Was that planned? >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, >>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>>> >>>>> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what >>>>> does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and have >>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed >>>>> (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen him >>>>> raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and >>>>> Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as >>>>> Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience but how >>>>> art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more and more >>>>> in his writing). >>>>> >>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the >>>>> dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often translate >>>>> what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a form of >>>>> meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation from >>>>> Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is arguing >>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered >>>>> activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we bring >>>>> in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I don't >>>>> want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It is >>>>> perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I >>>>> can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw his >>>>> paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that was >>>>> the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience there >>>>> because my activities become stilted and artificia >>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at >>>>> pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random >>>>> threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was >>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my life to >>>>> enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital experience. >>>>> I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is not >>>>> just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading to that >>>>> experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long line of >>>>> historical experiences. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, my take. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>> >> > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 07:51:47 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 08:51:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55a8afb8.31c4420a.43f07.ffffc3d2@mx.google.com> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55a8afb8.31c4420a.43f07.ffffc3d2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Beth, Andy, Larry..., I think that this question about the whole-ness of experience and the question of how to represent it resonates well with Rolf's question on the other thread about why everyone (in their study) turns to gesture in order to explain what they can't say. I wonder if part of the answer is suggested perhaps by the affordance of gesture - gesture uses space (in three dimensions, no less!) to represent and, as such, gesture provides expressions of wholes (key to experience!) in ways that this pathetic linear written language simply can't. Spoken language adds some dimension with prosodic features (tempo, pitch, amplitude, etc.), but that still pales in comparison to the three dimensional richness of gesture. One CHAT/sociocultural theorist of gesture that might be useful here is David McNeill (here is a link to his lab: http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/). McNeill has the notion of "growth points" that are particularly creative/productive and are one of the critical features of gesture. -greg On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:32 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Beth in your question: > "how to study the object which is the unity of the experience? > > Is it possible that to study the "object" (which is the unity) is another > category error. In other words the unity (as integral) is PRIOR to the > "object OF" and also prior to the "subject OF" "an" experience > > The "recognizing" objects (as Dewey contrasts with the concept > "perceiving" is not "an" experience. > > "an" experience has a particular quality of "having" an experience > which is not POSSESSIVE. Having an experience is "undergoing" an > experience. > I am proposing that these contrasting concepts of "having" (possessing and > undergoing) are subtle shifts (slants) that Dewey is bringing to the "fore". > > Andy says Dewey uses "beautiful" scientific language to explore this > phenomena. Beautiful as receptively "taking in" dewey's meaning. THIS > beauty "hinges" on "an" experience being an experience of undergoing or > grasping or taking in "an" experience (as a unity of being completed > through becoming completed. Being is the completed form that exists (is > completed) prior to subjects and objects forming and prior to emotion and > intellect forming and prior to intuition and reflection forming their > multimodal qualities. Qualities of these various multimodal "aspects" of > the unity of "having" "an" experience. These aspects are various ways > //about// reflecting and RE-presenting "an" already completed and existing > experience after first undergoing the experience. > As Andy emphasizes the unity is prior to distinguishing the multiple > modes that can then be recognized. The unity of "an" experience when > undergone is "perceived" not "recognized" (as Dewey meant this contrast in > terms. > > Therefore is place-making contrasted with place-undergoing?? > > In Buddhism is undergoing the key phenomena of unity as "dependent > arising"? > > Yes beautiful and a particular phenomenal/imaginal slant "/" > Poetic > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Beth Ferholt" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?16 11:15 PM > To: "Andy Blunden" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing the > whole entirely in the process of reflection. > > Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, something > about having an artist on every research team. I have been thinking about > this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not > only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to > the qualities of things" then this is who we need to tell us which > property is the one that can characterize the experience as a whole. > > No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is prior but > how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- sort of like the > empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you study the bowl itself > then you miss the whole point. > > I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating things?: > > "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is a > unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." and > > ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of art > take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain art, *and > to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not kill the > emotion*.? > -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) > > > I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of how > I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their students and > the activities with these students with such art, and how I am getting > better at creating classroom spaces that support this description -- but am > still not clear about how to consistently create spaces in my papers for > similar forms of representation and reflection. > > > This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and > thinking about Leigh Star's work. > > > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for these > > terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse > */about/ > > *an experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. > > In going over an experience in mind /*after/ *its occurrence, we may find > > that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that > it > > characterizes the experience as a whole. " > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories > you > > abstract from an experience. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > > Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > > think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > > proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to > > redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several > > timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > > This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's > > and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on > a > > small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only > > itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. > Beth > > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing this question you > >> raised about Dewey's saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval > >> buildings arises from their not being "planned" like buildings are > >> nowadays. He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan of, and > >> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he is raising here is the > >> completeness of an experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in the way a modern > >> building is planned. An experience - the kind of thing which sticks in > your > >> mind - is an original or prior unity, not a combination, and this is > what > >> gives a work of art that ineffable quality, something which can only be > >> transmitted by reproducing that whole of an experience. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >>> Andy, > >>> > >>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have that > >>> experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long time > ago, > >>> but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an > indiscriminate > >>> activity, probably, I had done so before. > >>> > >>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy > >>> Blunden > >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>> > >>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the > paintings..." > >>> > >>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have > that > >>> experience? > >>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things > >>> indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan > things?" > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>> > >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has > >>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from > >>>> Yiddish), > >>>> > >>>> Man plans, God laughs. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>>> > >>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your > museum-going, > >>>> when you had an experience. Was that planned? > >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, > >>>> Michael ... just some number actually) > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Larry and all, > >>>>> > >>>>> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what > >>>>> does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and > have > >>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed > >>>>> (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen > him > >>>>> raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and > >>>>> Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as > >>>>> Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience > but how > >>>>> art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more > and more > >>>>> in his writing). > >>>>> > >>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the > >>>>> dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often > translate > >>>>> what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a > form of > >>>>> meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation > from > >>>>> Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is > arguing > >>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered > >>>>> activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we > bring > >>>>> in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I > don't > >>>>> want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It > is > >>>>> perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. > Perhaps I > >>>>> can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw > his > >>>>> paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that > was > >>>>> the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience > there > >>>>> because my activities become stilted and artificia > >>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at > >>>>> pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random > >>>>> threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was > >>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my > life to > >>>>> enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital > experience. > >>>>> I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is > not > >>>>> just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading > to that > >>>>> experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long > line of > >>>>> historical experiences. > >>>>> > >>>>> Anyway, my take. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael > >>>>> > >>>>> - > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Beth Ferholt > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > 2900 Bedford Avenue > > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 08:18:14 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 08:18:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> Message-ID: <55a91ccd.62e4440a.16bda.0058@mx.google.com> I will add another slant on this notion of "having" an experience that theoretical processes when "reaching" or drawing or formulating or drawing " conclusion" EFFECTIVELY CONCEAL. In Dewey's words: "We say OF an experience of thinking that we reach or draw a conclusion. Theoretical formulation OF the process is often MADE IN SUCH TERMS as to CONCEAL effectively the similarity of "conclusion" TO the consummating phase of every developing INTEGRAL experience. These formulations (constructions) apparently take their cue FROM the SEPARATE propositions that are premisses AND the proposition that is "the" conclusion so AS TO GIVE RISE TO a third" In fact, IN an experience of thinking, premisses emerge (show up) ONLY AS a conclusion BE/COMES MANIFEST. The experience, like that of watching a storm reach its height and gradually subside IS ONE OF continuous movement of SUBJECT- MATTER/S. this returns to the play on "matter" and " subject matter". To undergo an experience is to "take in" a "subject-matter". To read Dewey carefully reveals ma or the pause as well as the making/doing/ WITHIN an experience. Heidegger in exploring da/sein (being there) concealed the "mit" (meaning with) An experience is mit/da/sein An experience is with/there/being An experience is undergoing/taking in/realizing/"perceiving" What an experience is not is the abstracting of re/presenting the abstracting of re/cognizing the abstracting of conclusions FROM the unity of having an experience consummated. Objects and subjects are derivative OF the undergoing of the "subject matter". What is "at hand" (as means) for reflecting back on an experience is not an experience of the subject matter (world) undergone/taken in -----Original Message----- From: "Andy Blunden" Sent: ?2015-?07-?16 11:48 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Beth. yes, when you reflect on something, it is already past. If you want to reproduce it, then as a human being you will have to analyse it. The trade of being an artist is the capacity to synthesise the elements and give you something of the ineffable. But I love that quote you have from Vygotsky, where he claims that art not only excites the experience in the reader, but also /explains/ it. I think that is actually setting a high standard for art. Dickens did not explain Dickensian London, but he represented it so faithfully. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 4:13 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so > without loosing the whole entirely in the process of > reflection. > > Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related > question, something about having an artist on every > research team. I have been thinking about this. If the > "artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not > only especially gifted in powers of execution but in > unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" then this > is who we need to tell us which property is the one that > can characterize the experience as a whole. > > No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The > unity is prior but how to study the object if this unity > is its essence? -- sort of like the empty space in the > bowl being the bowl, so when you study the bowl itself > then you miss the whole point. > > I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am > conflating things?: > > "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, > because there is a unity of experience that can be > expressed only as an experience." and > > ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the > effect of art take shape and excite the reader or > spectator but also to explain art, /and to explain it in > such a way that the explanation does not kill the > emotion/.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) > > > I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, > thinking of how I am always speaking to preschool teachers > who describe their students and the activities with these > students with such art, and how I am getting better at > creating classroom spaces that support this description -- > but am still not clear about how to consistently create > spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation > and reflection. > > > This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf > paper, and thinking about Leigh Star's work. > > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions > that reflection can make within it. In > discourse//about//an experience, we must make use > of these adjectives of interpretation. In going > over an experience in mind//after/ /its > occurrence, we may find that one property rather > than another was sufficiently dominant so that it > characterizes the experience as a whole." > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these > distinction when we *reflect* on an experience. And > perhaps we include the experience in our > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it > scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and > synthesis. But it is important to recognise that the > unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > cognition (for example) but also of attention and will > - and any other categories you abstract from an > experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? >> Like a fractal? I think it is the similarity across >> scales that makes an experience proleptic, or gives >> that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an >> experience on several timescales and so a sense of >> deja-vu is central to having an experience. This is >> what I am thinking about after reading both the paper >> of Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, >> Andy, although I am picking up on a small piece of >> the last email in this chain -- : If something is >> only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is >> what is bothering me. Beth >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just >> pursuing this question you raised about Dewey's >> saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval >> buildings arises from their not being "planned" >> like buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say >> "Every work of art follows the plan of, and >> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he >> is raising here is the completeness of an >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, >> and this cannot be created by assembling together >> parts in the way a modern building is planned. An >> experience - the kind of thing which sticks in >> your mind - is an original or prior unity, not a >> combination, and this is what gives a work of art >> that ineffable quality, something which can only >> be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an >> experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did >> I set out to have that experience, that >> morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long >> time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I >> have just treated it as an indiscriminate >> activity, probably, I had done so before. >> >> But I am guessing you're getting a something >> here Andy? >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf >> Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the >> experience with the paintings..." >> >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set >> out that morning to have that experience? >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he >> says you can't do things indiscriminately and >> have vital experience, but you also can't >> plan things?" >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Well I'm not sure I understand your >> question Andy, but perhaps it has >> something to do with my grandfather's >> favorite saying (translated from >> Yiddish), >> >> Man plans, God laughs. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> =ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> So Michael, there was just that one >> occasion, in all your museum-going, when >> you had an experience. Was that planned? >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a >> number of such experiences, >> Michael ... just some number actually) >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and all, >> >> I think this is one of the most >> complex aspects of experience, what >> does he mean when he says you can't >> do things indiscriminately and have >> vital experience, but you also can't >> plan things? I have discussed >> (argued) about this a lot with my >> students. I have especially seen him >> raise this point in at least two of >> his great works, Democracy and >> Education and Experience and Nature - >> and again of course in Art as >> Experience (notice he is not saying >> how Art enters into experience but >> how art is experience - I have come >> to notice these little things more >> and more in his writing). >> >> The difficulty we have, at least in >> the United States because of the >> dominance of the idea of >> meta-cognition, is that we too often >> translate what individuals are >> bringing in to experience to organize >> it as a form of meta-cognition. It >> is kind of possible to make that >> interpretation from Democracy and >> Education, although what I think he >> is doing more is arguing against >> misinterpretations of his work as >> random, child centered activities. I >> think he is clearer in Experience and >> Nature that we bring in who we are at >> the moment into the activity, and use >> who we are (I don't want to say >> identity) as an organizing principle >> for what we do. It is perhaps one of >> the places where Dewey and Vygotsky >> are close. Perhaps I can use the >> same Jackson Pollock example. The >> first few times I saw his paintings I >> was trying to "apprecitate" them >> because I was told that was the best >> way to experience them. Dewey says >> no vital experience there because my >> activities become stilted and artificia >> l. Sometimes I went through the >> museum and just looked at pictures, >> one to the other. No vital >> experience there, just random >> threads. But that time I had the >> experience with the paintings I was >> allowing who I was, what had been >> built up in the trajectory of my life >> to enter into my experience with the >> painting, making it a vital >> experience. I think Dewey makes the >> argument in Experience and Nature >> that it is not just the experience >> the moment before, but the >> experiences leading to that >> experience, the context of my life, >> of my parent's life, of a long line >> of historical experiences. >> >> Anyway, my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 08:25:12 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 09:25:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55a8afb8.31c4420a.43f07.ffffc3d2@mx.google.com> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55a8afb8.31c4420a.43f07.ffffc3d2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: And to the question that I have calqued (perhaps improperly) as the question of re-presenting the essence of an experience, or even knowing how to talk about an experience, I had two quick ideas: 1. This is a problem that I grapple with every year as I teach undergraduate students ethnographic writing. One of the biggest problems that I see is that students come in wanting to provide a perfect description of events that has maximal fidelity. Now, I suppose that the seeking for fidelity isn't the problem so much as is the way in which they understand fidelity. They understand fidelity to mean a perfect rendering of the exact things that were said and done - every movement, every sound, everything. Yet my fear is that this loses precisely what we are talking about here - the experience (and Jorge Luis Borges has a wonderful essay that I have attached called Funes the Memorious that describes a man, Funes, who was capable of that kind of perfect recollection that students aspire to; and to my mind the essay suggests that Funes has lost the ability to Have an Experience). A perfect description of every little thing that happened without capturing the experiences had is missing what is most essential, most real in human activity. Participants in interaction do not attend to every little thing. Nor is every little thing what it appears to be (particularly to a cultural outsider!). So I suggest to my students something somewhat radical and perhaps a bit scandalous for the more scientistic of social scientists. I suggest that my students consider fidelity not in terms of one-to-one mappings of word to world and instead try to maintain fidelity of the real and consequential meanings of the experience had by participants. The scandal here is that, because part of the work of ethnography is rendering what happened in one cultural context in the terms of another cultural context (perhaps not unlike the problem confronted by Rolf and Alfredo's designers?), this translation may require representing happenings in ways that are not really perfect representations of what, physically and acoustically, "actually" happened. The suggestion here is that in representing the "meaning" in one cultural context in terms that will be understandable to people in another cultural context, one might need to alter the details in one's description a bit. This is the art of ethnographic description. (and I imagine that some reading this will have a very visceral reaction to this suggestion - "isn't that just plain lying?"). As I'm writing this, I am reminded of Mike's (Luria's? - Wordsworth - see two stanza's pasted below) famous line that science too often "murders to dissect". That is, we kill the experience in order to study it. I suppose I'm wondering: what is the alternative? 2. For the more philosophically inclined, Heidegger has done some wonderful work with the notion of befindlichkeit. Here is a secondary source (Eugene Gendlin) describing what it is in case anyone has an interest: http://www.focusing.org/gendlin_befindlichkeit.html Here is a nugget from that page to get you started: "Heidegger says that *Befindlichkeit *refers to what is ordinarily called "being in a mood," and also what is called "feeling" and "affect." But Heidegger offers a radically different way of thinking about this ordinary experience. *Befindlichkeit *refers to the kind of beings that humans are, that aspect of these beings which makes for them having moods, feelings, or affects." Okay, back to experience. -greg Here are the last two stanzas of Wordsworth's The Tables Turned - a little screed against book-larnin' (and perhaps even better than "murder to dissect" are the closing words: "a heart that watches and receives"): Sweet is the lore which Nature brings; Our meddling intellect Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:? We murder to dissect. Enough of Science and of Art; Close up those barren leaves; Come forth, and bring with you a heart That watches and receives. On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:32 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Beth in your question: > "how to study the object which is the unity of the experience? > > Is it possible that to study the "object" (which is the unity) is another > category error. In other words the unity (as integral) is PRIOR to the > "object OF" and also prior to the "subject OF" "an" experience > > The "recognizing" objects (as Dewey contrasts with the concept > "perceiving" is not "an" experience. > > "an" experience has a particular quality of "having" an experience > which is not POSSESSIVE. Having an experience is "undergoing" an > experience. > I am proposing that these contrasting concepts of "having" (possessing and > undergoing) are subtle shifts (slants) that Dewey is bringing to the "fore". > > Andy says Dewey uses "beautiful" scientific language to explore this > phenomena. Beautiful as receptively "taking in" dewey's meaning. THIS > beauty "hinges" on "an" experience being an experience of undergoing or > grasping or taking in "an" experience (as a unity of being completed > through becoming completed. Being is the completed form that exists (is > completed) prior to subjects and objects forming and prior to emotion and > intellect forming and prior to intuition and reflection forming their > multimodal qualities. Qualities of these various multimodal "aspects" of > the unity of "having" "an" experience. These aspects are various ways > //about// reflecting and RE-presenting "an" already completed and existing > experience after first undergoing the experience. > As Andy emphasizes the unity is prior to distinguishing the multiple > modes that can then be recognized. The unity of "an" experience when > undergone is "perceived" not "recognized" (as Dewey meant this contrast in > terms. > > Therefore is place-making contrasted with place-undergoing?? > > In Buddhism is undergoing the key phenomena of unity as "dependent > arising"? > > Yes beautiful and a particular phenomenal/imaginal slant "/" > Poetic > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Beth Ferholt" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?16 11:15 PM > To: "Andy Blunden" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing the > whole entirely in the process of reflection. > > Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, something > about having an artist on every research team. I have been thinking about > this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not > only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to > the qualities of things" then this is who we need to tell us which > property is the one that can characterize the experience as a whole. > > No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is prior but > how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- sort of like the > empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you study the bowl itself > then you miss the whole point. > > I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating things?: > > "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is a > unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." and > > ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of art > take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain art, *and > to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not kill the > emotion*.? > -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) > > > I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of how > I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their students and > the activities with these students with such art, and how I am getting > better at creating classroom spaces that support this description -- but am > still not clear about how to consistently create spaces in my papers for > similar forms of representation and reflection. > > > This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and > thinking about Leigh Star's work. > > > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for these > > terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse > */about/ > > *an experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. > > In going over an experience in mind /*after/ *its occurrence, we may find > > that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that > it > > characterizes the experience as a whole. " > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories > you > > abstract from an experience. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > > Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > > think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > > proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to > > redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several > > timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > > This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's > > and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on > a > > small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only > > itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. > Beth > > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing this question you > >> raised about Dewey's saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval > >> buildings arises from their not being "planned" like buildings are > >> nowadays. He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan of, and > >> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he is raising here is the > >> completeness of an experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in the way a modern > >> building is planned. An experience - the kind of thing which sticks in > your > >> mind - is an original or prior unity, not a combination, and this is > what > >> gives a work of art that ineffable quality, something which can only be > >> transmitted by reproducing that whole of an experience. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >>> Andy, > >>> > >>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have that > >>> experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long time > ago, > >>> but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an > indiscriminate > >>> activity, probably, I had done so before. > >>> > >>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy > >>> Blunden > >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>> > >>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the > paintings..." > >>> > >>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have > that > >>> experience? > >>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things > >>> indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan > things?" > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>> > >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has > >>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from > >>>> Yiddish), > >>>> > >>>> Man plans, God laughs. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>>> > >>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your > museum-going, > >>>> when you had an experience. Was that planned? > >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, > >>>> Michael ... just some number actually) > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Larry and all, > >>>>> > >>>>> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what > >>>>> does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and > have > >>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed > >>>>> (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen > him > >>>>> raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and > >>>>> Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as > >>>>> Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience > but how > >>>>> art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more > and more > >>>>> in his writing). > >>>>> > >>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the > >>>>> dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often > translate > >>>>> what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a > form of > >>>>> meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation > from > >>>>> Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is > arguing > >>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered > >>>>> activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we > bring > >>>>> in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I > don't > >>>>> want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It > is > >>>>> perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. > Perhaps I > >>>>> can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw > his > >>>>> paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that > was > >>>>> the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience > there > >>>>> because my activities become stilted and artificia > >>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at > >>>>> pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random > >>>>> threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was > >>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my > life to > >>>>> enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital > experience. > >>>>> I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is > not > >>>>> just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading > to that > >>>>> experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long > line of > >>>>> historical experiences. > >>>>> > >>>>> Anyway, my take. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael > >>>>> > >>>>> - > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Beth Ferholt > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > 2900 Bedford Avenue > > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Borges - Funes the memorious.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 458473 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150717/a067eb40/attachment.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jul 17 09:23:39 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 09:23:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> Message-ID: Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there a purely theoretical problem." On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > interpretation. In going over an experience in > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to recognise > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories you > abstract from an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on a >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. Beth >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle >> he is raising here is the completeness of an >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing >> that whole of an experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done >> so before. >> >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here >> Andy? >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience >> with the paintings..." >> >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out >> that morning to have that experience? >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question >> Andy, but perhaps it has >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite >> saying (translated from >> Yiddish), >> >> Man plans, God laughs. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> = >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, >> in all your museum-going, when you had an >> experience. Was that planned? >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number >> of such experiences, >> Michael ... just some number actually) >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and all, >> >> I think this is one of the most complex >> aspects of experience, what does he mean >> when he says you can't do things >> indiscriminately and have vital >> experience, but you also can't plan >> things? I have discussed (argued) about >> this a lot with my students. I have >> especially seen him raise this point in at >> least two of his great works, Democracy >> and Education and Experience and Nature - >> and again of course in Art as Experience >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters >> into experience but how art is experience >> - I have come to notice these little >> things more and more in his writing). >> >> The difficulty we have, at least in the >> United States because of the dominance of >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too >> often translate what individuals are >> bringing in to experience to organize it >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind >> of possible to make that interpretation >> from Democracy and Education, although >> what I think he is doing more is arguing >> against misinterpretations of his work as >> random, child centered activities. I >> think he is clearer in Experience and >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the >> moment into the activity, and use who we >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an >> organizing principle for what we do. It >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The >> first few times I saw his paintings I was >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was >> told that was the best way to experience >> them. Dewey says no vital experience >> there because my activities become stilted >> and artificia >> l. Sometimes I went through the >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to >> the other. No vital experience there, >> just random threads. But that time I had >> the experience with the paintings I was >> allowing who I was, what had been built up >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into >> my experience with the painting, making it >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes >> the argument in Experience and Nature that >> it is not just the experience the moment >> before, but the experiences leading to >> that experience, the context of my life, >> of my parent's life, of a long line of >> historical experiences. >> >> Anyway, my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 09:39:01 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 09:39:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55a8afb8.31c4420a.43f07.ffffc3d2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <55a92fbb.6486440a.d34d.0f87@mx.google.com> Greg, fidelity as bring forth ( the therefore AND with (the mit) you bring a "heart" (a quality or character or disposition of "care" leading to repair when called forth) to watch (not re/cognize, re/present) AND RECEIVE This IS fidelity WITH (mit) an experience of the subject matter consummated (not concluded) The "mood" undergone ( not created or constructed FROM the "will" Fidelity not to the "being" fidelity not to the "therefore" ( as conclusion) but therefore as "phase" and completion as consummation Fidelity focusing on "mit" and "therefore" slanted towards mit/da/sein (with/being/there) and away from aspects of mitdasein as abstracted. Experience a " being within "a" mood. Fidelity as bringing your heart and abiding within or undergoing through watching (witnessing) with heart (abiding around the table/hearth) RECEIVING genetic and agentic going forth (bringing to the for) AND (taking in) like breathing. going out, taking in, enveloped, embodied, bodying gesturing, Receiving, RECEPTIVE, (not TO the world, not ENTERING the world, but RECEPTIVELY RECEIVING/PERCEIVING the world. This is breath This is life This is animating vitality This is moods This is fidelity of science as poetry Romantic science, Being within the heart of experience. Watching and receiving without end. To live is to "breath"/experience prior to objects and subjects. The fidelity of science as poetry Theory and practice both consummating movement of mitdasein I put the emphasize on the "mit" as a counterbalance to the focus on either "da" or "sein" or "dasein/therefore" Fidelity to consummation and not conclusions. Dewey's profound prototypical slant on undergoing "an" experience expressed poetically/beautifully as "truth" -----Original Message----- From: "Greg Thompson" Sent: ?2015-?07-?17 8:27 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience And to the question that I have calqued (perhaps improperly) as the question of re-presenting the essence of an experience, or even knowing how to talk about an experience, I had two quick ideas: 1. This is a problem that I grapple with every year as I teach undergraduate students ethnographic writing. One of the biggest problems that I see is that students come in wanting to provide a perfect description of events that has maximal fidelity. Now, I suppose that the seeking for fidelity isn't the problem so much as is the way in which they understand fidelity. They understand fidelity to mean a perfect rendering of the exact things that were said and done - every movement, every sound, everything. Yet my fear is that this loses precisely what we are talking about here - the experience (and Jorge Luis Borges has a wonderful essay that I have attached called Funes the Memorious that describes a man, Funes, who was capable of that kind of perfect recollection that students aspire to; and to my mind the essay suggests that Funes has lost the ability to Have an Experience). A perfect description of every little thing that happened without capturing the experiences had is missing what is most essential, most real in human activity. Participants in interaction do not attend to every little thing. Nor is every little thing what it appears to be (particularly to a cultural outsider!). So I suggest to my students something somewhat radical and perhaps a bit scandalous for the more scientistic of social scientists. I suggest that my students consider fidelity not in terms of one-to-one mappings of word to world and instead try to maintain fidelity of the real and consequential meanings of the experience had by participants. The scandal here is that, because part of the work of ethnography is rendering what happened in one cultural context in the terms of another cultural context (perhaps not unlike the problem confronted by Rolf and Alfredo's designers?), this translation may require representing happenings in ways that are not really perfect representations of what, physically and acoustically, "actually" happened. The suggestion here is that in representing the "meaning" in one cultural context in terms that will be understandable to people in another cultural context, one might need to alter the details in one's description a bit. This is the art of ethnographic description. (and I imagine that some reading this will have a very visceral reaction to this suggestion - "isn't that just plain lying?"). As I'm writing this, I am reminded of Mike's (Luria's? - Wordsworth - see two stanza's pasted below) famous line that science too often "murders to dissect". That is, we kill the experience in order to study it. I suppose I'm wondering: what is the alternative? 2. For the more philosophically inclined, Heidegger has done some wonderful work with the notion of befindlichkeit. Here is a secondary source (Eugene Gendlin) describing what it is in case anyone has an interest: http://www.focusing.org/gendlin_befindlichkeit.html Here is a nugget from that page to get you started: "Heidegger says that *Befindlichkeit *refers to what is ordinarily called "being in a mood," and also what is called "feeling" and "affect." But Heidegger offers a radically different way of thinking about this ordinary experience. *Befindlichkeit *refers to the kind of beings that humans are, that aspect of these beings which makes for them having moods, feelings, or affects." Okay, back to experience. -greg Here are the last two stanzas of Wordsworth's The Tables Turned - a little screed against book-larnin' (and perhaps even better than "murder to dissect" are the closing words: "a heart that watches and receives"): Sweet is the lore which Nature brings; Our meddling intellect Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:? We murder to dissect. Enough of Science and of Art; Close up those barren leaves; Come forth, and bring with you a heart That watches and receives. On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:32 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Beth in your question: > "how to study the object which is the unity of the experience? > > Is it possible that to study the "object" (which is the unity) is another > category error. In other words the unity (as integral) is PRIOR to the > "object OF" and also prior to the "subject OF" "an" experience > > The "recognizing" objects (as Dewey contrasts with the concept > "perceiving" is not "an" experience. > > "an" experience has a particular quality of "having" an experience > which is not POSSESSIVE. Having an experience is "undergoing" an > experience. > I am proposing that these contrasting concepts of "having" (possessing and > undergoing) are subtle shifts (slants) that Dewey is bringing to the "fore". > > Andy says Dewey uses "beautiful" scientific language to explore this > phenomena. Beautiful as receptively "taking in" dewey's meaning. THIS > beauty "hinges" on "an" experience being an experience of undergoing or > grasping or taking in "an" experience (as a unity of being completed > through becoming completed. Being is the completed form that exists (is > completed) prior to subjects and objects forming and prior to emotion and > intellect forming and prior to intuition and reflection forming their > multimodal qualities. Qualities of these various multimodal "aspects" of > the unity of "having" "an" experience. These aspects are various ways > //about// reflecting and RE-presenting "an" already completed and existing > experience after first undergoing the experience. > As Andy emphasizes the unity is prior to distinguishing the multiple > modes that can then be recognized. The unity of "an" experience when > undergone is "perceived" not "recognized" (as Dewey meant this contrast in > terms. > > Therefore is place-making contrasted with place-undergoing?? > > In Buddhism is undergoing the key phenomena of unity as "dependent > arising"? > > Yes beautiful and a particular phenomenal/imaginal slant "/" > Poetic > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Beth Ferholt" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?16 11:15 PM > To: "Andy Blunden" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing the > whole entirely in the process of reflection. > > Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, something > about having an artist on every research team. I have been thinking about > this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not > only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to > the qualities of things" then this is who we need to tell us which > property is the one that can characterize the experience as a whole. > > No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is prior but > how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- sort of like the > empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you study the bowl itself > then you miss the whole point. > > I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating things?: > > "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is a > unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." and > > ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of art > take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain art, *and > to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not kill the > emotion*.? > -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) > > > I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of how > I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their students and > the activities with these students with such art, and how I am getting > better at creating classroom spaces that support this description -- but am > still not clear about how to consistently create spaces in my papers for > similar forms of representation and reflection. > > > This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and > thinking about Leigh Star's work. > > > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for these > > terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse > */about/ > > *an experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. > > In going over an experience in mind /*after/ *its occurrence, we may find > > that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that > it > > characterizes the experience as a whole. " > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories > you > > abstract from an experience. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > > Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > > think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > > proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to > > redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several > > timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > > This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's > > and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on > a > > small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only > > itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. > Beth > > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing this question you > >> raised about Dewey's saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval > >> buildings arises from their not being "planned" like buildings are > >> nowadays. He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan of, and > >> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he is raising here is the > >> completeness of an experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in the way a modern > >> building is planned. An experience - the kind of thing which sticks in > your > >> mind - is an original or prior unity, not a combination, and this is > what > >> gives a work of art that ineffable quality, something which can only be > >> transmitted by reproducing that whole of an experience. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >>> Andy, > >>> > >>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have that > >>> experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long time > ago, > >>> but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an > indiscriminate > >>> activity, probably, I had done so before. > >>> > >>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy > >>> Blunden > >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>> > >>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the > paintings..." > >>> > >>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to have > that > >>> experience? > >>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do things > >>> indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also can't plan > things?" > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>> > >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it has > >>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying (translated from > >>>> Yiddish), > >>>> > >>>> Man plans, God laughs. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>>> > >>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your > museum-going, > >>>> when you had an experience. Was that planned? > >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such experiences, > >>>> Michael ... just some number actually) > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Larry and all, > >>>>> > >>>>> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, what > >>>>> does he mean when he says you can't do things indiscriminately and > have > >>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have discussed > >>>>> (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially seen > him > >>>>> raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy and > >>>>> Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in Art as > >>>>> Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into experience > but how > >>>>> art is experience - I have come to notice these little things more > and more > >>>>> in his writing). > >>>>> > >>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of the > >>>>> dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too often > translate > >>>>> what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as a > form of > >>>>> meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that interpretation > from > >>>>> Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more is > arguing > >>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered > >>>>> activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that we > bring > >>>>> in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we are (I > don't > >>>>> want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. It > is > >>>>> perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. > Perhaps I > >>>>> can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I saw > his > >>>>> paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told that > was > >>>>> the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience > there > >>>>> because my activities become stilted and artificia > >>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at > >>>>> pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just random > >>>>> threads. But that time I had the experience with the paintings I was > >>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up in the trajectory of my > life to > >>>>> enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital > experience. > >>>>> I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that it is > not > >>>>> just the experience the moment before, but the experiences leading > to that > >>>>> experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a long > line of > >>>>> historical experiences. > >>>>> > >>>>> Anyway, my take. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael > >>>>> > >>>>> - > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Beth Ferholt > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > 2900 Bedford Avenue > > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Jul 17 09:42:57 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 16:42:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with his mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the latter is not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms of consequences for the participants, which they display for each other in their actual practice. This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of ANALYSIS BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. Unit analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That is why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned not to think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action and transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own powers. This is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without isolation of presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements??. An experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in itself: it is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & Bentley write. I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there a purely theoretical problem." On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > interpretation. In going over an experience in > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to recognise > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories you > abstract from an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up on a >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. Beth >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle >> he is raising here is the completeness of an >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing >> that whole of an experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done >> so before. >> >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here >> Andy? >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience >> with the paintings..." >> >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out >> that morning to have that experience? >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question >> Andy, but perhaps it has >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite >> saying (translated from >> Yiddish), >> >> Man plans, God laughs. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> = >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, >> in all your museum-going, when you had an >> experience. Was that planned? >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number >> of such experiences, >> Michael ... just some number actually) >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and all, >> >> I think this is one of the most complex >> aspects of experience, what does he mean >> when he says you can't do things >> indiscriminately and have vital >> experience, but you also can't plan >> things? I have discussed (argued) about >> this a lot with my students. I have >> especially seen him raise this point in at >> least two of his great works, Democracy >> and Education and Experience and Nature - >> and again of course in Art as Experience >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters >> into experience but how art is experience >> - I have come to notice these little >> things more and more in his writing). >> >> The difficulty we have, at least in the >> United States because of the dominance of >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too >> often translate what individuals are >> bringing in to experience to organize it >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind >> of possible to make that interpretation >> from Democracy and Education, although >> what I think he is doing more is arguing >> against misinterpretations of his work as >> random, child centered activities. I >> think he is clearer in Experience and >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the >> moment into the activity, and use who we >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an >> organizing principle for what we do. It >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The >> first few times I saw his paintings I was >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was >> told that was the best way to experience >> them. Dewey says no vital experience >> there because my activities become stilted >> and artificia >> l. Sometimes I went through the >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to >> the other. No vital experience there, >> just random threads. But that time I had >> the experience with the paintings I was >> allowing who I was, what had been built up >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into >> my experience with the painting, making it >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes >> the argument in Experience and Nature that >> it is not just the experience the moment >> before, but the experiences leading to >> that experience, the context of my life, >> of my parent's life, of a long line of >> historical experiences. >> >> Anyway, my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jul 17 10:40:22 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 10:40:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo-- a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. mike On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with his > mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the latter is > not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms of > consequences for the participants, which they display for each other in > their actual practice. > > This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of ANALYSIS > BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. Unit > analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real > phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That is > why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned not to > think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action and > transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own powers. This > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by > elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of > action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without isolation of > presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements??. An > experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in itself: it > is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & Bentley > write. > > I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > mike cole > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, > spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be > antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of > the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, > only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any > means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of > life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there a > purely theoretical problem." > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > > interpretation. In going over an experience in > > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories > you > > abstract from an experience. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road > to > >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several > >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's > >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up > on a > >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only > >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. > Beth > >> > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing > >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the > >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from > >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. > >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan > >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle > >> he is raising here is the completeness of an > >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in > >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - > >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an > >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, > >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing > >> that whole of an experience. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Andy, > >> > >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set > >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I > >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm > >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as > >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done > >> so before. > >> > >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here > >> Andy? > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > >> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] On Behalf Of > >> Andy Blunden > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >> > >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience > >> with the paintings..." > >> > >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out > >> that morning to have that experience? > >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says > >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have > >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question > >> Andy, but perhaps it has > >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite > >> saying (translated from > >> Yiddish), > >> > >> Man plans, God laughs. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > >> = > >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >> > >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, > >> in all your museum-going, when you had an > >> experience. Was that planned? > >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number > >> of such experiences, > >> Michael ... just some number actually) > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Hi Larry and all, > >> > >> I think this is one of the most complex > >> aspects of experience, what does he mean > >> when he says you can't do things > >> indiscriminately and have vital > >> experience, but you also can't plan > >> things? I have discussed (argued) about > >> this a lot with my students. I have > >> especially seen him raise this point in at > >> least two of his great works, Democracy > >> and Education and Experience and Nature - > >> and again of course in Art as Experience > >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters > >> into experience but how art is experience > >> - I have come to notice these little > >> things more and more in his writing). > >> > >> The difficulty we have, at least in the > >> United States because of the dominance of > >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > >> often translate what individuals are > >> bringing in to experience to organize it > >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind > >> of possible to make that interpretation > >> from Democracy and Education, although > >> what I think he is doing more is arguing > >> against misinterpretations of his work as > >> random, child centered activities. I > >> think he is clearer in Experience and > >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the > >> moment into the activity, and use who we > >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an > >> organizing principle for what we do. It > >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey > >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use > >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The > >> first few times I saw his paintings I was > >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was > >> told that was the best way to experience > >> them. Dewey says no vital experience > >> there because my activities become stilted > >> and artificia > >> l. Sometimes I went through the > >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to > >> the other. No vital experience there, > >> just random threads. But that time I had > >> the experience with the paintings I was > >> allowing who I was, what had been built up > >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into > >> my experience with the painting, making it > >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes > >> the argument in Experience and Nature that > >> it is not just the experience the moment > >> before, but the experiences leading to > >> that experience, the context of my life, > >> of my parent's life, of a long line of > >> historical experiences. > >> > >> Anyway, my take. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> - > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Beth Ferholt > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > >> > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > >> > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Jul 17 10:50:41 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 17:50:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55a92fbb.6486440a.d34d.0f87@mx.google.com> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55a8afb8.31c4420a.43f07.ffffc3d2@mx.google.com> <55a92fbb.6486440a.d34d.0f87@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4D42@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Thinking about fidelity, experience and creativity I keep returning to Stanislavskii, who I believe had an influence on Vygotsky, but where I also see similarities with Dewey. In the system he lays out in his trilogy he focuses on emotion, the ability to access this emotion and use it to bring truth to a scene. Once at an acting workshop a veteran character actor described the way he used the system, creating a past for the character and building up that past through his imagination so that it could spark a creative present - creating a diary, living in the clothes the character wore. The creative present was fueled by the imagination. The dialogue, I guess in the language of this thread, serves as a constraint on actions. But the emotional imagination opened up new possibilities for affordances. I remember him talking about finding an egg holder on stage, making that an essential part of his expression, his communication, both to the other characters and to the audience. A hundred actors could play the same scene in a thousand venues and never find that egg holder as a way to communicate. I think Stanislavskii hated fidelity to some pre-determined plan for the character, felt that there was no imagination there. I am always reminded of Marlon Brando's portrayal of Fletcher Christian in the film Mutiny on the Bounty - nothing what I had expected. I think perhaps that is what Dewey was talking about at least in part with vital experience. Habit is important but it does not foster imagination. In Experience and Nature he decried the way we had separated experience into those who tell you what to do and those who did it - with the lion's share going to those who told you what to do. There is then no emotional memory, no imagination in what we do. I think Andy that is what he was talking about when he talked about planning of modern building. The only ones who could bring their imagination to the practice of building, actually create are the artisans themselves. But they are in a straight jacket of those who tell them what to do, make plans for them, and control them through fidelity. So this maybe takes us back to Rolf and Alfredo's article. The designers has to design through this unity of action just as they are designing for a unity of action. The objects in the museum as well as its design act as constraints, but there also has to be a way for the visitors to bring their emotional memory into their transaction as imagination - leading to creative vital experiences that play off of these constraints. Realizing that each visitor is capable of finding their own egg holder. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lplarry Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 12:39 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Greg, fidelity as bring forth ( the therefore AND with (the mit) you bring a "heart" (a quality or character or disposition of "care" leading to repair when called forth) to watch (not re/cognize, re/present) AND RECEIVE This IS fidelity WITH (mit) an experience of the subject matter consummated (not concluded) The "mood" undergone ( not created or constructed FROM the "will" Fidelity not to the "being" fidelity not to the "therefore" ( as conclusion) but therefore as "phase" and completion as consummation Fidelity focusing on "mit" and "therefore" slanted towards mit/da/sein (with/being/there) and away from aspects of mitdasein as abstracted. Experience a " being within "a" mood. Fidelity as bringing your heart and abiding within or undergoing through watching (witnessing) with heart (abiding around the table/hearth) RECEIVING genetic and agentic going forth (bringing to the for) AND (taking in) like breathing. going out, taking in, enveloped, embodied, bodying gesturing, Receiving, RECEPTIVE, (not TO the world, not ENTERING the world, but RECEPTIVELY RECEIVING/PERCEIVING the world. This is breath This is life This is animating vitality This is moods This is fidelity of science as poetry Romantic science, Being within the heart of experience. Watching and receiving without end. To live is to "breath"/experience prior to objects and subjects. The fidelity of science as poetry Theory and practice both consummating movement of mitdasein I put the emphasize on the "mit" as a counterbalance to the focus on either "da" or "sein" or "dasein/therefore" Fidelity to consummation and not conclusions. Dewey's profound prototypical slant on undergoing "an" experience expressed poetically/beautifully as "truth" -----Original Message----- From: "Greg Thompson" Sent: ?2015-?07-?17 8:27 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience And to the question that I have calqued (perhaps improperly) as the question of re-presenting the essence of an experience, or even knowing how to talk about an experience, I had two quick ideas: 1. This is a problem that I grapple with every year as I teach undergraduate students ethnographic writing. One of the biggest problems that I see is that students come in wanting to provide a perfect description of events that has maximal fidelity. Now, I suppose that the seeking for fidelity isn't the problem so much as is the way in which they understand fidelity. They understand fidelity to mean a perfect rendering of the exact things that were said and done - every movement, every sound, everything. Yet my fear is that this loses precisely what we are talking about here - the experience (and Jorge Luis Borges has a wonderful essay that I have attached called Funes the Memorious that describes a man, Funes, who was capable of that kind of perfect recollection that students aspire to; and to my mind the essay suggests that Funes has lost the ability to Have an Experience). A perfect description of every little thing that happened without capturing the experiences had is missing what is most essential, most real in human activity. Participants in interaction do not attend to every little thing. Nor is every little thing what it appears to be (particularly to a cultural outsider!). So I suggest to my students something somewhat radical and perhaps a bit scandalous for the more scientistic of social scientists. I suggest that my students consider fidelity not in terms of one-to-one mappings of word to world and instead try to maintain fidelity of the real and consequential meanings of the experience had by participants. The scandal here is that, because part of the work of ethnography is rendering what happened in one cultural context in the terms of another cultural context (perhaps not unlike the problem confronted by Rolf and Alfredo's designers?), this translation may require representing happenings in ways that are not really perfect representations of what, physically and acoustically, "actually" happened. The suggestion here is that in representing the "meaning" in one cultural context in terms that will be understandable to people in another cultural context, one might need to alter the details in one's description a bit. This is the art of ethnographic description. (and I imagine that some reading this will have a very visceral reaction to this suggestion - "isn't that just plain lying?"). As I'm writing this, I am reminded of Mike's (Luria's? - Wordsworth - see two stanza's pasted below) famous line that science too often "murders to dissect". That is, we kill the experience in order to study it. I suppose I'm wondering: what is the alternative? 2. For the more philosophically inclined, Heidegger has done some wonderful work with the notion of befindlichkeit. Here is a secondary source (Eugene Gendlin) describing what it is in case anyone has an interest: http://www.focusing.org/gendlin_befindlichkeit.html Here is a nugget from that page to get you started: "Heidegger says that *Befindlichkeit *refers to what is ordinarily called "being in a mood," and also what is called "feeling" and "affect." But Heidegger offers a radically different way of thinking about this ordinary experience. *Befindlichkeit *refers to the kind of beings that humans are, that aspect of these beings which makes for them having moods, feelings, or affects." Okay, back to experience. -greg Here are the last two stanzas of Wordsworth's The Tables Turned - a little screed against book-larnin' (and perhaps even better than "murder to dissect" are the closing words: "a heart that watches and receives"): Sweet is the lore which Nature brings; Our meddling intellect Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:? We murder to dissect. Enough of Science and of Art; Close up those barren leaves; Come forth, and bring with you a heart That watches and receives. On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:32 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Beth in your question: > "how to study the object which is the unity of the experience? > > Is it possible that to study the "object" (which is the unity) is > another category error. In other words the unity (as integral) is > PRIOR to the "object OF" and also prior to the "subject OF" "an" > experience > > The "recognizing" objects (as Dewey contrasts with the concept > "perceiving" is not "an" experience. > > "an" experience has a particular quality of "having" an experience > which is not POSSESSIVE. Having an experience is "undergoing" an > experience. > I am proposing that these contrasting concepts of "having" (possessing > and > undergoing) are subtle shifts (slants) that Dewey is bringing to the "fore". > > Andy says Dewey uses "beautiful" scientific language to explore this > phenomena. Beautiful as receptively "taking in" dewey's meaning. THIS > beauty "hinges" on "an" experience being an experience of undergoing > or grasping or taking in "an" experience (as a unity of being > completed through becoming completed. Being is the completed form that > exists (is > completed) prior to subjects and objects forming and prior to > emotion and intellect forming and prior to intuition and reflection forming their > multimodal qualities. Qualities of these various multimodal "aspects" of > the unity of "having" "an" experience. These aspects are various ways > //about// reflecting and RE-presenting "an" already completed and > existing experience after first undergoing the experience. > As Andy emphasizes the unity is prior to distinguishing the multiple > modes that can then be recognized. The unity of "an" experience when > undergone is "perceived" not "recognized" (as Dewey meant this > contrast in terms. > > Therefore is place-making contrasted with place-undergoing?? > > In Buddhism is undergoing the key phenomena of unity as "dependent > arising"? > > Yes beautiful and a particular phenomenal/imaginal slant "/" > Poetic > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Beth Ferholt" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?16 11:15 PM > To: "Andy Blunden" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing > the whole entirely in the process of reflection. > > Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, > something about having an artist on every research team. I have been > thinking about this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, > is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in > unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" then this is who we > need to tell us which property is the one that can characterize the experience as a whole. > > No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is > prior but how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- > sort of like the empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you > study the bowl itself then you miss the whole point. > > I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating things?: > > "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is > a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." > and > > ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of > art take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain > art, *and to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not > kill the emotion*.? > -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) > > > I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of > how I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their > students and the activities with these students with such art, and how > I am getting better at creating classroom spaces that support this > description -- but am still not clear about how to consistently create > spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation and reflection. > > > This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and > thinking about Leigh Star's work. > > > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for > > these terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In > > discourse > */about/ > > *an experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. > > In going over an experience in mind /*after/ *its occurrence, we may > > find that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > > so that > it > > characterizes the experience as a whole. " > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction > > when we > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in > > our autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it > > scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But > > it is important to > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > > cognition (for example) but also of attention and will - and any > > other categories > you > > abstract from an experience. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > > Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? > > I think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > > proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the > > road to redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience > > on several timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > > This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of > > Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am > > picking up on > a > > small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is > > only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. > Beth > > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing this question > >> you raised about Dewey's saying that the aesthetic quality of > >> medieval buildings arises from their not being "planned" like > >> buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say "Every work of art > >> follows the plan of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The > >> puzzle he is raising here is the completeness of an experience > >> which gives it its aesthetic quality, and this cannot be created by > >> assembling together parts in the way a modern building is planned. > >> An experience - the kind of thing which sticks in > your > >> mind - is an original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > >> is > what > >> gives a work of art that ineffable quality, something which can > >> only be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an experience. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >>> Andy, > >>> > >>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set out to have > >>> that experience, that morning...no, I don't think so (it was a > >>> long time > ago, > >>> but I'm pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as an > indiscriminate > >>> activity, probably, I had done so before. > >>> > >>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here Andy? > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > >>> xmca-l-bounces+Andy > >>> Blunden > >>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>> > >>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience with the > paintings..." > >>> > >>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out that morning to > >>> have > that > >>> experience? > >>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says you can't do > >>> things indiscriminately and have vital experience, but you also > >>> can't plan > things?" > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>> > >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question Andy, but perhaps it > >>>> has something to do with my grandfather's favorite saying > >>>> (translated from Yiddish), > >>>> > >>>> Man plans, God laughs. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd. > >>>> edu] > >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>>> > >>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, in all your > museum-going, > >>>> when you had an experience. Was that planned? > >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number of such > >>>> experiences, Michael ... just some number actually) > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, > >>>> Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Larry and all, > >>>>> > >>>>> I think this is one of the most complex aspects of experience, > >>>>> what does he mean when he says you can't do things > >>>>> indiscriminately and > have > >>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things? I have > >>>>> discussed > >>>>> (argued) about this a lot with my students. I have especially > >>>>> seen > him > >>>>> raise this point in at least two of his great works, Democracy > >>>>> and Education and Experience and Nature - and again of course in > >>>>> Art as Experience (notice he is not saying how Art enters into > >>>>> experience > but how > >>>>> art is experience - I have come to notice these little things > >>>>> more > and more > >>>>> in his writing). > >>>>> > >>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the United States because of > >>>>> the dominance of the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > >>>>> often > translate > >>>>> what individuals are bringing in to experience to organize it as > >>>>> a > form of > >>>>> meta-cognition. It is kind of possible to make that > >>>>> interpretation > from > >>>>> Democracy and Education, although what I think he is doing more > >>>>> is > arguing > >>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as random, child centered > >>>>> activities. I think he is clearer in Experience and Nature that > >>>>> we > bring > >>>>> in who we are at the moment into the activity, and use who we > >>>>> are (I > don't > >>>>> want to say identity) as an organizing principle for what we do. > >>>>> It > is > >>>>> perhaps one of the places where Dewey and Vygotsky are close. > Perhaps I > >>>>> can use the same Jackson Pollock example. The first few times I > >>>>> saw > his > >>>>> paintings I was trying to "apprecitate" them because I was told > >>>>> that > was > >>>>> the best way to experience them. Dewey says no vital experience > there > >>>>> because my activities become stilted and artificia > >>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the museum and just looked at > >>>>> pictures, one to the other. No vital experience there, just > >>>>> random threads. But that time I had the experience with the > >>>>> paintings I was allowing who I was, what had been built up in > >>>>> the trajectory of my > life to > >>>>> enter into my experience with the painting, making it a vital > experience. > >>>>> I think Dewey makes the argument in Experience and Nature that > >>>>> it is > not > >>>>> just the experience the moment before, but the experiences > >>>>> leading > to that > >>>>> experience, the context of my life, of my parent's life, of a > >>>>> long > line of > >>>>> historical experiences. > >>>>> > >>>>> Anyway, my take. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael > >>>>> > >>>>> - > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Beth Ferholt > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, > > City University of New York > > 2900 Bedford Avenue > > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City > University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Jul 17 10:58:15 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 17:58:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> Mike, could you elaborate on that? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Alfredo-- a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. mike On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with his > mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the latter is > not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms of > consequences for the participants, which they display for each other in > their actual practice. > > This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of ANALYSIS > BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. Unit > analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real > phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That is > why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned not to > think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action and > transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own powers. This > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by > elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of > action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without isolation of > presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements??. An > experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in itself: it > is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & Bentley > write. > > I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > mike cole > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, > spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be > antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of > the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, > only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any > means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of > life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there a > purely theoretical problem." > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > > interpretation. In going over an experience in > > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when we > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in our > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all of > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and cognition > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories > you > > abstract from an experience. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road > to > >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on several > >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of Dewey's > >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up > on a > >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only > >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. > Beth > >> > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing > >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the > >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from > >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. > >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan > >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle > >> he is raising here is the completeness of an > >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in > >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - > >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an > >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, > >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing > >> that whole of an experience. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Andy, > >> > >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set > >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I > >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm > >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as > >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done > >> so before. > >> > >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here > >> Andy? > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > >> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] On Behalf Of > >> Andy Blunden > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >> > >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience > >> with the paintings..." > >> > >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out > >> that morning to have that experience? > >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says > >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have > >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question > >> Andy, but perhaps it has > >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite > >> saying (translated from > >> Yiddish), > >> > >> Man plans, God laughs. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > >> = > >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >> > >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, > >> in all your museum-going, when you had an > >> experience. Was that planned? > >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number > >> of such experiences, > >> Michael ... just some number actually) > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Hi Larry and all, > >> > >> I think this is one of the most complex > >> aspects of experience, what does he mean > >> when he says you can't do things > >> indiscriminately and have vital > >> experience, but you also can't plan > >> things? I have discussed (argued) about > >> this a lot with my students. I have > >> especially seen him raise this point in at > >> least two of his great works, Democracy > >> and Education and Experience and Nature - > >> and again of course in Art as Experience > >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters > >> into experience but how art is experience > >> - I have come to notice these little > >> things more and more in his writing). > >> > >> The difficulty we have, at least in the > >> United States because of the dominance of > >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > >> often translate what individuals are > >> bringing in to experience to organize it > >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind > >> of possible to make that interpretation > >> from Democracy and Education, although > >> what I think he is doing more is arguing > >> against misinterpretations of his work as > >> random, child centered activities. I > >> think he is clearer in Experience and > >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the > >> moment into the activity, and use who we > >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an > >> organizing principle for what we do. It > >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey > >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use > >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The > >> first few times I saw his paintings I was > >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was > >> told that was the best way to experience > >> them. Dewey says no vital experience > >> there because my activities become stilted > >> and artificia > >> l. Sometimes I went through the > >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to > >> the other. No vital experience there, > >> just random threads. But that time I had > >> the experience with the paintings I was > >> allowing who I was, what had been built up > >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into > >> my experience with the painting, making it > >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes > >> the argument in Experience and Nature that > >> it is not just the experience the moment > >> before, but the experiences leading to > >> that experience, the context of my life, > >> of my parent's life, of a long line of > >> historical experiences. > >> > >> Anyway, my take. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> - > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Beth Ferholt > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > >> > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > >> > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From lspopov@bgsu.edu Fri Jul 17 11:35:54 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 18:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. Mike Yes, this is it. Design is about organizing a morphology .... and .. and ... and we can add many additional things. The key word is "organizing." This is conceptualization might be even better than design is problem solving. Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 1:40 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Alfredo-- a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. mike On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with > his mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the > latter is not about representing exactly, but about describing events > in terms of consequences for the participants, which they display for > each other in their actual practice. > > This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of > ANALYSIS BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful > here. Unit analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as > concrete and real phenomena, have some form of organization that > extends in time. That is why, if I understood the discussion below > correctly, Beth is warned not to think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action > and transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own > powers. This is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as > analysis by elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects > and phases of action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other > presumptively detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and > without isolation of presumptively detachable ?relations? from such > detachable ?elements??. An experience can be studied precisely because > it is not a thing in itself: it is always a moving, gesture, a "method > of organization" as Dewey & Bentley write. > > I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > mike cole > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and > objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, > cease to be antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The > resolution of the theoretical contradictions is possible only through > practical means, only through the practical energy of man. Their > resolution is not by any means, therefore, only a problem of > knowledge, but is a real problem of life which philosophy was unable > to solve precisely because it saw there a purely theoretical problem." > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > > interpretation. In going over an experience in > > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction > > when we > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in > > our autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it > > scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But > > it is important to > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > > cognition (for example) but also of attention and will - and any > > other categories > you > > abstract from an experience. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? > >> I think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the > >> road > to > >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on > >> several timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an experience. > >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of > >> Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am > >> picking up > on a > >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is > >> only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. > Beth > >> > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing > >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the > >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from > >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. > >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan > >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle > >> he is raising here is the completeness of an > >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in > >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - > >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an > >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, > >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing > >> that whole of an experience. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Andy, > >> > >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set > >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I > >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm > >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as > >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done > >> so before. > >> > >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here > >> Andy? > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > >> =osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] On Behalf Of > >> Andy Blunden > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >> > >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience > >> with the paintings..." > >> > >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out > >> that morning to have that experience? > >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says > >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have > >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question > >> Andy, but perhaps it has > >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite > >> saying (translated from > >> Yiddish), > >> > >> Man plans, God laughs. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > >> = > >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >> > >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, > >> in all your museum-going, when you had an > >> experience. Was that planned? > >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number > >> of such experiences, > >> Michael ... just some number actually) > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> > >> Hi Larry and all, > >> > >> I think this is one of the most complex > >> aspects of experience, what does he mean > >> when he says you can't do things > >> indiscriminately and have vital > >> experience, but you also can't plan > >> things? I have discussed (argued) about > >> this a lot with my students. I have > >> especially seen him raise this point in at > >> least two of his great works, Democracy > >> and Education and Experience and Nature - > >> and again of course in Art as Experience > >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters > >> into experience but how art is experience > >> - I have come to notice these little > >> things more and more in his writing). > >> > >> The difficulty we have, at least in the > >> United States because of the dominance of > >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > >> often translate what individuals are > >> bringing in to experience to organize it > >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind > >> of possible to make that interpretation > >> from Democracy and Education, although > >> what I think he is doing more is arguing > >> against misinterpretations of his work as > >> random, child centered activities. I > >> think he is clearer in Experience and > >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the > >> moment into the activity, and use who we > >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an > >> organizing principle for what we do. It > >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey > >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use > >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The > >> first few times I saw his paintings I was > >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was > >> told that was the best way to experience > >> them. Dewey says no vital experience > >> there because my activities become stilted > >> and artificia > >> l. Sometimes I went through the > >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to > >> the other. No vital experience there, > >> just random threads. But that time I had > >> the experience with the paintings I was > >> allowing who I was, what had been built up > >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into > >> my experience with the painting, making it > >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes > >> the argument in Experience and Nature that > >> it is not just the experience the moment > >> before, but the experiences leading to > >> that experience, the context of my life, > >> of my parent's life, of a long line of > >> historical experiences. > >> > >> Anyway, my take. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> - > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Beth Ferholt > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, > >> City University of New York > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > >> > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > >> > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > >> > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From bferholt@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 11:40:35 2015 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 14:40:35 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests me most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and then to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was a preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be described as being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that you can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an experience''? Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what is most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true to the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If you don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words that give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties that will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named 'preschool didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in research. This sounds like 5D. Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. One is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art creates in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the effect of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a unity, and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what we have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art as a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget this then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. As an researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the first purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not conserve the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could have a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest questions to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not know how to do this even in my own work. Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children before your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo suggested The Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, also Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is studying see. Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. Beth On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Mike, could you elaborate on that? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > mike cole > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Alfredo-- > > a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. > > mike > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with his > > mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the latter > is > > not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms of > > consequences for the participants, which they display for each other in > > their actual practice. > > > > This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of ANALYSIS > > BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. Unit > > analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real > > phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That is > > why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned not > to > > think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". > > > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action and > > transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own powers. > This > > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by > > elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of > > action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively > > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without isolation > of > > presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements??. An > > experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in itself: > it > > is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & > Bentley > > write. > > > > I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, > > Alfredo > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > mike cole > > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, > > spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be > > antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of > > the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, > > only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any > > means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of > > life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there > a > > purely theoretical problem." > > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > > > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > > > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > > > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > > > interpretation. In going over an experience in > > > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > > > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > > > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when > we > > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in > our > > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all > of > > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > > recognise > > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > cognition > > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories > > you > > > abstract from an experience. > > > > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > > > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > > >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > > >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road > > to > > >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on > several > > >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an > experience. > > >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of > Dewey's > > >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up > > on a > > >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only > > >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. > > Beth > > >> > > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > >> > wrote: > > >> > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing > > >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the > > >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from > > >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. > > >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan > > >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle > > >> he is raising here is the completeness of an > > >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in > > >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - > > >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an > > >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > > >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, > > >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing > > >> that whole of an experience. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > >> > > >> Andy, > > >> > > >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set > > >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I > > >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm > > >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as > > >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done > > >> so before. > > >> > > >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here > > >> Andy? > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: > > >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > > >> = > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> ] On Behalf Of > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > >> > > >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience > > >> with the paintings..." > > >> > > >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out > > >> that morning to have that experience? > > >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says > > >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have > > >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > >> > > >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question > > >> Andy, but perhaps it has > > >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite > > >> saying (translated from > > >> Yiddish), > > >> > > >> Man plans, God laughs. > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: > > >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > >> = > > >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> ] > > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > >> > > >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, > > >> in all your museum-going, when you had an > > >> experience. Was that planned? > > >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number > > >> of such experiences, > > >> Michael ... just some number actually) > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi Larry and all, > > >> > > >> I think this is one of the most complex > > >> aspects of experience, what does he mean > > >> when he says you can't do things > > >> indiscriminately and have vital > > >> experience, but you also can't plan > > >> things? I have discussed (argued) about > > >> this a lot with my students. I have > > >> especially seen him raise this point in at > > >> least two of his great works, Democracy > > >> and Education and Experience and Nature - > > >> and again of course in Art as Experience > > >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters > > >> into experience but how art is experience > > >> - I have come to notice these little > > >> things more and more in his writing). > > >> > > >> The difficulty we have, at least in the > > >> United States because of the dominance of > > >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > > >> often translate what individuals are > > >> bringing in to experience to organize it > > >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind > > >> of possible to make that interpretation > > >> from Democracy and Education, although > > >> what I think he is doing more is arguing > > >> against misinterpretations of his work as > > >> random, child centered activities. I > > >> think he is clearer in Experience and > > >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the > > >> moment into the activity, and use who we > > >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an > > >> organizing principle for what we do. It > > >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey > > >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use > > >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The > > >> first few times I saw his paintings I was > > >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was > > >> told that was the best way to experience > > >> them. Dewey says no vital experience > > >> there because my activities become stilted > > >> and artificia > > >> l. Sometimes I went through the > > >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to > > >> the other. No vital experience there, > > >> just random threads. But that time I had > > >> the experience with the paintings I was > > >> allowing who I was, what had been built up > > >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into > > >> my experience with the painting, making it > > >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes > > >> the argument in Experience and Nature that > > >> it is not just the experience the moment > > >> before, but the experiences leading to > > >> that experience, the context of my life, > > >> of my parent's life, of a long line of > > >> historical experiences. > > >> > > >> Anyway, my take. > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> > > >> - > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Beth Ferholt > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue > > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > >> > > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 12:10:12 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 12:10:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Enough of science and art Message-ID: Greg, How are others "reading" Dewey's answer to Wordsworth's "enough of science and art" ? Notice how he is shifting to matters of the "heart" as a romantic image of nature. What about the "truth-value" of this romantic notion? This topic as what to include and what to exclude as "primary mover" seems to move in the realm of the "imaginal" but does not acknowledge that science and art are also moving within this same primary realm of "having" an experience. Beth's beautiful rendition of the responsibility [and response/ability] embodying the living experience of a preschool teacher as expressions of "heart" is as truthful as Wordsworth's notion of "heart" within the "natural" I will only add that two possible synonyms closely resembling "heart" are "hearth" and "focus" [all notions of home] and finding our "place". The unity of the immediate and mediated as consummation [not conclusions] within a mood/befindlichkeit/experience. What is at the heart of experience is the "subject matter" [unity of mind and world] For example [a case in "place"] is Beth's preschool "experience" and what she "perceives" [not recognizes] at the "heart" of the "matter". This under/standing and under/going of source and re-source [what is in the back "ground"] is a much more extended notion of "cognizing" including both focusing and reflecting as phases [never conclusions] Always uncertain and fallible and open [within constraints and completions] If "organizing" is the "key" it must include these aspects of the heart. Is it mis-guided to leave out "science and art" as imaginal paths of living experience as aspects of "having" an experience?. It is also mis-guided to leave out the heart and taking "care" of what "matters" From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 17:29:17 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 09:29:17 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A8ADB5.8050800@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311023327F1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <55A8ADB5.8050800@mira.net> Message-ID: The context is the concluding chapter of "Psychology of Art", entitled "Art and Life". The title itself tells you something of what Vygotsky wants to say. The great slogan of nineteenth century realism was for life to permeate art, hence the realistic conversations we find in Jane Austen (compared to the epistolary novels of the eighteenth century and the speech making we find in Samuel Johnson), hence Monet's paintings of railway stations, hence "verismo" in Italian opera. But the acmeists (an offshoot of symbolism to which Vygotsky was was quite close at the time of writing "Psychology of Art") turned this on its head. Their great slogan was for art to permeate life, so that each moment of everyday conversation, each photograph we take, and each snatch of street noise might be live-experienced the way we experience a novel, a painting, or an opera. Vygotsky says that for this to happen we need art criticism. If art is the moment of actual experiencing, art criticism is the "perizhivanie" of the experience. This is incorrectly conceived of as "catharisis" (even by Vygotsky himself earlier in the book). "Catharisis" is therapeutic and self-limiting; it's a matter of explaining away and destroying a pathology; this is true whether we read Aristotle or Freud. But that is not "perizhivanie". Like all units of development (Vygotsky: "relational units"), perizhivanie is a unit that develops: in the infant it means one thing and in the art critic something that is linked, but distinct. We can say that for the infant, "perizhivanie" is the feeling of what happens more or less as it happens (the satisfaction of drinking the milk as you are drinking it). But for the art critic, "perizhivanie" is really Wordsworth's "emotion recollected in tranquility". It's a catharsis which doesn't disappear but which develops into a more complex, more potent, and higher form instead. Wordworth wrote some good poems, but we can only really see how and why when we read his really bad ones, and I think "The Tables Turned (Enough of Art and Science)" is an example of Wordsworth at his very worst. Ruqaiya Hasan wrote that what is different about verbal art (she means what is different about verbal ART as opposed to other forms of verbalism) is that we can separate its verbalization from a layer she calls "symbolic articulation" and we can even seperate this layer of symbolic articulation from a layer she calls "theme". In Wordworth's poem, the verbalization is the rhyme and meter, the way in which "leaves" rhymes with "receives" and "intellect" does NOT rhyme with "dissect". The layer of symbolic articulation is at the level of "barren leaves" and "murder to dissect", both of which are symbols which articulate Wordworth's small-minded, reactionary, English disgust with and hatred for the great French tradition of rationalism. But the theme? The theme is..."turning the tables" and abandoning your books! This is why it's really a bad poem--the means contradicts the message. I hope I have not, with this explanation, destroyed anyone's pleasure in the poem, but anyone who feels that I have should go and read "Tintern Abbey" or the Lucy poems....here you can see that the layers do not contradict each other at all, and the difference really like the difference between chewing dry crunchy barren leaves and fresh green shoots that you can whistle with or put in your salad. David Kellogg On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 4:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > You may be right, Rod. Perhaps Beth could give us the quote in context so > we have a better chance of understanding it? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 5:19 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > >> Apologies again for coming late into a conversation but I was interested >> by a disparity between my reading of Beth's quote from Vygotsky and (what I >> understand as being) Andy's reading of the same quote. Andy seems to read >> the quote as saying that art BOTH produces (or perhaps catalyses) an >> experience in the observer AND explains this experience but I read the >> quote (and Beth's use of it) as suggesting that it is imperative BOTH for >> art to bring on the experience AND that that experience should be explained >> (it is imperative ... to explain it) - though not necessarily explained BY >> the art itself. The reason why I was intrigued by this difference in >> interpretations is that it made me reflect on what is achieved when an >> experience is explained. I suspect that we tend to focus too much, even >> exclusively, on what the explanation brings to (and out from) the >> experience but isn't it also true that the process of explaining an >> experience also affects the medium in which the explanation is expressed. A >> language which is bent into the service of explaining experiences is bent >> by that process, becoming enriched by the ways it has been used, acquiring >> a patina of use which is carried into other situations. A system of >> categories can perhaps be given heart if people struggle with the task of >> hacking it to describe, represent and explain things which it may not (yet) >> be fit to explain - so language comes to echo and resonate with the >> experiences of the people who use it - a kind of frohWian process (that's >> Whorf in reverse). >> >> All the best, >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 17 July 2015 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> Beth. yes, when you reflect on something, it is already past. If you want >> to reproduce it, then as a human being you will have to analyse it. >> The trade of being an artist is the capacity to synthesise the elements >> and give you something of the ineffable. But I love that quote you have >> from Vygotsky, where he claims that art not only excites the experience in >> the reader, but also /explains/ it. I think that is actually setting a high >> standard for art. Dickens did not explain Dickensian London, but he >> represented it so faithfully. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 17/07/2015 4:13 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >>> But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without loosing >>> the whole entirely in the process of reflection. >>> >>> Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, >>> something about having an artist on every research team. I have been >>> thinking about this. If the "artist, in comparison with his fellows, >>> is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in >>> unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" then this is who we >>> need to tell us which property is the one that can characterize the >>> experience as a whole. >>> >>> No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is >>> prior but how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- >>> sort of like the empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you >>> study the bowl itself then you miss the whole point. >>> >>> I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating >>> things?: >>> >>> "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is >>> a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." >>> and >>> >>> ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of >>> art take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to explain >>> art, /and to explain it in such a way that the explanation does not >>> kill the emotion/.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) >>> >>> >>> I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking of >>> how I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their >>> students and the activities with these students with such art, and how >>> I am getting better at creating classroom spaces that support this >>> description -- but am still not clear about how to consistently create >>> spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation and >>> reflection. >>> >>> >>> This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, and >>> thinking about Leigh Star's work. >>> >>> >>> Beth >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >>> >>> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >>> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions >>> that reflection can make within it. In >>> discourse//about//an experience, we must make use >>> of these adjectives of interpretation. In going >>> over an experience in mind//after/ /its >>> occurrence, we may find that one property rather >>> than another was sufficiently dominant so that it >>> characterizes the experience as a whole." >>> >>> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these >>> distinction when we *reflect* on an experience. And >>> perhaps we include the experience in our >>> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it >>> scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and >>> synthesis. But it is important to recognise that the >>> unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >>> cognition (for example) but also of attention and will >>> - and any other categories you abstract from an >>> experience. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>> >>>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? >>>> Like a fractal? I think it is the similarity across >>>> scales that makes an experience proleptic, or gives >>>> that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to >>>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an >>>> experience on several timescales and so a sense of >>>> deja-vu is central to having an experience. This is >>>> what I am thinking about after reading both the paper >>>> of Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, >>>> Andy, although I am picking up on a small piece of >>>> the last email in this chain -- : If something is >>>> only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is >>>> what is bothering me. Beth >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just >>>> pursuing this question you raised about Dewey's >>>> saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval >>>> buildings arises from their not being "planned" >>>> like buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say >>>> "Every work of art follows the plan of, and >>>> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he >>>> is raising here is the completeness of an >>>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, >>>> and this cannot be created by assembling together >>>> parts in the way a modern building is planned. An >>>> experience - the kind of thing which sticks in >>>> your mind - is an original or prior unity, not a >>>> combination, and this is what gives a work of art >>>> that ineffable quality, something which can only >>>> be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an >>>> experience. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did >>>> I set out to have that experience, that >>>> morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long >>>> time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I >>>> have just treated it as an indiscriminate >>>> activity, probably, I had done so before. >>>> >>>> But I am guessing you're getting a something >>>> here Andy? >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>>> = >>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] On Behalf >>>> Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>> >>>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the >>>> experience with the paintings..." >>>> >>>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set >>>> out that morning to have that experience? >>>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he >>>> says you can't do things indiscriminately and >>>> have vital experience, but you also can't >>>> plan things?" >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your >>>> question Andy, but perhaps it has >>>> something to do with my grandfather's >>>> favorite saying (translated from >>>> Yiddish), >>>> >>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>> = >>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>> >>>> So Michael, there was just that one >>>> occasion, in all your museum-going, when >>>> you had an experience. Was that planned? >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a >>>> number of such experiences, >>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>> >>>> I think this is one of the most >>>> complex aspects of experience, what >>>> does he mean when he says you can't >>>> do things indiscriminately and have >>>> vital experience, but you also can't >>>> plan things? I have discussed >>>> (argued) about this a lot with my >>>> students. I have especially seen him >>>> raise this point in at least two of >>>> his great works, Democracy and >>>> Education and Experience and Nature - >>>> and again of course in Art as >>>> Experience (notice he is not saying >>>> how Art enters into experience but >>>> how art is experience - I have come >>>> to notice these little things more >>>> and more in his writing). >>>> >>>> The difficulty we have, at least in >>>> the United States because of the >>>> dominance of the idea of >>>> meta-cognition, is that we too often >>>> translate what individuals are >>>> bringing in to experience to organize >>>> it as a form of meta-cognition. It >>>> is kind of possible to make that >>>> interpretation from Democracy and >>>> Education, although what I think he >>>> is doing more is arguing against >>>> misinterpretations of his work as >>>> random, child centered activities. I >>>> think he is clearer in Experience and >>>> Nature that we bring in who we are at >>>> the moment into the activity, and use >>>> who we are (I don't want to say >>>> identity) as an organizing principle >>>> for what we do. It is perhaps one of >>>> the places where Dewey and Vygotsky >>>> are close. Perhaps I can use the >>>> same Jackson Pollock example. The >>>> first few times I saw his paintings I >>>> was trying to "apprecitate" them >>>> because I was told that was the best >>>> way to experience them. Dewey says >>>> no vital experience there because my >>>> activities become stilted and artificia >>>> l. Sometimes I went through the >>>> museum and just looked at pictures, >>>> one to the other. No vital >>>> experience there, just random >>>> threads. But that time I had the >>>> experience with the paintings I was >>>> allowing who I was, what had been >>>> built up in the trajectory of my life >>>> to enter into my experience with the >>>> painting, making it a vital >>>> experience. I think Dewey makes the >>>> argument in Experience and Nature >>>> that it is not just the experience >>>> the moment before, but the >>>> experiences leading to that >>>> experience, the context of my life, >>>> of my parent's life, of a long line >>>> of historical experiences. >>>> >>>> Anyway, my take. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> - >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Beth Ferholt >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>> >>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Beth Ferholt >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City >>> University of New York >>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>> >>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> >>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >> by an official order form. >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 17 19:42:25 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 12:42:25 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> Like you, Beth, I have found this xmca thread particularly exciting! There is one thing I'd like to add, which is implicit in Mike's quote from Marx: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art which is that Dewey holds an experience to be both suffering and *doing* [Tatigkeit in German]. The doing means that an experience (to be an experience, and stand out from the background of experience, have significance and form a whole) entails wilfully changing the world, even if that changing is trivial, such as changing other people's attitudes to you or most trivially changing how you henceforth interact with a certain kind of situation, person or whatever. But doing is doing, it is not just going through the motions or habit. And that is why experiences in this sense are so important to the development of the personality and the world, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests me > most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and then > to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was a > preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be described as > being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an > experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so > condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that you > can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an experience''? > > Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what is > most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true to > the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If you > don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words that > give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even > remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. > > I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties that > will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named 'preschool > didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in > research. This sounds like 5D. > > Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. One > is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art creates > in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the effect > of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a unity, > and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what we > have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art as > a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid > this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. > > As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget this > then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. As an > researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the first > purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not conserve > the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could have > a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest questions > to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people > working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not know > how to do this even in my own work. > > Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children before > your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo suggested The > Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, also > Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is > studying see. > > Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> Mike, could you elaborate on that? >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> mike cole >> Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> Alfredo-- >> >> a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >> >>> I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with his >>> mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the latter >> is >>> not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms of >>> consequences for the participants, which they display for each other in >>> their actual practice. >>> >>> This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of ANALYSIS >>> BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. Unit >>> analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real >>> phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That is >>> why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned not >> to >>> think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". >>> >>> Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action and >>> transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own powers. >> This >>> is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by >>> elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of >>> action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively >>> detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without isolation >> of >>> presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements??. An >>> experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in itself: >> it >>> is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & >> Bentley >>> write. >>> >>> I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, >>> Alfredo >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of >>> mike cole >>> Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, >>> spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be >>> antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of >>> the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, >>> only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any >>> means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of >>> life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there >> a >>> purely theoretical problem." >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >>>> >>>> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >>>> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that >>>> reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an >>>> experience, we must make use of these adjectives of >>>> interpretation. In going over an experience in >>>> mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one >>>> property rather than another was sufficiently dominant >>>> so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." >>>> >>>> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when >> we >>>> *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in >> our >>>> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all >> of >>>> which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to >>> recognise >>>> that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >> cognition >>>> (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories >>> you >>>> abstract from an experience. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>>> >>>>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I >>>>> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience >>>>> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road >>> to >>>>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on >> several >>>>> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an >> experience. >>>>> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of >> Dewey's >>>>> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up >>> on a >>>>> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only >>>>> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. >>> Beth >>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing >>>>> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the >>>>> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from >>>>> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. >>>>> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan >>>>> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle >>>>> he is raising here is the completeness of an >>>>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >>>>> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in >>>>> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - >>>>> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an >>>>> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this >>>>> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, >>>>> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing >>>>> that whole of an experience. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set >>>>> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I >>>>> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm >>>>> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as >>>>> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done >>>>> so before. >>>>> >>>>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here >>>>> Andy? >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>>>> = >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> ] On Behalf Of >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>> >>>>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience >>>>> with the paintings..." >>>>> >>>>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out >>>>> that morning to have that experience? >>>>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says >>>>> you can't do things indiscriminately and have >>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question >>>>> Andy, but perhaps it has >>>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite >>>>> saying (translated from >>>>> Yiddish), >>>>> >>>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>>> = >>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> ] >>>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>> >>>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, >>>>> in all your museum-going, when you had an >>>>> experience. Was that planned? >>>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number >>>>> of such experiences, >>>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>>> >>>>> I think this is one of the most complex >>>>> aspects of experience, what does he mean >>>>> when he says you can't do things >>>>> indiscriminately and have vital >>>>> experience, but you also can't plan >>>>> things? I have discussed (argued) about >>>>> this a lot with my students. I have >>>>> especially seen him raise this point in at >>>>> least two of his great works, Democracy >>>>> and Education and Experience and Nature - >>>>> and again of course in Art as Experience >>>>> (notice he is not saying how Art enters >>>>> into experience but how art is experience >>>>> - I have come to notice these little >>>>> things more and more in his writing). >>>>> >>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the >>>>> United States because of the dominance of >>>>> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too >>>>> often translate what individuals are >>>>> bringing in to experience to organize it >>>>> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind >>>>> of possible to make that interpretation >>>>> from Democracy and Education, although >>>>> what I think he is doing more is arguing >>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as >>>>> random, child centered activities. I >>>>> think he is clearer in Experience and >>>>> Nature that we bring in who we are at the >>>>> moment into the activity, and use who we >>>>> are (I don't want to say identity) as an >>>>> organizing principle for what we do. It >>>>> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey >>>>> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use >>>>> the same Jackson Pollock example. The >>>>> first few times I saw his paintings I was >>>>> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was >>>>> told that was the best way to experience >>>>> them. Dewey says no vital experience >>>>> there because my activities become stilted >>>>> and artificia >>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the >>>>> museum and just looked at pictures, one to >>>>> the other. No vital experience there, >>>>> just random threads. But that time I had >>>>> the experience with the paintings I was >>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up >>>>> in the trajectory of my life to enter into >>>>> my experience with the painting, making it >>>>> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes >>>>> the argument in Experience and Nature that >>>>> it is not just the experience the moment >>>>> before, but the experiences leading to >>>>> that experience, the context of my life, >>>>> of my parent's life, of a long line of >>>>> historical experiences. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, my take. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Beth Ferholt >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>>> >>>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>> >>> >> >> -- >> >> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >> Ecological Niche, 2008) >> >> > From bferholt@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 20:03:57 2015 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 23:03:57 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, this really makes sense! So it is the doing that is the practical energy. SO Marx was writing about a method of perezhivanie? I may be conflating things but I am trying to piece together several pieces (like how in a big city you know a whole neighborhood as a world unto itself, and then you find out it is in the same area as another neighborhood that you know well -- but you did not know they were connected -- ). Actually that process of piecing together across the gaps is also related to what we are talking about. Of course. When you age in a city you also have the depth of the memories in layers at a given place, and this stringing together across time and place is what Virginia Woolf calls life: moments in which "life stands still her" strung together like a strand of pearls = with gaps between them. Beth On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Like you, Beth, I have found this xmca thread particularly exciting! > There is one thing I'd like to add, which is implicit in Mike's quote from > Marx: > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art > which is that Dewey holds an experience to be both suffering and *doing* > [Tatigkeit in German]. > The doing means that an experience (to be an experience, and stand out > from the background of experience, have significance and form a whole) > entails wilfully changing the world, even if that changing is trivial, such > as changing other people's attitudes to you or most trivially changing how > you henceforth interact with a certain kind of situation, person or > whatever. But doing is doing, it is not just going through the motions or > habit. And that is why experiences in this sense are so important to the > development of the personality and the world, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >> This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests me >> most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and then >> to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was a >> preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be described >> as >> being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an >> experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so >> condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that you >> can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an >> experience''? >> >> Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what is >> most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true to >> the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If you >> don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words that >> give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even >> remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. >> >> I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties >> that >> will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named 'preschool >> didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in >> research. This sounds like 5D. >> >> Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. >> One >> is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art >> creates >> in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the >> effect >> of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a unity, >> and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what we >> have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art as >> a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid >> this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. >> >> As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget >> this >> then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. As >> an >> researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the first >> purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not >> conserve >> the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could have >> a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest >> questions >> to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people >> working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not know >> how to do this even in my own work. >> >> Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children before >> your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo suggested >> The >> Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, also >> Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is >> studying see. >> >> Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. >> >> Beth >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >> >> Mike, could you elaborate on that? >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of >>> mike cole >>> Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> Alfredo-- >>> >>> a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with his >>>> mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the latter >>>> >>> is >>> >>>> not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms of >>>> consequences for the participants, which they display for each other in >>>> their actual practice. >>>> >>>> This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of >>>> ANALYSIS >>>> BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. Unit >>>> analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real >>>> phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That is >>>> why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned not >>>> >>> to >>> >>>> think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". >>>> >>>> Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action and >>>> transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own powers. >>>> >>> This >>> >>>> is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by >>>> elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of >>>> action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively >>>> detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without isolation >>>> >>> of >>> >>>> presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements??. >>>> An >>>> experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in itself: >>>> >>> it >>> >>>> is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & >>>> >>> Bentley >>> >>>> write. >>>> >>>> I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, >>>> Alfredo >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> on behalf of >>>> mike cole >>>> Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>> >>>> Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, >>>> spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be >>>> antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of >>>> the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means, >>>> only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any >>>> means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of >>>> life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there >>>> >>> a >>> >>>> purely theoretical problem." >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >>>>> >>>>> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >>>>> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that >>>>> reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an >>>>> experience, we must make use of these adjectives of >>>>> interpretation. In going over an experience in >>>>> mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one >>>>> property rather than another was sufficiently dominant >>>>> so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." >>>>> >>>>> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when >>>>> >>>> we >>> >>>> *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in >>>>> >>>> our >>> >>>> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, all >>>>> >>>> of >>> >>>> which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to >>>>> >>>> recognise >>>> >>>>> that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >>>>> >>>> cognition >>> >>>> (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other categories >>>>> >>>> you >>>> >>>>> abstract from an experience. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I >>>>>> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience >>>>>> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>> >>>>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on >>>>>> >>>>> several >>> >>>> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an >>>>>> >>>>> experience. >>> >>>> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of >>>>>> >>>>> Dewey's >>> >>>> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking up >>>>>> >>>>> on a >>>> >>>>> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is only >>>>>> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering me. >>>>>> >>>>> Beth >>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing >>>>>> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the >>>>>> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from >>>>>> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. >>>>>> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan >>>>>> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle >>>>>> he is raising here is the completeness of an >>>>>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >>>>>> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in >>>>>> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - >>>>>> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an >>>>>> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this >>>>>> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, >>>>>> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing >>>>>> that whole of an experience. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set >>>>>> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I >>>>>> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm >>>>>> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as >>>>>> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done >>>>>> so before. >>>>>> >>>>>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here >>>>>> Andy? >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>>>>> = >>>>>> >>>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>> ] On Behalf Of >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>> >>>>>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience >>>>>> with the paintings..." >>>>>> >>>>>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out >>>>>> that morning to have that experience? >>>>>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says >>>>>> you can't do things indiscriminately and have >>>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question >>>>>> Andy, but perhaps it has >>>>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite >>>>>> saying (translated from >>>>>> Yiddish), >>>>>> >>>>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >>>>>> >>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>>>> = >>>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> ] >>>>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>> >>>>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, >>>>>> in all your museum-going, when you had an >>>>>> experience. Was that planned? >>>>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number >>>>>> of such experiences, >>>>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>>>> >>>>>> I think this is one of the most complex >>>>>> aspects of experience, what does he mean >>>>>> when he says you can't do things >>>>>> indiscriminately and have vital >>>>>> experience, but you also can't plan >>>>>> things? I have discussed (argued) about >>>>>> this a lot with my students. I have >>>>>> especially seen him raise this point in at >>>>>> least two of his great works, Democracy >>>>>> and Education and Experience and Nature - >>>>>> and again of course in Art as Experience >>>>>> (notice he is not saying how Art enters >>>>>> into experience but how art is experience >>>>>> - I have come to notice these little >>>>>> things more and more in his writing). >>>>>> >>>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the >>>>>> United States because of the dominance of >>>>>> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too >>>>>> often translate what individuals are >>>>>> bringing in to experience to organize it >>>>>> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind >>>>>> of possible to make that interpretation >>>>>> from Democracy and Education, although >>>>>> what I think he is doing more is arguing >>>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as >>>>>> random, child centered activities. I >>>>>> think he is clearer in Experience and >>>>>> Nature that we bring in who we are at the >>>>>> moment into the activity, and use who we >>>>>> are (I don't want to say identity) as an >>>>>> organizing principle for what we do. It >>>>>> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey >>>>>> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use >>>>>> the same Jackson Pollock example. The >>>>>> first few times I saw his paintings I was >>>>>> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was >>>>>> told that was the best way to experience >>>>>> them. Dewey says no vital experience >>>>>> there because my activities become stilted >>>>>> and artificia >>>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the >>>>>> museum and just looked at pictures, one to >>>>>> the other. No vital experience there, >>>>>> just random threads. But that time I had >>>>>> the experience with the paintings I was >>>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up >>>>>> in the trajectory of my life to enter into >>>>>> my experience with the painting, making it >>>>>> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes >>>>>> the argument in Experience and Nature that >>>>>> it is not just the experience the moment >>>>>> before, but the experiences leading to >>>>>> that experience, the context of my life, >>>>>> of my parent's life, of a long line of >>>>>> historical experiences. >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyway, my take. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> >>>>>> - >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Beth Ferholt >>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>>>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>>>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>>>> >>>>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>>>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >>>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>> >>> >>> >> > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 17 20:11:21 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 13:11:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> Message-ID: <55A9C3D9.5090509@mira.net> According to Mikhail Munipov (whom you have met on FaceBook, Beth) that process of "life standing still" is characteristic of the cathartic moment of a perezhivanie. And David, if I associate catharsis with perezhivanie I am more referring to its meaning in Greek drama, not 19th century medicine or Freudian psychoanalysis, all of these being derivatives of the original Greek, I think, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 18/07/2015 1:03 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > Yes, this really makes sense! So it is the doing that is > the practical energy. SO Marx was writing about a method > of perezhivanie? > > I may be conflating things but I am trying to piece > together several pieces (like how in a big city you know a > whole neighborhood as a world unto itself, and then you > find out it is in the same area as another neighborhood > that you know well -- but you did not know they were > connected -- ). > > Actually that process of piecing together across the gaps > is also related to what we are talking about. Of course. > When you age in a city you also have the depth of the > memories in layers at a given place, and this stringing > together across time and place is what Virginia Woolf > calls life: moments in which "life stands still her" > strung together like a strand of pearls = with gaps > between them. > > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Like you, Beth, I have found this xmca thread > particularly exciting! > There is one thing I'd like to add, which is implicit > in Mike's quote from Marx: > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art > which is that Dewey holds an experience to be both > suffering and *doing* [Tatigkeit in German]. > The doing means that an experience (to be an > experience, and stand out from the background of > experience, have significance and form a whole) > entails wilfully changing the world, even if that > changing is trivial, such as changing other people's > attitudes to you or most trivially changing how you > henceforth interact with a certain kind of situation, > person or whatever. But doing is doing, it is not just > going through the motions or habit. And that is why > experiences in this sense are so important to the > development of the personality and the world, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever > felt to what interests me > most. It covers all the interests that brought me > first to play and then > to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. > Before I went to LCHC I was a > preschool teacher and this is a profession that I > think can be described as > being, in its first part, responsible for > reflecting upon the 'having an > experience' that is happening all around you every > day (time is so > condensed for young children so it is happening > all the time) so that you > can support the self-creation beings who are able > to "have an experience''? > > Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher > you find that what is > most important is to describe what is happening in > a way that is true to > the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us > how to do this. If you > don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who > has had the words that > give it life removed from its mouth: you just have > dirt, nothing even > remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. > > I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for > us those properties that > will characterize the experience as a whole. What > Monica named 'preschool > didactics from within' is a process of working > with these people in > research. This sounds like 5D. > > Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two > purposes of art criticism. One > is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, > guiding what art creates > in its audience in useful directions. The other > is to 'conserve the effect > of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, > because art is a unity, > and without the whole criticism is not related to > art -- he calls what we > have left, without the unity, a wound. But > criticism of art treats art as > a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. > Vygtosky shows how to avoid > this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. > > As a preschool teacher you know that art is life > because if you forget this > then you have unhappy children and your job is > impossible, or worse. As an > researcher, every time you hit something hard you > can revert to the first > purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the > part that does not conserve > the effect, without any consequences on your > livelihood. If we could have > a system of science that makes it impossible to > leave the hardest questions > to the first purpose of criticism, then we could > have so many people > working on these hardest questions in a meaningful > way, but I do not know > how to do this even in my own work. > > Except one way is to place the desires of the > teachers and children before > your own. This is sort of a method of love or > empathy. Kiyo suggested The > Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) > and this is related, also > Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality > that the people she is > studying see. > > Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet > Gil > > wrote: > > Mike, could you elaborate on that? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of > mike cole > > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Alfredo-- > > a "method of organization" seems close to a > synonym for design. > > mike > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > I like very much how Greg brings in a > methodological issue here with his > mention about ethnography and his reading > of "fidelity"; that the latter > > is > > not about representing exactly, but about > describing events in terms of > consequences for the participants, which > they display for each other in > their actual practice. > > This methodological aspect makes me think > that the the notion of ANALYSIS > BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca > before, is useful here. Unit > analysis reminds us that, as units, > experiences, as concrete and real > phenomena, have some form of organization > that extends in time. That is > why, if I understood the discussion below > correctly, Beth is warned not > > to > > think of the unit of experience as a unit > "in itself". > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the > differentiation between self-action and > transaction. In self action, things are > explained by their own powers. > > This > > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have > referred to as analysis by > elements. In transaction, they say, > ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of > action, without final attribution to > ?elements? or other presumptively > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or > ?realities,? and without isolation > > of > > presumptively detachable ?relations? from > such detachable ?elements??. An > experience can be studied precisely > because it is not a thing in itself: > > it > > is always a moving, gesture, a "method of > organization" as Dewey & > > Bentley > > write. > > I thought this my add something to your > fascinating discussion, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of > mike cole > > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Marx: It is only in a social context that > subjectivism and objectivism, > spiritualism and materialism, activity and > passivity, cease to be > antinomies and thus cease to exist as such > antinomies. The resolution of > the theoretical contradictions is possible > only through practical means, > only through the practical energy of man. > Their resolution is not by any > means, therefore, only a problem of > knowledge, but is a real problem of > life which philosophy was unable to solve > precisely because it saw there > > a > > purely theoretical problem." > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy > Blunden > > > wrote: > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither emotional, > practical, nor > intellectual, for these terms name > distinctions that > reflection can make within it. In > discourse//about//an > experience, we must make use of > these adjectives of > interpretation. In going over an > experience in > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we > may find that one > property rather than another was > sufficiently dominant > so that it characterizes the > experience as a whole." > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! > We make these distinction when > > we > > *reflect* on an experience. And > perhaps we include the experience in > > our > > autobiography, act it out on the > stage, analyse it scientifically, all > > of > > which presupposes analysis and > synthesis. But it is important to > > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not > only a unity of emotion and > > cognition > > (for example) but also of attention > and will - and any other categories > > you > > abstract from an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > Or reproducing the part that > represents the whole? Like a > fractal? I > think it is the similarity across > scales that makes an experience > proleptic, or gives that 'bliss > conferred at the beginning of the road > > to > > redemption" that Vasilyuk refers > to. You have an experience on > > several > > timescales and so a sense of > deja-vu is central to having an > > experience. > > This is what I am thinking about > after reading both the paper of > > Dewey's > > and your recent piece on > perezhivanie, Andy, although I am > picking up > > on a > > small piece of the last email in > this chain -- : If something is only > itself in its whole then you can't > study it, is what is bothering me. > > Beth > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, > Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > > Not "getting at something", > Michael. Just pursuing > this question you raised > about Dewey's saying that the > aesthetic quality of medieval > buildings arises from > their not being "planned" > like buildings are nowadays. > He goes on to say "Every work > of art follows the plan > of, and pattern of, a > complete experience." The puzzle > he is raising here is the > completeness of an > experience which gives it its > aesthetic quality, and > this cannot be created by > assembling together parts in > the way a modern building is > planned. An experience - > the kind of thing which > sticks in your mind - is an > original or prior unity, not > a combination, and this > is what gives a work of art > that ineffable quality, > something which can only be > transmitted by reproducing > that whole of an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, > Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Andy, > > I'm still not sure about > your question. Did I set > out to have that > experience, that morning...no, I > don't think so (it was a > long time ago, but I'm > pretty sure no). Could I > have just treated it as > an indiscriminate > activity, probably, I had done > so before. > > But I am guessing you're > getting a something here > Andy? > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > > >= > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >] On > Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, July 16, > 2015 12:21 PM > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an experience > > YOu said: "... But that > time I had the experience > with the paintings..." > > I mean that was an > experience. Did you set out > that morning to have that > experience? > RE, your question: "what > does he mean when he says > you can't do things > indiscriminately and have > vital experience, but you > also can't plan things?" > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, > Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Well I'm not sure I > understand your question > Andy, but perhaps it has > something to do with > my grandfather's favorite > saying (translated from > Yiddish), > > Man plans, God laughs. > > Michael > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > > >= > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >] > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, July > 16, 2015 12:04 PM > To: > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an experience > > So Michael, there was > just that one occasion, > in all your > museum-going, when you had an > experience. Was that > planned? > (I don't mean to say > you haven't had a number > of such experiences, > Michael ... just some > number actually) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 17/07/2015 1:19 > AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hi Larry and all, > > I think this is > one of the most complex > aspects of > experience, what does he mean > when he says you > can't do things > indiscriminately > and have vital > experience, but > you also can't plan > things? I have > discussed (argued) about > this a lot with > my students. I have > especially seen > him raise this point in at > least two of his > great works, Democracy > and Education and > Experience and Nature - > and again of > course in Art as Experience > (notice he is not > saying how Art enters > into experience > but how art is experience > - I have come to > notice these little > things more and > more in his writing). > > The difficulty we > have, at least in the > United States > because of the dominance of > the idea of > meta-cognition, is that we too > often translate > what individuals are > bringing in to > experience to organize it > as a form of > meta-cognition. It is kind > of possible to > make that interpretation > from Democracy > and Education, although > what I think he > is doing more is arguing > against > misinterpretations of his work as > random, child > centered activities. I > think he is > clearer in Experience and > Nature that we > bring in who we are at the > moment into the > activity, and use who we > are (I don't want > to say identity) as an > organizing > principle for what we do. It > is perhaps one of > the places where Dewey > and Vygotsky are > close. Perhaps I can use > the same Jackson > Pollock example. The > first few times I > saw his paintings I was > trying to > "apprecitate" them because I was > told that was the > best way to experience > them. Dewey says > no vital experience > there because my > activities become stilted > and artificia > l. Sometimes > I went through the > museum and just > looked at pictures, one to > the other. No > vital experience there, > just random > threads. But that time I had > the experience > with the paintings I was > allowing who I > was, what had been built up > in the trajectory > of my life to enter into > my experience > with the painting, making it > a vital > experience. I think Dewey makes > the argument in > Experience and Nature that > it is not just > the experience the moment > before, but the > experiences leading to > that experience, > the context of my life, > of my parent's > life, of a long line of > historical > experiences. > > Anyway, my take. > > Michael > > - > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and > Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University > of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given > forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given > forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From bferholt@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 20:25:45 2015 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 23:25:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A9C3D9.5090509@mira.net> References: <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> <55A9C3D9.5090509@mira.net> Message-ID: Which stage according to Vasilyuk's stages is the standing still? Redemption or the smack middle of repentance, when you can see both directions at once? Beth On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > According to Mikhail Munipov (whom you have met on FaceBook, Beth) that > process of "life standing still" is characteristic of the cathartic moment > of a perezhivanie. > And David, if I associate catharsis with perezhivanie I am more referring > to its meaning in Greek drama, not 19th century medicine or Freudian > psychoanalysis, all of these being derivatives of the original Greek, I > think, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 18/07/2015 1:03 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >> Yes, this really makes sense! So it is the doing that is the practical >> energy. SO Marx was writing about a method of perezhivanie? >> >> I may be conflating things but I am trying to piece together several >> pieces (like how in a big city you know a whole neighborhood as a world >> unto itself, and then you find out it is in the same area as another >> neighborhood that you know well -- but you did not know they were connected >> -- ). >> >> Actually that process of piecing together across the gaps is also related >> to what we are talking about. Of course. When you age in a city you also >> have the depth of the memories in layers at a given place, and this >> stringing together across time and place is what Virginia Woolf calls life: >> moments in which "life stands still her" strung together like a strand of >> pearls = with gaps between them. >> >> Beth >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Like you, Beth, I have found this xmca thread >> particularly exciting! >> There is one thing I'd like to add, which is implicit >> in Mike's quote from Marx: >> >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art >> which is that Dewey holds an experience to be both >> suffering and *doing* [Tatigkeit in German]. >> The doing means that an experience (to be an >> experience, and stand out from the background of >> experience, have significance and form a whole) >> entails wilfully changing the world, even if that >> changing is trivial, such as changing other people's >> attitudes to you or most trivially changing how you >> henceforth interact with a certain kind of situation, >> person or whatever. But doing is doing, it is not just >> going through the motions or habit. And that is why >> experiences in this sense are so important to the >> development of the personality and the world, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >> This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever >> felt to what interests me >> most. It covers all the interests that brought me >> first to play and then >> to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went >> to LCHC I was a >> preschool teacher and this is a profession that I >> think can be described as >> being, in its first part, responsible for >> reflecting upon the 'having an >> experience' that is happening all around you every >> day (time is so >> condensed for young children so it is happening >> all the time) so that you >> can support the self-creation beings who are able >> to "have an experience''? >> >> Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher >> you find that what is >> most important is to describe what is happening in >> a way that is true to >> the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us >> how to do this. If you >> don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who >> has had the words that >> give it life removed from its mouth: you just have >> dirt, nothing even >> remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. >> >> I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for >> us those properties that >> will characterize the experience as a whole. What >> Monica named 'preschool >> didactics from within' is a process of working >> with these people in >> research. This sounds like 5D. >> >> Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two >> purposes of art criticism. One >> is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, >> guiding what art creates >> in its audience in useful directions. The other >> is to 'conserve the effect >> of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, >> because art is a unity, >> and without the whole criticism is not related to >> art -- he calls what we >> have left, without the unity, a wound. But >> criticism of art treats art as >> a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky >> shows how to avoid >> this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. >> >> As a preschool teacher you know that art is life >> because if you forget this >> then you have unhappy children and your job is >> impossible, or worse. As an >> researcher, every time you hit something hard you >> can revert to the first >> purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the >> part that does not conserve >> the effect, without any consequences on your >> livelihood. If we could have >> a system of science that makes it impossible to >> leave the hardest questions >> to the first purpose of criticism, then we could >> have so many people >> working on these hardest questions in a meaningful >> way, but I do not know >> how to do this even in my own work. >> >> Except one way is to place the desires of the >> teachers and children before >> your own. This is sort of a method of love or >> empathy. Kiyo suggested The >> Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) >> and this is related, also >> Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality >> that the people she is >> studying see. >> >> Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. >> >> Beth >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet >> Gil > >> wrote: >> >> Mike, could you elaborate on that? >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> mike cole > >> Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> Alfredo-- >> >> a "method of organization" seems close to a >> synonym for design. >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil > > >> >> wrote: >> >> I like very much how Greg brings in a >> methodological issue here with his >> mention about ethnography and his reading >> of "fidelity"; that the latter >> >> is >> >> not about representing exactly, but about >> describing events in terms of >> consequences for the participants, which >> they display for each other in >> their actual practice. >> >> This methodological aspect makes me think >> that the the notion of ANALYSIS >> BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca >> before, is useful here. Unit >> analysis reminds us that, as units, >> experiences, as concrete and real >> phenomena, have some form of organization >> that extends in time. That is >> why, if I understood the discussion below >> correctly, Beth is warned not >> >> to >> >> think of the unit of experience as a unit >> "in itself". >> >> Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the >> differentiation between self-action and >> transaction. In self action, things are >> explained by their own powers. >> >> This >> >> is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have >> referred to as analysis by >> elements. In transaction, they say, >> ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of >> action, without final attribution to >> ?elements? or other presumptively >> detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or >> ?realities,? and without isolation >> >> of >> >> presumptively detachable ?relations? from >> such detachable ?elements??. An >> experience can be studied precisely >> because it is not a thing in itself: >> >> it >> >> is always a moving, gesture, a "method of >> organization" as Dewey & >> >> Bentley >> >> write. >> >> I thought this my add something to your >> fascinating discussion, >> Alfredo >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> mike cole > > >> Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> Marx: It is only in a social context that >> subjectivism and objectivism, >> spiritualism and materialism, activity and >> passivity, cease to be >> antinomies and thus cease to exist as such >> antinomies. The resolution of >> the theoretical contradictions is possible >> only through practical means, >> only through the practical energy of man. >> Their resolution is not by any >> means, therefore, only a problem of >> knowledge, but is a real problem of >> life which philosophy was unable to solve >> precisely because it saw there >> >> a >> >> purely theoretical problem." >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy >> Blunden > > >> >> wrote: >> >> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >> >> "This unity is neither emotional, >> practical, nor >> intellectual, for these terms name >> distinctions that >> reflection can make within it. In >> discourse//about//an >> experience, we must make use of >> these adjectives of >> interpretation. In going over an >> experience in >> mind//after/ /its occurrence, we >> may find that one >> property rather than another was >> sufficiently dominant >> so that it characterizes the >> experience as a whole." >> >> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! >> We make these distinction when >> >> we >> >> *reflect* on an experience. And >> perhaps we include the experience in >> >> our >> >> autobiography, act it out on the >> stage, analyse it scientifically, all >> >> of >> >> which presupposes analysis and >> synthesis. But it is important to >> >> recognise >> >> that the unity is prior. It is not >> only a unity of emotion and >> >> cognition >> >> (for example) but also of attention >> and will - and any other categories >> >> you >> >> abstract from an experience. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >> Or reproducing the part that >> represents the whole? Like a >> fractal? I >> think it is the similarity across >> scales that makes an experience >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss >> conferred at the beginning of the road >> >> to >> >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers >> to. You have an experience on >> >> several >> >> timescales and so a sense of >> deja-vu is central to having an >> >> experience. >> >> This is what I am thinking about >> after reading both the paper of >> >> Dewey's >> >> and your recent piece on >> perezhivanie, Andy, although I am >> picking up >> >> on a >> >> small piece of the last email in >> this chain -- : If something is only >> itself in its whole then you can't >> study it, is what is bothering me. >> >> Beth >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, >> Andy Blunden > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Not "getting at something", >> Michael. Just pursuing >> this question you raised >> about Dewey's saying that the >> aesthetic quality of medieval >> buildings arises from >> their not being "planned" >> like buildings are nowadays. >> He goes on to say "Every work >> of art follows the plan >> of, and pattern of, a >> complete experience." The puzzle >> he is raising here is the >> completeness of an >> experience which gives it its >> aesthetic quality, and >> this cannot be created by >> assembling together parts in >> the way a modern building is >> planned. An experience - >> the kind of thing which >> sticks in your mind - is an >> original or prior unity, not >> a combination, and this >> is what gives a work of art >> that ineffable quality, >> something which can only be >> transmitted by reproducing >> that whole of an experience. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> < >> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, >> Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I'm still not sure about >> your question. Did I set >> out to have that >> experience, that morning...no, I >> don't think so (it was a >> long time ago, but I'm >> pretty sure no). Could I >> have just treated it as >> an indiscriminate >> activity, probably, I had done >> so before. >> >> But I am guessing you're >> getting a something here >> Andy? >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > >> [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >> > xmca-l-bounces%2Bglassman.13 >> >= >> >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >] On >> Behalf Of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, >> 2015 12:21 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >> Having an experience >> >> YOu said: "... But that >> time I had the experience >> with the paintings..." >> >> I mean that was an >> experience. Did you set out >> that morning to have that >> experience? >> RE, your question: "what >> does he mean when he says >> you can't do things >> indiscriminately and have >> vital experience, but you >> also can't plan things?" >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> < >> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, >> Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Well I'm not sure I >> understand your question >> Andy, but perhaps it has >> something to do with >> my grandfather's favorite >> saying (translated from >> Yiddish), >> >> Man plans, God laughs. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original >> Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >> >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > >> [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> >> > xmca-l-bounces%2Bmglassman >= >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >> > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, July >> 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> To: >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >> Having an experience >> >> So Michael, there was >> just that one occasion, >> in all your >> museum-going, when you had an >> experience. Was that >> planned? >> (I don't mean to say >> you haven't had a number >> of such experiences, >> Michael ... just some >> number actually) >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> < >> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >> >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 >> AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and all, >> >> I think this is >> one of the most complex >> aspects of >> experience, what does he mean >> when he says you >> can't do things >> indiscriminately >> and have vital >> experience, but >> you also can't plan >> things? I have >> discussed (argued) about >> this a lot with >> my students. I have >> especially seen >> him raise this point in at >> least two of his >> great works, Democracy >> and Education and >> Experience and Nature - >> and again of >> course in Art as Experience >> (notice he is not >> saying how Art enters >> into experience >> but how art is experience >> - I have come to >> notice these little >> things more and >> more in his writing). >> >> The difficulty we >> have, at least in the >> United States >> because of the dominance of >> the idea of >> meta-cognition, is that we too >> often translate >> what individuals are >> bringing in to >> experience to organize it >> as a form of >> meta-cognition. It is kind >> of possible to >> make that interpretation >> from Democracy >> and Education, although >> what I think he >> is doing more is arguing >> against >> misinterpretations of his work as >> random, child >> centered activities. I >> think he is >> clearer in Experience and >> Nature that we >> bring in who we are at the >> moment into the >> activity, and use who we >> are (I don't want >> to say identity) as an >> organizing >> principle for what we do. It >> is perhaps one of >> the places where Dewey >> and Vygotsky are >> close. Perhaps I can use >> the same Jackson >> Pollock example. The >> first few times I >> saw his paintings I was >> trying to >> "apprecitate" them because I was >> told that was the >> best way to experience >> them. Dewey says >> no vital experience >> there because my >> activities become stilted >> and artificia >> l. Sometimes >> I went through the >> museum and just >> looked at pictures, one to >> the other. No >> vital experience there, >> just random >> threads. But that time I had >> the experience >> with the paintings I was >> allowing who I >> was, what had been built up >> in the trajectory >> of my life to enter into >> my experience >> with the painting, making it >> a vital >> experience. I think Dewey makes >> the argument in >> Experience and Nature that >> it is not just >> the experience the moment >> before, but the >> experiences leading to >> that experience, >> the context of my life, >> of my parent's >> life, of a long line of >> historical >> experiences. >> >> Anyway, my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and >> Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University >> of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> > bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> >> > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> >> >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Both environment and species change in the >> course of time, and thus >> ecological niches are not stable and given >> forever (Polotova & Storch, >> Ecological Niche, 2008) >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Both environment and species change in the >> course of time, and thus >> ecological niches are not stable and given >> forever (Polotova & Storch, >> Ecological Niche, 2008) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> > > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 20:40:47 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 20:40:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, the phrase "changing how you henceforth interact with a certain kind of situation, person or whatever". This form of wilfully changing the world as a "doing" may "conceal" as well as "reveal" and become one sided "doing". However, as I was reading Dewey's "Having an Experience" I was reading a caution that we also pause in our reflections/critiques when we are intently focusing on "doing". That THIS "doing" may be/come a one sided intended focus if we loose sight of the "on the other hand" of "doing" [the receiving aspect] as also changing how you henceforth interact with a certain kind of situation, person, or whatever." Changing "how you henceforth act" includes this other kind of "doing" that is not so focused on "constructing" but is more focused as anticipation opening towards and undergoing "an" experience as a way of orienting within the world. performing the world "includes" this doing and that doing and both are agentic ways of experiencing forming places. Either alone and we loose having "an" experience. Is Dewey actually saying what I am putting in his mouth? Am I "translating"? or learning a different "language"? Here is Thomas Kuhn's understanding of "learning a language" There is a certain group of connected terms that seem to occur together in closely related ways in areas that do not make sense. Finally one perceives that if you "use" the words THIS way you can finally understand what these passages in a text "mean". You then utilize what you have "discovered" and teach other people to use the words in THAT way. That's why Kuhn says that the process of "understanding" involves language LEARNING and cannot be reduced to "translation" You cannot go back and forth between the two languages. You cannot simply incorporate terms from another language into your own language and "use" them interchangeably with your own terms." Now to "understand" the language is conceptual but must we also undergo having "an" experience "using" this language before we "understand" this language. And is THIS process of undergoing "an" experience the meaning of "learning"? Andy, I am asking if both kinds of "doing" are necessary for learning and to "have" an experience that is meaningful? Both in/take and out/take [taking "in"] and [taking "out"]. Anticipation consummated and completed and at rest [not concluded and finished] In Dewey's language "phases" of experience. In place-making the "extension" within time. From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 17 20:44:04 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 13:44:04 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> <55A9C3D9.5090509@mira.net> Message-ID: <55A9CB84.3020303@mira.net> I couldn't tell you that, Beth. On Mike's suggestion, you will recall, the discussion of perezhivanie was progressed, avoiding cross-cultural difficulties, by a discussion of films! There is a movie called "An Education," and there is a passage in this movie where the young heroine has this experience, following the revelation of how she has been deceived and exploited. It is the moment of self-transformation, but that transformation is extended perhaps over a period of 24 hours, in silence, in that kind of state. The first movie that was discussed was "Brief Encounter" and here that moment of time standing still comes at the end of the movie when the heroine reflects on an exciting affair and her life with her nice boring husband and sees that her life is best just as it is and lets go of her romanticism. In my own life, I recall several such time-standing-still moments of transformation. But in none of these cases was there a therapist involved. It is an open question for me, if you want to give a different name ("meta-perezhivanie") to that perezhivanie where the person is able to reflect upon their own experience without the aid of another. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 18/07/2015 1:25 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > Which stage according to Vasilyuk's stages is the standing > still? Redemption or the smack middle of repentance, when > you can see both directions at once? Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > According to Mikhail Munipov (whom you have met on > FaceBook, Beth) that process of "life standing still" > is characteristic of the cathartic moment of a > perezhivanie. > And David, if I associate catharsis with perezhivanie > I am more referring to its meaning in Greek drama, not > 19th century medicine or Freudian psychoanalysis, all > of these being derivatives of the original Greek, I think, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 18/07/2015 1:03 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > Yes, this really makes sense! So it is the doing > that is the practical energy. SO Marx was writing > about a method of perezhivanie? > > I may be conflating things but I am trying to > piece together several pieces (like how in a big > city you know a whole neighborhood as a world unto > itself, and then you find out it is in the same > area as another neighborhood that you know well -- > but you did not know they were connected -- ). > > Actually that process of piecing together across > the gaps is also related to what we are talking > about. Of course. When you age in a city you also > have the depth of the memories in layers at a > given place, and this stringing together across > time and place is what Virginia Woolf calls life: > moments in which "life stands still her" strung > together like a strand of pearls = with gaps > between them. > > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Like you, Beth, I have found this xmca thread > particularly exciting! > There is one thing I'd like to add, which is > implicit > in Mike's quote from Marx: > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art > which is that Dewey holds an experience to be both > suffering and *doing* [Tatigkeit in German]. > The doing means that an experience (to be an > experience, and stand out from the background of > experience, have significance and form a whole) > entails wilfully changing the world, even if that > changing is trivial, such as changing other > people's > attitudes to you or most trivially changing > how you > henceforth interact with a certain kind of > situation, > person or whatever. But doing is doing, it is > not just > going through the motions or habit. And that > is why > experiences in this sense are so important to the > development of the personality and the world, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever > felt to what interests me > most. It covers all the interests that > brought me > first to play and then > to the playworlds and then to > perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was a > preschool teacher and this is a profession > that I > think can be described as > being, in its first part, responsible for > reflecting upon the 'having an > experience' that is happening all around > you every > day (time is so > condensed for young children so it is > happening > all the time) so that you > can support the self-creation beings who > are able > to "have an experience''? > > Like with Greg's students, as a preschool > teacher > you find that what is > most important is to describe what is > happening in > a way that is true to > the children's experiences. Vivian Paley > shows us > how to do this. If you > don;t do this you find dealing with the > Golem who > has had the words that > give it life removed from its mouth: you > just have > dirt, nothing even > remotely related to the Golem, not even > weight. > > I think it is the teacher/artists who can > find for > us those properties that > will characterize the experience as a > whole. What > Monica named 'preschool > didactics from within' is a process of working > with these people in > research. This sounds like 5D. > > Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two > purposes of art criticism. One > is entirely in the domain of social life, > he says, > guiding what art creates > in its audience in useful directions. The > other > is to 'conserve the effect > of art as art'. He says we know this is > needed, > because art is a unity, > and without the whole criticism is not > related to > art -- he calls what we > have left, without the unity, a wound. But > criticism of art treats art as > a parliamentary speech -- often -- he > says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid > this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. > > As a preschool teacher you know that art > is life > because if you forget this > then you have unhappy children and your job is > impossible, or worse. As an > researcher, every time you hit something > hard you > can revert to the first > purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow > to the > part that does not conserve > the effect, without any consequences on your > livelihood. If we could have > a system of science that makes it > impossible to > leave the hardest questions > to the first purpose of criticism, then we > could > have so many people > working on these hardest questions in a > meaningful > way, but I do not know > how to do this even in my own work. > > Except one way is to place the desires of the > teachers and children before > your own. This is sort of a method of love or > empathy. Kiyo suggested The > Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I > think) > and this is related, also > Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality > that the people she is > studying see. > > Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo > Jornet > Gil > >> > wrote: > > Mike, could you elaborate on that? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> on > behalf of > mike cole >> > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > Alfredo-- > > a "method of organization" seems close > to a > synonym for design. > > mike > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil > >> > > wrote: > > I like very much how Greg brings in a > methodological issue here with his > mention about ethnography and his > reading > of "fidelity"; that the latter > > is > > not about representing exactly, > but about > describing events in terms of > consequences for the participants, > which > they display for each other in > their actual practice. > > This methodological aspect makes > me think > that the the notion of ANALYSIS > BY UNITS, which has been discussed > in xmca > before, is useful here. Unit > analysis reminds us that, as units, > experiences, as concrete and real > phenomena, have some form of > organization > that extends in time. That is > why, if I understood the > discussion below > correctly, Beth is warned not > > to > > think of the unit of experience as > a unit > "in itself". > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the > differentiation between > self-action and > transaction. In self action, > things are > explained by their own powers. > > This > > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would > have > referred to as analysis by > elements. In transaction, they say, > ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of > action, without final attribution to > ?elements? or other presumptively > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or > ?realities,? and without isolation > > of > > presumptively detachable > ?relations? from > such detachable ?elements??. An > experience can be studied precisely > because it is not a thing in itself: > > it > > is always a moving, gesture, a > "method of > organization" as Dewey & > > Bentley > > write. > > I thought this my add something to > your > fascinating discussion, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> on > behalf of > mike cole > >> > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, > Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an > experience > > Marx: It is only in a social > context that > subjectivism and objectivism, > spiritualism and materialism, > activity and > passivity, cease to be > antinomies and thus cease to exist > as such > antinomies. The resolution of > the theoretical contradictions is > possible > only through practical means, > only through the practical energy > of man. > Their resolution is not by any > means, therefore, only a problem of > knowledge, but is a real problem of > life which philosophy was unable > to solve > precisely because it saw there > > a > > purely theoretical problem." > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy > Blunden > >> > > wrote: > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > "This unity is neither > emotional, > practical, nor > intellectual, for these > terms name > distinctions that > reflection can make within > it. In > discourse//about//an > experience, we must make > use of > these adjectives of > interpretation. In going > over an > experience in > mind//after/ /its > occurrence, we > may find that one > property rather than > another was > sufficiently dominant > so that it characterizes the > experience as a whole." > > Isn't this beautiful > scientific prose! > We make these distinction when > > we > > *reflect* on an experience. And > perhaps we include the > experience in > > our > > autobiography, act it out on the > stage, analyse it > scientifically, all > > of > > which presupposes analysis and > synthesis. But it is important to > > recognise > > that the unity is prior. It is not > only a unity of emotion and > > cognition > > (for example) but also of > attention > and will - and any other > categories > > you > > abstract from an experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth > Ferholt wrote: > > Or reproducing the part that > represents the whole? Like a > fractal? I > think it is the similarity > across > scales that makes an > experience > proleptic, or gives that > 'bliss > conferred at the beginning > of the road > > to > > redemption" that Vasilyuk > refers > to. You have an experience on > > several > > timescales and so a sense of > deja-vu is central to > having an > > experience. > > This is what I am thinking > about > after reading both the > paper of > > Dewey's > > and your recent piece on > perezhivanie, Andy, > although I am > picking up > > on a > > small piece of the last > email in > this chain -- : If > something is only > itself in its whole then > you can't > study it, is what is > bothering me. > > Beth > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at > 11:22 PM, > Andy Blunden > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Not "getting at > something", > Michael. Just pursuing > this question you raised > about Dewey's saying that the > aesthetic quality of > medieval > buildings arises from > their not being "planned" > like buildings are nowadays. > He goes on to say > "Every work > of art follows the plan > of, and pattern of, a > complete experience." The > puzzle > he is raising here is the > completeness of an > experience which > gives it its > aesthetic quality, and > this cannot be created by > assembling together parts in > the way a modern > building is > planned. An experience - > the kind of thing which > sticks in your mind - is an > original or prior > unity, not > a combination, and this > is what gives a work > of art > that ineffable quality, > something which can > only be > transmitted by reproducing > that whole of an > experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, > Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Andy, > > I'm still not > sure about > your question. Did I set > out to have that > experience, that > morning...no, I > don't think so > (it was a > long time ago, but I'm > pretty sure no). > Could I > have just treated it as > an indiscriminate > activity, probably, I had done > so before. > > But I am guessing > you're > getting a something here > Andy? > > Michael > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > > > > > > >>= > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >>] On > Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, > July 16, > 2015 12:21 PM > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an experience > > YOu said: "... > But that > time I had the experience > with the > paintings..." > > I mean that was an > experience. Did you set out > that morning to > have that > experience? > RE, your > question: "what > does he mean when he says > you can't do things > indiscriminately and have > vital experience, > but you > also can't plan things?" > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 17/07/2015 > 2:09 AM, > Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Well I'm not > sure I > understand your question > Andy, but > perhaps it has > something to > do with > my grandfather's favorite > saying > (translated from > Yiddish), > > Man plans, > God laughs. > > Michael > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > > > > > >>= > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >>] > On Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: > Thursday, July > 16, 2015 12:04 PM > To: > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an experience > > So Michael, > there was > just that one occasion, > in all your > museum-going, when you had an > experience. > Was that > planned? > (I don't mean > to say > you haven't had a number > of such > experiences, > Michael ... > just some > number actually) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 17/07/2015 > 1:19 > AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hi Larry > and all, > > I think > this is > one of the most complex > aspects of > experience, what does he mean > when he > says you > can't do things > indiscriminately > and have vital > > experience, but > you also can't plan > things? > I have > discussed (argued) about > this a > lot with > my students. I have > > especially seen > him raise this point in at > least two > of his > great works, Democracy > and > Education and > Experience and Nature - > and again of > course in Art as Experience > (notice > he is not > saying how Art enters > into > experience > but how art is experience > - I have > come to > notice these little > things > more and > more in his writing). > > The > difficulty we > have, at least in the > United States > because of the dominance of > the idea of > meta-cognition, is that we too > often > translate > what individuals are > bringing > in to > experience to organize it > as a form of > meta-cognition. It is kind > of > possible to > make that interpretation > from > Democracy > and Education, although > what I > think he > is doing more is arguing > against > misinterpretations of his > work as > random, child > centered activities. I > think he is > clearer in Experience and > Nature > that we > bring in who we are at the > moment > into the > activity, and use who we > are (I > don't want > to say identity) as an > organizing > principle for what we do. It > is > perhaps one of > the places where Dewey > and > Vygotsky are > close. Perhaps I can use > the same > Jackson > Pollock example. The > first few > times I > saw his paintings I was > trying to > "apprecitate" them because > I was > told that > was the > best way to experience > them. > Dewey says > no vital experience > there > because my > activities become stilted > and artificia > l. > Sometimes > I went through the > museum > and just > looked at pictures, one to > the other. No > vital experience there, > just random > threads. But that time I had > the > experience > with the paintings I was > allowing > who I > was, what had been built up > in the > trajectory > of my life to enter into > my experience > with the painting, making it > a vital > experience. I think Dewey > makes > the > argument in > Experience and Nature that > it is not > just > the experience the moment > before, > but the > experiences leading to > that > experience, > the context of my life, > of my > parent's > life, of a long line of > historical > experiences. > > Anyway, > my take. > > Michael > > - > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early > Childhood and > Art Education > Brooklyn College, City > University > of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: > bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > > > > > > >> > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species > change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable > and given > forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given > forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 17 20:46:21 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 13:46:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> Message-ID: <55A9CC0D.7030001@mira.net> Yes, Larry, BOTH doing and undergoing are necessary for an experience. If you are acting blindly to what you are doing then you cannot have an experience in that, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 18/07/2015 1:40 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > > the phrase > "changing how you henceforth interact with a certain kind > of situation, person or whatever". > This form of wilfully changing the world as a "doing" may > "conceal" as well as "reveal" and become one sided "doing". > > However, as I was reading Dewey's "Having an Experience" I > was reading a caution that we also pause in our > reflections/critiques when we are intently focusing on > "doing". That THIS "doing" may be/come a one sided > intended focus if we loose sight of the "on the other > hand" of "doing" [the receiving aspect] as also changing > how you henceforth interact with a certain kind of > situation, person, or whatever." > > Changing "how you henceforth act" includes this > other kind of "doing" that is not so focused on > "constructing" but is more focused as anticipation > opening towards and undergoing "an" experience as a way > of orienting within the world. > > performing the world "includes" this doing and that doing > and both are agentic ways of experiencing forming places. > Either alone and we loose having "an" experience. > > Is Dewey actually saying what I am putting in his mouth? > Am I "translating"? or learning a different "language"? > Here is Thomas Kuhn's understanding of "learning a language" > > There is a certain group of connected terms that seem to > occur together in closely related ways in areas that do > not make sense. Finally one perceives that if you "use" > the words THIS way you can finally understand what these > passages in a text "mean". You then utilize what you have > "discovered" and teach other people to use the words in > THAT way. That's why Kuhn says that the process of > "understanding" involves language LEARNING and cannot be > reduced to "translation" > You cannot go back and forth between the two languages. > You cannot simply incorporate terms from another language > into your own language and "use" them interchangeably with > your own terms." > > Now to "understand" the language is conceptual but must we > also undergo having "an" experience "using" this language > before we "understand" this language. And is THIS process > of undergoing "an" experience the meaning of "learning"? > > > > > > Andy, I am asking if both kinds of "doing" are necessary > for learning and to "have" an experience that is > meaningful? Both in/take and out/take [taking "in"] and > [taking "out"]. Anticipation consummated and completed > and at rest [not concluded and finished] In Dewey's > language "phases" of experience. In place-making the > "extension" within time. From bferholt@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 20:55:43 2015 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 23:55:43 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55A9CB84.3020303@mira.net> References: <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> <55A9C3D9.5090509@mira.net> <55A9CB84.3020303@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, that is very helpful, thank you! I do not think it is ever without another, and thought of this when I read your recent paper. You can always perezhivanie with the others in yourself, so long as you attach the other to something, even to a "past" or "future" self. Virginia Woolf is very good at showing this. Paley's children in her class appear to be like Buber, having life stand still here with a cat or even a tree. Beth On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:44 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I couldn't tell you that, Beth. > On Mike's suggestion, you will recall, the discussion of perezhivanie was > progressed, avoiding cross-cultural difficulties, by a discussion of films! > There is a movie called "An Education," and there is a passage in this > movie where the young heroine has this experience, following the revelation > of how she has been deceived and exploited. It is the moment of > self-transformation, but that transformation is extended perhaps over a > period of 24 hours, in silence, in that kind of state. The first movie that > was discussed was "Brief Encounter" and here that moment of time standing > still comes at the end of the movie when the heroine reflects on an > exciting affair and her life with her nice boring husband and sees that her > life is best just as it is and lets go of her romanticism. In my own life, > I recall several such time-standing-still moments of transformation. But in > none of these cases was there a therapist involved. It is an open question > for me, if you want to give a different name ("meta-perezhivanie") to that > perezhivanie where the person is able to reflect upon their own experience > without the aid of another. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 18/07/2015 1:25 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >> Which stage according to Vasilyuk's stages is the standing still? >> Redemption or the smack middle of repentance, when you can see both >> directions at once? Beth >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> According to Mikhail Munipov (whom you have met on >> FaceBook, Beth) that process of "life standing still" >> is characteristic of the cathartic moment of a >> perezhivanie. >> And David, if I associate catharsis with perezhivanie >> I am more referring to its meaning in Greek drama, not >> 19th century medicine or Freudian psychoanalysis, all >> of these being derivatives of the original Greek, I think, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 18/07/2015 1:03 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >> Yes, this really makes sense! So it is the doing >> that is the practical energy. SO Marx was writing >> about a method of perezhivanie? >> >> I may be conflating things but I am trying to >> piece together several pieces (like how in a big >> city you know a whole neighborhood as a world unto >> itself, and then you find out it is in the same >> area as another neighborhood that you know well -- >> but you did not know they were connected -- ). >> >> Actually that process of piecing together across >> the gaps is also related to what we are talking >> about. Of course. When you age in a city you also >> have the depth of the memories in layers at a >> given place, and this stringing together across >> time and place is what Virginia Woolf calls life: >> moments in which "life stands still her" strung >> together like a strand of pearls = with gaps >> between them. >> >> Beth >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> wrote: >> >> Like you, Beth, I have found this xmca thread >> particularly exciting! >> There is one thing I'd like to add, which is >> implicit >> in Mike's quote from Marx: >> >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art >> which is that Dewey holds an experience to be both >> suffering and *doing* [Tatigkeit in German]. >> The doing means that an experience (to be an >> experience, and stand out from the background of >> experience, have significance and form a whole) >> entails wilfully changing the world, even if that >> changing is trivial, such as changing other >> people's >> attitudes to you or most trivially changing >> how you >> henceforth interact with a certain kind of >> situation, >> person or whatever. But doing is doing, it is >> not just >> going through the motions or habit. And that >> is why >> experiences in this sense are so important to the >> development of the personality and the world, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >> This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever >> felt to what interests me >> most. It covers all the interests that >> brought me >> first to play and then >> to the playworlds and then to >> perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was a >> preschool teacher and this is a profession >> that I >> think can be described as >> being, in its first part, responsible for >> reflecting upon the 'having an >> experience' that is happening all around >> you every >> day (time is so >> condensed for young children so it is >> happening >> all the time) so that you >> can support the self-creation beings who >> are able >> to "have an experience''? >> >> Like with Greg's students, as a preschool >> teacher >> you find that what is >> most important is to describe what is >> happening in >> a way that is true to >> the children's experiences. Vivian Paley >> shows us >> how to do this. If you >> don;t do this you find dealing with the >> Golem who >> has had the words that >> give it life removed from its mouth: you >> just have >> dirt, nothing even >> remotely related to the Golem, not even >> weight. >> >> I think it is the teacher/artists who can >> find for >> us those properties that >> will characterize the experience as a >> whole. What >> Monica named 'preschool >> didactics from within' is a process of working >> with these people in >> research. This sounds like 5D. >> >> Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two >> purposes of art criticism. One >> is entirely in the domain of social life, >> he says, >> guiding what art creates >> in its audience in useful directions. The >> other >> is to 'conserve the effect >> of art as art'. He says we know this is >> needed, >> because art is a unity, >> and without the whole criticism is not >> related to >> art -- he calls what we >> have left, without the unity, a wound. But >> criticism of art treats art as >> a parliamentary speech -- often -- he >> says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid >> this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. >> >> As a preschool teacher you know that art >> is life >> because if you forget this >> then you have unhappy children and your job is >> impossible, or worse. As an >> researcher, every time you hit something >> hard you >> can revert to the first >> purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow >> to the >> part that does not conserve >> the effect, without any consequences on your >> livelihood. If we could have >> a system of science that makes it >> impossible to >> leave the hardest questions >> to the first purpose of criticism, then we >> could >> have so many people >> working on these hardest questions in a >> meaningful >> way, but I do not know >> how to do this even in my own work. >> >> Except one way is to place the desires of the >> teachers and children before >> your own. This is sort of a method of love or >> empathy. Kiyo suggested The >> Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I >> think) >> and this is related, also >> Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality >> that the people she is >> studying see. >> >> Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. >> >> Beth >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo >> Jornet >> Gil > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Mike, could you elaborate on that? >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >> on >> behalf of >> mike cole > > >> >> Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> Alfredo-- >> >> a "method of organization" seems close >> to a >> synonym for design. >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil > >> > >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> I like very much how Greg brings in a >> methodological issue here with his >> mention about ethnography and his >> reading >> of "fidelity"; that the latter >> >> is >> >> not about representing exactly, >> but about >> describing events in terms of >> consequences for the participants, >> which >> they display for each other in >> their actual practice. >> >> This methodological aspect makes >> me think >> that the the notion of ANALYSIS >> BY UNITS, which has been discussed >> in xmca >> before, is useful here. Unit >> analysis reminds us that, as units, >> experiences, as concrete and real >> phenomena, have some form of >> organization >> that extends in time. That is >> why, if I understood the >> discussion below >> correctly, Beth is warned not >> >> to >> >> think of the unit of experience as >> a unit >> "in itself". >> >> Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the >> differentiation between >> self-action and >> transaction. In self action, >> things are >> explained by their own powers. >> >> This >> >> is, I believe, what Vygotsky would >> have >> referred to as analysis by >> elements. In transaction, they say, >> ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of >> action, without final attribution to >> ?elements? or other presumptively >> detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or >> ?realities,? and without isolation >> >> of >> >> presumptively detachable >> ?relations? from >> such detachable ?elements??. An >> experience can be studied precisely >> because it is not a thing in itself: >> >> it >> >> is always a moving, gesture, a >> "method of >> organization" as Dewey & >> >> Bentley >> >> write. >> >> I thought this my add something to >> your >> fascinating discussion, >> Alfredo >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >> on >> behalf of >> mike cole > >> > >> >> >> Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, >> Culture, >> Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an >> experience >> >> Marx: It is only in a social >> context that >> subjectivism and objectivism, >> spiritualism and materialism, >> activity and >> passivity, cease to be >> antinomies and thus cease to exist >> as such >> antinomies. The resolution of >> the theoretical contradictions is >> possible >> only through practical means, >> only through the practical energy >> of man. >> Their resolution is not by any >> means, therefore, only a problem of >> knowledge, but is a real problem of >> life which philosophy was unable >> to solve >> precisely because it saw there >> >> a >> >> purely theoretical problem." >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy >> Blunden > >> > >> >> >> wrote: >> >> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >> >> "This unity is neither >> emotional, >> practical, nor >> intellectual, for these >> terms name >> distinctions that >> reflection can make within >> it. In >> discourse//about//an >> experience, we must make >> use of >> these adjectives of >> interpretation. In going >> over an >> experience in >> mind//after/ /its >> occurrence, we >> may find that one >> property rather than >> another was >> sufficiently dominant >> so that it characterizes the >> experience as a whole." >> >> Isn't this beautiful >> scientific prose! >> We make these distinction when >> >> we >> >> *reflect* on an experience. And >> perhaps we include the >> experience in >> >> our >> >> autobiography, act it out on the >> stage, analyse it >> scientifically, all >> >> of >> >> which presupposes analysis and >> synthesis. But it is important to >> >> recognise >> >> that the unity is prior. It is not >> only a unity of emotion and >> >> cognition >> >> (for example) but also of >> attention >> and will - and any other >> categories >> >> you >> >> abstract from an experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth >> Ferholt wrote: >> >> Or reproducing the part that >> represents the whole? Like a >> fractal? I >> think it is the similarity >> across >> scales that makes an >> experience >> proleptic, or gives that >> 'bliss >> conferred at the beginning >> of the road >> >> to >> >> redemption" that Vasilyuk >> refers >> to. You have an experience on >> >> several >> >> timescales and so a sense of >> deja-vu is central to >> having an >> >> experience. >> >> This is what I am thinking >> about >> after reading both the >> paper of >> >> Dewey's >> >> and your recent piece on >> perezhivanie, Andy, >> although I am >> picking up >> >> on a >> >> small piece of the last >> email in >> this chain -- : If >> something is only >> itself in its whole then >> you can't >> study it, is what is >> bothering me. >> >> Beth >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at >> 11:22 PM, >> Andy Blunden >> >> > > >> > >> >> > >>> wrote: >> >> Not "getting at >> something", >> Michael. Just pursuing >> this question you raised >> about Dewey's saying that the >> aesthetic quality of >> medieval >> buildings arises from >> their not being "planned" >> like buildings are nowadays. >> He goes on to say >> "Every work >> of art follows the plan >> of, and pattern of, a >> complete experience." The >> puzzle >> he is raising here is the >> completeness of an >> experience which >> gives it its >> aesthetic quality, and >> this cannot be created by >> assembling together parts in >> the way a modern >> building is >> planned. An experience - >> the kind of thing which >> sticks in your mind - is an >> original or prior >> unity, not >> a combination, and this >> is what gives a work >> of art >> that ineffable quality, >> something which can >> only be >> transmitted by reproducing >> that whole of an >> experience. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> < >> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >> >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, >> Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I'm still not >> sure about >> your question. Did I set >> out to have that >> experience, that >> morning...no, I >> don't think so >> (it was a >> long time ago, but I'm >> pretty sure no). >> Could I >> have just treated it as >> an indiscriminate >> activity, probably, I had done >> so before. >> >> But I am guessing >> you're >> getting a something here >> Andy? >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original >> Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >> >> > > >> > >> > xmca-l-bounces%252Bglassman.13 >> >>= >> >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >>] On >> Behalf Of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, >> July 16, >> 2015 12:21 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >> Having an experience >> >> YOu said: "... >> But that >> time I had the experience >> with the >> paintings..." >> >> I mean that was an >> experience. Did you set out >> that morning to >> have that >> experience? >> RE, your >> question: "what >> does he mean when he says >> you can't do things >> indiscriminately and have >> vital experience, >> but you >> also can't plan things?" >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> < >> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >> >> On 17/07/2015 >> 2:09 AM, >> Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Well I'm not >> sure I >> understand your question >> Andy, but >> perhaps it has >> something to >> do with >> my grandfather's favorite >> saying >> (translated from >> Yiddish), >> >> Man plans, >> God laughs. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original >> Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >> >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > >> >> > >> > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> >> > > >> > >> > >>= >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>] >> On Behalf Of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: >> Thursday, July >> 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> To: >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> >> > >> >> Subject: >> [Xmca-l] Re: >> Having an experience >> >> So Michael, >> there was >> just that one occasion, >> in all your >> museum-going, when you had an >> experience. >> Was that >> planned? >> (I don't mean >> to say >> you haven't had a number >> of such >> experiences, >> Michael ... >> just some >> number actually) >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> < >> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 >> 1:19 >> AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Hi Larry >> and all, >> >> I think >> this is >> one of the most complex >> aspects of >> experience, what does he mean >> when he >> says you >> can't do things >> indiscriminately >> and have vital >> experience, but >> you also can't plan >> things? I have >> discussed (argued) about >> this a >> lot with >> my students. I have >> especially seen >> him raise this point in at >> least two >> of his >> great works, Democracy >> and >> Education and >> Experience and Nature - >> and again of >> course in Art as Experience >> (notice >> he is not >> saying how Art enters >> into >> experience >> but how art is experience >> - I have >> come to >> notice these little >> things >> more and >> more in his writing). >> >> The >> difficulty we >> have, at least in the >> United States >> because of the dominance of >> the idea of >> meta-cognition, is that we too >> often >> translate >> what individuals are >> bringing >> in to >> experience to organize it >> as a form of >> meta-cognition. It is kind >> of >> possible to >> make that interpretation >> from >> Democracy >> and Education, although >> what I >> think he >> is doing more is arguing >> against >> misinterpretations of his >> work as >> random, child >> centered activities. I >> think he is >> clearer in Experience and >> Nature >> that we >> bring in who we are at the >> moment >> into the >> activity, and use who we >> are (I >> don't want >> to say identity) as an >> organizing >> principle for what we do. It >> is >> perhaps one of >> the places where Dewey >> and >> Vygotsky are >> close. Perhaps I can use >> the same >> Jackson >> Pollock example. The >> first few >> times I >> saw his paintings I was >> trying to >> "apprecitate" them because >> I was >> told that >> was the >> best way to experience >> them. Dewey says >> no vital experience >> there >> because my >> activities become stilted >> and artificia >> l. >> Sometimes >> I went through the >> museum >> and just >> looked at pictures, one to >> the other. No >> vital experience there, >> just random >> threads. But that time I had >> the >> experience >> with the paintings I was >> allowing >> who I >> was, what had been built up >> in the >> trajectory >> of my life to enter into >> my experience >> with the painting, making it >> a vital >> experience. I think Dewey >> makes >> the >> argument in >> Experience and Nature that >> it is not >> just >> the experience the moment >> before, >> but the >> experiences leading to >> that >> experience, >> the context of my life, >> of my >> parent's >> life, of a long line of >> historical >> experiences. >> >> Anyway, >> my take. >> >> Michael >> >> - >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early >> Childhood and >> Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City >> University >> of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: >> bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> >> > > >> > >> >> > >> >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> >> >> >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Both environment and species >> change in the >> course of time, and thus >> ecological niches are not stable >> and given >> forever (Polotova & Storch, >> Ecological Niche, 2008) >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Both environment and species change in the >> course of time, and thus >> ecological niches are not stable and given >> forever (Polotova & Storch, >> Ecological Niche, 2008) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> >> > > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> > > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 17 21:02:48 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 14:02:48 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> <55A9C3D9.5090509@mira.net> <55A9CB84.3020303@mira.net> Message-ID: <55A9CFE8.1090204@mira.net> That sounds right, Beth. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 18/07/2015 1:55 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > Yes, that is very helpful, thank you! > I do not think it is ever without another, and thought of > this when I read your recent paper. > You can always perezhivanie with the others in yourself, > so long as you attach the other to something, even to a > "past" or "future" self. Virginia Woolf is very good at > showing this. Paley's children in her class appear to be > like Buber, having life stand still here with a cat or > even a tree. > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:44 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > I couldn't tell you that, Beth. > On Mike's suggestion, you will recall, the discussion > of perezhivanie was progressed, avoiding > cross-cultural difficulties, by a discussion of films! > There is a movie called "An Education," and there is a > passage in this movie where the young heroine has this > experience, following the revelation of how she has > been deceived and exploited. It is the moment of > self-transformation, but that transformation is > extended perhaps over a period of 24 hours, in > silence, in that kind of state. The first movie that > was discussed was "Brief Encounter" and here that > moment of time standing still comes at the end of the > movie when the heroine reflects on an exciting affair > and her life with her nice boring husband and sees > that her life is best just as it is and lets go of her > romanticism. In my own life, I recall several such > time-standing-still moments of transformation. But in > none of these cases was there a therapist involved. It > is an open question for me, if you want to give a > different name ("meta-perezhivanie") to that > perezhivanie where the person is able to reflect upon > their own experience without the aid of another. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 18/07/2015 1:25 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > Which stage according to Vasilyuk's stages is the > standing still? Redemption or the smack middle of > repentance, when you can see both directions at > once? Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > According to Mikhail Munipov (whom you have met on > FaceBook, Beth) that process of "life standing > still" > is characteristic of the cathartic moment of a > perezhivanie. > And David, if I associate catharsis with > perezhivanie > I am more referring to its meaning in Greek > drama, not > 19th century medicine or Freudian > psychoanalysis, all > of these being derivatives of the original > Greek, I think, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 18/07/2015 1:03 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > Yes, this really makes sense! So it is > the doing > that is the practical energy. SO Marx was > writing > about a method of perezhivanie? > > I may be conflating things but I am trying to > piece together several pieces (like how in > a big > city you know a whole neighborhood as a > world unto > itself, and then you find out it is in the > same > area as another neighborhood that you know > well -- > but you did not know they were connected -- ). > > Actually that process of piecing together > across > the gaps is also related to what we are > talking > about. Of course. When you age in a city > you also > have the depth of the memories in layers at a > given place, and this stringing together > across > time and place is what Virginia Woolf > calls life: > moments in which "life stands still her" > strung > together like a strand of pearls = with gaps > between them. > > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Like you, Beth, I have found this xmca > thread > particularly exciting! > There is one thing I'd like to add, > which is > implicit > in Mike's quote from Marx: > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art > which is that Dewey holds an > experience to be both > suffering and *doing* [Tatigkeit in > German]. > The doing means that an experience (to > be an > experience, and stand out from the > background of > experience, have significance and form > a whole) > entails wilfully changing the world, > even if that > changing is trivial, such as changing > other > people's > attitudes to you or most trivially > changing > how you > henceforth interact with a certain kind of > situation, > person or whatever. But doing is > doing, it is > not just > going through the motions or habit. > And that > is why > experiences in this sense are so > important to the > development of the personality and the > world, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > This chain of ideas is the closest > I have ever > felt to what interests me > most. It covers all the interests > that > brought me > first to play and then > to the playworlds and then to > perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I > was a > preschool teacher and this is a > profession > that I > think can be described as > being, in its first part, > responsible for > reflecting upon the 'having an > experience' that is happening all > around > you every > day (time is so > condensed for young children so it is > happening > all the time) so that you > can support the self-creation > beings who > are able > to "have an experience''? > > Like with Greg's students, as a > preschool > teacher > you find that what is > most important is to describe what is > happening in > a way that is true to > the children's experiences. Vivian > Paley > shows us > how to do this. If you > don;t do this you find dealing > with the > Golem who > has had the words that > give it life removed from its > mouth: you > just have > dirt, nothing even > remotely related to the Golem, not > even > weight. > > I think it is the teacher/artists > who can > find for > us those properties that > will characterize the experience as a > whole. What > Monica named 'preschool > didactics from within' is a > process of working > with these people in > research. This sounds like 5D. > > Andy, Vygotsky is talking about > the the two > purposes of art criticism. One > is entirely in the domain of > social life, > he says, > guiding what art creates > in its audience in useful > directions. The > other > is to 'conserve the effect > of art as art'. He says we know > this is > needed, > because art is a unity, > and without the whole criticism is not > related to > art -- he calls what we > have left, without the unity, a > wound. But > criticism of art treats art as > a parliamentary speech -- often -- he > says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid > this in the chapter on Bunin's > short story. > > As a preschool teacher you know > that art > is life > because if you forget this > then you have unhappy children and > your job is > impossible, or worse. As an > researcher, every time you hit > something > hard you > can revert to the first > purpose of art/life criticism, or > anyhow > to the > part that does not conserve > the effect, without any > consequences on your > livelihood. If we could have > a system of science that makes it > impossible to > leave the hardest questions > to the first purpose of criticism, > then we > could > have so many people > working on these hardest questions > in a > meaningful > way, but I do not know > how to do this even in my own work. > > Except one way is to place the > desires of the > teachers and children before > your own. This is sort of a > method of love or > empathy. Kiyo suggested The > Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no > relation I > think) > and this is related, also > Edith Turner's work where she sees > the reality > that the people she is > studying see. > > Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, > Alfredo > Jornet > Gil > > > > >>> > wrote: > > Mike, could you elaborate on that? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > mike cole > > > >>> > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having > an experience > > Alfredo-- > > a "method of organization" > seems close > to a > synonym for design. > > mike > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 > AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil > > > > > > >>> > > wrote: > > I like very much how Greg > brings in a > methodological issue here > with his > mention about ethnography > and his > reading > of "fidelity"; that the latter > > is > > not about representing > exactly, > but about > describing events in terms of > consequences for the > participants, > which > they display for each other in > their actual practice. > > This methodological aspect > makes > me think > that the the notion of > ANALYSIS > BY UNITS, which has been > discussed > in xmca > before, is useful here. Unit > analysis reminds us that, > as units, > experiences, as concrete > and real > phenomena, have some form of > organization > that extends in time. That is > why, if I understood the > discussion below > correctly, Beth is warned not > > to > > think of the unit of > experience as > a unit > "in itself". > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 > made the > differentiation between > self-action and > transaction. In self action, > things are > explained by their own powers. > > This > > is, I believe, what > Vygotsky would > have > referred to as analysis by > elements. In transaction, > they say, > ?deal[s] with aspects and > phases of > action, without final > attribution to > ?elements? or other > presumptively > detachable ?entities,? > ?essences,? or > ?realities,? and without > isolation > > of > > presumptively detachable > ?relations? from > such detachable > ?elements??. An > experience can be studied > precisely > because it is not a thing > in itself: > > it > > is always a moving, gesture, a > "method of > organization" as Dewey & > > Bentley > > write. > > I thought this my add > something to > your > fascinating discussion, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > mike cole > > > > > >>> > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended > Mind, > Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an > experience > > Marx: It is only in a social > context that > subjectivism and objectivism, > spiritualism and materialism, > activity and > passivity, cease to be > antinomies and thus cease > to exist > as such > antinomies. The resolution of > the theoretical > contradictions is > possible > only through practical means, > only through the practical > energy > of man. > Their resolution is not by any > means, therefore, only a > problem of > knowledge, but is a real > problem of > life which philosophy was > unable > to solve > precisely because it saw there > > a > > purely theoretical problem." > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at > 10:45 PM, Andy > Blunden > > > > >>> > > wrote: > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey > says: > > "This unity is neither > emotional, > practical, nor > intellectual, for > these > terms name > distinctions that > reflection can > make within > it. In > discourse//about//an > experience, we > must make > use of > these adjectives of > interpretation. In > going > over an > experience in > mind//after/ /its > occurrence, we > may find that one > property rather than > another was > sufficiently dominant > so that it > characterizes the > experience as a whole." > > Isn't this beautiful > scientific prose! > We make these > distinction when > > we > > *reflect* on an > experience. And > perhaps we include the > experience in > > our > > autobiography, act it > out on the > stage, analyse it > scientifically, all > > of > > which presupposes > analysis and > synthesis. But it is > important to > > recognise > > that the unity is > prior. It is not > only a unity of > emotion and > > cognition > > (for example) but also of > attention > and will - and any other > categories > > you > > abstract from an > experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, > Beth > Ferholt wrote: > > Or reproducing the > part that > represents the > whole? Like a > fractal? I > think it is the > similarity > across > scales that makes an > experience > proleptic, or > gives that > 'bliss > conferred at the > beginning > of the road > > to > > redemption" that > Vasilyuk > refers > to. You have an > experience on > > several > > timescales and so > a sense of > deja-vu is central to > having an > > experience. > > This is what I am > thinking > about > after reading both the > paper of > > Dewey's > > and your recent > piece on > perezhivanie, Andy, > although I am > picking up > > on a > > small piece of the > last > email in > this chain -- : If > something is only > itself in its > whole then > you can't > study it, is what is > bothering me. > > Beth > > On Thu, Jul 16, > 2015 at > 11:22 PM, > Andy Blunden > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > Not "getting at > something", > Michael. Just pursuing > this question > you raised > about Dewey's > saying that the > aesthetic > quality of > medieval > buildings arises from > their not > being "planned" > like buildings are > nowadays. > He goes on to say > "Every work > of art follows the > plan > of, and > pattern of, a > complete > experience." The > puzzle > he is raising > here is the > completeness of an > experience which > gives it its > aesthetic quality, and > this cannot > be created by > assembling > together parts in > the way a modern > building is > planned. An > experience - > the kind of > thing which > sticks in your > mind - is an > original or prior > unity, not > a combination, and > this > is what gives > a work > of art > that ineffable > quality, > something > which can > only be > transmitted by > reproducing > that whole of an > experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 17/07/2015 > 2:32 AM, > Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > Andy, > > I'm still not > sure about > your question. > Did I set > out to > have that > experience, that > morning...no, I > don't > think so > (it was a > long time ago, but I'm > pretty > sure no). > Could I > have just treated > it as > an > indiscriminate > activity, > probably, I had done > so before. > > But I am > guessing > you're > getting a > something here > Andy? > > Michael > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>>= > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>>] On > Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: > Thursday, > July 16, > 2015 12:21 PM > To: > eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an experience > > YOu said: > "... > But that > time I had the > experience > with the > paintings..." > > I mean > that was an > experience. Did > you set out > that > morning to > have that > experience? > RE, your > question: "what > does he mean when > he says > you can't > do things > indiscriminately > and have > vital > experience, > but you > also can't plan > things?" > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy > Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 17/07/2015 > 2:09 AM, > Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > Well > I'm not > sure I > understand your > question > Andy, but > perhaps it has > > something to > do with > my grandfather's > favorite > saying > (translated from > Yiddish), > > Man > plans, > God laughs. > > Michael > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > > > > > >> > > > > > >>>= > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>>] > On > Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: > Thursday, July > 16, 2015 12:04 PM > To: > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an experience > > So > Michael, > there was > just that one > occasion, > in > all your > museum-going, when > you had an > experience. > Was that > planned? > (I > don't mean > to say > you haven't had a > number > of such > experiences, > > Michael ... > just some > number actually) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy > Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > On > 17/07/2015 > 1:19 > AM, Glassman, > Michael wrote: > > > Hi Larry > and all, > > I > think > this is > one of the most > complex > aspects of > experience, what > does he mean > > when he > says you > can't do things > indiscriminately > and have vital > experience, but > you also can't plan > things? I have > discussed (argued) > about > > this a > lot with > my students. I have > especially seen > him raise this > point in at > > least two > of his > great works, Democracy > and > Education and > Experience and > Nature - > > and again of > course in Art as > Experience > (notice > he is not > saying how Art enters > into > experience > but how art is > experience > - > I have > come to > notice these little > things > more and > more in his writing). > > The > difficulty we > have, at least in the > United States > because of the > dominance of > > the idea of > meta-cognition, is > that we too > often > translate > what individuals are > bringing > in to > experience to > organize it > > as a form of > meta-cognition. It > is kind > of > possible to > make that > interpretation > from > Democracy > and Education, > although > > what I > think he > is doing more is > arguing > against > misinterpretations > of his > work as > random, child > centered activities. I > > think he is > clearer in > Experience and > Nature > that we > bring in who we > are at the > moment > into the > activity, and use > who we > > are (I > don't want > to say identity) as an > organizing > principle for what > we do. It > is > perhaps one of > the places where Dewey > and > Vygotsky are > close. Perhaps I > can use > > the same > Jackson > Pollock example. The > > first few > times I > saw his paintings > I was > trying to > "apprecitate" them > because > I was > > told that > was the > best way to experience > them. Dewey says > no vital experience > there > because my > activities become > stilted > > and artificia > l. > Sometimes > I went through the > museum > and just > looked at > pictures, one to > > the other. No > vital experience > there, > > just random > threads. But that > time I had > the > experience > with the paintings > I was > allowing > who I > was, what had been > built up > > in the > trajectory > of my life to > enter into > > my experience > with the painting, > making it > a > vital > experience. I > think Dewey > makes > the > argument in > Experience and > Nature that > > it is not > just > the experience the > moment > before, > but the > experiences leading to > that > experience, > the context of my > life, > of my > parent's > life, of a long > line of > historical > experiences. > > Anyway, > my take. > > Michael > > - > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early > Childhood and > Art Education > Brooklyn College, City > University > of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY > 11210-2889 > > Email: > bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> > Phone: (718) > 951-5205 > > > > Fax: (718) > 951-4816 > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species > change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not > stable > and given > forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > -- > > Both environment and species > change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not > stable and given > forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > -- Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art > Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > > > >> > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From bferholt@gmail.com Fri Jul 17 21:04:55 2015 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 00:04:55 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> <55A9C3D9.5090509@mira.net> <55A9CB84.3020303@mira.net> Message-ID: oops -- did not mean to use the term as a verb, above -- in any case the reason we use film to discuss across cultures could be because it is a medium of gaps (the still pictures appear to move because of the gaps -- I am referring to Sobchack) -- Beth On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:55 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > Yes, that is very helpful, thank you! > I do not think it is ever without another, and thought of this when I read > your recent paper. > You can always perezhivanie with the others in yourself, so long as you > attach the other to something, even to a "past" or "future" self. Virginia > Woolf is very good at showing this. Paley's children in her class appear > to be like Buber, having life stand still here with a cat or even a tree. > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:44 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> I couldn't tell you that, Beth. >> On Mike's suggestion, you will recall, the discussion of perezhivanie was >> progressed, avoiding cross-cultural difficulties, by a discussion of films! >> There is a movie called "An Education," and there is a passage in this >> movie where the young heroine has this experience, following the revelation >> of how she has been deceived and exploited. It is the moment of >> self-transformation, but that transformation is extended perhaps over a >> period of 24 hours, in silence, in that kind of state. The first movie that >> was discussed was "Brief Encounter" and here that moment of time standing >> still comes at the end of the movie when the heroine reflects on an >> exciting affair and her life with her nice boring husband and sees that her >> life is best just as it is and lets go of her romanticism. In my own life, >> I recall several such time-standing-still moments of transformation. But in >> none of these cases was there a therapist involved. It is an open question >> for me, if you want to give a different name ("meta-perezhivanie") to that >> perezhivanie where the person is able to reflect upon their own experience >> without the aid of another. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 18/07/2015 1:25 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >>> Which stage according to Vasilyuk's stages is the standing still? >>> Redemption or the smack middle of repentance, when you can see both >>> directions at once? Beth >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> According to Mikhail Munipov (whom you have met on >>> FaceBook, Beth) that process of "life standing still" >>> is characteristic of the cathartic moment of a >>> perezhivanie. >>> And David, if I associate catharsis with perezhivanie >>> I am more referring to its meaning in Greek drama, not >>> 19th century medicine or Freudian psychoanalysis, all >>> of these being derivatives of the original Greek, I think, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 18/07/2015 1:03 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>> >>> Yes, this really makes sense! So it is the doing >>> that is the practical energy. SO Marx was writing >>> about a method of perezhivanie? >>> >>> I may be conflating things but I am trying to >>> piece together several pieces (like how in a big >>> city you know a whole neighborhood as a world unto >>> itself, and then you find out it is in the same >>> area as another neighborhood that you know well -- >>> but you did not know they were connected -- ). >>> >>> Actually that process of piecing together across >>> the gaps is also related to what we are talking >>> about. Of course. When you age in a city you also >>> have the depth of the memories in layers at a >>> given place, and this stringing together across >>> time and place is what Virginia Woolf calls life: >>> moments in which "life stands still her" strung >>> together like a strand of pearls = with gaps >>> between them. >>> >>> Beth >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Like you, Beth, I have found this xmca thread >>> particularly exciting! >>> There is one thing I'd like to add, which is >>> implicit >>> in Mike's quote from Marx: >>> >>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art >>> which is that Dewey holds an experience to be both >>> suffering and *doing* [Tatigkeit in German]. >>> The doing means that an experience (to be an >>> experience, and stand out from the background of >>> experience, have significance and form a whole) >>> entails wilfully changing the world, even if that >>> changing is trivial, such as changing other >>> people's >>> attitudes to you or most trivially changing >>> how you >>> henceforth interact with a certain kind of >>> situation, >>> person or whatever. But doing is doing, it is >>> not just >>> going through the motions or habit. And that >>> is why >>> experiences in this sense are so important to the >>> development of the personality and the world, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>> >>> This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever >>> felt to what interests me >>> most. It covers all the interests that >>> brought me >>> first to play and then >>> to the playworlds and then to >>> perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was a >>> preschool teacher and this is a profession >>> that I >>> think can be described as >>> being, in its first part, responsible for >>> reflecting upon the 'having an >>> experience' that is happening all around >>> you every >>> day (time is so >>> condensed for young children so it is >>> happening >>> all the time) so that you >>> can support the self-creation beings who >>> are able >>> to "have an experience''? >>> >>> Like with Greg's students, as a preschool >>> teacher >>> you find that what is >>> most important is to describe what is >>> happening in >>> a way that is true to >>> the children's experiences. Vivian Paley >>> shows us >>> how to do this. If you >>> don;t do this you find dealing with the >>> Golem who >>> has had the words that >>> give it life removed from its mouth: you >>> just have >>> dirt, nothing even >>> remotely related to the Golem, not even >>> weight. >>> >>> I think it is the teacher/artists who can >>> find for >>> us those properties that >>> will characterize the experience as a >>> whole. What >>> Monica named 'preschool >>> didactics from within' is a process of working >>> with these people in >>> research. This sounds like 5D. >>> >>> Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two >>> purposes of art criticism. One >>> is entirely in the domain of social life, >>> he says, >>> guiding what art creates >>> in its audience in useful directions. The >>> other >>> is to 'conserve the effect >>> of art as art'. He says we know this is >>> needed, >>> because art is a unity, >>> and without the whole criticism is not >>> related to >>> art -- he calls what we >>> have left, without the unity, a wound. But >>> criticism of art treats art as >>> a parliamentary speech -- often -- he >>> says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid >>> this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. >>> >>> As a preschool teacher you know that art >>> is life >>> because if you forget this >>> then you have unhappy children and your job is >>> impossible, or worse. As an >>> researcher, every time you hit something >>> hard you >>> can revert to the first >>> purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow >>> to the >>> part that does not conserve >>> the effect, without any consequences on your >>> livelihood. If we could have >>> a system of science that makes it >>> impossible to >>> leave the hardest questions >>> to the first purpose of criticism, then we >>> could >>> have so many people >>> working on these hardest questions in a >>> meaningful >>> way, but I do not know >>> how to do this even in my own work. >>> >>> Except one way is to place the desires of the >>> teachers and children before >>> your own. This is sort of a method of love or >>> empathy. Kiyo suggested The >>> Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I >>> think) >>> and this is related, also >>> Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality >>> that the people she is >>> studying see. >>> >>> Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. >>> >>> Beth >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo >>> Jornet >>> Gil >> >>> >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Mike, could you elaborate on that? >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >>> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> >> on >>> behalf of >>> mike cole >> >> >> >>> Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> Alfredo-- >>> >>> a "method of organization" seems close >>> to a >>> synonym for design. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I like very much how Greg brings in a >>> methodological issue here with his >>> mention about ethnography and his >>> reading >>> of "fidelity"; that the latter >>> >>> is >>> >>> not about representing exactly, >>> but about >>> describing events in terms of >>> consequences for the participants, >>> which >>> they display for each other in >>> their actual practice. >>> >>> This methodological aspect makes >>> me think >>> that the the notion of ANALYSIS >>> BY UNITS, which has been discussed >>> in xmca >>> before, is useful here. Unit >>> analysis reminds us that, as units, >>> experiences, as concrete and real >>> phenomena, have some form of >>> organization >>> that extends in time. That is >>> why, if I understood the >>> discussion below >>> correctly, Beth is warned not >>> >>> to >>> >>> think of the unit of experience as >>> a unit >>> "in itself". >>> >>> Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the >>> differentiation between >>> self-action and >>> transaction. In self action, >>> things are >>> explained by their own powers. >>> >>> This >>> >>> is, I believe, what Vygotsky would >>> have >>> referred to as analysis by >>> elements. In transaction, they say, >>> ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of >>> action, without final attribution to >>> ?elements? or other presumptively >>> detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or >>> ?realities,? and without isolation >>> >>> of >>> >>> presumptively detachable >>> ?relations? from >>> such detachable ?elements??. An >>> experience can be studied precisely >>> because it is not a thing in itself: >>> >>> it >>> >>> is always a moving, gesture, a >>> "method of >>> organization" as Dewey & >>> >>> Bentley >>> >>> write. >>> >>> I thought this my add something to >>> your >>> fascinating discussion, >>> Alfredo >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >>> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> >> on >>> behalf of >>> mike cole >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, >>> Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an >>> experience >>> >>> Marx: It is only in a social >>> context that >>> subjectivism and objectivism, >>> spiritualism and materialism, >>> activity and >>> passivity, cease to be >>> antinomies and thus cease to exist >>> as such >>> antinomies. The resolution of >>> the theoretical contradictions is >>> possible >>> only through practical means, >>> only through the practical energy >>> of man. >>> Their resolution is not by any >>> means, therefore, only a problem of >>> knowledge, but is a real problem of >>> life which philosophy was unable >>> to solve >>> precisely because it saw there >>> >>> a >>> >>> purely theoretical problem." >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy >>> Blunden >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >>> >>> "This unity is neither >>> emotional, >>> practical, nor >>> intellectual, for these >>> terms name >>> distinctions that >>> reflection can make within >>> it. In >>> discourse//about//an >>> experience, we must make >>> use of >>> these adjectives of >>> interpretation. In going >>> over an >>> experience in >>> mind//after/ /its >>> occurrence, we >>> may find that one >>> property rather than >>> another was >>> sufficiently dominant >>> so that it characterizes the >>> experience as a whole." >>> >>> Isn't this beautiful >>> scientific prose! >>> We make these distinction when >>> >>> we >>> >>> *reflect* on an experience. And >>> perhaps we include the >>> experience in >>> >>> our >>> >>> autobiography, act it out on the >>> stage, analyse it >>> scientifically, all >>> >>> of >>> >>> which presupposes analysis and >>> synthesis. But it is important to >>> >>> recognise >>> >>> that the unity is prior. It is not >>> only a unity of emotion and >>> >>> cognition >>> >>> (for example) but also of >>> attention >>> and will - and any other >>> categories >>> >>> you >>> >>> abstract from an experience. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth >>> Ferholt wrote: >>> >>> Or reproducing the part that >>> represents the whole? Like a >>> fractal? I >>> think it is the similarity >>> across >>> scales that makes an >>> experience >>> proleptic, or gives that >>> 'bliss >>> conferred at the beginning >>> of the road >>> >>> to >>> >>> redemption" that Vasilyuk >>> refers >>> to. You have an experience on >>> >>> several >>> >>> timescales and so a sense of >>> deja-vu is central to >>> having an >>> >>> experience. >>> >>> This is what I am thinking >>> about >>> after reading both the >>> paper of >>> >>> Dewey's >>> >>> and your recent piece on >>> perezhivanie, Andy, >>> although I am >>> picking up >>> >>> on a >>> >>> small piece of the last >>> email in >>> this chain -- : If >>> something is only >>> itself in its whole then >>> you can't >>> study it, is what is >>> bothering me. >>> >>> Beth >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at >>> 11:22 PM, >>> Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Not "getting at >>> something", >>> Michael. Just pursuing >>> this question you raised >>> about Dewey's saying that the >>> aesthetic quality of >>> medieval >>> buildings arises from >>> their not being "planned" >>> like buildings are nowadays. >>> He goes on to say >>> "Every work >>> of art follows the plan >>> of, and pattern of, a >>> complete experience." The >>> puzzle >>> he is raising here is the >>> completeness of an >>> experience which >>> gives it its >>> aesthetic quality, and >>> this cannot be created by >>> assembling together parts in >>> the way a modern >>> building is >>> planned. An experience - >>> the kind of thing which >>> sticks in your mind - is an >>> original or prior >>> unity, not >>> a combination, and this >>> is what gives a work >>> of art >>> that ineffable quality, >>> something which can >>> only be >>> transmitted by reproducing >>> that whole of an >>> experience. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> < >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, >>> Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I'm still not >>> sure about >>> your question. Did I set >>> out to have that >>> experience, that >>> morning...no, I >>> don't think so >>> (it was a >>> long time ago, but I'm >>> pretty sure no). >>> Could I >>> have just treated it as >>> an indiscriminate >>> activity, probably, I had done >>> so before. >>> >>> But I am guessing >>> you're >>> getting a something here >>> Andy? >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> >> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> xmca-l-bounces%252Bglassman.13 >>> >>= >>> >>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >>> >> >>] On >>> >>> Behalf Of >>> Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, >>> July 16, >>> 2015 12:21 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>> Having an experience >>> >>> YOu said: "... >>> But that >>> time I had the experience >>> with the >>> paintings..." >>> >>> I mean that was an >>> experience. Did you set out >>> that morning to >>> have that >>> experience? >>> RE, your >>> question: "what >>> does he mean when he says >>> you can't do things >>> indiscriminately and have >>> vital experience, >>> but you >>> also can't plan things?" >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> < >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 >>> 2:09 AM, >>> Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>> Well I'm not >>> sure I >>> understand your question >>> Andy, but >>> perhaps it has >>> something to >>> do with >>> my grandfather's favorite >>> saying >>> (translated from >>> Yiddish), >>> >>> Man plans, >>> God laughs. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >>> >>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> > >>> >>> >> >>> >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>> >>> >> xmca-l-bounces%2Bmglassman >>> > >>> >> >>> >> >>= >>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>] >>> On Behalf Of >>> Andy Blunden >>> Sent: >>> Thursday, July >>> 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>> To: >>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >>> >> >> >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: >>> Having an experience >>> >>> So Michael, >>> there was >>> just that one occasion, >>> in all your >>> museum-going, when you had an >>> experience. >>> Was that >>> planned? >>> (I don't mean >>> to say >>> you haven't had a number >>> of such >>> experiences, >>> Michael ... >>> just some >>> number actually) >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> < >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 >>> 1:19 >>> AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>> Hi Larry >>> and all, >>> >>> I think >>> this is >>> one of the most complex >>> aspects of >>> experience, what does he mean >>> when he >>> says you >>> can't do things >>> indiscriminately >>> and have vital >>> experience, but >>> you also can't plan >>> things? I have >>> discussed (argued) about >>> this a >>> lot with >>> my students. I have >>> especially seen >>> him raise this point in at >>> least two >>> of his >>> great works, Democracy >>> and >>> Education and >>> Experience and Nature - >>> and again of >>> course in Art as Experience >>> (notice >>> he is not >>> saying how Art enters >>> into >>> experience >>> but how art is experience >>> - I have >>> come to >>> notice these little >>> things >>> more and >>> more in his writing). >>> >>> The >>> difficulty we >>> have, at least in the >>> United States >>> because of the dominance of >>> the idea of >>> meta-cognition, is that we too >>> often >>> translate >>> what individuals are >>> bringing >>> in to >>> experience to organize it >>> as a form of >>> meta-cognition. It is kind >>> of >>> possible to >>> make that interpretation >>> from >>> Democracy >>> and Education, although >>> what I >>> think he >>> is doing more is arguing >>> against >>> misinterpretations of his >>> work as >>> random, child >>> centered activities. I >>> think he is >>> clearer in Experience and >>> Nature >>> that we >>> bring in who we are at the >>> moment >>> into the >>> activity, and use who we >>> are (I >>> don't want >>> to say identity) as an >>> organizing >>> principle for what we do. It >>> is >>> perhaps one of >>> the places where Dewey >>> and >>> Vygotsky are >>> close. Perhaps I can use >>> the same >>> Jackson >>> Pollock example. The >>> first few >>> times I >>> saw his paintings I was >>> trying to >>> "apprecitate" them because >>> I was >>> told that >>> was the >>> best way to experience >>> them. Dewey says >>> no vital experience >>> there >>> because my >>> activities become stilted >>> and artificia >>> l. >>> Sometimes >>> I went through the >>> museum >>> and just >>> looked at pictures, one to >>> the other. No >>> vital experience there, >>> just random >>> threads. But that time I had >>> the >>> experience >>> with the paintings I was >>> allowing >>> who I >>> was, what had been built up >>> in the >>> trajectory >>> of my life to enter into >>> my experience >>> with the painting, making it >>> a vital >>> experience. I think Dewey >>> makes >>> the >>> argument in >>> Experience and Nature that >>> it is not >>> just >>> the experience the moment >>> before, >>> but the >>> experiences leading to >>> that >>> experience, >>> the context of my life, >>> of my >>> parent's >>> life, of a long line of >>> historical >>> experiences. >>> >>> Anyway, >>> my take. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> - >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Beth Ferholt >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Early >>> Childhood and >>> Art Education >>> Brooklyn College, City >>> University >>> of New York >>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>> >>> Email: >>> bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> >>> >> bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> > >>> >> >>> >>> >> bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> >> >>> >>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>> >>> >>> >>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species >>> change in the >>> course of time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable >>> and given >>> forever (Polotova & Storch, >>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species change in the >>> course of time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable and given >>> forever (Polotova & Storch, >>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Beth Ferholt >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>> >>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Beth Ferholt >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>> >>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>> >> >> > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 17 22:31:37 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 15:31:37 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55A9BD11.7040501@mira.net> <55A9C3D9.5090509@mira.net> <55A9CB84.3020303@mira.net> Message-ID: <55A9E4B9.10601@mira.net> Mike will have to explain where that idea comes from. It is the kind of insight which (to my mind) marks out the experimental/practical scientist from the theorist/philosopher. But it seems to me that it is any shared object, even one extracted from the Anglo culture, which can become (if I understand it correctly) a "boundary object," in that it is meaningful in the cultural universe of all participants in a dialogue. The fact that the movie (or book - we also discussed a couple of autobiographies) talks about kinds of experience which all of us may be familiar with is I guess important too. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 18/07/2015 2:04 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > oops -- did not mean to use the term as a verb, above -- > in any case the reason we use film to discuss across > cultures could be because it is a medium of gaps (the > still pictures appear to move because of the gaps -- I am > referring to Sobchack) -- Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:55 PM, Beth Ferholt > > wrote: > > Yes, that is very helpful, thank you! > I do not think it is ever without another, and thought > of this when I read your recent paper. > You can always perezhivanie with the others in > yourself, so long as you attach the other to > something, even to a "past" or "future" self. > Virginia Woolf is very good at showing this. Paley's > children in her class appear to be like Buber, having > life stand still here with a cat or even a tree. > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:44 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > I couldn't tell you that, Beth. > On Mike's suggestion, you will recall, the > discussion of perezhivanie was progressed, > avoiding cross-cultural difficulties, by a > discussion of films! > There is a movie called "An Education," and there > is a passage in this movie where the young heroine > has this experience, following the revelation of > how she has been deceived and exploited. It is the > moment of self-transformation, but that > transformation is extended perhaps over a period > of 24 hours, in silence, in that kind of state. > The first movie that was discussed was "Brief > Encounter" and here that moment of time standing > still comes at the end of the movie when the > heroine reflects on an exciting affair and her > life with her nice boring husband and sees that > her life is best just as it is and lets go of her > romanticism. In my own life, I recall several such > time-standing-still moments of transformation. But > in none of these cases was there a therapist > involved. It is an open question for me, if you > want to give a different name > ("meta-perezhivanie") to that perezhivanie where > the person is able to reflect upon their own > experience without the aid of another. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 18/07/2015 1:25 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > Which stage according to Vasilyuk's stages is > the standing still? Redemption or the smack > middle of repentance, when you can see both > directions at once? Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > According to Mikhail Munipov (whom you > have met on > FaceBook, Beth) that process of "life > standing still" > is characteristic of the cathartic moment of a > perezhivanie. > And David, if I associate catharsis with > perezhivanie > I am more referring to its meaning in > Greek drama, not > 19th century medicine or Freudian > psychoanalysis, all > of these being derivatives of the original > Greek, I think, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 18/07/2015 1:03 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > Yes, this really makes sense! So it > is the doing > that is the practical energy. SO Marx > was writing > about a method of perezhivanie? > > I may be conflating things but I am > trying to > piece together several pieces (like > how in a big > city you know a whole neighborhood as > a world unto > itself, and then you find out it is in > the same > area as another neighborhood that you > know well -- > but you did not know they were > connected -- ). > > Actually that process of piecing > together across > the gaps is also related to what we > are talking > about. Of course. When you age in a > city you also > have the depth of the memories in > layers at a > given place, and this stringing > together across > time and place is what Virginia Woolf > calls life: > moments in which "life stands still > her" strung > together like a strand of pearls = > with gaps > between them. > > Beth > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Andy > Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Like you, Beth, I have found this > xmca thread > particularly exciting! > There is one thing I'd like to > add, which is > implicit > in Mike's quote from Marx: > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#art > which is that Dewey holds an > experience to be both > suffering and *doing* [Tatigkeit > in German]. > The doing means that an experience > (to be an > experience, and stand out from the > background of > experience, have significance and > form a whole) > entails wilfully changing the > world, even if that > changing is trivial, such as > changing other > people's > attitudes to you or most trivially > changing > how you > henceforth interact with a certain > kind of > situation, > person or whatever. But doing is > doing, it is > not just > going through the motions or > habit. And that > is why > experiences in this sense are so > important to the > development of the personality and > the world, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 18/07/2015 4:40 AM, Beth > Ferholt wrote: > > This chain of ideas is the > closest I have ever > felt to what interests me > most. It covers all the > interests that > brought me > first to play and then > to the playworlds and then to > perezhivanie. Before I went to > LCHC I was a > preschool teacher and this is > a profession > that I > think can be described as > being, in its first part, > responsible for > reflecting upon the 'having an > experience' that is happening > all around > you every > day (time is so > condensed for young children > so it is > happening > all the time) so that you > can support the self-creation > beings who > are able > to "have an experience''? > > Like with Greg's students, as > a preschool > teacher > you find that what is > most important is to describe > what is > happening in > a way that is true to > the children's experiences. > Vivian Paley > shows us > how to do this. If you > don;t do this you find dealing > with the > Golem who > has had the words that > give it life removed from its > mouth: you > just have > dirt, nothing even > remotely related to the Golem, > not even > weight. > > I think it is the > teacher/artists who can > find for > us those properties that > will characterize the > experience as a > whole. What > Monica named 'preschool > didactics from within' is a > process of working > with these people in > research. This sounds like 5D. > > Andy, Vygotsky is talking > about the the two > purposes of art criticism. One > is entirely in the domain of > social life, > he says, > guiding what art creates > in its audience in useful > directions. The > other > is to 'conserve the effect > of art as art'. He says we > know this is > needed, > because art is a unity, > and without the whole > criticism is not > related to > art -- he calls what we > have left, without the unity, > a wound. But > criticism of art treats art as > a parliamentary speech -- > often -- he > says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid > this in the chapter on Bunin's > short story. > > As a preschool teacher you > know that art > is life > because if you forget this > then you have unhappy children > and your job is > impossible, or worse. As an > researcher, every time you hit > something > hard you > can revert to the first > purpose of art/life criticism, > or anyhow > to the > part that does not conserve > the effect, without any > consequences on your > livelihood. If we could have > a system of science that makes it > impossible to > leave the hardest questions > to the first purpose of > criticism, then we > could > have so many people > working on these hardest > questions in a > meaningful > way, but I do not know > how to do this even in my own > work. > > Except one way is to place the > desires of the > teachers and children before > your own. This is sort of a > method of love or > empathy. Kiyo suggested The > Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no > relation I > think) > and this is related, also > Edith Turner's work where she > sees the reality > that the people she is > studying see. > > Maybe it is a method of > perezhivanie. > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 > PM, Alfredo > Jornet > Gil > > > > >>> > wrote: > > Mike, could you elaborate > on that? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > mike cole > > > > >>> > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an experience > > Alfredo-- > > a "method of organization" > seems close > to a > synonym for design. > > mike > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at > 9:42 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil > > > > > > > >>> > > > wrote: > > I like very much how > Greg brings in a > methodological issue > here with his > mention about > ethnography and his > reading > of "fidelity"; that > the latter > > is > > not about representing > exactly, > but about > describing events in > terms of > consequences for the > participants, > which > they display for each > other in > their actual practice. > > This methodological > aspect makes > me think > that the the notion of > ANALYSIS > BY UNITS, which has > been discussed > in xmca > before, is useful > here. Unit > analysis reminds us > that, as units, > experiences, as > concrete and real > phenomena, have some > form of > organization > that extends in time. > That is > why, if I understood the > discussion below > correctly, Beth is > warned not > > to > > think of the unit of > experience as > a unit > "in itself". > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 > made the > differentiation between > self-action and > transaction. In self > action, > things are > explained by their own > powers. > > This > > is, I believe, what > Vygotsky would > have > referred to as analysis by > elements. In > transaction, they say, > ?deal[s] with aspects > and phases of > action, without final > attribution to > ?elements? or other > presumptively > detachable ?entities,? > ?essences,? or > ?realities,? and > without isolation > > of > > presumptively detachable > ?relations? from > such detachable > ?elements??. An > experience can be > studied precisely > because it is not a > thing in itself: > > it > > is always a moving, > gesture, a > "method of > organization" as Dewey & > > Bentley > > write. > > I thought this my add > something to > your > fascinating discussion, > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > mike cole > > > > > > >>> > > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > To: Andy Blunden; > eXtended Mind, > Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an > experience > > Marx: It is only in a > social > context that > subjectivism and > objectivism, > spiritualism and > materialism, > activity and > passivity, cease to be > antinomies and thus > cease to exist > as such > antinomies. The > resolution of > the theoretical > contradictions is > possible > only through practical > means, > only through the > practical energy > of man. > Their resolution is > not by any > means, therefore, only > a problem of > knowledge, but is a > real problem of > life which philosophy > was unable > to solve > precisely because it > saw there > > a > > purely theoretical > problem." > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 > at 10:45 PM, Andy > Blunden > > > > > > >>> > > wrote: > > No, no, Beth. As > Dewey says: > > "This unity is > neither > emotional, > practical, nor > intellectual, for these > terms name > distinctions that > reflection can > make within > it. In > discourse//about//an > experience, we > must make > use of > these adjectives of > interpretation. In going > over an > experience in > mind//after/ /its > occurrence, we > may find that one > property > rather than > another was > sufficiently dominant > so that it > characterizes the > experience as a > whole." > > Isn't this beautiful > scientific prose! > We make these > distinction when > > we > > *reflect* on an > experience. And > perhaps we include the > experience in > > our > > autobiography, act > it out on the > stage, analyse it > scientifically, all > > of > > which presupposes > analysis and > synthesis. But it > is important to > > recognise > > that the unity is > prior. It is not > only a unity of > emotion and > > cognition > > (for example) but > also of > attention > and will - and any > other > categories > > you > > abstract from an > experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 > PM, Beth > Ferholt wrote: > > Or reproducing > the part that > represents the > whole? Like a > fractal? I > think it is > the similarity > across > scales that > makes an > experience > proleptic, or > gives that > 'bliss > conferred at > the beginning > of the road > > to > > redemption" > that Vasilyuk > refers > to. You have > an experience on > > several > > timescales and > so a sense of > deja-vu is > central to > having an > > experience. > > This is what I > am thinking > about > after reading > both the > paper of > > Dewey's > > and your > recent piece on > perezhivanie, Andy, > although I am > picking up > > on a > > small piece of > the last > email in > this chain -- : If > something is only > itself in its > whole then > you can't > study it, is > what is > bothering me. > > Beth > > On Thu, Jul > 16, 2015 at > 11:22 PM, > Andy Blunden > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > Not > "getting at > something", > Michael. Just > pursuing > this > question you raised > about Dewey's > saying that the > aesthetic quality of > medieval > buildings > arises from > their not > being "planned" > like buildings > are nowadays. > He goes > on to say > "Every work > of art follows > the plan > of, and > pattern of, a > complete > experience." The > puzzle > he is > raising here is the > completeness of an > experience which > gives it its > aesthetic > quality, and > this > cannot be created by > assembling > together parts in > the way a > modern > building is > planned. An > experience - > the kind > of thing which > sticks in your > mind - is an > original or prior > unity, not > a combination, > and this > is what > gives a work > of art > that ineffable > quality, > something which can > only be > transmitted by > reproducing > that > whole of an > experience. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy > Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > On > 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, > Glassman, > Michael wrote: > > Andy, > > I'm > still not > sure about > your > question. Did I set > out > to have that > experience, that > morning...no, I > don't think so > (it was a > long time ago, > but I'm > pretty sure no). > Could I > have just > treated it as > an > indiscriminate > activity, > probably, I had done > so > before. > > But I > am guessing > you're > getting a > something here > Andy? > > Michael > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>>= > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>>] On > > Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, > July 16, > 2015 12:21 PM > To: > eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an > experience > > YOu > said: "... > But that > time I had the > experience > with the > paintings..." > > I > mean that was an > experience. > Did you set out > that morning to > have that > experience? > RE, your > question: "what > does he mean > when he says > you > can't do things > indiscriminately and have > vital experience, > but you > also can't > plan things?" > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On > 17/07/2015 > 2:09 AM, > Glassman, > Michael wrote: > > Well I'm not > sure I > understand > your question > Andy, but > perhaps it has > something to > do with > my > grandfather's favorite > saying > (translated from > Yiddish), > > Man plans, > God laughs. > > Michael > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > > > > >> > > > > > >>>= > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>>] > On Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: > Thursday, July > 16, 2015 12:04 PM > To: > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: > Having an > experience > > So Michael, > there was > just that one > occasion, > in all your > museum-going, > when you had an > experience. > Was that > planned? > (I don't mean > to say > you haven't > had a number > of such > experiences, > Michael ... > just some > number actually) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > On 17/07/2015 > 1:19 > AM, Glassman, > Michael wrote: > > Hi Larry > and all, > > I think > this is > one of the > most complex > aspects of > experience, > what does he mean > when he > says you > can't do things > indiscriminately > and have vital > experience, but > you also can't > plan > things? I have > discussed > (argued) about > this a > lot with > my students. I > have > especially seen > him raise this > point in at > least two > of his > great works, > Democracy > and > Education and > Experience and > Nature - > and again of > course in Art > as Experience > (notice > he is not > saying how Art > enters > into > experience > but how art is > experience > - I have > come to > notice these > little > things > more and > more in his > writing). > > The > difficulty we > have, at least > in the > United States > because of the > dominance of > the idea of > meta-cognition, is that we too > often > translate > what > individuals are > bringing > in to > experience to > organize it > as a form of > meta-cognition. It is kind > of > possible to > make that > interpretation > from > Democracy > and Education, > although > what I > think he > is doing more > is arguing > against > misinterpretations of his > work as > random, child > centered > activities. I > think he is > clearer in > Experience and > Nature > that we > bring in who > we are at the > moment > into the > activity, and > use who we > are (I > don't want > to say > identity) as an > organizing > principle for > what we do. It > is > perhaps one of > the places > where Dewey > and > Vygotsky are > close. Perhaps > I can use > the same > Jackson > Pollock > example. The > first few > times I > saw his > paintings I was > trying to > "apprecitate" them because > I was > told that > was the > best way to > experience > them. Dewey says > no vital > experience > there > because my > activities > become stilted > and artificia > l. > Sometimes > I went through the > museum > and just > looked at > pictures, one to > the other. No > vital > experience there, > just random > threads. But > that time I had > the > experience > with the > paintings I was > allowing > who I > was, what had > been built up > in the > trajectory > of my life to > enter into > my experience > with the > painting, making it > a vital > experience. I > think Dewey > makes > the > argument in > Experience and > Nature that > it is not > just > the experience > the moment > before, > but the > experiences > leading to > that > experience, > the context of > my life, > of my > parent's > life, of a > long line of > historical > experiences. > > Anyway, > my take. > > Michael > > - > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant > Professor > Department of > Early > Childhood and > Art Education > Brooklyn > College, City > University > of New York > 2900 Bedford > Avenue > Brooklyn, NY > 11210-2889 > > Email: > bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> > > Phone: (718) > 951-5205 > > > > Fax: (718) > 951-4816 > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and > species > change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are > not stable > and given > forever (Polotova & > Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > -- > > Both environment and > species change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not > stable and given > forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > -- Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art > Education > Brooklyn College, City University of > New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > > > >> > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From smago@uga.edu Sat Jul 18 03:27:54 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 10:27:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311023327F1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <55A8ADB5.8050800@mira.net> Message-ID: Wordsworth is alarmingly well-represented in THE STUFFED OWL: AN ANTHOLOGY OF BAD VERSE, still available at http://www.amazon.com/The-Stuffed-Owl-Anthology-Review/dp/1590170385. Indeed, the book's title comes from Wordsworth. (FYI I was a college English major and the British Lake Poets were among my favorites.) "WHILE ANNA'S PEERS AND EARLY PLAYMATES TREAD" WHILE Anna's peers and early playmates tread, In freedom, mountain-turf and river's marge; Or float with music in the festal barge; Rein the proud steed, or through the dance are led; Her doom it is to press a weary bed-- Till oft her guardian Angel, to some charge More urgent called, will stretch his wings at large, And friends too rarely prop the languid head. Yet, helped by Genius--untired comforter, The presence even of a stuffed Owl for her 10 Can cheat the time; sending her fancy out To ivied castles and to moonlight skies, Though he can neither stir a plume, nor shout; Nor veil, with restless film, his staring eyes. 1827. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 8:29 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience The context is the concluding chapter of "Psychology of Art", entitled "Art and Life". The title itself tells you something of what Vygotsky wants to say. The great slogan of nineteenth century realism was for life to permeate art, hence the realistic conversations we find in Jane Austen (compared to the epistolary novels of the eighteenth century and the speech making we find in Samuel Johnson), hence Monet's paintings of railway stations, hence "verismo" in Italian opera. But the acmeists (an offshoot of symbolism to which Vygotsky was was quite close at the time of writing "Psychology of Art") turned this on its head. Their great slogan was for art to permeate life, so that each moment of everyday conversation, each photograph we take, and each snatch of street noise might be live-experienced the way we experience a novel, a painting, or an opera. Vygotsky says that for this to happen we need art criticism. If art is the moment of actual experiencing, art criticism is the "perizhivanie" of the experience. This is incorrectly conceived of as "catharisis" (even by Vygotsky himself earlier in the book). "Catharisis" is therapeutic and self-limiting; it's a matter of explaining away and destroying a pathology; this is true whether we read Aristotle or Freud. But that is not "perizhivanie". Like all units of development (Vygotsky: "relational units"), perizhivanie is a unit that develops: in the infant it means one thing and in the art critic something that is linked, but distinct. We can say that for the infant, "perizhivanie" is the feeling of what happens more or less as it happens (the satisfaction of drinking the milk as you are drinking it). But for the art critic, "perizhivanie" is really Wordsworth's "emotion recollected in tranquility". It's a catharsis which doesn't disappear but which develops into a more complex, more potent, and higher form instead. Wordworth wrote some good poems, but we can only really see how and why when we read his really bad ones, and I think "The Tables Turned (Enough of Art and Science)" is an example of Wordsworth at his very worst. Ruqaiya Hasan wrote that what is different about verbal art (she means what is different about verbal ART as opposed to other forms of verbalism) is that we can separate its verbalization from a layer she calls "symbolic articulation" and we can even seperate this layer of symbolic articulation from a layer she calls "theme". In Wordworth's poem, the verbalization is the rhyme and meter, the way in which "leaves" rhymes with "receives" and "intellect" does NOT rhyme with "dissect". The layer of symbolic articulation is at the level of "barren leaves" and "murder to dissect", both of which are symbols which articulate Wordworth's small-minded, reactionary, English disgust with and hatred for the great French tradition of rationalism. But the theme? The theme is..."turning the tables" and abandoning your books! This is why it's really a bad poem--the means contradicts the message. I hope I have not, with this explanation, destroyed anyone's pleasure in the poem, but anyone who feels that I have should go and read "Tintern Abbey" or the Lucy poems....here you can see that the layers do not contradict each other at all, and the difference really like the difference between chewing dry crunchy barren leaves and fresh green shoots that you can whistle with or put in your salad. David Kellogg On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 4:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > You may be right, Rod. Perhaps Beth could give us the quote in context > so we have a better chance of understanding it? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 5:19 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > >> Apologies again for coming late into a conversation but I was >> interested by a disparity between my reading of Beth's quote from >> Vygotsky and (what I understand as being) Andy's reading of the same >> quote. Andy seems to read the quote as saying that art BOTH produces >> (or perhaps catalyses) an experience in the observer AND explains >> this experience but I read the quote (and Beth's use of it) as >> suggesting that it is imperative BOTH for art to bring on the >> experience AND that that experience should be explained (it is >> imperative ... to explain it) - though not necessarily explained BY >> the art itself. The reason why I was intrigued by this difference in >> interpretations is that it made me reflect on what is achieved when >> an experience is explained. I suspect that we tend to focus too much, >> even exclusively, on what the explanation brings to (and out from) >> the experience but isn't it also true that the process of explaining >> an experience also affects the medium in which the explanation is >> expressed. A language which is bent into the service of explaining >> experiences is bent by that process, becoming enriched by the ways it >> has been used, acquiring a patina of use which is carried into other >> situations. A system of categories can perhaps be given heart if >> people struggle with the task of hacking it to describe, represent >> and explain things which it may not (yet) be fit to explain - so >> language comes to echo and resonate with the experiences of the people who use it - a kind of frohWian process (that's Whorf in reverse). >> >> All the best, >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.ed >> u] >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 17 July 2015 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> Beth. yes, when you reflect on something, it is already past. If you >> want to reproduce it, then as a human being you will have to analyse it. >> The trade of being an artist is the capacity to synthesise the >> elements and give you something of the ineffable. But I love that >> quote you have from Vygotsky, where he claims that art not only >> excites the experience in the reader, but also /explains/ it. I think >> that is actually setting a high standard for art. Dickens did not >> explain Dickensian London, but he represented it so faithfully. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 17/07/2015 4:13 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >>> But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without >>> loosing the whole entirely in the process of reflection. >>> >>> Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, >>> something about having an artist on every research team. I have >>> been thinking about this. If the "artist, in comparison with his >>> fellows, is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of >>> execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" >>> then this is who we need to tell us which property is the one that >>> can characterize the experience as a whole. >>> >>> No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is >>> prior but how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- >>> sort of like the empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you >>> study the bowl itself then you miss the whole point. >>> >>> I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating >>> things?: >>> >>> "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there >>> is a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." >>> and >>> >>> ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of >>> art take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to >>> explain art, /and to explain it in such a way that the explanation >>> does not kill the emotion/.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) >>> >>> >>> I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking >>> of how I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their >>> students and the activities with these students with such art, and >>> how I am getting better at creating classroom spaces that support >>> this description -- but am still not clear about how to consistently >>> create spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation and >>> reflection. >>> >>> >>> This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, >>> and thinking about Leigh Star's work. >>> >>> >>> Beth >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >>> >>> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >>> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions >>> that reflection can make within it. In >>> discourse//about//an experience, we must make use >>> of these adjectives of interpretation. In going >>> over an experience in mind//after/ /its >>> occurrence, we may find that one property rather >>> than another was sufficiently dominant so that it >>> characterizes the experience as a whole." >>> >>> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these >>> distinction when we *reflect* on an experience. And >>> perhaps we include the experience in our >>> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it >>> scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and >>> synthesis. But it is important to recognise that the >>> unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >>> cognition (for example) but also of attention and will >>> - and any other categories you abstract from an >>> experience. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>> >>>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? >>>> Like a fractal? I think it is the similarity across >>>> scales that makes an experience proleptic, or gives >>>> that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to >>>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an >>>> experience on several timescales and so a sense of >>>> deja-vu is central to having an experience. This is >>>> what I am thinking about after reading both the paper >>>> of Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, >>>> Andy, although I am picking up on a small piece of >>>> the last email in this chain -- : If something is >>>> only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is >>>> what is bothering me. Beth >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just >>>> pursuing this question you raised about Dewey's >>>> saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval >>>> buildings arises from their not being "planned" >>>> like buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say >>>> "Every work of art follows the plan of, and >>>> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he >>>> is raising here is the completeness of an >>>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, >>>> and this cannot be created by assembling together >>>> parts in the way a modern building is planned. An >>>> experience - the kind of thing which sticks in >>>> your mind - is an original or prior unity, not a >>>> combination, and this is what gives a work of art >>>> that ineffable quality, something which can only >>>> be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an >>>> experience. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did >>>> I set out to have that experience, that >>>> morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long >>>> time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I >>>> have just treated it as an indiscriminate >>>> activity, probably, I had done so before. >>>> >>>> But I am guessing you're getting a something >>>> here Andy? >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>>> = >>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] On Behalf >>>> Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>> >>>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the >>>> experience with the paintings..." >>>> >>>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set >>>> out that morning to have that experience? >>>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he >>>> says you can't do things indiscriminately and >>>> have vital experience, but you also can't >>>> plan things?" >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your >>>> question Andy, but perhaps it has >>>> something to do with my grandfather's >>>> favorite saying (translated from >>>> Yiddish), >>>> >>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>> = >>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>> >>>> So Michael, there was just that one >>>> occasion, in all your museum-going, when >>>> you had an experience. Was that planned? >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a >>>> number of such experiences, >>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>> >>>> I think this is one of the most >>>> complex aspects of experience, what >>>> does he mean when he says you can't >>>> do things indiscriminately and have >>>> vital experience, but you also can't >>>> plan things? I have discussed >>>> (argued) about this a lot with my >>>> students. I have especially seen him >>>> raise this point in at least two of >>>> his great works, Democracy and >>>> Education and Experience and Nature - >>>> and again of course in Art as >>>> Experience (notice he is not saying >>>> how Art enters into experience but >>>> how art is experience - I have come >>>> to notice these little things more >>>> and more in his writing). >>>> >>>> The difficulty we have, at least in >>>> the United States because of the >>>> dominance of the idea of >>>> meta-cognition, is that we too often >>>> translate what individuals are >>>> bringing in to experience to organize >>>> it as a form of meta-cognition. It >>>> is kind of possible to make that >>>> interpretation from Democracy and >>>> Education, although what I think he >>>> is doing more is arguing against >>>> misinterpretations of his work as >>>> random, child centered activities. I >>>> think he is clearer in Experience and >>>> Nature that we bring in who we are at >>>> the moment into the activity, and use >>>> who we are (I don't want to say >>>> identity) as an organizing principle >>>> for what we do. It is perhaps one of >>>> the places where Dewey and Vygotsky >>>> are close. Perhaps I can use the >>>> same Jackson Pollock example. The >>>> first few times I saw his paintings I >>>> was trying to "apprecitate" them >>>> because I was told that was the best >>>> way to experience them. Dewey says >>>> no vital experience there because my >>>> activities become stilted and artificia >>>> l. Sometimes I went through the >>>> museum and just looked at pictures, >>>> one to the other. No vital >>>> experience there, just random >>>> threads. But that time I had the >>>> experience with the paintings I was >>>> allowing who I was, what had been >>>> built up in the trajectory of my life >>>> to enter into my experience with the >>>> painting, making it a vital >>>> experience. I think Dewey makes the >>>> argument in Experience and Nature >>>> that it is not just the experience >>>> the moment before, but the >>>> experiences leading to that >>>> experience, the context of my life, >>>> of my parent's life, of a long line >>>> of historical experiences. >>>> >>>> Anyway, my take. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> - >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Beth Ferholt >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>> >>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Beth Ferholt >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, >>> City University of New York >>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>> >>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> >>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >> for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not >> the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are >> not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >> accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility >> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not >> accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing >> in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or >> services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> > > From smago@uga.edu Sat Jul 18 08:51:41 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 15:51:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Fulani Fellows In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: "Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience." This position is in NYC. Please respond to Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org and NOT TO ME. From: Lois Holzman [mailto:lhmailhelp@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Lois Holzman Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 10:49 AM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: Fulani Fellows Hi Peter, I'm writing to ask for your help with a new initiative of the All Stars Project. It's a post-graduate fellowship program called the Fulani Fellows, made possible by a recent grant the All Stars received. The purpose of the fellowship is to provide the opportunity to work directly with developmental psychologist, activist and grassroots educator, Lenora Fulani, in her many projects that incorporate new ways of addressing poverty, human development and public policy. I 'm hoping that you can help us connect with interested and qualified candidates for both a program manager and the fellows themselves. The program manager will be responsible for recruitment of the fellows and the selection process, as well as the day-to-day operations of the program. I thought that you might be able to recommend some candidates for this position in addition to getting the job description (attached) out to your network. The Fulani Fellows will participate in a 5-month program of immersion in the on-the-ground practice, methodology and theory employed in the programs and practices that Dr. Fulani has helped to create and build. Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience. The All Stars will place three fellows in each of three cycles, the first beginning in January 2016. If you know of anyone who would make a strong Fulani Fellow program manager or fellowship candidate, you can have them reach Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org to initiate the process. Thanks in advance for your support as the All Stars Project launches this important and exciting new initiative. Your help in distributing the job description - we need our program manager in place before we can select our fellows - and in keeping an eye out for candidates to become Fulani Fellows, is invaluable. All best, Lois -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Program Manager FF JD final.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 120761 bytes Desc: Program Manager FF JD final.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150718/9b40714e/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: ATT00001.htm Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150718/9b40714e/attachment.pl From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Jul 18 14:00:23 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 06:00:23 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <55A8A505.6010102@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311023327F1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <55A8ADB5.8050800@mira.net> Message-ID: Wordsworth's "Simon Lee" was nominated for the BBC's worst poem in English several years running, and (if I remember correctly) finally won it shortly before the competition was abolished and replaced with the Evelyn Waugh award for bad sex writing (here D.H. Lawrence was the man to beat). My professor Henry Widdowson wrote a whole book chapter on what makes "Simon Lee" so bad, and--better--how Widdowson solved the Simon Lee problem perfectly and how this solution made the Lucy poems possible. (Details in the attached chapter from my book, pp. 15-14). That is what is exciting about Wordsworth--he really couldn't tell the difference between his bad poems and his brilliant ones, and instead of just burning the former and publishing the latter so we remember him for his unadulterated genius, he just sat on the lot, so today we can pick and choose, laugh and love. Reading over Peter's offering, though, I have to admit that my book chapter missed something truly awful about the man ("awful" in both the 19th Century sense of "awesome" and the 20th Century sense of dreadful). The sentimental cult of the child that permeates Dickens (think of Oliver Twist, Little Nell, and the scarcely disguised pedophilia of Little Dorrit) begins here. It's Wordsworth who retrieves from France and popularizes Rousseauvian ideas about children and education. But the way he does this is quite grim: it's a cult for the DEAD child; the child who does not develop ("We are Six"). Together with Coleridge, Wordsworth was a champion of something called the "Madras Method" in education--this was an early form of behaviorism that emphasized unconditional obedience, originally designed for the bastard offspring of British soldiers in India (see Kipling's novel "Kim"). Later this was brought back to England and made de rigueur in working class schools in London. It really was de rigueur mortis: I went to one in 1966, and I still smart when I think of the canings and pandybattings I earned. Bernstein's work, written about exactly the time I was going to elementary school in London, was partly a reaction against the Madras Method and a way of seeking an alternative for working class youth. David Kellogg On Sat, Jul 18, 2015 at 7:27 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Wordsworth is alarmingly well-represented in THE STUFFED OWL: AN ANTHOLOGY > OF BAD VERSE, still available at > http://www.amazon.com/The-Stuffed-Owl-Anthology-Review/dp/1590170385. > > Indeed, the book's title comes from Wordsworth. (FYI I was a college > English major and the British Lake Poets were among my favorites.) > > "WHILE ANNA'S PEERS AND EARLY PLAYMATES TREAD" > > WHILE Anna's peers and early playmates tread, > In freedom, mountain-turf and river's marge; > Or float with music in the festal barge; > Rein the proud steed, or through the dance are led; > Her doom it is to press a weary bed-- > Till oft her guardian Angel, to some charge > More urgent called, will stretch his wings at large, > And friends too rarely prop the languid head. > Yet, helped by Genius--untired comforter, > The presence even of a stuffed Owl for her 10 > Can cheat the time; sending her fancy out > To ivied castles and to moonlight skies, > Though he can neither stir a plume, nor shout; > Nor veil, with restless film, his staring eyes. > 1827. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 8:29 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > The context is the concluding chapter of "Psychology of Art", entitled > "Art and Life". The title itself tells you something of what Vygotsky wants > to say. The great slogan of nineteenth century realism was for life to > permeate art, hence the realistic conversations we find in Jane Austen > (compared to the epistolary novels of the eighteenth century and the speech > making we find in Samuel Johnson), hence Monet's paintings of railway > stations, hence "verismo" in Italian opera. But the acmeists (an offshoot > of symbolism to which Vygotsky was was quite close at the time of writing > "Psychology of Art") turned this on its head. Their great slogan was for > art to permeate life, so that each moment of everyday conversation, each > photograph we take, and each snatch of street noise might be > live-experienced the way we experience a novel, a painting, or an opera. > > Vygotsky says that for this to happen we need art criticism. If art is the > moment of actual experiencing, art criticism is the "perizhivanie" of the > experience. This is incorrectly conceived of as "catharisis" (even by > Vygotsky himself earlier in the book). "Catharisis" is therapeutic and > self-limiting; it's a matter of explaining away and destroying a pathology; > this is true whether we read Aristotle or Freud. But that is not > "perizhivanie". Like all units of development (Vygotsky: "relational > units"), perizhivanie is a unit that develops: in the infant it means one > thing and in the art critic something that is linked, but distinct. We can > say that for the infant, "perizhivanie" is the feeling of what happens more > or less as it happens (the satisfaction of drinking the milk as you are > drinking it). But for the art critic, "perizhivanie" is really Wordsworth's > "emotion recollected in tranquility". It's a catharsis which doesn't > disappear but which develops into a more complex, more potent, and higher > form instead. > > Wordworth wrote some good poems, but we can only really see how and why > when we read his really bad ones, and I think "The Tables Turned (Enough of > Art and Science)" is an example of Wordsworth at his very worst. Ruqaiya > Hasan wrote that what is different about verbal art (she means what is > different about verbal ART as opposed to other forms of verbalism) is that > we can separate its verbalization from a layer she calls "symbolic > articulation" and we can even seperate this layer of symbolic articulation > from a layer she calls "theme". In Wordworth's poem, the verbalization is > the rhyme and meter, the way in which "leaves" rhymes with "receives" and > "intellect" does NOT rhyme with "dissect". The layer of symbolic > articulation is at the level of "barren leaves" and "murder to dissect", > both of which are symbols which articulate Wordworth's small-minded, > reactionary, English disgust with and hatred for the great French tradition > of rationalism. > > But the theme? The theme is..."turning the tables" and abandoning your > books! This is why it's really a bad poem--the means contradicts the > message. I hope I have not, with this explanation, destroyed anyone's > pleasure in the poem, but anyone who feels that I have should go and read > "Tintern Abbey" or the Lucy poems....here you can see that the layers do > not contradict each other at all, and the difference really like the > difference between chewing dry crunchy barren leaves and fresh green shoots > that you can whistle with or put in your salad. > > David Kellogg > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 4:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > You may be right, Rod. Perhaps Beth could give us the quote in context > > so we have a better chance of understanding it? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 5:19 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > > > >> Apologies again for coming late into a conversation but I was > >> interested by a disparity between my reading of Beth's quote from > >> Vygotsky and (what I understand as being) Andy's reading of the same > >> quote. Andy seems to read the quote as saying that art BOTH produces > >> (or perhaps catalyses) an experience in the observer AND explains > >> this experience but I read the quote (and Beth's use of it) as > >> suggesting that it is imperative BOTH for art to bring on the > >> experience AND that that experience should be explained (it is > >> imperative ... to explain it) - though not necessarily explained BY > >> the art itself. The reason why I was intrigued by this difference in > >> interpretations is that it made me reflect on what is achieved when > >> an experience is explained. I suspect that we tend to focus too much, > >> even exclusively, on what the explanation brings to (and out from) > >> the experience but isn't it also true that the process of explaining > >> an experience also affects the medium in which the explanation is > >> expressed. A language which is bent into the service of explaining > >> experiences is bent by that process, becoming enriched by the ways it > >> has been used, acquiring a patina of use which is carried into other > >> situations. A system of categories can perhaps be given heart if > >> people struggle with the task of hacking it to describe, represent > >> and explain things which it may not (yet) be fit to explain - so > >> language comes to echo and resonate with the experiences of the people > who use it - a kind of frohWian process (that's Whorf in reverse). > >> > >> All the best, > >> > >> Rod > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.ed > >> u] > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >> Sent: 17 July 2015 07:48 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >> > >> Beth. yes, when you reflect on something, it is already past. If you > >> want to reproduce it, then as a human being you will have to analyse it. > >> The trade of being an artist is the capacity to synthesise the > >> elements and give you something of the ineffable. But I love that > >> quote you have from Vygotsky, where he claims that art not only > >> excites the experience in the reader, but also /explains/ it. I think > >> that is actually setting a high standard for art. Dickens did not > >> explain Dickensian London, but he represented it so faithfully. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> On 17/07/2015 4:13 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >> > >>> But when we reflect on some things it is hard to do so without > >>> loosing the whole entirely in the process of reflection. > >>> > >>> Jay said in a chain recently, in response to a related question, > >>> something about having an artist on every research team. I have > >>> been thinking about this. If the "artist, in comparison with his > >>> fellows, is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of > >>> execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" > >>> then this is who we need to tell us which property is the one that > >>> can characterize the experience as a whole. > >>> > >>> No? Am I missing something in what you just wrote? The unity is > >>> prior but how to study the object if this unity is its essence? -- > >>> sort of like the empty space in the bowl being the bowl, so when you > >>> study the bowl itself then you miss the whole point. > >>> > >>> I am thinking of these two quotes, although maybe I am conflating > >>> things?: > >>> > >>> "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there > >>> is a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience." > >>> and > >>> > >>> ?Few understand why it is imperative not only to have the effect of > >>> art take shape and excite the reader or spectator but also to > >>> explain art, /and to explain it in such a way that the explanation > >>> does not kill the emotion/.? -- p. 254, Vygotsky (1971) > >>> > >>> > >>> I am really meaning this question in a very practical way, thinking > >>> of how I am always speaking to preschool teachers who describe their > >>> students and the activities with these students with such art, and > >>> how I am getting better at creating classroom spaces that support > >>> this description -- but am still not clear about how to consistently > >>> create spaces in my papers for similar forms of representation and > >>> reflection. > >>> > >>> > >>> This question also comes from reading the Alfredo and Rolf paper, > >>> and thinking about Leigh Star's work. > >>> > >>> > >>> Beth > >>> > >>> > >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:45 AM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: > >>> > >>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > >>> > >>> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > >>> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions > >>> that reflection can make within it. In > >>> discourse//about//an experience, we must make use > >>> of these adjectives of interpretation. In going > >>> over an experience in mind//after/ /its > >>> occurrence, we may find that one property rather > >>> than another was sufficiently dominant so that it > >>> characterizes the experience as a whole." > >>> > >>> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these > >>> distinction when we *reflect* on an experience. And > >>> perhaps we include the experience in our > >>> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it > >>> scientifically, all of which presupposes analysis and > >>> synthesis. But it is important to recognise that the > >>> unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > >>> cognition (for example) but also of attention and will > >>> - and any other categories you abstract from an > >>> experience. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >>> > >>>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? > >>>> Like a fractal? I think it is the similarity across > >>>> scales that makes an experience proleptic, or gives > >>>> that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the road to > >>>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an > >>>> experience on several timescales and so a sense of > >>>> deja-vu is central to having an experience. This is > >>>> what I am thinking about after reading both the paper > >>>> of Dewey's and your recent piece on perezhivanie, > >>>> Andy, although I am picking up on a small piece of > >>>> the last email in this chain -- : If something is > >>>> only itself in its whole then you can't study it, is > >>>> what is bothering me. Beth > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just > >>>> pursuing this question you raised about Dewey's > >>>> saying that the aesthetic quality of medieval > >>>> buildings arises from their not being "planned" > >>>> like buildings are nowadays. He goes on to say > >>>> "Every work of art follows the plan of, and > >>>> pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle he > >>>> is raising here is the completeness of an > >>>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, > >>>> and this cannot be created by assembling together > >>>> parts in the way a modern building is planned. An > >>>> experience - the kind of thing which sticks in > >>>> your mind - is an original or prior unity, not a > >>>> combination, and this is what gives a work of art > >>>> that ineffable quality, something which can only > >>>> be transmitted by reproducing that whole of an > >>>> experience. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Andy, > >>>> > >>>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did > >>>> I set out to have that experience, that > >>>> morning...no, I don't think so (it was a long > >>>> time ago, but I'm pretty sure no). Could I > >>>> have just treated it as an indiscriminate > >>>> activity, probably, I had done so before. > >>>> > >>>> But I am guessing you're getting a something > >>>> here Andy? > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > >>>> = > >>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> ] On Behalf > >>>> Of Andy Blunden > >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>>> > >>>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the > >>>> experience with the paintings..." > >>>> > >>>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set > >>>> out that morning to have that experience? > >>>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he > >>>> says you can't do things indiscriminately and > >>>> have vital experience, but you also can't > >>>> plan things?" > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your > >>>> question Andy, but perhaps it has > >>>> something to do with my grandfather's > >>>> favorite saying (translated from > >>>> Yiddish), > >>>> > >>>> Man plans, God laughs. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > >>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > >>>> = > >>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> ] > >>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >>>> > >>>> So Michael, there was just that one > >>>> occasion, in all your museum-going, when > >>>> you had an experience. Was that planned? > >>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a > >>>> number of such experiences, > >>>> Michael ... just some number actually) > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Hi Larry and all, > >>>> > >>>> I think this is one of the most > >>>> complex aspects of experience, what > >>>> does he mean when he says you can't > >>>> do things indiscriminately and have > >>>> vital experience, but you also can't > >>>> plan things? I have discussed > >>>> (argued) about this a lot with my > >>>> students. I have especially seen him > >>>> raise this point in at least two of > >>>> his great works, Democracy and > >>>> Education and Experience and Nature - > >>>> and again of course in Art as > >>>> Experience (notice he is not saying > >>>> how Art enters into experience but > >>>> how art is experience - I have come > >>>> to notice these little things more > >>>> and more in his writing). > >>>> > >>>> The difficulty we have, at least in > >>>> the United States because of the > >>>> dominance of the idea of > >>>> meta-cognition, is that we too often > >>>> translate what individuals are > >>>> bringing in to experience to organize > >>>> it as a form of meta-cognition. It > >>>> is kind of possible to make that > >>>> interpretation from Democracy and > >>>> Education, although what I think he > >>>> is doing more is arguing against > >>>> misinterpretations of his work as > >>>> random, child centered activities. I > >>>> think he is clearer in Experience and > >>>> Nature that we bring in who we are at > >>>> the moment into the activity, and use > >>>> who we are (I don't want to say > >>>> identity) as an organizing principle > >>>> for what we do. It is perhaps one of > >>>> the places where Dewey and Vygotsky > >>>> are close. Perhaps I can use the > >>>> same Jackson Pollock example. The > >>>> first few times I saw his paintings I > >>>> was trying to "apprecitate" them > >>>> because I was told that was the best > >>>> way to experience them. Dewey says > >>>> no vital experience there because my > >>>> activities become stilted and artificia > >>>> l. Sometimes I went through the > >>>> museum and just looked at pictures, > >>>> one to the other. No vital > >>>> experience there, just random > >>>> threads. But that time I had the > >>>> experience with the paintings I was > >>>> allowing who I was, what had been > >>>> built up in the trajectory of my life > >>>> to enter into my experience with the > >>>> painting, making it a vital > >>>> experience. I think Dewey makes the > >>>> argument in Experience and Nature > >>>> that it is not just the experience > >>>> the moment before, but the > >>>> experiences leading to that > >>>> experience, the context of my life, > >>>> of my parent's life, of a long line > >>>> of historical experiences. > >>>> > >>>> Anyway, my take. > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> > >>>> - > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Beth Ferholt > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > >>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York > >>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue > >>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > >>>> > >>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > >>>> > >>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > >>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Beth Ferholt > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, > >>> City University of New York > >>> 2900 Bedford Avenue > >>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > >>> > >>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > >>> > >>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > >>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > >>> > >> ________________________________ > >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >> > >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > >> for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > >> the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > it. > >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are > >> not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > >> accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility > >> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not > >> accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing > >> in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or > >> services unless accompanied by an official order form. > >> > > > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 5How and Why.doc Type: application/msword Size: 617984 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150719/98faf453/attachment-0001.doc From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Jul 18 17:25:09 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 18:25:09 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Fulani Fellows In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Peter, I love the mission statement of All Stars Project (allstars.org ) at their website: ?We transform the lives of youth, and poor communities using the developmental power of performance in partnership with caring adults.? On stage. Where have I heard that before? Very nice! Henry > On Jul 18, 2015, at 9:51 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > "Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience." > This position is in NYC. Please respond to Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org and NOT TO ME. > > From: Lois Holzman [mailto:lhmailhelp@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Lois Holzman > Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 10:49 AM > To: Peter Smagorinsky > Subject: Fulani Fellows > > Hi Peter, > I'm writing to ask for your help with a new initiative of the All Stars Project. It's a post-graduate fellowship program called the Fulani Fellows, made possible by a recent grant the All Stars received. The purpose of the fellowship is to provide the opportunity to work directly with developmental psychologist, activist and grassroots educator, Lenora Fulani, in her many projects that incorporate new ways of addressing poverty, human development and public policy. > I 'm hoping that you can help us connect with interested and qualified candidates for both a program manager and the fellows themselves. > The program manager will be responsible for recruitment of the fellows and the selection process, as well as the day-to-day operations of the program. I thought that you might be able to recommend some candidates for this position in addition to getting the job description (attached) out to your network. > The Fulani Fellows will participate in a 5-month program of immersion in the on-the-ground practice, methodology and theory employed in the programs and practices that Dr. Fulani has helped to create and build. Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience. > The All Stars will place three fellows in each of three cycles, the first beginning in January 2016. If you know of anyone who would make a strong Fulani Fellow program manager or fellowship candidate, you can have them reach Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org to initiate the process. > Thanks in advance for your support as the All Stars Project launches this important and exciting new initiative. Your help in distributing the job description - we need our program manager in place before we can select our fellows - and in keeping an eye out for candidates to become Fulani Fellows, is invaluable. > All best, > Lois > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Jul 18 17:36:59 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 18:36:59 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Fulani Fellows In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <9E026322-8444-4E82-AB6F-AEAD274B91DC@gmail.com> Peter, I love the mission statement of All Stars Project (allstars.org ) at their website: ?We transform the lives of youth, and poor communities using the developmental power of performance in partnership with caring adults.? On stage. Where have I heard that before? ?In partnership with caring adults?. Very child- and community centered. I have this image of Beth as a pre-school teacher. Recency phenomenon, I guess. And the power of narrative and dialog. This feels like consumation to me. Very nice! Henry > On Jul 18, 2015, at 9:51 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > "Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience." > This position is in NYC. Please respond to Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org and NOT TO ME. > > From: Lois Holzman [mailto:lhmailhelp@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Lois Holzman > Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 10:49 AM > To: Peter Smagorinsky > Subject: Fulani Fellows > > Hi Peter, > I'm writing to ask for your help with a new initiative of the All Stars Project. It's a post-graduate fellowship program called the Fulani Fellows, made possible by a recent grant the All Stars received. The purpose of the fellowship is to provide the opportunity to work directly with developmental psychologist, activist and grassroots educator, Lenora Fulani, in her many projects that incorporate new ways of addressing poverty, human development and public policy. > I 'm hoping that you can help us connect with interested and qualified candidates for both a program manager and the fellows themselves. > The program manager will be responsible for recruitment of the fellows and the selection process, as well as the day-to-day operations of the program. I thought that you might be able to recommend some candidates for this position in addition to getting the job description (attached) out to your network. > The Fulani Fellows will participate in a 5-month program of immersion in the on-the-ground practice, methodology and theory employed in the programs and practices that Dr. Fulani has helped to create and build. Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience. > The All Stars will place three fellows in each of three cycles, the first beginning in January 2016. If you know of anyone who would make a strong Fulani Fellow program manager or fellowship candidate, you can have them reach Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org to initiate the process. > Thanks in advance for your support as the All Stars Project launches this important and exciting new initiative. Your help in distributing the job description - we need our program manager in place before we can select our fellows - and in keeping an eye out for candidates to become Fulani Fellows, is invaluable. > All best, > Lois > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jul 18 20:35:10 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 23:35:10 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Beth, "a method of perezhivanie" sounds like a brilliant and important thing to develop. I wonder if you might be able to use it to get at that sentiment that you described earlier where, talking about children's experience of time, you said "time is so condensed for young children so it is happening all the time". How to translate that experience to adults for whom time has slowed and expanded and for whom it is difficult not to impose on those poor children? (and I love the little gems you dropped throughout - "conserve the effect" (and perhaps the "affect" too!) is just one of many favorites...) Much appreciated. -greg On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests me > most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and then > to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was a > preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be described as > being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an > experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so > condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that you > can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an experience''? > > Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what is > most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true to > the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If you > don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words that > give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even > remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. > > I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties that > will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named 'preschool > didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in > research. This sounds like 5D. > > Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. One > is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art creates > in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the effect > of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a unity, > and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what we > have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art as > a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid > this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. > > As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget this > then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. As an > researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the first > purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not conserve > the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could have > a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest questions > to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people > working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not know > how to do this even in my own work. > > Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children before > your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo suggested The > Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, also > Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is > studying see. > > Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Mike, could you elaborate on that? > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > mike cole > > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > Alfredo-- > > > > a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. > > > > mike > > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > > I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with > his > > > mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the > latter > > is > > > not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms of > > > consequences for the participants, which they display for each other in > > > their actual practice. > > > > > > This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of > ANALYSIS > > > BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. Unit > > > analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real > > > phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That is > > > why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned not > > to > > > think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". > > > > > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action and > > > transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own powers. > > This > > > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by > > > elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of > > > action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively > > > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without > isolation > > of > > > presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements??. > An > > > experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in > itself: > > it > > > is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & > > Bentley > > > write. > > > > > > I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf of > > > mike cole > > > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > > > Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, > > > spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be > > > antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution > of > > > the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical > means, > > > only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by > any > > > means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of > > > life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw > there > > a > > > purely theoretical problem." > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > > > > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > > > > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > > > > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > > > > interpretation. In going over an experience in > > > > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > > > > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > > > > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > > > > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when > > we > > > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in > > our > > > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, > all > > of > > > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > > > recognise > > > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > > cognition > > > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other > categories > > > you > > > > abstract from an experience. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > > > > > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > > > >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > > > >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the > road > > > to > > > >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on > > several > > > >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an > > experience. > > > >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of > > Dewey's > > > >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking > up > > > on a > > > >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is > only > > > >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering > me. > > > Beth > > > >> > > > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing > > > >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the > > > >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from > > > >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. > > > >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan > > > >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle > > > >> he is raising here is the completeness of an > > > >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > > > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in > > > >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - > > > >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an > > > >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > > > >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, > > > >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing > > > >> that whole of an experience. > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Andy, > > > >> > > > >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set > > > >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I > > > >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm > > > >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as > > > >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done > > > >> so before. > > > >> > > > >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here > > > >> Andy? > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > > >> From: > > > >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > > > >> = > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> ] On Behalf Of > > > >> Andy Blunden > > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > >> > > > >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience > > > >> with the paintings..." > > > >> > > > >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out > > > >> that morning to have that experience? > > > >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says > > > >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have > > > >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question > > > >> Andy, but perhaps it has > > > >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite > > > >> saying (translated from > > > >> Yiddish), > > > >> > > > >> Man plans, God laughs. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > > >> From: > > > >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > > >> = > > > >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> ] > > > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > >> > > > >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, > > > >> in all your museum-going, when you had an > > > >> experience. Was that planned? > > > >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number > > > >> of such experiences, > > > >> Michael ... just some number actually) > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Hi Larry and all, > > > >> > > > >> I think this is one of the most complex > > > >> aspects of experience, what does he mean > > > >> when he says you can't do things > > > >> indiscriminately and have vital > > > >> experience, but you also can't plan > > > >> things? I have discussed (argued) about > > > >> this a lot with my students. I have > > > >> especially seen him raise this point in at > > > >> least two of his great works, Democracy > > > >> and Education and Experience and Nature - > > > >> and again of course in Art as Experience > > > >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters > > > >> into experience but how art is experience > > > >> - I have come to notice these little > > > >> things more and more in his writing). > > > >> > > > >> The difficulty we have, at least in the > > > >> United States because of the dominance of > > > >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > > > >> often translate what individuals are > > > >> bringing in to experience to organize it > > > >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind > > > >> of possible to make that interpretation > > > >> from Democracy and Education, although > > > >> what I think he is doing more is arguing > > > >> against misinterpretations of his work as > > > >> random, child centered activities. I > > > >> think he is clearer in Experience and > > > >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the > > > >> moment into the activity, and use who we > > > >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an > > > >> organizing principle for what we do. It > > > >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey > > > >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use > > > >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The > > > >> first few times I saw his paintings I was > > > >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was > > > >> told that was the best way to experience > > > >> them. Dewey says no vital experience > > > >> there because my activities become stilted > > > >> and artificia > > > >> l. Sometimes I went through the > > > >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to > > > >> the other. No vital experience there, > > > >> just random threads. But that time I had > > > >> the experience with the paintings I was > > > >> allowing who I was, what had been built up > > > >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into > > > >> my experience with the painting, making it > > > >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes > > > >> the argument in Experience and Nature that > > > >> it is not just the experience the moment > > > >> before, but the experiences leading to > > > >> that experience, the context of my life, > > > >> of my parent's life, of a long line of > > > >> historical experiences. > > > >> > > > >> Anyway, my take. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> > > > >> - > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> Beth Ferholt > > > >> Assistant Professor > > > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > > >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue > > > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > >> > > > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu> > > > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 18 22:43:36 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 22:43:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55ab392e.a6d5440a.66a5.ffffc2f4@mx.google.com> Greg, Beth, How do we find a way to describe (in a way that is true) what the preschool children are experiencing. The images of the video that Greg sent on the magic of synchronized hand clapping is one example of "showing" or "perceiving" Can this experience we see in the video be described in a way that expresses the truth of the way the children are having this experience. can we do this type of truthful describing as observers of the experience? Or must we undergo the experience (with) the children prior to describing the experience? Is synchronized hand clapping which is transformative a matter of describing "subjects" and "objects" or does the truth of this matter as lived experience exist in the undergoing the experienc of hand clapping. Greg, I am reading the Gendlin article on (befindlichkeit) and this concept seems relevant to this theme of having an experience and the truth of describing synchronized hand clapping -----Original Message----- From: "Greg Thompson" Sent: ?2015-?07-?18 8:37 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Beth, "a method of perezhivanie" sounds like a brilliant and important thing to develop. I wonder if you might be able to use it to get at that sentiment that you described earlier where, talking about children's experience of time, you said "time is so condensed for young children so it is happening all the time". How to translate that experience to adults for whom time has slowed and expanded and for whom it is difficult not to impose on those poor children? (and I love the little gems you dropped throughout - "conserve the effect" (and perhaps the "affect" too!) is just one of many favorites...) Much appreciated. -greg On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests me > most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and then > to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was a > preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be described as > being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an > experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so > condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that you > can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an experience''? > > Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what is > most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true to > the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If you > don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words that > give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even > remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. > > I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties that > will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named 'preschool > didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in > research. This sounds like 5D. > > Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. One > is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art creates > in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the effect > of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a unity, > and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what we > have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art as > a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid > this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. > > As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget this > then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. As an > researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the first > purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not conserve > the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could have > a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest questions > to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people > working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not know > how to do this even in my own work. > > Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children before > your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo suggested The > Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, also > Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is > studying see. > > Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. > > Beth > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Mike, could you elaborate on that? > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > mike cole > > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > Alfredo-- > > > > a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. > > > > mike > > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > > I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with > his > > > mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the > latter > > is > > > not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms of > > > consequences for the participants, which they display for each other in > > > their actual practice. > > > > > > This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of > ANALYSIS > > > BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. Unit > > > analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real > > > phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That is > > > why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned not > > to > > > think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". > > > > > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action and > > > transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own powers. > > This > > > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by > > > elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases of > > > action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively > > > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without > isolation > > of > > > presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements??. > An > > > experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in > itself: > > it > > > is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & > > Bentley > > > write. > > > > > > I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf of > > > mike cole > > > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > > > Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, > > > spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be > > > antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution > of > > > the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical > means, > > > only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by > any > > > means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of > > > life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw > there > > a > > > purely theoretical problem." > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > > > > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > > > > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > > > > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > > > > interpretation. In going over an experience in > > > > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > > > > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > > > > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > > > > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction when > > we > > > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience in > > our > > > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, > all > > of > > > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > > > recognise > > > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > > cognition > > > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other > categories > > > you > > > > abstract from an experience. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > > > > > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a fractal? I > > > >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > > > >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the > road > > > to > > > >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on > > several > > > >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an > > experience. > > > >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of > > Dewey's > > > >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking > up > > > on a > > > >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is > only > > > >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering > me. > > > Beth > > > >> > > > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing > > > >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the > > > >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from > > > >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. > > > >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan > > > >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle > > > >> he is raising here is the completeness of an > > > >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > > > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in > > > >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - > > > >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an > > > >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > > > >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, > > > >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing > > > >> that whole of an experience. > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Andy, > > > >> > > > >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set > > > >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I > > > >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm > > > >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as > > > >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done > > > >> so before. > > > >> > > > >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here > > > >> Andy? > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > > >> From: > > > >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > > > >> = > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> ] On Behalf Of > > > >> Andy Blunden > > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > >> > > > >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience > > > >> with the paintings..." > > > >> > > > >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out > > > >> that morning to have that experience? > > > >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says > > > >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have > > > >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question > > > >> Andy, but perhaps it has > > > >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite > > > >> saying (translated from > > > >> Yiddish), > > > >> > > > >> Man plans, God laughs. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > > >> From: > > > >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > > >> = > > > >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> ] > > > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > >> > > > >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, > > > >> in all your museum-going, when you had an > > > >> experience. Was that planned? > > > >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number > > > >> of such experiences, > > > >> Michael ... just some number actually) > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Hi Larry and all, > > > >> > > > >> I think this is one of the most complex > > > >> aspects of experience, what does he mean > > > >> when he says you can't do things > > > >> indiscriminately and have vital > > > >> experience, but you also can't plan > > > >> things? I have discussed (argued) about > > > >> this a lot with my students. I have > > > >> especially seen him raise this point in at > > > >> least two of his great works, Democracy > > > >> and Education and Experience and Nature - > > > >> and again of course in Art as Experience > > > >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters > > > >> into experience but how art is experience > > > >> - I have come to notice these little > > > >> things more and more in his writing). > > > >> > > > >> The difficulty we have, at least in the > > > >> United States because of the dominance of > > > >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > > > >> often translate what individuals are > > > >> bringing in to experience to organize it > > > >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind > > > >> of possible to make that interpretation > > > >> from Democracy and Education, although > > > >> what I think he is doing more is arguing > > > >> against misinterpretations of his work as > > > >> random, child centered activities. I > > > >> think he is clearer in Experience and > > > >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the > > > >> moment into the activity, and use who we > > > >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an > > > >> organizing principle for what we do. It > > > >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey > > > >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use > > > >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The > > > >> first few times I saw his paintings I was > > > >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was > > > >> told that was the best way to experience > > > >> them. Dewey says no vital experience > > > >> there because my activities become stilted > > > >> and artificia > > > >> l. Sometimes I went through the > > > >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to > > > >> the other. No vital experience there, > > > >> just random threads. But that time I had > > > >> the experience with the paintings I was > > > >> allowing who I was, what had been built up > > > >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into > > > >> my experience with the painting, making it > > > >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes > > > >> the argument in Experience and Nature that > > > >> it is not just the experience the moment > > > >> before, but the experiences leading to > > > >> that experience, the context of my life, > > > >> of my parent's life, of a long line of > > > >> historical experiences. > > > >> > > > >> Anyway, my take. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> > > > >> - > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> Beth Ferholt > > > >> Assistant Professor > > > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > > >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue > > > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > >> > > > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu> > > > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Assistant Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From s.davis@cqu.edu.au Sun Jul 19 00:54:49 2015 From: s.davis@cqu.edu.au (Susan Davis) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 07:54:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55ab392e.a6d5440a.66a5.ffffc2f4@mx.google.com> References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55ab392e.a6d5440a.66a5.ffffc2f4@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi all, I am an xmca lurker, but am particularly interested in some of the matters raised on this thread in relation to experience, the arts perezhivanie and learning so I will venture forth! My particular background has been drama (including process and improvised forms of drama) and teacher education but I have been involved in many projects working with children and young people. I would like to present a number of points for consideration that respond to some of the issue raised: It is important to note that Dewey was making a point that the art-making/creative experience was somewhat different from general experience per se. In relation to art and experience, art-making becomes a mediated, expressive and reflective process whereby experience is crystallised and ideas/emotions internalised and externalised in specific expressive modes. Through art and creative processes, experience and emotion is shaped through expressive 'forms', with the subjects or agents projecting and externalising their expression of emotion and ideas. Through art making these emotions and ideas are not just ?experienced? but selected, shaped and communicated socially in some material form. ?Selection and organization of material are at once a function and test of the quality of the emotion experienced? (p. 72). These forms (such as art, music, theatre and so on) are realised through reflection-in-action which involves processes of selection and the relationship of qualities (and here Eisner?s work on the quality of qualities is also pertinent) ? ?Only when the constituent parts of the whole have the unique end of contributing to the consummation of a conscious experience, do design and shape lose superimposed character and become form? (p. 122). Dewey?s work draws attention to the process and materiality of the making, and the embodiment of emotions and imagination through ?form? involving these processes of selection, organisation, elimination and resolution: ?In short, art, in its form, unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience?. (Dewey, 1934:50) Therefore when it comes to possibilities to studying perezhivanie or children?s experience, while you can never get inside their personal experience, it is possible to record their external expressions of experience (through video/audio etc) and also their art-making (drawing, dance,dramatic play, songs etc) and also engage them in reflection-on-action about their experience. It is also possible to trace ongoing activity and expressions to trace their appropriation of concepts and tool use and the development of ideas in their externalised expressions. In relation to experience and reflection perhaps it is worth considering two different notions of reflection and two different Russian terms that relate to experience ? perezhivanie and opyt. At a Perezhivanie forum convened at Monash University earlier this year Nikolai Veresov noted that in Russian the title of Dewey?s book used another word ?opyt?.Opyt implies an experience that is in the past or is like the ?accumulated body of experience? (see Meshcheryakov in Blunden 2010). However, it could be argued that what Dewey was discussing was perezhivanie and a much more immediate, active process, as Dewey says ?Experience ?..it signals active and alert commerce with the world?(Dewey 1934, p. 18). I wonder if there has been any recent analysis of the Russian translations of Dewey?s ?Art as experience? to consider whether it really is appropriate to translate it as opyt or whether it should be perezhivanie (or perhaps both). Likewise in art making and criticism, two different types of reflection are involved, as proposed by Schon ? reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. These inform the immediate experience but also the ongoing possibilities for the experience to be remade, reconceived and inform future experience (and perhaps as Beth suggestions chains of ideas/events/experience). Reflection-in-action is an active reflective process that is part of the art-making experience, where the artist is actually reflecting upon what is happening and being created, and drawing on their toolkit of skills and knowledge and weighing up the qualities of such to make moment by moment decisions about what to do next. This experience has a unity in itself, however there is also a provisionality about it. Reflection-on-action may then be engaged in after the event/experience, as the experience is interpreted and made sense of and other modes of expression and communication may be involved (eg. Reflecting on a visual arts or music experience using verbal or written language). This may be an act in itself or may inform further creative activity and experience that may even extend upon, reinvent or reinterpret the first. I look forward to hearing some of your thoughts about these points. Kind regards Sue Davis Dr Susan Davis Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au On 19/07/2015 3:43 pm, "Lplarry" wrote: >Greg, Beth, >How do we find a way to describe (in a way that is true) what the >preschool children are experiencing. > >The images of the video that Greg sent on the magic of synchronized hand >clapping is one example of "showing" or "perceiving" Can this experience >we see in the video be described in a way that expresses the truth of >the way the children are having this experience. > can we do this type of truthful describing as observers of the >experience? >Or must we undergo the experience (with) the children prior to describing >the experience? >Is synchronized hand clapping which is transformative a matter of >describing "subjects" and "objects" or does the truth of this matter as >lived experience exist in the undergoing the experienc of hand clapping. > >Greg, I am reading the Gendlin article on (befindlichkeit) and this >concept seems relevant to this theme of having an experience and the >truth of describing synchronized hand clapping > >-----Original Message----- >From: "Greg Thompson" >Sent: 2015-07-18 8:37 PM >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > >Beth, >"a method of perezhivanie" sounds like a brilliant and important thing to >develop. > >I wonder if you might be able to use it to get at that sentiment that you >described earlier where, talking about children's experience of time, you >said "time is so condensed for young children so it is happening all the >time". How to translate that experience to adults for whom time has slowed >and expanded and for whom it is difficult not to impose on those poor >children? > >(and I love the little gems you dropped throughout - "conserve the effect" >(and perhaps the "affect" too!) is just one of many favorites...) > >Much appreciated. >-greg > > >On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >> This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests me >> most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and >>then >> to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I >>was a >> preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be >>described as >> being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an >> experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so >> condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that >>you >> can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an >>experience''? >> >> Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what is >> most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true to >> the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If >>you >> don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words that >> give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even >> remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. >> >> I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties >>that >> will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named >>'preschool >> didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in >> research. This sounds like 5D. >> >> Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. >>One >> is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art >>creates >> in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the >>effect >> of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a unity, >> and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what >>we >> have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art >>as >> a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid >> this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. >> >> As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget >>this >> then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. >>As an >> researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the >>first >> purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not >>conserve >> the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could >>have >> a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest >>questions >> to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people >> working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not >>know >> how to do this even in my own work. >> >> Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children >>before >> your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo suggested >>The >> Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, >>also >> Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is >> studying see. >> >> Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. >> >> Beth >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> >> wrote: >> >> > Mike, could you elaborate on that? >> > >> > Alfredo >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > on behalf of >> > mike cole >> > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> > >> > Alfredo-- >> > >> > a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> > >> > wrote: >> > >> > > I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with >> his >> > > mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the >> latter >> > is >> > > not about representing exactly, but about describing events in >>terms of >> > > consequences for the participants, which they display for each >>other in >> > > their actual practice. >> > > >> > > This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of >> ANALYSIS >> > > BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. >>Unit >> > > analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and >>real >> > > phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. >>That is >> > > why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned >>not >> > to >> > > think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". >> > > >> > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action >>and >> > > transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own >>powers. >> > This >> > > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by >> > > elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and >>phases of >> > > action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other >>presumptively >> > > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without >> isolation >> > of >> > > presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable >>?elements??. >> An >> > > experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in >> itself: >> > it >> > > is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & >> > Bentley >> > > write. >> > > >> > > I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, >> > > Alfredo >> > > >> > > >> > > ________________________________________ >> > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > on behalf >>of >> > > mike cole >> > > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >> > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> > > >> > > Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and >>objectivism, >> > > spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be >> > > antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The >>resolution >> of >> > > the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical >> means, >> > > only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by >> any >> > > means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real >>problem of >> > > life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw >> there >> > a >> > > purely theoretical problem." >> > > >> > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> > > >> > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >> > > > >> > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >> > > > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that >> > > > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an >> > > > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of >> > > > interpretation. In going over an experience in >> > > > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one >> > > > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant >> > > > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." >> > > > >> > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction >>when >> > we >> > > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience >>in >> > our >> > > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, >> all >> > of >> > > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to >> > > recognise >> > > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >> > cognition >> > > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other >> categories >> > > you >> > > > abstract from an experience. >> > > > >> > > > Andy >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > > *Andy Blunden* >> > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> > > > >> > > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a >>fractal? I >> > > >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience >> > > >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the >> road >> > > to >> > > >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on >> > several >> > > >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an >> > experience. >> > > >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of >> > Dewey's >> > > >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am >>picking >> up >> > > on a >> > > >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is >> only >> > > >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering >> me. >> > > Beth >> > > >> >> > > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > > >> > wrote: >> > > >> >> > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing >> > > >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the >> > > >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from >> > > >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. >> > > >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan >> > > >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle >> > > >> he is raising here is the completeness of an >> > > >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >> > > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in >> > > >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - >> > > >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an >> > > >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this >> > > >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, >> > > >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing >> > > >> that whole of an experience. >> > > >> >> > > >> Andy >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > >> >> > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> > > >> >> > > >> Andy, >> > > >> >> > > >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set >> > > >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I >> > > >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm >> > > >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as >> > > >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done >> > > >> so before. >> > > >> >> > > >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here >> > > >> Andy? >> > > >> >> > > >> Michael >> > > >> >> > > >> -----Original Message----- >> > > >> From: >> > > >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > > >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >> > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >> > > >> = >> > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > >> ] On Behalf Of >> > > >> Andy Blunden >> > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >> > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> > > >> >> > > >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience >> > > >> with the paintings..." >> > > >> >> > > >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out >> > > >> that morning to have that experience? >> > > >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says >> > > >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have >> > > >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >> > > >> Andy >> > > >> >> > > >> >>------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > >> >> > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> > > >> >> > > >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question >> > > >> Andy, but perhaps it has >> > > >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite >> > > >> saying (translated from >> > > >> Yiddish), >> > > >> >> > > >> Man plans, God laughs. >> > > >> >> > > >> Michael >> > > >> >> > > >> -----Original Message----- >> > > >> From: >> > > >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >> > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > >> >> > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> > > >> = >> > > >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > >> ] >> > > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >> > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > >> >> > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> > > >> >> > > >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, >> > > >> in all your museum-going, when you had an >> > > >> experience. Was that planned? >> > > >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number >> > > >> of such experiences, >> > > >> Michael ... just some number actually) >> > > >> >> > > >> Andy >> > > >> >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> > > >> >> > > >> Hi Larry and all, >> > > >> >> > > >> I think this is one of the most complex >> > > >> aspects of experience, what does he mean >> > > >> when he says you can't do things >> > > >> indiscriminately and have vital >> > > >> experience, but you also can't plan >> > > >> things? I have discussed (argued) about >> > > >> this a lot with my students. I have >> > > >> especially seen him raise this point in at >> > > >> least two of his great works, Democracy >> > > >> and Education and Experience and Nature - >> > > >> and again of course in Art as Experience >> > > >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters >> > > >> into experience but how art is experience >> > > >> - I have come to notice these little >> > > >> things more and more in his writing). >> > > >> >> > > >> The difficulty we have, at least in the >> > > >> United States because of the dominance of >> > > >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too >> > > >> often translate what individuals are >> > > >> bringing in to experience to organize it >> > > >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind >> > > >> of possible to make that interpretation >> > > >> from Democracy and Education, although >> > > >> what I think he is doing more is arguing >> > > >> against misinterpretations of his work as >> > > >> random, child centered activities. I >> > > >> think he is clearer in Experience and >> > > >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the >> > > >> moment into the activity, and use who we >> > > >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an >> > > >> organizing principle for what we do. It >> > > >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey >> > > >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use >> > > >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The >> > > >> first few times I saw his paintings I was >> > > >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was >> > > >> told that was the best way to experience >> > > >> them. Dewey says no vital experience >> > > >> there because my activities become stilted >> > > >> and artificia >> > > >> l. Sometimes I went through the >> > > >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to >> > > >> the other. No vital experience there, >> > > >> just random threads. But that time I had >> > > >> the experience with the paintings I was >> > > >> allowing who I was, what had been built up >> > > >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into >> > > >> my experience with the painting, making it >> > > >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes >> > > >> the argument in Experience and Nature that >> > > >> it is not just the experience the moment >> > > >> before, but the experiences leading to >> > > >> that experience, the context of my life, >> > > >> of my parent's life, of a long line of >> > > >> historical experiences. >> > > >> >> > > >> Anyway, my take. >> > > >> >> > > >> Michael >> > > >> >> > > >> - >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> -- >> > > >> Beth Ferholt >> > > >> Assistant Professor >> > > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> > > >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> > > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> > > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> > > >> >> > > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu> >> > > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> > > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> > > >> >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -- >> > > >> > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >> > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>Storch, >> > > Ecological Niche, 2008) >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > >> > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >> > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >> > Ecological Niche, 2008) >> > >> > >> >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >> > > > >-- >Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >Assistant Professor >Department of Anthropology >880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >Brigham Young University >Provo, UT 84602 >http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: default.xml Type: application/xml Size: 3222 bytes Desc: default.xml Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150719/9147e81a/attachment.rdf From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jul 19 01:32:16 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 18:32:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55ab392e.a6d5440a.66a5.ffffc2f4@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <55AB6090.8070006@mira.net> Nice to hear your voice, Susan, rising up from the dark world of lurkers! As to translation of Dewey's works into Russian. It seems, though I am only going on a few glimpses, that Russians have translated "experience" in Dewey's writing as opyt. If this is the case, then obviously Dewey will seem to Russians as just another Empiricist and the real novelty of American Pragmatism will escape their attention. I raised the possibility of translating "Having An Experience" into Russian on the Facebook page, and the only response was that Dewey reads so well in English why translate him into Russian. :) But in my opinion a translator would be obliged to translate "experience" sometimes as opit and sometimes as perezhivanie, depending on the exact point and context. Dewey has to struggle to bend the English language into making this distinction which is provided ready-made in the Russian language. But I think mainly if you follow the clue as to whether he uses the word as a count noun or as a mass noun, you can correctly translate him into Russians, choosing perezhivanie or opit accordingly. Dewey's critique of the Reflex Arc is an example far from the artist's trade where he explicitly poses the "double-barrelled" nature of acts/experiences. "Having An Experience" is presented by Dewey as part of his work on Aesthetics, and aesthetic ideas play a big part in his explanation of this idea. But can I suggest that in Art, perezhivanie is particularly developed and stands out in particular sharpness from opit, and this is great help in understanding what "an experience" is, as opposed to that general background of thoughtless doing and passive undergoing. But perezhivanija are not limited to the work of the artist. The artist is obliged to recognise a perzhivanie and works at how to evoke it in others, at least approximately, but it figures in all our lives even if we never get to write our autobiography, reproduce them on stage or express them on the canvass. But we do live through them and change ourselves and the world in the process. Can I ask you: what in your opinion does Dewey mean when he talks about the aesthetic quality of perezhivanija when he is discussing ordinary life, not the work of an artist? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 19/07/2015 5:54 PM, Susan Davis wrote: > Hi all, > > I am an xmca lurker, but am particularly interested in some of the matters > raised on this thread in relation to experience, the arts perezhivanie and > learning so I will venture forth! My particular background has been drama > (including process and improvised forms of drama) and teacher education > but I have been involved in many projects working with children and young > people. > > I would like to present a number of points for consideration that respond > to some of the issue raised: > > > It is important to note that Dewey was making a point that the > art-making/creative experience was somewhat different from general > experience per se. > > > In relation to art and experience, art-making becomes a mediated, > expressive and reflective process whereby experience is crystallised and > ideas/emotions internalised and externalised in specific expressive modes. > Through art and creative processes, experience and emotion is shaped > through expressive 'forms', with the subjects or agents projecting and > externalising their expression of emotion and ideas. > > > Through art making these emotions and ideas are not just ?experienced? but > selected, shaped and communicated socially in > some material form. ?Selection and organization of material are at once a > function and test of the quality of the > emotion experienced? (p. 72). These forms (such as art, music, theatre > and so on) are realised through reflection-in-action which involves > processes of selection and the relationship of qualities (and here > Eisner?s work on the quality of qualities is also > pertinent) ? ?Only when the constituent parts of the whole have the unique > end of contributing to the consummation of a conscious experience, do > design and shape lose superimposed character and become form? (p. 122). > Dewey?s work draws attention to the process > and materiality of the making, and the embodiment of emotions and > imagination through ?form? involving these processes of selection, > organisation, elimination and resolution: ?In short, art, in its form, > unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and > incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience?. (Dewey, > 1934:50) > > > Therefore when it comes to possibilities to studying perezhivanie or > children?s experience, while you can never get inside their > personal experience, it is possible to record their external expressions > of experience (through video/audio etc) and also their art-making > (drawing, dance,dramatic play, songs etc) and also engage them in > reflection-on-action about their experience. It is also possible to trace > ongoing activity and expressions to trace their appropriation of concepts > and tool use and the development of ideas in their externalised > expressions. > > > In relation to experience and reflection perhaps it is worth considering > two different notions of reflection and two different Russian terms that > relate to experience ? perezhivanie and opyt. At a Perezhivanie forum > convened at Monash University earlier this year Nikolai Veresov noted that > in Russian the title of Dewey?s book used another word ?opyt?.Opyt implies > an experience that is in the past or is like the ?accumulated body of > experience? (see Meshcheryakov in Blunden 2010). However, it could be > argued that what Dewey was discussing was perezhivanie and a much more > immediate, active process, as Dewey says ?Experience ?..it signals active > and alert commerce with the world?(Dewey 1934, p. 18). > > > I wonder if there has been any recent analysis of the Russian translations > of Dewey?s ?Art as experience? to consider whether it really is > appropriate to translate it as opyt or whether it should be perezhivanie > (or perhaps both). > > > Likewise in art making and criticism, two different types of reflection > are involved, as proposed by Schon ? reflection-in-action and > reflection-on-action. These inform the immediate experience but also the > ongoing possibilities for the experience to be remade, reconceived and > inform future experience (and perhaps as Beth suggestions chains of > ideas/events/experience). Reflection-in-action is an active reflective > process that is part of the art-making experience, where the artist is > actually reflecting upon what is happening and being created, and drawing > on their toolkit of skills and knowledge and weighing up the qualities of > such to make moment by moment decisions about what to do next. This > experience has a unity in itself, however there is also a provisionality > about it. Reflection-on-action may then be engaged in after the > event/experience, as the experience is interpreted and made sense of and > other modes of expression and communication may be involved (eg. > Reflecting on a visual arts or music experience using verbal or written > language). This may be an act in itself or may inform further creative > activity and experience that may even extend upon, reinvent or reinterpret > the first. > > > I look forward to hearing some of your thoughts about these points. > Kind regards > > Sue Davis > > Dr Susan Davis > Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division > CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 > P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au > > > > > > On 19/07/2015 3:43 pm, "Lplarry" wrote: > >> Greg, Beth, >> How do we find a way to describe (in a way that is true) what the >> preschool children are experiencing. >> >> The images of the video that Greg sent on the magic of synchronized hand >> clapping is one example of "showing" or "perceiving" Can this experience >> we see in the video be described in a way that expresses the truth of >> the way the children are having this experience. >> can we do this type of truthful describing as observers of the >> experience? >> Or must we undergo the experience (with) the children prior to describing >> the experience? >> Is synchronized hand clapping which is transformative a matter of >> describing "subjects" and "objects" or does the truth of this matter as >> lived experience exist in the undergoing the experienc of hand clapping. >> >> Greg, I am reading the Gendlin article on (befindlichkeit) and this >> concept seems relevant to this theme of having an experience and the >> truth of describing synchronized hand clapping >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Greg Thompson" >> Sent: 2015-07-18 8:37 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >> >> Beth, >> "a method of perezhivanie" sounds like a brilliant and important thing to >> develop. >> >> I wonder if you might be able to use it to get at that sentiment that you >> described earlier where, talking about children's experience of time, you >> said "time is so condensed for young children so it is happening all the >> time". How to translate that experience to adults for whom time has slowed >> and expanded and for whom it is difficult not to impose on those poor >> children? >> >> (and I love the little gems you dropped throughout - "conserve the effect" >> (and perhaps the "affect" too!) is just one of many favorites...) >> >> Much appreciated. >> -greg >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >>> This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests me >>> most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and >>> then >>> to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I >>> was a >>> preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be >>> described as >>> being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an >>> experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so >>> condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that >>> you >>> can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an >>> experience''? >>> >>> Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what is >>> most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true to >>> the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If >>> you >>> don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words that >>> give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even >>> remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. >>> >>> I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties >>> that >>> will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named >>> 'preschool >>> didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in >>> research. This sounds like 5D. >>> >>> Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. >>> One >>> is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art >>> creates >>> in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the >>> effect >>> of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a unity, >>> and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what >>> we >>> have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art >>> as >>> a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid >>> this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. >>> >>> As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget >>> this >>> then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. >>> As an >>> researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the >>> first >>> purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not >>> conserve >>> the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could >>> have >>> a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest >>> questions >>> to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people >>> working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not >>> know >>> how to do this even in my own work. >>> >>> Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children >>> before >>> your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo suggested >>> The >>> Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, >>> also >>> Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is >>> studying see. >>> >>> Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. >>> >>> Beth >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Mike, could you elaborate on that? >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> on behalf of >>>> mike cole >>>> Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>> >>>> Alfredo-- >>>> >>>> a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with >>> his >>>>> mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the >>> latter >>>> is >>>>> not about representing exactly, but about describing events in >>> terms of >>>>> consequences for the participants, which they display for each >>> other in >>>>> their actual practice. >>>>> >>>>> This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of >>> ANALYSIS >>>>> BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. >>> Unit >>>>> analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and >>> real >>>>> phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. >>> That is >>>>> why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned >>> not >>>> to >>>>> think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". >>>>> >>>>> Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action >>> and >>>>> transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own >>> powers. >>>> This >>>>> is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by >>>>> elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and >>> phases of >>>>> action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other >>> presumptively >>>>> detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without >>> isolation >>>> of >>>>> presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable >>> ?elements??. >>> An >>>>> experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in >>> itself: >>>> it >>>>> is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & >>>> Bentley >>>>> write. >>>>> >>>>> I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> on behalf >>> of >>>>> mike cole >>>>> Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>> >>>>> Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and >>> objectivism, >>>>> spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be >>>>> antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The >>> resolution >>> of >>>>> the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical >>> means, >>>>> only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by >>> any >>>>> means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real >>> problem of >>>>> life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw >>> there >>>> a >>>>> purely theoretical problem." >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>>>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >>>>>> >>>>>> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >>>>>> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that >>>>>> reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an >>>>>> experience, we must make use of these adjectives of >>>>>> interpretation. In going over an experience in >>>>>> mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one >>>>>> property rather than another was sufficiently dominant >>>>>> so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." >>>>>> >>>>>> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction >>> when >>>> we >>>>>> *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience >>> in >>>> our >>>>>> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, >>> all >>>> of >>>>>> which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to >>>>> recognise >>>>>> that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >>>> cognition >>>>>> (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other >>> categories >>>>> you >>>>>> abstract from an experience. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a >>> fractal? I >>>>>>> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience >>>>>>> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the >>> road >>>>> to >>>>>>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on >>>> several >>>>>>> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an >>>> experience. >>>>>>> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of >>>> Dewey's >>>>>>> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am >>> picking >>> up >>>>> on a >>>>>>> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is >>> only >>>>>>> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering >>> me. >>>>> Beth >>>>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing >>>>>>> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the >>>>>>> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from >>>>>>> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. >>>>>>> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan >>>>>>> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle >>>>>>> he is raising here is the completeness of an >>>>>>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >>>>>>> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in >>>>>>> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - >>>>>>> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an >>>>>>> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this >>>>>>> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, >>>>>>> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing >>>>>>> that whole of an experience. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set >>>>>>> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I >>>>>>> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm >>>>>>> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as >>>>>>> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done >>>>>>> so before. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here >>>>>>> Andy? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>>>>>> = >>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> ] On Behalf Of >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>>> >>>>>>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience >>>>>>> with the paintings..." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out >>>>>>> that morning to have that experience? >>>>>>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says >>>>>>> you can't do things indiscriminately and have >>>>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question >>>>>>> Andy, but perhaps it has >>>>>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite >>>>>>> saying (translated from >>>>>>> Yiddish), >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>>>>> = >>>>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> ] >>>>>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, >>>>>>> in all your museum-going, when you had an >>>>>>> experience. Was that planned? >>>>>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number >>>>>>> of such experiences, >>>>>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think this is one of the most complex >>>>>>> aspects of experience, what does he mean >>>>>>> when he says you can't do things >>>>>>> indiscriminately and have vital >>>>>>> experience, but you also can't plan >>>>>>> things? I have discussed (argued) about >>>>>>> this a lot with my students. I have >>>>>>> especially seen him raise this point in at >>>>>>> least two of his great works, Democracy >>>>>>> and Education and Experience and Nature - >>>>>>> and again of course in Art as Experience >>>>>>> (notice he is not saying how Art enters >>>>>>> into experience but how art is experience >>>>>>> - I have come to notice these little >>>>>>> things more and more in his writing). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the >>>>>>> United States because of the dominance of >>>>>>> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too >>>>>>> often translate what individuals are >>>>>>> bringing in to experience to organize it >>>>>>> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind >>>>>>> of possible to make that interpretation >>>>>>> from Democracy and Education, although >>>>>>> what I think he is doing more is arguing >>>>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as >>>>>>> random, child centered activities. I >>>>>>> think he is clearer in Experience and >>>>>>> Nature that we bring in who we are at the >>>>>>> moment into the activity, and use who we >>>>>>> are (I don't want to say identity) as an >>>>>>> organizing principle for what we do. It >>>>>>> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey >>>>>>> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use >>>>>>> the same Jackson Pollock example. The >>>>>>> first few times I saw his paintings I was >>>>>>> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was >>>>>>> told that was the best way to experience >>>>>>> them. Dewey says no vital experience >>>>>>> there because my activities become stilted >>>>>>> and artificia >>>>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the >>>>>>> museum and just looked at pictures, one to >>>>>>> the other. No vital experience there, >>>>>>> just random threads. But that time I had >>>>>>> the experience with the paintings I was >>>>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up >>>>>>> in the trajectory of my life to enter into >>>>>>> my experience with the painting, making it >>>>>>> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes >>>>>>> the argument in Experience and Nature that >>>>>>> it is not just the experience the moment >>>>>>> before, but the experiences leading to >>>>>>> that experience, the context of my life, >>>>>>> of my parent's life, of a long line of >>>>>>> historical experiences. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Anyway, my take. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Beth Ferholt >>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>>>>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>>>>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>>>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu> >>>>>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>>>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>> Storch, >>>>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >>>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Beth Ferholt >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>> >>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From s.davis@cqu.edu.au Sun Jul 19 02:58:47 2015 From: s.davis@cqu.edu.au (Susan Davis) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 09:58:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: <55AB6090.8070006@mira.net> References: <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> <55ab392e.a6d5440a.66a5.ffffc2f4@mx.google.com> <55AB6090.8070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Thank you for that encouragement Andy and the information about Dewey, Russian translations and perezhivanie & opit. I understand that perezhivanie is not confined to the artist or artistic experience, however the aesthetic and artistic process can enable humans (not only artists) to encapsulate and externalise experience in ways that can heighten the experience and share it within social and cultural spheres. Yes an experience might be particularly significant and meaningful for us, but we may be able to make sense and draw meaning from it through expressing that in a particular aesthetic form and be able to share that with others in ways we might not otherwise do so. As an example, when my mother was ill and dying, this time included some very significant experiences, some of which stood out and had an impact on my life. However, through capturing and shaping some of my thoughts and feelings in poetic form, I was able to process these experiences for myself but also share them with others in ways I would not necessarily have done otherwise. In relation to work with children, through providing children with access to these various expressive forms (and actually teaching them about how to use the tools, and explore the impact of decisions made) we often find the children can express things about their thoughts and feelings that they may not be able to do through speech or writing alone. In terms of the expressive/aesthetic qualities of experience/perezhivanie in everyday life - this is about the awareness of the sensory qualities of things, the relationships and the exercising of judgment that may contribute to the quality of the experience. So we all put on clothes every day, but we may do so with varying degrees of attention to the sensory and aesthetic qualities of the items we wear and the relationships between the elements we choose and their overall impact. Eisner talked about this type of ?artistry' through concepts such as connoisseurship and criticism. This is not conceived of in an elitist way, but in the recognition that the ?quality? of experience can be determined through paying attention to qualities, detail and discernment. Cheers Sue On 19/07/2015 6:32 pm, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >Nice to hear your voice, Susan, rising up from the dark >world of lurkers! > >As to translation of Dewey's works into Russian. It seems, >though I am only going on a few glimpses, that Russians have >translated "experience" in Dewey's writing as opyt. If this >is the case, then obviously Dewey will seem to Russians as >just another Empiricist and the real novelty of American >Pragmatism will escape their attention. I raised the >possibility of translating "Having An Experience" into >Russian on the Facebook page, and the only response was that >Dewey reads so well in English why translate him into >Russian. :) But in my opinion a translator would be obliged >to translate "experience" sometimes as opit and sometimes as >perezhivanie, depending on the exact point and context. >Dewey has to struggle to bend the English language into >making this distinction which is provided ready-made in the >Russian language. But I think mainly if you follow the clue >as to whether he uses the word as a count noun or as a mass >noun, you can correctly translate him into Russians, >choosing perezhivanie or opit accordingly. Dewey's critique >of the Reflex Arc is an example far from the artist's trade >where he explicitly poses the "double-barrelled" nature of >acts/experiences. > >"Having An Experience" is presented by Dewey as part of his >work on Aesthetics, and aesthetic ideas play a big part in >his explanation of this idea. But can I suggest that in Art, >perezhivanie is particularly developed and stands out in >particular sharpness from opit, and this is great help in >understanding what "an experience" is, as opposed to that >general background of thoughtless doing and passive >undergoing. But perezhivanija are not limited to the work of >the artist. The artist is obliged to recognise a perzhivanie >and works at how to evoke it in others, at least >approximately, but it figures in all our lives even if we >never get to write our autobiography, reproduce them on >stage or express them on the canvass. But we do live through >them and change ourselves and the world in the process. > >Can I ask you: what in your opinion does Dewey mean when he >talks about the aesthetic quality of perezhivanija when he >is discussing ordinary life, not the work of an artist? > >Andy >------------------------------------------------------------ >*Andy Blunden* >http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >On 19/07/2015 5:54 PM, Susan Davis wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> I am an xmca lurker, but am particularly interested in some of the >>matters >> raised on this thread in relation to experience, the arts perezhivanie >>and >> learning so I will venture forth! My particular background has been >>drama >> (including process and improvised forms of drama) and teacher education >> but I have been involved in many projects working with children and >>young >> people. >> >> I would like to present a number of points for consideration that >>respond >> to some of the issue raised: >> >> >> It is important to note that Dewey was making a point that the >> art-making/creative experience was somewhat different from general >> experience per se. >> >> >> In relation to art and experience, art-making becomes a mediated, >> expressive and reflective process whereby experience is crystallised and >> ideas/emotions internalised and externalised in specific expressive >>modes. >> Through art and creative processes, experience and emotion is shaped >> through expressive 'forms', with the subjects or agents projecting and >> externalising their expression of emotion and ideas. >> >> >> Through art making these emotions and ideas are not just ?experienced? >>but >> selected, shaped and communicated socially in >> some material form. ?Selection and organization of material are at >>once a >> function and test of the quality of the >> emotion experienced? (p. 72). These forms (such as art, music, theatre >> and so on) are realised through reflection-in-action which involves >> processes of selection and the relationship of qualities (and here >> Eisner?s work on the quality of qualities is also >> pertinent) ? ?Only when the constituent parts of the whole have the >>unique >> end of contributing to the consummation of a conscious experience, do >> design and shape lose superimposed character and become form? (p. 122). >> Dewey?s work draws attention to the process >> and materiality of the making, and the embodiment of emotions and >> imagination through ?form? involving these processes of selection, >> organisation, elimination and resolution: ?In short, art, in its form, >> unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and >> incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience?. (Dewey, >> 1934:50) >> >> >> Therefore when it comes to possibilities to studying perezhivanie or >> children?s experience, while you can never get inside their >> personal experience, it is possible to record their external expressions >> of experience (through video/audio etc) and also their art-making >> (drawing, dance,dramatic play, songs etc) and also engage them in >> reflection-on-action about their experience. It is also possible to >>trace >> ongoing activity and expressions to trace their appropriation of >>concepts >> and tool use and the development of ideas in their externalised >> expressions. >> >> >> In relation to experience and reflection perhaps it is worth considering >> two different notions of reflection and two different Russian terms that >> relate to experience ? perezhivanie and opyt. At a Perezhivanie forum >> convened at Monash University earlier this year Nikolai Veresov noted >>that >> in Russian the title of Dewey?s book used another word ?opyt?.Opyt >>implies >> an experience that is in the past or is like the ?accumulated body of >> experience? (see Meshcheryakov in Blunden 2010). However, it could be >> argued that what Dewey was discussing was perezhivanie and a much more >> immediate, active process, as Dewey says ?Experience ?..it signals >>active >> and alert commerce with the world?(Dewey 1934, p. 18). >> >> >> I wonder if there has been any recent analysis of the Russian >>translations >> of Dewey?s ?Art as experience? to consider whether it really is >> appropriate to translate it as opyt or whether it should be perezhivanie >> (or perhaps both). >> >> >> Likewise in art making and criticism, two different types of reflection >> are involved, as proposed by Schon ? reflection-in-action and >> reflection-on-action. These inform the immediate experience but also >>the >> ongoing possibilities for the experience to be remade, reconceived and >> inform future experience (and perhaps as Beth suggestions chains of >> ideas/events/experience). Reflection-in-action is an active reflective >> process that is part of the art-making experience, where the artist is >> actually reflecting upon what is happening and being created, and >>drawing >> on their toolkit of skills and knowledge and weighing up the qualities >>of >> such to make moment by moment decisions about what to do next. This >> experience has a unity in itself, however there is also a provisionality >> about it. Reflection-on-action may then be engaged in after the >> event/experience, as the experience is interpreted and made sense of and >> other modes of expression and communication may be involved (eg. >> Reflecting on a visual arts or music experience using verbal or written >> language). This may be an act in itself or may inform further creative >> activity and experience that may even extend upon, reinvent or >>reinterpret >> the first. >> >> >> I look forward to hearing some of your thoughts about these points. >> Kind regards >> >> Sue Davis >> >> Dr Susan Davis >> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education >>Division >> CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 >> P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au >> >> >> >> >> >> On 19/07/2015 3:43 pm, "Lplarry" wrote: >> >>> Greg, Beth, >>> How do we find a way to describe (in a way that is true) what the >>> preschool children are experiencing. >>> >>> The images of the video that Greg sent on the magic of synchronized >>>hand >>> clapping is one example of "showing" or "perceiving" Can this >>>experience >>> we see in the video be described in a way that expresses the truth of >>> the way the children are having this experience. >>> can we do this type of truthful describing as observers of the >>> experience? >>> Or must we undergo the experience (with) the children prior to >>>describing >>> the experience? >>> Is synchronized hand clapping which is transformative a matter of >>> describing "subjects" and "objects" or does the truth of this matter >>>as >>> lived experience exist in the undergoing the experienc of hand >>>clapping. >>> >>> Greg, I am reading the Gendlin article on (befindlichkeit) and this >>> concept seems relevant to this theme of having an experience and the >>> truth of describing synchronized hand clapping >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>> Sent: 2015-07-18 8:37 PM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> Beth, >>> "a method of perezhivanie" sounds like a brilliant and important thing >>>to >>> develop. >>> >>> I wonder if you might be able to use it to get at that sentiment that >>>you >>> described earlier where, talking about children's experience of time, >>>you >>> said "time is so condensed for young children so it is happening all >>>the >>> time". How to translate that experience to adults for whom time has >>>slowed >>> and expanded and for whom it is difficult not to impose on those poor >>> children? >>> >>> (and I love the little gems you dropped throughout - "conserve the >>>effect" >>> (and perhaps the "affect" too!) is just one of many favorites...) >>> >>> Much appreciated. >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Beth Ferholt >>>wrote: >>> >>>> This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests >>>>me >>>> most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and >>>> then >>>> to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I >>>> was a >>>> preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be >>>> described as >>>> being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having >>>>an >>>> experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so >>>> condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that >>>> you >>>> can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an >>>> experience''? >>>> >>>> Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what >>>>is >>>> most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true >>>>to >>>> the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If >>>> you >>>> don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words >>>>that >>>> give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even >>>> remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. >>>> >>>> I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties >>>> that >>>> will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named >>>> 'preschool >>>> didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in >>>> research. This sounds like 5D. >>>> >>>> Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. >>>> One >>>> is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art >>>> creates >>>> in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the >>>> effect >>>> of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a >>>>unity, >>>> and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what >>>> we >>>> have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats >>>>art >>>> as >>>> a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to >>>>avoid >>>> this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. >>>> >>>> As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget >>>> this >>>> then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. >>>> As an >>>> researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the >>>> first >>>> purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not >>>> conserve >>>> the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could >>>> have >>>> a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest >>>> questions >>>> to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people >>>> working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not >>>> know >>>> how to do this even in my own work. >>>> >>>> Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children >>>> before >>>> your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo >>>>suggested >>>> The >>>> Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, >>>> also >>>> Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is >>>> studying see. >>>> >>>> Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. >>>> >>>> Beth >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Mike, could you elaborate on that? >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> on behalf of >>>>> mike cole >>>>> Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo-- >>>>> >>>>> a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with >>>> his >>>>>> mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the >>>> latter >>>>> is >>>>>> not about representing exactly, but about describing events in >>>> terms of >>>>>> consequences for the participants, which they display for each >>>> other in >>>>>> their actual practice. >>>>>> >>>>>> This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of >>>> ANALYSIS >>>>>> BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. >>>> Unit >>>>>> analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and >>>> real >>>>>> phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. >>>> That is >>>>>> why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned >>>> not >>>>> to >>>>>> think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". >>>>>> >>>>>> Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action >>>> and >>>>>> transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own >>>> powers. >>>>> This >>>>>> is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by >>>>>> elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and >>>> phases of >>>>>> action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other >>>> presumptively >>>>>> detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without >>>> isolation >>>>> of >>>>>> presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable >>>> ?elements??. >>>> An >>>>>> experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in >>>> itself: >>>>> it >>>>>> is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & >>>>> Bentley >>>>>> write. >>>>>> >>>>>> I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> on behalf >>>> of >>>>>> mike cole >>>>>> Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>> >>>>>> Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and >>>> objectivism, >>>>>> spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be >>>>>> antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The >>>> resolution >>>> of >>>>>> the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical >>>> means, >>>>>> only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by >>>> any >>>>>> means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real >>>> problem of >>>>>> life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw >>>> there >>>>> a >>>>>> purely theoretical problem." >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >>>>>>> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that >>>>>>> reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an >>>>>>> experience, we must make use of these adjectives of >>>>>>> interpretation. In going over an experience in >>>>>>> mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one >>>>>>> property rather than another was sufficiently dominant >>>>>>> so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction >>>> when >>>>> we >>>>>>> *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience >>>> in >>>>> our >>>>>>> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, >>>> all >>>>> of >>>>>>> which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to >>>>>> recognise >>>>>>> that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >>>>> cognition >>>>>>> (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other >>>> categories >>>>>> you >>>>>>> abstract from an experience. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a >>>> fractal? I >>>>>>>> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience >>>>>>>> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the >>>> road >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on >>>>> several >>>>>>>> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an >>>>> experience. >>>>>>>> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of >>>>> Dewey's >>>>>>>> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am >>>> picking >>>> up >>>>>> on a >>>>>>>> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is >>>> only >>>>>>>> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering >>>> me. >>>>>> Beth >>>>>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing >>>>>>>> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the >>>>>>>> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from >>>>>>>> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. >>>>>>>> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan >>>>>>>> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle >>>>>>>> he is raising here is the completeness of an >>>>>>>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >>>>>>>> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in >>>>>>>> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - >>>>>>>> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an >>>>>>>> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this >>>>>>>> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, >>>>>>>> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing >>>>>>>> that whole of an experience. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set >>>>>>>> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I >>>>>>>> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm >>>>>>>> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as >>>>>>>> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done >>>>>>>> so before. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here >>>>>>>> Andy? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>>>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>>>>>>> = >>>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> ] On Behalf Of >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience >>>>>>>> with the paintings..." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out >>>>>>>> that morning to have that experience? >>>>>>>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says >>>>>>>> you can't do things indiscriminately and have >>>>>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question >>>>>>>> Andy, but perhaps it has >>>>>>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite >>>>>>>> saying (translated from >>>>>>>> Yiddish), >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >>>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>>>>>> = >>>>>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> ] >>>>>>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, >>>>>>>> in all your museum-going, when you had an >>>>>>>> experience. Was that planned? >>>>>>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number >>>>>>>> of such experiences, >>>>>>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think this is one of the most complex >>>>>>>> aspects of experience, what does he mean >>>>>>>> when he says you can't do things >>>>>>>> indiscriminately and have vital >>>>>>>> experience, but you also can't plan >>>>>>>> things? I have discussed (argued) about >>>>>>>> this a lot with my students. I have >>>>>>>> especially seen him raise this point in at >>>>>>>> least two of his great works, Democracy >>>>>>>> and Education and Experience and Nature - >>>>>>>> and again of course in Art as Experience >>>>>>>> (notice he is not saying how Art enters >>>>>>>> into experience but how art is experience >>>>>>>> - I have come to notice these little >>>>>>>> things more and more in his writing). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the >>>>>>>> United States because of the dominance of >>>>>>>> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too >>>>>>>> often translate what individuals are >>>>>>>> bringing in to experience to organize it >>>>>>>> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind >>>>>>>> of possible to make that interpretation >>>>>>>> from Democracy and Education, although >>>>>>>> what I think he is doing more is arguing >>>>>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as >>>>>>>> random, child centered activities. I >>>>>>>> think he is clearer in Experience and >>>>>>>> Nature that we bring in who we are at the >>>>>>>> moment into the activity, and use who we >>>>>>>> are (I don't want to say identity) as an >>>>>>>> organizing principle for what we do. It >>>>>>>> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey >>>>>>>> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use >>>>>>>> the same Jackson Pollock example. The >>>>>>>> first few times I saw his paintings I was >>>>>>>> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was >>>>>>>> told that was the best way to experience >>>>>>>> them. Dewey says no vital experience >>>>>>>> there because my activities become stilted >>>>>>>> and artificia >>>>>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the >>>>>>>> museum and just looked at pictures, one to >>>>>>>> the other. No vital experience there, >>>>>>>> just random threads. But that time I had >>>>>>>> the experience with the paintings I was >>>>>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up >>>>>>>> in the trajectory of my life to enter into >>>>>>>> my experience with the painting, making it >>>>>>>> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes >>>>>>>> the argument in Experience and Nature that >>>>>>>> it is not just the experience the moment >>>>>>>> before, but the experiences leading to >>>>>>>> that experience, the context of my life, >>>>>>>> of my parent's life, of a long line of >>>>>>>> historical experiences. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Anyway, my take. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Beth Ferholt >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>>>>>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>>>>>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>>>>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu> >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>> Storch, >>>>>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>>>Storch, >>>>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Beth Ferholt >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>> >>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From smago@uga.edu Sun Jul 19 03:11:13 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 10:11:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Fulani Fellows In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: The best way to show your appreciation: Send them a check! They operate solely by donations. p -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 8:25 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Hillocks@LISTSERV.UGA.EDU; Elizabeth Ann Pittard; Deavours Hall; LEGO-L@listserv.uga.edu; Peter K. (mrpkahn@hotmail.com) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Fulani Fellows Peter, I love the mission statement of All Stars Project (allstars.org ) at their website: ?We transform the lives of youth, and poor communities using the developmental power of performance in partnership with caring adults.? On stage. Where have I heard that before? Very nice! Henry > On Jul 18, 2015, at 9:51 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > "Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience." > This position is in NYC. Please respond to Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org and NOT TO ME. > > From: Lois Holzman [mailto:lhmailhelp@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Lois Holzman > Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 10:49 AM > To: Peter Smagorinsky > Subject: Fulani Fellows > > Hi Peter, > I'm writing to ask for your help with a new initiative of the All Stars Project. It's a post-graduate fellowship program called the Fulani Fellows, made possible by a recent grant the All Stars received. The purpose of the fellowship is to provide the opportunity to work directly with developmental psychologist, activist and grassroots educator, Lenora Fulani, in her many projects that incorporate new ways of addressing poverty, human development and public policy. > I 'm hoping that you can help us connect with interested and qualified candidates for both a program manager and the fellows themselves. > The program manager will be responsible for recruitment of the fellows and the selection process, as well as the day-to-day operations of the program. I thought that you might be able to recommend some candidates for this position in addition to getting the job description (attached) out to your network. > The Fulani Fellows will participate in a 5-month program of immersion in the on-the-ground practice, methodology and theory employed in the programs and practices that Dr. Fulani has helped to create and build. Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience. > The All Stars will place three fellows in each of three cycles, the first beginning in January 2016. If you know of anyone who would make a strong Fulani Fellow program manager or fellowship candidate, you can have them reach Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org to initiate the process. > Thanks in advance for your support as the All Stars Project launches this important and exciting new initiative. Your help in distributing the job description - we need our program manager in place before we can select our fellows - and in keeping an eye out for candidates to become Fulani Fellows, is invaluable. > All best, > Lois > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Sun Jul 19 08:24:42 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 15:24:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] About translation: WAS: Having an experience Message-ID: Hi Susan, Just for information. It is very difficult to translate Anglo science and English language texts into Russian and vice versa. The problem is that all concepts are somewhat different. There are analogous concepts that are easy to translate. However, there are many, and sometimes major concepts that cannot be translated linguistically or terminologically. They might differ slightly (which in science can be problematic or confusing when we try to communicate the richness of our findings) or a lot (which creates major problems). The English word Experience stands for several things that have separate words in Russian. The best possible way to translate is to have someone from the Anglo school of thought who is well versed in the Russian school of thought and Russian psychology and other social sciences. With all due respect, the Russians translate Anglo texts assuming that they understand them. The same for American translator. A language translator would not be able to make such translations. I have read papers in Russian. They make perfect sense to me. When similar papers are written in English by the same authors, the texts are beyond understanding. They are clumsy, illogical, strange. I have read such papers as a reviewer and have been stunned. Scholarly/scientific is about translating concepts and terminology, which is a completely different job compared to translation. In addition, we have the typical translation component with its problems. When Russians translate, in many cases they translate their idioms and staple expressions word by word. This doesn't make sense to Anglo readers. I have my own experience translating jokes. Very funny jokes. But people do not lough and look at me as if I come from Mars. The problem is that all jokes and the words used in the jokes are always very contextualized. This makes the joke. A literary translation word by word kills the joke and makes it a nonsense. Something similar happens in science as well. Perezhivanie cannot be translated in English without being defined. And the definition of perezhivanie will require the use of many words that cannot be translated in English without being defined. And so on. By the way, it was pretty common in the Soviet Block to write full-scale dissertation on one category only, over and over again, by different authors. This comes from the tradition to interpret Marx' writing and ideas, which by the way were scribbled poorly by hand in German. No one can read his scribbles, and then when the scribbles are put together, no one can make sense of his expressions, often written only for him of personal communication and reminders. The biggest paradox is that the East Germans used the 50-volume collective works of Marx that were published first in Russian and then translated them in German. You can imagine how much was lost in translation. On the top of all, the Bolsheviks were sticking to each word as they want it and claimed that that is the real and pure Marx and all the rest is revisionism. So much about Marx. I personally have a lot of problems translating activity-action-operation-act, etc. -- the very basics of Activity Theory. When we talk about perezhivanie, I don't think Dewey is the best stepping stone. Also, perezhivanie is not well developed even in the Russian psychological literature. You can find more about it in the totality of its richness in Russian literary theory, theater and drama theory, and the other arts theories and philosophy. One reason that perezhivanie was not developed well in psychology is that it was considered very subjective, not measurable, and so on. In some way, the Russian ethnic concept of perezhivanie was in conflict with the militant strain of Marxist philosophy that the Bolsheviks have adopted. When the first major psychological books and articles on perezhevanie appeared in the 1980s, they were a big deal -- something daring, new, and liberating from the Marxist dogmas. Before the 1980's scholars (outside art theory and philosophy) who engaged in the study of perezhivanie risked to be branded as revisionist, with all negative implications for their careers. Actually, the major books on perezhevanie that appeard were not written by mainstream psychologists but by social philosophers who were interested in phenomenology and hermeneutics and have read enough translations or even original texts in German and French. A caveat: this is a generalized picture and the details might be somewhat different. Some people might have different experience and perception of that situation. I might be biased. But I still hope that this narrative will provide some impression about the difficulties translating texts instead of ideas and concepts. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Susan Davis Sent: Sunday, July 19, 2015 5:59 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience Thank you for that encouragement Andy and the information about Dewey, Russian translations and perezhivanie & opit. I understand that perezhivanie is not confined to the artist or artistic experience, however the aesthetic and artistic process can enable humans (not only artists) to encapsulate and externalise experience in ways that can heighten the experience and share it within social and cultural spheres. Yes an experience might be particularly significant and meaningful for us, but we may be able to make sense and draw meaning from it through expressing that in a particular aesthetic form and be able to share that with others in ways we might not otherwise do so. As an example, when my mother was ill and dying, this time included some very significant experiences, some of which stood out and had an impact on my life. However, through capturing and shaping some of my thoughts and feelings in poetic form, I was able to process these experiences for myself but also share them with others in ways I would not necessarily have done otherwise. In relation to work with children, through providing children with access to these various expressive forms (and actually teaching them about how to use the tools, and explore the impact of decisions made) we often find the children can express things about their thoughts and feelings that they may not be able to do through speech or writing alone. In terms of the expressive/aesthetic qualities of experience/perezhivanie in everyday life - this is about the awareness of the sensory qualities of things, the relationships and the exercising of judgment that may contribute to the quality of the experience. So we all put on clothes every day, but we may do so with varying degrees of attention to the sensory and aesthetic qualities of the items we wear and the relationships between the elements we choose and their overall impact. Eisner talked about this type of ?artistry' through concepts such as connoisseurship and criticism. This is not conceived of in an elitist way, but in the recognition that the ?quality? of experience can be determined through paying attention to qualities, detail and discernment. Cheers Sue On 19/07/2015 6:32 pm, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >Nice to hear your voice, Susan, rising up from the dark world of >lurkers! > >As to translation of Dewey's works into Russian. It seems, though I am >only going on a few glimpses, that Russians have translated >"experience" in Dewey's writing as opyt. If this is the case, then >obviously Dewey will seem to Russians as just another Empiricist and >the real novelty of American Pragmatism will escape their attention. I >raised the possibility of translating "Having An Experience" into >Russian on the Facebook page, and the only response was that Dewey >reads so well in English why translate him into Russian. :) But in my >opinion a translator would be obliged to translate "experience" >sometimes as opit and sometimes as perezhivanie, depending on the exact >point and context. >Dewey has to struggle to bend the English language into making this >distinction which is provided ready-made in the Russian language. But I >think mainly if you follow the clue as to whether he uses the word as a >count noun or as a mass noun, you can correctly translate him into >Russians, choosing perezhivanie or opit accordingly. Dewey's critique >of the Reflex Arc is an example far from the artist's trade where he >explicitly poses the "double-barrelled" nature of acts/experiences. > >"Having An Experience" is presented by Dewey as part of his work on >Aesthetics, and aesthetic ideas play a big part in his explanation of >this idea. But can I suggest that in Art, perezhivanie is particularly >developed and stands out in particular sharpness from opit, and this is >great help in understanding what "an experience" is, as opposed to that >general background of thoughtless doing and passive undergoing. But >perezhivanija are not limited to the work of the artist. The artist is >obliged to recognise a perzhivanie and works at how to evoke it in >others, at least approximately, but it figures in all our lives even if >we never get to write our autobiography, reproduce them on stage or >express them on the canvass. But we do live through them and change >ourselves and the world in the process. > >Can I ask you: what in your opinion does Dewey mean when he talks about >the aesthetic quality of perezhivanija when he is discussing ordinary >life, not the work of an artist? > >Andy >------------------------------------------------------------ >*Andy Blunden* >http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >On 19/07/2015 5:54 PM, Susan Davis wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> I am an xmca lurker, but am particularly interested in some of the >>matters raised on this thread in relation to experience, the arts >>perezhivanie and learning so I will venture forth! My particular >>background has been drama (including process and improvised forms of >>drama) and teacher education but I have been involved in many >>projects working with children and young people. >> >> I would like to present a number of points for consideration that >>respond to some of the issue raised: >> >> >> It is important to note that Dewey was making a point that the >> art-making/creative experience was somewhat different from general >> experience per se. >> >> >> In relation to art and experience, art-making becomes a mediated, >>expressive and reflective process whereby experience is crystallised >>and ideas/emotions internalised and externalised in specific >>expressive modes. >> Through art and creative processes, experience and emotion is shaped >>through expressive 'forms', with the subjects or agents projecting and >>externalising their expression of emotion and ideas. >> >> >> Through art making these emotions and ideas are not just >>?experienced? but selected, shaped and communicated socially in some >>material form. ?Selection and organization of material are at once a >>function and test of the quality of the emotion experienced? (p. 72). >>These forms (such as art, music, theatre and so on) are realised >>through reflection-in-action which involves processes of selection >>and the relationship of qualities (and here Eisner?s work on the >>quality of qualities is also >> pertinent) ? ?Only when the constituent parts of the whole have the >>unique end of contributing to the consummation of a conscious >>experience, do design and shape lose superimposed character and >>become form? (p. 122). >> Dewey?s work draws attention to the process and materiality of the >>making, and the embodiment of emotions and imagination through ?form? >>involving these processes of selection, organisation, elimination and >>resolution: ?In short, art, in its form, unites the very same >>relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that >>makes an experience to be an experience?. (Dewey, >> 1934:50) >> >> >> Therefore when it comes to possibilities to studying perezhivanie or >>children?s experience, while you can never get inside their personal >>experience, it is possible to record their external expressions of >>experience (through video/audio etc) and also their art-making >>(drawing, dance,dramatic play, songs etc) and also engage them in >>reflection-on-action about their experience. It is also possible to >>trace ongoing activity and expressions to trace their appropriation >>of concepts and tool use and the development of ideas in their >>externalised expressions. >> >> >> In relation to experience and reflection perhaps it is worth >>considering two different notions of reflection and two different >>Russian terms that relate to experience ? perezhivanie and opyt. At a >>Perezhivanie forum convened at Monash University earlier this year >>Nikolai Veresov noted that in Russian the title of Dewey?s book used >>another word ?opyt?.Opyt implies an experience that is in the past or >>is like the ?accumulated body of experience? (see Meshcheryakov in >>Blunden 2010). However, it could be argued that what Dewey was >>discussing was perezhivanie and a much more immediate, active >>process, as Dewey says ?Experience ?..it signals active and alert >>commerce with the world?(Dewey 1934, p. 18). >> >> >> I wonder if there has been any recent analysis of the Russian >>translations of Dewey?s ?Art as experience? to consider whether it >>really is appropriate to translate it as opyt or whether it should be >>perezhivanie (or perhaps both). >> >> >> Likewise in art making and criticism, two different types of >>reflection are involved, as proposed by Schon ? reflection-in-action >>and reflection-on-action. These inform the immediate experience but >>also the ongoing possibilities for the experience to be remade, >>reconceived and inform future experience (and perhaps as Beth >>suggestions chains of ideas/events/experience). Reflection-in-action >>is an active reflective process that is part of the art-making >>experience, where the artist is actually reflecting upon what is >>happening and being created, and drawing on their toolkit of skills >>and knowledge and weighing up the qualities of such to make moment by >>moment decisions about what to do next. This experience has a unity >>in itself, however there is also a provisionality about it. >>Reflection-on-action may then be engaged in after the >>event/experience, as the experience is interpreted and made sense of >>and other modes of expression and communication may be involved (eg. >> Reflecting on a visual arts or music experience using verbal or >>written language). This may be an act in itself or may inform further >>creative activity and experience that may even extend upon, reinvent >>or reinterpret the first. >> >> >> I look forward to hearing some of your thoughts about these points. >> Kind regards >> >> Sue Davis >> >> Dr Susan Davis >> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education >>Division CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 P +61 >>(0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au >> >> >> >> >> >> On 19/07/2015 3:43 pm, "Lplarry" wrote: >> >>> Greg, Beth, >>> How do we find a way to describe (in a way that is true) what the >>> preschool children are experiencing. >>> >>> The images of the video that Greg sent on the magic of synchronized >>>hand clapping is one example of "showing" or "perceiving" Can this >>>experience we see in the video be described in a way that expresses >>>the truth of the way the children are having this experience. >>> can we do this type of truthful describing as observers of the >>>experience? >>> Or must we undergo the experience (with) the children prior to >>>describing the experience? >>> Is synchronized hand clapping which is transformative a matter of >>>describing "subjects" and "objects" or does the truth of this matter >>>as lived experience exist in the undergoing the experienc of hand >>>clapping. >>> >>> Greg, I am reading the Gendlin article on (befindlichkeit) and this >>> concept seems relevant to this theme of having an experience and the >>> truth of describing synchronized hand clapping >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Greg Thompson" >>> Sent: 2015-07-18 8:37 PM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>> >>> Beth, >>> "a method of perezhivanie" sounds like a brilliant and important >>>thing to develop. >>> >>> I wonder if you might be able to use it to get at that sentiment >>>that you described earlier where, talking about children's >>>experience of time, you said "time is so condensed for young >>>children so it is happening all the time". How to translate that >>>experience to adults for whom time has slowed and expanded and for >>>whom it is difficult not to impose on those poor children? >>> >>> (and I love the little gems you dropped throughout - "conserve the >>>effect" >>> (and perhaps the "affect" too!) is just one of many favorites...) >>> >>> Much appreciated. >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Beth Ferholt >>>wrote: >>> >>>> This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what >>>>interests me most. It covers all the interests that brought me >>>>first to play and then to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. >>>>Before I went to LCHC I was a preschool teacher and this is a >>>>profession that I think can be described as being, in its first >>>>part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an experience' >>>>that is happening all around you every day (time is so condensed >>>>for young children so it is happening all the time) so that you >>>>can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an >>>>experience''? >>>> >>>> Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that >>>>what is most important is to describe what is happening in a way >>>>that is true to the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us >>>>how to do this. If you don;t do this you find dealing with the >>>>Golem who has had the words that give it life removed from its >>>>mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even remotely related to the >>>>Golem, not even weight. >>>> >>>> I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those >>>> properties that will characterize the experience as a whole. What >>>> Monica named 'preschool didactics from within' is a process of >>>> working with these people in research. This sounds like 5D. >>>> >>>> Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. >>>> One >>>> is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art >>>>creates in its audience in useful directions. The other is to >>>>'conserve the effect of art as art'. He says we know this is >>>>needed, because art is a unity, and without the whole criticism is >>>>not related to art -- he calls what we have left, without the >>>>unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art as a >>>>parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to >>>>avoid this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. >>>> >>>> As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you >>>> forget this then you have unhappy children and your job is >>>> impossible, or worse. >>>> As an >>>> researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the >>>> first purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that >>>> does not conserve the effect, without any consequences on your >>>> livelihood. If we could have a system of science that makes it >>>> impossible to leave the hardest questions to the first purpose of >>>> criticism, then we could have so many people working on these >>>> hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not know how to do >>>> this even in my own work. >>>> >>>> Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children >>>>before your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. >>>>Kiyo suggested The Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I >>>>think) and this is related, also Edith Turner's work where she >>>>sees the reality that the people she is studying see. >>>> >>>> Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. >>>> >>>> Beth >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Mike, could you elaborate on that? >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> on behalf >>>>> of mike cole >>>>> Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo-- >>>>> >>>>> a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here >>>>>> with >>>> his >>>>>> mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the >>>> latter >>>>> is >>>>>> not about representing exactly, but about describing events in >>>> terms of >>>>>> consequences for the participants, which they display for each >>>> other in >>>>>> their actual practice. >>>>>> >>>>>> This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of >>>> ANALYSIS >>>>>> BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. >>>> Unit >>>>>> analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and >>>> real >>>>>> phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. >>>> That is >>>>>> why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is >>>>>> warned >>>> not >>>>> to >>>>>> think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". >>>>>> >>>>>> Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between >>>>>> self-action >>>> and >>>>>> transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own >>>> powers. >>>>> This >>>>>> is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis >>>>>> by elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and >>>> phases of >>>>>> action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other >>>> presumptively >>>>>> detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without >>>> isolation >>>>> of >>>>>> presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable >>>> ?elements??. >>>> An >>>>>> experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in >>>> itself: >>>>> it >>>>>> is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey >>>>>> & >>>>> Bentley >>>>>> write. >>>>>> >>>>>> I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> on >>>>>> behalf >>>> of >>>>>> mike cole >>>>>> Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 >>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>> >>>>>> Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and >>>> objectivism, >>>>>> spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be >>>>>> antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The >>>> resolution >>>> of >>>>>> the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical >>>> means, >>>>>> only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not >>>>>> by >>>> any >>>>>> means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real >>>> problem of >>>>>> life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it >>>>>> saw >>>> there >>>>> a >>>>>> purely theoretical problem." >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor >>>>>>> intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that >>>>>>> reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an >>>>>>> experience, we must make use of these adjectives of >>>>>>> interpretation. In going over an experience in >>>>>>> mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one >>>>>>> property rather than another was sufficiently dominant >>>>>>> so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction >>>> when >>>>> we >>>>>>> *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the >>>>>>> experience >>>> in >>>>> our >>>>>>> autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it >>>>>>> scientifically, >>>> all >>>>> of >>>>>>> which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to >>>>>> recognise >>>>>>> that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and >>>>> cognition >>>>>>> (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other >>>> categories >>>>>> you >>>>>>> abstract from an experience. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth >>>>>>> Ferholt wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a >>>> fractal? I >>>>>>>> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an >>>>>>>> experience proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the >>>>>>>> beginning of the >>>> road >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on >>>>> several >>>>>>>> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an >>>>> experience. >>>>>>>> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper >>>>>>>> of >>>>> Dewey's >>>>>>>> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am >>>> picking >>>> up >>>>>> on a >>>>>>>> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something >>>>>>>> is >>>> only >>>>>>>> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is >>>>>>>> bothering >>>> me. >>>>>> Beth >>>>>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing >>>>>>>> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the >>>>>>>> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from >>>>>>>> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. >>>>>>>> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan >>>>>>>> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle >>>>>>>> he is raising here is the completeness of an >>>>>>>> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and >>>>>>>> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in >>>>>>>> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - >>>>>>>> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an >>>>>>>> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this >>>>>>>> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, >>>>>>>> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing >>>>>>>> that whole of an experience. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set >>>>>>>> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I >>>>>>>> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm >>>>>>>> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as >>>>>>>> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done >>>>>>>> so before. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But I am guessing you're getting a something here >>>>>>>> Andy? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>>>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 >>>>>>>> = >>>>> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> ] On Behalf Of >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience >>>>>>>> with the paintings..." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out >>>>>>>> that morning to have that experience? >>>>>>>> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says >>>>>>>> you can't do things indiscriminately and have >>>>>>>> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well I'm not sure I understand your question >>>>>>>> Andy, but perhaps it has >>>>>>>> something to do with my grandfather's favorite >>>>>>>> saying (translated from >>>>>>>> Yiddish), >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Man plans, God laughs. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >>>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>>>>>> = >>>>>>>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> ] >>>>>>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM >>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, >>>>>>>> in all your museum-going, when you had an >>>>>>>> experience. Was that planned? >>>>>>>> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number >>>>>>>> of such experiences, >>>>>>>> Michael ... just some number actually) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Larry and all, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think this is one of the most complex >>>>>>>> aspects of experience, what does he mean >>>>>>>> when he says you can't do things >>>>>>>> indiscriminately and have vital >>>>>>>> experience, but you also can't plan >>>>>>>> things? I have discussed (argued) about >>>>>>>> this a lot with my students. I have >>>>>>>> especially seen him raise this point in at >>>>>>>> least two of his great works, Democracy >>>>>>>> and Education and Experience and Nature - >>>>>>>> and again of course in Art as Experience >>>>>>>> (notice he is not saying how Art enters >>>>>>>> into experience but how art is experience >>>>>>>> - I have come to notice these little >>>>>>>> things more and more in his writing). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The difficulty we have, at least in the >>>>>>>> United States because of the dominance of >>>>>>>> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too >>>>>>>> often translate what individuals are >>>>>>>> bringing in to experience to organize it >>>>>>>> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind >>>>>>>> of possible to make that interpretation >>>>>>>> from Democracy and Education, although >>>>>>>> what I think he is doing more is arguing >>>>>>>> against misinterpretations of his work as >>>>>>>> random, child centered activities. I >>>>>>>> think he is clearer in Experience and >>>>>>>> Nature that we bring in who we are at the >>>>>>>> moment into the activity, and use who we >>>>>>>> are (I don't want to say identity) as an >>>>>>>> organizing principle for what we do. It >>>>>>>> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey >>>>>>>> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use >>>>>>>> the same Jackson Pollock example. The >>>>>>>> first few times I saw his paintings I was >>>>>>>> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was >>>>>>>> told that was the best way to experience >>>>>>>> them. Dewey says no vital experience >>>>>>>> there because my activities become stilted >>>>>>>> and artificia >>>>>>>> l. Sometimes I went through the >>>>>>>> museum and just looked at pictures, one to >>>>>>>> the other. No vital experience there, >>>>>>>> just random threads. But that time I had >>>>>>>> the experience with the paintings I was >>>>>>>> allowing who I was, what had been built up >>>>>>>> in the trajectory of my life to enter into >>>>>>>> my experience with the painting, making it >>>>>>>> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes >>>>>>>> the argument in Experience and Nature that >>>>>>>> it is not just the experience the moment >>>>>>>> before, but the experiences leading to >>>>>>>> that experience, the context of my life, >>>>>>>> of my parent's life, of a long line of >>>>>>>> historical experiences. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Anyway, my take. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Beth Ferholt >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn >>>>>>>> College, City University of New York >>>>>>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>>>>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>> bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu> >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and >>>>>> thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova >>>>>> & >>>> Storch, >>>>>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and >>>>>thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova >>>>>& Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Beth Ferholt >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, >>>> City University of New York >>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>> >>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 10:51:02 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 10:51:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: About translation: WAS: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Susan and Lubomir, and Greg {Greg shared the Gendlin article as of interest as a philosophical approach to this topic and I want to weave Gendlin into this topic under discussion} I am enthusiastically learning from this developing conversation because of the depth of the reflection on having "an" experience. The zone being created by the "focus" on "boundary" objects, design, ordering, conceptual mutations, Dewey's article, Gendlin's article on "dwelling" and how we make "sense" of all this as expressing a unity. Susan, as I read your commentary [moving from the background to the foreground] I experienced all the above notions coalescing as if expressed within a work of art. No, that is not what I meant, Your commentary IS a work of art. No, that is not what I meant. Your commentary IS art, the way it was sculpted, presented, and offered with care. I experienced this reading as connecting the dots as a synthesizing of what has come before. Thank you for "weaving a tapestry" [your strands and our strands interwoven]. Lubomir: I am highlighting and focusing on one paragraph of your response to Susan: the Russian ethnic concept of perezhivanie was in conflict with the militant strain of Marxist philosophy that the Bolsheviks have adopted. When the first major psychological books and articles on perezhevanie appeared in the 1980s, they were a big deal -- something daring, new, and liberating from the Marxist dogmas. Before the 1980's scholars (outside art theory and philosophy) who engaged in the study of perezhivanie risked to be branded as revisionist, with all negative implications for their careers. Actually, the major books on perezhevanie that appeard were not written by mainstream psychologists but by social philosophers who were interested in phenomenology and hermeneutics and have read enough translations or even original texts in German and French. I want to "focus" on the qualifier "ethnic" as the "source" of perezhevanie [as a concept]. THIS ethnic concept was not explored by mainstream psychologists but by social PHILOSOPHERS who were interested in PHENOMENOLOGY and HERMENEUTICS. Social philosophy from the German and French "traditions". A this juncture I want to bring in Greg's article he sent written by Eugene Gendlin to return us to the theme of "place-making" as social philosophy. Gendlin in note #2 p.31 says: "Heidegger told Joan Stambaugh, an editor and translator of his works in English, that in his later work "Befindlichkeit" becomes "wohnen" [dwelling] The phrase "dwelling IN place" and the concept of place-making expressed in the concept "befindlichkeit/wohnen" has the quality of "ethnic" common sense when exploring "an" experience. Can these various "traditions" [and mutating concepts] be "translated" or must each "ethnic" tradition undergo its own transformation and the "sense" we are exploring be "transcended" within each ethnic tradition? Do we need to learn each others "languages" to explore place-making and boundary objects? Gendlin's article is "focusing" [dwelling within] the differences he is drawing out between "philosophy" and "psychology/science" He says philosophy asks, What KINDS of "concept" are we exploring when we explore BASIC concepts?" Gendlin says this is the realm of philosophy. He also says these basic concepts are mutable into other KINDS of basic concepts.. He suggests that currently most scientists explore using "basic"concepts "is" using concepts having the qualities of stones. What Gendlin means by "basic" gets at the difference between philosophy and any science and also the usefulness of philosophy for science. [in order to structure or "do" science]. I will offer a quote from Gendlin to get the "feel" or "sense" of where he is "focusing" [focus as a concept also has as it's source the meaning of "dwelling" or place-making as "an" experience.] Gendlin says: Most people, scientists and others, do not usually think ABOUT what KIND of concept they are using. The most current KIND "is" modelled on ordinary things like stones. A stone can be moved from one PLACE to another without changing. It is still the SAME stone, now in a different spot. A thing LIKE a stone may relate to other things, of course; for example, it may break a porcelain pitcher. But THESE relations "are" external AND ADDITIONAL TO what the stone "is". Whether it breaks a pitcher or not, even if it just sits in one spot. it "is" a stone. It would not be usual to say that a stone "is" pitcher-breaking, or window-smashing, or any SUCH interaction." Gendlin is asking what KIND of concepts are we "using" in current science. For example an "electron" is a thing-like concept. Concepts like "self" "ego" "perception" "personal interaction" "feeling" "affect" "intersubjectivity" "states" etc. are usually read/formulated in thing-like KINDS of concepts. A stone-like concept views "interactions" AS a relation between two such stone-like things. EACH separate entity is a "stimulus thing, each separate thing is a REPRESENTATION-thing. Its essential essence as thing-like. Feelings or affects "are" little things inside the object that is also thing-like. Sometimes these "feelings" and "affects" are imagined as within the "self" and sometimes these "feelings" and "affects" are located within a "thing-like" larger box that holds the thing-like "self" [and its feelings, affects] People supposedly "feel" these "inside thing-like" entities DIRECTLY. Then by "analogy" to our own "thing-like feelings" we are able to "imagine" [or infer] by empathy the thing-like feelings [as entities] existing "in" the other person. Gendlin is suggesting that this KIND of "psychology" [as a science] has a certain notion of "basic" psychological concepts as existing and having the same qualities in their essence AS like stones. They can be moved from place to place and in their "essence" retain their same thing-like "basic" use pattern as conceptualized THIS way [as we currently understand "ethnic" psychological concepts] This months article has opened up a "space/zone" to question our "basic" assumptions and concepts How we are envisioning/perceiving "boundary objects" is a mutating process. What KIND of concept is the notion of boundary object? Is the answer changing as we develop this concept? "Befindlichment" changing to "dwelling with" Having "an" experience changing to "dwelling with" "focusing" changing to "dwelling with" da-sein [there-being] changing to "dwelling with" place-making changing to "dwelling with" Is it possible to shift our focus from thing-like concepts [like stones] to other KINDS of concepts developing the disposition to value "an" experience as the act of "dwelling with". Gendlin's article is making the case that philosophy asks the question of the quality of "basic" concepts and answers with notions of what the "basic" concepts "are" in truth. He is saying "basic" concepts do not have stone-like qualities. His article is showing what he means within the field of psychology but the truth of "basic" concepts extends to all the sciences. Gendlin goes into "specific examples" of this place-making activity within the field of psychology but the general theme I see as interweaving with our topic under discussion focuses on having living experiences as having a specific experience. Concepts mutating such as Befindlichment becoming wohnen/dwelling as a process of place-making within "felt sense" [as a wholistic integral texture]. This process happening prior to reflection has qualities that are qualitatively different from the qualities emerging when we reflect ON this process after we first live through the experience at this "felt phase" in the process. This original place receding into the background before reflection moves to the foreground and gives representations OF this primary experience its derivative sense of enduring qualities. ? From lspopov@bgsu.edu Sun Jul 19 11:34:26 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 18:34:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: About translation: WAS: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Larry, Thank you for your extensive post. Your insights are interesting for me. I will explore further your line of thought and the examples you provide. And thank you for highlighting Gendlin's article again. It is a great reading in the context of the present thread. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Sunday, July 19, 2015 1:51 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: About translation: WAS: Having an experience Susan and Lubomir, and Greg {Greg shared the Gendlin article as of interest as a philosophical approach to this topic and I want to weave Gendlin into this topic under discussion} I am enthusiastically learning from this developing conversation because of the depth of the reflection on having "an" experience. The zone being created by the "focus" on "boundary" objects, design, ordering, conceptual mutations, Dewey's article, Gendlin's article on "dwelling" and how we make "sense" of all this as expressing a unity. Susan, as I read your commentary [moving from the background to the foreground] I experienced all the above notions coalescing as if expressed within a work of art. No, that is not what I meant, Your commentary IS a work of art. No, that is not what I meant. Your commentary IS art, the way it was sculpted, presented, and offered with care. I experienced this reading as connecting the dots as a synthesizing of what has come before. Thank you for "weaving a tapestry" [your strands and our strands interwoven]. Lubomir: I am highlighting and focusing on one paragraph of your response to Susan: the Russian ethnic concept of perezhivanie was in conflict with the militant strain of Marxist philosophy that the Bolsheviks have adopted. When the first major psychological books and articles on perezhevanie appeared in the 1980s, they were a big deal -- something daring, new, and liberating from the Marxist dogmas. Before the 1980's scholars (outside art theory and philosophy) who engaged in the study of perezhivanie risked to be branded as revisionist, with all negative implications for their careers. Actually, the major books on perezhevanie that appeard were not written by mainstream psychologists but by social philosophers who were interested in phenomenology and hermeneutics and have read enough translations or even original texts in German and French. I want to "focus" on the qualifier "ethnic" as the "source" of perezhevanie [as a concept]. THIS ethnic concept was not explored by mainstream psychologists but by social PHILOSOPHERS who were interested in PHENOMENOLOGY and HERMENEUTICS. Social philosophy from the German and French "traditions". A this juncture I want to bring in Greg's article he sent written by Eugene Gendlin to return us to the theme of "place-making" as social philosophy. Gendlin in note #2 p.31 says: "Heidegger told Joan Stambaugh, an editor and translator of his works in English, that in his later work "Befindlichkeit" becomes "wohnen" [dwelling] The phrase "dwelling IN place" and the concept of place-making expressed in the concept "befindlichkeit/wohnen" has the quality of "ethnic" common sense when exploring "an" experience. Can these various "traditions" [and mutating concepts] be "translated" or must each "ethnic" tradition undergo its own transformation and the "sense" we are exploring be "transcended" within each ethnic tradition? Do we need to learn each others "languages" to explore place-making and boundary objects? Gendlin's article is "focusing" [dwelling within] the differences he is drawing out between "philosophy" and "psychology/science" He says philosophy asks, What KINDS of "concept" are we exploring when we explore BASIC concepts?" Gendlin says this is the realm of philosophy. He also says these basic concepts are mutable into other KINDS of basic concepts.. He suggests that currently most scientists explore using "basic"concepts "is" using concepts having the qualities of stones. What Gendlin means by "basic" gets at the difference between philosophy and any science and also the usefulness of philosophy for science. [in order to structure or "do" science]. I will offer a quote from Gendlin to get the "feel" or "sense" of where he is "focusing" [focus as a concept also has as it's source the meaning of "dwelling" or place-making as "an" experience.] Gendlin says: Most people, scientists and others, do not usually think ABOUT what KIND of concept they are using. The most current KIND "is" modelled on ordinary things like stones. A stone can be moved from one PLACE to another without changing. It is still the SAME stone, now in a different spot. A thing LIKE a stone may relate to other things, of course; for example, it may break a porcelain pitcher. But THESE relations "are" external AND ADDITIONAL TO what the stone "is". Whether it breaks a pitcher or not, even if it just sits in one spot. it "is" a stone. It would not be usual to say that a stone "is" pitcher-breaking, or window-smashing, or any SUCH interaction." Gendlin is asking what KIND of concepts are we "using" in current science. For example an "electron" is a thing-like concept. Concepts like "self" "ego" "perception" "personal interaction" "feeling" "affect" "intersubjectivity" "states" etc. are usually read/formulated in thing-like KINDS of concepts. A stone-like concept views "interactions" AS a relation between two such stone-like things. EACH separate entity is a "stimulus thing, each separate thing is a REPRESENTATION-thing. Its essential essence as thing-like. Feelings or affects "are" little things inside the object that is also thing-like. Sometimes these "feelings" and "affects" are imagined as within the "self" and sometimes these "feelings" and "affects" are located within a "thing-like" larger box that holds the thing-like "self" [and its feelings, affects] People supposedly "feel" these "inside thing-like" entities DIRECTLY. Then by "analogy" to our own "thing-like feelings" we are able to "imagine" [or infer] by empathy the thing-like feelings [as entities] existing "in" the other person. Gendlin is suggesting that this KIND of "psychology" [as a science] has a certain notion of "basic" psychological concepts as existing and having the same qualities in their essence AS like stones. They can be moved from place to place and in their "essence" retain their same thing-like "basic" use pattern as conceptualized THIS way [as we currently understand "ethnic" psychological concepts] This months article has opened up a "space/zone" to question our "basic" assumptions and concepts How we are envisioning/perceiving "boundary objects" is a mutating process. What KIND of concept is the notion of boundary object? Is the answer changing as we develop this concept? "Befindlichment" changing to "dwelling with" Having "an" experience changing to "dwelling with" "focusing" changing to "dwelling with" da-sein [there-being] changing to "dwelling with" place-making changing to "dwelling with" Is it possible to shift our focus from thing-like concepts [like stones] to other KINDS of concepts developing the disposition to value "an" experience as the act of "dwelling with". Gendlin's article is making the case that philosophy asks the question of the quality of "basic" concepts and answers with notions of what the "basic" concepts "are" in truth. He is saying "basic" concepts do not have stone-like qualities. His article is showing what he means within the field of psychology but the truth of "basic" concepts extends to all the sciences. Gendlin goes into "specific examples" of this place-making activity within the field of psychology but the general theme I see as interweaving with our topic under discussion focuses on having living experiences as having a specific experience. Concepts mutating such as Befindlichment becoming wohnen/dwelling as a process of place-making within "felt sense" [as a wholistic integral texture]. This process happening prior to reflection has qualities that are qualitatively different from the qualities emerging when we reflect ON this process after we first live through the experience at this "felt phase" in the process. This original place receding into the background before reflection moves to the foreground and gives representations OF this primary experience its derivative sense of enduring qualities. ? From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 13:23:13 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 14:23:13 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fulani Fellows In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Touche! Done! > On Jul 19, 2015, at 4:11 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > The best way to show your appreciation: Send them a check! They operate solely by donations. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 8:25 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Hillocks@LISTSERV.UGA.EDU; Elizabeth Ann Pittard; Deavours Hall; LEGO-L@listserv.uga.edu; Peter K. (mrpkahn@hotmail.com) > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Fulani Fellows > > Peter, > I love the mission statement of All Stars Project (allstars.org ) at their website: > > ?We transform the lives of youth, and poor communities using the developmental power of performance in partnership with caring adults.? > > On stage. Where have I heard that before? > > Very nice! > > Henry > >> On Jul 18, 2015, at 9:51 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >> >> "Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience." >> This position is in NYC. Please respond to Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org and NOT TO ME. >> >> From: Lois Holzman [mailto:lhmailhelp@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Lois Holzman >> Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 10:49 AM >> To: Peter Smagorinsky >> Subject: Fulani Fellows >> >> Hi Peter, >> I'm writing to ask for your help with a new initiative of the All Stars Project. It's a post-graduate fellowship program called the Fulani Fellows, made possible by a recent grant the All Stars received. The purpose of the fellowship is to provide the opportunity to work directly with developmental psychologist, activist and grassroots educator, Lenora Fulani, in her many projects that incorporate new ways of addressing poverty, human development and public policy. >> I 'm hoping that you can help us connect with interested and qualified candidates for both a program manager and the fellows themselves. >> The program manager will be responsible for recruitment of the fellows and the selection process, as well as the day-to-day operations of the program. I thought that you might be able to recommend some candidates for this position in addition to getting the job description (attached) out to your network. >> The Fulani Fellows will participate in a 5-month program of immersion in the on-the-ground practice, methodology and theory employed in the programs and practices that Dr. Fulani has helped to create and build. Ideal candidates for this paid fellowship are recent graduates of masters and doctoral programs, graduate students, and faculty in the fields of education, psychology, cultural anthropology, social work, youth development, applied theater, poverty, public policy - or the equivalent life experience. >> The All Stars will place three fellows in each of three cycles, the first beginning in January 2016. If you know of anyone who would make a strong Fulani Fellow program manager or fellowship candidate, you can have them reach Sarah Plotkin at 212-356-8431, splotkin@allstars.org to initiate the process. >> Thanks in advance for your support as the All Stars Project launches this important and exciting new initiative. Your help in distributing the job description - we need our program manager in place before we can select our fellows - and in keeping an eye out for candidates to become Fulani Fellows, is invaluable. >> All best, >> Lois >> >> >> > > From preiss.xmca@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 15:28:23 2015 From: preiss.xmca@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 18:28:23 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Provocative song Message-ID: Dear colleagues, Some may like this song, some others hate it. It sounds to me like a worth expression of many things going wrong with contenporary schools everywhere. I am glad to see this coming from the younger generation as adult talk about education scarcely listen what kids and young have to say about what is being done to them at school. (I don't support the final statement of the song, of course; still find the message in the bottle quite on target). https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=w3cyYMyj2QM A bit of a renewed version of Pink Floyd's The Wall in a new genre. For those of you exploring new expresions, may be worth of your time. David From larabeaty@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 16:11:30 2015 From: larabeaty@gmail.com (Lara Beaty) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 19:11:30 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Provocative song In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: And here?s an interesting follow-up: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCM4GEBDjz4. Thanks for this link! Something to definitely use with my students to provoke a discussion. Best, Lara > On Jul 19, 2015, at 6:28 PM, David Preiss wrote: > > Dear colleagues, > > Some may like this song, some others hate it. It sounds to me like a worth > expression of many things going wrong with contenporary schools everywhere. > I am glad to see this coming from the younger generation as adult talk > about education scarcely listen what kids and young have to say about what > is being done to them at school. (I don't support the final statement of > the song, of course; still find the message in the bottle quite on target). > > https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=w3cyYMyj2QM > > A bit of a renewed version of Pink Floyd's The Wall in a new genre. For > those of you exploring new expresions, may be worth of your time. > > David From billkerr@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 16:54:45 2015 From: billkerr@gmail.com (Bill Kerr) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:54:45 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Provocative song In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Also, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJIu7pE0lBA some of the core issues for discussion are identified there IMO Equal rights and democracy would have appeal to disempowered students but how can abstract maths be made more interesting, a more difficult question. It may not be possible to make some very important stuff more interesting. Marx complained about having to study the "economic shit". On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:11 AM, Lara Beaty wrote: > And here?s an interesting follow-up: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCM4GEBDjz4. Thanks for this link! > Something to definitely use with my students to provoke a discussion. > > Best, > Lara > > > > > > On Jul 19, 2015, at 6:28 PM, David Preiss wrote: > > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > Some may like this song, some others hate it. It sounds to me like a > worth > > expression of many things going wrong with contenporary schools > everywhere. > > I am glad to see this coming from the younger generation as adult talk > > about education scarcely listen what kids and young have to say about > what > > is being done to them at school. (I don't support the final statement of > > the song, of course; still find the message in the bottle quite on > target). > > > > https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=w3cyYMyj2QM > > > > A bit of a renewed version of Pink Floyd's The Wall in a new genre. For > > those of you exploring new expresions, may be worth of your time. > > > > David > > > From daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 17:17:52 2015 From: daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com (Daniel Hyman) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 20:17:52 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Provocative song In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: For those with a fondness for text, and with all appropriate incantations to the gods of fair use: https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Boyinaband/Don-t-Stay-in-School As someone who loves being educated (no quotes) on virtually any topic, but found the how-to knowledge offered to novice teachers (at least in New York), falling short of what a practicing educator needs to know, I can relate to the song's sense of painful unpreparedness, in my field. Not to the sense that public schools must (or in some domains can) teach how to make all personal moral choices, or that all subjects must be practical, e.g. being a bank customer (and no "impractical" subjects, e.g. math, underpin them), or that home life need not inculcate an interest in current events, history, or politics. So to me, the song is easy to reject at first, but on reflection... On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 at 7:54 PM, Bill Kerr wrote: > Also, > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJIu7pE0lBA > > some of the core issues for discussion are identified there IMO > > Equal rights and democracy would have appeal to disempowered students but > how can abstract maths be made more interesting, a more difficult question. > It may not be possible to make some very important stuff more interesting. > Marx complained about having to study the "economic shit". > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:11 AM, Lara Beaty wrote: > > > And here?s an interesting follow-up: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCM4GEBDjz4. Thanks for this link! > > Something to definitely use with my students to provoke a discussion. > > > > Best, > > Lara > > > > > > > > > > > On Jul 19, 2015, at 6:28 PM, David Preiss > wrote: > > > > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > > > Some may like this song, some others hate it. It sounds to me like a > > worth > > > expression of many things going wrong with contenporary schools > > everywhere. > > > I am glad to see this coming from the younger generation as adult talk > > > about education scarcely listen what kids and young have to say about > > what > > > is being done to them at school. (I don't support the final statement > of > > > the song, of course; still find the message in the bottle quite on > > target). > > > > > > https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=w3cyYMyj2QM > > > > > > A bit of a renewed version of Pink Floyd's The Wall in a new genre. > For > > > those of you exploring new expresions, may be worth of your time. > > > > > > David > > > > > > > From bferholt@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 18:56:18 2015 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 21:56:18 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience In-Reply-To: References: <1437018222268.78821@iped.uio.no> <1437024789424.22675@iped.uio.no> <55a7628e.0612450a.2a7a.2dc2@mx.google.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A57@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D5FB.2040004@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4A89@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A7D9F0.6060808@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4AAF@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <55A87510.4040603@mira.net> <55A8967B.5050706@mira.net> <1437151377843.50675@iped.uio.no> <1437155895193.86705@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thank you very much for the support, Greg, I will try to develop this idea. Susan, thank you for all of these interesting ideas. I am working to understand them. Is there any recording or repository of presentations for this forum at Monash? Beth On Sat, Jul 18, 2015 at 11:35 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Beth, > "a method of perezhivanie" sounds like a brilliant and important thing to > develop. > > I wonder if you might be able to use it to get at that sentiment that you > described earlier where, talking about children's experience of time, you > said "time is so condensed for young children so it is happening all the > time". How to translate that experience to adults for whom time has slowed > and expanded and for whom it is difficult not to impose on those poor > children? > > (and I love the little gems you dropped throughout - "conserve the effect" > (and perhaps the "affect" too!) is just one of many favorites...) > > Much appreciated. > -greg > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > This chain of ideas is the closest I have ever felt to what interests me > > most. It covers all the interests that brought me first to play and then > > to the playworlds and then to perezhivanie. Before I went to LCHC I was > a > > preschool teacher and this is a profession that I think can be described > as > > being, in its first part, responsible for reflecting upon the 'having an > > experience' that is happening all around you every day (time is so > > condensed for young children so it is happening all the time) so that you > > can support the self-creation beings who are able to "have an > experience''? > > > > Like with Greg's students, as a preschool teacher you find that what is > > most important is to describe what is happening in a way that is true to > > the children's experiences. Vivian Paley shows us how to do this. If you > > don;t do this you find dealing with the Golem who has had the words that > > give it life removed from its mouth: you just have dirt, nothing even > > remotely related to the Golem, not even weight. > > > > I think it is the teacher/artists who can find for us those properties > that > > will characterize the experience as a whole. What Monica named > 'preschool > > didactics from within' is a process of working with these people in > > research. This sounds like 5D. > > > > Andy, Vygotsky is talking about the the two purposes of art criticism. > One > > is entirely in the domain of social life, he says, guiding what art > creates > > in its audience in useful directions. The other is to 'conserve the > effect > > of art as art'. He says we know this is needed, because art is a unity, > > and without the whole criticism is not related to art -- he calls what we > > have left, without the unity, a wound. But criticism of art treats art > as > > a parliamentary speech -- often -- he says. Vygtosky shows how to avoid > > this in the chapter on Bunin's short story. > > > > As a preschool teacher you know that art is life because if you forget > this > > then you have unhappy children and your job is impossible, or worse. As > an > > researcher, every time you hit something hard you can revert to the first > > purpose of art/life criticism, or anyhow to the part that does not > conserve > > the effect, without any consequences on your livelihood. If we could > have > > a system of science that makes it impossible to leave the hardest > questions > > to the first purpose of criticism, then we could have so many people > > working on these hardest questions in a meaningful way, but I do not know > > how to do this even in my own work. > > > > Except one way is to place the desires of the teachers and children > before > > your own. This is sort of a method of love or empathy. Kiyo suggested > The > > Method of Hope by Miyazaki (no relation I think) and this is related, > also > > Edith Turner's work where she sees the reality that the people she is > > studying see. > > > > Maybe it is a method of perezhivanie. > > > > Beth > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > > Mike, could you elaborate on that? > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf of > > > mike cole > > > Sent: 17 July 2015 19:40 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > > > Alfredo-- > > > > > > a "method of organization" seems close to a synonym for design. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > I like very much how Greg brings in a methodological issue here with > > his > > > > mention about ethnography and his reading of "fidelity"; that the > > latter > > > is > > > > not about representing exactly, but about describing events in terms > of > > > > consequences for the participants, which they display for each other > in > > > > their actual practice. > > > > > > > > This methodological aspect makes me think that the the notion of > > ANALYSIS > > > > BY UNITS, which has been discussed in xmca before, is useful here. > Unit > > > > analysis reminds us that, as units, experiences, as concrete and real > > > > phenomena, have some form of organization that extends in time. That > is > > > > why, if I understood the discussion below correctly, Beth is warned > not > > > to > > > > think of the unit of experience as a unit "in itself". > > > > > > > > Dewey and Bentley 1949 made the differentiation between self-action > and > > > > transaction. In self action, things are explained by their own > powers. > > > This > > > > is, I believe, what Vygotsky would have referred to as analysis by > > > > elements. In transaction, they say, ?deal[s] with aspects and phases > of > > > > action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other > presumptively > > > > detachable ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without > > isolation > > > of > > > > presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable > ?elements??. > > An > > > > experience can be studied precisely because it is not a thing in > > itself: > > > it > > > > is always a moving, gesture, a "method of organization" as Dewey & > > > Bentley > > > > write. > > > > > > > > I thought this my add something to your fascinating discussion, > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf > of > > > > mike cole > > > > Sent: 17 July 2015 18:23 > > > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > > > > > Marx: It is only in a social context that subjectivism and > objectivism, > > > > spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be > > > > antinomies and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution > > of > > > > the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical > > means, > > > > only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by > > any > > > > means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem > of > > > > life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw > > there > > > a > > > > purely theoretical problem." > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > No, no, Beth. As Dewey says: > > > > > > > > > > "This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor > > > > > intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that > > > > > reflection can make within it. In discourse//about//an > > > > > experience, we must make use of these adjectives of > > > > > interpretation. In going over an experience in > > > > > mind//after/ /its occurrence, we may find that one > > > > > property rather than another was sufficiently dominant > > > > > so that it characterizes the experience as a whole." > > > > > > > > > > Isn't this beautiful scientific prose! We make these distinction > when > > > we > > > > > *reflect* on an experience. And perhaps we include the experience > in > > > our > > > > > autobiography, act it out on the stage, analyse it scientifically, > > all > > > of > > > > > which presupposes analysis and synthesis. But it is important to > > > > recognise > > > > > that the unity is prior. It is not only a unity of emotion and > > > cognition > > > > > (for example) but also of attention and will - and any other > > categories > > > > you > > > > > abstract from an experience. > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 17/07/2015 3:00 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> Or reproducing the part that represents the whole? Like a > fractal? I > > > > >> think it is the similarity across scales that makes an experience > > > > >> proleptic, or gives that 'bliss conferred at the beginning of the > > road > > > > to > > > > >> redemption" that Vasilyuk refers to. You have an experience on > > > several > > > > >> timescales and so a sense of deja-vu is central to having an > > > experience. > > > > >> This is what I am thinking about after reading both the paper of > > > Dewey's > > > > >> and your recent piece on perezhivanie, Andy, although I am picking > > up > > > > on a > > > > >> small piece of the last email in this chain -- : If something is > > only > > > > >> itself in its whole then you can't study it, is what is bothering > > me. > > > > Beth > > > > >> > > > > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > > >> > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Not "getting at something", Michael. Just pursuing > > > > >> this question you raised about Dewey's saying that the > > > > >> aesthetic quality of medieval buildings arises from > > > > >> their not being "planned" like buildings are nowadays. > > > > >> He goes on to say "Every work of art follows the plan > > > > >> of, and pattern of, a complete experience." The puzzle > > > > >> he is raising here is the completeness of an > > > > >> experience which gives it its aesthetic quality, and > > > > >> this cannot be created by assembling together parts in > > > > >> the way a modern building is planned. An experience - > > > > >> the kind of thing which sticks in your mind - is an > > > > >> original or prior unity, not a combination, and this > > > > >> is what gives a work of art that ineffable quality, > > > > >> something which can only be transmitted by reproducing > > > > >> that whole of an experience. > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >> > > > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:32 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy, > > > > >> > > > > >> I'm still not sure about your question. Did I set > > > > >> out to have that experience, that morning...no, I > > > > >> don't think so (it was a long time ago, but I'm > > > > >> pretty sure no). Could I have just treated it as > > > > >> an indiscriminate activity, probably, I had done > > > > >> so before. > > > > >> > > > > >> But I am guessing you're getting a something here > > > > >> Andy? > > > > >> > > > > >> Michael > > > > >> > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > > > >> From: > > > > >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13 > > > > >> = > > > osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >> ] On Behalf Of > > > > >> Andy Blunden > > > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:21 PM > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > >> > > > > >> YOu said: "... But that time I had the experience > > > > >> with the paintings..." > > > > >> > > > > >> I mean that was an experience. Did you set out > > > > >> that morning to have that experience? > > > > >> RE, your question: "what does he mean when he says > > > > >> you can't do things indiscriminately and have > > > > >> vital experience, but you also can't plan things?" > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> > > > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >> > > > > >> On 17/07/2015 2:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Well I'm not sure I understand your question > > > > >> Andy, but perhaps it has > > > > >> something to do with my grandfather's favorite > > > > >> saying (translated from > > > > >> Yiddish), > > > > >> > > > > >> Man plans, God laughs. > > > > >> > > > > >> Michael > > > > >> > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > > > >> From: > > > > >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= > > > > ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >> > > > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > > > >> = > > > > >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >> ] > > > > >> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > > > >> Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 12:04 PM > > > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >> > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Having an experience > > > > >> > > > > >> So Michael, there was just that one occasion, > > > > >> in all your museum-going, when you had an > > > > >> experience. Was that planned? > > > > >> (I don't mean to say you haven't had a number > > > > >> of such experiences, > > > > >> Michael ... just some number actually) > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> On 17/07/2015 1:19 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Hi Larry and all, > > > > >> > > > > >> I think this is one of the most complex > > > > >> aspects of experience, what does he mean > > > > >> when he says you can't do things > > > > >> indiscriminately and have vital > > > > >> experience, but you also can't plan > > > > >> things? I have discussed (argued) about > > > > >> this a lot with my students. I have > > > > >> especially seen him raise this point in at > > > > >> least two of his great works, Democracy > > > > >> and Education and Experience and Nature - > > > > >> and again of course in Art as Experience > > > > >> (notice he is not saying how Art enters > > > > >> into experience but how art is experience > > > > >> - I have come to notice these little > > > > >> things more and more in his writing). > > > > >> > > > > >> The difficulty we have, at least in the > > > > >> United States because of the dominance of > > > > >> the idea of meta-cognition, is that we too > > > > >> often translate what individuals are > > > > >> bringing in to experience to organize it > > > > >> as a form of meta-cognition. It is kind > > > > >> of possible to make that interpretation > > > > >> from Democracy and Education, although > > > > >> what I think he is doing more is arguing > > > > >> against misinterpretations of his work as > > > > >> random, child centered activities. I > > > > >> think he is clearer in Experience and > > > > >> Nature that we bring in who we are at the > > > > >> moment into the activity, and use who we > > > > >> are (I don't want to say identity) as an > > > > >> organizing principle for what we do. It > > > > >> is perhaps one of the places where Dewey > > > > >> and Vygotsky are close. Perhaps I can use > > > > >> the same Jackson Pollock example. The > > > > >> first few times I saw his paintings I was > > > > >> trying to "apprecitate" them because I was > > > > >> told that was the best way to experience > > > > >> them. Dewey says no vital experience > > > > >> there because my activities become stilted > > > > >> and artificia > > > > >> l. Sometimes I went through the > > > > >> museum and just looked at pictures, one to > > > > >> the other. No vital experience there, > > > > >> just random threads. But that time I had > > > > >> the experience with the paintings I was > > > > >> allowing who I was, what had been built up > > > > >> in the trajectory of my life to enter into > > > > >> my experience with the painting, making it > > > > >> a vital experience. I think Dewey makes > > > > >> the argument in Experience and Nature that > > > > >> it is not just the experience the moment > > > > >> before, but the experiences leading to > > > > >> that experience, the context of my life, > > > > >> of my parent's life, of a long line of > > > > >> historical experiences. > > > > >> > > > > >> Anyway, my take. > > > > >> > > > > >> Michael > > > > >> > > > > >> - > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> -- > > > > >> Beth Ferholt > > > > >> Assistant Professor > > > > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > > > >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > > > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue > > > > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > > >> > > > > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu> > > > > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > > > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > Storch, > > > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Beth Ferholt > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > 2900 Bedford Avenue > > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Beth Ferholt Assistant Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 20:20:02 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 12:20:02 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Provocative song In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It?s really ?The Tables Turned? again, isn?t it? Yet one of the most practical things that a teenager can learn in school is the intimate way in which knowledge that seems purely abstract is linked to everyday life. Like ?The Tables Turned?, the medium contradicts the message. The message is really an appeal for the concrete, the particular, and the real against knowledge which is abstract, general, and merely potential. And yet the medium is?rap lyrics, Youtube and the internet. Rap lyrics are full of abstractions. Just as an example, the list of ?practical? things we don?t learn in school that most purely abstract of all concepts, human rights. Youtube is completely general?that is what allows him to get tens of thousands of ?likes? and reach millions of people. And of course the programme he is pushing is mere potential, and the internet is not real at all: there is no such place. In the end, what he is really saying is just: "like this", "don't like that". Meh. Feh. David Kellogg On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:17 AM, Daniel Hyman wrote: > For those with a fondness for text, and with all appropriate incantations > to the gods of fair use: > > https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Boyinaband/Don-t-Stay-in-School > > As someone who loves being educated (no quotes) on virtually any topic, but > found the how-to knowledge offered to novice teachers (at least in New > York), falling short of what a practicing educator needs to know, I can > relate to the song's sense of painful unpreparedness, in my field. Not to > the sense that public schools must (or in some domains can) teach how to > make all personal moral choices, or that all subjects must be practical, > e.g. being a bank customer (and no "impractical" subjects, e.g. math, > underpin them), or that home life need not inculcate an interest in current > events, history, or politics. > > So to me, the song is easy to reject at first, but on reflection... > > On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 at 7:54 PM, Bill Kerr wrote: > > > Also, > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJIu7pE0lBA > > > > some of the core issues for discussion are identified there IMO > > > > Equal rights and democracy would have appeal to disempowered students but > > how can abstract maths be made more interesting, a more difficult > question. > > It may not be possible to make some very important stuff more > interesting. > > Marx complained about having to study the "economic shit". > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:11 AM, Lara Beaty wrote: > > > > > And here?s an interesting follow-up: > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCM4GEBDjz4. Thanks for this link! > > > Something to definitely use with my students to provoke a discussion. > > > > > > Best, > > > Lara > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jul 19, 2015, at 6:28 PM, David Preiss > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > > > > > Some may like this song, some others hate it. It sounds to me like a > > > worth > > > > expression of many things going wrong with contenporary schools > > > everywhere. > > > > I am glad to see this coming from the younger generation as adult > talk > > > > about education scarcely listen what kids and young have to say about > > > what > > > > is being done to them at school. (I don't support the final statement > > of > > > > the song, of course; still find the message in the bottle quite on > > > target). > > > > > > > > https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=w3cyYMyj2QM > > > > > > > > A bit of a renewed version of Pink Floyd's The Wall in a new genre. > > For > > > > those of you exploring new expresions, may be worth of your time. > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > From larabeaty@gmail.com Sun Jul 19 21:25:46 2015 From: larabeaty@gmail.com (Lara Beaty) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 00:25:46 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Provocative song In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <0C242B7B-1ACB-468B-9590-D5EE71F5955C@gmail.com> I would not venture a guess at what the musician?s initial intent was, but his explanations that emerged after overwhelming attention throughout the internet is an interesting development. As he said in the video Bill posted, there wouldn?t be a conversation if he titled the rap something less provocative. That at least one school has responded demonstrates both the possibility of individual and institutional development provoked by what might have just been viewed as yet another kid hating school. Best, Lara > On Jul 19, 2015, at 11:20 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > It?s really ?The Tables Turned? again, isn?t it? Yet one of the most > practical things that a teenager can learn in school is the intimate way in > which knowledge that seems purely abstract is linked to everyday life. Like > ?The Tables Turned?, the medium contradicts the message. The message is > really an appeal for the concrete, the particular, and the real against > knowledge which is abstract, general, and merely potential. And yet the > medium is?rap lyrics, Youtube and the internet. > > > Rap lyrics are full of abstractions. Just as an example, the list of > ?practical? things we don?t learn in school that most purely abstract of > all concepts, human rights. Youtube is completely general?that is what > allows him to get tens of thousands of ?likes? and reach millions of > people. And of course the programme he is pushing is mere potential, and > the internet is not real at all: there is no such place. In the end, what > he is really saying is just: "like this", "don't like that". > > > Meh. Feh. > > > David Kellogg > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:17 AM, Daniel Hyman > wrote: > >> For those with a fondness for text, and with all appropriate incantations >> to the gods of fair use: >> >> https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Boyinaband/Don-t-Stay-in-School >> >> As someone who loves being educated (no quotes) on virtually any topic, but >> found the how-to knowledge offered to novice teachers (at least in New >> York), falling short of what a practicing educator needs to know, I can >> relate to the song's sense of painful unpreparedness, in my field. Not to >> the sense that public schools must (or in some domains can) teach how to >> make all personal moral choices, or that all subjects must be practical, >> e.g. being a bank customer (and no "impractical" subjects, e.g. math, >> underpin them), or that home life need not inculcate an interest in current >> events, history, or politics. >> >> So to me, the song is easy to reject at first, but on reflection... >> >> On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 at 7:54 PM, Bill Kerr wrote: >> >>> Also, >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJIu7pE0lBA >>> >>> some of the core issues for discussion are identified there IMO >>> >>> Equal rights and democracy would have appeal to disempowered students but >>> how can abstract maths be made more interesting, a more difficult >> question. >>> It may not be possible to make some very important stuff more >> interesting. >>> Marx complained about having to study the "economic shit". >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:11 AM, Lara Beaty wrote: >>> >>>> And here?s an interesting follow-up: >>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCM4GEBDjz4. Thanks for this link! >>>> Something to definitely use with my students to provoke a discussion. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Lara >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jul 19, 2015, at 6:28 PM, David Preiss >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear colleagues, >>>>> >>>>> Some may like this song, some others hate it. It sounds to me like a >>>> worth >>>>> expression of many things going wrong with contenporary schools >>>> everywhere. >>>>> I am glad to see this coming from the younger generation as adult >> talk >>>>> about education scarcely listen what kids and young have to say about >>>> what >>>>> is being done to them at school. (I don't support the final statement >>> of >>>>> the song, of course; still find the message in the bottle quite on >>>> target). >>>>> >>>>> https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=w3cyYMyj2QM >>>>> >>>>> A bit of a renewed version of Pink Floyd's The Wall in a new genre. >>> For >>>>> those of you exploring new expresions, may be worth of your time. >>>>> >>>>> David >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 20 04:00:20 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 21:00:20 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> Message-ID: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of cooperation despite consensus"? p. 131, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > Are we allowed to ask questions about our paper as well? I hope so! > > For a little context -in our paper, we identified particular kinds of > episodes in which participants from different disciplines seek coherence > and continuity of shared representations through bodily action. These > actions include gesture, movement and physical performance linking the > present material artifacts to objects of design. Most of these episodes > seem to involve some form of improvisation, resourcefulness or creativity, > and I'm not fully sure how to characterize these aspects of the > interactions. In most cases, the participants seem to be searching for the > best words or material representation to convey a particular intention - > when this becomes problematic or limiting - they almost fall back on what > is available - these improvised bodily performances - as a way of > maintaining continuity, and of inviting co-participants into a shared and > imagined space. These bodily actions don't seem to begin the proposals, but > are in a sense *discovered* by the participants. > > I think there is something really fascinating about this kind of creativity > and resourcefulness in interaction that could be explored more deeply - and > that I'm having trouble articulating. Maybe some of you have some thoughts > on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked about this a bit before so maybe you > can add a little clarity to my question. > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Alfredo, >> Thank you very much for the sketch of your roots. I taught English in >> Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in the early 70s, just before >> Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the plane back to the U.S.) Place >> and language are interesting, especially where language varieties meet. >> Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity with the music of Catalunya >> and Mallorca that the speech communities in each of those places treasure >> their unique languages (Catalan and Mallorquin), yet see a commonality >> vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian Spanish, the national language >> of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel between your work on boundary >> objects, where individual persons collaborate to create spaces, AND >> boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of people who live in real spaces. >> I am thinking, among other things, of indigeneity, a big topic here in New >> Mexico, with so many Native Americans. Assymetries of power. Bullying. >> Testing and curriculum become instruments of war by other means. I hope my >> tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the optimism created by this >> thread. Yet I think that optimism is so precious because of the ground (the >> world) of the dialog. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >>> Well, you could say that I am partly Catalan. I grew up in the province >> of Valencia, where Catalan language is official language together with >> Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the county) and Catalonia are >> different regional counties, Catalan is spoken in Catalonia, Valencia, and >> the Balear Islands. Some call the three together as the Catalan Countries. >> I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy cultural diversity. >>> Standardized testing, and the whole assumptions behind it, are an issue >> also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education has been so battered during >> the last years of right-wing government that I the debate have been more >> about means and access than about contents and aims. Which in some sense >> may be good because it moves the debates away from performance. But I have >> been living outside of Spain for eight years now, so I am not the best to >> update you on this either. >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Yes, you have answered my question very nicely! I especially appreciate >> that you were willing to wrestle with my question, despite your lack of >> familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. Am I wrong, or are you >> Catalan? In which case your experience in Catalunya would take you to a >> different place in critiquing schooling there, though not necessarily >> unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on boundary objects. I just met for >> the second day in a row with a friend who is the liaison between our public >> school district and a children?s science museum called Explora. I feel like >> I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a mixed metaphor! >>> Henry >>> >>> >>>> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >>>> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very familiar with high-stakes >> standardized testing (as different to standardized testing in general) or >> with common core (which I quickly read is an issue in US). But I would say >> that, if (school) curricula were to be consistent with the view of >> education as the practice of creating conditions for certain attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge--which is what I was suggesting in the paragraph you >> copy--curricula would not be so much about standardized contents, but about >> human sensitivities and relations. So, I would say, no, standardized >> testing is not in principle in line with what I was trying to say. >>>> I was trying to make a distinction between trying to design someone's >> particular experience, and trying to design conditions for the development >> of attitudes and orientations. The first is likely impossible. The second >> seems to make more sense. >>>> One may of course wonder whether those attitudes and orientations can >> be considered general, and then form part of standardize measures instead >> of the traditional "contents and skills". But measuring assumes some >> quantitative increment in a particular aspect as the result of learning. >> Growth and development, however, are about qualitative change. So, as soon >> as you start measuring you would be missing growth and development. So, >> again, no. I would not say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line >> with what I was trying to say. >>>> I hope I have answered your question, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Alfredo, you say: >>>> >>>> "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular >> situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot >> intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the >> students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the >> conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." >>>> Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with >> your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >>>>> Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that >> designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. I >> see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things >> done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for >> place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >> what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial >> features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining >> others. >>>>> I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction >> problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of study is >> experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more correct >> way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and >> negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual >> and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances and >> constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me wonder >> whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," >> might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions >> become entangled into particular trajectories. >>>>> In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study >> indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus >> prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry >> into design work. >>>>> Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here >> has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can be >> expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At the >> level of generic social processes, and given a particular >> cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some >> generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that more >> or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim at >> determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said about >> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the >> content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to >> create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Glassman, Michael >>>>> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>>> >>>>> I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences >> between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described the >> designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It was a >> long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I >> remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The painting, >> I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. The >> lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in >> many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light (there >> was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings >> were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on >> three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered restraints >> - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was >> impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one >> time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social >> interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson >> Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that viewers >> would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints that >> canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really had >> only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I >> had done every previous time coming upon them. >>>>> The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the >> nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my >> abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not be >> designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to >> happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there was >> also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his >> water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it was >> large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you went >> somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an >> obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water >> lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of >> the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was >> actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer >> anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the >> lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the >> perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and space. >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Thanks Michael, >>>>> >>>>> I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or >> less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he used >> the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that moves >> the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the >> case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the >> energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context within >> which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is in >> that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not intend >> the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were >> connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the sum >> of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his >> inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. >>>>> But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they >> relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very much the >> notion of ecology to address these issues. >>>>> If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), >> you suggest the possibility that the relations between design intentions >> and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? >> That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot design >> for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a >> similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on >> general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular >> (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road to >> consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. >>>>> Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can >> design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one >> presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in actual >> experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how >> the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at the >> same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for >> cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as >> asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, >> texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an >> affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you are >> within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in the >> road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that >> carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its >> environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite the >> possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long >> enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your >> position here better. >>>>> Thanks! >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Glassman, Michael >>>>> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>>> >>>>> I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson >> along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original Sears >> conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when you >> have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... >>>>> I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more >> physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace the >> pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. I >> think his larger point is that everything has a response within the larger >> feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as >> MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a >> system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. >>>>> This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed >> into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are >> taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to >> cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also >> likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, an >> attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in >> terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some >> way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are >> taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will >> take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the >> larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no >> assumption about trajectory. >>>>> I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an >> interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do certain >> things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you want >> light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we are >> more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is >> very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that >> even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking >> about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept of >> transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to create >> a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. >> But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on >> needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for these >> discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of his >> life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). >>>>> I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but >> about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are >> constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your direction >> has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But the >> mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the >> individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action is >> important, but limited. >>>>> The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it >> seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an individual's >> and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's journey. >> But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think >> Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are >> saying Alfredo. >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM >>>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not >> affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints presupposed >> by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask whether >> museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. >>>>> What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the >> Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being >> somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be >> INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those >> who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee >> what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. >>>>> I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue >> with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical >> relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >> noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not >> the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He noticed >> that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of physics) >> transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and we >> can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will take >> based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. In >> living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a >> pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of >> the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, >> at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a >> different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of >> mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not >> direct, but mediated. >>>>> So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and >> Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, and >> we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, and >> that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social >> relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster >> social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, >> without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, >> but not about how to interpret something, but about going about >> interpreting. I think. >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Glassman, Michael >>>>> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 >>>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning >> to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple with, >> especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not >> understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both >> as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in >> the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived >> affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has >> potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment >> (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, meaning >> those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the >> historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with >> the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, >> but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the needs >> of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization >> and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this >> point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own >> meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a >> potential trails for others. >>>>> An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I >> used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in large >> part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit the >> Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful to >> me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and >> unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same >> paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional punch >> - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and fear >> to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have >> planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through the >> museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing might >> have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization >> perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture >> also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one that >> included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. >>>>> Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as >> perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of perceived >> affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in my >> need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting a >> general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, >> to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want to >> eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at >> that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the >> article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for >> perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking this >> because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. >> The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as >> recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen >> many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the >> Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a >> museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. >>>>> Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan >> Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I >> spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, so >> that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to constrain >> your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school of >> art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits here >> as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to certain >> types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of >> food). >>>>> Okay, too much I know. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Rolf Steier >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM >>>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Thank you for your thoughts Larry, >>>>> >>>>> I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I >> think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared >> meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star >> might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes the >> task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 from >> our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to the >> researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual field. >>>>> The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing >> gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. The >> curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same table >> to be able to share his vision for the gallery. >>>>> This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( >>>>> *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the >> facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design catches >> the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for the >> ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down >> to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling >> into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are >> designing breakfast."* >>>>> There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative >> orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations of >> sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the >> workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same way >> that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the meeting. >> That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity for >> their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the >> exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, sketches >> and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task >> of imagining the future exhibition. >>>>> Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or >> the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this is >> difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the >> place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place and >> meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place >>>>> potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm >> only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to disagree! >>>>> Rolf >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < >> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >>>>>> >>>>>> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks >>>>>> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an >>>>>> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to the >>>>>> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. >>>>>> >>>>>> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort >>>>>> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part >> of "an" >>>>>> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence >>>>>> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about >>>>>> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some >>>>>> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as >>>>>> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, >>>>>> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be >>>>>> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, >>>>>> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us >>>>>> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing we >>>>>> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations >> versus actions. >>>>>> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and >>>>>> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be >>>>>> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed >>>>>> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hope this helps >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >>>>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >>>>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you Alfredo, >>>>>> >>>>>> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for >>>>>> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. >>>>>> >>>>>> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the >>>>>> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what >>>>>> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in >>>>>> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place in >>>>>> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and >>>>>> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for the >>>>>> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of >>>>>> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How >>>>>> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? >>>>>> >>>>>> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the >>>>>> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? >>>>>> >>>>>> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and >>>>>> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best wishes, >>>>>> >>>>>> Lubomir >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM >>>>>> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> Dear Lubomir, >>>>>> >>>>>> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been >>>>>> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, >>>>>> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called >>>>>> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a >>>>>> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the paper, >>>>>> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand >> it. >>>>>> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of >>>>>> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly >>>>>> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about >>>>>> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of >>>>>> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing >>>>>> Cresswell about >>>>>> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". >>>>>> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that >>>>>> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in an >>>>>> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming involved, >>>>>> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents >>>>>> going on in a given situation. >>>>>> >>>>>> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between space >>>>>> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being >>>>>> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, >>>>>> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place >>>>>> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not >>>>>> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a >> perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 >>>>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo >> Jornet >>>>>> Gil >>>>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, >>>>>> >>>>>> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? >>>>>> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of >>>>>> different ways; it is just mindboggling. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>> >>>>>> Lubomir >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Steier >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM >>>>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >>>>>> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> Hello All, >>>>>> >>>>>> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, >>>>>> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our text. >>>>>> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our >>>>>> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings >>>>>> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely >>>>>> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance >>>>>> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the >>>>>> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design work >>>>>> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place >>>>>> as the participants construct representations and begin to >>>>>> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these >>>>>> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together - >>>>>> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm looking forward to the discussion! >>>>>> Rolf >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Mike and all, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to >>>>>>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try >>>>>>> to say a bit about the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a >>>>>>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of >>>>>>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we >>>>>>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective >>>>>>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more >>>>>>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together >>>>>>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The design meetings involved many participants from different >>>>>>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software >>>>>>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance >>>>>>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the >>>>>>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a >>>>>>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one >>>>>>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, >>>>>>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in >>>>>>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space >>>>>>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design >>>>>>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had >>>>>>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve >>>>>>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have >>>>>>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the >>>>>>> figure of Leigh Star begun to >>>>>> be relevant. >>>>>>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the >>>>>>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our >>>>>>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of >>>>>>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than >>>>>>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the >>>>>>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform >>>>>>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). >>>>>>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to >>>>>>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a >>>>>>> place and finding one's ways >>>>>> around it. >>>>>>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective >>>>>>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun >>>>>>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to >>>>>>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was >>>>>>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, >>>>>>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different >> frameworks. >>>>>>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for >>>>>>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward >>>>>>> to >>>>>> learn a lot from them. >>>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike >>>>>>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 >>>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time >>>>>>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of >>>>>>> boundary objects. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, to start the discussion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think >>>>>>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The >>>>>>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming >>>>>>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in >>>>>>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have >>>>>>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an >>>>>>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary >> object. >>>>>>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of >> imagination" >>>>>>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two >>>>>>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create >> them. >>>>>>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, >>>>>>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the >>>>>>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the >>>>>> processes involved. >>>>>>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> PS-- >>>>>>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>>>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > From rolfsteier@gmail.com Mon Jul 20 04:42:48 2015 From: rolfsteier@gmail.com (Rolf Steier) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 13:42:48 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> References: <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy - Good catch! I believe that is a typo and should read "despite a LACK of consensus". Thank you for pointing that out. I also wanted to follow up on a suggestion that Greg made in the other thread suggesting we look at David McNeill's work. I had only been familiar with his earlier work on gesture, but after doing a bit of reading over the weekend, I found his concept of 'unexpected metaphors' potentially useful in dealing with some of my questions.( http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf ) Here is a relevant quote describing unexpected metaphors as a form of gesture: > *The logic is that unexpected metaphors arise from the need to create > images when the culture does not have them readily at hand. These images > join linguistic content as growth points and differentiate what Vygotsky > (1987) called psychological predicates, or points of contrast in the > immediate ongoing context of speaking. Unexpected metaphors, precisely > because they are outside the conventions of language and culture, can > capture abstractions in novel ways and provide the fluidity of thought and > language that is the essence of ongoing discourse.* On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of cooperation despite > consensus"? > p. 131, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >> Are we allowed to ask questions about our paper as well? I hope so! >> >> For a little context -in our paper, we identified particular kinds of >> episodes in which participants from different disciplines seek coherence >> and continuity of shared representations through bodily action. These >> actions include gesture, movement and physical performance linking the >> present material artifacts to objects of design. Most of these episodes >> seem to involve some form of improvisation, resourcefulness or creativity, >> and I'm not fully sure how to characterize these aspects of the >> interactions. In most cases, the participants seem to be searching for the >> best words or material representation to convey a particular intention - >> when this becomes problematic or limiting - they almost fall back on what >> is available - these improvised bodily performances - as a way of >> maintaining continuity, and of inviting co-participants into a shared and >> imagined space. These bodily actions don't seem to begin the proposals, >> but >> are in a sense *discovered* by the participants. >> >> >> I think there is something really fascinating about this kind of >> creativity >> and resourcefulness in interaction that could be explored more deeply - >> and >> that I'm having trouble articulating. Maybe some of you have some thoughts >> on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked about this a bit before so maybe >> you >> can add a little clarity to my question. >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >> >> Alfredo, >>> Thank you very much for the sketch of your roots. I taught English in >>> Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in the early 70s, just before >>> Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the plane back to the U.S.) Place >>> and language are interesting, especially where language varieties meet. >>> Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity with the music of Catalunya >>> and Mallorca that the speech communities in each of those places treasure >>> their unique languages (Catalan and Mallorquin), yet see a commonality >>> vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian Spanish, the national >>> language >>> of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel between your work on boundary >>> objects, where individual persons collaborate to create spaces, AND >>> boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of people who live in real >>> spaces. >>> I am thinking, among other things, of indigeneity, a big topic here in >>> New >>> Mexico, with so many Native Americans. Assymetries of power. Bullying. >>> Testing and curriculum become instruments of war by other means. I hope >>> my >>> tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the optimism created by this >>> thread. Yet I think that optimism is so precious because of the ground >>> (the >>> world) of the dialog. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Well, you could say that I am partly Catalan. I grew up in the province >>>> >>> of Valencia, where Catalan language is official language together with >>> Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the county) and Catalonia are >>> different regional counties, Catalan is spoken in Catalonia, Valencia, >>> and >>> the Balear Islands. Some call the three together as the Catalan >>> Countries. >>> I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy cultural diversity. >>> >>>> Standardized testing, and the whole assumptions behind it, are an issue >>>> >>> also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education has been so battered during >>> the last years of right-wing government that I the debate have been more >>> about means and access than about contents and aims. Which in some sense >>> may be good because it moves the debates away from performance. But I >>> have >>> been living outside of Spain for eight years now, so I am not the best to >>> update you on this either. >>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>> on behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Alfredo, >>>> Yes, you have answered my question very nicely! I especially appreciate >>>> >>> that you were willing to wrestle with my question, despite your lack of >>> familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. Am I wrong, or are you >>> Catalan? In which case your experience in Catalunya would take you to a >>> different place in critiquing schooling there, though not necessarily >>> unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on boundary objects. I just met for >>> the second day in a row with a friend who is the liaison between our >>> public >>> school district and a children?s science museum called Explora. I feel >>> like >>> I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a mixed metaphor! >>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very familiar with high-stakes >>>>> >>>> standardized testing (as different to standardized testing in general) >>> or >>> with common core (which I quickly read is an issue in US). But I would >>> say >>> that, if (school) curricula were to be consistent with the view of >>> education as the practice of creating conditions for certain attitudes >>> and >>> dispositions to emerge--which is what I was suggesting in the paragraph >>> you >>> copy--curricula would not be so much about standardized contents, but >>> about >>> human sensitivities and relations. So, I would say, no, standardized >>> testing is not in principle in line with what I was trying to say. >>> >>>> I was trying to make a distinction between trying to design someone's >>>>> >>>> particular experience, and trying to design conditions for the >>> development >>> of attitudes and orientations. The first is likely impossible. The second >>> seems to make more sense. >>> >>>> One may of course wonder whether those attitudes and orientations can >>>>> >>>> be considered general, and then form part of standardize measures >>> instead >>> of the traditional "contents and skills". But measuring assumes some >>> quantitative increment in a particular aspect as the result of learning. >>> Growth and development, however, are about qualitative change. So, as >>> soon >>> as you start measuring you would be missing growth and development. So, >>> again, no. I would not say that high-stakes standardized testing is in >>> line >>> with what I was trying to say. >>> >>>> I hope I have answered your question, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>> on behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo, you say: >>>>> >>>>> "However, we cannot aim at determining any particular >>>>> >>>> situation/experience. The same may be said about EDUCATION. We cannot >>> intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the content of the >>> students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try to create the >>> conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge." >>> >>>> Would you say that high-stakes standardized testing is in line with >>>>> >>>> your construal of curriculum design? How about common core? >>> >>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks a lot for the clarifications. I see now why it may be said that >>>>>> >>>>> designers can aim at designing for constrains but not for affordances. >>> I >>> see that this way of talking is part of a designers' way to get things >>> done, and that it may indeed be an effective way to design for >>> place-making, as in the example that Michael gives of MOMA. Indeed, much >>> of >>> what we report in our study is about designers talking about how spatial >>> features might afford some experiences in the museum while constraining >>> others. >>> >>>> I must admit, however, that I still consider the distinction >>>>>> >>>>> problematic from an analytical perspective whenever our object of >>> study is >>> experience, situated action, or design as situated practice. A more >>> correct >>> way to talk is that affordances and constrains are the positive and >>> negative sides/interpretations of a single unitary category. As an actual >>> and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem implies both affordances >>> and >>> constrains at the same time, whether intended or not. Which makes me >>> wonder >>> whether other terminology, such as Ingold's notion of "correspondence," >>> might be more appropriated when we talk about how materials and actions >>> become entangled into particular trajectories. >>> >>>> In any case, and as Rolf emphasizes, what the designers in our study >>>>>> >>>>> indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the museum. Imagination versus >>> prediction may be an interesting topic emerging here for further inquiry >>> into design work. >>> >>>> Another important (and related) issue that I think is emerging here >>>>>> >>>>> has to do with the level of generality at which design intentions can >>> be >>> expected to work (just as Bateson argued with regard to prediction). At >>> the >>> level of generic social processes, and given a particular >>> cultural-historical background, we as designers may try to make some >>> generic situations more likely to occur than others (facilitating that >>> more >>> or less people end up together in a given place). However, we cannot aim >>> at >>> determining any particular situation/experience. The same may be said >>> about >>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the curriculum and make it the >>> content of the students' experience in the way we intend. But we can try >>> to >>> create the conditions for certain attitudes and dispositions to emerge. >>> >>>> Alfredo >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>> on behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>>> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Rolf may have addressed the question of the differences >>>>>> >>>>> between affordances and constraints in his post. The way he described >>> the >>> designers as possibly setting up the corner with Pollock at MOMA. It >>> was a >>> long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the way it was or the way I >>> remember it, but let's just believe this is the way it was. The >>> painting, >>> I think there were three were set up in a corner off a main corridor. >>> The >>> lighting was dark, which if you have ever been to MOMA is different, in >>> many other parts of the museum there is a good deal of natural light >>> (there >>> was this great fountain, I wonder if it is still there). The paintings >>> were on tripods rather than hung on the walls and they were surrounded on >>> three sides by walls. All of these I think would be considered >>> restraints >>> - pushing me in to the works rather than stepping back away. It was >>> impossible for more than two or three people to view the paintings at one >>> time and movement was limited, so there were fewer chances for social >>> interactions (you were not going to pick up anybody looking at Jackson >>> Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making it more likely that >>> viewers >>> would move towards internal reflection. All of these were constraints >>> that >>> canalized perspectives and feelings viewing the paintings. You really >>> had >>> only two choices, you moved in to the paintings or you moved on, which I >>> had done every previous time coming upon them. >>> >>>> The painting itself though became an affordances, an object at the >>>>>> >>>>> nexus of my journey through the museum, where I was in my life, and my >>> abilities to perceive the painitings. This was something that could not >>> be >>> designed I think because nobody could think that moment was going to >>> happen. So then what is a perceived affordance. Way back when there >>> was >>> also a Manet room. It was a round room with different variations of his >>> water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact opposite in constraints it >>> was >>> large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you were looking to brood you >>> went >>> somewhere else. In the middle of the room was a wooden structure (not an >>> obvious bench), but you realized as random colors dissolved into water >>> lilies that you wanted to sit down. You naturally moved to the center of >>> the room and sat (wondering if a guard would come and tell you it was >>> actually an important piece of art and you should get off). The designer >>> anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to almost get dizzy in the >>> lights, and included in the design the piece of wood that will have the >>> perceived affordance for sitting, changing your concept of time and >>> space. >>> >>>> Michael >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Alfredo >>> >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks Michael, >>>>>> >>>>>> I think we are saying the same things, indeed, or at least more or >>>>>> >>>>> less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred to energy, and that he >>> used >>> the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to show how the energy that >>> moves >>> the pig is not a direct transfer of energy from the kick, whereas in the >>> case of the billiard balls, the movement of one ball is caused by the >>> energy that the kicking ball brings. I might be wrong in the context >>> within >>> which Bateson was discussing the example, and I see that your account is >>> in >>> that regard is more accurate. But the point is the same: you can not >>> intend >>> the outcomes of a system by addressing only its parts as if they were >>> connected directly, in a linear causal fashion; as if the whole was the >>> sum >>> of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's rejection of S-R and his >>> inclusion of a third element that transforms the whole system. >>> >>>> But I totally agree with your comments on design intentions as they >>>>>> >>>>> relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf does, also like very >>> much the >>> notion of ecology to address these issues. >>> >>>> If I read you correctly, and citing Don Norman (whose work I ignore), >>>>>> >>>>> you suggest the possibility that the relations between design >>> intentions >>> and actual experience could be thought of in terms of different levels? >>> That one thing is to design for what is general, but that we cannot >>> design >>> for the particular. Is that right? If so, I think that Bateson had a >>> similar argument on prediction, does not him? That we can predict on >>> general levels (e.g. population), but not at the level of the particular >>> (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, but seems a promising road >>> to >>> consider this jumps between levels of generality or scales. >>> >>>> Finally, I am not sure if I get what you mean when you say that we can >>>>>> >>>>> design for constrains but not for affordances. I still see that the one >>> presupposes the other; you can separate them in talk, but, to me, in >>> actual >>> experience, a constrain is an affordance and vice-versa. I don't see how >>> the road has any inherent constrain that could not be an affordance at >>> the >>> same time. Of course, if you take the normative stance that roads are for >>> cars driving through them, you may be right. But if we think of roads as >>> asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only of a different shape, >>> texture, and color, how is that a constrain but not an affordance? Or an >>> affordance but not a constrain? Of course, culture constrains once you >>> are >>> within the road and you are driving. But then, the constrain is not in >>> the >>> road, as you seem to suggest, but in the journey; in the journeyman that >>> carries some cultural way of orienting and affectively relating to its >>> environment so that particular constrains are taken for granted despite >>> the >>> possibility of being otherwise. But I might not have thought it well/long >>> enough and of course I might be wrong. I would like to understand your >>> position here better. >>> >>>> Thanks! >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>> on behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>>> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading Bateson through a cybernetics lens lately (Bateson >>>>>> >>>>> along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead were part of the original >>> Sears >>> conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or I am victim to the "when >>> you >>> have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" but.... >>> >>>> I think Bateson was arguing with those looking to apply the more >>>>>> >>>>> physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics to human or really (pace >>> the >>> pig story) and system that moves beyond simple physical feedback loops. >>> I >>> think his larger point is that everything has a response within the >>> larger >>> feedback system that exists but we cannot go - what Bateson refers to as >>> MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback loops, to try and design a >>> system for specific types of feedback is a dangerous proposition. >>> >>>> This I think is the reason that affordances really can't be designed >>>>>> >>>>> into an ecology, only a recognition of the context in which actions are >>> taking place (and I say this having no idea what Gibson's relationship to >>> cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of the girl it is perhaps also >>> likely that the girl could have taken the fixing of hair as a criticism, >>> an >>> attack, and it might have destroyed her confidence. Both make sense in >>> terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So if a designer does in some >>> way design that experience into the action, even without meaning they are >>> taking a large chance, because they do not know the trajectory it will >>> take. We simply need objects that are part of our journey, part of the >>> larger context but not designed for purpose, for feedback. There is no >>> assumption about trajectory. >>> >>>> I think Don Norman sort of muddied the waters on this, but in an >>>>>> >>>>> interesting way. That we can assume people are going to want to do >>> certain >>> things in a very general environment - when you enter a dark room you >>> want >>> light, so it is possible to design objects that meet that need that we >>> are >>> more likely to find in the moment that we need them. But I think that is >>> very different from the idea of specifically guiding feedback loops that >>> even take generalized experience in a certain direction. I am thinking >>> about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument to Bateson with his concept >>> of >>> transactions. Although he does seem to think that it is possible to >>> create >>> a larger field of action so we can see at least local interrelationships. >>> But his idea of experience is also very much one of discovery based on >>> needs at the immediate moment - social relations act as a vehicle for >>> these >>> discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing before Gibson and for most of >>> his >>> life before cybernetics. I also wonder what he thought of cybernetics). >>> >>>> I think I disagree with you, constraints are not about the journey but >>>>>> >>>>> about the road. If you build a road on the side of the river you are >>> constrained because no matter what, you cannot turn right. Your >>> direction >>> has already been partially determined by the designer of the road. But >>> the >>> mistake we make is in thinking that also controls the trajectory of the >>> individual's journey. The effect of designers on trajectories of action >>> is >>> important, but limited. >>> >>>> The primary place that designers have influence on affordances it >>>>>> >>>>> seems to me is by being able to create a unique context for an >>> individual's >>> and a group's that limit possible trajectories on an individual's >>> journey. >>> But we should never mistake those constraints for affordances. I think >>> Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. Perhaps this is what you are >>> saying Alfredo. >>> >>>> Michael >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> On >>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 12:38 PM >>>>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> I'd like to follow up on Michael's post by asking a question: Are not >>>>>> >>>>> affordances presupposed by constraints and are not constraints >>> presupposed >>> by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether it makes sense to ask >>> whether >>> museums should be designed for affordances and constraints. >>> >>>> What I think is clear from the anecdote that you bring about the >>>>>> >>>>> Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>> somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in some place) cannot be >>> INTENDED. And I think this applies both to designers and users, to those >>> who set things up for you to experience and to you, who could not foresee >>> what your experience was going to turn you into before you go through it. >>> >>>> I think that the big issue that you bring on the table (to continue >>>>>> >>>>> with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a difference between physical >>> relations and social relations, and the idea of MEDIATION. Gregory >>> Bateson >>> noticed that the relations that are the subject matter in physics are not >>> the same as those that are the subject matter in communication. He >>> noticed >>> that physical relations (relations that are the object of study of >>> physics) >>> transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard ball hits another ball and >>> we >>> can anticipate the exact speed and direction that the second ball will >>> take >>> based on the energy that is in the system ball + ball + someone hitting. >>> In >>> living beings, the things are different. Bateson explained, if we kick a >>> pig's ass (I think he used this somehow bizarre example) the reaction of >>> the pig is not accounted for by the energy that is contained in the kick, >>> at least not in a direct manner. The energy that moves the pig is from a >>> different source. Before Bateson, it was Vygotsky and his notion of >>> mediation who would most clearly state that social relations are not >>> direct, but mediated. >>> >>>> So, how can design go about this? If we, along with Dewey and >>>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of person and environment, >>> and >>> we assume as well that this is a social (not just individual) category, >>> and >>> that how a situation is experienced is also refracted through the social >>> relations within which we engage, the most designers can do is to foster >>> social relations go on, giving afordances to prcesses of signification, >>> without intending to embed meanings. It is about affordances/constraints, >>> but not about how to interpret something, but about going about >>> interpreting. I think. >>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>> on behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>>> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 >>>>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> So after reading the article and the e-mail discussion I'm beginning >>>>>> >>>>> to think there is a really big issue here that I am trying to grapple >>> with, >>> especially in terms of boundary objects (which I admittedly do not >>> understand very well). And it relates to the metaphor of the table (both >>> as discussed by Larry and Ingold as interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in >>> the museum should the place be set up as affordances, perceived >>> affordances, or constraints? It seems the museum in the study has >>> potential affordances for the users. The cultural historical moment >>> (unable to think of any other word) of the museum sets the context, >>> meaning >>> those walking through the museum are going to be restricted by the >>> historical and cultural boundaries leading up to the art work, along with >>> the expectations and needs of the individuals moving through the museum, >>> but they will come across objects/artifacts that they think meets the >>> needs >>> of their particular journeys. The posing becomes both an internalization >>> and externalization of the thinking (or are they one continuum at this >>> point?) in which they both make sense of the object in terms of their own >>> meaning and needs and also try and communicate what they found, leaving a >>> potential trails for others. >>> >>>> An example that has stayed with me for years. Living in New York I >>>>>> >>>>> used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a semi-regular basis (in >>> large >>> part to try and meet women, always unsuccessful). I would often visit >>> the >>> Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it would always be meaningful >>> to >>> me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon after graduating college and >>> unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever been I viewed the same >>> paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense to me, a deep emotional >>> punch >>> - the paintings became objects that could bridge my rage, sadness and >>> fear >>> to the next moment in my life. There is no way a designer could have >>> planned this affordance. It was based on the movement not just through >>> the >>> museum but my life. I think back to what my gestures, or even posing >>> might >>> have been at that moment. A slumping in to myself, an internalization >>> perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of rage. But perhaps a posture >>> also that said stay away. The place I created in that moment was one >>> that >>> included me and whatever demons Jackson Pollock fought with. >>> >>>> Or should museums should be designed for what Don Norman refers to as >>>>>> >>>>> perceived affordances? The table that is set up can be one of >>> perceived >>> affordances. What I grab for the spoon because its shape makes sense in >>> my >>> need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes from cultural history setting >>> a >>> general context - Jackson Pollock is a sanctioned way to bridge emotions, >>> to actually setting the trajectory of the act. I sit at a table, I want >>> to >>> eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule systems, I know what I need at >>> that moment and look for objects that fit my needs. Is the room in the >>> article about perceived affordances. Should the museum be designed for >>> perceived affordances. A person coming upon an object may be thinking >>> this >>> because of what it means in our society to be walking through a museum. >>> The object offers an opportunity to make communicative gestures, such as >>> recreating the posture of The Thinker the authors refer to. I have seen >>> many shows, movies where this happens, from movies from the 1940s to the >>> Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we do with art objects in a >>> museum, we gesture to both understand and communicate. >>> >>>> Or should museums be designed as constraints. In the Metropolitan >>>>>> >>>>> Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric places but that's where I >>> spent most of my museum life) the rooms are set up very, very carefully, >>> so >>> that in many ways the objects (at least are meant to I think) to >>> constrain >>> your thinking, so that you are responding to a certain period or school >>> of >>> art, understanding how it all fits together. The table metaphor fits >>> here >>> as well I think. Does the table constrain our actions, limiting to >>> certain >>> types of behavior (use only certain types of forks for certain types of >>> food). >>> >>>> Okay, too much I know. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> On >>> Behalf Of Rolf Steier >>> >>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM >>>>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >>>>>> >>>>> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you for your thoughts Larry, >>>>>> >>>>>> I wanted to pick up on your suggestion of the table metaphor because I >>>>>> >>>>> think that's really interesting. I believe you are proposing the shared >>> meal as analogous to the kind of orientation work (or perhaps Leigh Star >>> might consider this translation or pre-translation work?) that precedes >>> the >>> task at hand (in the case of our study, the task is design). Excerpt 3 >>> from >>> our study might be relevant here, when in turn 6, the curator turns to >>> the >>> researcher, leans in, and points in order to create a shared visual >>> field. >>> >>>> The curator and the researcher can now orient towards the existing >>>>>> >>>>> gallery in order to imagine future, possible changes in the gallery. >>> The >>> curator is in a sense extending an invitation to sit down at the same >>> table >>> to be able to share his vision for the gallery. >>> >>>> This shared meal might of course also be considered designed. Ingold ( >>>>>> *Making*) actually uses this same table metaphor to demonstrate the >>>>>> >>>>> facilitation of activity as an aspect of design - *"Everyday design >>> catches >>> the narrative and pins it down, establishing a kind of choreography for >>> the >>> ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed from the moment you sit down >>> to eat. In such a straightforward task as laying the table - in enrolling >>> into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug and cereal box - you are >>> designing breakfast."* >>> >>>> There is an improvisational quality to the bodily/performative >>>>>> >>>>> orientation work that is maybe not captured by the shared expectations >>> of >>> sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, we can also consider the >>> workspace of the multidisciplinary design team as designed in the same >>> way >>> that the meal is designed in order to support the objective of the >>> meeting. >>> That is, the, design team must first engage in a place-making activity >>> for >>> their collaborative setting in order to attend to the design of the >>> exhibition space. The designers set the table with a white board, >>> sketches >>> and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., before turning to the task >>> of imagining the future exhibition. >>> >>>> Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the placemakers -- the architects or >>>>>> >>>>> the USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces?" *I think this >>> is >>> difficult to answer because both architect and user play a role in the >>> place-making process. The architects embed possible meanings (if place >>> and >>> meaning are analogous than perhaps these might be considered 'place >>> >>>> potentials') that only emerge through the activity of the users. I'm >>>>>> >>>>> only thinking through this now, so feel free to elaborate or to >>> disagree! >>> >>>> Rolf >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < >>>>>> >>>>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On to your question, I am tempted to stretch a bit across frameworks >>>>>>> and answer that, the difference between the process of performing an >>>>>>> activity in space and developing a sense of place would be akin to >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> difference between an operation and an action as per Activity theory. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Again, we must be careful on the distinction between space as a sort >>>>>>> of objective geometrical coordinate, or space as not becoming a part >>>>>>> >>>>>> of "an" >>> >>>> experience (in Dewey's sense). In the first sense, the sentence >>>>>>> "performing an activity in space" makes only sense when talking about >>>>>>> geometrical practices, for example; one may think that in some >>>>>>> engineering practices, it is possible to orient to space as space, as >>>>>>> a coordinate. BUT still, the experience of being doing such practice, >>>>>>> if it has import to further development in the person, it must be >>>>>>> refracted through the person's experience; there must be involvement, >>>>>>> and therefore placemaking. In the second case, we might think of us >>>>>>> performing some activity within taking much of it, without noticing >>>>>>> we >>>>>>> are doing. It is in this sense that I do the bridge with operations >>>>>>> >>>>>> versus actions. >>> >>>> I would not have many problems in associating place with meaning and >>>>>>> placemaking with meaning-making, although I personally would be >>>>>>> careful if doing so, emphasizing the situational and distributed >>>>>>> nature of the process that placemaking attempts to capture. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hope this helps >>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>>>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >>>>>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>>> >>>>>> Activity >>> >>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you Alfredo, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> By the way, I should have started my mail with an appreciation for >>>>>>> your article and Mike's choice to bring it to our attention. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Now it is almost clear how you use the word and conceptualize the >>>>>>> phenomenon. I would respectfully ask you for a few more things: what >>>>>>> is the difference between the process of performing an activity in >>>>>>> space and developing a sense of place. I personally interpret place >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> terms of appropriation of space in the process of human activity and >>>>>>> the subsequent meaning making which has existential importance for >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> individual. The phenomenon of place is on par with the phenomenon of >>>>>>> meaning and placemaking is a process on par with meaning making. How >>>>>>> do you position yourself regarding such conceptualization? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On a similar note, who are the placemakers -- the architects or the >>>>>>> USERS of designed/created/socially produced spaces? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> By the way, I might be stretching too much the part on place and >>>>>>> distracting from other aspects of your wonderful article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best wishes, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Lubomir >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no] >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 4:31 PM >>>>>>> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>>> Activity >>>>>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear Lubomir, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> thanks for your questions. I agree that the notion of place has been >>>>>>> around in different forms during at least the last 20 years or so, >>>>>>> from geography with Tuan, technology with Dourish, to the so-called >>>>>>> place-based education. I must also admit that we did not work with a >>>>>>> carefully operationalized definition when using the term in the >>>>>>> paper, >>>>>>> but I can of course share my view on the issue and how I understand >>>>>>> >>>>>> it. >>> >>>> For me, as in most of the cases mentioned above, place is a way of >>>>>>> emphasizing the experiential in what comes to be socially or humanly >>>>>>> relevant. Most simply, and this most of you probably know, is about >>>>>>> the difference between a rationalistic, geometrical conception of >>>>>>> space versus a more phenomenological one. I read Streek (2010) citing >>>>>>> Cresswell about >>>>>>> place: "Place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved". >>>>>>> This is precisely what we aimed to emphasize in our paper, that >>>>>>> whatever practices were involved in getting things done together in >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> interdisciplinary group, they involved a process of becoming >>>>>>> involved, >>>>>>> experientially, emotionally, bodily, with the materials and currents >>>>>>> going on in a given situation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I also read Ingold (2011) warning against the difference between >>>>>>> space >>>>>>> and place in terms of space being a reality substance and place being >>>>>>> constituted by subsequent level of abstractions. In my view, >>>>>>> experience is not about abstraction, but about involvement. And place >>>>>>> is about space as it is refracted in intelligible experience; not >>>>>>> about an abstraction over an objective field, but more related to a >>>>>>> >>>>>> perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. >>> >>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>>>>> Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 >>>>>>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alfredo >>>>>>> >>>>>> Jornet >>> >>>> Gil >>>>>>> Cc: mike cole; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear Rolf and Alfredo, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is your definition for place? How is place different from space? >>>>>>> I ask because people use the words place and peacemaking in dozens of >>>>>>> different ways; it is just mindboggling. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Lubomir >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rolf >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Steier >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:44 PM >>>>>>> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; mike cole; >>>>>>> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hello All, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I also want to thank everyone for participating in this discussion, >>>>>>> and I'm looking forward to developing some of the ideas from our >>>>>>> text. >>>>>>> I think that Alfredo did a nice job of introducing the context of our >>>>>>> study, so I don't have much to add. The two aspects that Mike brings >>>>>>> up are also very much of interest to me, and I think quite closely >>>>>>> related. I think we treat 'distributed imagination' in this instance >>>>>>> as a form of place-making for a space that doesn't exist yet (the >>>>>>> museum exhibition). At the same time, the place where this design >>>>>>> work >>>>>>> is occurring is also undergoing a transformation from space to place >>>>>>> as the participants construct representations and begin to >>>>>>> collaborate. Alfredo and I were playing with an illustration of these >>>>>>> trajectories as merging, though we weren't able to bring it together >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> so maybe this discussion can allow us to flesh out these thoughts. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm looking forward to the discussion! >>>>>>> Rolf >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Mike and all, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> thanks for recommending our article for discussion, and thanks to >>>>>>>> anyone who wishes to participate. We really appreciate it! I can try >>>>>>>> to say a bit about the article. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Rolf and I did our PhD as part of two different projects that had a >>>>>>>> science museum and an art museum as settings for the design of >>>>>>>> technology-enhanced learning environments. Early on in the PhD, we >>>>>>>> begun talking about notions of space as central in our respective >>>>>>>> projects. During the last year, we shared office and had much more >>>>>>>> time to discuss. We had always wanted to write something together >>>>>>>> and the MCA special issue on Leigh Star seemed the perfect occasion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The design meetings involved many participants from different >>>>>>>> backgrounds, from education to architecture and software >>>>>>>> engineering, and sometimes it was difficult for the teams to advance >>>>>>>> towards definite solutions. I remember watching the videos from the >>>>>>>> first months of design work, hoping to find something for writing a >>>>>>>> first paper. I found different interesting issues to pursue, but one >>>>>>>> episode clearly stood out from the rest. It was a design meeting, >>>>>>>> after many meetings with lots of disagreements and dead ends, in >>>>>>>> which a discussion that concerned a wall in the museum space >>>>>>>> unexpectedly appeared to trigger lots of good ideas in the design >>>>>>>> team. It stroke me that something as banal and simple as a wall had >>>>>>>> been important in making it possible for the participants to achieve >>>>>>>> shared perspectives on the task and go on. I remembered then to have >>>>>>>> read something about boundary objects, and it was then that the >>>>>>>> figure of Leigh Star begun to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> be relevant. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In this paper, the aim was to consider boundary "objects" from the >>>>>>>> perspective of the participants' "bodies," which stood out in our >>>>>>>> analyses as particularly relevant for the achievement of >>>>>>>> co-operation despite lack of substantive agreement. Rather than >>>>>>>> shared substantive understandings, what seemed to allow the >>>>>>>> participants to proceed was being able to orient towards and perform >>>>>>>> specific situations that were lived-in (experienced, gone through). >>>>>>>> We recur to the notions of place-making and place-imagining to >>>>>>>> emphasize this per-formative aspect that has to do with inhabiting a >>>>>>>> place and finding one's ways >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> around it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We wrote the paper as we were finishing our respective >>>>>>>> theses/defenses, and we wanted to do something that should feel fun >>>>>>>> and free. We felt that Star's work was broad and were encouraged to >>>>>>>> connect different ideas from different scholars. The schedule was >>>>>>>> tight, and, although I think we managed to put together some ideas, >>>>>>>> we may have taken many risks in bridging across the different >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> frameworks. >>> >>>> I hope that those risks taken may now open space for >>>>>>>> questions/comments to emerge in the discussion, and I look forward >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> learn a lot from them. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com on behalf of mike >>>>>>>> cole < mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>> *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 >>>>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo Jornet Gil; lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> *Subject:* The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If my information is correct, both Alfredo and Rolf have some time >>>>>>>> in the upcoming period to discuss their article on the emergence of >>>>>>>> boundary objects. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So, to start the discussion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I am finding this article enormously generative of ways to think >>>>>>>> about some perennial issues that have recently been on my mind. The >>>>>>>> entire discussion leading up to the formulation of transforming >>>>>>>> spaces into places (and recreating spaces in the process) locks in >>>>>>>> directly with our current work on the 5th Dimension, which i have >>>>>>>> been writing about for some time as a tertiary artifact and an >>>>>>>> idioculture, but which most certainly fits the concept of a boundary >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> object. >>> >>>> Secondly, I have become really interested in "practices of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> imagination" >>> >>>> and that is just how Alfredo and Rolf characterize their two >>>>>>>> installations and the professional teams that cooperate to create >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> them. >>> >>>> And they make a new linkage by referring to distributed imagination, >>>>>>>> which is most certainly going to require imagination to fill in the >>>>>>>> ineluctable gaps, and provide us with some insight insight into the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> processes involved. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Those are my issues for starters. What strikes others? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS-- >>>>>>>> For those of you who missed this topic, the article is attached. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>>>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>>>>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 20 05:46:28 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 22:46:28 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> Message-ID: <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> Phew! So would it be correct to describe the government institutions and political system are "boundary objects"? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > Hi Andy - > Good catch! I believe that is a typo and should read > "despite a LACK of consensus". Thank you for pointing that > out. > > > I also wanted to follow up on a suggestion that Greg made > in the other thread suggesting we look at David McNeill's > work. I had only been familiar with his earlier work on > gesture, but after doing a bit of reading over the > weekend, I found his concept of 'unexpected metaphors' > potentially useful in dealing with some of my questions.( > http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf ) > > Here is a relevant quote describing unexpected metaphors > as a form of gesture: > > /The logic is that unexpected metaphors arise from the > need to create images when the culture does not have > them readily at hand. These images join linguistic > content as growth points and differentiate what > Vygotsky (1987) called psychological predicates, or > points of contrast in the immediate ongoing context of > speaking. Unexpected metaphors, precisely because they > are outside the conventions of language and culture, > can capture abstractions in novel ways and provide the > fluidity of thought and language that is the essence > of ongoing discourse./ > > > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of > cooperation despite consensus"? > p. 131, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > Are we allowed to ask questions about our paper as > well? I hope so! > > For a little context -in our paper, we identified > particular kinds of > episodes in which participants from different > disciplines seek coherence > and continuity of shared representations through > bodily action. These > actions include gesture, movement and physical > performance linking the > present material artifacts to objects of design. > Most of these episodes > seem to involve some form of improvisation, > resourcefulness or creativity, > and I'm not fully sure how to characterize these > aspects of the > interactions. In most cases, the participants seem > to be searching for the > best words or material representation to convey a > particular intention - > when this becomes problematic or limiting - they > almost fall back on what > is available - these improvised bodily > performances - as a way of > maintaining continuity, and of inviting > co-participants into a shared and > imagined space. These bodily actions don't seem to > begin the proposals, but > are in a sense *discovered* by the participants. > > > I think there is something really fascinating > about this kind of creativity > and resourcefulness in interaction that could be > explored more deeply - and > that I'm having trouble articulating. Maybe some > of you have some thoughts > on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked about this > a bit before so maybe you > can add a little clarity to my question. > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > wrote: > > Alfredo, > Thank you very much for the sketch of your > roots. I taught English in > Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in > the early 70s, just before > Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the > plane back to the U.S.) Place > and language are interesting, especially where > language varieties meet. > Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity > with the music of Catalunya > and Mallorca that the speech communities in > each of those places treasure > their unique languages (Catalan and > Mallorquin), yet see a commonality > vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian > Spanish, the national language > of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel > between your work on boundary > objects, where individual persons collaborate > to create spaces, AND > boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of > people who live in real spaces. > I am thinking, among other things, of > indigeneity, a big topic here in New > Mexico, with so many Native Americans. > Assymetries of power. Bullying. > Testing and curriculum become instruments of > war by other means. I hope my > tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the > optimism created by this > thread. Yet I think that optimism is so > precious because of the ground (the > world) of the dialog. > Henry > > > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > Well, you could say that I am partly > Catalan. I grew up in the province > > of Valencia, where Catalan language is > official language together with > Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the > county) and Catalonia are > different regional counties, Catalan is spoken > in Catalonia, Valencia, and > the Balear Islands. Some call the three > together as the Catalan Countries. > I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy > cultural diversity. > > Standardized testing, and the whole > assumptions behind it, are an issue > > also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education > has been so battered during > the last years of right-wing government that I > the debate have been more > about means and access than about contents and > aims. Which in some sense > may be good because it moves the debates away > from performance. But I have > been living outside of Spain for eight years > now, so I am not the best to > update you on this either. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on > behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > > > Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, > Yes, you have answered my question very > nicely! I especially appreciate > > that you were willing to wrestle with my > question, despite your lack of > familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. > Am I wrong, or are you > Catalan? In which case your experience in > Catalunya would take you to a > different place in critiquing schooling there, > though not necessarily > unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on > boundary objects. I just met for > the second day in a row with a friend who is > the liaison between our public > school district and a children?s science > museum called Explora. I feel like > I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a > mixed metaphor! > > Henry > > > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very > familiar with high-stakes > > standardized testing (as different to > standardized testing in general) or > with common core (which I quickly read is an > issue in US). But I would say > that, if (school) curricula were to be > consistent with the view of > education as the practice of creating > conditions for certain attitudes and > dispositions to emerge--which is what I was > suggesting in the paragraph you > copy--curricula would not be so much about > standardized contents, but about > human sensitivities and relations. So, I would > say, no, standardized > testing is not in principle in line with what > I was trying to say. > > I was trying to make a distinction > between trying to design someone's > > particular experience, and trying to design > conditions for the development > of attitudes and orientations. The first is > likely impossible. The second > seems to make more sense. > > One may of course wonder whether those > attitudes and orientations can > > be considered general, and then form part of > standardize measures instead > of the traditional "contents and skills". But > measuring assumes some > quantitative increment in a particular aspect > as the result of learning. > Growth and development, however, are about > qualitative change. So, as soon > as you start measuring you would be missing > growth and development. So, > again, no. I would not say that high-stakes > standardized testing is in line > with what I was trying to say. > > I hope I have answered your question, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on > behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > > > Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, you say: > > "However, we cannot aim at determining > any particular > > situation/experience. The same may be said > about EDUCATION. We cannot > intend to communicate the curriculum and make > it the content of the > students' experience in the way we intend. But > we can try to create the > conditions for certain attitudes and > dispositions to emerge." > > Would you say that high-stakes > standardized testing is in line with > > your construal of curriculum design? How about > common core? > > Henry > > > > > > > On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, > Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > wrote: > > Thanks a lot for the > clarifications. I see now why it > may be said that > > designers can aim at designing for constrains > but not for affordances. I > see that this way of talking is part of a > designers' way to get things > done, and that it may indeed be an effective > way to design for > place-making, as in the example that Michael > gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of > what we report in our study is about designers > talking about how spatial > features might afford some experiences in the > museum while constraining > others. > > I must admit, however, that I > still consider the distinction > > problematic from an analytical perspective > whenever our object of study is > experience, situated action, or design as > situated practice. A more correct > way to talk is that affordances and constrains > are the positive and > negative sides/interpretations of a single > unitary category. As an actual > and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem > implies both affordances and > constrains at the same time, whether intended > or not. Which makes me wonder > whether other terminology, such as Ingold's > notion of "correspondence," > might be more appropriated when we talk about > how materials and actions > become entangled into particular trajectories. > > In any case, and as Rolf > emphasizes, what the designers in > our study > > indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the > museum. Imagination versus > prediction may be an interesting topic > emerging here for further inquiry > into design work. > > Another important (and related) > issue that I think is emerging here > > has to do with the level of generality at > which design intentions can be > expected to work (just as Bateson argued with > regard to prediction). At the > level of generic social processes, and given a > particular > cultural-historical background, we as > designers may try to make some > generic situations more likely to occur than > others (facilitating that more > or less people end up together in a given > place). However, we cannot aim at > determining any particular > situation/experience. The same may be said about > EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the > curriculum and make it the > content of the students' experience in the way > we intend. But we can try to > create the conditions for certain attitudes > and dispositions to emerge. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > > > Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I think Rolf may have addressed > the question of the differences > > between affordances and constraints in his > post. The way he described the > designers as possibly setting up the corner > with Pollock at MOMA. It was a > long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the > way it was or the way I > remember it, but let's just believe this is > the way it was. The painting, > I think there were three were set up in a > corner off a main corridor. The > lighting was dark, which if you have ever been > to MOMA is different, in > many other parts of the museum there is a good > deal of natural light (there > was this great fountain, I wonder if it is > still there). The paintings > were on tripods rather than hung on the walls > and they were surrounded on > three sides by walls. All of these I think > would be considered restraints > - pushing me in to the works rather than > stepping back away. It was > impossible for more than two or three people > to view the paintings at one > time and movement was limited, so there were > fewer chances for social > interactions (you were not going to pick up > anybody looking at Jackson > Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making > it more likely that viewers > would move towards internal reflection. All > of these were constraints that > canalized perspectives and feelings viewing > the paintings. You really had > only two choices, you moved in to the > paintings or you moved on, which I > had done every previous time coming upon them. > > The painting itself though became > an affordances, an object at the > > nexus of my journey through the museum, where > I was in my life, and my > abilities to perceive the painitings. This > was something that could not be > designed I think because nobody could think > that moment was going to > happen. So then what is a perceived > affordance. Way back when there was > also a Manet room. It was a round room with > different variations of his > water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact > opposite in constraints it was > large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you > were looking to brood you went > somewhere else. In the middle of the room was > a wooden structure (not an > obvious bench), but you realized as random > colors dissolved into water > lilies that you wanted to sit down. You > naturally moved to the center of > the room and sat (wondering if a guard would > come and tell you it was > actually an important piece of art and you > should get off). The designer > anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to > almost get dizzy in the > lights, and included in the design the piece > of wood that will have the > perceived affordance for sitting, changing > your concept of time and space. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf > Of Alfredo > > Jornet Gil > > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thanks Michael, > > I think we are saying the same > things, indeed, or at least more or > > less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred > to energy, and that he used > the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to > show how the energy that moves > the pig is not a direct transfer of energy > from the kick, whereas in the > case of the billiard balls, the movement of > one ball is caused by the > energy that the kicking ball brings. I might > be wrong in the context within > which Bateson was discussing the example, and > I see that your account is in > that regard is more accurate. But the point is > the same: you can not intend > the outcomes of a system by addressing only > its parts as if they were > connected directly, in a linear causal > fashion; as if the whole was the sum > of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's > rejection of S-R and his > inclusion of a third element that transforms > the whole system. > > But I totally agree with your > comments on design intentions as they > > relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf > does, also like very much the > notion of ecology to address these issues. > > If I read you correctly, and > citing Don Norman (whose work I > ignore), > > you suggest the possibility that the relations > between design intentions > and actual experience could be thought of in > terms of different levels? > That one thing is to design for what is > general, but that we cannot design > for the particular. Is that right? If so, I > think that Bateson had a > similar argument on prediction, does not him? > That we can predict on > general levels (e.g. population), but not at > the level of the particular > (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, > but seems a promising road to > consider this jumps between levels of > generality or scales. > > Finally, I am not sure if I get > what you mean when you say that we can > > design for constrains but not for affordances. > I still see that the one > presupposes the other; you can separate them > in talk, but, to me, in actual > experience, a constrain is an affordance and > vice-versa. I don't see how > the road has any inherent constrain that could > not be an affordance at the > same time. Of course, if you take the > normative stance that roads are for > cars driving through them, you may be right. > But if we think of roads as > asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only > of a different shape, > texture, and color, how is that a constrain > but not an affordance? Or an > affordance but not a constrain? Of course, > culture constrains once you are > within the road and you are driving. But then, > the constrain is not in the > road, as you seem to suggest, but in the > journey; in the journeyman that > carries some cultural way of orienting and > affectively relating to its > environment so that particular constrains are > taken for granted despite the > possibility of being otherwise. But I might > not have thought it well/long > enough and of course I might be wrong. I would > like to understand your > position here better. > > Thanks! > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > > > Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I have been reading Bateson > through a cybernetics lens lately > (Bateson > > along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead > were part of the original Sears > conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or > I am victim to the "when you > have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" > but.... > > I think Bateson was arguing with > those looking to apply the more > > physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics > to human or really (pace the > pig story) and system that moves beyond simple > physical feedback loops. I > think his larger point is that everything has > a response within the larger > feedback system that exists but we cannot go - > what Bateson refers to as > MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback > loops, to try and design a > system for specific types of feedback is a > dangerous proposition. > > This I think is the reason that > affordances really can't be designed > > into an ecology, only a recognition of the > context in which actions are > taking place (and I say this having no idea > what Gibson's relationship to > cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of > the girl it is perhaps also > likely that the girl could have taken the > fixing of hair as a criticism, an > attack, and it might have destroyed her > confidence. Both make sense in > terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So > if a designer does in some > way design that experience into the action, > even without meaning they are > taking a large chance, because they do not > know the trajectory it will > take. We simply need objects that are part of > our journey, part of the > larger context but not designed for purpose, > for feedback. There is no > assumption about trajectory. > > I think Don Norman sort of muddied > the waters on this, but in an > > interesting way. That we can assume people > are going to want to do certain > things in a very general environment - when > you enter a dark room you want > light, so it is possible to design objects > that meet that need that we are > more likely to find in the moment that we need > them. But I think that is > very different from the idea of specifically > guiding feedback loops that > even take generalized experience in a certain > direction. I am thinking > about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument > to Bateson with his concept of > transactions. Although he does seem to think > that it is possible to create > a larger field of action so we can see at > least local interrelationships. > But his idea of experience is also very much > one of discovery based on > needs at the immediate moment - social > relations act as a vehicle for these > discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing > before Gibson and for most of his > life before cybernetics. I also wonder what > he thought of cybernetics). > > I think I disagree with you, > constraints are not about the > journey but > > about the road. If you build a road on the > side of the river you are > constrained because no matter what, you cannot > turn right. Your direction > has already been partially determined by the > designer of the road. But the > mistake we make is in thinking that also > controls the trajectory of the > individual's journey. The effect of designers > on trajectories of action is > important, but limited. > > The primary place that designers > have influence on affordances it > > seems to me is by being able to create a > unique context for an individual's > and a group's that limit possible trajectories > on an individual's journey. > But we should never mistake those constraints > for affordances. I think > Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. > Perhaps this is what you are > saying Alfredo. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > =ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On > Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 > 12:38 PM > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I'd like to follow up on Michael's > post by asking a question: Are not > > affordances presupposed by constraints and are > not constraints presupposed > by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether > it makes sense to ask whether > museums should be designed for affordances and > constraints. > > What I think is clear from the > anecdote that you bring about the > > Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever > EXPERIENCE emerges from being > somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in > some place) cannot be > INTENDED. And I think this applies both to > designers and users, to those > who set things up for you to experience and to > you, who could not foresee > what your experience was going to turn you > into before you go through it. > > I think that the big issue that > you bring on the table (to continue > > with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a > difference between physical > relations and social relations, and the idea > of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson > noticed that the relations that are the > subject matter in physics are not > the same as those that are the subject matter > in communication. He noticed > that physical relations (relations that are > the object of study of physics) > transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard > ball hits another ball and we > can anticipate the exact speed and direction > that the second ball will take > based on the energy that is in the system ball > + ball + someone hitting. In > living beings, the things are different. > Bateson explained, if we kick a > pig's ass (I think he used this somehow > bizarre example) the reaction of > the pig is not accounted for by the energy > that is contained in the kick, > at least not in a direct manner. The energy > that moves the pig is from a > different source. Before Bateson, it was > Vygotsky and his notion of > mediation who would most clearly state that > social relations are not > direct, but mediated. > > So, how can design go about this? > If we, along with Dewey and > > Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of > person and environment, and > we assume as well that this is a social (not > just individual) category, and > that how a situation is experienced is also > refracted through the social > relations within which we engage, the most > designers can do is to foster > social relations go on, giving afordances to > prcesses of signification, > without intending to embed meanings. It is > about affordances/constraints, > but not about how to interpret something, but > about going about > interpreting. I think. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > > > Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > So after reading the article and > the e-mail discussion I'm beginning > > to think there is a really big issue here that > I am trying to grapple with, > especially in terms of boundary objects (which > I admittedly do not > understand very well). And it relates to the > metaphor of the table (both > as discussed by Larry and Ingold as > interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in > the museum should the place be set up as > affordances, perceived > affordances, or constraints? It seems the > museum in the study has > potential affordances for the users. The > cultural historical moment > (unable to think of any other word) of the > museum sets the context, meaning > those walking through the museum are going to > be restricted by the > historical and cultural boundaries leading up > to the art work, along with > the expectations and needs of the individuals > moving through the museum, > but they will come across objects/artifacts > that they think meets the needs > of their particular journeys. The posing > becomes both an internalization > and externalization of the thinking (or are > they one continuum at this > point?) in which they both make sense of the > object in terms of their own > meaning and needs and also try and communicate > what they found, leaving a > potential trails for others. > > An example that has stayed with me > for years. Living in New York I > > used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a > semi-regular basis (in large > part to try and meet women, always > unsuccessful). I would often visit the > Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it > would always be meaningful to > me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon > after graduating college and > unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever > been I viewed the same > paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense > to me, a deep emotional punch > - the paintings became objects that could > bridge my rage, sadness and fear > to the next moment in my life. There is no > way a designer could have > planned this affordance. It was based on the > movement not just through the > museum but my life. I think back to what my > gestures, or even posing might > have been at that moment. A slumping in to > myself, an internalization > perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of > rage. But perhaps a posture > also that said stay away. The place I created > in that moment was one that > included me and whatever demons Jackson > Pollock fought with. > > Or should museums should be > designed for what Don Norman > refers to as > > perceived affordances? The table that is set > up can be one of perceived > affordances. What I grab for the spoon > because its shape makes sense in my > need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes > from cultural history setting a > general context - Jackson Pollock is a > sanctioned way to bridge emotions, > to actually setting the trajectory of the > act. I sit at a table, I want to > eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule > systems, I know what I need at > that moment and look for objects that fit my > needs. Is the room in the > article about perceived affordances. Should > the museum be designed for > perceived affordances. A person coming upon > an object may be thinking this > because of what it means in our society to be > walking through a museum. > The object offers an opportunity to make > communicative gestures, such as > recreating the posture of The Thinker the > authors refer to. I have seen > many shows, movies where this happens, from > movies from the 1940s to the > Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we > do with art objects in a > museum, we gesture to both understand and > communicate. > > Or should museums be designed as > constraints. In the Metropolitan > > Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric > places but that's where I > spent most of my museum life) the rooms are > set up very, very carefully, so > that in many ways the objects (at least are > meant to I think) to constrain > your thinking, so that you are responding to a > certain period or school of > art, understanding how it all fits together. > The table metaphor fits here > as well I think. Does the table constrain our > actions, limiting to certain > types of behavior (use only certain types of > forks for certain types of > food). > > Okay, too much I know. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > =ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On > Behalf Of Rolf Steier > > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity; mike cole; > > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you for your thoughts Larry, > > I wanted to pick up on your > suggestion of the table metaphor > because I > > think that's really interesting. I believe you > are proposing the shared > meal as analogous to the kind of orientation > work (or perhaps Leigh Star > might consider this translation or > pre-translation work?) that precedes the > task at hand (in the case of our study, the > task is design). Excerpt 3 from > our study might be relevant here, when in turn > 6, the curator turns to the > researcher, leans in, and points in order to > create a shared visual field. > > The curator and the researcher can > now orient towards the existing > > gallery in order to imagine future, possible > changes in the gallery. The > curator is in a sense extending an invitation > to sit down at the same table > to be able to share his vision for the gallery. > > This shared meal might of course > also be considered designed. Ingold ( > *Making*) actually uses this same > table metaphor to demonstrate the > > facilitation of activity as an aspect of > design - *"Everyday design catches > the narrative and pins it down, establishing a > kind of choreography for the > ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed > from the moment you sit down > to eat. In such a straightforward task as > laying the table - in enrolling > into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug > and cereal box - you are > designing breakfast."* > > There is an improvisational > quality to the bodily/performative > > orientation work that is maybe not captured by > the shared expectations of > sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, > we can also consider the > workspace of the multidisciplinary design team > as designed in the same way > that the meal is designed in order to support > the objective of the meeting. > That is, the, design team must first engage in > a place-making activity for > their collaborative setting in order to attend > to the design of the > exhibition space. The designers set the table > with a white board, sketches > and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., > before turning to the task > of imagining the future exhibition. > > Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the > placemakers -- the architects or > > the USERS of designed/created/socially > produced spaces?" *I think this is > difficult to answer because both architect and > user play a role in the > place-making process. The architects embed > possible meanings (if place and > meaning are analogous than perhaps these might > be considered 'place > > potentials') that only emerge > through the activity of the users. I'm > > only thinking through this now, so feel free > to elaborate or to disagree! > > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, > Alfredo Jornet Gil < > > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no > > > wrote: > > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am > tempted to stretch a bit > across frameworks > and answer that, the > difference between the process > of performing an > activity in space and > developing a sense of place > would be akin to the > difference between an > operation and an action as per > Activity theory. > > Again, we must be careful on > the distinction between space > as a sort > of objective geometrical > coordinate, or space as not > becoming a part > > of "an" > > experience (in Dewey's sense). > In the first sense, the sentence > "performing an activity in > space" makes only sense when > talking about > geometrical practices, for > example; one may think that in > some > engineering practices, it is > possible to orient to space as > space, as > a coordinate. BUT still, the > experience of being doing such > practice, > if it has import to further > development in the person, it > must be > refracted through the person's > experience; there must be > involvement, > and therefore placemaking. In > the second case, we might > think of us > performing some activity > within taking much of it, > without noticing we > are doing. It is in this sense > that I do the bridge with > operations > > versus actions. > > I would not have many problems > in associating place with > meaning and > placemaking with > meaning-making, although I > personally would be > careful if doing so, > emphasizing the situational > and distributed > nature of the process that > placemaking attempts to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf > Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > Cc: mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have > started my mail with an > appreciation for > your article and Mike's choice > to bring it to our attention. > > Now it is almost clear how you > use the word and conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would > respectfully ask you for a few > more things: what > is the difference between the > process of performing an > activity in > space and developing a sense > of place. I personally > interpret place in > terms of appropriation of > space in the process of human > activity and > the subsequent meaning making > which has existential > importance for the > individual. The phenomenon of > place is on par with the > phenomenon of > meaning and placemaking is a > process on par with meaning > making. How > do you position yourself > regarding such conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who are the > placemakers -- the architects > or the > USERS of > designed/created/socially > produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be > stretching too much the part > on place and > distracting from other aspects > of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no > ] > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 > 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf > Steier; eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Lubomir, > > thanks for your questions. I > agree that the notion of place > has been > around in different forms > during at least the last 20 > years or so, > from geography with Tuan, > technology with Dourish, to > the so-called > place-based education. I must > also admit that we did not > work with a > carefully operationalized > definition when using the term > in the paper, > but I can of course share my > view on the issue and how I > understand > > it. > > For me, as in most of the > cases mentioned above, place > is a way of > emphasizing the experiential > in what comes to be socially > or humanly > relevant. Most simply, and > this most of you probably > know, is about > the difference between a > rationalistic, geometrical > conception of > space versus a more > phenomenological one. I read > Streek (2010) citing > Cresswell about > place: "Place is about > stopping and resting and > becoming involved". > This is precisely what we > aimed to emphasize in our > paper, that > whatever practices were > involved in getting things > done together in an > interdisciplinary group, they > involved a process of becoming > involved, > experientially, emotionally, > bodily, with the materials and > currents > going on in a given situation. > > I also read Ingold (2011) > warning against the difference > between space > and place in terms of space > being a reality substance and > place being > constituted by subsequent > level of abstractions. In my view, > experience is not about > abstraction, but about > involvement. And place > is about space as it is > refracted in intelligible > experience; not > about an abstraction over an > objective field, but more > related to a > > perezhivanie in Vygotsky's sense. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: 14 July 2015 21:55 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended > Mind, Culture, Activity; > Alfredo > > Jornet > > Gil > Cc: mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Rolf and Alfredo, > > What is your definition for > place? How is place different > from space? > I ask because people use the > words place and peacemaking in > dozens of > different ways; it is just > mindboggling. > > Thanks, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > On Behalf Of Rolf > xmca-l-bounces+Steier > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 > 2:44 PM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity; mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hello All, > > I also want to thank everyone > for participating in this > discussion, > and I'm looking forward to > developing some of the ideas > from our text. > I think that Alfredo did a > nice job of introducing the > context of our > study, so I don't have much to > add. The two aspects that Mike > brings > up are also very much of > interest to me, and I think > quite closely > related. I think we treat > 'distributed imagination' in > this instance > as a form of place-making for > a space that doesn't exist yet > (the > museum exhibition). At the > same time, the place where > this design work > is occurring is also > undergoing a transformation > from space to place > as the participants construct > representations and begin to > collaborate. Alfredo and I > were playing with an > illustration of these > trajectories as merging, > though we weren't able to > bring it together - > so maybe this discussion can > allow us to flesh out these > thoughts. > > I'm looking forward to the > discussion! > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 7:38 > PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > Hi Mike and all, > > > thanks for recommending > our article for > discussion, and thanks to > anyone who wishes to > participate. We really > appreciate it! I can try > to say a bit about the > article. > > Rolf and I did our PhD as > part of two different > projects that had a > science museum and an art > museum as settings for the > design of > technology-enhanced > learning environments. > Early on in the PhD, we > begun talking about > notions of space as > central in our respective > projects. During the last > year, we shared office and > had much more > time to discuss. We had > always wanted to write > something together > and the MCA special issue > on Leigh Star seemed the > perfect occasion. > > The design meetings > involved many participants > from different > backgrounds, from > education to architecture > and software > engineering, and sometimes > it was difficult for the > teams to advance > towards definite > solutions. I remember > watching the videos from the > first months of design > work, hoping to find > something for writing a > first paper. I found > different interesting > issues to pursue, but one > episode clearly stood out > from the rest. It was a > design meeting, > after many meetings with > lots of disagreements and > dead ends, in > which a discussion that > concerned a wall in the > museum space > unexpectedly appeared to > trigger lots of good ideas > in the design > team. It stroke me that > something as banal and > simple as a wall had > been important in making > it possible for the > participants to achieve > shared perspectives on the > task and go on. I > remembered then to have > read something about > boundary objects, and it > was then that the > figure of Leigh Star begun to > > be relevant. > > In this paper, the aim was > to consider boundary > "objects" from the > perspective of the > participants' "bodies," > which stood out in our > analyses as particularly > relevant for the > achievement of > co-operation despite lack > of substantive agreement. > Rather than > shared substantive > understandings, what > seemed to allow the > participants to proceed > was being able to orient > towards and perform > specific situations that > were lived-in > (experienced, gone through). > We recur to the notions of > place-making and > place-imagining to > emphasize this > per-formative aspect that > has to do with inhabiting a > place and finding one's ways > > around it. > > We wrote the paper as we > were finishing our respective > theses/defenses, and we > wanted to do something > that should feel fun > and free. We felt that > Star's work was broad and > were encouraged to > connect different ideas > from different scholars. > The schedule was > tight, and, although I > think we managed to put > together some ideas, > we may have taken many > risks in bridging across > the different > > frameworks. > > I hope that those risks > taken may now open space for > questions/comments to > emerge in the discussion, > and I look forward > to > > learn a lot from them. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* lchcmike@gmail.com > > > on behalf of mike > cole < mcole@ucsd.edu > > > *Sent:* 14 July 2015 19:17 > *To:* eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > *Cc:* Rolf Steier; Alfredo > Jornet Gil; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > *Subject:* The Emergence > of Boundary Objects > > If my information is > correct, both Alfredo and > Rolf have some time > in the upcoming period to > discuss their article on > the emergence of > boundary objects. > > So, to start the discussion. > > I am finding this article > enormously generative of > ways to think > about some perennial > issues that have recently > been on my mind. The > entire discussion leading > up to the formulation of > transforming > spaces into places (and > recreating spaces in the > process) locks in > directly with our current > work on the 5th Dimension, > which i have > been writing about for > some time as a tertiary > artifact and an > idioculture, but which > most certainly fits the > concept of a boundary > > object. > > Secondly, I have become > really interested in > "practices of > > imagination" > > and that is just how > Alfredo and Rolf > characterize their two > installations and the > professional teams that > cooperate to create > > them. > > And they make a new > linkage by referring to > distributed imagination, > which is most certainly > going to require > imagination to fill in the > ineluctable gaps, and > provide us with some > insight insight into the > > processes involved. > > Those are my issues for > starters. What strikes others? > > mike > > PS-- > For those of you who > missed this topic, the > article is attached. > > > > -- > > Both environment and > species change in the > course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not > stable and given forever > (Polotova & > Storch, Ecological Niche, > 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From rolfsteier@gmail.com Mon Jul 20 06:13:40 2015 From: rolfsteier@gmail.com (Rolf Steier) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 15:13:40 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> References: <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> Message-ID: I think that a particular institution or government system could potentially be a boundary object depending on how the concept is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) interpretive flexibility 2) material/ organizational structure and 3) scale/ granularity in which the concept is useful. She argues that boundary objects are typically most useful at the organizational level - so I would say that one would have to justify the utility of applying the concept to a particular institution, as opposed to, say, an object within an institution. On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Phew! > So would it be correct to describe the government institutions and > political system are "boundary objects"? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >> Hi Andy - >> Good catch! I believe that is a typo and should read "despite a LACK of >> consensus". Thank you for pointing that out. >> >> >> I also wanted to follow up on a suggestion that Greg made in the other >> thread suggesting we look at David McNeill's work. I had only been familiar >> with his earlier work on gesture, but after doing a bit of reading over the >> weekend, I found his concept of 'unexpected metaphors' potentially useful >> in dealing with some of my questions.( >> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf ) >> >> Here is a relevant quote describing unexpected metaphors as a form of >> gesture: >> >> /The logic is that unexpected metaphors arise from the >> need to create images when the culture does not have >> them readily at hand. These images join linguistic >> content as growth points and differentiate what >> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological predicates, or >> points of contrast in the immediate ongoing context of >> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, precisely because they >> are outside the conventions of language and culture, >> can capture abstractions in novel ways and provide the >> fluidity of thought and language that is the essence >> of ongoing discourse./ >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of >> cooperation despite consensus"? >> p. 131, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> Are we allowed to ask questions about our paper as >> well? I hope so! >> >> For a little context -in our paper, we identified >> particular kinds of >> episodes in which participants from different >> disciplines seek coherence >> and continuity of shared representations through >> bodily action. These >> actions include gesture, movement and physical >> performance linking the >> present material artifacts to objects of design. >> Most of these episodes >> seem to involve some form of improvisation, >> resourcefulness or creativity, >> and I'm not fully sure how to characterize these >> aspects of the >> interactions. In most cases, the participants seem >> to be searching for the >> best words or material representation to convey a >> particular intention - >> when this becomes problematic or limiting - they >> almost fall back on what >> is available - these improvised bodily >> performances - as a way of >> maintaining continuity, and of inviting >> co-participants into a shared and >> imagined space. These bodily actions don't seem to >> begin the proposals, but >> are in a sense *discovered* by the participants. >> >> >> I think there is something really fascinating >> about this kind of creativity >> and resourcefulness in interaction that could be >> explored more deeply - and >> that I'm having trouble articulating. Maybe some >> of you have some thoughts >> on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked about this >> a bit before so maybe you >> can add a little clarity to my question. >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> > >> wrote: >> >> Alfredo, >> Thank you very much for the sketch of your >> roots. I taught English in >> Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in >> the early 70s, just before >> Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the >> plane back to the U.S.) Place >> and language are interesting, especially where >> language varieties meet. >> Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity >> with the music of Catalunya >> and Mallorca that the speech communities in >> each of those places treasure >> their unique languages (Catalan and >> Mallorquin), yet see a commonality >> vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian >> Spanish, the national language >> of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel >> between your work on boundary >> objects, where individual persons collaborate >> to create spaces, AND >> boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of >> people who live in real spaces. >> I am thinking, among other things, of >> indigeneity, a big topic here in New >> Mexico, with so many Native Americans. >> Assymetries of power. Bullying. >> Testing and curriculum become instruments of >> war by other means. I hope my >> tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the >> optimism created by this >> thread. Yet I think that optimism is so >> precious because of the ground (the >> world) of the dialog. >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil > > >> >> wrote: >> >> Well, you could say that I am partly >> Catalan. I grew up in the province >> >> of Valencia, where Catalan language is >> official language together with >> Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the >> county) and Catalonia are >> different regional counties, Catalan is spoken >> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >> the Balear Islands. Some call the three >> together as the Catalan Countries. >> I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy >> cultural diversity. >> >> Standardized testing, and the whole >> assumptions behind it, are an issue >> >> also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education >> has been so battered during >> the last years of right-wing government that I >> the debate have been more >> about means and access than about contents and >> aims. Which in some sense >> may be good because it moves the debates away >> from performance. But I have >> been living outside of Spain for eight years >> now, so I am not the best to >> update you on this either. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD > > >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, >> Yes, you have answered my question very >> nicely! I especially appreciate >> >> that you were willing to wrestle with my >> question, despite your lack of >> familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. >> Am I wrong, or are you >> Catalan? In which case your experience in >> Catalunya would take you to a >> different place in critiquing schooling there, >> though not necessarily >> unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on >> boundary objects. I just met for >> the second day in a row with a friend who is >> the liaison between our public >> school district and a children?s science >> museum called Explora. I feel like >> I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a >> mixed metaphor! >> >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil > > >> >> wrote: >> >> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very >> familiar with high-stakes >> >> standardized testing (as different to >> standardized testing in general) or >> with common core (which I quickly read is an >> issue in US). But I would say >> that, if (school) curricula were to be >> consistent with the view of >> education as the practice of creating >> conditions for certain attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge--which is what I was >> suggesting in the paragraph you >> copy--curricula would not be so much about >> standardized contents, but about >> human sensitivities and relations. So, I would >> say, no, standardized >> testing is not in principle in line with what >> I was trying to say. >> >> I was trying to make a distinction >> between trying to design someone's >> >> particular experience, and trying to design >> conditions for the development >> of attitudes and orientations. The first is >> likely impossible. The second >> seems to make more sense. >> >> One may of course wonder whether those >> attitudes and orientations can >> >> be considered general, and then form part of >> standardize measures instead >> of the traditional "contents and skills". But >> measuring assumes some >> quantitative increment in a particular aspect >> as the result of learning. >> Growth and development, however, are about >> qualitative change. So, as soon >> as you start measuring you would be missing >> growth and development. So, >> again, no. I would not say that high-stakes >> standardized testing is in line >> with what I was trying to say. >> >> I hope I have answered your question, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD > > >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, you say: >> >> "However, we cannot aim at determining >> any particular >> >> situation/experience. The same may be said >> about EDUCATION. We cannot >> intend to communicate the curriculum and make >> it the content of the >> students' experience in the way we intend. But >> we can try to create the >> conditions for certain attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge." >> >> Would you say that high-stakes >> standardized testing is in line with >> >> your construal of curriculum design? How about >> common core? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > > >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot for the >> clarifications. I see now why it >> may be said that >> >> designers can aim at designing for constrains >> but not for affordances. I >> see that this way of talking is part of a >> designers' way to get things >> done, and that it may indeed be an effective >> way to design for >> place-making, as in the example that Michael >> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >> what we report in our study is about designers >> talking about how spatial >> features might afford some experiences in the >> museum while constraining >> others. >> >> I must admit, however, that I >> still consider the distinction >> >> problematic from an analytical perspective >> whenever our object of study is >> experience, situated action, or design as >> situated practice. A more correct >> way to talk is that affordances and constrains >> are the positive and >> negative sides/interpretations of a single >> unitary category. As an actual >> and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem >> implies both affordances and >> constrains at the same time, whether intended >> or not. Which makes me wonder >> whether other terminology, such as Ingold's >> notion of "correspondence," >> might be more appropriated when we talk about >> how materials and actions >> become entangled into particular trajectories. >> >> In any case, and as Rolf >> emphasizes, what the designers in >> our study >> >> indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the >> museum. Imagination versus >> prediction may be an interesting topic >> emerging here for further inquiry >> into design work. >> >> Another important (and related) >> issue that I think is emerging here >> >> has to do with the level of generality at >> which design intentions can be >> expected to work (just as Bateson argued with >> regard to prediction). At the >> level of generic social processes, and given a >> particular >> cultural-historical background, we as >> designers may try to make some >> generic situations more likely to occur than >> others (facilitating that more >> or less people end up together in a given >> place). However, we cannot aim at >> determining any particular >> situation/experience. The same may be said about >> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the >> curriculum and make it the >> content of the students' experience in the way >> we intend. But we can try to >> create the conditions for certain attitudes >> and dispositions to emerge. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael > > >> >> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I think Rolf may have addressed >> the question of the differences >> >> between affordances and constraints in his >> post. The way he described the >> designers as possibly setting up the corner >> with Pollock at MOMA. It was a >> long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the >> way it was or the way I >> remember it, but let's just believe this is >> the way it was. The painting, >> I think there were three were set up in a >> corner off a main corridor. The >> lighting was dark, which if you have ever been >> to MOMA is different, in >> many other parts of the museum there is a good >> deal of natural light (there >> was this great fountain, I wonder if it is >> still there). The paintings >> were on tripods rather than hung on the walls >> and they were surrounded on >> three sides by walls. All of these I think >> would be considered restraints >> - pushing me in to the works rather than >> stepping back away. It was >> impossible for more than two or three people >> to view the paintings at one >> time and movement was limited, so there were >> fewer chances for social >> interactions (you were not going to pick up >> anybody looking at Jackson >> Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making >> it more likely that viewers >> would move towards internal reflection. All >> of these were constraints that >> canalized perspectives and feelings viewing >> the paintings. You really had >> only two choices, you moved in to the >> paintings or you moved on, which I >> had done every previous time coming upon them. >> >> The painting itself though became >> an affordances, an object at the >> >> nexus of my journey through the museum, where >> I was in my life, and my >> abilities to perceive the painitings. This >> was something that could not be >> designed I think because nobody could think >> that moment was going to >> happen. So then what is a perceived >> affordance. Way back when there was >> also a Manet room. It was a round room with >> different variations of his >> water lilies in a circle. Almost the exact >> opposite in constraints it was >> large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you >> were looking to brood you went >> somewhere else. In the middle of the room was >> a wooden structure (not an >> obvious bench), but you realized as random >> colors dissolved into water >> lilies that you wanted to sit down. You >> naturally moved to the center of >> the room and sat (wondering if a guard would >> come and tell you it was >> actually an important piece of art and you >> should get off). The designer >> anticipates a desire to soak in the room, to >> almost get dizzy in the >> lights, and included in the design the piece >> of wood that will have the >> perceived affordance for sitting, changing >> your concept of time and space. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13= >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto: >> >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf >> Of Alfredo >> >> Jornet Gil >> >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 3:01 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thanks Michael, >> >> I think we are saying the same >> things, indeed, or at least more or >> >> less. I am quite certain that Bateson referred >> to energy, and that he used >> the mentioned examples (or similar ones) to >> show how the energy that moves >> the pig is not a direct transfer of energy >> from the kick, whereas in the >> case of the billiard balls, the movement of >> one ball is caused by the >> energy that the kicking ball brings. I might >> be wrong in the context within >> which Bateson was discussing the example, and >> I see that your account is in >> that regard is more accurate. But the point is >> the same: you can not intend >> the outcomes of a system by addressing only >> its parts as if they were >> connected directly, in a linear causal >> fashion; as if the whole was the sum >> of its parts. I do see a link with Vygotsky's >> rejection of S-R and his >> inclusion of a third element that transforms >> the whole system. >> >> But I totally agree with your >> comments on design intentions as they >> >> relate to ecology, and I, as I know also Rolf >> does, also like very much the >> notion of ecology to address these issues. >> >> If I read you correctly, and >> citing Don Norman (whose work I >> ignore), >> >> you suggest the possibility that the relations >> between design intentions >> and actual experience could be thought of in >> terms of different levels? >> That one thing is to design for what is >> general, but that we cannot design >> for the particular. Is that right? If so, I >> think that Bateson had a >> similar argument on prediction, does not him? >> That we can predict on >> general levels (e.g. population), but not at >> the level of the particular >> (e.g., individual). I haven't gone that way, >> but seems a promising road to >> consider this jumps between levels of >> generality or scales. >> >> Finally, I am not sure if I get >> what you mean when you say that we can >> >> design for constrains but not for affordances. >> I still see that the one >> presupposes the other; you can separate them >> in talk, but, to me, in actual >> experience, a constrain is an affordance and >> vice-versa. I don't see how >> the road has any inherent constrain that could >> not be an affordance at the >> same time. Of course, if you take the >> normative stance that roads are for >> cars driving through them, you may be right. >> But if we think of roads as >> asphalt on the ground, as yet more ground only >> of a different shape, >> texture, and color, how is that a constrain >> but not an affordance? Or an >> affordance but not a constrain? Of course, >> culture constrains once you are >> within the road and you are driving. But then, >> the constrain is not in the >> road, as you seem to suggest, but in the >> journey; in the journeyman that >> carries some cultural way of orienting and >> affectively relating to its >> environment so that particular constrains are >> taken for granted despite the >> possibility of being otherwise. But I might >> not have thought it well/long >> enough and of course I might be wrong. I would >> like to understand your >> position here better. >> >> Thanks! >> Alfredo >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael > > >> >> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I have been reading Bateson >> through a cybernetics lens lately >> (Bateson >> >> along with Lewin and his wife Margaret Mead >> were part of the original Sears >> conferences) and I'm not sure that's right or >> I am victim to the "when you >> have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" >> but.... >> >> I think Bateson was arguing with >> those looking to apply the more >> >> physical/mathematical origins of cybernetics >> to human or really (pace the >> pig story) and system that moves beyond simple >> physical feedback loops. I >> think his larger point is that everything has >> a response within the larger >> feedback system that exists but we cannot go - >> what Bateson refers to as >> MIND. Attempts to create and control feedback >> loops, to try and design a >> system for specific types of feedback is a >> dangerous proposition. >> >> This I think is the reason that >> affordances really can't be designed >> >> into an ecology, only a recognition of the >> context in which actions are >> taking place (and I say this having no idea >> what Gibson's relationship to >> cybernetics was). Taking Larry's example of >> the girl it is perhaps also >> likely that the girl could have taken the >> fixing of hair as a criticism, an >> attack, and it might have destroyed her >> confidence. Both make sense in >> terms of feedback loops, but only ad hoc. So >> if a designer does in some >> way design that experience into the action, >> even without meaning they are >> taking a large chance, because they do not >> know the trajectory it will >> take. We simply need objects that are part of >> our journey, part of the >> larger context but not designed for purpose, >> for feedback. There is no >> assumption about trajectory. >> >> I think Don Norman sort of muddied >> the waters on this, but in an >> >> interesting way. That we can assume people >> are going to want to do certain >> things in a very general environment - when you >> enter a dark room you want >> light, so it is possible to design objects >> that meet that need that we are >> more likely to find in the moment that we need >> them. But I think that is >> very different from the idea of specifically >> guiding feedback loops that >> even take generalized experience in a certain >> direction. I am thinking >> about Dewey, and he makes a similar argument >> to Bateson with his concept of >> transactions. Although he does seem to think >> that it is possible to create >> a larger field of action so we can see at >> least local interrelationships. >> But his idea of experience is also very much >> one of discovery based on >> needs at the immediate moment - social >> relations act as a vehicle for these >> discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing >> before Gibson and for most of his >> life before cybernetics. I also wonder what >> he thought of cybernetics). >> >> I think I disagree with you, >> constraints are not about the >> journey but >> >> about the road. If you build a road on the >> side of the river you are >> constrained because no matter what, you cannot >> turn right. Your direction >> has already been partially determined by the >> designer of the road. But the >> mistake we make is in thinking that also >> controls the trajectory of the >> individual's journey. The effect of designers >> on trajectories of action is >> important, but limited. >> >> The primary place that designers >> have influence on affordances it >> >> seems to me is by being able to create a >> unique context for an individual's >> and a group's that limit possible trajectories >> on an individual's journey. >> But we should never mistake those constraints >> for affordances. I think >> Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. >> Perhaps this is what you are >> saying Alfredo. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> = >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On >> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >> 12:38 PM >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> I'd like to follow up on Michael's >> post by asking a question: Are not >> >> affordances presupposed by constraints and are >> not constraints presupposed >> by affordances? If so, I would wonder whether >> it makes sense to ask whether >> museums should be designed for affordances and >> constraints. >> >> What I think is clear from the >> anecdote that you bring about the >> >> Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever >> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >> somewhere (i.e. being someone at some time in >> some place) cannot be >> INTENDED. And I think this applies both to >> designers and users, to those >> who set things up for you to experience and to >> you, who could not foresee >> what your experience was going to turn you >> into before you go through it. >> >> I think that the big issue that >> you bring on the table (to continue >> >> with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a >> difference between physical >> relations and social relations, and the idea >> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >> noticed that the relations that are the >> subject matter in physics are not >> the same as those that are the subject matter >> in communication. He noticed >> that physical relations (relations that are >> the object of study of physics) >> transfer energy in direct manners: a billiard >> ball hits another ball and we >> can anticipate the exact speed and direction >> that the second ball will take >> based on the energy that is in the system ball >> + ball + someone hitting. In >> living beings, the things are different. >> Bateson explained, if we kick a >> pig's ass (I think he used this somehow >> bizarre example) the reaction of >> the pig is not accounted for by the energy >> that is contained in the kick, >> at least not in a direct manner. The energy >> that moves the pig is from a >> different source. Before Bateson, it was >> Vygotsky and his notion of >> mediation who would most clearly state that >> social relations are not >> direct, but mediated. >> >> So, how can design go about this? >> If we, along with Dewey and >> >> Vygotsky, consider experience to be a unity of >> person and environment, and >> we assume as well that this is a social (not >> just individual) category, and >> that how a situation is experienced is also >> refracted through the social >> relations within which we engage, the most >> designers can do is to foster >> social relations go on, giving afordances to >> prcesses of signification, >> without intending to embed meanings. It is >> about affordances/constraints, >> but not about how to interpret something, but >> about going about >> interpreting. I think. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael > > >> >> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> So after reading the article and >> the e-mail discussion I'm beginning >> >> to think there is a really big issue here that >> I am trying to grapple with, >> especially in terms of boundary objects (which >> I admittedly do not >> understand very well). And it relates to the >> metaphor of the table (both >> as discussed by Larry and Ingold as >> interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in >> the museum should the place be set up as >> affordances, perceived >> affordances, or constraints? It seems the >> museum in the study has >> potential affordances for the users. The >> cultural historical moment >> (unable to think of any other word) of the >> museum sets the context, meaning >> those walking through the museum are going to >> be restricted by the >> historical and cultural boundaries leading up >> to the art work, along with >> the expectations and needs of the individuals >> moving through the museum, >> but they will come across objects/artifacts >> that they think meets the needs >> of their particular journeys. The posing >> becomes both an internalization >> and externalization of the thinking (or are >> they one continuum at this >> point?) in which they both make sense of the >> object in terms of their own >> meaning and needs and also try and communicate >> what they found, leaving a >> potential trails for others. >> >> An example that has stayed with me >> for years. Living in New York I >> >> used to go to the Museum of Modern Art on a >> semi-regular basis (in large >> part to try and meet women, always >> unsuccessful). I would often visit the >> Jackson Pollock corner. I would look and it >> would always be meaningful to >> me and I would move one quickly. Once, soon >> after graduating college and >> unemployed and about as frustrated as I'd ever >> been I viewed the same >> paintings. At that moment Pollock made sense >> to me, a deep emotional punch >> - the paintings became objects that could >> bridge my rage, sadness and fear >> to the next moment in my life. There is no >> way a designer could have >> planned this affordance. It was based on the >> movement not just through the >> museum but my life. I think back to what my >> gestures, or even posing might >> have been at that moment. A slumping in to >> myself, an internalization >> perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of >> rage. But perhaps a posture >> also that said stay away. The place I created >> in that moment was one that >> included me and whatever demons Jackson >> Pollock fought with. >> >> Or should museums should be >> designed for what Don Norman >> refers to as >> >> perceived affordances? The table that is set >> up can be one of perceived >> affordances. What I grab for the spoon >> because its shape makes sense in my >> need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes >> from cultural history setting a >> general context - Jackson Pollock is a >> sanctioned way to bridge emotions, >> to actually setting the trajectory of the >> act. I sit at a table, I want to >> eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule >> systems, I know what I need at >> that moment and look for objects that fit my >> needs. Is the room in the >> article about perceived affordances. Should >> the museum be designed for >> perceived affordances. A person coming upon >> an object may be thinking this >> because of what it means in our society to be >> walking through a museum. >> The object offers an opportunity to make >> communicative gestures, such as >> recreating the posture of The Thinker the >> authors refer to. I have seen >> many shows, movies where this happens, from >> movies from the 1940s to the >> Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of what we >> do with art objects in a >> museum, we gesture to both understand and >> communicate. >> >> Or should museums be designed as >> constraints. In the Metropolitan >> >> Museum of Art (sorry for the New York centric >> places but that's where I >> spent most of my museum life) the rooms are >> set up very, very carefully, so >> that in many ways the objects (at least are >> meant to I think) to constrain >> your thinking, so that you are responding to a >> certain period or school of >> art, understanding how it all fits together. The >> table metaphor fits here >> as well I think. Does the table constrain our >> actions, limiting to certain >> types of behavior (use only certain types of >> forks for certain types of >> food). >> >> Okay, too much I know. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman= >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> = >> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On >> Behalf Of Rolf Steier >> >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 6:58 AM >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity; mike cole; >> >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thank you for your thoughts Larry, >> >> I wanted to pick up on your >> suggestion of the table metaphor >> because I >> >> think that's really interesting. I believe you >> are proposing the shared >> meal as analogous to the kind of orientation >> work (or perhaps Leigh Star >> might consider this translation or >> pre-translation work?) that precedes the >> task at hand (in the case of our study, the >> task is design). Excerpt 3 from >> our study might be relevant here, when in turn >> 6, the curator turns to the >> researcher, leans in, and points in order to >> create a shared visual field. >> >> The curator and the researcher can >> now orient towards the existing >> >> gallery in order to imagine future, possible >> changes in the gallery. The >> curator is in a sense extending an invitation >> to sit down at the same table >> to be able to share his vision for the gallery. >> >> This shared meal might of course >> also be considered designed. Ingold ( >> *Making*) actually uses this same >> table metaphor to demonstrate the >> >> facilitation of activity as an aspect of >> design - *"Everyday design catches >> the narrative and pins it down, establishing a >> kind of choreography for the >> ensuing permanence that allows it to proceed >> from the moment you sit down >> to eat. In such a straightforward task as >> laying the table - in enrolling >> into your relation bowl and spoon, milk jug >> and cereal box - you are >> designing breakfast."* >> >> There is an improvisational >> quality to the bodily/performative >> >> orientation work that is maybe not captured by >> the shared expectations of >> sitting down to a meal. But at the same time, >> we can also consider the >> workspace of the multidisciplinary design team >> as designed in the same way >> that the meal is designed in order to support >> the objective of the meeting. >> That is, the, design team must first engage in >> a place-making activity for >> their collaborative setting in order to attend >> to the design of the >> exhibition space. The designers set the table >> with a white board, sketches >> and design ideas, perhaps some coffee... etc., >> before turning to the task >> of imagining the future exhibition. >> >> Lubomir, you asked - *"who are the >> placemakers -- the architects or >> >> the USERS of designed/created/socially >> produced spaces?" *I think this is >> difficult to answer because both architect and >> user play a role in the >> place-making process. The architects embed >> possible meanings (if place and >> meaning are analogous than perhaps these might >> be considered 'place >> >> potentials') that only emerge >> through the activity of the users. I'm >> >> only thinking through this now, so feel free >> to elaborate or to disagree! >> >> Rolf >> >> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:28 PM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil < >> >> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no > >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >> >> On to your question, I am >> tempted to stretch a bit >> across frameworks >> and answer that, the >> difference between the process >> of performing an >> activity in space and >> developing a sense of place >> would be akin to the >> difference between an >> operation and an action as per >> Activity theory. >> >> Again, we must be careful on >> the distinction between space >> as a sort >> of objective geometrical >> coordinate, or space as not >> becoming a part >> >> of "an" >> >> experience (in Dewey's sense). >> In the first sense, the sentence >> "performing an activity in >> space" makes only sense when >> talking about >> geometrical practices, for >> example; one may think that in >> some >> engineering practices, it is >> possible to orient to space as >> space, as >> a coordinate. BUT still, the >> experience of being doing such >> practice, >> if it has import to further >> development in the person, it >> must be >> refracted through the person's >> experience; there must be >> involvement, >> and therefore placemaking. In >> the second case, we might >> think of us >> performing some activity >> within taking much of it, >> without noticing we >> are doing. It is in this sense >> that I do the bridge with >> operations >> >> versus actions. >> >> I would not have many problems >> in associating place with >> meaning and >> placemaking with >> meaning-making, although I >> personally would be >> careful if doing so, >> emphasizing the situational >> and distributed >> nature of the process that >> placemaking attempts to capture. >> >> Hope this helps >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> > > >> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Rolf >> Steier; eXtended Mind, Culture, >> >> Activity >> >> Cc: mike cole; >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Thank you Alfredo, >> >> By the way, I should have >> started my mail with an >> appreciation for >> your article and Mike's choice >> to bring it to our attention. >> >> Now it is almost clear how you >> use the word and conceptualize the >> phenomenon. I would >> respectfully ask you for a few >> more things: what >> is the difference between the >> process of performing an >> activity in >> space and developing a sense >> of place. I personally >> interpret place in >> terms of appropriation of >> space in the process of human >> activity and >> the subsequent meaning making >> which has existential >> importance for the >> individual. The phenomenon of >> place is on par with the >> phenomenon of >> meaning and placemaking is a >> process on par with meaning >> making. How >> do you position yourself >> regarding such conceptualization? >> >> On a similar note, who are the >> placemakers -- the architects >> or the >> USERS of >> designed/created/socially >> produced spaces? >> >> By the way, I might be >> stretching too much the part >> on place and >> distracting from other aspects >> of your wonderful article. >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil >> [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no >> ] >> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 >> 4:31 PM >> To: Lubomir Savov Popov; Rolf >> Steier; eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Cc: mike cole; >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The > > From preiss.xmca@gmail.com Mon Jul 20 06:17:31 2015 From: preiss.xmca@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:17:31 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Provocative song In-Reply-To: <0C242B7B-1ACB-468B-9590-D5EE71F5955C@gmail.com> References: <0C242B7B-1ACB-468B-9590-D5EE71F5955C@gmail.com> Message-ID: I did not see this song as making a contrast between abstract and concrete but between irrelevant and relevant school knowledge. Of course, none of us would agree with the call to not stay at school. That is quite an impractical choice, indeed. I prefer to think of that hashtag as don't let knowledge stay death at school and the song as a call to a more relevant curriculum. Of course there is nothing new in it but the medium, may be. Still that the message resonates with many says a lot about the awful state of formal education these days. On Monday, July 20, 2015, Lara Beaty wrote: > I would not venture a guess at what the musician?s initial intent was, but > his explanations that emerged after overwhelming attention throughout the > internet is an interesting development. As he said in the video Bill > posted, there wouldn?t be a conversation if he titled the rap something > less provocative. That at least one school has responded demonstrates both > the possibility of individual and institutional development provoked by > what might have just been viewed as yet another kid hating school. > > Best, > Lara > > > > > > On Jul 19, 2015, at 11:20 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > It?s really ?The Tables Turned? again, isn?t it? Yet one of the most > > practical things that a teenager can learn in school is the intimate way > in > > which knowledge that seems purely abstract is linked to everyday life. > Like > > ?The Tables Turned?, the medium contradicts the message. The message is > > really an appeal for the concrete, the particular, and the real against > > knowledge which is abstract, general, and merely potential. And yet the > > medium is?rap lyrics, Youtube and the internet. > > > > > > Rap lyrics are full of abstractions. Just as an example, the list of > > ?practical? things we don?t learn in school that most purely abstract of > > all concepts, human rights. Youtube is completely general?that is what > > allows him to get tens of thousands of ?likes? and reach millions of > > people. And of course the programme he is pushing is mere potential, and > > the internet is not real at all: there is no such place. In the end, what > > he is really saying is just: "like this", "don't like that". > > > > > > Meh. Feh. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:17 AM, Daniel Hyman < > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > >> For those with a fondness for text, and with all appropriate > incantations > >> to the gods of fair use: > >> > >> https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Boyinaband/Don-t-Stay-in-School > >> > >> As someone who loves being educated (no quotes) on virtually any topic, > but > >> found the how-to knowledge offered to novice teachers (at least in New > >> York), falling short of what a practicing educator needs to know, I can > >> relate to the song's sense of painful unpreparedness, in my field. Not > to > >> the sense that public schools must (or in some domains can) teach how to > >> make all personal moral choices, or that all subjects must be practical, > >> e.g. being a bank customer (and no "impractical" subjects, e.g. math, > >> underpin them), or that home life need not inculcate an interest in > current > >> events, history, or politics. > >> > >> So to me, the song is easy to reject at first, but on reflection... > >> > >> On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 at 7:54 PM, Bill Kerr > wrote: > >> > >>> Also, > >>> Reacting to ?Don?t Stay in School? hate comments > > >>> > >>> some of the core issues for discussion are identified there IMO > >>> > >>> Equal rights and democracy would have appeal to disempowered students > but > >>> how can abstract maths be made more interesting, a more difficult > >> question. > >>> It may not be possible to make some very important stuff more > >> interesting. > >>> Marx complained about having to study the "economic shit". > >>> > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:11 AM, Lara Beaty > wrote: > >>> > >>>> And here?s an interesting follow-up: > >>>> Holy crap, a school actually listened! > . Thanks for this link! > >>>> Something to definitely use with my students to provoke a discussion. > >>>> > >>>> Best, > >>>> Lara > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Jul 19, 2015, at 6:28 PM, David Preiss > > >>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Dear colleagues, > >>>>> > >>>>> Some may like this song, some others hate it. It sounds to me like a > >>>> worth > >>>>> expression of many things going wrong with contenporary schools > >>>> everywhere. > >>>>> I am glad to see this coming from the younger generation as adult > >> talk > >>>>> about education scarcely listen what kids and young have to say about > >>>> what > >>>>> is being done to them at school. (I don't support the final statement > >>> of > >>>>> the song, of course; still find the message in the bottle quite on > >>>> target). > >>>>> > >>>>> Boyinaband - Don't Stay in School (Sub Espa?ol) > > >>>>> > >>>>> A bit of a renewed version of Pink Floyd's The Wall in a new genre. > >>> For > >>>>> those of you exploring new expresions, may be worth of your time. > >>>>> > >>>>> David > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 20 06:27:28 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 23:27:28 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> Message-ID: <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some social theory into domains of activity (scientific and work collaborations for example) where the participants naively think they are collaborating on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, but also the ideological context. In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers collaborate with the old couple according to rules and regulations, communications resources, technology, finance and so on, which in the unnamed country, the old couple are apparently cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it is those rules and regulations, etc., which are the "boundary objects"? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > I think that a particular institution or government system > could potentially be a boundary object depending on how > the concept is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) > interpretive flexibility 2) material/ organizational > structure and 3) scale/ granularity in which the concept > is useful. > > She argues that boundary objects are typically most useful > at the organizational level - so I would say that one > would have to justify the utility of applying the concept > to a particular institution, as opposed to, say, an object > within an institution. > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Phew! > So would it be correct to describe the government > institutions and political system are "boundary objects"? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > Hi Andy - > Good catch! I believe that is a typo and should > read "despite a LACK of consensus". Thank you for > pointing that out. > > > I also wanted to follow up on a suggestion that > Greg made in the other thread suggesting we look > at David McNeill's work. I had only been familiar > with his earlier work on gesture, but after doing > a bit of reading over the weekend, I found his > concept of 'unexpected metaphors' potentially > useful in dealing with some of my questions.( > http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf > ) > > Here is a relevant quote describing unexpected > metaphors as a form of gesture: > > /The logic is that unexpected metaphors arise > from the > need to create images when the culture does > not have > them readily at hand. These images join linguistic > content as growth points and differentiate what > Vygotsky (1987) called psychological > predicates, or > points of contrast in the immediate ongoing > context of > speaking. Unexpected metaphors, precisely > because they > are outside the conventions of language and > culture, > can capture abstractions in novel ways and > provide the > fluidity of thought and language that is the > essence > of ongoing discourse./ > > > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of > cooperation despite consensus"? > p. 131, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > Are we allowed to ask questions about our > paper as > well? I hope so! > > For a little context -in our paper, we > identified > particular kinds of > episodes in which participants from different > disciplines seek coherence > and continuity of shared representations > through > bodily action. These > actions include gesture, movement and physical > performance linking the > present material artifacts to objects of > design. > Most of these episodes > seem to involve some form of improvisation, > resourcefulness or creativity, > and I'm not fully sure how to characterize > these > aspects of the > interactions. In most cases, the > participants seem > to be searching for the > best words or material representation to > convey a > particular intention - > when this becomes problematic or limiting > - they > almost fall back on what > is available - these improvised bodily > performances - as a way of > maintaining continuity, and of inviting > co-participants into a shared and > imagined space. These bodily actions don't > seem to > begin the proposals, but > are in a sense *discovered* by the > participants. > > > I think there is something really fascinating > about this kind of creativity > and resourcefulness in interaction that > could be > explored more deeply - and > that I'm having trouble articulating. > Maybe some > of you have some thoughts > on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked > about this > a bit before so maybe you > can add a little clarity to my question. > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > >> > wrote: > > Alfredo, > Thank you very much for the sketch of your > roots. I taught English in > Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years > back in > the early 70s, just before > Franco died. (He died the day I > boarded the > plane back to the U.S.) Place > and language are interesting, > especially where > language varieties meet. > Boundaries. I know mostly from my > familiarity > with the music of Catalunya > and Mallorca that the speech > communities in > each of those places treasure > their unique languages (Catalan and > Mallorquin), yet see a commonality > vis-a-vis their separateness from > Castilian > Spanish, the national language > of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel > between your work on boundary > objects, where individual persons > collaborate > to create spaces, AND > boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of > people who live in real spaces. > I am thinking, among other things, of > indigeneity, a big topic here in New > Mexico, with so many Native Americans. > Assymetries of power. Bullying. > Testing and curriculum become > instruments of > war by other means. I hope my > tone does not distract from, nor > diminish, the > optimism created by this > thread. Yet I think that optimism is so > precious because of the ground (the > world) of the dialog. > Henry > > > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil > >> > > wrote: > > Well, you could say that I am partly > Catalan. I grew up in the province > > of Valencia, where Catalan language is > official language together with > Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the > county) and Catalonia are > different regional counties, Catalan > is spoken > in Catalonia, Valencia, and > the Balear Islands. Some call the three > together as the Catalan Countries. > I don't like borders, but I respect > and enjoy > cultural diversity. > > Standardized testing, and the whole > assumptions behind it, are an issue > > also in Spain and in Catalonia; but > education > has been so battered during > the last years of right-wing > government that I > the debate have been more > about means and access than about > contents and > aims. Which in some sense > may be good because it moves the > debates away > from performance. But I have > been living outside of Spain for eight > years > now, so I am not the best to > update you on this either. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> on > behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > >> > > Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, > Yes, you have answered my question > very > nicely! I especially appreciate > > that you were willing to wrestle with my > question, despite your lack of > familiarity with the issues here in > the U.S. > Am I wrong, or are you > Catalan? In which case your experience in > Catalunya would take you to a > different place in critiquing > schooling there, > though not necessarily > unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on > boundary objects. I just met for > the second day in a row with a friend > who is > the liaison between our public > school district and a children?s science > museum called Explora. I feel like > I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a > mixed metaphor! > > Henry > > > On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, > Alfredo > Jornet Gil > > >> > > wrote: > > I am sorry, Henry, but I am > not very > familiar with high-stakes > > standardized testing (as different to > standardized testing in general) or > with common core (which I quickly read > is an > issue in US). But I would say > that, if (school) curricula were to be > consistent with the view of > education as the practice of creating > conditions for certain attitudes and > dispositions to emerge--which is what > I was > suggesting in the paragraph you > copy--curricula would not be so much about > standardized contents, but about > human sensitivities and relations. So, > I would > say, no, standardized > testing is not in principle in line > with what > I was trying to say. > > I was trying to make a distinction > between trying to design someone's > > particular experience, and trying to > design > conditions for the development > of attitudes and orientations. The > first is > likely impossible. The second > seems to make more sense. > > One may of course wonder > whether those > attitudes and orientations can > > be considered general, and then form > part of > standardize measures instead > of the traditional "contents and > skills". But > measuring assumes some > quantitative increment in a particular > aspect > as the result of learning. > Growth and development, however, are about > qualitative change. So, as soon > as you start measuring you would be > missing > growth and development. So, > again, no. I would not say that > high-stakes > standardized testing is in line > with what I was trying to say. > > I hope I have answered your > question, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> on > behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > >> > > Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, you say: > > "However, we cannot aim at > determining > any particular > > situation/experience. The same may be said > about EDUCATION. We cannot > intend to communicate the curriculum > and make > it the content of the > students' experience in the way we > intend. But > we can try to create the > conditions for certain attitudes and > dispositions to emerge." > > Would you say that high-stakes > standardized testing is in > line with > > your construal of curriculum design? > How about > common core? > > Henry > > > > > > > On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, > Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > >> > > wrote: > > Thanks a lot for the > clarifications. I see now > why it > may be said that > > designers can aim at designing for > constrains > but not for affordances. I > see that this way of talking is part of a > designers' way to get things > done, and that it may indeed be an > effective > way to design for > place-making, as in the example that > Michael > gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of > what we report in our study is about > designers > talking about how spatial > features might afford some experiences > in the > museum while constraining > others. > > I must admit, however, that I > still consider the distinction > > problematic from an analytical perspective > whenever our object of study is > experience, situated action, or design as > situated practice. A more correct > way to talk is that affordances and > constrains > are the positive and > negative sides/interpretations of a single > unitary category. As an actual > and concrete phenomenon, walking into > a musuem > implies both affordances and > constrains at the same time, whether > intended > or not. Which makes me wonder > whether other terminology, such as > Ingold's > notion of "correspondence," > might be more appropriated when we > talk about > how materials and actions > become entangled into particular > trajectories. > > In any case, and as Rolf > emphasizes, what the > designers in > our study > > indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being > in the > museum. Imagination versus > prediction may be an interesting topic > emerging here for further inquiry > into design work. > > Another important (and > related) > issue that I think is > emerging here > > has to do with the level of generality at > which design intentions can be > expected to work (just as Bateson > argued with > regard to prediction). At the > level of generic social processes, and > given a > particular > cultural-historical background, we as > designers may try to make some > generic situations more likely to > occur than > others (facilitating that more > or less people end up together in a given > place). However, we cannot aim at > determining any particular > situation/experience. The same may be > said about > EDUCATION. We cannot intend to > communicate the > curriculum and make it the > content of the students' experience in > the way > we intend. But we can try to > create the conditions for certain > attitudes > and dispositions to emerge. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >> > > Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I think Rolf may have > addressed > the question of the > differences > > between affordances and constraints in his > post. The way he described the > designers as possibly setting up the > corner > with Pollock at MOMA. It was a > long time ago so I'm not sure if this > is the > way it was or the way I > remember it, but let's just believe > this is > the way it was. The painting, > I think there were three were set up in a > corner off a main corridor. The > lighting was dark, which if you have > ever been > to MOMA is different, in > many other parts of the museum there > is a good > deal of natural light (there > was this great fountain, I wonder if it is > still there). The paintings > were on tripods rather than hung on > the walls > and they were surrounded on > three sides by walls. All of these I > think > would be considered restraints > - pushing me in to the works rather than > stepping back away. It was > impossible for more than two or three > people > to view the paintings at one > time and movement was limited, so > there were > fewer chances for social > interactions (you were not going to > pick up > anybody looking at Jackson > Pollock). The atmosphere was > brooding, making > it more likely that viewers > would move towards internal > reflection. All > of these were constraints that > canalized perspectives and feelings > viewing > the paintings. You really had > only two choices, you moved in to the > paintings or you moved on, which I > had done every previous time coming > upon them. > > The painting itself though > became > an affordances, an object > at the > > nexus of my journey through the > museum, where > I was in my life, and my > abilities to perceive the painitings. > This > was something that could not be > designed I think because nobody could > think > that moment was going to > happen. So then what is a perceived > affordance. Way back when there was > also a Manet room. It was a round > room with > different variations of his > water lilies in a circle. Almost the > exact > opposite in constraints it was > large, airy, a lot of natural light. > If you > were looking to brood you went > somewhere else. In the middle of the > room was > a wooden structure (not an > obvious bench), but you realized as random > colors dissolved into water > lilies that you wanted to sit down. You > naturally moved to the center of > the room and sat (wondering if a guard > would > come and tell you it was > actually an important piece of art and you > should get off). The designer > anticipates a desire to soak in the > room, to > almost get dizzy in the > lights, and included in the design the > piece > of wood that will have the > perceived affordance for sitting, changing > your concept of time and space. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >] On Behalf > Of Alfredo > > Jornet Gil > > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, > 2015 3:01 PM > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thanks Michael, > > I think we are saying the same > things, indeed, or at > least more or > > less. I am quite certain that Bateson > referred > to energy, and that he used > the mentioned examples (or similar > ones) to > show how the energy that moves > the pig is not a direct transfer of energy > from the kick, whereas in the > case of the billiard balls, the > movement of > one ball is caused by the > energy that the kicking ball brings. I > might > be wrong in the context within > which Bateson was discussing the > example, and > I see that your account is in > that regard is more accurate. But the > point is > the same: you can not intend > the outcomes of a system by addressing > only > its parts as if they were > connected directly, in a linear causal > fashion; as if the whole was the sum > of its parts. I do see a link with > Vygotsky's > rejection of S-R and his > inclusion of a third element that > transforms > the whole system. > > But I totally agree with your > comments on design > intentions as they > > relate to ecology, and I, as I know > also Rolf > does, also like very much the > notion of ecology to address these issues. > > If I read you correctly, and > citing Don Norman (whose > work I > ignore), > > you suggest the possibility that the > relations > between design intentions > and actual experience could be thought > of in > terms of different levels? > That one thing is to design for what is > general, but that we cannot design > for the particular. Is that right? If > so, I > think that Bateson had a > similar argument on prediction, does > not him? > That we can predict on > general levels (e.g. population), but > not at > the level of the particular > (e.g., individual). I haven't gone > that way, > but seems a promising road to > consider this jumps between levels of > generality or scales. > > Finally, I am not sure if > I get > what you mean when you say > that we can > > design for constrains but not for > affordances. > I still see that the one > presupposes the other; you can > separate them > in talk, but, to me, in actual > experience, a constrain is an > affordance and > vice-versa. I don't see how > the road has any inherent constrain > that could > not be an affordance at the > same time. Of course, if you take the > normative stance that roads are for > cars driving through them, you may be > right. > But if we think of roads as > asphalt on the ground, as yet more > ground only > of a different shape, > texture, and color, how is that a > constrain > but not an affordance? Or an > affordance but not a constrain? Of course, > culture constrains once you are > within the road and you are driving. > But then, > the constrain is not in the > road, as you seem to suggest, but in the > journey; in the journeyman that > carries some cultural way of orienting and > affectively relating to its > environment so that particular > constrains are > taken for granted despite the > possibility of being otherwise. But I > might > not have thought it well/long > enough and of course I might be wrong. > I would > like to understand your > position here better. > > Thanks! > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >> > > Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I have been reading Bateson > through a cybernetics lens > lately > (Bateson > > along with Lewin and his wife Margaret > Mead > were part of the original Sears > conferences) and I'm not sure that's > right or > I am victim to the "when you > have a hammer, everything looks like a > nail" > but.... > > I think Bateson was > arguing with > those looking to apply the > more > > physical/mathematical origins of > cybernetics > to human or really (pace the > pig story) and system that moves > beyond simple > physical feedback loops. I > think his larger point is that > everything has > a response within the larger > feedback system that exists but we > cannot go - > what Bateson refers to as > MIND. Attempts to create and control > feedback > loops, to try and design a > system for specific types of feedback is a > dangerous proposition. > > This I think is the reason > that > affordances really can't > be designed > > into an ecology, only a recognition of the > context in which actions are > taking place (and I say this having no > idea > what Gibson's relationship to > cybernetics was). Taking Larry's > example of > the girl it is perhaps also > likely that the girl could have taken the > fixing of hair as a criticism, an > attack, and it might have destroyed her > confidence. Both make sense in > terms of feedback loops, but only ad > hoc. So > if a designer does in some > way design that experience into the > action, > even without meaning they are > taking a large chance, because they do not > know the trajectory it will > take. We simply need objects that are > part of > our journey, part of the > larger context but not designed for > purpose, > for feedback. There is no > assumption about trajectory. > > I think Don Norman sort of > muddied > the waters on this, but in an > > interesting way. That we can assume > people > are going to want to do certain > things in a very general environment - > when you enter a dark room you want > light, so it is possible to design objects > that meet that need that we are > more likely to find in the moment that > we need > them. But I think that is > very different from the idea of > specifically > guiding feedback loops that > even take generalized experience in a > certain > direction. I am thinking > about Dewey, and he makes a similar > argument > to Bateson with his concept of > transactions. Although he does seem > to think > that it is possible to create > a larger field of action so we can see at > least local interrelationships. > But his idea of experience is also > very much > one of discovery based on > needs at the immediate moment - social > relations act as a vehicle for these > discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing > before Gibson and for most of his > life before cybernetics. I also > wonder what > he thought of cybernetics). > > I think I disagree with you, > constraints are not about the > journey but > > about the road. If you build a road > on the > side of the river you are > constrained because no matter what, > you cannot > turn right. Your direction > has already been partially determined > by the > designer of the road. But the > mistake we make is in thinking that also > controls the trajectory of the > individual's journey. The effect of > designers > on trajectories of action is > important, but limited. > > The primary place that > designers > have influence on > affordances it > > seems to me is by being able to create a > unique context for an individual's > and a group's that limit possible > trajectories > on an individual's journey. > But we should never mistake those > constraints > for affordances. I think > Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. > Perhaps this is what you are > saying Alfredo. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > >=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >] On > Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 > 12:38 PM > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended > Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I'd like to follow up on > Michael's > post by asking a question: > Are not > > affordances presupposed by constraints > and are > not constraints presupposed > by affordances? If so, I would wonder > whether > it makes sense to ask whether > museums should be designed for > affordances and > constraints. > > What I think is clear from the > anecdote that you bring > about the > > Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever > EXPERIENCE emerges from being > somewhere (i.e. being someone at some > time in > some place) cannot be > INTENDED. And I think this applies both to > designers and users, to those > who set things up for you to > experience and to > you, who could not foresee > what your experience was going to turn you > into before you go through it. > > I think that the big issue > that > you bring on the table (to > continue > > with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a > difference between physical > relations and social relations, and > the idea > of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson > noticed that the relations that are the > subject matter in physics are not > the same as those that are the subject > matter > in communication. He noticed > that physical relations (relations > that are > the object of study of physics) > transfer energy in direct manners: a > billiard > ball hits another ball and we > can anticipate the exact speed and > direction > that the second ball will take > based on the energy that is in the > system ball > + ball + someone hitting. In > living beings, the things are different. > Bateson explained, if we kick a > pig's ass (I think he used this somehow > bizarre example) the reaction of > the pig is not accounted for by the energy > that is contained in the kick, > at least not in a direct manner. The > energy > that moves the pig is from a > different source. Before Bateson, it was > Vygotsky and his notion of > mediation who would most clearly state > that > social relations are not > direct, but mediated. > > So, how can design go > about this? > If we, along with Dewey and > > Vygotsky, consider experience to be a > unity of > person and environment, and > we assume as well that this is a > social (not > just individual) category, and > that how a situation is experienced is > also > refracted through the social > relations within which we engage, the most > designers can do is to foster > social relations go on, giving > afordances to > prcesses of signification, > without intending to embed meanings. It is > about affordances/constraints, > but not about how to interpret > something, but > about going about > interpreting. I think. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > >> > > Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 > To: Rolf Steier; eXtended > Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > So after reading the > article and > the e-mail discussion I'm > beginning > > to think there is a really big issue > here that > I am trying to grapple with, > especially in terms of boundary > objects (which > I admittedly do not > understand very well). And it relates > to the > metaphor of the table (both > as discussed by Larry and Ingold as > interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in > the museum should the place be set up as > affordances, perceived > affordances, or constraints? It seems the > museum in the study has > potential affordances for the users. The > cultural historical moment > (unable to think of any other word) of the > museum sets the context, meaning > those walking through the museum are > going to > be restricted by the > historical and cultural boundaries > leading up > to the art work, along with > the expectations and needs of the > individuals > moving through the museum, > but they will come across > objects/artifacts > that they think meets the needs > of their particular journeys. The posing > becomes both an internalization > and externalization of the thinking > (or are > they one continuum at this > point?) in which they both make sense > of the > object in terms of their own > meaning and needs and also try and > communicate > what they found, leaving a > potential trails for others. > > An example that has stayed > with me > for years. Living in New > York I > > used to go to the Museum of Modern Art > on a > semi-regular basis (in large > part to try and meet women, always > unsuccessful). I would often visit the > Jackson Pollock corner. I would look > and it > would always be meaningful to > me and I would move one quickly. > Once, soon > after graduating college and > unemployed and about as frustrated as > I'd ever > been I viewed the same > paintings. At that moment Pollock > made sense > to me, a deep emotional punch > - the paintings became objects that could > bridge my rage, sadness and fear > to the next moment in my life. There > is no > way a designer could have > planned this affordance. It was based > on the > movement not just through the > museum but my life. I think back to > what my > gestures, or even posing might > have been at that moment. A slumping > in to > myself, an internalization > perhaps of a socially sanctioned symbol of > rage. But perhaps a posture > also that said stay away. The place I > created > in that moment was one that > included me and whatever demons Jackson > Pollock fought with. > > Or should museums should be > designed for what Don Norman > refers to as > > perceived affordances? The table that > is set > up can be one of perceived > affordances. What I grab for the spoon > because its shape makes sense in my > need/desire to eat cereal. The focus goes > from cultural history setting a > general context - Jackson Pollock is a > sanctioned way to bridge emotions, > to actually setting the trajectory of the > act. I sit at a table, I want to > eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned rule > systems, I know what I need at > that moment and look for objects that > fit my > needs. Is the room in the > article about perceived affordances. > Should > the museum be designed for > perceived affordances. A person > coming upon > an object may be thinking this > because of what it means in our > society to be > walking through a museum. > The object offers an opportunity to make > communicative gestures, such as > recreating the posture of The Thinker the > authors refer to. I have seen > many shows, movies where this happens, > from > movies from the 1940s to the > Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of > what we > do with art objects in a > museum, we gesture to both understand and > communicate. > > Or should museums be > designed as > constraints. In the > Metropolitan > > Museum of Art (sorry for the New York > centric > places but that's where I > spent most of my museum life) the > rooms are > set up very, very carefully, so > that in many ways the objects (at > least are > meant to I think) to constrain > your thinking, so that you are > responding to a > certain period or school of > art, understanding how it all fits > together. The table metaphor fits here > as well I think. Does the table > constrain our > actions, limiting to certain > types of behavior (use only certain > types of > forks for certain types of > food). > > Okay, too much I know. > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > >=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >] On > Behalf Of Rolf Steier > > Sent: Wednesday, July 15, > 2015 6:58 AM > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity; mike cole; > > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you for your > thoughts Larry, > > I wanted to pick up on your > suggestion of the table > metaphor > because I > > think that's really interesting. I > believe you > are proposing the shared > meal as analogous to the kind of > orientation > work (or perhaps Leigh Star > might consider this translation or > pre-translation work?) that precedes the > task at hand (in the case of our > study, the > task is design). Excerpt 3 from > our study might be relevant here, when > in turn > 6, the curator turns to the > researcher, leans in, and points in > order to > create a shared visual field. > > The curator and the > researcher can > now orient towards the > existing > > gallery in order to imagine future, > possible > changes in the gallery. The > curator is in a sense extending an > invitation > to sit down at the same table > to be able to share his vision for the > gallery. > > This shared meal might of > course > also be considered > designed. Ingold ( > *Making*) actually uses > this same > table metaphor to > demonstrate the > > facilitation of activity as an aspect of > design - *"Everyday design catches > the narrative and pins it down, > establishing a > kind of choreography for the > ensuing permanence that allows it to > proceed > from the moment you sit down > to eat. In such a straightforward task as > laying the table - in enrolling > into your relation bowl and spoon, > milk jug > and cereal box - you are > designing breakfast."* > > There is an improvisational > quality to the > bodily/performative > > orientation work that is maybe not > captured by > the shared expectations of > sitting down to a meal. But at the > same time, > we can also consider the > workspace of the multidisciplinary > design team > as designed in the same way > that the meal is designed in order to > support > the objective of the meeting. > That is, the, design team must first > engage in > a place-making activity for > their collaborative setting in order > to attend > to the design of the > exhibition space. The designers set > the table > with a white board, sketches > and design ideas, perhaps some > coffee... etc., > before turning to the task > of imagining the future exhibition. > > Lubomir, you asked - *"who > are the > placemakers -- the > architects or > > the USERS of designed/created/socially > produced spaces?" *I think this is > difficult to answer because both > architect and > user play a role in the > place-making process. The architects embed > possible meanings (if place and > meaning are analogous than perhaps > these might > be considered 'place > > potentials') that only emerge > through the activity of > the users. I'm > > only thinking through this now, so > feel free > to elaborate or to disagree! > > Rolf > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at > 11:28 PM, > Alfredo Jornet Gil < > > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no > >> > > wrote: > > Thanks a lot, Lubomir! > > On to your question, I am > tempted to stretch a bit > across frameworks > and answer that, the > difference between the > process > of performing an > activity in space and > developing a sense of > place > would be akin to the > difference between an > operation and an > action as per > Activity theory. > > Again, we must be > careful on > the distinction > between space > as a sort > of objective geometrical > coordinate, or space > as not > becoming a part > > of "an" > > experience (in Dewey's > sense). > In the first sense, > the sentence > "performing an activity in > space" makes only > sense when > talking about > geometrical practices, for > example; one may think > that in > some > engineering practices, > it is > possible to orient to > space as > space, as > a coordinate. BUT > still, the > experience of being > doing such > practice, > if it has import to > further > development in the > person, it > must be > refracted through the > person's > experience; there must be > involvement, > and therefore > placemaking. In > the second case, we might > think of us > performing some activity > within taking much of it, > without noticing we > are doing. It is in > this sense > that I do the bridge with > operations > > versus actions. > > I would not have many > problems > in associating place with > meaning and > placemaking with > meaning-making, although I > personally would be > careful if doing so, > emphasizing the > situational > and distributed > nature of the process that > placemaking attempts > to capture. > > Hope this helps > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > > >> > Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 > To: Alfredo Jornet > Gil; Rolf > Steier; eXtended Mind, > Culture, > > Activity > > Cc: mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] > Re: The > Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Thank you Alfredo, > > By the way, I should have > started my mail with an > appreciation for > your article and > Mike's choice > to bring it to our > attention. > > Now it is almost clear > how you > use the word and > conceptualize the > phenomenon. I would > respectfully ask you > for a few > more things: what > is the difference > between the > process of performing an > activity in > space and developing a > sense > of place. I personally > interpret place in > terms of appropriation of > space in the process > of human > activity and > the subsequent meaning > making > which has existential > importance for the > individual. The > phenomenon of > place is on par with the > phenomenon of > meaning and > placemaking is a > process on par with > meaning > making. How > do you position yourself > regarding such > conceptualization? > > On a similar note, who > are the > placemakers -- the > architects > or the > USERS of > designed/created/socially > produced spaces? > > By the way, I might be > stretching too much > the part > on place and > distracting from other > aspects > of your wonderful article. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil > > [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no > > > >] > Sent: Tuesday, July > 14, 2015 > 4:31 PM > To: Lubomir Savov > Popov; Rolf > Steier; eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Cc: mike cole; > lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] > Re: The > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 20 06:49:51 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 23:49:51 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> References: <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> Message-ID: <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an interpretation which Thomas contests by showing photographs of far away places and explaining how well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of himself as a well-travelled and experiences man-of-the-world. Does that make better sense? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory and I'd > never heard of "boundary objects." It seems to me that > what BOs do is introduce some social theory into domains > of activity (scientific and work collaborations for > example) where the participants naively think they are > collaborating on neutral ground. So it is not just > granularity, but also the ideological context. > > In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers > collaborate with the old couple according to rules and > regulations, communications resources, technology, finance > and so on, which in the unnamed country, the old couple > are apparently cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that > here it is those rules and regulations, etc., which are > the "boundary objects"? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> I think that a particular institution or government >> system could potentially be a boundary object depending >> on how the concept is applied. Star describes three >> criteria: 1) interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >> organizational structure and 3) scale/ granularity in >> which the concept is useful. >> >> She argues that boundary objects are typically most >> useful at the organizational level - so I would say that >> one would have to justify the utility of applying the >> concept to a particular institution, as opposed to, say, >> an object within an institution. >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> Phew! >> So would it be correct to describe the government >> institutions and political system are "boundary >> objects"? >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> Hi Andy - >> Good catch! I believe that is a typo and should >> read "despite a LACK of consensus". Thank you for >> pointing that out. >> >> >> I also wanted to follow up on a suggestion that >> Greg made in the other thread suggesting we look >> at David McNeill's work. I had only been familiar >> with his earlier work on gesture, but after doing >> a bit of reading over the weekend, I found his >> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' potentially >> useful in dealing with some of my questions.( >> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >> ) >> >> Here is a relevant quote describing unexpected >> metaphors as a form of gesture: >> >> /The logic is that unexpected metaphors arise >> from the >> need to create images when the culture does >> not have >> them readily at hand. These images join >> linguistic >> content as growth points and differentiate what >> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >> predicates, or >> points of contrast in the immediate ongoing >> context of >> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, precisely >> because they >> are outside the conventions of language and >> culture, >> can capture abstractions in novel ways and >> provide the >> fluidity of thought and language that is the >> essence >> of ongoing discourse./ >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> wrote: >> >> Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of >> cooperation despite consensus"? >> p. 131, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> Are we allowed to ask questions about our >> paper as >> well? I hope so! >> >> For a little context -in our paper, we >> identified >> particular kinds of >> episodes in which participants from >> different >> disciplines seek coherence >> and continuity of shared representations >> through >> bodily action. These >> actions include gesture, movement and >> physical >> performance linking the >> present material artifacts to objects of >> design. >> Most of these episodes >> seem to involve some form of improvisation, >> resourcefulness or creativity, >> and I'm not fully sure how to characterize >> these >> aspects of the >> interactions. In most cases, the >> participants seem >> to be searching for the >> best words or material representation to >> convey a >> particular intention - >> when this becomes problematic or limiting >> - they >> almost fall back on what >> is available - these improvised bodily >> performances - as a way of >> maintaining continuity, and of inviting >> co-participants into a shared and >> imagined space. These bodily actions don't >> seem to >> begin the proposals, but >> are in a sense *discovered* by the >> participants. >> >> >> I think there is something really >> fascinating >> about this kind of creativity >> and resourcefulness in interaction that >> could be >> explored more deeply - and >> that I'm having trouble articulating. >> Maybe some >> of you have some thoughts >> on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked >> about this >> a bit before so maybe you >> can add a little clarity to my question. >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY >> SHONERD >> > >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Alfredo, >> Thank you very much for the sketch of >> your >> roots. I taught English in >> Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years >> back in >> the early 70s, just before >> Franco died. (He died the day I >> boarded the >> plane back to the U.S.) Place >> and language are interesting, >> especially where >> language varieties meet. >> Boundaries. I know mostly from my >> familiarity >> with the music of Catalunya >> and Mallorca that the speech >> communities in >> each of those places treasure >> their unique languages (Catalan and >> Mallorquin), yet see a commonality >> vis-a-vis their separateness from >> Castilian >> Spanish, the national language >> of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel >> between your work on boundary >> objects, where individual persons >> collaborate >> to create spaces, AND >> boundary objects ?negotiated? by >> groups of >> people who live in real spaces. >> I am thinking, among other things, of >> indigeneity, a big topic here in New >> Mexico, with so many Native Americans. >> Assymetries of power. Bullying. >> Testing and curriculum become >> instruments of >> war by other means. I hope my >> tone does not distract from, nor >> diminish, the >> optimism created by this >> thread. Yet I think that optimism is so >> precious because of the ground (the >> world) of the dialog. >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, >> Alfredo >> Jornet Gil > >> > >> >> >> wrote: >> >> Well, you could say that I am partly >> Catalan. I grew up in the province >> >> of Valencia, where Catalan language is >> official language together with >> Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia >> (the >> county) and Catalonia are >> different regional counties, Catalan >> is spoken >> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >> the Balear Islands. Some call the three >> together as the Catalan Countries. >> I don't like borders, but I respect >> and enjoy >> cultural diversity. >> >> Standardized testing, and the whole >> assumptions behind it, are an issue >> >> also in Spain and in Catalonia; but >> education >> has been so battered during >> the last years of right-wing >> government that I >> the debate have been more >> about means and access than about >> contents and >> aims. Which in some sense >> may be good because it moves the >> debates away >> from performance. But I have >> been living outside of Spain for eight >> years >> now, so I am not the best to >> update you on this either. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> > >> > >> on >> behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD > >> > >> >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, >> Yes, you have answered my question >> very >> nicely! I especially appreciate >> >> that you were willing to wrestle with my >> question, despite your lack of >> familiarity with the issues here in >> the U.S. >> Am I wrong, or are you >> Catalan? In which case your >> experience in >> Catalunya would take you to a >> different place in critiquing >> schooling there, >> though not necessarily >> unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on >> boundary objects. I just met for >> the second day in a row with a friend >> who is >> the liaison between our public >> school district and a children?s science >> museum called Explora. I feel like >> I?m swimming in this thread, talk >> about a >> mixed metaphor! >> >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, >> Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> >> > >> >> >> wrote: >> >> I am sorry, Henry, but I am >> not very >> familiar with high-stakes >> >> standardized testing (as different to >> standardized testing in general) or >> with common core (which I quickly read >> is an >> issue in US). But I would say >> that, if (school) curricula were to be >> consistent with the view of >> education as the practice of creating >> conditions for certain attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge--which is what >> I was >> suggesting in the paragraph you >> copy--curricula would not be so much >> about >> standardized contents, but about >> human sensitivities and relations. So, >> I would >> say, no, standardized >> testing is not in principle in line >> with what >> I was trying to say. >> >> I was trying to make a >> distinction >> between trying to design >> someone's >> >> particular experience, and trying to >> design >> conditions for the development >> of attitudes and orientations. The >> first is >> likely impossible. The second >> seems to make more sense. >> >> One may of course wonder >> whether those >> attitudes and orientations can >> >> be considered general, and then form >> part of >> standardize measures instead >> of the traditional "contents and >> skills". But >> measuring assumes some >> quantitative increment in a particular >> aspect >> as the result of learning. >> Growth and development, however, are >> about >> qualitative change. So, as soon >> as you start measuring you would be >> missing >> growth and development. So, >> again, no. I would not say that >> high-stakes >> standardized testing is in line >> with what I was trying to say. >> >> I hope I have answered your >> question, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> > >> > >> on >> behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD > >> > >> >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, you say: >> >> "However, we cannot aim at >> determining >> any particular >> >> situation/experience. The same may be >> said >> about EDUCATION. We cannot >> intend to communicate the curriculum >> and make >> it the content of the >> students' experience in the way we >> intend. But >> we can try to create the >> conditions for certain attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge." >> >> Would you say that high-stakes >> standardized testing is in >> line with >> >> your construal of curriculum design? >> How about >> common core? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > >> > >> >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot for the >> clarifications. I see now >> why it >> may be said that >> >> designers can aim at designing for >> constrains >> but not for affordances. I >> see that this way of talking is part >> of a >> designers' way to get things >> done, and that it may indeed be an >> effective >> way to design for >> place-making, as in the example that >> Michael >> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >> what we report in our study is about >> designers >> talking about how spatial >> features might afford some experiences >> in the >> museum while constraining >> others. >> >> I must admit, however, >> that I >> still consider the >> distinction >> >> problematic from an analytical >> perspective >> whenever our object of study is >> experience, situated action, or >> design as >> situated practice. A more correct >> way to talk is that affordances and >> constrains >> are the positive and >> negative sides/interpretations of a >> single >> unitary category. As an actual >> and concrete phenomenon, walking into >> a musuem >> implies both affordances and >> constrains at the same time, whether >> intended >> or not. Which makes me wonder >> whether other terminology, such as >> Ingold's >> notion of "correspondence," >> might be more appropriated when we >> talk about >> how materials and actions >> become entangled into particular >> trajectories. >> >> In any case, and as Rolf >> emphasizes, what the >> designers in >> our study >> >> indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being >> in the >> museum. Imagination versus >> prediction may be an interesting topic >> emerging here for further inquiry >> into design work. >> >> Another important (and >> related) >> issue that I think is >> emerging here >> >> has to do with the level of >> generality at >> which design intentions can be >> expected to work (just as Bateson >> argued with >> regard to prediction). At the >> level of generic social processes, and >> given a >> particular >> cultural-historical background, we as >> designers may try to make some >> generic situations more likely to >> occur than >> others (facilitating that more >> or less people end up together in a >> given >> place). However, we cannot aim at >> determining any particular >> situation/experience. The same may be >> said about >> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >> communicate the >> curriculum and make it the >> content of the students' experience in >> the way >> we intend. But we can try to >> create the conditions for certain >> attitudes >> and dispositions to emerge. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> > >> > >> on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael > >> > >> >> >> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I think Rolf may have >> addressed >> the question of the >> differences >> >> between affordances and constraints >> in his >> post. The way he described the >> designers as possibly setting up the >> corner >> with Pollock at MOMA. It was a >> long time ago so I'm not sure if this >> is the >> way it was or the way I >> remember it, but let's just believe >> this is >> the way it was. The painting, >> I think there were three were set up >> in a >> corner off a main corridor. The >> lighting was dark, which if you have >> ever been >> to MOMA is different, in >> many other parts of the museum there >> is a good >> deal of natural light (there >> was this great fountain, I wonder if >> it is >> still there). The paintings >> were on tripods rather than hung on >> the walls >> and they were surrounded on >> three sides by walls. All of these I >> think >> would be considered restraints >> - pushing me in to the works rather than >> stepping back away. It was >> impossible for more than two or three >> people >> to view the paintings at one >> time and movement was limited, so >> there were >> fewer chances for social >> interactions (you were not going to >> pick up >> anybody looking at Jackson >> Pollock). The atmosphere was >> brooding, making >> it more likely that viewers >> would move towards internal >> reflection. All >> of these were constraints that >> canalized perspectives and feelings >> viewing >> the paintings. You really had >> only two choices, you moved in to the >> paintings or you moved on, which I >> had done every previous time coming >> upon them. >> >> The painting itself though >> became >> an affordances, an object >> at the >> >> nexus of my journey through the >> museum, where >> I was in my life, and my >> abilities to perceive the painitings. >> This >> was something that could not be >> designed I think because nobody could >> think >> that moment was going to >> happen. So then what is a perceived >> affordance. Way back when there was >> also a Manet room. It was a round >> room with >> different variations of his >> water lilies in a circle. Almost the >> exact >> opposite in constraints it was >> large, airy, a lot of natural light. >> If you >> were looking to brood you went >> somewhere else. In the middle of the >> room was >> a wooden structure (not an >> obvious bench), but you realized as >> random >> colors dissolved into water >> lilies that you wanted to sit down. You >> naturally moved to the center of >> the room and sat (wondering if a guard >> would >> come and tell you it was >> actually an important piece of art >> and you >> should get off). The designer >> anticipates a desire to soak in the >> room, to >> almost get dizzy in the >> lights, and included in the design the >> piece >> of wood that will have the >> perceived affordance for sitting, >> changing >> your concept of time and space. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> [mailto: >> >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >] On Behalf >> Of Alfredo >> >> Jornet Gil >> >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, >> 2015 3:01 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Thanks Michael, >> >> I think we are saying the >> same >> things, indeed, or at >> least more or >> >> less. I am quite certain that Bateson >> referred >> to energy, and that he used >> the mentioned examples (or similar >> ones) to >> show how the energy that moves >> the pig is not a direct transfer of >> energy >> from the kick, whereas in the >> case of the billiard balls, the >> movement of >> one ball is caused by the >> energy that the kicking ball brings. I >> might >> be wrong in the context within >> which Bateson was discussing the >> example, and >> I see that your account is in >> that regard is more accurate. But the >> point is >> the same: you can not intend >> the outcomes of a system by addressing >> only >> its parts as if they were >> connected directly, in a linear causal >> fashion; as if the whole was the sum >> of its parts. I do see a link with >> Vygotsky's >> rejection of S-R and his >> inclusion of a third element that >> transforms >> the whole system. >> >> But I totally agree with >> your >> comments on design >> intentions as they >> >> relate to ecology, and I, as I know >> also Rolf >> does, also like very much the >> notion of ecology to address these >> issues. >> >> If I read you correctly, and >> citing Don Norman (whose >> work I >> ignore), >> >> you suggest the possibility that the >> relations >> between design intentions >> and actual experience could be thought >> of in >> terms of different levels? >> That one thing is to design for what is >> general, but that we cannot design >> for the particular. Is that right? If >> so, I >> think that Bateson had a >> similar argument on prediction, does >> not him? >> That we can predict on >> general levels (e.g. population), but >> not at >> the level of the particular >> (e.g., individual). I haven't gone >> that way, >> but seems a promising road to >> consider this jumps between levels of >> generality or scales. >> >> Finally, I am not sure if >> I get >> what you mean when you say >> that we can >> >> design for constrains but not for >> affordances. >> I still see that the one >> presupposes the other; you can >> separate them >> in talk, but, to me, in actual >> experience, a constrain is an >> affordance and >> vice-versa. I don't see how >> the road has any inherent constrain >> that could >> not be an affordance at the >> same time. Of course, if you take the >> normative stance that roads are for >> cars driving through them, you may be >> right. >> But if we think of roads as >> asphalt on the ground, as yet more >> ground only >> of a different shape, >> texture, and color, how is that a >> constrain >> but not an affordance? Or an >> affordance but not a constrain? Of >> course, >> culture constrains once you are >> within the road and you are driving. >> But then, >> the constrain is not in the >> road, as you seem to suggest, but in the >> journey; in the journeyman that >> carries some cultural way of >> orienting and >> affectively relating to its >> environment so that particular >> constrains are >> taken for granted despite the >> possibility of being otherwise. But I >> might >> not have thought it well/long >> enough and of course I might be wrong. >> I would >> like to understand your >> position here better. >> >> Thanks! >> Alfredo >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> > >> > >> on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael > >> > >> >> >> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I have been reading Bateson >> through a cybernetics lens >> lately >> (Bateson >> >> along with Lewin and his wife Margaret >> Mead >> were part of the original Sears >> conferences) and I'm not sure that's >> right or >> I am victim to the "when you >> have a hammer, everything looks like a >> nail" >> but.... >> >> I think Bateson was >> arguing with >> those looking to apply the >> more >> >> physical/mathematical origins of >> cybernetics >> to human or really (pace the >> pig story) and system that moves >> beyond simple >> physical feedback loops. I >> think his larger point is that >> everything has >> a response within the larger >> feedback system that exists but we >> cannot go - >> what Bateson refers to as >> MIND. Attempts to create and control >> feedback >> loops, to try and design a >> system for specific types of feedback >> is a >> dangerous proposition. >> >> This I think is the reason >> that >> affordances really can't >> be designed >> >> into an ecology, only a recognition >> of the >> context in which actions are >> taking place (and I say this having no >> idea >> what Gibson's relationship to >> cybernetics was). Taking Larry's >> example of >> the girl it is perhaps also >> likely that the girl could have taken >> the >> fixing of hair as a criticism, an >> attack, and it might have destroyed her >> confidence. Both make sense in >> terms of feedback loops, but only ad >> hoc. So >> if a designer does in some >> way design that experience into the >> action, >> even without meaning they are >> taking a large chance, because they >> do not >> know the trajectory it will >> take. We simply need objects that are >> part of >> our journey, part of the >> larger context but not designed for >> purpose, >> for feedback. There is no >> assumption about trajectory. >> >> I think Don Norman sort of >> muddied >> the waters on this, but >> in an >> >> interesting way. That we can assume >> people >> are going to want to do certain >> things in a very general environment - >> when you enter a dark room you want >> light, so it is possible to design >> objects >> that meet that need that we are >> more likely to find in the moment that >> we need >> them. But I think that is >> very different from the idea of >> specifically >> guiding feedback loops that >> even take generalized experience in a >> certain >> direction. I am thinking >> about Dewey, and he makes a similar >> argument >> to Bateson with his concept of >> transactions. Although he does seem >> to think >> that it is possible to create >> a larger field of action so we can >> see at >> least local interrelationships. >> But his idea of experience is also >> very much >> one of discovery based on >> needs at the immediate moment - social >> relations act as a vehicle for these >> discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing >> before Gibson and for most of his >> life before cybernetics. I also >> wonder what >> he thought of cybernetics). >> >> I think I disagree with you, >> constraints are not about >> the >> journey but >> >> about the road. If you build a road >> on the >> side of the river you are >> constrained because no matter what, >> you cannot >> turn right. Your direction >> has already been partially determined >> by the >> designer of the road. But the >> mistake we make is in thinking that also >> controls the trajectory of the >> individual's journey. The effect of >> designers >> on trajectories of action is >> important, but limited. >> >> The primary place that >> designers >> have influence on >> affordances it >> >> seems to me is by being able to create a >> unique context for an individual's >> and a group's that limit possible >> trajectories >> on an individual's journey. >> But we should never mistake those >> constraints >> for affordances. I think >> Bateson might argue it is hubris to >> do so. >> Perhaps this is what you are >> saying Alfredo. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> >> > >=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >] On >> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, >> 2015 >> 12:38 PM >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended >> Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> I'd like to follow up on >> Michael's >> post by asking a question: >> Are not >> >> affordances presupposed by constraints >> and are >> not constraints presupposed >> by affordances? If so, I would wonder >> whether >> it makes sense to ask whether >> museums should be designed for >> affordances and >> constraints. >> >> What I think is clear >> from the >> anecdote that you bring >> about the >> >> Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever >> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >> somewhere (i.e. being someone at some >> time in >> some place) cannot be >> INTENDED. And I think this applies >> both to >> designers and users, to those >> who set things up for you to >> experience and to >> you, who could not foresee >> what your experience was going to >> turn you >> into before you go through it. >> >> I think that the big issue >> that >> you bring on the table (to >> continue >> >> with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a >> difference between physical >> relations and social relations, and >> the idea >> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >> noticed that the relations that are the >> subject matter in physics are not >> the same as those that are the subject >> matter >> in communication. He noticed >> that physical relations (relations >> that are >> the object of study of physics) >> transfer energy in direct manners: a >> billiard >> ball hits another ball and we >> can anticipate the exact speed and >> direction >> that the second ball will take >> based on the energy that is in the >> system ball >> + ball + someone hitting. In >> living beings, the things are different. >> Bateson explained, if we kick a >> pig's ass (I think he used this somehow >> bizarre example) the reaction of >> the pig is not accounted for by the >> energy >> that is contained in the kick, >> at least not in a direct manner. The >> energy >> that moves the pig is from a >> different source. Before Bateson, it was >> Vygotsky and his notion of >> mediation who would most clearly state >> that >> social relations are not >> direct, but mediated. >> >> So, how can design go >> about this? >> If we, along with Dewey and >> >> Vygotsky, consider experience to be a >> unity of >> person and environment, and >> we assume as well that this is a >> social (not >> just individual) category, and >> that how a situation is experienced is >> also >> refracted through the social >> relations within which we engage, the >> most >> designers can do is to foster >> social relations go on, giving >> afordances to >> prcesses of signification, >> without intending to embed meanings. >> It is >> about affordances/constraints, >> but not about how to interpret >> something, but >> about going about >> interpreting. I think. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> > >> > >> on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael > >> > >> >> >> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 >> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended >> Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> So after reading the >> article and >> the e-mail discussion I'm >> beginning >> >> to think there is a really big issue >> here that >> I am trying to grapple with, >> especially in terms of boundary >> objects (which >> I admittedly do not >> understand very well). And it relates >> to the >> metaphor of the table (both >> as discussed by Larry and Ingold as >> interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in >> the museum should the place be set up as >> affordances, perceived >> affordances, or constraints? It >> seems the >> museum in the study has >> potential affordances for the users. >> The >> cultural historical moment >> (unable to think of any other word) >> of the >> museum sets the context, meaning >> those walking through the museum are >> going to >> be restricted by the >> historical and cultural boundaries >> leading up >> to the art work, along with >> the expectations and needs of the >> individuals >> moving through the museum, >> but they will come across >> objects/artifacts >> that they think meets the needs >> of their particular journeys. The posing >> becomes both an internalization >> and externalization of the thinking >> (or are >> they one continuum at this >> point?) in which they both make sense >> of the >> object in terms of their own >> meaning and needs and also try and >> communicate >> what they found, leaving a >> potential trails for others. >> >> An example that has stayed >> with me >> for years. Living in New >> York I >> >> used to go to the Museum of Modern Art >> on a >> semi-regular basis (in large >> part to try and meet women, always >> unsuccessful). I would often visit the >> Jackson Pollock corner. I would look >> and it >> would always be meaningful to >> me and I would move one quickly. >> Once, soon >> after graduating college and >> unemployed and about as frustrated as >> I'd ever >> been I viewed the same >> paintings. At that moment Pollock >> made sense >> to me, a deep emotional punch >> - the paintings became objects that >> could >> bridge my rage, sadness and fear >> to the next moment in my life. There >> is no >> way a designer could have >> planned this affordance. It was based >> on the >> movement not just through the >> museum but my life. I think back to >> what my >> gestures, or even posing might >> have been at that moment. A slumping >> in to >> myself, an internalization >> perhaps of a socially sanctioned >> symbol of >> rage. But perhaps a posture >> also that said stay away. The place I >> created >> in that moment was one that >> included me and whatever demons Jackson >> Pollock fought with. >> >> Or should museums should be >> designed for what Don Norman >> refers to as >> >> perceived affordances? The table that >> is set >> up can be one of perceived >> affordances. What I grab for the spoon >> because its shape makes sense in my >> need/desire to eat cereal. The focus >> goes >> from cultural history setting a >> general context - Jackson Pollock is a >> sanctioned way to bridge emotions, >> to actually setting the trajectory of >> the >> act. I sit at a table, I want to >> eat cereal, I must follow sanctioned >> rule >> systems, I know what I need at >> that moment and look for objects that >> fit my >> needs. Is the room in the >> article about perceived affordances. >> Should >> the museum be designed for >> perceived affordances. A person >> coming upon >> an object may be thinking this >> because of what it means in our >> society to be >> walking through a museum. >> The object offers an opportunity to make >> communicative gestures, such as >> recreating the posture of The Thinker >> the >> authors refer to. I have seen >> many shows, movies where this happens, >> from >> movies from the 1940s to the >> Rugrats. This is the cultural cue of >> what we >> do with art objects in a >> museum, we gesture to both understand >> and >> communicate. >> >> Or should museums be >> designed as >> constraints. In the >> Metropolitan >> >> Museum of Art (sorry for the New York >> centric >> places but that's where I >> spent most of my museum life) the >> rooms are >> set up very, very carefully, so >> that in many ways the objects (at >> least are >> meant to I think) to constrain >> your thinking, so that you are >> responding to a >> certain period or school of >> art, understanding how it all fits >> together. The table metaphor fits here >> as well I think. Does the table >> constrain our >> actions, limiting to certain >> types of behavior (use only certain >> types of >> forks for certain types of >> food). >> >> Okay, too much I know. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> >> > >=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >] On >> Behalf Of Rolf Steier >> >> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, >> 2015 6:58 AM >> To: Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity; mike cole; >> >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Thank you for your >> thoughts Larry, >> >> I wanted to pick up on your >> suggestion of the table >> metaphor >> because I >> >> think that's really interesting. I >> believe you >> are proposing the shared >> meal as analogous to the kind of >> orientation >> work (or perhaps Leigh Star >> might consider this translation or >> pre-translation work?) that precedes the >> task at hand (in the case of our >> study, the >> task is design). Excerpt 3 from >> our study might be relevant here, when >> in turn >> 6, the curator turns to the >> researcher, leans in, and points in >> order to >> create a shared visual field. >> >> The curator and the >> researcher can >> now orient towards the >> existing >> >> gallery in order to imagine future, >> possible >> changes in the gallery. The >> curator is in a sense extending an >> invitation >> to sit down at the same table >> to be able to share his vision for the >> gallery. >> >> This shared meal might of >> course >> also be considered >> designed. Ingold ( >> *Making*) actually uses >> this same >> table metaphor to >> demonstrate the >> >> facilitation of activity as an aspect of >> design - *"Everyday design catches >> the narrative and pins it down, >> establishing a >> kind of choreography for the >> ensuing permanence that allows it to >> proceed >> from the moment you sit down >> to eat. In such a straightforward >> task as >> laying the table - in enrolling >> into your relation bowl and spoon, >> milk jug >> and cereal box - you are >> designing breakfast."* >> >> There is an improvisational >> quality to the >> bodily/performative >> >> orientation work that is maybe not >> captured by >> the shared expectations of >> sitting down to a meal. But at the >> same time, >> we can also consider the >> workspace of the multidisciplinary >> design team >> as designed in the same way >> that the meal is designed in order to >> support >> the objective of the meeting. >> That is, the, design team must first >> engage in >> a place-making activity for >> their collaborative setting in order >> to attend >> to the design of the >> exhibition space. The designers set >> the table >> with a white board, sketches >> and design ideas, perhaps some >> coffee... etc., >> before turning to the task >> of imagining the future exhibition. >> >> Lubomir, you asked - *"who >> are the >> placemakers -- the >> architects or >> >> the USERS of designed/created/socially >> produced spaces?" *I think this is >> difficult to answer because both >> architect and >> user play a role in the >> place-making process. The architects >> embed >> possible meanings (if place and >> meaning are analogous than perhaps >> these might >> be considered 'place >> >> potentials') that only >> emerge >> through the activity of >> the users. I'm >> >> only thinking through this now, so >> feel free >> to elaborate or to disagree! >> >> Rolf >> >> On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at >> 11:28 PM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil < >> >> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no >> > >> >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot, Lubomir! >> >> On to your question, >> I am >> tempted to stretch a bit >> across frameworks >> and answer that, the >> difference between the >> process >> of performing an >> activity in space and >> developing a sense of >> place >> would be akin to the >> difference between an >> operation and an >> action as per >> Activity theory. >> >> Again, we must be >> careful on >> the distinction >> between space >> as a sort >> of objective geometrical >> coordinate, or space >> as not >> becoming a part >> >> of "an" >> >> experience (in Dewey's >> sense). >> In the first sense, >> the sentence >> "performing an >> activity in >> space" makes only >> sense when >> talking about >> geometrical >> practices, for >> example; one may think >> that in >> some >> engineering practices, >> it is >> possible to orient to >> space as >> space, as >> a coordinate. BUT >> still, the >> experience of being >> doing such >> practice, >> if it has import to >> further >> development in the >> person, it >> must be >> refracted through the >> person's >> experience; there >> must be >> involvement, >> and therefore >> placemaking. In >> the second case, we >> might >> think of us >> performing some activity >> within taking much of >> it, >> without noticing we >> are doing. It is in >> this sense >> that I do the bridge >> with >> operations >> >> versus actions. >> >> I would not have many >> problems >> in associating place >> with >> meaning and >> placemaking with >> meaning-making, >> although I >> personally would be >> careful if doing so, >> emphasizing the >> situational >> and distributed >> nature of the process >> that >> placemaking attempts >> to capture. >> >> Hope this helps >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: Lubomir Savov >> Popov >> > >> >> >> Sent: 14 July 2015 23:06 >> To: Alfredo Jornet >> Gil; Rolf >> Steier; eXtended Mind, >> Culture, >> >> Activity >> >> Cc: mike cole; >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] >> Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Thank you Alfredo, >> >> By the way, I should >> have >> started my mail with an >> appreciation for >> your article and >> Mike's choice >> to bring it to our >> attention. >> >> Now it is almost clear >> how you >> use the word and >> conceptualize the >> phenomenon. I would >> respectfully ask you >> for a few >> more things: what >> is the difference >> between the >> process of performing an >> activity in >> space and developing a >> sense >> of place. I personally >> interpret place in >> terms of >> appropriation of >> space in the process >> of human >> activity and >> the subsequent meaning >> making >> which has existential >> importance for the >> individual. The >> phenomenon of >> place is on par with the >> phenomenon of >> meaning and >> placemaking is a >> process on par with >> meaning >> making. How >> do you position yourself >> regarding such >> conceptualization? >> >> On a similar note, who >> are the >> placemakers -- the >> architects >> or the >> USERS of >> >> designed/created/socially >> produced spaces? >> >> By the way, I might be >> stretching too much >> the part >> on place and >> distracting from other >> aspects >> of your wonderful >> article. >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original >> Message----- >> From: Alfredo Jornet Gil >> [mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no >> >> > >] >> Sent: Tuesday, July >> 14, 2015 >> 4:31 PM >> To: Lubomir Savov >> Popov; Rolf >> Steier; eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Cc: mike cole; >> lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] >> Re: The >> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 20 07:18:53 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 07:18:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> Message-ID: <55ad037b.86f8420a.2ac3.ffffcc15@mx.google.com> Rolf, Here is how McNeill summarizes the way he is structuring or organizing the features of his theory. (see page 5) "The metaphoricity of the gesture was in this way an ESSENTIAL feature of speech and thought, and the linkage of both to context." Does McNeil "adequately" convince that THIS way of organizing the features (metaphoricity, gesture, speech, thought, context) describes the continuing way we move together as place making (meaning). THIS micro analysis of the features of place making as capturing a feature ( the metaphoricity of gesture that is ESSENTIAL) means that if this feature is missing then place making does not come into being/form. The bringing into form /structure the image-speech dialetic depends on the NECESSITY of the metaphoricity of gesture. -----Original Message----- From: "Rolf Steier" Sent: ?2015-?07-?20 6:18 AM To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I think that a particular institution or government system could potentially be a boundary object depending on how the concept is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) interpretive flexibility 2) material/ organizational structure and 3) scale/ granularity in which the concept is useful. She argues that boundary objects are typically most useful at the organizational level - so I would say that one would have to justify the utility of applying the concept to a particular institution, as opposed to, say, an object within an institution. On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Phew! > So would it be correct to describe the government institutions and > political system are "boundary objects"? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >> Hi Andy - >> Good catch! I believe that is a typo and should read "despite a LACK of >> consensus". Thank you for pointing that out. >> >> >> I also wanted to follow up on a suggestion that Greg made in the other >> thread suggesting we look at David McNeill's work. I had only been familiar >> with his earlier work on gesture, but after doing a bit of reading over the >> weekend, I found his concept of 'unexpected metaphors' potentially useful >> in dealing with some of my questions.( >> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf ) >> >> Here is a relevant quote describing unexpected metaphors as a form of >> gesture: >> >> /The logic is that unexpected metaphors arise from the >> need to create images when the culture does not have >> them readily at hand. These images join linguistic >> content as growth points and differentiate what >> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological predicates, or >> points of contrast in the immediate ongoing context of >> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, precisely because they >> are outside the conventions of language and culture, >> can capture abstractions in novel ways and provide the >> fluidity of thought and language that is the essence >> of ongoing discourse./ >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of >> cooperation despite consensus"? >> p. 131, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> Are we allowed to ask questions about our paper as >> well? I hope so! >> >> For a little context -in our paper, we identified >> particular kinds of >> episodes in which participants from different >> disciplines seek coherence >> and continuity of shared representations through >> bodily action. These >> actions include gesture, movement and physical >> performance linking the >> present material artifacts to objects of design. >> Most of these episodes >> seem to involve some form of improvisation, >> resourcefulness or creativity, >> and I'm not fully sure how to characterize these >> aspects of the >> interactions. In most cases, the participants seem >> to be searching for the >> best words or material representation to convey a >> particular intention - >> when this becomes problematic or limiting - they >> almost fall back on what >> is available - these improvised bodily >> performances - as a way of >> maintaining continuity, and of inviting >> co-participants into a shared and >> imagined space. These bodily actions don't seem to >> begin the proposals, but >> are in a sense *discovered* by the participants. >> >> >> I think there is something really fascinating >> about this kind of creativity >> and resourcefulness in interaction that could be >> explored more deeply - and >> that I'm having trouble articulating. Maybe some >> of you have some thoughts >> on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked about this >> a bit before so maybe you >> can add a little clarity to my question. >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> > >> wrote: >> >> Alfredo, >> Thank you very much for the sketch of your >> roots. I taught English in >> Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in >> the early 70s, just before >> Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the >> plane back to the U.S.) Place >> and language are interesting, especially where >> language varieties meet. >> Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity >> with the music of Catalunya >> and Mallorca that the speech communities in >> each of those places treasure >> their unique languages (Catalan and >> Mallorquin), yet see a commonality >> vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian >> Spanish, the national language >> of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel >> between your work on boundary >> objects, where individual persons collaborate >> to create spaces, AND >> boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of >> people who live in real spaces. >> I am thinking, among other things, of >> indigeneity, a big topic here in New >> Mexico, with so many Native Americans. >> Assymetries of power. Bullying. >> Testing and curriculum become instruments of >> war by other means. I hope my >> tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the >> optimism created by this >> thread. Yet I think that optimism is so >> precious because of the ground (the >> world) of the dialog. >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil > > >> >> wrote: >> >> Well, you could say that I am partly >> Catalan. I grew up in the province >> >> of Valencia, where Catalan language is >> official language together with >> Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the >> county) and Catalonia are >> different regional counties, Catalan is spoken >> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >> the Balear Islands. Some call the three >> together as the Catalan Countries. >> I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy >> cultural diversity. >> >> Standardized testing, and the whole >> assumptions behind it, are an issue >> >> also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education >> has been so battered during >> the last years of right-wing government that I >> the debate have been more >> about means and access than about contents and >> aims. Which in some sense >> may be good because it moves the debates away >> from performance. But I have >> been living outside of Spain for eight years >> now, so I am not the best to >> update you on this either. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD > > >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, >> Yes, you have answered my question very >> nicely! I especially appreciate >> >> that you were willing to wrestle with my >> question, despite your lack of >> familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. >> Am I wrong, or are you >> Catalan? In which case your experience in >> Catalunya would take you to a >> different place in critiquing schooling there, >> though not necessarily >> unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on >> boundary objects. I just met for >> the second day in a row with a friend who is >> the liaison between our public >> school district and a children?s science >> museum called Explora. I feel like >> I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a >> mixed metaphor! >> >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil > > >> >> wrote: >> >> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very >> familiar with high-stakes >> >> standardized testing (as different to >> standardized testing in general) or >> with common core (which I quickly read is an >> issue in US). But I would say >> that, if (school) curricula were to be >> consistent with the view of >> education as the practice of creating >> conditions for certain attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge--which is what I was >> suggesting in the paragraph you >> copy--curricula would not be so much about >> standardized contents, but about >> human sensitivities and relations. So, I would >> say, no, standardized >> testing is not in principle in line with what >> I was trying to say. >> >> I was trying to make a distinction >> between trying to design someone's >> >> particular experience, and trying to design >> conditions for the development >> of attitudes and orientations. The first is >> likely impossible. The second >> seems to make more sense. >> >> One may of course wonder whether those >> attitudes and orientations can >> >> be considered general, and then form part of >> standardize measures instead >> of the traditional "contents and skills". But >> measuring assumes some >> quantitative increment in a particular aspect >> as the result of learning. >> Growth and development, however, are about >> qualitative change. So, as soon >> as you start measuring you would be missing >> growth and development. So, >> again, no. I would not say that high-stakes >> standardized testing is in line >> with what I was trying to say. >> >> I hope I have answered your question, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD > > >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, you say: >> >> "However, we cannot aim at determining >> any particular >> >> situation/experience. The same may be said >> about EDUCATION. We cannot >> intend to communicate the curriculum and make >> it the content of the >> students' experience in the way we intend. But >> we can try to create the >> conditions for certain attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge." >> >> Would you say that high-stakes >> standardized testing is in line with >> >> your construal of curriculum design? How about >> common core? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > > >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot for the >> clarifications. I see now why it >> may be said that >> >> designers can aim at designing for constrains >> but not for affordances. I >> see that this way of talking is part of a >> designers' way to get things >> done, and that it may indeed be an effective >> way to design for >> place-making, as in the example that Michael >> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >> what we report in our study is about designers >> talking about how spatial >> features might afford some experiences in the >> museum while constraining >> others. >> >> I must admit, however, that I >> still consider the distinction >> >> problematic from an analytical perspective >> whenever our object of study is >> experience, situated action, or design as >> situated practice. A more correct >> way to talk is that affordances and constrains >> are the positive and >> negative sides/interpretations of a single >> unitary category. As an actual >> and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem >> implies both affordances and >> constrains at the same time, whether intended >> or not. Which makes me wonder >> whether other terminology, such as Ingold's >> notion of "correspondence," >> might be more appropriated when we talk about >> how materials and actions >> become entangled into particular trajectories. >> >> In any case, and as Rolf >> emphasizes, what the designers in >> our study >> >> indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the >> museum. Imagination versus >> prediction may be an interesting topic >> emerging here for further inquiry >> into design work. >> >> Another important (and related) >> issue that I think is emerging here >> >> has to do with the level of generality at >> which design intentions can be >> expected to work (just as Bateson argued with >> regard to prediction). At the >> level of generic social processes, and given a >> particular >> cultural-historical background, we as >> designers may try to make some >> generic situations more likely to occur than >> others (facilitating that more >> or less people end up together in a given >> place). However, we cannot aim at >> determining any particular >> situation/experience. The same may be said about >> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the >> curriculum and make it the >> content of the students' experience in the way >> we intend. But we can try to >> create the conditions for certain attitudes >> and dispositions to emerge. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> > > on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael > > >> >> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I think Rolf may have addressed >> the question of the differences >> >> between affordances and constraints in his >> post. The way he described the >> designers as possibly setting up the corner >> with Pollock at MOMA. It was a >> long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the >> way it was or the way I >> remember it, but let's just believe this is >> the way it was. The painting, >> I think there were three were set up in a >> corner off a main corridor. The >> lighting was dark, which if you have ever been >> to MOMA is different, in >> many other parts of the museum there is a good >> deal of natural light (there >> was this great fountain, I wonder if it is >> still there). The paintings >> were on tripods rather than hung on the walls >> and they were surrounded on >> three sides by walls. All of these I think >> would be considered restraints >> - pushing me in to the works rather than >> stepping back away. It was >> impossible for more than two or three people >> to view the paintings at one >> time and movement was limited, so there were >> fewer chances for social >> interactions (you were not going to pick up >> anybody looking at Jackson >> Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making >> it more likely that viewers >> would move towards internal reflection. All >> of these were constraints that >> canalized perspectives and feelings viewing >> the paintings. You really had >> only two choices, you moved in to the >> paintings or you moved on, which I >> had done every previous time coming upon them. >> >> The painting itself though became >> [The entire original message is not included.] From rolfsteier@gmail.com Mon Jul 20 09:39:13 2015 From: rolfsteier@gmail.com (Rolf Steier) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 18:39:13 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55ad037b.86f8420a.2ac3.ffffcc15@mx.google.com> References: <1436905858466.82086@iped.uio.no> <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ad037b.86f8420a.2ac3.ffffcc15@mx.google.com> Message-ID: I hope I'm understanding your question, Larry. I interpreted *metaphoricity* in McNeill's analysis to be an essential feature linking speech and thought only in situations that include such metaphorical gestures (both expected and unexpected as he refers to them). If you are challenging the idea that this is an essential feature linking *all* speech and thought, then I agree with you completely. I have to admit, I was attending more to the 'unexpected' aspect of the concept rather than the metaphorical aspect, as a way of describing the creative introduction of new signs into interaction. In any case, it seems like there may be a lack of concepts allowing us to discuss place making activities at both a micro-interactional level, and at the level characterized by An Experience emerging in the other thread. Thanks for your thoughts! On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 4:18 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Rolf, > > Here is how McNeill summarizes the way he is structuring or organizing the > features of his theory. (see page 5) > > "The metaphoricity of the gesture was in this way an ESSENTIAL feature of > speech and thought, and the linkage of both to context." > > Does McNeil "adequately" convince that THIS way of organizing the features > (metaphoricity, gesture, speech, thought, context) describes the > continuing way we move together as place making (meaning). > > THIS micro analysis of the features of place making as capturing a > feature ( the metaphoricity of gesture that is ESSENTIAL) means that if > this feature is missing then place making does not come into being/form. > > The bringing into form /structure the image-speech dialetic depends on > the NECESSITY of the metaphoricity of gesture. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Rolf Steier" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?20 6:18 AM > To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I think that a particular institution or government system could > potentially be a boundary object depending on how the concept is applied. > Star describes three criteria: 1) interpretive flexibility 2) material/ > organizational structure and 3) scale/ granularity in which the concept is > useful. > > She argues that boundary objects are typically most useful at the > organizational level - so I would say that one would have to justify the > utility of applying the concept to a particular institution, as opposed to, > say, an object within an institution. > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Phew! > > So would it be correct to describe the government institutions and > > political system are "boundary objects"? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > >> Hi Andy - > >> Good catch! I believe that is a typo and should read "despite a LACK of > >> consensus". Thank you for pointing that out. > >> > >> > >> I also wanted to follow up on a suggestion that Greg made in the other > >> thread suggesting we look at David McNeill's work. I had only been > familiar > >> with his earlier work on gesture, but after doing a bit of reading over > the > >> weekend, I found his concept of 'unexpected metaphors' potentially > useful > >> in dealing with some of my questions.( > >> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf ) > >> > >> Here is a relevant quote describing unexpected metaphors as a form of > >> gesture: > >> > >> /The logic is that unexpected metaphors arise from the > >> need to create images when the culture does not have > >> them readily at hand. These images join linguistic > >> content as growth points and differentiate what > >> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological predicates, or > >> points of contrast in the immediate ongoing context of > >> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, precisely because they > >> are outside the conventions of language and culture, > >> can capture abstractions in novel ways and provide the > >> fluidity of thought and language that is the essence > >> of ongoing discourse./ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of > >> cooperation despite consensus"? > >> p. 131, > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >> > >> Are we allowed to ask questions about our paper as > >> well? I hope so! > >> > >> For a little context -in our paper, we identified > >> particular kinds of > >> episodes in which participants from different > >> disciplines seek coherence > >> and continuity of shared representations through > >> bodily action. These > >> actions include gesture, movement and physical > >> performance linking the > >> present material artifacts to objects of design. > >> Most of these episodes > >> seem to involve some form of improvisation, > >> resourcefulness or creativity, > >> and I'm not fully sure how to characterize these > >> aspects of the > >> interactions. In most cases, the participants seem > >> to be searching for the > >> best words or material representation to convey a > >> particular intention - > >> when this becomes problematic or limiting - they > >> almost fall back on what > >> is available - these improvised bodily > >> performances - as a way of > >> maintaining continuity, and of inviting > >> co-participants into a shared and > >> imagined space. These bodily actions don't seem to > >> begin the proposals, but > >> are in a sense *discovered* by the participants. > >> > >> > >> I think there is something really fascinating > >> about this kind of creativity > >> and resourcefulness in interaction that could be > >> explored more deeply - and > >> that I'm having trouble articulating. Maybe some > >> of you have some thoughts > >> on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked about this > >> a bit before so maybe you > >> can add a little clarity to my question. > >> > >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> Alfredo, > >> Thank you very much for the sketch of your > >> roots. I taught English in > >> Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years back in > >> the early 70s, just before > >> Franco died. (He died the day I boarded the > >> plane back to the U.S.) Place > >> and language are interesting, especially where > >> language varieties meet. > >> Boundaries. I know mostly from my familiarity > >> with the music of Catalunya > >> and Mallorca that the speech communities in > >> each of those places treasure > >> their unique languages (Catalan and > >> Mallorquin), yet see a commonality > >> vis-a-vis their separateness from Castilian > >> Spanish, the national language > >> of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel > >> between your work on boundary > >> objects, where individual persons collaborate > >> to create spaces, AND > >> boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of > >> people who live in real spaces. > >> I am thinking, among other things, of > >> indigeneity, a big topic here in New > >> Mexico, with so many Native Americans. > >> Assymetries of power. Bullying. > >> Testing and curriculum become instruments of > >> war by other means. I hope my > >> tone does not distract from, nor diminish, the > >> optimism created by this > >> thread. Yet I think that optimism is so > >> precious because of the ground (the > >> world) of the dialog. > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo > >> Jornet Gil >> > > >> > >> wrote: > >> > >> Well, you could say that I am partly > >> Catalan. I grew up in the province > >> > >> of Valencia, where Catalan language is > >> official language together with > >> Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the > >> county) and Catalonia are > >> different regional counties, Catalan is spoken > >> in Catalonia, Valencia, and > >> the Balear Islands. Some call the three > >> together as the Catalan Countries. > >> I don't like borders, but I respect and enjoy > >> cultural diversity. > >> > >> Standardized testing, and the whole > >> assumptions behind it, are an issue > >> > >> also in Spain and in Catalonia; but education > >> has been so battered during > >> the last years of right-wing government that I > >> the debate have been more > >> about means and access than about contents and > >> aims. Which in some sense > >> may be good because it moves the debates away > >> from performance. But I have > >> been living outside of Spain for eight years > >> now, so I am not the best to > >> update you on this either. > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> > >> >> > on > >> behalf of > >> HENRY SHONERD >> > > >> > >> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of > >> Boundary Objects > >> > >> Alfredo, > >> Yes, you have answered my question very > >> nicely! I especially appreciate > >> > >> that you were willing to wrestle with my > >> question, despite your lack of > >> familiarity with the issues here in the U.S. > >> Am I wrong, or are you > >> Catalan? In which case your experience in > >> Catalunya would take you to a > >> different place in critiquing schooling there, > >> though not necessarily > >> unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on > >> boundary objects. I just met for > >> the second day in a row with a friend who is > >> the liaison between our public > >> school district and a children?s science > >> museum called Explora. I feel like > >> I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a > >> mixed metaphor! > >> > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, Alfredo > >> Jornet Gil >> > > >> > >> wrote: > >> > >> I am sorry, Henry, but I am not very > >> familiar with high-stakes > >> > >> standardized testing (as different to > >> standardized testing in general) or > >> with common core (which I quickly read is an > >> issue in US). But I would say > >> that, if (school) curricula were to be > >> consistent with the view of > >> education as the practice of creating > >> conditions for certain attitudes and > >> dispositions to emerge--which is what I was > >> suggesting in the paragraph you > >> copy--curricula would not be so much about > >> standardized contents, but about > >> human sensitivities and relations. So, I would > >> say, no, standardized > >> testing is not in principle in line with what > >> I was trying to say. > >> > >> I was trying to make a distinction > >> between trying to design someone's > >> > >> particular experience, and trying to design > >> conditions for the development > >> of attitudes and orientations. The first is > >> likely impossible. The second > >> seems to make more sense. > >> > >> One may of course wonder whether those > >> attitudes and orientations can > >> > >> be considered general, and then form part of > >> standardize measures instead > >> of the traditional "contents and skills". But > >> measuring assumes some > >> quantitative increment in a particular aspect > >> as the result of learning. > >> Growth and development, however, are about > >> qualitative change. So, as soon > >> as you start measuring you would be missing > >> growth and development. So, > >> again, no. I would not say that high-stakes > >> standardized testing is in line > >> with what I was trying to say. > >> > >> I hope I have answered your question, > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= > >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> > >> >> > on > >> behalf of > >> HENRY SHONERD >> > > >> > >> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of > >> Boundary Objects > >> > >> Alfredo, you say: > >> > >> "However, we cannot aim at determining > >> any particular > >> > >> situation/experience. The same may be said > >> about EDUCATION. We cannot > >> intend to communicate the curriculum and make > >> it the content of the > >> students' experience in the way we intend. But > >> we can try to create the > >> conditions for certain attitudes and > >> dispositions to emerge." > >> > >> Would you say that high-stakes > >> standardized testing is in line with > >> > >> your construal of curriculum design? How about > >> common core? > >> > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, > >> Alfredo Jornet Gil > >> >> > > >> > >> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks a lot for the > >> clarifications. I see now why it > >> may be said that > >> > >> designers can aim at designing for constrains > >> but not for affordances. I > >> see that this way of talking is part of a > >> designers' way to get things > >> done, and that it may indeed be an effective > >> way to design for > >> place-making, as in the example that Michael > >> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of > >> what we report in our study is about designers > >> talking about how spatial > >> features might afford some experiences in the > >> museum while constraining > >> others. > >> > >> I must admit, however, that I > >> still consider the distinction > >> > >> problematic from an analytical perspective > >> whenever our object of study is > >> experience, situated action, or design as > >> situated practice. A more correct > >> way to talk is that affordances and constrains > >> are the positive and > >> negative sides/interpretations of a single > >> unitary category. As an actual > >> and concrete phenomenon, walking into a musuem > >> implies both affordances and > >> constrains at the same time, whether intended > >> or not. Which makes me wonder > >> whether other terminology, such as Ingold's > >> notion of "correspondence," > >> might be more appropriated when we talk about > >> how materials and actions > >> become entangled into particular trajectories. > >> > >> In any case, and as Rolf > >> emphasizes, what the designers in > >> our study > >> > >> indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being in the > >> museum. Imagination versus > >> prediction may be an interesting topic > >> emerging here for further inquiry > >> into design work. > >> > >> Another important (and related) > >> issue that I think is emerging here > >> > >> has to do with the level of generality at > >> which design intentions can be > >> expected to work (just as Bateson argued with > >> regard to prediction). At the > >> level of generic social processes, and given a > >> particular > >> cultural-historical background, we as > >> designers may try to make some > >> generic situations more likely to occur than > >> others (facilitating that more > >> or less people end up together in a given > >> place). However, we cannot aim at > >> determining any particular > >> situation/experience. The same may be said about > >> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to communicate the > >> curriculum and make it the > >> content of the students' experience in the way > >> we intend. But we can try to > >> create the conditions for certain attitudes > >> and dispositions to emerge. > >> > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= > >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> > >> >> > on > >> behalf of > >> Glassman, Michael >> > > >> > >> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > >> Emergence of Boundary Objects > >> > >> Hi Alfredo, > >> > >> I think Rolf may have addressed > >> the question of the differences > >> > >> between affordances and constraints in his > >> post. The way he described the > >> designers as possibly setting up the corner > >> with Pollock at MOMA. It was a > >> long time ago so I'm not sure if this is the > >> way it was or the way I > >> remember it, but let's just believe this is > >> the way it was. The painting, > >> I think there were three were set up in a > >> corner off a main corridor. The > >> lighting was dark, which if you have ever been > >> to MOMA is different, in > >> many other parts of the museum there is a good > >> deal of natural light (there > >> was this great fountain, I wonder if it is > >> still there). The paintings > >> were on tripods rather than hung on the walls > >> and they were surrounded on > >> three sides by walls. All of these I think > >> would be considered restraints > >> - pushing me in to the works rather than > >> stepping back away. It was > >> impossible for more than two or three people > >> to view the paintings at one > >> time and movement was limited, so there were > >> fewer chances for social > >> interactions (you were not going to pick up > >> anybody looking at Jackson > >> Pollock). The atmosphere was brooding, making > >> it more likely that viewers > >> would move towards internal reflection. All > >> of these were constraints that > >> canalized perspectives and feelings viewing > >> the paintings. You really had > >> only two choices, you moved in to the > >> paintings or you moved on, which I > >> had done every previous time coming upon them. > >> > >> The painting itself though became > >> > > > [The entire original message is not included.] From rolfsteier@gmail.com Mon Jul 20 10:04:12 2015 From: rolfsteier@gmail.com (Rolf Steier) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 19:04:12 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> References: <1436909325449.60948@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> Message-ID: This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is Thomas's aged body, > which is subject to an interpretation which Thomas contests by showing > photographs of far away places and explaining how well-travelled he is, > seeking an interpretation of himself as a well-travelled and experiences > man-of-the-world. > Does that make better sense? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory and I'd never heard of >> "boundary objects." It seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >> social theory into domains of activity (scientific and work collaborations >> for example) where the participants naively think they are collaborating on >> neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, but also the ideological >> context. >> >> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers collaborate with the >> old couple according to rules and regulations, communications resources, >> technology, finance and so on, which in the unnamed country, the old couple >> are apparently cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it is those >> rules and regulations, etc., which are the "boundary objects"? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >>> I think that a particular institution or government system could >>> potentially be a boundary object depending on how the concept is applied. >>> Star describes three criteria: 1) interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ granularity in which the concept is >>> useful. >>> >>> She argues that boundary objects are typically most useful at the >>> organizational level - so I would say that one would have to justify the >>> utility of applying the concept to a particular institution, as opposed to, >>> say, an object within an institution. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> Phew! >>> So would it be correct to describe the government >>> institutions and political system are "boundary objects"? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy - >>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo and should >>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". Thank you for >>> pointing that out. >>> >>> >>> I also wanted to follow up on a suggestion that >>> Greg made in the other thread suggesting we look >>> at David McNeill's work. I had only been familiar >>> with his earlier work on gesture, but after doing >>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I found his >>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' potentially >>> useful in dealing with some of my questions.( >>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>> ) >>> >>> Here is a relevant quote describing unexpected >>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>> >>> /The logic is that unexpected metaphors arise >>> from the >>> need to create images when the culture does >>> not have >>> them readily at hand. These images join linguistic >>> content as growth points and differentiate what >>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>> predicates, or >>> points of contrast in the immediate ongoing >>> context of >>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, precisely >>> because they >>> are outside the conventions of language and >>> culture, >>> can capture abstractions in novel ways and >>> provide the >>> fluidity of thought and language that is the >>> essence >>> of ongoing discourse./ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the achievement of >>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>> p. 131, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> Are we allowed to ask questions about our >>> paper as >>> well? I hope so! >>> >>> For a little context -in our paper, we >>> identified >>> particular kinds of >>> episodes in which participants from different >>> disciplines seek coherence >>> and continuity of shared representations >>> through >>> bodily action. These >>> actions include gesture, movement and physical >>> performance linking the >>> present material artifacts to objects of >>> design. >>> Most of these episodes >>> seem to involve some form of improvisation, >>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>> and I'm not fully sure how to characterize >>> these >>> aspects of the >>> interactions. In most cases, the >>> participants seem >>> to be searching for the >>> best words or material representation to >>> convey a >>> particular intention - >>> when this becomes problematic or limiting >>> - they >>> almost fall back on what >>> is available - these improvised bodily >>> performances - as a way of >>> maintaining continuity, and of inviting >>> co-participants into a shared and >>> imagined space. These bodily actions don't >>> seem to >>> begin the proposals, but >>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>> participants. >>> >>> >>> I think there is something really fascinating >>> about this kind of creativity >>> and resourcefulness in interaction that >>> could be >>> explored more deeply - and >>> that I'm having trouble articulating. >>> Maybe some >>> of you have some thoughts >>> on this? Alfredo - I know we've talked >>> about this >>> a bit before so maybe you >>> can add a little clarity to my question. >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Thank you very much for the sketch of your >>> roots. I taught English in >>> Puigcerda and Barcelona for 5 years >>> back in >>> the early 70s, just before >>> Franco died. (He died the day I >>> boarded the >>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>> and language are interesting, >>> especially where >>> language varieties meet. >>> Boundaries. I know mostly from my >>> familiarity >>> with the music of Catalunya >>> and Mallorca that the speech >>> communities in >>> each of those places treasure >>> their unique languages (Catalan and >>> Mallorquin), yet see a commonality >>> vis-a-vis their separateness from >>> Castilian >>> Spanish, the national language >>> of Spain from 1492 on. I see a parallel >>> between your work on boundary >>> objects, where individual persons >>> collaborate >>> to create spaces, AND >>> boundary objects ?negotiated? by groups of >>> people who live in real spaces. >>> I am thinking, among other things, of >>> indigeneity, a big topic here in New >>> Mexico, with so many Native Americans. >>> Assymetries of power. Bullying. >>> Testing and curriculum become >>> instruments of >>> war by other means. I hope my >>> tone does not distract from, nor >>> diminish, the >>> optimism created by this >>> thread. Yet I think that optimism is so >>> precious because of the ground (the >>> world) of the dialog. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well, you could say that I am partly >>> Catalan. I grew up in the province >>> >>> of Valencia, where Catalan language is >>> official language together with >>> Castilian Spanish. Although Valencia (the >>> county) and Catalonia are >>> different regional counties, Catalan >>> is spoken >>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>> the Balear Islands. Some call the three >>> together as the Catalan Countries. >>> I don't like borders, but I respect >>> and enjoy >>> cultural diversity. >>> >>> Standardized testing, and the whole >>> assumptions behind it, are an issue >>> >>> also in Spain and in Catalonia; but >>> education >>> has been so battered during >>> the last years of right-wing >>> government that I >>> the debate have been more >>> about means and access than about >>> contents and >>> aims. Which in some sense >>> may be good because it moves the >>> debates away >>> from performance. But I have >>> been living outside of Spain for eight >>> years >>> now, so I am not the best to >>> update you on this either. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >> >> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Yes, you have answered my question >>> very >>> nicely! I especially appreciate >>> >>> that you were willing to wrestle with my >>> question, despite your lack of >>> familiarity with the issues here in >>> the U.S. >>> Am I wrong, or are you >>> Catalan? In which case your experience in >>> Catalunya would take you to a >>> different place in critiquing >>> schooling there, >>> though not necessarily >>> unconnected to yours and Rolf?s work on >>> boundary objects. I just met for >>> the second day in a row with a friend >>> who is >>> the liaison between our public >>> school district and a children?s science >>> museum called Explora. I feel like >>> I?m swimming in this thread, talk about a >>> mixed metaphor! >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at 12:18 AM, >>> Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I am sorry, Henry, but I am >>> not very >>> familiar with high-stakes >>> >>> standardized testing (as different to >>> standardized testing in general) or >>> with common core (which I quickly read >>> is an >>> issue in US). But I would say >>> that, if (school) curricula were to be >>> consistent with the view of >>> education as the practice of creating >>> conditions for certain attitudes and >>> dispositions to emerge--which is what >>> I was >>> suggesting in the paragraph you >>> copy--curricula would not be so much about >>> standardized contents, but about >>> human sensitivities and relations. So, >>> I would >>> say, no, standardized >>> testing is not in principle in line >>> with what >>> I was trying to say. >>> >>> I was trying to make a distinction >>> between trying to design someone's >>> >>> particular experience, and trying to >>> design >>> conditions for the development >>> of attitudes and orientations. The >>> first is >>> likely impossible. The second >>> seems to make more sense. >>> >>> One may of course wonder >>> whether those >>> attitudes and orientations can >>> >>> be considered general, and then form >>> part of >>> standardize measures instead >>> of the traditional "contents and >>> skills". But >>> measuring assumes some >>> quantitative increment in a particular >>> aspect >>> as the result of learning. >>> Growth and development, however, are about >>> qualitative change. So, as soon >>> as you start measuring you would be >>> missing >>> growth and development. So, >>> again, no. I would not say that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized testing is in line >>> with what I was trying to say. >>> >>> I hope I have answered your >>> question, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >> >> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 07:48 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >>> Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, you say: >>> >>> "However, we cannot aim at >>> determining >>> any particular >>> >>> situation/experience. The same may be said >>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>> intend to communicate the curriculum >>> and make >>> it the content of the >>> students' experience in the way we >>> intend. But >>> we can try to create the >>> conditions for certain attitudes and >>> dispositions to emerge." >>> >>> Would you say that high-stakes >>> standardized testing is in >>> line with >>> >>> your construal of curriculum design? >>> How about >>> common core? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jul 15, 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks a lot for the >>> clarifications. I see now >>> why it >>> may be said that >>> >>> designers can aim at designing for >>> constrains >>> but not for affordances. I >>> see that this way of talking is part of a >>> designers' way to get things >>> done, and that it may indeed be an >>> effective >>> way to design for >>> place-making, as in the example that >>> Michael >>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>> what we report in our study is about >>> designers >>> talking about how spatial >>> features might afford some experiences >>> in the >>> museum while constraining >>> others. >>> >>> I must admit, however, that I >>> still consider the distinction >>> >>> problematic from an analytical perspective >>> whenever our object of study is >>> experience, situated action, or design as >>> situated practice. A more correct >>> way to talk is that affordances and >>> constrains >>> are the positive and >>> negative sides/interpretations of a single >>> unitary category. As an actual >>> and concrete phenomenon, walking into >>> a musuem >>> implies both affordances and >>> constrains at the same time, whether >>> intended >>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>> whether other terminology, such as >>> Ingold's >>> notion of "correspondence," >>> might be more appropriated when we >>> talk about >>> how materials and actions >>> become entangled into particular >>> trajectories. >>> >>> In any case, and as Rolf >>> emphasizes, what the >>> designers in >>> our study >>> >>> indeed do is to IMAGINE ways of being >>> in the >>> museum. Imagination versus >>> prediction may be an interesting topic >>> emerging here for further inquiry >>> into design work. >>> >>> Another important (and >>> related) >>> issue that I think is >>> emerging here >>> >>> has to do with the level of generality at >>> which design intentions can be >>> expected to work (just as Bateson >>> argued with >>> regard to prediction). At the >>> level of generic social processes, and >>> given a >>> particular >>> cultural-historical background, we as >>> designers may try to make some >>> generic situations more likely to >>> occur than >>> others (facilitating that more >>> or less people end up together in a given >>> place). However, we cannot aim at >>> determining any particular >>> situation/experience. The same may be >>> said about >>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>> communicate the >>> curriculum and make it the >>> content of the students' experience in >>> the way >>> we intend. But we can try to >>> create the conditions for certain >>> attitudes >>> and dispositions to emerge. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >> >> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 23:30 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I think Rolf may have >>> addressed >>> the question of the >>> differences >>> >>> between affordances and constraints in his >>> post. The way he described the >>> designers as possibly setting up the >>> corner >>> with Pollock at MOMA. It was a >>> long time ago so I'm not sure if this >>> is the >>> way it was or the way I >>> remember it, but let's just believe >>> this is >>> the way it was. The painting, >>> I think there were three were set up in a >>> corner off a main corridor. The >>> lighting was dark, which if you have >>> ever been >>> to MOMA is different, in >>> many other parts of the museum there >>> is a good >>> deal of natural light (there >>> was this great fountain, I wonder if it is >>> still there). The paintings >>> were on tripods rather than hung on >>> the walls >>> and they were surrounded on >>> three sides by walls. All of these I >>> think >>> would be considered restraints >>> - pushing me in to the works rather than >>> stepping back away. It was >>> impossible for more than two or three >>> people >>> to view the paintings at one >>> time and movement was limited, so >>> there were >>> fewer chances for social >>> interactions (you were not going to >>> pick up >>> anybody looking at Jackson >>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>> brooding, making >>> it more likely that viewers >>> would move towards internal >>> reflection. All >>> of these were constraints that >>> canalized perspectives and feelings >>> viewing >>> the paintings. You really had >>> only two choices, you moved in to the >>> paintings or you moved on, which I >>> had done every previous time coming >>> upon them. >>> >>> The painting itself though >>> became >>> an affordances, an object >>> at the >>> >>> nexus of my journey through the >>> museum, where >>> I was in my life, and my >>> abilities to perceive the painitings. This >>> was something that could not be >>> designed I think because nobody could >>> think >>> that moment was going to >>> happen. So then what is a perceived >>> affordance. Way back when there was >>> also a Manet room. It was a round >>> room with >>> different variations of his >>> water lilies in a circle. Almost the >>> exact >>> opposite in constraints it was >>> large, airy, a lot of natural light. If you >>> were looking to brood you went >>> somewhere else. In the middle of the >>> room was >>> a wooden structure (not an >>> obvious bench), but you realized as random >>> colors dissolved into water >>> lilies that you wanted to sit down. You >>> naturally moved to the center of >>> the room and sat (wondering if a guard >>> would >>> come and tell you it was >>> actually an important piece of art and you >>> should get off). The designer >>> anticipates a desire to soak in the >>> room, to >>> almost get dizzy in the >>> lights, and included in the design the >>> piece >>> of wood that will have the >>> perceived affordance for sitting, changing >>> your concept of time and space. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>> >> > >>> [mailto: >>> >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>> >> >] On Behalf >>> Of Alfredo >>> >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, >>> 2015 3:01 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thanks Michael, >>> >>> I think we are saying the same >>> things, indeed, or at >>> least more or >>> >>> less. I am quite certain that Bateson >>> referred >>> to energy, and that he used >>> the mentioned examples (or similar >>> ones) to >>> show how the energy that moves >>> the pig is not a direct transfer of energy >>> from the kick, whereas in the >>> case of the billiard balls, the >>> movement of >>> one ball is caused by the >>> energy that the kicking ball brings. I >>> might >>> be wrong in the context within >>> which Bateson was discussing the >>> example, and >>> I see that your account is in >>> that regard is more accurate. But the >>> point is >>> the same: you can not intend >>> the outcomes of a system by addressing >>> only >>> its parts as if they were >>> connected directly, in a linear causal >>> fashion; as if the whole was the sum >>> of its parts. I do see a link with >>> Vygotsky's >>> rejection of S-R and his >>> inclusion of a third element that >>> transforms >>> the whole system. >>> >>> But I totally agree with your >>> comments on design >>> intentions as they >>> >>> relate to ecology, and I, as I know >>> also Rolf >>> does, also like very much the >>> notion of ecology to address these issues. >>> >>> If I read you correctly, and >>> citing Don Norman (whose >>> work I >>> ignore), >>> >>> you suggest the possibility that the >>> relations >>> between design intentions >>> and actual experience could be thought >>> of in >>> terms of different levels? >>> That one thing is to design for what is >>> general, but that we cannot design >>> for the particular. Is that right? If >>> so, I >>> think that Bateson had a >>> similar argument on prediction, does >>> not him? >>> That we can predict on >>> general levels (e.g. population), but >>> not at >>> the level of the particular >>> (e.g., individual). I haven't gone >>> that way, >>> but seems a promising road to >>> consider this jumps between levels of >>> generality or scales. >>> >>> Finally, I am not sure if >>> I get >>> what you mean when you say >>> that we can >>> >>> design for constrains but not for >>> affordances. >>> I still see that the one >>> presupposes the other; you can >>> separate them >>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>> experience, a constrain is an >>> affordance and >>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>> the road has any inherent constrain >>> that could >>> not be an affordance at the >>> same time. Of course, if you take the >>> normative stance that roads are for >>> cars driving through them, you may be >>> right. >>> But if we think of roads as >>> asphalt on the ground, as yet more >>> ground only >>> of a different shape, >>> texture, and color, how is that a >>> constrain >>> but not an affordance? Or an >>> affordance but not a constrain? Of course, >>> culture constrains once you are >>> within the road and you are driving. >>> But then, >>> the constrain is not in the >>> road, as you seem to suggest, but in the >>> journey; in the journeyman that >>> carries some cultural way of orienting and >>> affectively relating to its >>> environment so that particular >>> constrains are >>> taken for granted despite the >>> possibility of being otherwise. But I >>> might >>> not have thought it well/long >>> enough and of course I might be wrong. >>> I would >>> like to understand your >>> position here better. >>> >>> Thanks! >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >> >> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 20:32 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I have been reading Bateson >>> through a cybernetics lens >>> lately >>> (Bateson >>> >>> along with Lewin and his wife Margaret >>> Mead >>> were part of the original Sears >>> conferences) and I'm not sure that's >>> right or >>> I am victim to the "when you >>> have a hammer, everything looks like a >>> nail" >>> but.... >>> >>> I think Bateson was >>> arguing with >>> those looking to apply the >>> more >>> >>> physical/mathematical origins of >>> cybernetics >>> to human or really (pace the >>> pig story) and system that moves >>> beyond simple >>> physical feedback loops. I >>> think his larger point is that >>> everything has >>> a response within the larger >>> feedback system that exists but we >>> cannot go - >>> what Bateson refers to as >>> MIND. Attempts to create and control >>> feedback >>> loops, to try and design a >>> system for specific types of feedback is a >>> dangerous proposition. >>> >>> This I think is the reason >>> that >>> affordances really can't >>> be designed >>> >>> into an ecology, only a recognition of the >>> context in which actions are >>> taking place (and I say this having no >>> idea >>> what Gibson's relationship to >>> cybernetics was). Taking Larry's >>> example of >>> the girl it is perhaps also >>> likely that the girl could have taken the >>> fixing of hair as a criticism, an >>> attack, and it might have destroyed her >>> confidence. Both make sense in >>> terms of feedback loops, but only ad >>> hoc. So >>> if a designer does in some >>> way design that experience into the >>> action, >>> even without meaning they are >>> taking a large chance, because they do not >>> know the trajectory it will >>> take. We simply need objects that are >>> part of >>> our journey, part of the >>> larger context but not designed for >>> purpose, >>> for feedback. There is no >>> assumption about trajectory. >>> >>> I think Don Norman sort of >>> muddied >>> the waters on this, but in an >>> >>> interesting way. That we can assume >>> people >>> are going to want to do certain >>> things in a very general environment - >>> when you enter a dark room you want >>> light, so it is possible to design objects >>> that meet that need that we are >>> more likely to find in the moment that >>> we need >>> them. But I think that is >>> very different from the idea of >>> specifically >>> guiding feedback loops that >>> even take generalized experience in a >>> certain >>> direction. I am thinking >>> about Dewey, and he makes a similar >>> argument >>> to Bateson with his concept of >>> transactions. Although he does seem >>> to think >>> that it is possible to create >>> a larger field of action so we can see at >>> least local interrelationships. >>> But his idea of experience is also >>> very much >>> one of discovery based on >>> needs at the immediate moment - social >>> relations act as a vehicle for these >>> discoveriesn(Dewey of course was writing >>> before Gibson and for most of his >>> life before cybernetics. I also >>> wonder what >>> he thought of cybernetics). >>> >>> I think I disagree with you, >>> constraints are not about the >>> journey but >>> >>> about the road. If you build a road >>> on the >>> side of the river you are >>> constrained because no matter what, >>> you cannot >>> turn right. Your direction >>> has already been partially determined >>> by the >>> designer of the road. But the >>> mistake we make is in thinking that also >>> controls the trajectory of the >>> individual's journey. The effect of >>> designers >>> on trajectories of action is >>> important, but limited. >>> >>> The primary place that >>> designers >>> have influence on >>> affordances it >>> >>> seems to me is by being able to create a >>> unique context for an individual's >>> and a group's that limit possible >>> trajectories >>> on an individual's journey. >>> But we should never mistake those >>> constraints >>> for affordances. I think >>> Bateson might argue it is hubris to do so. >>> Perhaps this is what you are >>> saying Alfredo. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>> >>> >> >= >>> ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> >] On >>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>> 12:38 PM >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> I'd like to follow up on >>> Michael's >>> post by asking a question: >>> Are not >>> >>> affordances presupposed by constraints >>> and are >>> not constraints presupposed >>> by affordances? If so, I would wonder >>> whether >>> it makes sense to ask whether >>> museums should be designed for >>> affordances and >>> constraints. >>> >>> What I think is clear from the >>> anecdote that you bring >>> about the >>> >>> Jackson Pollock corner is that whatever >>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>> somewhere (i.e. being someone at some >>> time in >>> some place) cannot be >>> INTENDED. And I think this applies both to >>> designers and users, to those >>> who set things up for you to >>> experience and to >>> you, who could not foresee >>> what your experience was going to turn you >>> into before you go through it. >>> >>> I think that the big issue >>> that >>> you bring on the table (to >>> continue >>> >>> with Larry's metaphor) has to do with a >>> difference between physical >>> relations and social relations, and >>> the idea >>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>> noticed that the relations that are the >>> subject matter in physics are not >>> the same as those that are the subject >>> matter >>> in communication. He noticed >>> that physical relations (relations >>> that are >>> the object of study of physics) >>> transfer energy in direct manners: a >>> billiard >>> ball hits another ball and we >>> can anticipate the exact speed and >>> direction >>> that the second ball will take >>> based on the energy that is in the >>> system ball >>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>> living beings, the things are different. >>> Bateson explained, if we kick a >>> pig's ass (I think he used this somehow >>> bizarre example) the reaction of >>> the pig is not accounted for by the energy >>> that is contained in the kick, >>> at least not in a direct manner. The >>> energy >>> that moves the pig is from a >>> different source. Before Bateson, it was >>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>> mediation who would most clearly state >>> that >>> social relations are not >>> direct, but mediated. >>> >>> So, how can design go >>> about this? >>> If we, along with Dewey and >>> >>> Vygotsky, consider experience to be a >>> unity of >>> person and environment, and >>> we assume as well that this is a >>> social (not >>> just individual) category, and >>> that how a situation is experienced is >>> also >>> refracted through the social >>> relations within which we engage, the most >>> designers can do is to foster >>> social relations go on, giving >>> afordances to >>> prcesses of signification, >>> without intending to embed meanings. It is >>> about affordances/constraints, >>> but not about how to interpret >>> something, but >>> about going about >>> interpreting. I think. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >> >> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July 2015 18:04 >>> To: Rolf Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> So after reading the >>> article and >>> the e-mail discussion I'm >>> beginning >>> >>> to think there is a really big issue >>> here that >>> I am trying to grapple with, >>> especially in terms of boundary >>> objects (which >>> I admittedly do not >>> understand very well). And it relates >>> to the >>> metaphor of the table (both >>> as discussed by Larry and Ingold as >>> interpreted by Rolf). It is this, in >>> the museum should the place be set up as >>> affordances, perceived >>> affordances, or constraints? It seems the >>> museum in the study has >>> potential affordances for the users. The >>> cultural historical moment >>> (unable to think of any other word) of the >>> museum sets the context, meaning >>> those walking through the museum are >>> going to >>> be restricted by the >>> historical and cultural boundaries >>> leading up >>> to the art work, along with >>> the expectations and needs of the >>> individuals >>> moving through the museum, >>> but they will come across >>> objects/artifacts >>> that they think meets the needs >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 20 17:07:11 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 10:07:11 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> Message-ID: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. Thanks Rolf! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the > photographs as boundary objects as they support the > coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the > nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > identification of what may or may not be a boundary > object. This is only my opinion though! > > > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is > Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > interpretation which Thomas contests by showing > photographs of far away places and explaining how > well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of > himself as a well-travelled and experiences > man-of-the-world. > Does that make better sense? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory > and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It > seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some > social theory into domains of activity (scientific > and work collaborations for example) where the > participants naively think they are collaborating > on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, > but also the ideological context. > > In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers > collaborate with the old couple according to rules > and regulations, communications resources, > technology, finance and so on, which in the > unnamed country, the old couple are apparently > cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it > is those rules and regulations, etc., which are > the "boundary objects"? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > I think that a particular institution or > government system could potentially be a > boundary object depending on how the concept > is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) > interpretive flexibility 2) material/ > organizational structure and 3) scale/ > granularity in which the concept is useful. > > She argues that boundary objects are typically > most useful at the organizational level - so I > would say that one would have to justify the > utility of applying the concept to a > particular institution, as opposed to, say, an > object within an institution. > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Phew! > So would it be correct to describe the > government > institutions and political system are > "boundary objects"? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > Hi Andy - > Good catch! I believe that is a typo > and should > read "despite a LACK of consensus". > Thank you for > pointing that out. > > > I also wanted to follow up on a > suggestion that > Greg made in the other thread > suggesting we look > at David McNeill's work. I had only > been familiar > with his earlier work on gesture, but > after doing > a bit of reading over the weekend, I > found his > concept of 'unexpected metaphors' > potentially > useful in dealing with some of my > questions.( > http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf > ) > > Here is a relevant quote describing > unexpected > metaphors as a form of gesture: > > /The logic is that unexpected > metaphors arise > from the > need to create images when the > culture does > not have > them readily at hand. These images > join linguistic > content as growth points and > differentiate what > Vygotsky (1987) called psychological > predicates, or > points of contrast in the > immediate ongoing > context of > speaking. Unexpected metaphors, > precisely > because they > are outside the conventions of > language and > culture, > can capture abstractions in novel > ways and > provide the > fluidity of thought and language > that is the > essence > of ongoing discourse./ > > > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy > Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Rolf, what did you mean by "the > achievement of > cooperation despite consensus"? > p. 131, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier > wrote: > > Are we allowed to ask > questions about our > paper as > well? I hope so! > > For a little context -in our > paper, we > identified > particular kinds of > episodes in which participants > from different > disciplines seek coherence > and continuity of shared > representations > through > bodily action. These > actions include gesture, > movement and physical > performance linking the > present material artifacts to > objects of > design. > Most of these episodes > seem to involve some form of > improvisation, > resourcefulness or creativity, > and I'm not fully sure how to > characterize > these > aspects of the > interactions. In most cases, the > participants seem > to be searching for the > best words or material > representation to > convey a > particular intention - > when this becomes problematic > or limiting > - they > almost fall back on what > is available - these > improvised bodily > performances - as a way of > maintaining continuity, and of > inviting > co-participants into a shared and > imagined space. These bodily > actions don't > seem to > begin the proposals, but > are in a sense *discovered* by the > participants. > > > I think there is something > really fascinating > about this kind of creativity > and resourcefulness in > interaction that > could be > explored more deeply - and > that I'm having trouble > articulating. > Maybe some > of you have some thoughts > on this? Alfredo - I know > we've talked > about this > a bit before so maybe you > can add a little clarity to my > question. > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 > PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > >>> > wrote: > > Alfredo, > Thank you very much for > the sketch of your > roots. I taught English in > Puigcerda and Barcelona > for 5 years > back in > the early 70s, just before > Franco died. (He died the > day I > boarded the > plane back to the U.S.) Place > and language are interesting, > especially where > language varieties meet. > Boundaries. I know mostly > from my > familiarity > with the music of Catalunya > and Mallorca that the speech > communities in > each of those places treasure > their unique languages > (Catalan and > Mallorquin), yet see a > commonality > vis-a-vis their > separateness from > Castilian > Spanish, the national language > of Spain from 1492 on. I > see a parallel > between your work on boundary > objects, where individual > persons > collaborate > to create spaces, AND > boundary objects > ?negotiated? by groups of > people who live in real > spaces. > I am thinking, among other > things, of > indigeneity, a big topic > here in New > Mexico, with so many > Native Americans. > Assymetries of power. > Bullying. > Testing and curriculum become > instruments of > war by other means. I hope my > tone does not distract > from, nor > diminish, the > optimism created by this > thread. Yet I think that > optimism is so > precious because of the > ground (the > world) of the dialog. > Henry > > > On Jul 16, 2015, at > 12:13 PM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil > > > > > > >>> > > wrote: > > Well, you could say > that I am partly > Catalan. I grew up in > the province > > of Valencia, where Catalan > language is > official language together > with > Castilian Spanish. > Although Valencia (the > county) and Catalonia are > different regional > counties, Catalan > is spoken > in Catalonia, Valencia, and > the Balear Islands. Some > call the three > together as the Catalan > Countries. > I don't like borders, but > I respect > and enjoy > cultural diversity. > > Standardized testing, > and the whole > assumptions behind it, > are an issue > > also in Spain and in > Catalonia; but > education > has been so battered during > the last years of right-wing > government that I > the debate have been more > about means and access > than about > contents and > aims. Which in some sense > may be good because it > moves the > debates away > from performance. But I have > been living outside of > Spain for eight > years > now, so I am not the best to > update you on this either. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > > > > > >>> > > Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > The Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, > Yes, you have answered > my question > very > nicely! I especially > appreciate > > that you were willing to > wrestle with my > question, despite your lack of > familiarity with the > issues here in > the U.S. > Am I wrong, or are you > Catalan? In which case > your experience in > Catalunya would take you to a > different place in critiquing > schooling there, > though not necessarily > unconnected to yours and > Rolf?s work on > boundary objects. I just > met for > the second day in a row > with a friend > who is > the liaison between our public > school district and a > children?s science > museum called Explora. I > feel like > I?m swimming in this > thread, talk about a > mixed metaphor! > > Henry > > > On Jul 16, 2015, > at 12:18 AM, > Alfredo > Jornet Gil > > > > > > >>> > > wrote: > > I am sorry, Henry, > but I am > not very > familiar with > high-stakes > > standardized testing (as > different to > standardized testing in > general) or > with common core (which I > quickly read > is an > issue in US). But I would say > that, if (school) > curricula were to be > consistent with the view of > education as the practice > of creating > conditions for certain > attitudes and > dispositions to > emerge--which is what > I was > suggesting in the > paragraph you > copy--curricula would not > be so much about > standardized contents, but > about > human sensitivities and > relations. So, > I would > say, no, standardized > testing is not in > principle in line > with what > I was trying to say. > > I was trying to > make a distinction > between trying to > design someone's > > particular experience, and > trying to > design > conditions for the development > of attitudes and > orientations. The > first is > likely impossible. The second > seems to make more sense. > > One may of course > wonder > whether those > attitudes and > orientations can > > be considered general, and > then form > part of > standardize measures instead > of the traditional > "contents and > skills". But > measuring assumes some > quantitative increment in > a particular > aspect > as the result of learning. > Growth and development, > however, are about > qualitative change. So, as > soon > as you start measuring you > would be > missing > growth and development. So, > again, no. I would not say > that > high-stakes > standardized testing is in > line > with what I was trying to say. > > I hope I have > answered your > question, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > HENRY SHONERD > > > > > >>> > > Sent: 16 July 2015 > 07:48 > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] > Re: The > Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Alfredo, you say: > > "However, we > cannot aim at > determining > any particular > > situation/experience. The > same may be said > about EDUCATION. We cannot > intend to communicate the > curriculum > and make > it the content of the > students' experience in > the way we > intend. But > we can try to create the > conditions for certain > attitudes and > dispositions to emerge." > > Would you say that > high-stakes > standardized > testing is in > line with > > your construal of > curriculum design? > How about > common core? > > Henry > > > > > > > On Jul 15, > 2015, at 5:29 PM, > Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > > >>> > > wrote: > > Thanks a lot > for the > > clarifications. I see now > why it > may be said that > > designers can aim at > designing for > constrains > but not for affordances. I > see that this way of > talking is part of a > designers' way to get things > done, and that it may > indeed be an > effective > way to design for > place-making, as in the > example that > Michael > gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of > what we report in our > study is about > designers > talking about how spatial > features might afford some > experiences > in the > museum while constraining > others. > > I must admit, > however, that I > still consider > the distinction > > problematic from an > analytical perspective > whenever our object of > study is > experience, situated > action, or design as > situated practice. A more > correct > way to talk is that > affordances and > constrains > are the positive and > negative > sides/interpretations of a single > unitary category. As an actual > and concrete phenomenon, > walking into > a musuem > implies both affordances and > constrains at the same > time, whether > intended > or not. Which makes me wonder > whether other terminology, > such as > Ingold's > notion of "correspondence," > might be more appropriated > when we > talk about > how materials and actions > become entangled into > particular > trajectories. > > In any case, > and as Rolf > emphasizes, > what the > designers in > our study > > indeed do is to IMAGINE > ways of being > in the > museum. Imagination versus > prediction may be an > interesting topic > emerging here for further > inquiry > into design work. > > Another > important (and > related) > issue that I > think is > emerging here > > has to do with the level > of generality at > which design intentions can be > expected to work (just as > Bateson > argued with > regard to prediction). At the > level of generic social > processes, and > given a > particular > cultural-historical > background, we as > designers may try to make some > generic situations more > likely to > occur than > others (facilitating that more > or less people end up > together in a given > place). However, we cannot > aim at > determining any particular > situation/experience. The > same may be > said about > EDUCATION. We cannot intend to > communicate the > curriculum and make it the > content of the students' > experience in > the way > we intend. But we can try to > create the conditions for > certain > attitudes > and dispositions to emerge. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > > > > > > >>> > > Sent: 15 July > 2015 23:30 > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I think Rolf > may have > addressed > the question > of the > differences > > between affordances and > constraints in his > post. The way he described the > designers as possibly > setting up the > corner > with Pollock at MOMA. It > was a > long time ago so I'm not > sure if this > is the > way it was or the way I > remember it, but let's > just believe > this is > the way it was. The painting, > I think there were three > were set up in a > corner off a main > corridor. The > lighting was dark, which > if you have > ever been > to MOMA is different, in > many other parts of the > museum there > is a good > deal of natural light (there > was this great fountain, I > wonder if it is > still there). The paintings > were on tripods rather > than hung on > the walls > and they were surrounded on > three sides by walls. All > of these I > think > would be considered restraints > - pushing me in to the > works rather than > stepping back away. It was > impossible for more than > two or three > people > to view the paintings at one > time and movement was > limited, so > there were > fewer chances for social > interactions (you were not > going to > pick up > anybody looking at Jackson > Pollock). The atmosphere was > brooding, making > it more likely that viewers > would move towards internal > reflection. All > of these were constraints that > canalized perspectives and > feelings > viewing > the paintings. You really had > only two choices, you > moved in to the > paintings or you moved on, > which I > had done every previous > time coming > upon them. > > The painting > itself though > became > an > affordances, an object > at the > > nexus of my journey > through the > museum, where > I was in my life, and my > abilities to perceive the > painitings. This > was something that could > not be > designed I think because > nobody could > think > that moment was going to > happen. So then what is > a perceived > affordance. Way back when > there was > also a Manet room. It was > a round > room with > different variations of his > water lilies in a circle. > Almost the > exact > opposite in constraints it was > large, airy, a lot of > natural light. If you > were looking to brood you went > somewhere else. In the > middle of the > room was > a wooden structure (not an > obvious bench), but you > realized as random > colors dissolved into water > lilies that you wanted to > sit down. You > naturally moved to the > center of > the room and sat > (wondering if a guard > would > come and tell you it was > actually an important > piece of art and you > should get off). The designer > anticipates a desire to > soak in the > room, to > almost get dizzy in the > lights, and included in > the design the > piece > of wood that will have the > perceived affordance for > sitting, changing > your concept of time and > space. > > Michael > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> > [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >>] On Behalf > Of Alfredo > > Jornet Gil > > Sent: > Wednesday, July 15, > 2015 3:01 PM > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Thanks Michael, > > I think we are > saying the same > things, > indeed, or at > least more or > > less. I am quite certain > that Bateson > referred > to energy, and that he used > the mentioned examples (or > similar > ones) to > show how the energy that moves > the pig is not a direct > transfer of energy > from the kick, whereas in the > case of the billiard > balls, the > movement of > one ball is caused by the > energy that the kicking > ball brings. I > might > be wrong in the context within > which Bateson was > discussing the > example, and > I see that your account is in > that regard is more > accurate. But the > point is > the same: you can not intend > the outcomes of a system > by addressing > only > its parts as if they were > connected directly, in a > linear causal > fashion; as if the whole > was the sum > of its parts. I do see a > link with > Vygotsky's > rejection of S-R and his > inclusion of a third > element that > transforms > the whole system. > > But I totally > agree with your > comments on design > intentions as they > > relate to ecology, and I, > as I know > also Rolf > does, also like very much the > notion of ecology to > address these issues. > > If I read you > correctly, and > citing Don > Norman (whose > work I > ignore), > > you suggest the > possibility that the > relations > between design intentions > and actual experience > could be thought > of in > terms of different levels? > That one thing is to > design for what is > general, but that we > cannot design > for the particular. Is > that right? If > so, I > think that Bateson had a > similar argument on > prediction, does > not him? > That we can predict on > general levels (e.g. > population), but > not at > the level of the particular > (e.g., individual). I > haven't gone > that way, > but seems a promising road to > consider this jumps > between levels of > generality or scales. > > Finally, I am > not sure if > I get > what you mean > when you say > that we can > > design for constrains but > not for > affordances. > I still see that the one > presupposes the other; you can > separate them > in talk, but, to me, in actual > experience, a constrain is an > affordance and > vice-versa. I don't see how > the road has any inherent > constrain > that could > not be an affordance at the > same time. Of course, if > you take the > normative stance that > roads are for > cars driving through them, > you may be > right. > But if we think of roads as > asphalt on the ground, as > yet more > ground only > of a different shape, > texture, and color, how is > that a > constrain > but not an affordance? Or an > affordance but not a > constrain? Of course, > culture constrains once > you are > within the road and you > are driving. > But then, > the constrain is not in the > road, as you seem to > suggest, but in the > journey; in the journeyman > that > carries some cultural way > of orienting and > affectively relating to its > environment so that particular > constrains are > taken for granted despite the > possibility of being > otherwise. But I > might > not have thought it well/long > enough and of course I > might be wrong. > I would > like to understand your > position here better. > > Thanks! > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > > > > > > >>> > > Sent: 15 July > 2015 20:32 > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > I have been > reading Bateson > through a > cybernetics lens > lately > (Bateson > > along with Lewin and his > wife Margaret > Mead > were part of the original > Sears > conferences) and I'm not > sure that's > right or > I am victim to the "when you > have a hammer, everything > looks like a > nail" > but.... > > I think > Bateson was > arguing with > those looking > to apply the > more > > physical/mathematical > origins of > cybernetics > to human or really (pace the > pig story) and system that > moves > beyond simple > physical feedback loops. I > think his larger point is that > everything has > a response within the larger > feedback system that > exists but we > cannot go - > what Bateson refers to as > MIND. Attempts to create > and control > feedback > loops, to try and design a > system for specific types > of feedback is a > dangerous proposition. > > This I think > is the reason > that > affordances > really can't > be designed > > into an ecology, only a > recognition of the > context in which actions are > taking place (and I say > this having no > idea > what Gibson's relationship to > cybernetics was). Taking > Larry's > example of > the girl it is perhaps also > likely that the girl could > have taken the > fixing of hair as a > criticism, an > attack, and it might have > destroyed her > confidence. Both make > sense in > terms of feedback loops, > but only ad > hoc. So > if a designer does in some > way design that experience > into the > action, > even without meaning they are > taking a large chance, > because they do not > know the trajectory it will > take. We simply need > objects that are > part of > our journey, part of the > larger context but not > designed for > purpose, > for feedback. There is no > assumption about trajectory. > > I think Don > Norman sort of > muddied > the waters on > this, but in an > > interesting way. That we > can assume > people > are going to want to do > certain > things in a very general > environment - > when you enter a dark room > you want > light, so it is possible > to design objects > that meet that need that > we are > more likely to find in the > moment that > we need > them. But I think that is > very different from the > idea of > specifically > guiding feedback loops that > even take generalized > experience in a > certain > direction. I am thinking > about Dewey, and he makes > a similar > argument > to Bateson with his concept of > transactions. Although he > does seem > to think > that it is possible to create > a larger field of action > so we can see at > least local > interrelationships. > But his idea of experience > is also > very much > one of discovery based on > needs at the immediate > moment - social > relations act as a vehicle > for these > discoveriesn(Dewey of > course was writing > before Gibson and for most > of his > life before cybernetics. > I also > wonder what > he thought of cybernetics). > > I think I > disagree with you, > constraints > are not about the > journey but > > about the road. If you > build a road > on the > side of the river you are > constrained because no > matter what, > you cannot > turn right. Your direction > has already been partially > determined > by the > designer of the road. But the > mistake we make is in > thinking that also > controls the trajectory of the > individual's journey. The > effect of > designers > on trajectories of action is > important, but limited. > > The primary > place that > designers > have influence on > affordances it > > seems to me is by being > able to create a > unique context for an > individual's > and a group's that limit > possible > trajectories > on an individual's journey. > But we should never > mistake those > constraints > for affordances. I think > Bateson might argue it is > hubris to do so. > Perhaps this is what you are > saying Alfredo. > > Michael > > > > -----Original > Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >> > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman > > > > > > >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >>] On > Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: > Wednesday, July 15, 2015 > 12:38 PM > To: Rolf > Steier; eXtended > Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > I'd like to > follow up on > Michael's > post by asking > a question: > Are not > > affordances presupposed by > constraints > and are > not constraints presupposed > by affordances? If so, I > would wonder > whether > it makes sense to ask whether > museums should be designed for > affordances and > constraints. > > What I think > is clear from the > anecdote that > you bring > about the > > Jackson Pollock corner is > that whatever > EXPERIENCE emerges from being > somewhere (i.e. being > someone at some > time in > some place) cannot be > INTENDED. And I think this > applies both to > designers and users, to those > who set things up for you to > experience and to > you, who could not foresee > what your experience was > going to turn you > into before you go through it. > > I think that > the big issue > that > you bring on > the table (to > continue > > with Larry's metaphor) has > to do with a > difference between physical > relations and social > relations, and > the idea > of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson > noticed that the relations > that are the > subject matter in physics > are not > the same as those that are > the subject > matter > in communication. He noticed > that physical relations > (relations > that are > the object of study of > physics) > transfer energy in direct > manners: a > billiard > ball hits another ball and we > can anticipate the exact > speed and > direction > that the second ball will take > based on the energy that > is in the > system ball > + ball + someone hitting. In > living beings, the things > are different. > Bateson explained, if we > kick a > pig's ass (I think he used > this somehow > bizarre example) the > reaction of > the pig is not accounted > for by the energy > that is contained in the kick, > at least not in a direct > manner. The > energy > that moves the pig is from a > different source. Before > Bateson, it was > Vygotsky and his notion of > mediation who would most > clearly state > that > social relations are not > direct, but mediated. > > So, how can > design go > about this? > If we, along > with Dewey and > > Vygotsky, consider > experience to be a > unity of > person and environment, and > we assume as well that > this is a > social (not > just individual) category, and > that how a situation is > experienced is > also > refracted through the social > relations within which we > engage, the most > designers can do is to foster > social relations go on, giving > afordances to > prcesses of signification, > without intending to embed > meanings. It is > about affordances/constraints, > but not about how to interpret > something, but > about going about > interpreting. I think. > > Best wishes, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> on > behalf of > Glassman, Michael > > > > > > >>> > > Sent: 15 July > 2015 18:04 > To: Rolf > Steier; eXtended > Mind, > Culture, Activity > Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > So after > reading the > article and > the e-mail > discussion I'm > beginning > > to think there is a really > big issue > here that > I am trying to grapple with, > especially in terms of > boundary > objects (which > I admittedly do not > understand very well). > And it relates > to the > metaphor of the table (both > as discussed by Larry and > Ingold as > interpreted by Rolf). It > is this, in > the museum should the > place be set up as > affordances, perceived > affordances, or > constraints? It seems the > museum in the study has > potential affordances for > the users. The > cultural historical moment > (unable to think of any > other word) of the > museum sets the context, > meaning > those walking through the > museum are > going to > be restricted by the > historical and cultural > boundaries > leading up > to the art work, along with > the expectations and needs > of the > individuals > moving through the museum, > but they will come across > objects/artifacts > that they think meets the > needs > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jul 20 19:27:55 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 20:27:55 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD4765@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> Message-ID: Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? Henry > On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > Thanks Rolf! > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >> photographs of far away places and explaining how >> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >> man-of-the-world. >> Does that make better sense? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >> and work collaborations for example) where the >> participants naively think they are collaborating >> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >> but also the ideological context. >> >> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >> and regulations, communications resources, >> technology, finance and so on, which in the >> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >> the "boundary objects"? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> I think that a particular institution or >> government system could potentially be a >> boundary object depending on how the concept >> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >> granularity in which the concept is useful. >> >> She argues that boundary objects are typically >> most useful at the organizational level - so I >> would say that one would have to justify the >> utility of applying the concept to a >> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >> object within an institution. >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> wrote: >> >> Phew! >> So would it be correct to describe the >> government >> institutions and political system are >> "boundary objects"? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> Hi Andy - >> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >> and should >> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >> Thank you for >> pointing that out. >> >> >> I also wanted to follow up on a >> suggestion that >> Greg made in the other thread >> suggesting we look >> at David McNeill's work. I had only >> been familiar >> with his earlier work on gesture, but >> after doing >> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >> found his >> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >> potentially >> useful in dealing with some of my >> questions.( >> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >> ) >> >> Here is a relevant quote describing >> unexpected >> metaphors as a form of gesture: >> >> /The logic is that unexpected >> metaphors arise >> from the >> need to create images when the >> culture does >> not have >> them readily at hand. These images >> join linguistic >> content as growth points and >> differentiate what >> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >> predicates, or >> points of contrast in the >> immediate ongoing >> context of >> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >> precisely >> because they >> are outside the conventions of >> language and >> culture, >> can capture abstractions in novel >> ways and >> provide the >> fluidity of thought and language >> that is the >> essence >> of ongoing discourse./ >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >> Blunden >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> wrote: >> >> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >> achievement of >> cooperation despite consensus"? >> p. 131, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >> wrote: >> >> Are we allowed to ask >> questions about our >> paper as >> well? I hope so! >> >> For a little context -in our >> paper, we >> identified >> particular kinds of >> episodes in which participants >> from different >> disciplines seek coherence >> and continuity of shared >> representations >> through >> bodily action. These >> actions include gesture, >> movement and physical >> performance linking the >> present material artifacts to >> objects of >> design. >> Most of these episodes >> seem to involve some form of >> improvisation, >> resourcefulness or creativity, >> and I'm not fully sure how to >> characterize >> these >> aspects of the >> interactions. In most cases, the >> participants seem >> to be searching for the >> best words or material >> representation to >> convey a >> particular intention - >> when this becomes problematic >> or limiting >> - they >> almost fall back on what >> is available - these >> improvised bodily >> performances - as a way of >> maintaining continuity, and of >> inviting >> co-participants into a shared and >> imagined space. These bodily >> actions don't >> seem to >> begin the proposals, but >> are in a sense *discovered* by the >> participants. >> >> >> I think there is something >> really fascinating >> about this kind of creativity >> and resourcefulness in >> interaction that >> could be >> explored more deeply - and >> that I'm having trouble >> articulating. >> Maybe some >> of you have some thoughts >> on this? Alfredo - I know >> we've talked >> about this >> a bit before so maybe you >> can add a little clarity to my >> question. >> >> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >> PM, HENRY SHONERD >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> wrote: >> >> Alfredo, >> Thank you very much for >> the sketch of your >> roots. I taught English in >> Puigcerda and Barcelona >> for 5 years >> back in >> the early 70s, just before >> Franco died. (He died the >> day I >> boarded the >> plane back to the U.S.) Place >> and language are interesting, >> especially where >> language varieties meet. >> Boundaries. I know mostly >> from my >> familiarity >> with the music of Catalunya >> and Mallorca that the speech >> communities in >> each of those places treasure >> their unique languages >> (Catalan and >> Mallorquin), yet see a >> commonality >> vis-a-vis their >> separateness from >> Castilian >> Spanish, the national language >> of Spain from 1492 on. I >> see a parallel >> between your work on boundary >> objects, where individual >> persons >> collaborate >> to create spaces, AND >> boundary objects >> ?negotiated? by groups of >> people who live in real >> spaces. >> I am thinking, among other >> things, of >> indigeneity, a big topic >> here in New >> Mexico, with so many >> Native Americans. >> Assymetries of power. >> Bullying. >> Testing and curriculum become >> instruments of >> war by other means. I hope my >> tone does not distract >> from, nor >> diminish, the >> optimism created by this >> thread. Yet I think that >> optimism is so >> precious because of the >> ground (the >> world) of the dialog. >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at >> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> wrote: >> >> Well, you could say >> that I am partly >> Catalan. I grew up in >> the province >> >> of Valencia, where Catalan >> language is >> official language together >> with >> Castilian Spanish. >> Although Valencia (the >> county) and Catalonia are >> different regional >> counties, Catalan >> is spoken >> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >> the Balear Islands. Some >> call the three >> together as the Catalan >> Countries. >> I don't like borders, but >> I respect >> and enjoy >> cultural diversity. >> >> Standardized testing, >> and the whole >> assumptions behind it, >> are an issue >> >> also in Spain and in >> Catalonia; but >> education >> has been so battered during >> the last years of right-wing >> government that I >> the debate have been more >> about means and access >> than about >> contents and >> aims. Which in some sense >> may be good because it >> moves the >> debates away >> from performance. But I have >> been living outside of >> Spain for eight >> years >> now, so I am not the best to >> update you on this either. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> on >> behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD >> >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >> The Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, >> Yes, you have answered >> my question >> very >> nicely! I especially >> appreciate >> >> that you were willing to >> wrestle with my >> question, despite your lack of >> familiarity with the >> issues here in >> the U.S. >> Am I wrong, or are you >> Catalan? In which case >> your experience in >> Catalunya would take you to a >> different place in critiquing >> schooling there, >> though not necessarily >> unconnected to yours and >> Rolf?s work on >> boundary objects. I just >> met for >> the second day in a row >> with a friend >> who is >> the liaison between our public >> school district and a >> children?s science >> museum called Explora. I >> feel like >> I?m swimming in this >> thread, talk about a >> mixed metaphor! >> >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, >> at 12:18 AM, >> Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> wrote: >> >> I am sorry, Henry, >> but I am >> not very >> familiar with >> high-stakes >> >> standardized testing (as >> different to >> standardized testing in >> general) or >> with common core (which I >> quickly read >> is an >> issue in US). But I would say >> that, if (school) >> curricula were to be >> consistent with the view of >> education as the practice >> of creating >> conditions for certain >> attitudes and >> dispositions to >> emerge--which is what >> I was >> suggesting in the >> paragraph you >> copy--curricula would not >> be so much about >> standardized contents, but >> about >> human sensitivities and >> relations. So, >> I would >> say, no, standardized >> testing is not in >> principle in line >> with what >> I was trying to say. >> >> I was trying to >> make a distinction >> between trying to >> design someone's >> >> particular experience, and >> trying to >> design >> conditions for the development >> of attitudes and >> orientations. The >> first is >> likely impossible. The second >> seems to make more sense. >> >> One may of course >> wonder >> whether those >> attitudes and >> orientations can >> >> be considered general, and >> then form >> part of >> standardize measures instead >> of the traditional >> "contents and >> skills". But >> measuring assumes some >> quantitative increment in >> a particular >> aspect >> as the result of learning. >> Growth and development, >> however, are about >> qualitative change. So, as >> soon >> as you start measuring you >> would be >> missing >> growth and development. So, >> again, no. I would not say >> that >> high-stakes >> standardized testing is in >> line >> with what I was trying to say. >> >> I hope I have >> answered your >> question, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> on >> behalf of >> HENRY SHONERD >> >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 >> 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, >> Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] >> Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, you say: >> >> "However, we >> cannot aim at >> determining >> any particular >> >> situation/experience. The >> same may be said >> about EDUCATION. We cannot >> intend to communicate the >> curriculum >> and make >> it the content of the >> students' experience in >> the way we >> intend. But >> we can try to create the >> conditions for certain >> attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge." >> >> Would you say that >> high-stakes >> standardized >> testing is in >> line with >> >> your construal of >> curriculum design? >> How about >> common core? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jul 15, >> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil >> >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot >> for the >> clarifications. I see now >> why it >> may be said that >> >> designers can aim at >> designing for >> constrains >> but not for affordances. I >> see that this way of >> talking is part of a >> designers' way to get things >> done, and that it may >> indeed be an >> effective >> way to design for >> place-making, as in the >> example that >> Michael >> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >> what we report in our >> study is about >> designers >> talking about how spatial >> features might afford some >> experiences >> in the >> museum while constraining >> others. >> >> I must admit, >> however, that I >> still consider >> the distinction >> >> problematic from an >> analytical perspective >> whenever our object of >> study is >> experience, situated >> action, or design as >> situated practice. A more >> correct >> way to talk is that >> affordances and >> constrains >> are the positive and >> negative >> sides/interpretations of a single >> unitary category. As an actual >> and concrete phenomenon, >> walking into >> a musuem >> implies both affordances and >> constrains at the same >> time, whether >> intended >> or not. Which makes me wonder >> whether other terminology, >> such as >> Ingold's >> notion of "correspondence," >> might be more appropriated >> when we >> talk about >> how materials and actions >> become entangled into >> particular >> trajectories. >> >> In any case, >> and as Rolf >> emphasizes, >> what the >> designers in >> our study >> >> indeed do is to IMAGINE >> ways of being >> in the >> museum. Imagination versus >> prediction may be an >> interesting topic >> emerging here for further >> inquiry >> into design work. >> >> Another >> important (and >> related) >> issue that I >> think is >> emerging here >> >> has to do with the level >> of generality at >> which design intentions can be >> expected to work (just as >> Bateson >> argued with >> regard to prediction). At the >> level of generic social >> processes, and >> given a >> particular >> cultural-historical >> background, we as >> designers may try to make some >> generic situations more >> likely to >> occur than >> others (facilitating that more >> or less people end up >> together in a given >> place). However, we cannot >> aim at >> determining any particular >> situation/experience. The >> same may be >> said about >> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >> communicate the >> curriculum and make it the >> content of the students' >> experience in >> the way >> we intend. But we can try to >> create the conditions for >> certain >> attitudes >> and dispositions to emerge. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael >> >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> Sent: 15 July >> 2015 23:30 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: >> [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I think Rolf >> may have >> addressed >> the question >> of the >> differences >> >> between affordances and >> constraints in his >> post. The way he described the >> designers as possibly >> setting up the >> corner >> with Pollock at MOMA. It >> was a >> long time ago so I'm not >> sure if this >> is the >> way it was or the way I >> remember it, but let's >> just believe >> this is >> the way it was. The painting, >> I think there were three >> were set up in a >> corner off a main >> corridor. The >> lighting was dark, which >> if you have >> ever been >> to MOMA is different, in >> many other parts of the >> museum there >> is a good >> deal of natural light (there >> was this great fountain, I >> wonder if it is >> still there). The paintings >> were on tripods rather >> than hung on >> the walls >> and they were surrounded on >> three sides by walls. All >> of these I >> think >> would be considered restraints >> - pushing me in to the >> works rather than >> stepping back away. It was >> impossible for more than >> two or three >> people >> to view the paintings at one >> time and movement was >> limited, so >> there were >> fewer chances for social >> interactions (you were not >> going to >> pick up >> anybody looking at Jackson >> Pollock). The atmosphere was >> brooding, making >> it more likely that viewers >> would move towards internal >> reflection. All >> of these were constraints that >> canalized perspectives and >> feelings >> viewing >> the paintings. You really had >> only two choices, you >> moved in to the >> paintings or you moved on, >> which I >> had done every previous >> time coming >> upon them. >> >> The painting >> itself though >> became >> an >> affordances, an object >> at the >> >> nexus of my journey >> through the >> museum, where >> I was in my life, and my >> abilities to perceive the >> painitings. This >> was something that could >> not be >> designed I think because >> nobody could >> think >> that moment was going to >> happen. So then what is >> a perceived >> affordance. Way back when >> there was >> also a Manet room. It was >> a round >> room with >> different variations of his >> water lilies in a circle. >> Almost the >> exact >> opposite in constraints it was >> large, airy, a lot of >> natural light. If you >> were looking to brood you went >> somewhere else. In the >> middle of the >> room was >> a wooden structure (not an >> obvious bench), but you >> realized as random >> colors dissolved into water >> lilies that you wanted to >> sit down. You >> naturally moved to the >> center of >> the room and sat >> (wondering if a guard >> would >> come and tell you it was >> actually an important >> piece of art and you >> should get off). The designer >> anticipates a desire to >> soak in the >> room, to >> almost get dizzy in the >> lights, and included in >> the design the >> piece >> of wood that will have the >> perceived affordance for >> sitting, changing >> your concept of time and >> space. >> >> Michael >> >> -----Original >> Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> [mailto: >> >> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >>] On Behalf >> Of Alfredo >> >> Jornet Gil >> >> Sent: >> Wednesday, July 15, >> 2015 3:01 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: >> [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Thanks Michael, >> >> I think we are >> saying the same >> things, >> indeed, or at >> least more or >> >> less. I am quite certain >> that Bateson >> referred >> to energy, and that he used >> the mentioned examples (or >> similar >> ones) to >> show how the energy that moves >> the pig is not a direct >> transfer of energy >> from the kick, whereas in the >> case of the billiard >> balls, the >> movement of >> one ball is caused by the >> energy that the kicking >> ball brings. I >> might >> be wrong in the context within >> which Bateson was >> discussing the >> example, and >> I see that your account is in >> that regard is more >> accurate. But the >> point is >> the same: you can not intend >> the outcomes of a system >> by addressing >> only >> its parts as if they were >> connected directly, in a >> linear causal >> fashion; as if the whole >> was the sum >> of its parts. I do see a >> link with >> Vygotsky's >> rejection of S-R and his >> inclusion of a third >> element that >> transforms >> the whole system. >> >> But I totally >> agree with your >> comments on design >> intentions as they >> >> relate to ecology, and I, >> as I know >> also Rolf >> does, also like very much the >> notion of ecology to >> address these issues. >> >> If I read you >> correctly, and >> citing Don >> Norman (whose >> work I >> ignore), >> >> you suggest the >> possibility that the >> relations >> between design intentions >> and actual experience >> could be thought >> of in >> terms of different levels? >> That one thing is to >> design for what is >> general, but that we >> cannot design >> for the particular. Is >> that right? If >> so, I >> think that Bateson had a >> similar argument on >> prediction, does >> not him? >> That we can predict on >> general levels (e.g. >> population), but >> not at >> the level of the particular >> (e.g., individual). I >> haven't gone >> that way, >> but seems a promising road to >> consider this jumps >> between levels of >> generality or scales. >> >> Finally, I am >> not sure if >> I get >> what you mean >> when you say >> that we can >> >> design for constrains but >> not for >> affordances. >> I still see that the one >> presupposes the other; you can >> separate them >> in talk, but, to me, in actual >> experience, a constrain is an >> affordance and >> vice-versa. I don't see how >> the road has any inherent >> constrain >> that could >> not be an affordance at the >> same time. Of course, if >> you take the >> normative stance that >> roads are for >> cars driving through them, >> you may be >> right. >> But if we think of roads as >> asphalt on the ground, as >> yet more >> ground only >> of a different shape, >> texture, and color, how is >> that a >> constrain >> but not an affordance? Or an >> affordance but not a >> constrain? Of course, >> culture constrains once >> you are >> within the road and you >> are driving. >> But then, >> the constrain is not in the >> road, as you seem to >> suggest, but in the >> journey; in the journeyman >> that >> carries some cultural way >> of orienting and >> affectively relating to its >> environment so that particular >> constrains are >> taken for granted despite the >> possibility of being >> otherwise. But I >> might >> not have thought it well/long >> enough and of course I >> might be wrong. >> I would >> like to understand your >> position here better. >> >> Thanks! >> Alfredo >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael >> >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> Sent: 15 July >> 2015 20:32 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: >> [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I have been >> reading Bateson >> through a >> cybernetics lens >> lately >> (Bateson >> >> along with Lewin and his >> wife Margaret >> Mead >> were part of the original >> Sears >> conferences) and I'm not >> sure that's >> right or >> I am victim to the "when you >> have a hammer, everything >> looks like a >> nail" >> but.... >> >> I think >> Bateson was >> arguing with >> those looking >> to apply the >> more >> >> physical/mathematical >> origins of >> cybernetics >> to human or really (pace the >> pig story) and system that >> moves >> beyond simple >> physical feedback loops. I >> think his larger point is that >> everything has >> a response within the larger >> feedback system that >> exists but we >> cannot go - >> what Bateson refers to as >> MIND. Attempts to create >> and control >> feedback >> loops, to try and design a >> system for specific types >> of feedback is a >> dangerous proposition. >> >> This I think >> is the reason >> that >> affordances >> really can't >> be designed >> >> into an ecology, only a >> recognition of the >> context in which actions are >> taking place (and I say >> this having no >> idea >> what Gibson's relationship to >> cybernetics was). Taking >> Larry's >> example of >> the girl it is perhaps also >> likely that the girl could >> have taken the >> fixing of hair as a >> criticism, an >> attack, and it might have >> destroyed her >> confidence. Both make >> sense in >> terms of feedback loops, >> but only ad >> hoc. So >> if a designer does in some >> way design that experience >> into the >> action, >> even without meaning they are >> taking a large chance, >> because they do not >> know the trajectory it will >> take. We simply need >> objects that are >> part of >> our journey, part of the >> larger context but not >> designed for >> purpose, >> for feedback. There is no >> assumption about trajectory. >> >> I think Don >> Norman sort of >> muddied >> the waters on >> this, but in an >> >> interesting way. That we >> can assume >> people >> are going to want to do >> certain >> things in a very general >> environment - >> when you enter a dark room >> you want >> light, so it is possible >> to design objects >> that meet that need that >> we are >> more likely to find in the >> moment that >> we need >> them. But I think that is >> very different from the >> idea of >> specifically >> guiding feedback loops that >> even take generalized >> experience in a >> certain >> direction. I am thinking >> about Dewey, and he makes >> a similar >> argument >> to Bateson with his concept of >> transactions. Although he >> does seem >> to think >> that it is possible to create >> a larger field of action >> so we can see at >> least local >> interrelationships. >> But his idea of experience >> is also >> very much >> one of discovery based on >> needs at the immediate >> moment - social >> relations act as a vehicle >> for these >> discoveriesn(Dewey of >> course was writing >> before Gibson and for most >> of his >> life before cybernetics. I also >> wonder what >> he thought of cybernetics). >> >> I think I >> disagree with you, >> constraints >> are not about the >> journey but >> >> about the road. If you >> build a road >> on the >> side of the river you are >> constrained because no >> matter what, >> you cannot >> turn right. Your direction >> has already been partially >> determined >> by the >> designer of the road. But the >> mistake we make is in >> thinking that also >> controls the trajectory of the >> individual's journey. The >> effect of >> designers >> on trajectories of action is >> important, but limited. >> >> The primary >> place that >> designers >> have influence on >> affordances it >> >> seems to me is by being >> able to create a >> unique context for an >> individual's >> and a group's that limit >> possible >> trajectories >> on an individual's journey. >> But we should never >> mistake those >> constraints >> for affordances. I think >> Bateson might argue it is >> hubris to do so. >> Perhaps this is what you are >> saying Alfredo. >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> -----Original >> Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >> >> > > >> > >> > >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >>] On >> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> >> Sent: >> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >> 12:38 PM >> To: Rolf >> Steier; eXtended >> Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: >> [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> I'd like to >> follow up on >> Michael's >> post by asking >> a question: >> Are not >> >> affordances presupposed by >> constraints >> and are >> not constraints presupposed >> by affordances? If so, I >> would wonder >> whether >> it makes sense to ask whether >> museums should be designed for >> affordances and >> constraints. >> >> What I think >> is clear from the >> anecdote that >> you bring >> about the >> >> Jackson Pollock corner is >> that whatever >> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >> somewhere (i.e. being >> someone at some >> time in >> some place) cannot be >> INTENDED. And I think this >> applies both to >> designers and users, to those >> who set things up for you to >> experience and to >> you, who could not foresee >> what your experience was >> going to turn you >> into before you go through it. >> >> I think that >> the big issue >> that >> you bring on >> the table (to >> continue >> >> with Larry's metaphor) has >> to do with a >> difference between physical >> relations and social >> relations, and >> the idea >> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >> noticed that the relations >> that are the >> subject matter in physics >> are not >> the same as those that are >> the subject >> matter >> in communication. He noticed >> that physical relations >> (relations >> that are >> the object of study of >> physics) >> transfer energy in direct >> manners: a >> billiard >> ball hits another ball and we >> can anticipate the exact >> speed and >> direction >> that the second ball will take >> based on the energy that >> is in the >> system ball >> + ball + someone hitting. In >> living beings, the things >> are different. >> Bateson explained, if we >> kick a >> pig's ass (I think he used >> this somehow >> bizarre example) the >> reaction of >> the pig is not accounted >> for by the energy >> that is contained in the kick, >> at least not in a direct >> manner. The >> energy >> that moves the pig is from a >> different source. Before >> Bateson, it was >> Vygotsky and his notion of >> mediation who would most >> clearly state >> that >> social relations are not >> direct, but mediated. >> >> So, how can >> design go >> about this? >> If we, along >> with Dewey and >> >> Vygotsky, consider >> experience to be a >> unity of >> person and environment, and >> we assume as well that >> this is a >> social (not >> just individual) category, and >> that how a situation is >> experienced is >> also >> refracted through the social >> relations within which we >> engage, the most >> designers can do is to foster >> social relations go on, giving >> afordances to >> prcesses of signification, >> without intending to embed >> meanings. It is >> about affordances/constraints, >> but not about how to interpret >> something, but >> about going about >> interpreting. I think. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> on >> behalf of >> Glassman, Michael >> >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> Sent: 15 July >> 2015 18:04 >> To: Rolf >> Steier; eXtended >> Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: >> [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> So after >> reading the >> article and >> the e-mail >> discussion I'm >> beginning >> >> to think there is a really >> big issue >> here that >> I am trying to grapple with, >> especially in terms of >> boundary >> objects (which >> I admittedly do not >> understand very well). And it relates >> to the >> metaphor of the table (both >> as discussed by Larry and >> Ingold as >> interpreted by Rolf). It >> is this, in >> the museum should the >> place be set up as >> affordances, perceived >> affordances, or >> constraints? It seems the >> museum in the study has >> potential affordances for >> the users. The >> cultural historical moment >> (unable to think of any >> other word) of the >> museum sets the context, >> meaning >> those walking through the >> museum are >> going to >> be restricted by the >> historical and cultural >> boundaries >> leading up >> to the art work, along with >> the expectations and needs >> of the >> individuals >> moving through the museum, >> but they will come across >> objects/artifacts >> that they think meets the >> needs >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Jul 21 05:38:00 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 22:38:00 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> Message-ID: <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and one subject challenges that role and turns the object into its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. A number of examples spring to mind. * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are embraced by a despised group who take control of the word and assertively embrace it; * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before them rather than in shame); * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and read it, thus making the paper into a glorious organising tool; * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared object (the land); * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a symbol of India. In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when she introduced the term, but core point is that the ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a mediating artefact or the object of work (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according to context. In principle it is not the Object in the Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? > Henry > > >> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> Thanks Rolf! >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>> man-of-the-world. >>> Does that make better sense? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>> but also the ideological context. >>> >>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>> and regulations, communications resources, >>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>> the "boundary objects"? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> I think that a particular institution or >>> government system could potentially be a >>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>> >>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>> would say that one would have to justify the >>> utility of applying the concept to a >>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>> object within an institution. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Phew! >>> So would it be correct to describe the >>> government >>> institutions and political system are >>> "boundary objects"? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy - >>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>> and should >>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>> Thank you for >>> pointing that out. >>> >>> >>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>> suggestion that >>> Greg made in the other thread >>> suggesting we look >>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>> been familiar >>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>> after doing >>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>> found his >>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>> potentially >>> useful in dealing with some of my >>> questions.( >>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>> ) >>> >>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>> unexpected >>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>> >>> /The logic is that unexpected >>> metaphors arise >>> from the >>> need to create images when the >>> culture does >>> not have >>> them readily at hand. These images >>> join linguistic >>> content as growth points and >>> differentiate what >>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>> predicates, or >>> points of contrast in the >>> immediate ongoing >>> context of >>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>> precisely >>> because they >>> are outside the conventions of >>> language and >>> culture, >>> can capture abstractions in novel >>> ways and >>> provide the >>> fluidity of thought and language >>> that is the >>> essence >>> of ongoing discourse./ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>> Blunden >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>> achievement of >>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>> p. 131, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>> wrote: >>> >>> Are we allowed to ask >>> questions about our >>> paper as >>> well? I hope so! >>> >>> For a little context -in our >>> paper, we >>> identified >>> particular kinds of >>> episodes in which participants >>> from different >>> disciplines seek coherence >>> and continuity of shared >>> representations >>> through >>> bodily action. These >>> actions include gesture, >>> movement and physical >>> performance linking the >>> present material artifacts to >>> objects of >>> design. >>> Most of these episodes >>> seem to involve some form of >>> improvisation, >>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>> characterize >>> these >>> aspects of the >>> interactions. In most cases, the >>> participants seem >>> to be searching for the >>> best words or material >>> representation to >>> convey a >>> particular intention - >>> when this becomes problematic >>> or limiting >>> - they >>> almost fall back on what >>> is available - these >>> improvised bodily >>> performances - as a way of >>> maintaining continuity, and of >>> inviting >>> co-participants into a shared and >>> imagined space. These bodily >>> actions don't >>> seem to >>> begin the proposals, but >>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>> participants. >>> >>> >>> I think there is something >>> really fascinating >>> about this kind of creativity >>> and resourcefulness in >>> interaction that >>> could be >>> explored more deeply - and >>> that I'm having trouble >>> articulating. >>> Maybe some >>> of you have some thoughts >>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>> we've talked >>> about this >>> a bit before so maybe you >>> can add a little clarity to my >>> question. >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Thank you very much for >>> the sketch of your >>> roots. I taught English in >>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>> for 5 years >>> back in >>> the early 70s, just before >>> Franco died. (He died the >>> day I >>> boarded the >>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>> and language are interesting, >>> especially where >>> language varieties meet. >>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>> from my >>> familiarity >>> with the music of Catalunya >>> and Mallorca that the speech >>> communities in >>> each of those places treasure >>> their unique languages >>> (Catalan and >>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>> commonality >>> vis-a-vis their >>> separateness from >>> Castilian >>> Spanish, the national language >>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>> see a parallel >>> between your work on boundary >>> objects, where individual >>> persons >>> collaborate >>> to create spaces, AND >>> boundary objects >>> ?negotiated? by groups of >>> people who live in real >>> spaces. >>> I am thinking, among other >>> things, of >>> indigeneity, a big topic >>> here in New >>> Mexico, with so many >>> Native Americans. >>> Assymetries of power. >>> Bullying. >>> Testing and curriculum become >>> instruments of >>> war by other means. I hope my >>> tone does not distract >>> from, nor >>> diminish, the >>> optimism created by this >>> thread. Yet I think that >>> optimism is so >>> precious because of the >>> ground (the >>> world) of the dialog. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well, you could say >>> that I am partly >>> Catalan. I grew up in >>> the province >>> >>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>> language is >>> official language together >>> with >>> Castilian Spanish. >>> Although Valencia (the >>> county) and Catalonia are >>> different regional >>> counties, Catalan >>> is spoken >>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>> the Balear Islands. Some >>> call the three >>> together as the Catalan >>> Countries. >>> I don't like borders, but >>> I respect >>> and enjoy >>> cultural diversity. >>> >>> Standardized testing, >>> and the whole >>> assumptions behind it, >>> are an issue >>> >>> also in Spain and in >>> Catalonia; but >>> education >>> has been so battered during >>> the last years of right-wing >>> government that I >>> the debate have been more >>> about means and access >>> than about >>> contents and >>> aims. Which in some sense >>> may be good because it >>> moves the >>> debates away >>> from performance. But I have >>> been living outside of >>> Spain for eight >>> years >>> now, so I am not the best to >>> update you on this either. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>> The Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Yes, you have answered >>> my question >>> very >>> nicely! I especially >>> appreciate >>> >>> that you were willing to >>> wrestle with my >>> question, despite your lack of >>> familiarity with the >>> issues here in >>> the U.S. >>> Am I wrong, or are you >>> Catalan? In which case >>> your experience in >>> Catalunya would take you to a >>> different place in critiquing >>> schooling there, >>> though not necessarily >>> unconnected to yours and >>> Rolf?s work on >>> boundary objects. I just >>> met for >>> the second day in a row >>> with a friend >>> who is >>> the liaison between our public >>> school district and a >>> children?s science >>> museum called Explora. I >>> feel like >>> I?m swimming in this >>> thread, talk about a >>> mixed metaphor! >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>> at 12:18 AM, >>> Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I am sorry, Henry, >>> but I am >>> not very >>> familiar with >>> high-stakes >>> >>> standardized testing (as >>> different to >>> standardized testing in >>> general) or >>> with common core (which I >>> quickly read >>> is an >>> issue in US). But I would say >>> that, if (school) >>> curricula were to be >>> consistent with the view of >>> education as the practice >>> of creating >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to >>> emerge--which is what >>> I was >>> suggesting in the >>> paragraph you >>> copy--curricula would not >>> be so much about >>> standardized contents, but >>> about >>> human sensitivities and >>> relations. So, >>> I would >>> say, no, standardized >>> testing is not in >>> principle in line >>> with what >>> I was trying to say. >>> >>> I was trying to >>> make a distinction >>> between trying to >>> design someone's >>> >>> particular experience, and >>> trying to >>> design >>> conditions for the development >>> of attitudes and >>> orientations. The >>> first is >>> likely impossible. The second >>> seems to make more sense. >>> >>> One may of course >>> wonder >>> whether those >>> attitudes and >>> orientations can >>> >>> be considered general, and >>> then form >>> part of >>> standardize measures instead >>> of the traditional >>> "contents and >>> skills". But >>> measuring assumes some >>> quantitative increment in >>> a particular >>> aspect >>> as the result of learning. >>> Growth and development, >>> however, are about >>> qualitative change. So, as >>> soon >>> as you start measuring you >>> would be >>> missing >>> growth and development. So, >>> again, no. I would not say >>> that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized testing is in >>> line >>> with what I was trying to say. >>> >>> I hope I have >>> answered your >>> question, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>> 07:48 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, >>> Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>> Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, you say: >>> >>> "However, we >>> cannot aim at >>> determining >>> any particular >>> >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be said >>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>> intend to communicate the >>> curriculum >>> and make >>> it the content of the >>> students' experience in >>> the way we >>> intend. But >>> we can try to create the >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to emerge." >>> >>> Would you say that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized >>> testing is in >>> line with >>> >>> your construal of >>> curriculum design? >>> How about >>> common core? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jul 15, >>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks a lot >>> for the >>> clarifications. I see now >>> why it >>> may be said that >>> >>> designers can aim at >>> designing for >>> constrains >>> but not for affordances. I >>> see that this way of >>> talking is part of a >>> designers' way to get things >>> done, and that it may >>> indeed be an >>> effective >>> way to design for >>> place-making, as in the >>> example that >>> Michael >>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>> what we report in our >>> study is about >>> designers >>> talking about how spatial >>> features might afford some >>> experiences >>> in the >>> museum while constraining >>> others. >>> >>> I must admit, >>> however, that I >>> still consider >>> the distinction >>> >>> problematic from an >>> analytical perspective >>> whenever our object of >>> study is >>> experience, situated >>> action, or design as >>> situated practice. A more >>> correct >>> way to talk is that >>> affordances and >>> constrains >>> are the positive and >>> negative >>> sides/interpretations of a single >>> unitary category. As an actual >>> and concrete phenomenon, >>> walking into >>> a musuem >>> implies both affordances and >>> constrains at the same >>> time, whether >>> intended >>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>> whether other terminology, >>> such as >>> Ingold's >>> notion of "correspondence," >>> might be more appropriated >>> when we >>> talk about >>> how materials and actions >>> become entangled into >>> particular >>> trajectories. >>> >>> In any case, >>> and as Rolf >>> emphasizes, >>> what the >>> designers in >>> our study >>> >>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>> ways of being >>> in the >>> museum. Imagination versus >>> prediction may be an >>> interesting topic >>> emerging here for further >>> inquiry >>> into design work. >>> >>> Another >>> important (and >>> related) >>> issue that I >>> think is >>> emerging here >>> >>> has to do with the level >>> of generality at >>> which design intentions can be >>> expected to work (just as >>> Bateson >>> argued with >>> regard to prediction). At the >>> level of generic social >>> processes, and >>> given a >>> particular >>> cultural-historical >>> background, we as >>> designers may try to make some >>> generic situations more >>> likely to >>> occur than >>> others (facilitating that more >>> or less people end up >>> together in a given >>> place). However, we cannot >>> aim at >>> determining any particular >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be >>> said about >>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>> communicate the >>> curriculum and make it the >>> content of the students' >>> experience in >>> the way >>> we intend. But we can try to >>> create the conditions for >>> certain >>> attitudes >>> and dispositions to emerge. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 23:30 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I think Rolf >>> may have >>> addressed >>> the question >>> of the >>> differences >>> >>> between affordances and >>> constraints in his >>> post. The way he described the >>> designers as possibly >>> setting up the >>> corner >>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>> was a >>> long time ago so I'm not >>> sure if this >>> is the >>> way it was or the way I >>> remember it, but let's >>> just believe >>> this is >>> the way it was. The painting, >>> I think there were three >>> were set up in a >>> corner off a main >>> corridor. The >>> lighting was dark, which >>> if you have >>> ever been >>> to MOMA is different, in >>> many other parts of the >>> museum there >>> is a good >>> deal of natural light (there >>> was this great fountain, I >>> wonder if it is >>> still there). The paintings >>> were on tripods rather >>> than hung on >>> the walls >>> and they were surrounded on >>> three sides by walls. All >>> of these I >>> think >>> would be considered restraints >>> - pushing me in to the >>> works rather than >>> stepping back away. It was >>> impossible for more than >>> two or three >>> people >>> to view the paintings at one >>> time and movement was >>> limited, so >>> there were >>> fewer chances for social >>> interactions (you were not >>> going to >>> pick up >>> anybody looking at Jackson >>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>> brooding, making >>> it more likely that viewers >>> would move towards internal >>> reflection. All >>> of these were constraints that >>> canalized perspectives and >>> feelings >>> viewing >>> the paintings. You really had >>> only two choices, you >>> moved in to the >>> paintings or you moved on, >>> which I >>> had done every previous >>> time coming >>> upon them. >>> >>> The painting >>> itself though >>> became >>> an >>> affordances, an object >>> at the >>> >>> nexus of my journey >>> through the >>> museum, where >>> I was in my life, and my >>> abilities to perceive the >>> painitings. This >>> was something that could >>> not be >>> designed I think because >>> nobody could >>> think >>> that moment was going to >>> happen. So then what is >>> a perceived >>> affordance. Way back when >>> there was >>> also a Manet room. It was >>> a round >>> room with >>> different variations of his >>> water lilies in a circle. >>> Almost the >>> exact >>> opposite in constraints it was >>> large, airy, a lot of >>> natural light. If you >>> were looking to brood you went >>> somewhere else. In the >>> middle of the >>> room was >>> a wooden structure (not an >>> obvious bench), but you >>> realized as random >>> colors dissolved into water >>> lilies that you wanted to >>> sit down. You >>> naturally moved to the >>> center of >>> the room and sat >>> (wondering if a guard >>> would >>> come and tell you it was >>> actually an important >>> piece of art and you >>> should get off). The designer >>> anticipates a desire to >>> soak in the >>> room, to >>> almost get dizzy in the >>> lights, and included in >>> the design the >>> piece >>> of wood that will have the >>> perceived affordance for >>> sitting, changing >>> your concept of time and >>> space. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> [mailto: >>> >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On Behalf >>> Of Alfredo >>> >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, >>> 2015 3:01 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thanks Michael, >>> >>> I think we are >>> saying the same >>> things, >>> indeed, or at >>> least more or >>> >>> less. I am quite certain >>> that Bateson >>> referred >>> to energy, and that he used >>> the mentioned examples (or >>> similar >>> ones) to >>> show how the energy that moves >>> the pig is not a direct >>> transfer of energy >>> from the kick, whereas in the >>> case of the billiard >>> balls, the >>> movement of >>> one ball is caused by the >>> energy that the kicking >>> ball brings. I >>> might >>> be wrong in the context within >>> which Bateson was >>> discussing the >>> example, and >>> I see that your account is in >>> that regard is more >>> accurate. But the >>> point is >>> the same: you can not intend >>> the outcomes of a system >>> by addressing >>> only >>> its parts as if they were >>> connected directly, in a >>> linear causal >>> fashion; as if the whole >>> was the sum >>> of its parts. I do see a >>> link with >>> Vygotsky's >>> rejection of S-R and his >>> inclusion of a third >>> element that >>> transforms >>> the whole system. >>> >>> But I totally >>> agree with your >>> comments on design >>> intentions as they >>> >>> relate to ecology, and I, >>> as I know >>> also Rolf >>> does, also like very much the >>> notion of ecology to >>> address these issues. >>> >>> If I read you >>> correctly, and >>> citing Don >>> Norman (whose >>> work I >>> ignore), >>> >>> you suggest the >>> possibility that the >>> relations >>> between design intentions >>> and actual experience >>> could be thought >>> of in >>> terms of different levels? >>> That one thing is to >>> design for what is >>> general, but that we >>> cannot design >>> for the particular. Is >>> that right? If >>> so, I >>> think that Bateson had a >>> similar argument on >>> prediction, does >>> not him? >>> That we can predict on >>> general levels (e.g. >>> population), but >>> not at >>> the level of the particular >>> (e.g., individual). I >>> haven't gone >>> that way, >>> but seems a promising road to >>> consider this jumps >>> between levels of >>> generality or scales. >>> >>> Finally, I am >>> not sure if >>> I get >>> what you mean >>> when you say >>> that we can >>> >>> design for constrains but >>> not for >>> affordances. >>> I still see that the one >>> presupposes the other; you can >>> separate them >>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>> experience, a constrain is an >>> affordance and >>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>> the road has any inherent >>> constrain >>> that could >>> not be an affordance at the >>> same time. Of course, if >>> you take the >>> normative stance that >>> roads are for >>> cars driving through them, >>> you may be >>> right. >>> But if we think of roads as >>> asphalt on the ground, as >>> yet more >>> ground only >>> of a different shape, >>> texture, and color, how is >>> that a >>> constrain >>> but not an affordance? Or an >>> affordance but not a >>> constrain? Of course, >>> culture constrains once >>> you are >>> within the road and you >>> are driving. >>> But then, >>> the constrain is not in the >>> road, as you seem to >>> suggest, but in the >>> journey; in the journeyman >>> that >>> carries some cultural way >>> of orienting and >>> affectively relating to its >>> environment so that particular >>> constrains are >>> taken for granted despite the >>> possibility of being >>> otherwise. But I >>> might >>> not have thought it well/long >>> enough and of course I >>> might be wrong. >>> I would >>> like to understand your >>> position here better. >>> >>> Thanks! >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 20:32 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I have been >>> reading Bateson >>> through a >>> cybernetics lens >>> lately >>> (Bateson >>> >>> along with Lewin and his >>> wife Margaret >>> Mead >>> were part of the original >>> Sears >>> conferences) and I'm not >>> sure that's >>> right or >>> I am victim to the "when you >>> have a hammer, everything >>> looks like a >>> nail" >>> but.... >>> >>> I think >>> Bateson was >>> arguing with >>> those looking >>> to apply the >>> more >>> >>> physical/mathematical >>> origins of >>> cybernetics >>> to human or really (pace the >>> pig story) and system that >>> moves >>> beyond simple >>> physical feedback loops. I >>> think his larger point is that >>> everything has >>> a response within the larger >>> feedback system that >>> exists but we >>> cannot go - >>> what Bateson refers to as >>> MIND. Attempts to create >>> and control >>> feedback >>> loops, to try and design a >>> system for specific types >>> of feedback is a >>> dangerous proposition. >>> >>> This I think >>> is the reason >>> that >>> affordances >>> really can't >>> be designed >>> >>> into an ecology, only a >>> recognition of the >>> context in which actions are >>> taking place (and I say >>> this having no >>> idea >>> what Gibson's relationship to >>> cybernetics was). Taking >>> Larry's >>> example of >>> the girl it is perhaps also >>> likely that the girl could >>> have taken the >>> fixing of hair as a >>> criticism, an >>> attack, and it might have >>> destroyed her >>> confidence. Both make >>> sense in >>> terms of feedback loops, >>> but only ad >>> hoc. So >>> if a designer does in some >>> way design that experience >>> into the >>> action, >>> even without meaning they are >>> taking a large chance, >>> because they do not >>> know the trajectory it will >>> take. We simply need >>> objects that are >>> part of >>> our journey, part of the >>> larger context but not >>> designed for >>> purpose, >>> for feedback. There is no >>> assumption about trajectory. >>> >>> I think Don >>> Norman sort of >>> muddied >>> the waters on >>> this, but in an >>> >>> interesting way. That we >>> can assume >>> people >>> are going to want to do >>> certain >>> things in a very general >>> environment - >>> when you enter a dark room >>> you want >>> light, so it is possible >>> to design objects >>> that meet that need that >>> we are >>> more likely to find in the >>> moment that >>> we need >>> them. But I think that is >>> very different from the >>> idea of >>> specifically >>> guiding feedback loops that >>> even take generalized >>> experience in a >>> certain >>> direction. I am thinking >>> about Dewey, and he makes >>> a similar >>> argument >>> to Bateson with his concept of >>> transactions. Although he >>> does seem >>> to think >>> that it is possible to create >>> a larger field of action >>> so we can see at >>> least local >>> interrelationships. >>> But his idea of experience >>> is also >>> very much >>> one of discovery based on >>> needs at the immediate >>> moment - social >>> relations act as a vehicle >>> for these >>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>> course was writing >>> before Gibson and for most >>> of his >>> life before cybernetics. I also >>> wonder what >>> he thought of cybernetics). >>> >>> I think I >>> disagree with you, >>> constraints >>> are not about the >>> journey but >>> >>> about the road. If you >>> build a road >>> on the >>> side of the river you are >>> constrained because no >>> matter what, >>> you cannot >>> turn right. Your direction >>> has already been partially >>> determined >>> by the >>> designer of the road. But the >>> mistake we make is in >>> thinking that also >>> controls the trajectory of the >>> individual's journey. The >>> effect of >>> designers >>> on trajectories of action is >>> important, but limited. >>> >>> The primary >>> place that >>> designers >>> have influence on >>> affordances it >>> >>> seems to me is by being >>> able to create a >>> unique context for an >>> individual's >>> and a group's that limit >>> possible >>> trajectories >>> on an individual's journey. >>> But we should never >>> mistake those >>> constraints >>> for affordances. I think >>> Bateson might argue it is >>> hubris to do so. >>> Perhaps this is what you are >>> saying Alfredo. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On >>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>> 12:38 PM >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> I'd like to >>> follow up on >>> Michael's >>> post by asking >>> a question: >>> Are not >>> >>> affordances presupposed by >>> constraints >>> and are >>> not constraints presupposed >>> by affordances? If so, I >>> would wonder >>> whether >>> it makes sense to ask whether >>> museums should be designed for >>> affordances and >>> constraints. >>> >>> What I think >>> is clear from the >>> anecdote that >>> you bring >>> about the >>> >>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>> that whatever >>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>> somewhere (i.e. being >>> someone at some >>> time in >>> some place) cannot be >>> INTENDED. And I think this >>> applies both to >>> designers and users, to those >>> who set things up for you to >>> experience and to >>> you, who could not foresee >>> what your experience was >>> going to turn you >>> into before you go through it. >>> >>> I think that >>> the big issue >>> that >>> you bring on >>> the table (to >>> continue >>> >>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>> to do with a >>> difference between physical >>> relations and social >>> relations, and >>> the idea >>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>> noticed that the relations >>> that are the >>> subject matter in physics >>> are not >>> the same as those that are >>> the subject >>> matter >>> in communication. He noticed >>> that physical relations >>> (relations >>> that are >>> the object of study of >>> physics) >>> transfer energy in direct >>> manners: a >>> billiard >>> ball hits another ball and we >>> can anticipate the exact >>> speed and >>> direction >>> that the second ball will take >>> based on the energy that >>> is in the >>> system ball >>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>> living beings, the things >>> are different. >>> Bateson explained, if we >>> kick a >>> pig's ass (I think he used >>> this somehow >>> bizarre example) the >>> reaction of >>> the pig is not accounted >>> for by the energy >>> that is contained in the kick, >>> at least not in a direct >>> manner. The >>> energy >>> that moves the pig is from a >>> different source. Before >>> Bateson, it was >>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>> mediation who would most >>> clearly state >>> that >>> social relations are not >>> direct, but mediated. >>> >>> So, how can >>> design go >>> about this? >>> If we, along >>> with Dewey and >>> >>> Vygotsky, consider >>> experience to be a >>> unity of >>> person and environment, and >>> we assume as well that >>> this is a >>> social (not >>> just individual) category, and >>> that how a situation is >>> experienced is >>> also >>> refracted through the social >>> relations within which we >>> engage, the most >>> designers can do is to foster >>> social relations go on, giving >>> afordances to >>> prcesses of signification, >>> without intending to embed >>> meanings. It is >>> about affordances/constraints, >>> but not about how to interpret >>> something, but >>> about going about >>> interpreting. I think. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 18:04 >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> So after >>> reading the >>> article and >>> the e-mail >>> discussion I'm >>> beginning >>> >>> to think there is a really >>> big issue >>> here that >>> I am trying to grapple with, >>> especially in terms of >>> boundary >>> objects (which >>> I admittedly do not >>> understand very well). And it relates >>> to the >>> metaphor of the table (both >>> as discussed by Larry and >>> Ingold as >>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>> is this, in >>> the museum should the >>> place be set up as >>> affordances, perceived >>> affordances, or >>> constraints? It seems the >>> museum in the study has >>> potential affordances for >>> the users. The >>> cultural historical moment >>> (unable to think of any >>> other word) of the >>> museum sets the context, >>> meaning >>> those walking through the >>> museum are >>> going to >>> be restricted by the >>> historical and cultural >>> boundaries >>> leading up >>> to the art work, along with >>> the expectations and needs >>> of the >>> individuals >>> moving through the museum, >>> but they will come across >>> objects/artifacts >>> that they think meets the >>> needs >>> >>> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jul 21 08:36:29 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 15:36:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> References: <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> Message-ID: <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> Andy, all, I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). Any thoughts? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and one subject challenges that role and turns the object into its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. A number of examples spring to mind. * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are embraced by a despised group who take control of the word and assertively embrace it; * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before them rather than in shame); * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and read it, thus making the paper into a glorious organising tool; * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared object (the land); * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a symbol of India. In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when she introduced the term, but core point is that the ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a mediating artefact or the object of work (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according to context. In principle it is not the Object in the Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? > Henry > > >> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> Thanks Rolf! >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>> man-of-the-world. >>> Does that make better sense? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>> but also the ideological context. >>> >>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>> and regulations, communications resources, >>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>> the "boundary objects"? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> I think that a particular institution or >>> government system could potentially be a >>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>> >>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>> would say that one would have to justify the >>> utility of applying the concept to a >>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>> object within an institution. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Phew! >>> So would it be correct to describe the >>> government >>> institutions and political system are >>> "boundary objects"? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy - >>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>> and should >>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>> Thank you for >>> pointing that out. >>> >>> >>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>> suggestion that >>> Greg made in the other thread >>> suggesting we look >>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>> been familiar >>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>> after doing >>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>> found his >>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>> potentially >>> useful in dealing with some of my >>> questions.( >>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>> ) >>> >>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>> unexpected >>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>> >>> /The logic is that unexpected >>> metaphors arise >>> from the >>> need to create images when the >>> culture does >>> not have >>> them readily at hand. These images >>> join linguistic >>> content as growth points and >>> differentiate what >>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>> predicates, or >>> points of contrast in the >>> immediate ongoing >>> context of >>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>> precisely >>> because they >>> are outside the conventions of >>> language and >>> culture, >>> can capture abstractions in novel >>> ways and >>> provide the >>> fluidity of thought and language >>> that is the >>> essence >>> of ongoing discourse./ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>> Blunden >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>> achievement of >>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>> p. 131, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>> wrote: >>> >>> Are we allowed to ask >>> questions about our >>> paper as >>> well? I hope so! >>> >>> For a little context -in our >>> paper, we >>> identified >>> particular kinds of >>> episodes in which participants >>> from different >>> disciplines seek coherence >>> and continuity of shared >>> representations >>> through >>> bodily action. These >>> actions include gesture, >>> movement and physical >>> performance linking the >>> present material artifacts to >>> objects of >>> design. >>> Most of these episodes >>> seem to involve some form of >>> improvisation, >>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>> characterize >>> these >>> aspects of the >>> interactions. In most cases, the >>> participants seem >>> to be searching for the >>> best words or material >>> representation to >>> convey a >>> particular intention - >>> when this becomes problematic >>> or limiting >>> - they >>> almost fall back on what >>> is available - these >>> improvised bodily >>> performances - as a way of >>> maintaining continuity, and of >>> inviting >>> co-participants into a shared and >>> imagined space. These bodily >>> actions don't >>> seem to >>> begin the proposals, but >>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>> participants. >>> >>> >>> I think there is something >>> really fascinating >>> about this kind of creativity >>> and resourcefulness in >>> interaction that >>> could be >>> explored more deeply - and >>> that I'm having trouble >>> articulating. >>> Maybe some >>> of you have some thoughts >>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>> we've talked >>> about this >>> a bit before so maybe you >>> can add a little clarity to my >>> question. >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Thank you very much for >>> the sketch of your >>> roots. I taught English in >>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>> for 5 years >>> back in >>> the early 70s, just before >>> Franco died. (He died the >>> day I >>> boarded the >>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>> and language are interesting, >>> especially where >>> language varieties meet. >>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>> from my >>> familiarity >>> with the music of Catalunya >>> and Mallorca that the speech >>> communities in >>> each of those places treasure >>> their unique languages >>> (Catalan and >>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>> commonality >>> vis-a-vis their >>> separateness from >>> Castilian >>> Spanish, the national language >>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>> see a parallel >>> between your work on boundary >>> objects, where individual >>> persons >>> collaborate >>> to create spaces, AND >>> boundary objects >>> ?negotiated? by groups of >>> people who live in real >>> spaces. >>> I am thinking, among other >>> things, of >>> indigeneity, a big topic >>> here in New >>> Mexico, with so many >>> Native Americans. >>> Assymetries of power. >>> Bullying. >>> Testing and curriculum become >>> instruments of >>> war by other means. I hope my >>> tone does not distract >>> from, nor >>> diminish, the >>> optimism created by this >>> thread. Yet I think that >>> optimism is so >>> precious because of the >>> ground (the >>> world) of the dialog. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well, you could say >>> that I am partly >>> Catalan. I grew up in >>> the province >>> >>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>> language is >>> official language together >>> with >>> Castilian Spanish. >>> Although Valencia (the >>> county) and Catalonia are >>> different regional >>> counties, Catalan >>> is spoken >>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>> the Balear Islands. Some >>> call the three >>> together as the Catalan >>> Countries. >>> I don't like borders, but >>> I respect >>> and enjoy >>> cultural diversity. >>> >>> Standardized testing, >>> and the whole >>> assumptions behind it, >>> are an issue >>> >>> also in Spain and in >>> Catalonia; but >>> education >>> has been so battered during >>> the last years of right-wing >>> government that I >>> the debate have been more >>> about means and access >>> than about >>> contents and >>> aims. Which in some sense >>> may be good because it >>> moves the >>> debates away >>> from performance. But I have >>> been living outside of >>> Spain for eight >>> years >>> now, so I am not the best to >>> update you on this either. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>> The Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Yes, you have answered >>> my question >>> very >>> nicely! I especially >>> appreciate >>> >>> that you were willing to >>> wrestle with my >>> question, despite your lack of >>> familiarity with the >>> issues here in >>> the U.S. >>> Am I wrong, or are you >>> Catalan? In which case >>> your experience in >>> Catalunya would take you to a >>> different place in critiquing >>> schooling there, >>> though not necessarily >>> unconnected to yours and >>> Rolf?s work on >>> boundary objects. I just >>> met for >>> the second day in a row >>> with a friend >>> who is >>> the liaison between our public >>> school district and a >>> children?s science >>> museum called Explora. I >>> feel like >>> I?m swimming in this >>> thread, talk about a >>> mixed metaphor! >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>> at 12:18 AM, >>> Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I am sorry, Henry, >>> but I am >>> not very >>> familiar with >>> high-stakes >>> >>> standardized testing (as >>> different to >>> standardized testing in >>> general) or >>> with common core (which I >>> quickly read >>> is an >>> issue in US). But I would say >>> that, if (school) >>> curricula were to be >>> consistent with the view of >>> education as the practice >>> of creating >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to >>> emerge--which is what >>> I was >>> suggesting in the >>> paragraph you >>> copy--curricula would not >>> be so much about >>> standardized contents, but >>> about >>> human sensitivities and >>> relations. So, >>> I would >>> say, no, standardized >>> testing is not in >>> principle in line >>> with what >>> I was trying to say. >>> >>> I was trying to >>> make a distinction >>> between trying to >>> design someone's >>> >>> particular experience, and >>> trying to >>> design >>> conditions for the development >>> of attitudes and >>> orientations. The >>> first is >>> likely impossible. The second >>> seems to make more sense. >>> >>> One may of course >>> wonder >>> whether those >>> attitudes and >>> orientations can >>> >>> be considered general, and >>> then form >>> part of >>> standardize measures instead >>> of the traditional >>> "contents and >>> skills". But >>> measuring assumes some >>> quantitative increment in >>> a particular >>> aspect >>> as the result of learning. >>> Growth and development, >>> however, are about >>> qualitative change. So, as >>> soon >>> as you start measuring you >>> would be >>> missing >>> growth and development. So, >>> again, no. I would not say >>> that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized testing is in >>> line >>> with what I was trying to say. >>> >>> I hope I have >>> answered your >>> question, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>> 07:48 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, >>> Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>> Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, you say: >>> >>> "However, we >>> cannot aim at >>> determining >>> any particular >>> >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be said >>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>> intend to communicate the >>> curriculum >>> and make >>> it the content of the >>> students' experience in >>> the way we >>> intend. But >>> we can try to create the >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to emerge." >>> >>> Would you say that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized >>> testing is in >>> line with >>> >>> your construal of >>> curriculum design? >>> How about >>> common core? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jul 15, >>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks a lot >>> for the >>> clarifications. I see now >>> why it >>> may be said that >>> >>> designers can aim at >>> designing for >>> constrains >>> but not for affordances. I >>> see that this way of >>> talking is part of a >>> designers' way to get things >>> done, and that it may >>> indeed be an >>> effective >>> way to design for >>> place-making, as in the >>> example that >>> Michael >>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>> what we report in our >>> study is about >>> designers >>> talking about how spatial >>> features might afford some >>> experiences >>> in the >>> museum while constraining >>> others. >>> >>> I must admit, >>> however, that I >>> still consider >>> the distinction >>> >>> problematic from an >>> analytical perspective >>> whenever our object of >>> study is >>> experience, situated >>> action, or design as >>> situated practice. A more >>> correct >>> way to talk is that >>> affordances and >>> constrains >>> are the positive and >>> negative >>> sides/interpretations of a single >>> unitary category. As an actual >>> and concrete phenomenon, >>> walking into >>> a musuem >>> implies both affordances and >>> constrains at the same >>> time, whether >>> intended >>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>> whether other terminology, >>> such as >>> Ingold's >>> notion of "correspondence," >>> might be more appropriated >>> when we >>> talk about >>> how materials and actions >>> become entangled into >>> particular >>> trajectories. >>> >>> In any case, >>> and as Rolf >>> emphasizes, >>> what the >>> designers in >>> our study >>> >>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>> ways of being >>> in the >>> museum. Imagination versus >>> prediction may be an >>> interesting topic >>> emerging here for further >>> inquiry >>> into design work. >>> >>> Another >>> important (and >>> related) >>> issue that I >>> think is >>> emerging here >>> >>> has to do with the level >>> of generality at >>> which design intentions can be >>> expected to work (just as >>> Bateson >>> argued with >>> regard to prediction). At the >>> level of generic social >>> processes, and >>> given a >>> particular >>> cultural-historical >>> background, we as >>> designers may try to make some >>> generic situations more >>> likely to >>> occur than >>> others (facilitating that more >>> or less people end up >>> together in a given >>> place). However, we cannot >>> aim at >>> determining any particular >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be >>> said about >>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>> communicate the >>> curriculum and make it the >>> content of the students' >>> experience in >>> the way >>> we intend. But we can try to >>> create the conditions for >>> certain >>> attitudes >>> and dispositions to emerge. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 23:30 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I think Rolf >>> may have >>> addressed >>> the question >>> of the >>> differences >>> >>> between affordances and >>> constraints in his >>> post. The way he described the >>> designers as possibly >>> setting up the >>> corner >>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>> was a >>> long time ago so I'm not >>> sure if this >>> is the >>> way it was or the way I >>> remember it, but let's >>> just believe >>> this is >>> the way it was. The painting, >>> I think there were three >>> were set up in a >>> corner off a main >>> corridor. The >>> lighting was dark, which >>> if you have >>> ever been >>> to MOMA is different, in >>> many other parts of the >>> museum there >>> is a good >>> deal of natural light (there >>> was this great fountain, I >>> wonder if it is >>> still there). The paintings >>> were on tripods rather >>> than hung on >>> the walls >>> and they were surrounded on >>> three sides by walls. All >>> of these I >>> think >>> would be considered restraints >>> - pushing me in to the >>> works rather than >>> stepping back away. It was >>> impossible for more than >>> two or three >>> people >>> to view the paintings at one >>> time and movement was >>> limited, so >>> there were >>> fewer chances for social >>> interactions (you were not >>> going to >>> pick up >>> anybody looking at Jackson >>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>> brooding, making >>> it more likely that viewers >>> would move towards internal >>> reflection. All >>> of these were constraints that >>> canalized perspectives and >>> feelings >>> viewing >>> the paintings. You really had >>> only two choices, you >>> moved in to the >>> paintings or you moved on, >>> which I >>> had done every previous >>> time coming >>> upon them. >>> >>> The painting >>> itself though >>> became >>> an >>> affordances, an object >>> at the >>> >>> nexus of my journey >>> through the >>> museum, where >>> I was in my life, and my >>> abilities to perceive the >>> painitings. This >>> was something that could >>> not be >>> designed I think because >>> nobody could >>> think >>> that moment was going to >>> happen. So then what is >>> a perceived >>> affordance. Way back when >>> there was >>> also a Manet room. It was >>> a round >>> room with >>> different variations of his >>> water lilies in a circle. >>> Almost the >>> exact >>> opposite in constraints it was >>> large, airy, a lot of >>> natural light. If you >>> were looking to brood you went >>> somewhere else. In the >>> middle of the >>> room was >>> a wooden structure (not an >>> obvious bench), but you >>> realized as random >>> colors dissolved into water >>> lilies that you wanted to >>> sit down. You >>> naturally moved to the >>> center of >>> the room and sat >>> (wondering if a guard >>> would >>> come and tell you it was >>> actually an important >>> piece of art and you >>> should get off). The designer >>> anticipates a desire to >>> soak in the >>> room, to >>> almost get dizzy in the >>> lights, and included in >>> the design the >>> piece >>> of wood that will have the >>> perceived affordance for >>> sitting, changing >>> your concept of time and >>> space. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> [mailto: >>> >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On Behalf >>> Of Alfredo >>> >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, >>> 2015 3:01 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thanks Michael, >>> >>> I think we are >>> saying the same >>> things, >>> indeed, or at >>> least more or >>> >>> less. I am quite certain >>> that Bateson >>> referred >>> to energy, and that he used >>> the mentioned examples (or >>> similar >>> ones) to >>> show how the energy that moves >>> the pig is not a direct >>> transfer of energy >>> from the kick, whereas in the >>> case of the billiard >>> balls, the >>> movement of >>> one ball is caused by the >>> energy that the kicking >>> ball brings. I >>> might >>> be wrong in the context within >>> which Bateson was >>> discussing the >>> example, and >>> I see that your account is in >>> that regard is more >>> accurate. But the >>> point is >>> the same: you can not intend >>> the outcomes of a system >>> by addressing >>> only >>> its parts as if they were >>> connected directly, in a >>> linear causal >>> fashion; as if the whole >>> was the sum >>> of its parts. I do see a >>> link with >>> Vygotsky's >>> rejection of S-R and his >>> inclusion of a third >>> element that >>> transforms >>> the whole system. >>> >>> But I totally >>> agree with your >>> comments on design >>> intentions as they >>> >>> relate to ecology, and I, >>> as I know >>> also Rolf >>> does, also like very much the >>> notion of ecology to >>> address these issues. >>> >>> If I read you >>> correctly, and >>> citing Don >>> Norman (whose >>> work I >>> ignore), >>> >>> you suggest the >>> possibility that the >>> relations >>> between design intentions >>> and actual experience >>> could be thought >>> of in >>> terms of different levels? >>> That one thing is to >>> design for what is >>> general, but that we >>> cannot design >>> for the particular. Is >>> that right? If >>> so, I >>> think that Bateson had a >>> similar argument on >>> prediction, does >>> not him? >>> That we can predict on >>> general levels (e.g. >>> population), but >>> not at >>> the level of the particular >>> (e.g., individual). I >>> haven't gone >>> that way, >>> but seems a promising road to >>> consider this jumps >>> between levels of >>> generality or scales. >>> >>> Finally, I am >>> not sure if >>> I get >>> what you mean >>> when you say >>> that we can >>> >>> design for constrains but >>> not for >>> affordances. >>> I still see that the one >>> presupposes the other; you can >>> separate them >>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>> experience, a constrain is an >>> affordance and >>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>> the road has any inherent >>> constrain >>> that could >>> not be an affordance at the >>> same time. Of course, if >>> you take the >>> normative stance that >>> roads are for >>> cars driving through them, >>> you may be >>> right. >>> But if we think of roads as >>> asphalt on the ground, as >>> yet more >>> ground only >>> of a different shape, >>> texture, and color, how is >>> that a >>> constrain >>> but not an affordance? Or an >>> affordance but not a >>> constrain? Of course, >>> culture constrains once >>> you are >>> within the road and you >>> are driving. >>> But then, >>> the constrain is not in the >>> road, as you seem to >>> suggest, but in the >>> journey; in the journeyman >>> that >>> carries some cultural way >>> of orienting and >>> affectively relating to its >>> environment so that particular >>> constrains are >>> taken for granted despite the >>> possibility of being >>> otherwise. But I >>> might >>> not have thought it well/long >>> enough and of course I >>> might be wrong. >>> I would >>> like to understand your >>> position here better. >>> >>> Thanks! >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 20:32 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I have been >>> reading Bateson >>> through a >>> cybernetics lens >>> lately >>> (Bateson >>> >>> along with Lewin and his >>> wife Margaret >>> Mead >>> were part of the original >>> Sears >>> conferences) and I'm not >>> sure that's >>> right or >>> I am victim to the "when you >>> have a hammer, everything >>> looks like a >>> nail" >>> but.... >>> >>> I think >>> Bateson was >>> arguing with >>> those looking >>> to apply the >>> more >>> >>> physical/mathematical >>> origins of >>> cybernetics >>> to human or really (pace the >>> pig story) and system that >>> moves >>> beyond simple >>> physical feedback loops. I >>> think his larger point is that >>> everything has >>> a response within the larger >>> feedback system that >>> exists but we >>> cannot go - >>> what Bateson refers to as >>> MIND. Attempts to create >>> and control >>> feedback >>> loops, to try and design a >>> system for specific types >>> of feedback is a >>> dangerous proposition. >>> >>> This I think >>> is the reason >>> that >>> affordances >>> really can't >>> be designed >>> >>> into an ecology, only a >>> recognition of the >>> context in which actions are >>> taking place (and I say >>> this having no >>> idea >>> what Gibson's relationship to >>> cybernetics was). Taking >>> Larry's >>> example of >>> the girl it is perhaps also >>> likely that the girl could >>> have taken the >>> fixing of hair as a >>> criticism, an >>> attack, and it might have >>> destroyed her >>> confidence. Both make >>> sense in >>> terms of feedback loops, >>> but only ad >>> hoc. So >>> if a designer does in some >>> way design that experience >>> into the >>> action, >>> even without meaning they are >>> taking a large chance, >>> because they do not >>> know the trajectory it will >>> take. We simply need >>> objects that are >>> part of >>> our journey, part of the >>> larger context but not >>> designed for >>> purpose, >>> for feedback. There is no >>> assumption about trajectory. >>> >>> I think Don >>> Norman sort of >>> muddied >>> the waters on >>> this, but in an >>> >>> interesting way. That we >>> can assume >>> people >>> are going to want to do >>> certain >>> things in a very general >>> environment - >>> when you enter a dark room >>> you want >>> light, so it is possible >>> to design objects >>> that meet that need that >>> we are >>> more likely to find in the >>> moment that >>> we need >>> them. But I think that is >>> very different from the >>> idea of >>> specifically >>> guiding feedback loops that >>> even take generalized >>> experience in a >>> certain >>> direction. I am thinking >>> about Dewey, and he makes >>> a similar >>> argument >>> to Bateson with his concept of >>> transactions. Although he >>> does seem >>> to think >>> that it is possible to create >>> a larger field of action >>> so we can see at >>> least local >>> interrelationships. >>> But his idea of experience >>> is also >>> very much >>> one of discovery based on >>> needs at the immediate >>> moment - social >>> relations act as a vehicle >>> for these >>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>> course was writing >>> before Gibson and for most >>> of his >>> life before cybernetics. I also >>> wonder what >>> he thought of cybernetics). >>> >>> I think I >>> disagree with you, >>> constraints >>> are not about the >>> journey but >>> >>> about the road. If you >>> build a road >>> on the >>> side of the river you are >>> constrained because no >>> matter what, >>> you cannot >>> turn right. Your direction >>> has already been partially >>> determined >>> by the >>> designer of the road. But the >>> mistake we make is in >>> thinking that also >>> controls the trajectory of the >>> individual's journey. The >>> effect of >>> designers >>> on trajectories of action is >>> important, but limited. >>> >>> The primary >>> place that >>> designers >>> have influence on >>> affordances it >>> >>> seems to me is by being >>> able to create a >>> unique context for an >>> individual's >>> and a group's that limit >>> possible >>> trajectories >>> on an individual's journey. >>> But we should never >>> mistake those >>> constraints >>> for affordances. I think >>> Bateson might argue it is >>> hubris to do so. >>> Perhaps this is what you are >>> saying Alfredo. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On >>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>> 12:38 PM >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> I'd like to >>> follow up on >>> Michael's >>> post by asking >>> a question: >>> Are not >>> >>> affordances presupposed by >>> constraints >>> and are >>> not constraints presupposed >>> by affordances? If so, I >>> would wonder >>> whether >>> it makes sense to ask whether >>> museums should be designed for >>> affordances and >>> constraints. >>> >>> What I think >>> is clear from the >>> anecdote that >>> you bring >>> about the >>> >>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>> that whatever >>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>> somewhere (i.e. being >>> someone at some >>> time in >>> some place) cannot be >>> INTENDED. And I think this >>> applies both to >>> designers and users, to those >>> who set things up for you to >>> experience and to >>> you, who could not foresee >>> what your experience was >>> going to turn you >>> into before you go through it. >>> >>> I think that >>> the big issue >>> that >>> you bring on >>> the table (to >>> continue >>> >>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>> to do with a >>> difference between physical >>> relations and social >>> relations, and >>> the idea >>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>> noticed that the relations >>> that are the >>> subject matter in physics >>> are not >>> the same as those that are >>> the subject >>> matter >>> in communication. He noticed >>> that physical relations >>> (relations >>> that are >>> the object of study of >>> physics) >>> transfer energy in direct >>> manners: a >>> billiard >>> ball hits another ball and we >>> can anticipate the exact >>> speed and >>> direction >>> that the second ball will take >>> based on the energy that >>> is in the >>> system ball >>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>> living beings, the things >>> are different. >>> Bateson explained, if we >>> kick a >>> pig's ass (I think he used >>> this somehow >>> bizarre example) the >>> reaction of >>> the pig is not accounted >>> for by the energy >>> that is contained in the kick, >>> at least not in a direct >>> manner. The >>> energy >>> that moves the pig is from a >>> different source. Before >>> Bateson, it was >>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>> mediation who would most >>> clearly state >>> that >>> social relations are not >>> direct, but mediated. >>> >>> So, how can >>> design go >>> about this? >>> If we, along >>> with Dewey and >>> >>> Vygotsky, consider >>> experience to be a >>> unity of >>> person and environment, and >>> we assume as well that >>> this is a >>> social (not >>> just individual) category, and >>> that how a situation is >>> experienced is >>> also >>> refracted through the social >>> relations within which we >>> engage, the most >>> designers can do is to foster >>> social relations go on, giving >>> afordances to >>> prcesses of signification, >>> without intending to embed >>> meanings. It is >>> about affordances/constraints, >>> but not about how to interpret >>> something, but >>> about going about >>> interpreting. I think. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 18:04 >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> So after >>> reading the >>> article and >>> the e-mail >>> discussion I'm >>> beginning >>> >>> to think there is a really >>> big issue >>> here that >>> I am trying to grapple with, >>> especially in terms of >>> boundary >>> objects (which >>> I admittedly do not >>> understand very well). And it relates >>> to the >>> metaphor of the table (both >>> as discussed by Larry and >>> Ingold as >>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>> is this, in >>> the museum should the >>> place be set up as >>> affordances, perceived >>> affordances, or >>> constraints? It seems the >>> museum in the study has >>> potential affordances for >>> the users. The >>> cultural historical moment >>> (unable to think of any >>> other word) of the >>> museum sets the context, >>> meaning >>> those walking through the >>> museum are >>> going to >>> be restricted by the >>> historical and cultural >>> boundaries >>> leading up >>> to the art work, along with >>> the expectations and needs >>> of the >>> individuals >>> moving through the museum, >>> but they will come across >>> objects/artifacts >>> that they think meets the >>> needs >>> >>> > > From vygotsky@unm.edu Tue Jul 21 10:00:42 2015 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 17:00:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Hi San, I hope you are feeling less tired. When do you see the cardiologist? It is a little humid here but not as bad as in N.Y., I believe. Love, V. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+vygotsky=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Monday, July 13, 2015 10:35 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers Mike is a survivor of the long night of behaviorism in twentieth century psychology, and weirdly enough I had a walk on (or perhaps a crawl on) part in it myself. My mother, who had previously been a graduate student in physics and chemistry and then one of the first computer coders, began studying child psychology at the University of Minnesota as a way of wiling away the long hours I spent in their nursery school, which back in the early sixties was the only place that you could really get day care. I remember having to do rat-maze experiments and getting rewarded with M&Ms, and my dad says that it was only his personal intervention that prevented me from being raised in a Skinner box. But my point stands: behaviorists were never divided over the question of whether ALL behavior was inherited or ALL behavior was conditioned. It was always a matter of determining how much. It is interesting that the the Arden House experiments and the Harlow experiments have diametrically counterposed codas (one hesitates to draw them as conclusions). One argues that being taken care of is life denying, while the other finds it life-affirming. Not only does it never occur to the programme presenters that these two things might both be true at different developmental stages (since Arden House takes place at the close of life and the Harlow experiments are supposed to deal with the commencement), it doesn't even appear that they have noticed that they are in contradiction. The third programme, on the Hawthorne effect, is even more hilarious. I had always assumed that the Hawthorne effect was for psychology what the placebo effect was in medicine. But that's not the case at all. It's the late 1920s. There's a gigantic plant for manufacturing telephone relays on the outskirts of Chicago. The bosses want to find out how to increase productivity--increase the room temperature, decrease it, increase lighting, decrease it, more breaks, fewer breaks, what have you. It turns out that the answer is...what have you. No matter what the bosses do, productivity goes up. And no wonder. When two girls do NOT increase productivity, they are removed from the study on suspicion that they have "gone Bolshevik". David Kellogg and On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 3:31 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > Hi David, > > In regard to the BBC's crediting Harlow with making a breakthrough in the > nature-nuture debate: XMCAr's who where not educated in American > psychology departments in the post WWII era don't realize how peculiar the > intellectual climate was back then. > > B. F. Skinner's Behaviorism dominated American psychology from the 1950's > through the 1970's as a rigid Stimulus-Response Psychology. So much so, > that American psychologists were proclaiming a Cognitive Revolution in > psychology in the 1980's - not realizing that Vygotsky had already > pioneered the study of cognitive processes mediating between stimulus and > response. In 1924, when Vygotsky first presented his theory, he had then > credited Pavlov's later writings on the second signal system. Since Mind in > Society was first published in 1978, American psychologists were only > beginning to understand Vygotskian theory - and just beginning to think in > terms of dialectical psychology (such as nature-nurture interactions). > > In my pre-Vygotsky days, as a graduate student at the University of > Chicago during the 1970's > Skinnerian behaviorism dominated the field, Piaget's theory was the > hottest new theory > (imagine cognitive developmental stages !!!), and Humanistic Psychology > was the third Force > in psychology as an alternative to Behaviorism and orthodox Freudian > Psychoanalysis. > I knew there had to be something more - gradually I discovered books on > ego psychology > (neo-Freudians) that the School for Social Work Administration assigned > as texts for their courses. Then in 1976, when I was hired full-time as a > community college professor, I found two books in that library that were > just awesome - Klaus Reigel's Dialectical Psychology - and Werner and > Kaplan's Symbol Formation. One of my professor's at U.C. actually told me > that I did think like an American psychologist (meaning that I don't fit in > the department) - he said "you think like a European psychologist." In > 1984-1985 I translated the three Vygotsky papers on the development of > imagination and creativity and became a Vygotskian (or neo-Vygotskian, > whatever). > > And now American psychologists are just waking up to the fact that the > rest of the world > has never used the American Psychiatric Association's DSM system for > diagnosis of psychiatric or psychological disorders. Effective this October > the ICD 10 (International Classification of Diseases) has to be used to be > in compliance with HIPAA - I wonder what will happen to all > those Abnormal Psychology textbooks that are based exclusively on the > DSM's five axes > categorical system. > > > > > > Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:45:08 +0900 > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BBC: Mind Changers > > > > I've listened to the first two (that is the last two) of them (Arden > House > > and Harlow's Monkeys) and I'm always impressed by how very IDEOLOGICAL > they > > are. I mean ideological with a capital I, in the sense of reinforcing > > whatever idea happens to dominate the dominant minds of the dominant > class, > > and I also mean that both the experiments themselves and their > > re-presentations by the BBC are ideological. > > > > So for example the in the Arden House experiments two graduate schools > > devise an experiment that is designed to show how life-affirming and > > life-enhancing consumer choice is and how life-denying and life-deadening > > it is to be taken care of by people. Amusingly, the BBC then has to > > re-present this experiment by gushing that the two graduate students had > > absolutely no idea of what they would find (because of course even the > BBC > > understands that if an experiment simply reinforces our prejudices, it's > > not very significant in the history of psychology). > > > > The programme on Harry Harlow's experiments follows more or less the same > > model. Harlow designs an experiment to prove that "love" and "attachment" > > (which are apparently sufficiently represented by a wrapping a > terry-cloth > > towel around a wire cylinder) are crucial to parenting. The BBC > re-presents > > this as an astonishing experiment by claiming that in the 1950s the big > > debate in psychology was over whether behavior was entirely innate or > > entirely learned, something that has not been true of psychology since > > Pavlov. Then the Beeb includes some criticism of Harlow--but much of it > > has to do with animal rights! The best critique came from Harlow himself, > > who assessing his own work, remarked that he had succeeded, through sheer > > sadism and at no inconsiderable government expense, in convincing > > psychologists of something everybody else has known for thousands of > years. > > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > > > This week the BBC has a series of interesting radio documentaries on > > > classical psychological studies: > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 21 10:35:11 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 10:35:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> References: <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55ae830c.a85a420a.3d33.ffffed8a@mx.google.com> Andy, Rolf, these concrete examples help clarify the meaning of boundary object. I hope this thinking out loud process is an aspect of getting back to thinking of these different notions of "boundary" object contributing to changing spaces (and duration) as they become places. One clarification in what Rolf said. Is the place of "narratives" in the process a phase of this process? The notion of "representations" of the experience as an aspect (can we say mode?) of the ongoing "construction" OF (upon which) this experience unfolds. Is the place of narratives"about" the completion of a phase of this process (bringing into materiality as Rolf uses the term materiality) what "was" preceded by a "felt experience" that was pre-conceptual (as a bodily experience). In other words as Gendlin says was the narrative "about" a means of placing before the others a "felt experience" and in this act of materiality inviting the others to "perceive" (as Dewey uses this term in contrast to recognition). In other words is there a "felt sense" that already exists and has been undergone prior to the presentation OF this "felt" experience AS a " representation/materiality/act/ that brings the "felt experience" as bodily manifestation to the fore PRIOR to representing or bringing into materiality the "about" process that completes the bodily process when the other person undergoes the experience that has been articulated through the narrative and "perceives" the "felt experience" (already undergone bodily) MORE clearly. When he/she says "yes I see what you mean" that is another phase - the "perceived" phase of becoming clearer- after the fact (observable) of the materiality/representation OF the bodily "felt experience" that preceded the "about" narrative of the "felt experience". This is my attempt at thinking out loud. I am trying to be clear on the relations of " bodily experience" gestures/language as the materiality of bringing into "form" as an act of bringing to the "fore" what was in the "back" (using these bodily metaphors)and the "I see/perceive" gestalt as that imaginal moment when the "construction" (representation of the felt bodily experience undergone) is "realized/completed". I am attempting to become clearer on the place of "narratives" as one of the "means" that brings bodily experience materially to the "fore" IN ORDER TO facilitate the "aha, now I see what you mean!" experience as "an" experience happening in phases. I could be mashing up what I am attempting to make clear (for myself) as I bring the various readings of our shared articles "together". Where to place the "construction/materiality phase (that bring "things/processes" to the "fore") with the notion of "felt experience or "mood" (that is the background bodily living through). I know that other theories say that ALL experience "is" conceptual and what I am referring to as "felt experience" is adding an aspect that is a mis-representation of experience that to "have an experience" always is a construction and "felt experience" is no exception to this truth. The performance of presentation and representation and the space transforming to place. The place of "means of materiality" in relation to " felt experience". Is the "gestalt" a process of "construction" or is this presenting "representations of" having an experience an aspect of bringing to the "fore" IN ORDER TO have the other share in our having an experience by assisting the other to "perceive" ( becoming clearer or revealing). The "therefore" is a phase assisting the other to have "an" experience (in common) as we undergo THIS shared experience -----Original Message----- From: "Alfredo Jornet Gil" Sent: ?2015-?07-?21 8:38 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ; "Andy Blunden" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Andy, all, I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). Any thoughts? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and one subject challenges that role and turns the object into its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. A number of examples spring to mind. * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are embraced by a despised group who take control of the word and assertively embrace it; * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before them rather than in shame); * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and read it, thus making the paper into a glorious organising tool; * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared object (the land); * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a symbol of India. In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when she introduced the term, but core point is that the ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a mediating artefact or the object of work (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according to context. In principle it is not the Object in the Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? > Henry > > >> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> Thanks Rolf! >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>> man-of-the-world. >>> Does that make better sense? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>> but also the ideological context. >>> >>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>> and regulations, communications resources, >>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>> the "boundary objects"? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> I think that a particular institution or >>> government system could potentially be a >>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>> >>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>> would say that one would have to justify the >>> utility of applying the concept to a >>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>> object within an institution. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Phew! >>> So would it be correct to describe the >>> government >>> institutions and political system are >>> "boundary objects"? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy - >>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>> and should >>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>> Thank you for >>> pointing that out. >>> >>> >>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>> suggestion that >>> Greg made in the other thread >>> suggesting we look >>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>> been familiar >>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>> after doing >>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>> found his >>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>> potentially >>> useful in dealing with some of my >>> questions.( >>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>> ) >>> >>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>> unexpected >>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>> >>> /The logic is that unexpected >>> metaphors arise >>> from the >>> need to create images when the >>> culture does >>> not have >>> them readily at hand. These images >>> join linguistic >>> content as growth points and >>> differentiate what >>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>> predicates, or >>> points of contrast in the >>> immediate ongoing >>> context of >>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>> precisely >>> because they >>> are outside the conventions of >>> language and >>> culture, >>> can capture abstractions in novel >>> ways and >>> provide the >>> fluidity of thought and language >>> that is the >>> essence >>> of ongoing discourse./ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>> Blunden >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>> achievement of >>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>> p. 131, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>> wrote: >>> >>> Are we allowed to ask >>> questions about our >>> paper as >>> well? I hope so! >>> >>> For a little context -in our >>> paper, we >>> identified >>> particular kinds of >>> episodes in which participants >>> from different >>> disciplines seek coherence >>> and continuity of shared >>> representations >>> through >>> bodily action. These >>> actions include gesture, >>> movement and physical >>> performance linking the >>> present material artifacts to >>> objects of >>> design. >>> Most of these episodes >>> seem to involve some form of >>> improvisation, >>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>> characterize >>> these >>> aspects of the >>> interactions. In most cases, the >>> participants seem >>> to be searching for the >>> best words or material >>> representation to >>> convey a >>> particular intention - >>> when this becomes problematic >>> or limiting >>> - they >>> almost fall back on what >>> is available - these >>> improvised bodily >>> performances - as a way of >>> maintaining continuity, and of >>> inviting >>> co-participants into a shared and >>> imagined space. These bodily >>> actions don't >>> seem to >>> begin the proposals, but >>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>> participants. >>> >>> >>> I think there is something >>> really fascinating >>> about this kind of creativity >>> and resourcefulness in >>> interaction that >>> could be >>> explored more deeply - and >>> that I'm having trouble >>> articulating. >>> Maybe some >>> of you have some thoughts >>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>> we've talked >>> about this >>> a bit before so maybe you >>> can add a little clarity to my >>> question. >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Thank you very much for >>> the sketch of your >>> roots. I taught English in >>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>> for 5 years >>> back in >>> the early 70s, just before >>> Franco died. (He died the >>> day I >>> boarded the >>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>> and language are interesting, >>> especially where >>> language varieties meet. >>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>> from my >>> familiarity >>> with the music of Catalunya >>> and Mallorca that the speech >>> communities in >>> each of those places treasure >>> their unique languages >>> (Catalan and >>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>> commonality >>> vis-a-vis their >>> separateness from >>> Castilian >>> Spanish, the national language >>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>> see a parallel >>> between your work on boundary >>> objects, where individual >>> persons >>> collaborate >>> to create spaces, AND >>> boundary objects >>> ?negotiated? by groups of >>> people who live in real >>> spaces. >>> I am thinking, among other >>> things, of >>> indigeneity, a big topic >>> here in New >>> Mexico, with so many >>> Native Americans. >>> Assymetries of power. >>> Bullying. >>> Testing and curriculum become >>> instruments of >>> war by other means. I hope my >>> tone does not distract >>> from, nor >>> diminish, the >>> optimism created by this >>> thread. Yet I think that >>> optimism is so >>> precious because of the >>> ground (the >>> world) of the dialog. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> References: <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi Alfredo, I am not sure what you mean in this sentence: "But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud)." In classic Activity Theory there is a very well defined distinction between the object of activity and the means/mediating instruments for shaping/changing that object. Actually, one of the "formulas" or models is Subject (in the sense of Classical German philosophy)--Means--Object (of that activity). Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Andy, all, I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). Any thoughts? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and one subject challenges that role and turns the object into its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. A number of examples spring to mind. * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are embraced by a despised group who take control of the word and assertively embrace it; * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before them rather than in shame); * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and read it, thus making the paper into a glorious organising tool; * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared object (the land); * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a symbol of India. In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when she introduced the term, but core point is that the ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a mediating artefact or the object of work (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according to context. In principle it is not the Object in the Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? > Henry > > >> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> Thanks Rolf! >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>> man-of-the-world. >>> Does that make better sense? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>> but also the ideological context. >>> >>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>> and regulations, communications resources, >>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>> the "boundary objects"? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> I think that a particular institution or >>> government system could potentially be a >>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>> >>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>> would say that one would have to justify the >>> utility of applying the concept to a >>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>> object within an institution. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Phew! >>> So would it be correct to describe the >>> government >>> institutions and political system are >>> "boundary objects"? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy - >>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>> and should >>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>> Thank you for >>> pointing that out. >>> >>> >>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>> suggestion that >>> Greg made in the other thread >>> suggesting we look >>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>> been familiar >>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>> after doing >>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>> found his >>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>> potentially >>> useful in dealing with some of my >>> questions.( >>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>> ) >>> >>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>> unexpected >>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>> >>> /The logic is that unexpected >>> metaphors arise >>> from the >>> need to create images when the >>> culture does >>> not have >>> them readily at hand. These images >>> join linguistic >>> content as growth points and >>> differentiate what >>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>> predicates, or >>> points of contrast in the >>> immediate ongoing >>> context of >>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>> precisely >>> because they >>> are outside the conventions of >>> language and >>> culture, >>> can capture abstractions in novel >>> ways and >>> provide the >>> fluidity of thought and language >>> that is the >>> essence >>> of ongoing discourse./ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>> Blunden >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>> achievement of >>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>> p. 131, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>> wrote: >>> >>> Are we allowed to ask >>> questions about our >>> paper as >>> well? I hope so! >>> >>> For a little context -in our >>> paper, we >>> identified >>> particular kinds of >>> episodes in which participants >>> from different >>> disciplines seek coherence >>> and continuity of shared >>> representations >>> through >>> bodily action. These >>> actions include gesture, >>> movement and physical >>> performance linking the >>> present material artifacts to >>> objects of >>> design. >>> Most of these episodes >>> seem to involve some form of >>> improvisation, >>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>> characterize >>> these >>> aspects of the >>> interactions. In most cases, the >>> participants seem >>> to be searching for the >>> best words or material >>> representation to >>> convey a >>> particular intention - >>> when this becomes problematic >>> or limiting >>> - they >>> almost fall back on what >>> is available - these >>> improvised bodily >>> performances - as a way of >>> maintaining continuity, and of >>> inviting >>> co-participants into a shared and >>> imagined space. These bodily >>> actions don't >>> seem to >>> begin the proposals, but >>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>> participants. >>> >>> >>> I think there is something >>> really fascinating >>> about this kind of creativity >>> and resourcefulness in >>> interaction that >>> could be >>> explored more deeply - and >>> that I'm having trouble >>> articulating. >>> Maybe some >>> of you have some thoughts >>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>> we've talked >>> about this >>> a bit before so maybe you >>> can add a little clarity to my >>> question. >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Thank you very much for >>> the sketch of your >>> roots. I taught English in >>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>> for 5 years >>> back in >>> the early 70s, just before >>> Franco died. (He died the >>> day I >>> boarded the >>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>> and language are interesting, >>> especially where >>> language varieties meet. >>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>> from my >>> familiarity >>> with the music of Catalunya >>> and Mallorca that the speech >>> communities in >>> each of those places treasure >>> their unique languages >>> (Catalan and >>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>> commonality >>> vis-a-vis their >>> separateness from >>> Castilian >>> Spanish, the national language >>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>> see a parallel >>> between your work on boundary >>> objects, where individual >>> persons >>> collaborate >>> to create spaces, AND >>> boundary objects >>> "negotiated" by groups of >>> people who live in real >>> spaces. >>> I am thinking, among other >>> things, of >>> indigeneity, a big topic >>> here in New >>> Mexico, with so many >>> Native Americans. >>> Assymetries of power. >>> Bullying. >>> Testing and curriculum become >>> instruments of >>> war by other means. I hope my >>> tone does not distract >>> from, nor >>> diminish, the >>> optimism created by this >>> thread. Yet I think that >>> optimism is so >>> precious because of the >>> ground (the >>> world) of the dialog. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well, you could say >>> that I am partly >>> Catalan. I grew up in >>> the province >>> >>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>> language is >>> official language together >>> with >>> Castilian Spanish. >>> Although Valencia (the >>> county) and Catalonia are >>> different regional >>> counties, Catalan >>> is spoken >>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>> the Balear Islands. Some >>> call the three >>> together as the Catalan >>> Countries. >>> I don't like borders, but >>> I respect >>> and enjoy >>> cultural diversity. >>> >>> Standardized testing, >>> and the whole >>> assumptions behind it, >>> are an issue >>> >>> also in Spain and in >>> Catalonia; but >>> education >>> has been so battered during >>> the last years of right-wing >>> government that I >>> the debate have been more >>> about means and access >>> than about >>> contents and >>> aims. Which in some sense >>> may be good because it >>> moves the >>> debates away >>> from performance. But I have >>> been living outside of >>> Spain for eight >>> years >>> now, so I am not the best to >>> update you on this either. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>> The Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Yes, you have answered >>> my question >>> very >>> nicely! I especially >>> appreciate >>> >>> that you were willing to >>> wrestle with my >>> question, despite your lack of >>> familiarity with the >>> issues here in >>> the U.S. >>> Am I wrong, or are you >>> Catalan? In which case >>> your experience in >>> Catalunya would take you to a >>> different place in critiquing >>> schooling there, >>> though not necessarily >>> unconnected to yours and >>> Rolf's work on >>> boundary objects. I just >>> met for >>> the second day in a row >>> with a friend >>> who is >>> the liaison between our public >>> school district and a >>> children's science >>> museum called Explora. I >>> feel like >>> I'm swimming in this >>> thread, talk about a >>> mixed metaphor! >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>> at 12:18 AM, >>> Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I am sorry, Henry, >>> but I am >>> not very >>> familiar with >>> high-stakes >>> >>> standardized testing (as >>> different to >>> standardized testing in >>> general) or >>> with common core (which I >>> quickly read >>> is an >>> issue in US). But I would say >>> that, if (school) >>> curricula were to be >>> consistent with the view of >>> education as the practice >>> of creating >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to >>> emerge--which is what >>> I was >>> suggesting in the >>> paragraph you >>> copy--curricula would not >>> be so much about >>> standardized contents, but >>> about >>> human sensitivities and >>> relations. So, >>> I would >>> say, no, standardized >>> testing is not in >>> principle in line >>> with what >>> I was trying to say. >>> >>> I was trying to >>> make a distinction >>> between trying to >>> design someone's >>> >>> particular experience, and >>> trying to >>> design >>> conditions for the development >>> of attitudes and >>> orientations. The >>> first is >>> likely impossible. The second >>> seems to make more sense. >>> >>> One may of course >>> wonder >>> whether those >>> attitudes and >>> orientations can >>> >>> be considered general, and >>> then form >>> part of >>> standardize measures instead >>> of the traditional >>> "contents and >>> skills". But >>> measuring assumes some >>> quantitative increment in >>> a particular >>> aspect >>> as the result of learning. >>> Growth and development, >>> however, are about >>> qualitative change. So, as >>> soon >>> as you start measuring you >>> would be >>> missing >>> growth and development. So, >>> again, no. I would not say >>> that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized testing is in >>> line >>> with what I was trying to say. >>> >>> I hope I have >>> answered your >>> question, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>> 07:48 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, >>> Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>> Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, you say: >>> >>> "However, we >>> cannot aim at >>> determining >>> any particular >>> >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be said >>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>> intend to communicate the >>> curriculum >>> and make >>> it the content of the >>> students' experience in >>> the way we >>> intend. But >>> we can try to create the >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to emerge." >>> >>> Would you say that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized >>> testing is in >>> line with >>> >>> your construal of >>> curriculum design? >>> How about >>> common core? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jul 15, >>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks a lot >>> for the >>> clarifications. I see now >>> why it >>> may be said that >>> >>> designers can aim at >>> designing for >>> constrains >>> but not for affordances. I >>> see that this way of >>> talking is part of a >>> designers' way to get things >>> done, and that it may >>> indeed be an >>> effective >>> way to design for >>> place-making, as in the >>> example that >>> Michael >>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>> what we report in our >>> study is about >>> designers >>> talking about how spatial >>> features might afford some >>> experiences >>> in the >>> museum while constraining >>> others. >>> >>> I must admit, >>> however, that I >>> still consider >>> the distinction >>> >>> problematic from an >>> analytical perspective >>> whenever our object of >>> study is >>> experience, situated >>> action, or design as >>> situated practice. A more >>> correct >>> way to talk is that >>> affordances and >>> constrains >>> are the positive and >>> negative >>> sides/interpretations of a single >>> unitary category. As an actual >>> and concrete phenomenon, >>> walking into >>> a musuem >>> implies both affordances and >>> constrains at the same >>> time, whether >>> intended >>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>> whether other terminology, >>> such as >>> Ingold's >>> notion of "correspondence," >>> might be more appropriated >>> when we >>> talk about >>> how materials and actions >>> become entangled into >>> particular >>> trajectories. >>> >>> In any case, >>> and as Rolf >>> emphasizes, >>> what the >>> designers in >>> our study >>> >>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>> ways of being >>> in the >>> museum. Imagination versus >>> prediction may be an >>> interesting topic >>> emerging here for further >>> inquiry >>> into design work. >>> >>> Another >>> important (and >>> related) >>> issue that I >>> think is >>> emerging here >>> >>> has to do with the level >>> of generality at >>> which design intentions can be >>> expected to work (just as >>> Bateson >>> argued with >>> regard to prediction). At the >>> level of generic social >>> processes, and >>> given a >>> particular >>> cultural-historical >>> background, we as >>> designers may try to make some >>> generic situations more >>> likely to >>> occur than >>> others (facilitating that more >>> or less people end up >>> together in a given >>> place). However, we cannot >>> aim at >>> determining any particular >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be >>> said about >>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>> communicate the >>> curriculum and make it the >>> content of the students' >>> experience in >>> the way >>> we intend. But we can try to >>> create the conditions for >>> certain >>> attitudes >>> and dispositions to emerge. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 23:30 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I think Rolf >>> may have >>> addressed >>> the question >>> of the >>> differences >>> >>> between affordances and >>> constraints in his >>> post. The way he described the >>> designers as possibly >>> setting up the >>> corner >>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>> was a >>> long time ago so I'm not >>> sure if this >>> is the >>> way it was or the way I >>> remember it, but let's >>> just believe >>> this is >>> the way it was. The painting, >>> I think there were three >>> were set up in a >>> corner off a main >>> corridor. The >>> lighting was dark, which >>> if you have >>> ever been >>> to MOMA is different, in >>> many other parts of the >>> museum there >>> is a good >>> deal of natural light (there >>> was this great fountain, I >>> wonder if it is >>> still there). The paintings >>> were on tripods rather >>> than hung on >>> the walls >>> and they were surrounded on >>> three sides by walls. All >>> of these I >>> think >>> would be considered restraints >>> - pushing me in to the >>> works rather than >>> stepping back away. It was >>> impossible for more than >>> two or three >>> people >>> to view the paintings at one >>> time and movement was >>> limited, so >>> there were >>> fewer chances for social >>> interactions (you were not >>> going to >>> pick up >>> anybody looking at Jackson >>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>> brooding, making >>> it more likely that viewers >>> would move towards internal >>> reflection. All >>> of these were constraints that >>> canalized perspectives and >>> feelings >>> viewing >>> the paintings. You really had >>> only two choices, you >>> moved in to the >>> paintings or you moved on, >>> which I >>> had done every previous >>> time coming >>> upon them. >>> >>> The painting >>> itself though >>> became >>> an >>> affordances, an object >>> at the >>> >>> nexus of my journey >>> through the >>> museum, where >>> I was in my life, and my >>> abilities to perceive the >>> painitings. This >>> was something that could >>> not be >>> designed I think because >>> nobody could >>> think >>> that moment was going to >>> happen. So then what is >>> a perceived >>> affordance. Way back when >>> there was >>> also a Manet room. It was >>> a round >>> room with >>> different variations of his >>> water lilies in a circle. >>> Almost the >>> exact >>> opposite in constraints it was >>> large, airy, a lot of >>> natural light. If you >>> were looking to brood you went >>> somewhere else. In the >>> middle of the >>> room was >>> a wooden structure (not an >>> obvious bench), but you >>> realized as random >>> colors dissolved into water >>> lilies that you wanted to >>> sit down. You >>> naturally moved to the >>> center of >>> the room and sat >>> (wondering if a guard >>> would >>> come and tell you it was >>> actually an important >>> piece of art and you >>> should get off). The designer >>> anticipates a desire to >>> soak in the >>> room, to >>> almost get dizzy in the >>> lights, and included in >>> the design the >>> piece >>> of wood that will have the >>> perceived affordance for >>> sitting, changing >>> your concept of time and >>> space. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> [mailto: >>> >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On Behalf >>> Of Alfredo >>> >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, >>> 2015 3:01 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thanks Michael, >>> >>> I think we are >>> saying the same >>> things, >>> indeed, or at >>> least more or >>> >>> less. I am quite certain >>> that Bateson >>> referred >>> to energy, and that he used >>> the mentioned examples (or >>> similar >>> ones) to >>> show how the energy that moves >>> the pig is not a direct >>> transfer of energy >>> from the kick, whereas in the >>> case of the billiard >>> balls, the >>> movement of >>> one ball is caused by the >>> energy that the kicking >>> ball brings. I >>> might >>> be wrong in the context within >>> which Bateson was >>> discussing the >>> example, and >>> I see that your account is in >>> that regard is more >>> accurate. But the >>> point is >>> the same: you can not intend >>> the outcomes of a system >>> by addressing >>> only >>> its parts as if they were >>> connected directly, in a >>> linear causal >>> fashion; as if the whole >>> was the sum >>> of its parts. I do see a >>> link with >>> Vygotsky's >>> rejection of S-R and his >>> inclusion of a third >>> element that >>> transforms >>> the whole system. >>> >>> But I totally >>> agree with your >>> comments on design >>> intentions as they >>> >>> relate to ecology, and I, >>> as I know >>> also Rolf >>> does, also like very much the >>> notion of ecology to >>> address these issues. >>> >>> If I read you >>> correctly, and >>> citing Don >>> Norman (whose >>> work I >>> ignore), >>> >>> you suggest the >>> possibility that the >>> relations >>> between design intentions >>> and actual experience >>> could be thought >>> of in >>> terms of different levels? >>> That one thing is to >>> design for what is >>> general, but that we >>> cannot design >>> for the particular. Is >>> that right? If >>> so, I >>> think that Bateson had a >>> similar argument on >>> prediction, does >>> not him? >>> That we can predict on >>> general levels (e.g. >>> population), but >>> not at >>> the level of the particular >>> (e.g., individual). I >>> haven't gone >>> that way, >>> but seems a promising road to >>> consider this jumps >>> between levels of >>> generality or scales. >>> >>> Finally, I am >>> not sure if >>> I get >>> what you mean >>> when you say >>> that we can >>> >>> design for constrains but >>> not for >>> affordances. >>> I still see that the one >>> presupposes the other; you can >>> separate them >>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>> experience, a constrain is an >>> affordance and >>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>> the road has any inherent >>> constrain >>> that could >>> not be an affordance at the >>> same time. Of course, if >>> you take the >>> normative stance that >>> roads are for >>> cars driving through them, >>> you may be >>> right. >>> But if we think of roads as >>> asphalt on the ground, as >>> yet more >>> ground only >>> of a different shape, >>> texture, and color, how is >>> that a >>> constrain >>> but not an affordance? Or an >>> affordance but not a >>> constrain? Of course, >>> culture constrains once >>> you are >>> within the road and you >>> are driving. >>> But then, >>> the constrain is not in the >>> road, as you seem to >>> suggest, but in the >>> journey; in the journeyman >>> that >>> carries some cultural way >>> of orienting and >>> affectively relating to its >>> environment so that particular >>> constrains are >>> taken for granted despite the >>> possibility of being >>> otherwise. But I >>> might >>> not have thought it well/long >>> enough and of course I >>> might be wrong. >>> I would >>> like to understand your >>> position here better. >>> >>> Thanks! >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 20:32 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I have been >>> reading Bateson >>> through a >>> cybernetics lens >>> lately >>> (Bateson >>> >>> along with Lewin and his >>> wife Margaret >>> Mead >>> were part of the original >>> Sears >>> conferences) and I'm not >>> sure that's >>> right or >>> I am victim to the "when you >>> have a hammer, everything >>> looks like a >>> nail" >>> but.... >>> >>> I think >>> Bateson was >>> arguing with >>> those looking >>> to apply the >>> more >>> >>> physical/mathematical >>> origins of >>> cybernetics >>> to human or really (pace the >>> pig story) and system that >>> moves >>> beyond simple >>> physical feedback loops. I >>> think his larger point is that >>> everything has >>> a response within the larger >>> feedback system that >>> exists but we >>> cannot go - >>> what Bateson refers to as >>> MIND. Attempts to create >>> and control >>> feedback >>> loops, to try and design a >>> system for specific types >>> of feedback is a >>> dangerous proposition. >>> >>> This I think >>> is the reason >>> that >>> affordances >>> really can't >>> be designed >>> >>> into an ecology, only a >>> recognition of the >>> context in which actions are >>> taking place (and I say >>> this having no >>> idea >>> what Gibson's relationship to >>> cybernetics was). Taking >>> Larry's >>> example of >>> the girl it is perhaps also >>> likely that the girl could >>> have taken the >>> fixing of hair as a >>> criticism, an >>> attack, and it might have >>> destroyed her >>> confidence. Both make >>> sense in >>> terms of feedback loops, >>> but only ad >>> hoc. So >>> if a designer does in some >>> way design that experience >>> into the >>> action, >>> even without meaning they are >>> taking a large chance, >>> because they do not >>> know the trajectory it will >>> take. We simply need >>> objects that are >>> part of >>> our journey, part of the >>> larger context but not >>> designed for >>> purpose, >>> for feedback. There is no >>> assumption about trajectory. >>> >>> I think Don >>> Norman sort of >>> muddied >>> the waters on >>> this, but in an >>> >>> interesting way. That we >>> can assume >>> people >>> are going to want to do >>> certain >>> things in a very general >>> environment - >>> when you enter a dark room >>> you want >>> light, so it is possible >>> to design objects >>> that meet that need that >>> we are >>> more likely to find in the >>> moment that >>> we need >>> them. But I think that is >>> very different from the >>> idea of >>> specifically >>> guiding feedback loops that >>> even take generalized >>> experience in a >>> certain >>> direction. I am thinking >>> about Dewey, and he makes >>> a similar >>> argument >>> to Bateson with his concept of >>> transactions. Although he >>> does seem >>> to think >>> that it is possible to create >>> a larger field of action >>> so we can see at >>> least local >>> interrelationships. >>> But his idea of experience >>> is also >>> very much >>> one of discovery based on >>> needs at the immediate >>> moment - social >>> relations act as a vehicle >>> for these >>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>> course was writing >>> before Gibson and for most >>> of his >>> life before cybernetics. I also >>> wonder what >>> he thought of cybernetics). >>> >>> I think I >>> disagree with you, >>> constraints >>> are not about the >>> journey but >>> >>> about the road. If you >>> build a road >>> on the >>> side of the river you are >>> constrained because no >>> matter what, >>> you cannot >>> turn right. Your direction >>> has already been partially >>> determined >>> by the >>> designer of the road. But the >>> mistake we make is in >>> thinking that also >>> controls the trajectory of the >>> individual's journey. The >>> effect of >>> designers >>> on trajectories of action is >>> important, but limited. >>> >>> The primary >>> place that >>> designers >>> have influence on >>> affordances it >>> >>> seems to me is by being >>> able to create a >>> unique context for an >>> individual's >>> and a group's that limit >>> possible >>> trajectories >>> on an individual's journey. >>> But we should never >>> mistake those >>> constraints >>> for affordances. I think >>> Bateson might argue it is >>> hubris to do so. >>> Perhaps this is what you are >>> saying Alfredo. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On >>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>> 12:38 PM >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> I'd like to >>> follow up on >>> Michael's >>> post by asking >>> a question: >>> Are not >>> >>> affordances presupposed by >>> constraints >>> and are >>> not constraints presupposed >>> by affordances? If so, I >>> would wonder >>> whether >>> it makes sense to ask whether >>> museums should be designed for >>> affordances and >>> constraints. >>> >>> What I think >>> is clear from the >>> anecdote that >>> you bring >>> about the >>> >>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>> that whatever >>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>> somewhere (i.e. being >>> someone at some >>> time in >>> some place) cannot be >>> INTENDED. And I think this >>> applies both to >>> designers and users, to those >>> who set things up for you to >>> experience and to >>> you, who could not foresee >>> what your experience was >>> going to turn you >>> into before you go through it. >>> >>> I think that >>> the big issue >>> that >>> you bring on >>> the table (to >>> continue >>> >>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>> to do with a >>> difference between physical >>> relations and social >>> relations, and >>> the idea >>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>> noticed that the relations >>> that are the >>> subject matter in physics >>> are not >>> the same as those that are >>> the subject >>> matter >>> in communication. He noticed >>> that physical relations >>> (relations >>> that are >>> the object of study of >>> physics) >>> transfer energy in direct >>> manners: a >>> billiard >>> ball hits another ball and we >>> can anticipate the exact >>> speed and >>> direction >>> that the second ball will take >>> based on the energy that >>> is in the >>> system ball >>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>> living beings, the things >>> are different. >>> Bateson explained, if we >>> kick a >>> pig's ass (I think he used >>> this somehow >>> bizarre example) the >>> reaction of >>> the pig is not accounted >>> for by the energy >>> that is contained in the kick, >>> at least not in a direct >>> manner. The >>> energy >>> that moves the pig is from a >>> different source. Before >>> Bateson, it was >>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>> mediation who would most >>> clearly state >>> that >>> social relations are not >>> direct, but mediated. >>> >>> So, how can >>> design go >>> about this? >>> If we, along >>> with Dewey and >>> >>> Vygotsky, consider >>> experience to be a >>> unity of >>> person and environment, and >>> we assume as well that >>> this is a >>> social (not >>> just individual) category, and >>> that how a situation is >>> experienced is >>> also >>> refracted through the social >>> relations within which we >>> engage, the most >>> designers can do is to foster >>> social relations go on, giving >>> afordances to >>> prcesses of signification, >>> without intending to embed >>> meanings. It is >>> about affordances/constraints, >>> but not about how to interpret >>> something, but >>> about going about >>> interpreting. I think. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 18:04 >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> So after >>> reading the >>> article and >>> the e-mail >>> discussion I'm >>> beginning >>> >>> to think there is a really >>> big issue >>> here that >>> I am trying to grapple with, >>> especially in terms of >>> boundary >>> objects (which >>> I admittedly do not >>> understand very well). And it relates >>> to the >>> metaphor of the table (both >>> as discussed by Larry and >>> Ingold as >>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>> is this, in >>> the museum should the >>> place be set up as >>> affordances, perceived >>> affordances, or >>> constraints? It seems the >>> museum in the study has >>> potential affordances for >>> the users. The >>> cultural historical moment >>> (unable to think of any >>> other word) of the >>> museum sets the context, >>> meaning >>> those walking through the >>> museum are >>> going to >>> be restricted by the >>> historical and cultural >>> boundaries >>> leading up >>> to the art work, along with >>> the expectations and needs >>> of the >>> individuals >>> moving through the museum, >>> but they will come across >>> objects/artifacts >>> that they think meets the >>> needs >>> >>> > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Tue Jul 21 12:16:09 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 19:16:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> References: <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Dear Alfredo and Rolf, There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this discussion. First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call it Activity Theory? Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Andy, all, I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). Any thoughts? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and one subject challenges that role and turns the object into its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. A number of examples spring to mind. * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are embraced by a despised group who take control of the word and assertively embrace it; * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before them rather than in shame); * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and read it, thus making the paper into a glorious organising tool; * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared object (the land); * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a symbol of India. In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when she introduced the term, but core point is that the ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a mediating artefact or the object of work (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according to context. In principle it is not the Object in the Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? > Henry > > >> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> Thanks Rolf! >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>> man-of-the-world. >>> Does that make better sense? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>> but also the ideological context. >>> >>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>> and regulations, communications resources, >>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>> the "boundary objects"? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> I think that a particular institution or >>> government system could potentially be a >>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>> >>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>> would say that one would have to justify the >>> utility of applying the concept to a >>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>> object within an institution. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Phew! >>> So would it be correct to describe the >>> government >>> institutions and political system are >>> "boundary objects"? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy - >>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>> and should >>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>> Thank you for >>> pointing that out. >>> >>> >>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>> suggestion that >>> Greg made in the other thread >>> suggesting we look >>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>> been familiar >>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>> after doing >>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>> found his >>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>> potentially >>> useful in dealing with some of my >>> questions.( >>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>> ) >>> >>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>> unexpected >>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>> >>> /The logic is that unexpected >>> metaphors arise >>> from the >>> need to create images when the >>> culture does >>> not have >>> them readily at hand. These images >>> join linguistic >>> content as growth points and >>> differentiate what >>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>> predicates, or >>> points of contrast in the >>> immediate ongoing >>> context of >>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>> precisely >>> because they >>> are outside the conventions of >>> language and >>> culture, >>> can capture abstractions in novel >>> ways and >>> provide the >>> fluidity of thought and language >>> that is the >>> essence >>> of ongoing discourse./ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>> Blunden >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>> achievement of >>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>> p. 131, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>> wrote: >>> >>> Are we allowed to ask >>> questions about our >>> paper as >>> well? I hope so! >>> >>> For a little context -in our >>> paper, we >>> identified >>> particular kinds of >>> episodes in which participants >>> from different >>> disciplines seek coherence >>> and continuity of shared >>> representations >>> through >>> bodily action. These >>> actions include gesture, >>> movement and physical >>> performance linking the >>> present material artifacts to >>> objects of >>> design. >>> Most of these episodes >>> seem to involve some form of >>> improvisation, >>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>> characterize >>> these >>> aspects of the >>> interactions. In most cases, the >>> participants seem >>> to be searching for the >>> best words or material >>> representation to >>> convey a >>> particular intention - >>> when this becomes problematic >>> or limiting >>> - they >>> almost fall back on what >>> is available - these >>> improvised bodily >>> performances - as a way of >>> maintaining continuity, and of >>> inviting >>> co-participants into a shared and >>> imagined space. These bodily >>> actions don't >>> seem to >>> begin the proposals, but >>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>> participants. >>> >>> >>> I think there is something >>> really fascinating >>> about this kind of creativity >>> and resourcefulness in >>> interaction that >>> could be >>> explored more deeply - and >>> that I'm having trouble >>> articulating. >>> Maybe some >>> of you have some thoughts >>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>> we've talked >>> about this >>> a bit before so maybe you >>> can add a little clarity to my >>> question. >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Thank you very much for >>> the sketch of your >>> roots. I taught English in >>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>> for 5 years >>> back in >>> the early 70s, just before >>> Franco died. (He died the >>> day I >>> boarded the >>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>> and language are interesting, >>> especially where >>> language varieties meet. >>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>> from my >>> familiarity >>> with the music of Catalunya >>> and Mallorca that the speech >>> communities in >>> each of those places treasure >>> their unique languages >>> (Catalan and >>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>> commonality >>> vis-a-vis their >>> separateness from >>> Castilian >>> Spanish, the national language >>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>> see a parallel >>> between your work on boundary >>> objects, where individual >>> persons >>> collaborate >>> to create spaces, AND >>> boundary objects >>> "negotiated" by groups of >>> people who live in real >>> spaces. >>> I am thinking, among other >>> things, of >>> indigeneity, a big topic >>> here in New >>> Mexico, with so many >>> Native Americans. >>> Assymetries of power. >>> Bullying. >>> Testing and curriculum become >>> instruments of >>> war by other means. I hope my >>> tone does not distract >>> from, nor >>> diminish, the >>> optimism created by this >>> thread. Yet I think that >>> optimism is so >>> precious because of the >>> ground (the >>> world) of the dialog. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well, you could say >>> that I am partly >>> Catalan. I grew up in >>> the province >>> >>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>> language is >>> official language together >>> with >>> Castilian Spanish. >>> Although Valencia (the >>> county) and Catalonia are >>> different regional >>> counties, Catalan >>> is spoken >>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>> the Balear Islands. Some >>> call the three >>> together as the Catalan >>> Countries. >>> I don't like borders, but >>> I respect >>> and enjoy >>> cultural diversity. >>> >>> Standardized testing, >>> and the whole >>> assumptions behind it, >>> are an issue >>> >>> also in Spain and in >>> Catalonia; but >>> education >>> has been so battered during >>> the last years of right-wing >>> government that I >>> the debate have been more >>> about means and access >>> than about >>> contents and >>> aims. Which in some sense >>> may be good because it >>> moves the >>> debates away >>> from performance. But I have >>> been living outside of >>> Spain for eight >>> years >>> now, so I am not the best to >>> update you on this either. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>> The Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Yes, you have answered >>> my question >>> very >>> nicely! I especially >>> appreciate >>> >>> that you were willing to >>> wrestle with my >>> question, despite your lack of >>> familiarity with the >>> issues here in >>> the U.S. >>> Am I wrong, or are you >>> Catalan? In which case >>> your experience in >>> Catalunya would take you to a >>> different place in critiquing >>> schooling there, >>> though not necessarily >>> unconnected to yours and >>> Rolf's work on >>> boundary objects. I just >>> met for >>> the second day in a row >>> with a friend >>> who is >>> the liaison between our public >>> school district and a >>> children's science >>> museum called Explora. I >>> feel like >>> I'm swimming in this >>> thread, talk about a >>> mixed metaphor! >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>> at 12:18 AM, >>> Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I am sorry, Henry, >>> but I am >>> not very >>> familiar with >>> high-stakes >>> >>> standardized testing (as >>> different to >>> standardized testing in >>> general) or >>> with common core (which I >>> quickly read >>> is an >>> issue in US). But I would say >>> that, if (school) >>> curricula were to be >>> consistent with the view of >>> education as the practice >>> of creating >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to >>> emerge--which is what >>> I was >>> suggesting in the >>> paragraph you >>> copy--curricula would not >>> be so much about >>> standardized contents, but >>> about >>> human sensitivities and >>> relations. So, >>> I would >>> say, no, standardized >>> testing is not in >>> principle in line >>> with what >>> I was trying to say. >>> >>> I was trying to >>> make a distinction >>> between trying to >>> design someone's >>> >>> particular experience, and >>> trying to >>> design >>> conditions for the development >>> of attitudes and >>> orientations. The >>> first is >>> likely impossible. The second >>> seems to make more sense. >>> >>> One may of course >>> wonder >>> whether those >>> attitudes and >>> orientations can >>> >>> be considered general, and >>> then form >>> part of >>> standardize measures instead >>> of the traditional >>> "contents and >>> skills". But >>> measuring assumes some >>> quantitative increment in >>> a particular >>> aspect >>> as the result of learning. >>> Growth and development, >>> however, are about >>> qualitative change. So, as >>> soon >>> as you start measuring you >>> would be >>> missing >>> growth and development. So, >>> again, no. I would not say >>> that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized testing is in >>> line >>> with what I was trying to say. >>> >>> I hope I have >>> answered your >>> question, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>> 07:48 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, >>> Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>> Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, you say: >>> >>> "However, we >>> cannot aim at >>> determining >>> any particular >>> >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be said >>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>> intend to communicate the >>> curriculum >>> and make >>> it the content of the >>> students' experience in >>> the way we >>> intend. But >>> we can try to create the >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to emerge." >>> >>> Would you say that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized >>> testing is in >>> line with >>> >>> your construal of >>> curriculum design? >>> How about >>> common core? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jul 15, >>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks a lot >>> for the >>> clarifications. I see now >>> why it >>> may be said that >>> >>> designers can aim at >>> designing for >>> constrains >>> but not for affordances. I >>> see that this way of >>> talking is part of a >>> designers' way to get things >>> done, and that it may >>> indeed be an >>> effective >>> way to design for >>> place-making, as in the >>> example that >>> Michael >>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>> what we report in our >>> study is about >>> designers >>> talking about how spatial >>> features might afford some >>> experiences >>> in the >>> museum while constraining >>> others. >>> >>> I must admit, >>> however, that I >>> still consider >>> the distinction >>> >>> problematic from an >>> analytical perspective >>> whenever our object of >>> study is >>> experience, situated >>> action, or design as >>> situated practice. A more >>> correct >>> way to talk is that >>> affordances and >>> constrains >>> are the positive and >>> negative >>> sides/interpretations of a single >>> unitary category. As an actual >>> and concrete phenomenon, >>> walking into >>> a musuem >>> implies both affordances and >>> constrains at the same >>> time, whether >>> intended >>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>> whether other terminology, >>> such as >>> Ingold's >>> notion of "correspondence," >>> might be more appropriated >>> when we >>> talk about >>> how materials and actions >>> become entangled into >>> particular >>> trajectories. >>> >>> In any case, >>> and as Rolf >>> emphasizes, >>> what the >>> designers in >>> our study >>> >>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>> ways of being >>> in the >>> museum. Imagination versus >>> prediction may be an >>> interesting topic >>> emerging here for further >>> inquiry >>> into design work. >>> >>> Another >>> important (and >>> related) >>> issue that I >>> think is >>> emerging here >>> >>> has to do with the level >>> of generality at >>> which design intentions can be >>> expected to work (just as >>> Bateson >>> argued with >>> regard to prediction). At the >>> level of generic social >>> processes, and >>> given a >>> particular >>> cultural-historical >>> background, we as >>> designers may try to make some >>> generic situations more >>> likely to >>> occur than >>> others (facilitating that more >>> or less people end up >>> together in a given >>> place). However, we cannot >>> aim at >>> determining any particular >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be >>> said about >>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>> communicate the >>> curriculum and make it the >>> content of the students' >>> experience in >>> the way >>> we intend. But we can try to >>> create the conditions for >>> certain >>> attitudes >>> and dispositions to emerge. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 23:30 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I think Rolf >>> may have >>> addressed >>> the question >>> of the >>> differences >>> >>> between affordances and >>> constraints in his >>> post. The way he described the >>> designers as possibly >>> setting up the >>> corner >>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>> was a >>> long time ago so I'm not >>> sure if this >>> is the >>> way it was or the way I >>> remember it, but let's >>> just believe >>> this is >>> the way it was. The painting, >>> I think there were three >>> were set up in a >>> corner off a main >>> corridor. The >>> lighting was dark, which >>> if you have >>> ever been >>> to MOMA is different, in >>> many other parts of the >>> museum there >>> is a good >>> deal of natural light (there >>> was this great fountain, I >>> wonder if it is >>> still there). The paintings >>> were on tripods rather >>> than hung on >>> the walls >>> and they were surrounded on >>> three sides by walls. All >>> of these I >>> think >>> would be considered restraints >>> - pushing me in to the >>> works rather than >>> stepping back away. It was >>> impossible for more than >>> two or three >>> people >>> to view the paintings at one >>> time and movement was >>> limited, so >>> there were >>> fewer chances for social >>> interactions (you were not >>> going to >>> pick up >>> anybody looking at Jackson >>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>> brooding, making >>> it more likely that viewers >>> would move towards internal >>> reflection. All >>> of these were constraints that >>> canalized perspectives and >>> feelings >>> viewing >>> the paintings. You really had >>> only two choices, you >>> moved in to the >>> paintings or you moved on, >>> which I >>> had done every previous >>> time coming >>> upon them. >>> >>> The painting >>> itself though >>> became >>> an >>> affordances, an object >>> at the >>> >>> nexus of my journey >>> through the >>> museum, where >>> I was in my life, and my >>> abilities to perceive the >>> painitings. This >>> was something that could >>> not be >>> designed I think because >>> nobody could >>> think >>> that moment was going to >>> happen. So then what is >>> a perceived >>> affordance. Way back when >>> there was >>> also a Manet room. It was >>> a round >>> room with >>> different variations of his >>> water lilies in a circle. >>> Almost the >>> exact >>> opposite in constraints it was >>> large, airy, a lot of >>> natural light. If you >>> were looking to brood you went >>> somewhere else. In the >>> middle of the >>> room was >>> a wooden structure (not an >>> obvious bench), but you >>> realized as random >>> colors dissolved into water >>> lilies that you wanted to >>> sit down. You >>> naturally moved to the >>> center of >>> the room and sat >>> (wondering if a guard >>> would >>> come and tell you it was >>> actually an important >>> piece of art and you >>> should get off). The designer >>> anticipates a desire to >>> soak in the >>> room, to >>> almost get dizzy in the >>> lights, and included in >>> the design the >>> piece >>> of wood that will have the >>> perceived affordance for >>> sitting, changing >>> your concept of time and >>> space. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> [mailto: >>> >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On Behalf >>> Of Alfredo >>> >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, >>> 2015 3:01 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thanks Michael, >>> >>> I think we are >>> saying the same >>> things, >>> indeed, or at >>> least more or >>> >>> less. I am quite certain >>> that Bateson >>> referred >>> to energy, and that he used >>> the mentioned examples (or >>> similar >>> ones) to >>> show how the energy that moves >>> the pig is not a direct >>> transfer of energy >>> from the kick, whereas in the >>> case of the billiard >>> balls, the >>> movement of >>> one ball is caused by the >>> energy that the kicking >>> ball brings. I >>> might >>> be wrong in the context within >>> which Bateson was >>> discussing the >>> example, and >>> I see that your account is in >>> that regard is more >>> accurate. But the >>> point is >>> the same: you can not intend >>> the outcomes of a system >>> by addressing >>> only >>> its parts as if they were >>> connected directly, in a >>> linear causal >>> fashion; as if the whole >>> was the sum >>> of its parts. I do see a >>> link with >>> Vygotsky's >>> rejection of S-R and his >>> inclusion of a third >>> element that >>> transforms >>> the whole system. >>> >>> But I totally >>> agree with your >>> comments on design >>> intentions as they >>> >>> relate to ecology, and I, >>> as I know >>> also Rolf >>> does, also like very much the >>> notion of ecology to >>> address these issues. >>> >>> If I read you >>> correctly, and >>> citing Don >>> Norman (whose >>> work I >>> ignore), >>> >>> you suggest the >>> possibility that the >>> relations >>> between design intentions >>> and actual experience >>> could be thought >>> of in >>> terms of different levels? >>> That one thing is to >>> design for what is >>> general, but that we >>> cannot design >>> for the particular. Is >>> that right? If >>> so, I >>> think that Bateson had a >>> similar argument on >>> prediction, does >>> not him? >>> That we can predict on >>> general levels (e.g. >>> population), but >>> not at >>> the level of the particular >>> (e.g., individual). I >>> haven't gone >>> that way, >>> but seems a promising road to >>> consider this jumps >>> between levels of >>> generality or scales. >>> >>> Finally, I am >>> not sure if >>> I get >>> what you mean >>> when you say >>> that we can >>> >>> design for constrains but >>> not for >>> affordances. >>> I still see that the one >>> presupposes the other; you can >>> separate them >>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>> experience, a constrain is an >>> affordance and >>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>> the road has any inherent >>> constrain >>> that could >>> not be an affordance at the >>> same time. Of course, if >>> you take the >>> normative stance that >>> roads are for >>> cars driving through them, >>> you may be >>> right. >>> But if we think of roads as >>> asphalt on the ground, as >>> yet more >>> ground only >>> of a different shape, >>> texture, and color, how is >>> that a >>> constrain >>> but not an affordance? Or an >>> affordance but not a >>> constrain? Of course, >>> culture constrains once >>> you are >>> within the road and you >>> are driving. >>> But then, >>> the constrain is not in the >>> road, as you seem to >>> suggest, but in the >>> journey; in the journeyman >>> that >>> carries some cultural way >>> of orienting and >>> affectively relating to its >>> environment so that particular >>> constrains are >>> taken for granted despite the >>> possibility of being >>> otherwise. But I >>> might >>> not have thought it well/long >>> enough and of course I >>> might be wrong. >>> I would >>> like to understand your >>> position here better. >>> >>> Thanks! >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 20:32 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I have been >>> reading Bateson >>> through a >>> cybernetics lens >>> lately >>> (Bateson >>> >>> along with Lewin and his >>> wife Margaret >>> Mead >>> were part of the original >>> Sears >>> conferences) and I'm not >>> sure that's >>> right or >>> I am victim to the "when you >>> have a hammer, everything >>> looks like a >>> nail" >>> but.... >>> >>> I think >>> Bateson was >>> arguing with >>> those looking >>> to apply the >>> more >>> >>> physical/mathematical >>> origins of >>> cybernetics >>> to human or really (pace the >>> pig story) and system that >>> moves >>> beyond simple >>> physical feedback loops. I >>> think his larger point is that >>> everything has >>> a response within the larger >>> feedback system that >>> exists but we >>> cannot go - >>> what Bateson refers to as >>> MIND. Attempts to create >>> and control >>> feedback >>> loops, to try and design a >>> system for specific types >>> of feedback is a >>> dangerous proposition. >>> >>> This I think >>> is the reason >>> that >>> affordances >>> really can't >>> be designed >>> >>> into an ecology, only a >>> recognition of the >>> context in which actions are >>> taking place (and I say >>> this having no >>> idea >>> what Gibson's relationship to >>> cybernetics was). Taking >>> Larry's >>> example of >>> the girl it is perhaps also >>> likely that the girl could >>> have taken the >>> fixing of hair as a >>> criticism, an >>> attack, and it might have >>> destroyed her >>> confidence. Both make >>> sense in >>> terms of feedback loops, >>> but only ad >>> hoc. So >>> if a designer does in some >>> way design that experience >>> into the >>> action, >>> even without meaning they are >>> taking a large chance, >>> because they do not >>> know the trajectory it will >>> take. We simply need >>> objects that are >>> part of >>> our journey, part of the >>> larger context but not >>> designed for >>> purpose, >>> for feedback. There is no >>> assumption about trajectory. >>> >>> I think Don >>> Norman sort of >>> muddied >>> the waters on >>> this, but in an >>> >>> interesting way. That we >>> can assume >>> people >>> are going to want to do >>> certain >>> things in a very general >>> environment - >>> when you enter a dark room >>> you want >>> light, so it is possible >>> to design objects >>> that meet that need that >>> we are >>> more likely to find in the >>> moment that >>> we need >>> them. But I think that is >>> very different from the >>> idea of >>> specifically >>> guiding feedback loops that >>> even take generalized >>> experience in a >>> certain >>> direction. I am thinking >>> about Dewey, and he makes >>> a similar >>> argument >>> to Bateson with his concept of >>> transactions. Although he >>> does seem >>> to think >>> that it is possible to create >>> a larger field of action >>> so we can see at >>> least local >>> interrelationships. >>> But his idea of experience >>> is also >>> very much >>> one of discovery based on >>> needs at the immediate >>> moment - social >>> relations act as a vehicle >>> for these >>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>> course was writing >>> before Gibson and for most >>> of his >>> life before cybernetics. I also >>> wonder what >>> he thought of cybernetics). >>> >>> I think I >>> disagree with you, >>> constraints >>> are not about the >>> journey but >>> >>> about the road. If you >>> build a road >>> on the >>> side of the river you are >>> constrained because no >>> matter what, >>> you cannot >>> turn right. Your direction >>> has already been partially >>> determined >>> by the >>> designer of the road. But the >>> mistake we make is in >>> thinking that also >>> controls the trajectory of the >>> individual's journey. The >>> effect of >>> designers >>> on trajectories of action is >>> important, but limited. >>> >>> The primary >>> place that >>> designers >>> have influence on >>> affordances it >>> >>> seems to me is by being >>> able to create a >>> unique context for an >>> individual's >>> and a group's that limit >>> possible >>> trajectories >>> on an individual's journey. >>> But we should never >>> mistake those >>> constraints >>> for affordances. I think >>> Bateson might argue it is >>> hubris to do so. >>> Perhaps this is what you are >>> saying Alfredo. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On >>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>> 12:38 PM >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> I'd like to >>> follow up on >>> Michael's >>> post by asking >>> a question: >>> Are not >>> >>> affordances presupposed by >>> constraints >>> and are >>> not constraints presupposed >>> by affordances? If so, I >>> would wonder >>> whether >>> it makes sense to ask whether >>> museums should be designed for >>> affordances and >>> constraints. >>> >>> What I think >>> is clear from the >>> anecdote that >>> you bring >>> about the >>> >>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>> that whatever >>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>> somewhere (i.e. being >>> someone at some >>> time in >>> some place) cannot be >>> INTENDED. And I think this >>> applies both to >>> designers and users, to those >>> who set things up for you to >>> experience and to >>> you, who could not foresee >>> what your experience was >>> going to turn you >>> into before you go through it. >>> >>> I think that >>> the big issue >>> that >>> you bring on >>> the table (to >>> continue >>> >>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>> to do with a >>> difference between physical >>> relations and social >>> relations, and >>> the idea >>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>> noticed that the relations >>> that are the >>> subject matter in physics >>> are not >>> the same as those that are >>> the subject >>> matter >>> in communication. He noticed >>> that physical relations >>> (relations >>> that are >>> the object of study of >>> physics) >>> transfer energy in direct >>> manners: a >>> billiard >>> ball hits another ball and we >>> can anticipate the exact >>> speed and >>> direction >>> that the second ball will take >>> based on the energy that >>> is in the >>> system ball >>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>> living beings, the things >>> are different. >>> Bateson explained, if we >>> kick a >>> pig's ass (I think he used >>> this somehow >>> bizarre example) the >>> reaction of >>> the pig is not accounted >>> for by the energy >>> that is contained in the kick, >>> at least not in a direct >>> manner. The >>> energy >>> that moves the pig is from a >>> different source. Before >>> Bateson, it was >>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>> mediation who would most >>> clearly state >>> that >>> social relations are not >>> direct, but mediated. >>> >>> So, how can >>> design go >>> about this? >>> If we, along >>> with Dewey and >>> >>> Vygotsky, consider >>> experience to be a >>> unity of >>> person and environment, and >>> we assume as well that >>> this is a >>> social (not >>> just individual) category, and >>> that how a situation is >>> experienced is >>> also >>> refracted through the social >>> relations within which we >>> engage, the most >>> designers can do is to foster >>> social relations go on, giving >>> afordances to >>> prcesses of signification, >>> without intending to embed >>> meanings. It is >>> about affordances/constraints, >>> but not about how to interpret >>> something, but >>> about going about >>> interpreting. I think. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 18:04 >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> So after >>> reading the >>> article and >>> the e-mail >>> discussion I'm >>> beginning >>> >>> to think there is a really >>> big issue >>> here that >>> I am trying to grapple with, >>> especially in terms of >>> boundary >>> objects (which >>> I admittedly do not >>> understand very well). And it relates >>> to the >>> metaphor of the table (both >>> as discussed by Larry and >>> Ingold as >>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>> is this, in >>> the museum should the >>> place be set up as >>> affordances, perceived >>> affordances, or >>> constraints? It seems the >>> museum in the study has >>> potential affordances for >>> the users. The >>> cultural historical moment >>> (unable to think of any >>> other word) of the >>> museum sets the context, >>> meaning >>> those walking through the >>> museum are >>> going to >>> be restricted by the >>> historical and cultural >>> boundaries >>> leading up >>> to the art work, along with >>> the expectations and needs >>> of the >>> individuals >>> moving through the museum, >>> but they will come across >>> objects/artifacts >>> that they think meets the >>> needs >>> >>> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jul 21 12:46:03 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 19:46:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1436978265012.14185@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD47F6@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1436986850063.14944@iped.uio.no> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD48BA@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what participants' orientations concerned. If they oriented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those questions. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Dear Alfredo and Rolf, There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this discussion. First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call it Activity Theory? Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Andy, all, I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). Any thoughts? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and one subject challenges that role and turns the object into its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. A number of examples spring to mind. * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are embraced by a despised group who take control of the word and assertively embrace it; * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before them rather than in shame); * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and read it, thus making the paper into a glorious organising tool; * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared object (the land); * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a symbol of India. In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when she introduced the term, but core point is that the ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a mediating artefact or the object of work (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according to context. In principle it is not the Object in the Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? > Henry > > >> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> Thanks Rolf! >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>> man-of-the-world. >>> Does that make better sense? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>> but also the ideological context. >>> >>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>> and regulations, communications resources, >>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>> the "boundary objects"? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> I think that a particular institution or >>> government system could potentially be a >>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>> >>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>> would say that one would have to justify the >>> utility of applying the concept to a >>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>> object within an institution. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Phew! >>> So would it be correct to describe the >>> government >>> institutions and political system are >>> "boundary objects"? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy - >>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>> and should >>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>> Thank you for >>> pointing that out. >>> >>> >>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>> suggestion that >>> Greg made in the other thread >>> suggesting we look >>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>> been familiar >>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>> after doing >>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>> found his >>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>> potentially >>> useful in dealing with some of my >>> questions.( >>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>> ) >>> >>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>> unexpected >>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>> >>> /The logic is that unexpected >>> metaphors arise >>> from the >>> need to create images when the >>> culture does >>> not have >>> them readily at hand. These images >>> join linguistic >>> content as growth points and >>> differentiate what >>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>> predicates, or >>> points of contrast in the >>> immediate ongoing >>> context of >>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>> precisely >>> because they >>> are outside the conventions of >>> language and >>> culture, >>> can capture abstractions in novel >>> ways and >>> provide the >>> fluidity of thought and language >>> that is the >>> essence >>> of ongoing discourse./ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>> Blunden >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>> achievement of >>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>> p. 131, >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>> wrote: >>> >>> Are we allowed to ask >>> questions about our >>> paper as >>> well? I hope so! >>> >>> For a little context -in our >>> paper, we >>> identified >>> particular kinds of >>> episodes in which participants >>> from different >>> disciplines seek coherence >>> and continuity of shared >>> representations >>> through >>> bodily action. These >>> actions include gesture, >>> movement and physical >>> performance linking the >>> present material artifacts to >>> objects of >>> design. >>> Most of these episodes >>> seem to involve some form of >>> improvisation, >>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>> characterize >>> these >>> aspects of the >>> interactions. In most cases, the >>> participants seem >>> to be searching for the >>> best words or material >>> representation to >>> convey a >>> particular intention - >>> when this becomes problematic >>> or limiting >>> - they >>> almost fall back on what >>> is available - these >>> improvised bodily >>> performances - as a way of >>> maintaining continuity, and of >>> inviting >>> co-participants into a shared and >>> imagined space. These bodily >>> actions don't >>> seem to >>> begin the proposals, but >>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>> participants. >>> >>> >>> I think there is something >>> really fascinating >>> about this kind of creativity >>> and resourcefulness in >>> interaction that >>> could be >>> explored more deeply - and >>> that I'm having trouble >>> articulating. >>> Maybe some >>> of you have some thoughts >>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>> we've talked >>> about this >>> a bit before so maybe you >>> can add a little clarity to my >>> question. >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Thank you very much for >>> the sketch of your >>> roots. I taught English in >>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>> for 5 years >>> back in >>> the early 70s, just before >>> Franco died. (He died the >>> day I >>> boarded the >>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>> and language are interesting, >>> especially where >>> language varieties meet. >>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>> from my >>> familiarity >>> with the music of Catalunya >>> and Mallorca that the speech >>> communities in >>> each of those places treasure >>> their unique languages >>> (Catalan and >>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>> commonality >>> vis-a-vis their >>> separateness from >>> Castilian >>> Spanish, the national language >>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>> see a parallel >>> between your work on boundary >>> objects, where individual >>> persons >>> collaborate >>> to create spaces, AND >>> boundary objects >>> "negotiated" by groups of >>> people who live in real >>> spaces. >>> I am thinking, among other >>> things, of >>> indigeneity, a big topic >>> here in New >>> Mexico, with so many >>> Native Americans. >>> Assymetries of power. >>> Bullying. >>> Testing and curriculum become >>> instruments of >>> war by other means. I hope my >>> tone does not distract >>> from, nor >>> diminish, the >>> optimism created by this >>> thread. Yet I think that >>> optimism is so >>> precious because of the >>> ground (the >>> world) of the dialog. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well, you could say >>> that I am partly >>> Catalan. I grew up in >>> the province >>> >>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>> language is >>> official language together >>> with >>> Castilian Spanish. >>> Although Valencia (the >>> county) and Catalonia are >>> different regional >>> counties, Catalan >>> is spoken >>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>> the Balear Islands. Some >>> call the three >>> together as the Catalan >>> Countries. >>> I don't like borders, but >>> I respect >>> and enjoy >>> cultural diversity. >>> >>> Standardized testing, >>> and the whole >>> assumptions behind it, >>> are an issue >>> >>> also in Spain and in >>> Catalonia; but >>> education >>> has been so battered during >>> the last years of right-wing >>> government that I >>> the debate have been more >>> about means and access >>> than about >>> contents and >>> aims. Which in some sense >>> may be good because it >>> moves the >>> debates away >>> from performance. But I have >>> been living outside of >>> Spain for eight >>> years >>> now, so I am not the best to >>> update you on this either. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>> The Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, >>> Yes, you have answered >>> my question >>> very >>> nicely! I especially >>> appreciate >>> >>> that you were willing to >>> wrestle with my >>> question, despite your lack of >>> familiarity with the >>> issues here in >>> the U.S. >>> Am I wrong, or are you >>> Catalan? In which case >>> your experience in >>> Catalunya would take you to a >>> different place in critiquing >>> schooling there, >>> though not necessarily >>> unconnected to yours and >>> Rolf's work on >>> boundary objects. I just >>> met for >>> the second day in a row >>> with a friend >>> who is >>> the liaison between our public >>> school district and a >>> children's science >>> museum called Explora. I >>> feel like >>> I'm swimming in this >>> thread, talk about a >>> mixed metaphor! >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>> at 12:18 AM, >>> Alfredo >>> Jornet Gil >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I am sorry, Henry, >>> but I am >>> not very >>> familiar with >>> high-stakes >>> >>> standardized testing (as >>> different to >>> standardized testing in >>> general) or >>> with common core (which I >>> quickly read >>> is an >>> issue in US). But I would say >>> that, if (school) >>> curricula were to be >>> consistent with the view of >>> education as the practice >>> of creating >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to >>> emerge--which is what >>> I was >>> suggesting in the >>> paragraph you >>> copy--curricula would not >>> be so much about >>> standardized contents, but >>> about >>> human sensitivities and >>> relations. So, >>> I would >>> say, no, standardized >>> testing is not in >>> principle in line >>> with what >>> I was trying to say. >>> >>> I was trying to >>> make a distinction >>> between trying to >>> design someone's >>> >>> particular experience, and >>> trying to >>> design >>> conditions for the development >>> of attitudes and >>> orientations. The >>> first is >>> likely impossible. The second >>> seems to make more sense. >>> >>> One may of course >>> wonder >>> whether those >>> attitudes and >>> orientations can >>> >>> be considered general, and >>> then form >>> part of >>> standardize measures instead >>> of the traditional >>> "contents and >>> skills". But >>> measuring assumes some >>> quantitative increment in >>> a particular >>> aspect >>> as the result of learning. >>> Growth and development, >>> however, are about >>> qualitative change. So, as >>> soon >>> as you start measuring you >>> would be >>> missing >>> growth and development. So, >>> again, no. I would not say >>> that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized testing is in >>> line >>> with what I was trying to say. >>> >>> I hope I have >>> answered your >>> question, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>> 07:48 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, >>> Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>> Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Alfredo, you say: >>> >>> "However, we >>> cannot aim at >>> determining >>> any particular >>> >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be said >>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>> intend to communicate the >>> curriculum >>> and make >>> it the content of the >>> students' experience in >>> the way we >>> intend. But >>> we can try to create the >>> conditions for certain >>> attitudes and >>> dispositions to emerge." >>> >>> Would you say that >>> high-stakes >>> standardized >>> testing is in >>> line with >>> >>> your construal of >>> curriculum design? >>> How about >>> common core? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jul 15, >>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks a lot >>> for the >>> clarifications. I see now >>> why it >>> may be said that >>> >>> designers can aim at >>> designing for >>> constrains >>> but not for affordances. I >>> see that this way of >>> talking is part of a >>> designers' way to get things >>> done, and that it may >>> indeed be an >>> effective >>> way to design for >>> place-making, as in the >>> example that >>> Michael >>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>> what we report in our >>> study is about >>> designers >>> talking about how spatial >>> features might afford some >>> experiences >>> in the >>> museum while constraining >>> others. >>> >>> I must admit, >>> however, that I >>> still consider >>> the distinction >>> >>> problematic from an >>> analytical perspective >>> whenever our object of >>> study is >>> experience, situated >>> action, or design as >>> situated practice. A more >>> correct >>> way to talk is that >>> affordances and >>> constrains >>> are the positive and >>> negative >>> sides/interpretations of a single >>> unitary category. As an actual >>> and concrete phenomenon, >>> walking into >>> a musuem >>> implies both affordances and >>> constrains at the same >>> time, whether >>> intended >>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>> whether other terminology, >>> such as >>> Ingold's >>> notion of "correspondence," >>> might be more appropriated >>> when we >>> talk about >>> how materials and actions >>> become entangled into >>> particular >>> trajectories. >>> >>> In any case, >>> and as Rolf >>> emphasizes, >>> what the >>> designers in >>> our study >>> >>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>> ways of being >>> in the >>> museum. Imagination versus >>> prediction may be an >>> interesting topic >>> emerging here for further >>> inquiry >>> into design work. >>> >>> Another >>> important (and >>> related) >>> issue that I >>> think is >>> emerging here >>> >>> has to do with the level >>> of generality at >>> which design intentions can be >>> expected to work (just as >>> Bateson >>> argued with >>> regard to prediction). At the >>> level of generic social >>> processes, and >>> given a >>> particular >>> cultural-historical >>> background, we as >>> designers may try to make some >>> generic situations more >>> likely to >>> occur than >>> others (facilitating that more >>> or less people end up >>> together in a given >>> place). However, we cannot >>> aim at >>> determining any particular >>> situation/experience. The >>> same may be >>> said about >>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>> communicate the >>> curriculum and make it the >>> content of the students' >>> experience in >>> the way >>> we intend. But we can try to >>> create the conditions for >>> certain >>> attitudes >>> and dispositions to emerge. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 23:30 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I think Rolf >>> may have >>> addressed >>> the question >>> of the >>> differences >>> >>> between affordances and >>> constraints in his >>> post. The way he described the >>> designers as possibly >>> setting up the >>> corner >>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>> was a >>> long time ago so I'm not >>> sure if this >>> is the >>> way it was or the way I >>> remember it, but let's >>> just believe >>> this is >>> the way it was. The painting, >>> I think there were three >>> were set up in a >>> corner off a main >>> corridor. The >>> lighting was dark, which >>> if you have >>> ever been >>> to MOMA is different, in >>> many other parts of the >>> museum there >>> is a good >>> deal of natural light (there >>> was this great fountain, I >>> wonder if it is >>> still there). The paintings >>> were on tripods rather >>> than hung on >>> the walls >>> and they were surrounded on >>> three sides by walls. All >>> of these I >>> think >>> would be considered restraints >>> - pushing me in to the >>> works rather than >>> stepping back away. It was >>> impossible for more than >>> two or three >>> people >>> to view the paintings at one >>> time and movement was >>> limited, so >>> there were >>> fewer chances for social >>> interactions (you were not >>> going to >>> pick up >>> anybody looking at Jackson >>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>> brooding, making >>> it more likely that viewers >>> would move towards internal >>> reflection. All >>> of these were constraints that >>> canalized perspectives and >>> feelings >>> viewing >>> the paintings. You really had >>> only two choices, you >>> moved in to the >>> paintings or you moved on, >>> which I >>> had done every previous >>> time coming >>> upon them. >>> >>> The painting >>> itself though >>> became >>> an >>> affordances, an object >>> at the >>> >>> nexus of my journey >>> through the >>> museum, where >>> I was in my life, and my >>> abilities to perceive the >>> painitings. This >>> was something that could >>> not be >>> designed I think because >>> nobody could >>> think >>> that moment was going to >>> happen. So then what is >>> a perceived >>> affordance. Way back when >>> there was >>> also a Manet room. It was >>> a round >>> room with >>> different variations of his >>> water lilies in a circle. >>> Almost the >>> exact >>> opposite in constraints it was >>> large, airy, a lot of >>> natural light. If you >>> were looking to brood you went >>> somewhere else. In the >>> middle of the >>> room was >>> a wooden structure (not an >>> obvious bench), but you >>> realized as random >>> colors dissolved into water >>> lilies that you wanted to >>> sit down. You >>> naturally moved to the >>> center of >>> the room and sat >>> (wondering if a guard >>> would >>> come and tell you it was >>> actually an important >>> piece of art and you >>> should get off). The designer >>> anticipates a desire to >>> soak in the >>> room, to >>> almost get dizzy in the >>> lights, and included in >>> the design the >>> piece >>> of wood that will have the >>> perceived affordance for >>> sitting, changing >>> your concept of time and >>> space. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> [mailto: >>> >>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On Behalf >>> Of Alfredo >>> >>> Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, >>> 2015 3:01 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Thanks Michael, >>> >>> I think we are >>> saying the same >>> things, >>> indeed, or at >>> least more or >>> >>> less. I am quite certain >>> that Bateson >>> referred >>> to energy, and that he used >>> the mentioned examples (or >>> similar >>> ones) to >>> show how the energy that moves >>> the pig is not a direct >>> transfer of energy >>> from the kick, whereas in the >>> case of the billiard >>> balls, the >>> movement of >>> one ball is caused by the >>> energy that the kicking >>> ball brings. I >>> might >>> be wrong in the context within >>> which Bateson was >>> discussing the >>> example, and >>> I see that your account is in >>> that regard is more >>> accurate. But the >>> point is >>> the same: you can not intend >>> the outcomes of a system >>> by addressing >>> only >>> its parts as if they were >>> connected directly, in a >>> linear causal >>> fashion; as if the whole >>> was the sum >>> of its parts. I do see a >>> link with >>> Vygotsky's >>> rejection of S-R and his >>> inclusion of a third >>> element that >>> transforms >>> the whole system. >>> >>> But I totally >>> agree with your >>> comments on design >>> intentions as they >>> >>> relate to ecology, and I, >>> as I know >>> also Rolf >>> does, also like very much the >>> notion of ecology to >>> address these issues. >>> >>> If I read you >>> correctly, and >>> citing Don >>> Norman (whose >>> work I >>> ignore), >>> >>> you suggest the >>> possibility that the >>> relations >>> between design intentions >>> and actual experience >>> could be thought >>> of in >>> terms of different levels? >>> That one thing is to >>> design for what is >>> general, but that we >>> cannot design >>> for the particular. Is >>> that right? If >>> so, I >>> think that Bateson had a >>> similar argument on >>> prediction, does >>> not him? >>> That we can predict on >>> general levels (e.g. >>> population), but >>> not at >>> the level of the particular >>> (e.g., individual). I >>> haven't gone >>> that way, >>> but seems a promising road to >>> consider this jumps >>> between levels of >>> generality or scales. >>> >>> Finally, I am >>> not sure if >>> I get >>> what you mean >>> when you say >>> that we can >>> >>> design for constrains but >>> not for >>> affordances. >>> I still see that the one >>> presupposes the other; you can >>> separate them >>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>> experience, a constrain is an >>> affordance and >>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>> the road has any inherent >>> constrain >>> that could >>> not be an affordance at the >>> same time. Of course, if >>> you take the >>> normative stance that >>> roads are for >>> cars driving through them, >>> you may be >>> right. >>> But if we think of roads as >>> asphalt on the ground, as >>> yet more >>> ground only >>> of a different shape, >>> texture, and color, how is >>> that a >>> constrain >>> but not an affordance? Or an >>> affordance but not a >>> constrain? Of course, >>> culture constrains once >>> you are >>> within the road and you >>> are driving. >>> But then, >>> the constrain is not in the >>> road, as you seem to >>> suggest, but in the >>> journey; in the journeyman >>> that >>> carries some cultural way >>> of orienting and >>> affectively relating to its >>> environment so that particular >>> constrains are >>> taken for granted despite the >>> possibility of being >>> otherwise. But I >>> might >>> not have thought it well/long >>> enough and of course I >>> might be wrong. >>> I would >>> like to understand your >>> position here better. >>> >>> Thanks! >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 20:32 >>> To: eXtended Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> I have been >>> reading Bateson >>> through a >>> cybernetics lens >>> lately >>> (Bateson >>> >>> along with Lewin and his >>> wife Margaret >>> Mead >>> were part of the original >>> Sears >>> conferences) and I'm not >>> sure that's >>> right or >>> I am victim to the "when you >>> have a hammer, everything >>> looks like a >>> nail" >>> but.... >>> >>> I think >>> Bateson was >>> arguing with >>> those looking >>> to apply the >>> more >>> >>> physical/mathematical >>> origins of >>> cybernetics >>> to human or really (pace the >>> pig story) and system that >>> moves >>> beyond simple >>> physical feedback loops. I >>> think his larger point is that >>> everything has >>> a response within the larger >>> feedback system that >>> exists but we >>> cannot go - >>> what Bateson refers to as >>> MIND. Attempts to create >>> and control >>> feedback >>> loops, to try and design a >>> system for specific types >>> of feedback is a >>> dangerous proposition. >>> >>> This I think >>> is the reason >>> that >>> affordances >>> really can't >>> be designed >>> >>> into an ecology, only a >>> recognition of the >>> context in which actions are >>> taking place (and I say >>> this having no >>> idea >>> what Gibson's relationship to >>> cybernetics was). Taking >>> Larry's >>> example of >>> the girl it is perhaps also >>> likely that the girl could >>> have taken the >>> fixing of hair as a >>> criticism, an >>> attack, and it might have >>> destroyed her >>> confidence. Both make >>> sense in >>> terms of feedback loops, >>> but only ad >>> hoc. So >>> if a designer does in some >>> way design that experience >>> into the >>> action, >>> even without meaning they are >>> taking a large chance, >>> because they do not >>> know the trajectory it will >>> take. We simply need >>> objects that are >>> part of >>> our journey, part of the >>> larger context but not >>> designed for >>> purpose, >>> for feedback. There is no >>> assumption about trajectory. >>> >>> I think Don >>> Norman sort of >>> muddied >>> the waters on >>> this, but in an >>> >>> interesting way. That we >>> can assume >>> people >>> are going to want to do >>> certain >>> things in a very general >>> environment - >>> when you enter a dark room >>> you want >>> light, so it is possible >>> to design objects >>> that meet that need that >>> we are >>> more likely to find in the >>> moment that >>> we need >>> them. But I think that is >>> very different from the >>> idea of >>> specifically >>> guiding feedback loops that >>> even take generalized >>> experience in a >>> certain >>> direction. I am thinking >>> about Dewey, and he makes >>> a similar >>> argument >>> to Bateson with his concept of >>> transactions. Although he >>> does seem >>> to think >>> that it is possible to create >>> a larger field of action >>> so we can see at >>> least local >>> interrelationships. >>> But his idea of experience >>> is also >>> very much >>> one of discovery based on >>> needs at the immediate >>> moment - social >>> relations act as a vehicle >>> for these >>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>> course was writing >>> before Gibson and for most >>> of his >>> life before cybernetics. I also >>> wonder what >>> he thought of cybernetics). >>> >>> I think I >>> disagree with you, >>> constraints >>> are not about the >>> journey but >>> >>> about the road. If you >>> build a road >>> on the >>> side of the river you are >>> constrained because no >>> matter what, >>> you cannot >>> turn right. Your direction >>> has already been partially >>> determined >>> by the >>> designer of the road. But the >>> mistake we make is in >>> thinking that also >>> controls the trajectory of the >>> individual's journey. The >>> effect of >>> designers >>> on trajectories of action is >>> important, but limited. >>> >>> The primary >>> place that >>> designers >>> have influence on >>> affordances it >>> >>> seems to me is by being >>> able to create a >>> unique context for an >>> individual's >>> and a group's that limit >>> possible >>> trajectories >>> on an individual's journey. >>> But we should never >>> mistake those >>> constraints >>> for affordances. I think >>> Bateson might argue it is >>> hubris to do so. >>> Perhaps this is what you are >>> saying Alfredo. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original >>> Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>] On >>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> >>> Sent: >>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>> 12:38 PM >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> I'd like to >>> follow up on >>> Michael's >>> post by asking >>> a question: >>> Are not >>> >>> affordances presupposed by >>> constraints >>> and are >>> not constraints presupposed >>> by affordances? If so, I >>> would wonder >>> whether >>> it makes sense to ask whether >>> museums should be designed for >>> affordances and >>> constraints. >>> >>> What I think >>> is clear from the >>> anecdote that >>> you bring >>> about the >>> >>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>> that whatever >>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>> somewhere (i.e. being >>> someone at some >>> time in >>> some place) cannot be >>> INTENDED. And I think this >>> applies both to >>> designers and users, to those >>> who set things up for you to >>> experience and to >>> you, who could not foresee >>> what your experience was >>> going to turn you >>> into before you go through it. >>> >>> I think that >>> the big issue >>> that >>> you bring on >>> the table (to >>> continue >>> >>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>> to do with a >>> difference between physical >>> relations and social >>> relations, and >>> the idea >>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>> noticed that the relations >>> that are the >>> subject matter in physics >>> are not >>> the same as those that are >>> the subject >>> matter >>> in communication. He noticed >>> that physical relations >>> (relations >>> that are >>> the object of study of >>> physics) >>> transfer energy in direct >>> manners: a >>> billiard >>> ball hits another ball and we >>> can anticipate the exact >>> speed and >>> direction >>> that the second ball will take >>> based on the energy that >>> is in the >>> system ball >>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>> living beings, the things >>> are different. >>> Bateson explained, if we >>> kick a >>> pig's ass (I think he used >>> this somehow >>> bizarre example) the >>> reaction of >>> the pig is not accounted >>> for by the energy >>> that is contained in the kick, >>> at least not in a direct >>> manner. The >>> energy >>> that moves the pig is from a >>> different source. Before >>> Bateson, it was >>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>> mediation who would most >>> clearly state >>> that >>> social relations are not >>> direct, but mediated. >>> >>> So, how can >>> design go >>> about this? >>> If we, along >>> with Dewey and >>> >>> Vygotsky, consider >>> experience to be a >>> unity of >>> person and environment, and >>> we assume as well that >>> this is a >>> social (not >>> just individual) category, and >>> that how a situation is >>> experienced is >>> also >>> refracted through the social >>> relations within which we >>> engage, the most >>> designers can do is to foster >>> social relations go on, giving >>> afordances to >>> prcesses of signification, >>> without intending to embed >>> meanings. It is >>> about affordances/constraints, >>> but not about how to interpret >>> something, but >>> about going about >>> interpreting. I think. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> on >>> behalf of >>> Glassman, Michael >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Sent: 15 July >>> 2015 18:04 >>> To: Rolf >>> Steier; eXtended >>> Mind, >>> Culture, Activity >>> Subject: >>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>> Emergence of >>> Boundary Objects >>> >>> So after >>> reading the >>> article and >>> the e-mail >>> discussion I'm >>> beginning >>> >>> to think there is a really >>> big issue >>> here that >>> I am trying to grapple with, >>> especially in terms of >>> boundary >>> objects (which >>> I admittedly do not >>> understand very well). And it relates >>> to the >>> metaphor of the table (both >>> as discussed by Larry and >>> Ingold as >>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>> is this, in >>> the museum should the >>> place be set up as >>> affordances, perceived >>> affordances, or >>> constraints? It seems the >>> museum in the study has >>> potential affordances for >>> the users. The >>> cultural historical moment >>> (unable to think of any >>> other word) of the >>> museum sets the context, >>> meaning >>> those walking through the >>> museum are >>> going to >>> be restricted by the >>> historical and cultural >>> boundaries >>> leading up >>> to the art work, along with >>> the expectations and needs >>> of the >>> individuals >>> moving through the museum, >>> but they will come across >>> objects/artifacts >>> that they think meets the >>> needs >>> >>> > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Jul 21 23:31:51 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:31:51 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> References: <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no>, <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some distinctions in this field ... we have at least three different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate uses of the English word, but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent some different terms. The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the triangle. Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what is motivating all the members of the design team when they sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use Hegel's apt terminology here. Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is almost as bad in Russian and German, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). > > As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. > > I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those questions. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this discussion. > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call it Activity Theory? > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Andy, all, > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. > > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). > Any thoughts? > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some > role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and > one subject challenges that role and turns the object into > its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. > A number of examples spring to mind. > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are > embraced by a despised group who take control of the > word and assertively embrace it; > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before > them rather than in shame); > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > organising tool; > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared > object (the land); > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a > symbol of India. > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > mediating artefact or the object of work > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? >> Henry >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>> Thanks Rolf! >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>>> man-of-the-world. >>>> Does that make better sense? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>>> but also the ideological context. >>>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>>> and regulations, communications resources, >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> >>>> I think that a particular institution or >>>> government system could potentially be a >>>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>>> >>>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>>> would say that one would have to justify the >>>> utility of applying the concept to a >>>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>>> object within an institution. >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> >>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Phew! >>>> So would it be correct to describe the >>>> government >>>> institutions and political system are >>>> "boundary objects"? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy - >>>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>>> and should >>>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>>> Thank you for >>>> pointing that out. >>>> >>>> >>>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>>> suggestion that >>>> Greg made in the other thread >>>> suggesting we look >>>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>>> been familiar >>>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>>> after doing >>>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>>> found his >>>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>>> potentially >>>> useful in dealing with some of my >>>> questions.( >>>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>>> ) >>>> >>>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>>> unexpected >>>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>>> >>>> /The logic is that unexpected >>>> metaphors arise >>>> from the >>>> need to create images when the >>>> culture does >>>> not have >>>> them readily at hand. These images >>>> join linguistic >>>> content as growth points and >>>> differentiate what >>>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>>> predicates, or >>>> points of contrast in the >>>> immediate ongoing >>>> context of >>>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>>> precisely >>>> because they >>>> are outside the conventions of >>>> language and >>>> culture, >>>> can capture abstractions in novel >>>> ways and >>>> provide the >>>> fluidity of thought and language >>>> that is the >>>> essence >>>> of ongoing discourse./ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>>> Blunden >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>>> achievement of >>>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>>> p. 131, >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Are we allowed to ask >>>> questions about our >>>> paper as >>>> well? I hope so! >>>> >>>> For a little context -in our >>>> paper, we >>>> identified >>>> particular kinds of >>>> episodes in which participants >>>> from different >>>> disciplines seek coherence >>>> and continuity of shared >>>> representations >>>> through >>>> bodily action. These >>>> actions include gesture, >>>> movement and physical >>>> performance linking the >>>> present material artifacts to >>>> objects of >>>> design. >>>> Most of these episodes >>>> seem to involve some form of >>>> improvisation, >>>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>>> characterize >>>> these >>>> aspects of the >>>> interactions. In most cases, the >>>> participants seem >>>> to be searching for the >>>> best words or material >>>> representation to >>>> convey a >>>> particular intention - >>>> when this becomes problematic >>>> or limiting >>>> - they >>>> almost fall back on what >>>> is available - these >>>> improvised bodily >>>> performances - as a way of >>>> maintaining continuity, and of >>>> inviting >>>> co-participants into a shared and >>>> imagined space. These bodily >>>> actions don't >>>> seem to >>>> begin the proposals, but >>>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>>> participants. >>>> >>>> >>>> I think there is something >>>> really fascinating >>>> about this kind of creativity >>>> and resourcefulness in >>>> interaction that >>>> could be >>>> explored more deeply - and >>>> that I'm having trouble >>>> articulating. >>>> Maybe some >>>> of you have some thoughts >>>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>>> we've talked >>>> about this >>>> a bit before so maybe you >>>> can add a little clarity to my >>>> question. >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Alfredo, >>>> Thank you very much for >>>> the sketch of your >>>> roots. I taught English in >>>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>>> for 5 years >>>> back in >>>> the early 70s, just before >>>> Franco died. (He died the >>>> day I >>>> boarded the >>>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>>> and language are interesting, >>>> especially where >>>> language varieties meet. >>>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>>> from my >>>> familiarity >>>> with the music of Catalunya >>>> and Mallorca that the speech >>>> communities in >>>> each of those places treasure >>>> their unique languages >>>> (Catalan and >>>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>>> commonality >>>> vis-a-vis their >>>> separateness from >>>> Castilian >>>> Spanish, the national language >>>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>>> see a parallel >>>> between your work on boundary >>>> objects, where individual >>>> persons >>>> collaborate >>>> to create spaces, AND >>>> boundary objects >>>> "negotiated" by groups of >>>> people who live in real >>>> spaces. >>>> I am thinking, among other >>>> things, of >>>> indigeneity, a big topic >>>> here in New >>>> Mexico, with so many >>>> Native Americans. >>>> Assymetries of power. >>>> Bullying. >>>> Testing and curriculum become >>>> instruments of >>>> war by other means. I hope my >>>> tone does not distract >>>> from, nor >>>> diminish, the >>>> optimism created by this >>>> thread. Yet I think that >>>> optimism is so >>>> precious because of the >>>> ground (the >>>> world) of the dialog. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, you could say >>>> that I am partly >>>> Catalan. I grew up in >>>> the province >>>> >>>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>>> language is >>>> official language together >>>> with >>>> Castilian Spanish. >>>> Although Valencia (the >>>> county) and Catalonia are >>>> different regional >>>> counties, Catalan >>>> is spoken >>>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>>> the Balear Islands. Some >>>> call the three >>>> together as the Catalan >>>> Countries. >>>> I don't like borders, but >>>> I respect >>>> and enjoy >>>> cultural diversity. >>>> >>>> Standardized testing, >>>> and the whole >>>> assumptions behind it, >>>> are an issue >>>> >>>> also in Spain and in >>>> Catalonia; but >>>> education >>>> has been so battered during >>>> the last years of right-wing >>>> government that I >>>> the debate have been more >>>> about means and access >>>> than about >>>> contents and >>>> aims. Which in some sense >>>> may be good because it >>>> moves the >>>> debates away >>>> from performance. But I have >>>> been living outside of >>>> Spain for eight >>>> years >>>> now, so I am not the best to >>>> update you on this either. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>> The Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Alfredo, >>>> Yes, you have answered >>>> my question >>>> very >>>> nicely! I especially >>>> appreciate >>>> >>>> that you were willing to >>>> wrestle with my >>>> question, despite your lack of >>>> familiarity with the >>>> issues here in >>>> the U.S. >>>> Am I wrong, or are you >>>> Catalan? In which case >>>> your experience in >>>> Catalunya would take you to a >>>> different place in critiquing >>>> schooling there, >>>> though not necessarily >>>> unconnected to yours and >>>> Rolf's work on >>>> boundary objects. I just >>>> met for >>>> the second day in a row >>>> with a friend >>>> who is >>>> the liaison between our public >>>> school district and a >>>> children's science >>>> museum called Explora. I >>>> feel like >>>> I'm swimming in this >>>> thread, talk about a >>>> mixed metaphor! >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>>> at 12:18 AM, >>>> Alfredo >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I am sorry, Henry, >>>> but I am >>>> not very >>>> familiar with >>>> high-stakes >>>> >>>> standardized testing (as >>>> different to >>>> standardized testing in >>>> general) or >>>> with common core (which I >>>> quickly read >>>> is an >>>> issue in US). But I would say >>>> that, if (school) >>>> curricula were to be >>>> consistent with the view of >>>> education as the practice >>>> of creating >>>> conditions for certain >>>> attitudes and >>>> dispositions to >>>> emerge--which is what >>>> I was >>>> suggesting in the >>>> paragraph you >>>> copy--curricula would not >>>> be so much about >>>> standardized contents, but >>>> about >>>> human sensitivities and >>>> relations. So, >>>> I would >>>> say, no, standardized >>>> testing is not in >>>> principle in line >>>> with what >>>> I was trying to say. >>>> >>>> I was trying to >>>> make a distinction >>>> between trying to >>>> design someone's >>>> >>>> particular experience, and >>>> trying to >>>> design >>>> conditions for the development >>>> of attitudes and >>>> orientations. The >>>> first is >>>> likely impossible. The second >>>> seems to make more sense. >>>> >>>> One may of course >>>> wonder >>>> whether those >>>> attitudes and >>>> orientations can >>>> >>>> be considered general, and >>>> then form >>>> part of >>>> standardize measures instead >>>> of the traditional >>>> "contents and >>>> skills". But >>>> measuring assumes some >>>> quantitative increment in >>>> a particular >>>> aspect >>>> as the result of learning. >>>> Growth and development, >>>> however, are about >>>> qualitative change. So, as >>>> soon >>>> as you start measuring you >>>> would be >>>> missing >>>> growth and development. So, >>>> again, no. I would not say >>>> that >>>> high-stakes >>>> standardized testing is in >>>> line >>>> with what I was trying to say. >>>> >>>> I hope I have >>>> answered your >>>> question, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>>> 07:48 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, >>>> Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>> Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Alfredo, you say: >>>> >>>> "However, we >>>> cannot aim at >>>> determining >>>> any particular >>>> >>>> situation/experience. The >>>> same may be said >>>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>>> intend to communicate the >>>> curriculum >>>> and make >>>> it the content of the >>>> students' experience in >>>> the way we >>>> intend. But >>>> we can try to create the >>>> conditions for certain >>>> attitudes and >>>> dispositions to emerge." >>>> >>>> Would you say that >>>> high-stakes >>>> standardized >>>> testing is in >>>> line with >>>> >>>> your construal of >>>> curriculum design? >>>> How about >>>> common core? >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 15, >>>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks a lot >>>> for the >>>> clarifications. I see now >>>> why it >>>> may be said that >>>> >>>> designers can aim at >>>> designing for >>>> constrains >>>> but not for affordances. I >>>> see that this way of >>>> talking is part of a >>>> designers' way to get things >>>> done, and that it may >>>> indeed be an >>>> effective >>>> way to design for >>>> place-making, as in the >>>> example that >>>> Michael >>>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>>> what we report in our >>>> study is about >>>> designers >>>> talking about how spatial >>>> features might afford some >>>> experiences >>>> in the >>>> museum while constraining >>>> others. >>>> >>>> I must admit, >>>> however, that I >>>> still consider >>>> the distinction >>>> >>>> problematic from an >>>> analytical perspective >>>> whenever our object of >>>> study is >>>> experience, situated >>>> action, or design as >>>> situated practice. A more >>>> correct >>>> way to talk is that >>>> affordances and >>>> constrains >>>> are the positive and >>>> negative >>>> sides/interpretations of a single >>>> unitary category. As an actual >>>> and concrete phenomenon, >>>> walking into >>>> a musuem >>>> implies both affordances and >>>> constrains at the same >>>> time, whether >>>> intended >>>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>>> whether other terminology, >>>> such as >>>> Ingold's >>>> notion of "correspondence," >>>> might be more appropriated >>>> when we >>>> talk about >>>> how materials and actions >>>> become entangled into >>>> particular >>>> trajectories. >>>> >>>> In any case, >>>> and as Rolf >>>> emphasizes, >>>> what the >>>> designers in >>>> our study >>>> >>>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>>> ways of being >>>> in the >>>> museum. Imagination versus >>>> prediction may be an >>>> interesting topic >>>> emerging here for further >>>> inquiry >>>> into design work. >>>> >>>> Another >>>> important (and >>>> related) >>>> issue that I >>>> think is >>>> emerging here >>>> >>>> has to do with the level >>>> of generality at >>>> which design intentions can be >>>> expected to work (just as >>>> Bateson >>>> argued with >>>> regard to prediction). At the >>>> level of generic social >>>> processes, and >>>> given a >>>> particular >>>> cultural-historical >>>> background, we as >>>> designers may try to make some >>>> generic situations more >>>> likely to >>>> occur than >>>> others (facilitating that more >>>> or less people end up >>>> together in a given >>>> place). However, we cannot >>>> aim at >>>> determining any particular >>>> situation/experience. The >>>> same may be >>>> said about >>>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>>> communicate the >>>> curriculum and make it the >>>> content of the students' >>>> experience in >>>> the way >>>> we intend. But we can try to >>>> create the conditions for >>>> certain >>>> attitudes >>>> and dispositions to emerge. >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 23:30 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>> >>>> I think Rolf >>>> may have >>>> addressed >>>> the question >>>> of the >>>> differences >>>> >>>> between affordances and >>>> constraints in his >>>> post. The way he described the >>>> designers as possibly >>>> setting up the >>>> corner >>>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>>> was a >>>> long time ago so I'm not >>>> sure if this >>>> is the >>>> way it was or the way I >>>> remember it, but let's >>>> just believe >>>> this is >>>> the way it was. The painting, >>>> I think there were three >>>> were set up in a >>>> corner off a main >>>> corridor. The >>>> lighting was dark, which >>>> if you have >>>> ever been >>>> to MOMA is different, in >>>> many other parts of the >>>> museum there >>>> is a good >>>> deal of natural light (there >>>> was this great fountain, I >>>> wonder if it is >>>> still there). The paintings >>>> were on tripods rather >>>> than hung on >>>> the walls >>>> and they were surrounded on >>>> three sides by walls. All >>>> of these I >>>> think >>>> would be considered restraints >>>> - pushing me in to the >>>> works rather than >>>> stepping back away. It was >>>> impossible for more than >>>> two or three >>>> people >>>> to view the paintings at one >>>> time and movement was >>>> limited, so >>>> there were >>>> fewer chances for social >>>> interactions (you were not >>>> going to >>>> pick up >>>> anybody looking at Jackson >>>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>>> brooding, making >>>> it more likely that viewers >>>> would move towards internal >>>> reflection. All >>>> of these were constraints that >>>> canalized perspectives and >>>> feelings >>>> viewing >>>> the paintings. You really had >>>> only two choices, you >>>> moved in to the >>>> paintings or you moved on, >>>> which I >>>> had done every previous >>>> time coming >>>> upon them. >>>> >>>> The painting >>>> itself though >>>> became >>>> an >>>> affordances, an object >>>> at the >>>> >>>> nexus of my journey >>>> through the >>>> museum, where >>>> I was in my life, and my >>>> abilities to perceive the >>>> painitings. This >>>> was something that could >>>> not be >>>> designed I think because >>>> nobody could >>>> think >>>> that moment was going to >>>> happen. So then what is >>>> a perceived >>>> affordance. Way back when >>>> there was >>>> also a Manet room. It was >>>> a round >>>> room with >>>> different variations of his >>>> water lilies in a circle. >>>> Almost the >>>> exact >>>> opposite in constraints it was >>>> large, airy, a lot of >>>> natural light. If you >>>> were looking to brood you went >>>> somewhere else. In the >>>> middle of the >>>> room was >>>> a wooden structure (not an >>>> obvious bench), but you >>>> realized as random >>>> colors dissolved into water >>>> lilies that you wanted to >>>> sit down. You >>>> naturally moved to the >>>> center of >>>> the room and sat >>>> (wondering if a guard >>>> would >>>> come and tell you it was >>>> actually an important >>>> piece of art and you >>>> should get off). The designer >>>> anticipates a desire to >>>> soak in the >>>> room, to >>>> almost get dizzy in the >>>> lights, and included in >>>> the design the >>>> piece >>>> of wood that will have the >>>> perceived affordance for >>>> sitting, changing >>>> your concept of time and >>>> space. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original >>>> Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> [mailto: >>>> >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>] On Behalf >>>> Of Alfredo >>>> >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> Sent: >>>> Wednesday, July 15, >>>> 2015 3:01 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Thanks Michael, >>>> >>>> I think we are >>>> saying the same >>>> things, >>>> indeed, or at >>>> least more or >>>> >>>> less. I am quite certain >>>> that Bateson >>>> referred >>>> to energy, and that he used >>>> the mentioned examples (or >>>> similar >>>> ones) to >>>> show how the energy that moves >>>> the pig is not a direct >>>> transfer of energy >>>> from the kick, whereas in the >>>> case of the billiard >>>> balls, the >>>> movement of >>>> one ball is caused by the >>>> energy that the kicking >>>> ball brings. I >>>> might >>>> be wrong in the context within >>>> which Bateson was >>>> discussing the >>>> example, and >>>> I see that your account is in >>>> that regard is more >>>> accurate. But the >>>> point is >>>> the same: you can not intend >>>> the outcomes of a system >>>> by addressing >>>> only >>>> its parts as if they were >>>> connected directly, in a >>>> linear causal >>>> fashion; as if the whole >>>> was the sum >>>> of its parts. I do see a >>>> link with >>>> Vygotsky's >>>> rejection of S-R and his >>>> inclusion of a third >>>> element that >>>> transforms >>>> the whole system. >>>> >>>> But I totally >>>> agree with your >>>> comments on design >>>> intentions as they >>>> >>>> relate to ecology, and I, >>>> as I know >>>> also Rolf >>>> does, also like very much the >>>> notion of ecology to >>>> address these issues. >>>> >>>> If I read you >>>> correctly, and >>>> citing Don >>>> Norman (whose >>>> work I >>>> ignore), >>>> >>>> you suggest the >>>> possibility that the >>>> relations >>>> between design intentions >>>> and actual experience >>>> could be thought >>>> of in >>>> terms of different levels? >>>> That one thing is to >>>> design for what is >>>> general, but that we >>>> cannot design >>>> for the particular. Is >>>> that right? If >>>> so, I >>>> think that Bateson had a >>>> similar argument on >>>> prediction, does >>>> not him? >>>> That we can predict on >>>> general levels (e.g. >>>> population), but >>>> not at >>>> the level of the particular >>>> (e.g., individual). I >>>> haven't gone >>>> that way, >>>> but seems a promising road to >>>> consider this jumps >>>> between levels of >>>> generality or scales. >>>> >>>> Finally, I am >>>> not sure if >>>> I get >>>> what you mean >>>> when you say >>>> that we can >>>> >>>> design for constrains but >>>> not for >>>> affordances. >>>> I still see that the one >>>> presupposes the other; you can >>>> separate them >>>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>>> experience, a constrain is an >>>> affordance and >>>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>>> the road has any inherent >>>> constrain >>>> that could >>>> not be an affordance at the >>>> same time. Of course, if >>>> you take the >>>> normative stance that >>>> roads are for >>>> cars driving through them, >>>> you may be >>>> right. >>>> But if we think of roads as >>>> asphalt on the ground, as >>>> yet more >>>> ground only >>>> of a different shape, >>>> texture, and color, how is >>>> that a >>>> constrain >>>> but not an affordance? Or an >>>> affordance but not a >>>> constrain? Of course, >>>> culture constrains once >>>> you are >>>> within the road and you >>>> are driving. >>>> But then, >>>> the constrain is not in the >>>> road, as you seem to >>>> suggest, but in the >>>> journey; in the journeyman >>>> that >>>> carries some cultural way >>>> of orienting and >>>> affectively relating to its >>>> environment so that particular >>>> constrains are >>>> taken for granted despite the >>>> possibility of being >>>> otherwise. But I >>>> might >>>> not have thought it well/long >>>> enough and of course I >>>> might be wrong. >>>> I would >>>> like to understand your >>>> position here better. >>>> >>>> Thanks! >>>> Alfredo >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 20:32 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>> >>>> I have been >>>> reading Bateson >>>> through a >>>> cybernetics lens >>>> lately >>>> (Bateson >>>> >>>> along with Lewin and his >>>> wife Margaret >>>> Mead >>>> were part of the original >>>> Sears >>>> conferences) and I'm not >>>> sure that's >>>> right or >>>> I am victim to the "when you >>>> have a hammer, everything >>>> looks like a >>>> nail" >>>> but.... >>>> >>>> I think >>>> Bateson was >>>> arguing with >>>> those looking >>>> to apply the >>>> more >>>> >>>> physical/mathematical >>>> origins of >>>> cybernetics >>>> to human or really (pace the >>>> pig story) and system that >>>> moves >>>> beyond simple >>>> physical feedback loops. I >>>> think his larger point is that >>>> everything has >>>> a response within the larger >>>> feedback system that >>>> exists but we >>>> cannot go - >>>> what Bateson refers to as >>>> MIND. Attempts to create >>>> and control >>>> feedback >>>> loops, to try and design a >>>> system for specific types >>>> of feedback is a >>>> dangerous proposition. >>>> >>>> This I think >>>> is the reason >>>> that >>>> affordances >>>> really can't >>>> be designed >>>> >>>> into an ecology, only a >>>> recognition of the >>>> context in which actions are >>>> taking place (and I say >>>> this having no >>>> idea >>>> what Gibson's relationship to >>>> cybernetics was). Taking >>>> Larry's >>>> example of >>>> the girl it is perhaps also >>>> likely that the girl could >>>> have taken the >>>> fixing of hair as a >>>> criticism, an >>>> attack, and it might have >>>> destroyed her >>>> confidence. Both make >>>> sense in >>>> terms of feedback loops, >>>> but only ad >>>> hoc. So >>>> if a designer does in some >>>> way design that experience >>>> into the >>>> action, >>>> even without meaning they are >>>> taking a large chance, >>>> because they do not >>>> know the trajectory it will >>>> take. We simply need >>>> objects that are >>>> part of >>>> our journey, part of the >>>> larger context but not >>>> designed for >>>> purpose, >>>> for feedback. There is no >>>> assumption about trajectory. >>>> >>>> I think Don >>>> Norman sort of >>>> muddied >>>> the waters on >>>> this, but in an >>>> >>>> interesting way. That we >>>> can assume >>>> people >>>> are going to want to do >>>> certain >>>> things in a very general >>>> environment - >>>> when you enter a dark room >>>> you want >>>> light, so it is possible >>>> to design objects >>>> that meet that need that >>>> we are >>>> more likely to find in the >>>> moment that >>>> we need >>>> them. But I think that is >>>> very different from the >>>> idea of >>>> specifically >>>> guiding feedback loops that >>>> even take generalized >>>> experience in a >>>> certain >>>> direction. I am thinking >>>> about Dewey, and he makes >>>> a similar >>>> argument >>>> to Bateson with his concept of >>>> transactions. Although he >>>> does seem >>>> to think >>>> that it is possible to create >>>> a larger field of action >>>> so we can see at >>>> least local >>>> interrelationships. >>>> But his idea of experience >>>> is also >>>> very much >>>> one of discovery based on >>>> needs at the immediate >>>> moment - social >>>> relations act as a vehicle >>>> for these >>>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>>> course was writing >>>> before Gibson and for most >>>> of his >>>> life before cybernetics. I also >>>> wonder what >>>> he thought of cybernetics). >>>> >>>> I think I >>>> disagree with you, >>>> constraints >>>> are not about the >>>> journey but >>>> >>>> about the road. If you >>>> build a road >>>> on the >>>> side of the river you are >>>> constrained because no >>>> matter what, >>>> you cannot >>>> turn right. Your direction >>>> has already been partially >>>> determined >>>> by the >>>> designer of the road. But the >>>> mistake we make is in >>>> thinking that also >>>> controls the trajectory of the >>>> individual's journey. The >>>> effect of >>>> designers >>>> on trajectories of action is >>>> important, but limited. >>>> >>>> The primary >>>> place that >>>> designers >>>> have influence on >>>> affordances it >>>> >>>> seems to me is by being >>>> able to create a >>>> unique context for an >>>> individual's >>>> and a group's that limit >>>> possible >>>> trajectories >>>> on an individual's journey. >>>> But we should never >>>> mistake those >>>> constraints >>>> for affordances. I think >>>> Bateson might argue it is >>>> hubris to do so. >>>> Perhaps this is what you are >>>> saying Alfredo. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original >>>> Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>] On >>>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> Sent: >>>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>>> 12:38 PM >>>> To: Rolf >>>> Steier; eXtended >>>> Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> I'd like to >>>> follow up on >>>> Michael's >>>> post by asking >>>> a question: >>>> Are not >>>> >>>> affordances presupposed by >>>> constraints >>>> and are >>>> not constraints presupposed >>>> by affordances? If so, I >>>> would wonder >>>> whether >>>> it makes sense to ask whether >>>> museums should be designed for >>>> affordances and >>>> constraints. >>>> >>>> What I think >>>> is clear from the >>>> anecdote that >>>> you bring >>>> about the >>>> >>>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>>> that whatever >>>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>>> somewhere (i.e. being >>>> someone at some >>>> time in >>>> some place) cannot be >>>> INTENDED. And I think this >>>> applies both to >>>> designers and users, to those >>>> who set things up for you to >>>> experience and to >>>> you, who could not foresee >>>> what your experience was >>>> going to turn you >>>> into before you go through it. >>>> >>>> I think that >>>> the big issue >>>> that >>>> you bring on >>>> the table (to >>>> continue >>>> >>>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>>> to do with a >>>> difference between physical >>>> relations and social >>>> relations, and >>>> the idea >>>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>>> noticed that the relations >>>> that are the >>>> subject matter in physics >>>> are not >>>> the same as those that are >>>> the subject >>>> matter >>>> in communication. He noticed >>>> that physical relations >>>> (relations >>>> that are >>>> the object of study of >>>> physics) >>>> transfer energy in direct >>>> manners: a >>>> billiard >>>> ball hits another ball and we >>>> can anticipate the exact >>>> speed and >>>> direction >>>> that the second ball will take >>>> based on the energy that >>>> is in the >>>> system ball >>>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>>> living beings, the things >>>> are different. >>>> Bateson explained, if we >>>> kick a >>>> pig's ass (I think he used >>>> this somehow >>>> bizarre example) the >>>> reaction of >>>> the pig is not accounted >>>> for by the energy >>>> that is contained in the kick, >>>> at least not in a direct >>>> manner. The >>>> energy >>>> that moves the pig is from a >>>> different source. Before >>>> Bateson, it was >>>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>>> mediation who would most >>>> clearly state >>>> that >>>> social relations are not >>>> direct, but mediated. >>>> >>>> So, how can >>>> design go >>>> about this? >>>> If we, along >>>> with Dewey and >>>> >>>> Vygotsky, consider >>>> experience to be a >>>> unity of >>>> person and environment, and >>>> we assume as well that >>>> this is a >>>> social (not >>>> just individual) category, and >>>> that how a situation is >>>> experienced is >>>> also >>>> refracted through the social >>>> relations within which we >>>> engage, the most >>>> designers can do is to foster >>>> social relations go on, giving >>>> afordances to >>>> prcesses of signification, >>>> without intending to embed >>>> meanings. It is >>>> about affordances/constraints, >>>> but not about how to interpret >>>> something, but >>>> about going about >>>> interpreting. I think. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 18:04 >>>> To: Rolf >>>> Steier; eXtended >>>> Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> So after >>>> reading the >>>> article and >>>> the e-mail >>>> discussion I'm >>>> beginning >>>> >>>> to think there is a really >>>> big issue >>>> here that >>>> I am trying to grapple with, >>>> especially in terms of >>>> boundary >>>> objects (which >>>> I admittedly do not >>>> understand very well). And it relates >>>> to the >>>> metaphor of the table (both >>>> as discussed by Larry and >>>> Ingold as >>>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>>> is this, in >>>> the museum should the >>>> place be set up as >>>> affordances, perceived >>>> affordances, or >>>> constraints? It seems the >>>> museum in the study has >>>> potential affordances for >>>> the users. The >>>> cultural historical moment >>>> (unable to think of any >>>> other word) of the >>>> museum sets the context, >>>> meaning >>>> those walking through the >>>> museum are >>>> going to >>>> be restricted by the >>>> historical and cultural >>>> boundaries >>>> leading up >>>> to the art work, along with >>>> the expectations and needs >>>> of the >>>> individuals >>>> moving through the museum, >>>> but they will come across >>>> objects/artifacts >>>> that they think meets the >>>> needs >>>> >>>> >> > > > > > From smago@uga.edu Wed Jul 22 03:20:46 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 10:20:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Phil Jackson, R.I.P. In-Reply-To: <901012604.20931931.1437524885206.JavaMail.zimbra@comcast.net> References: <901012604.20931931.1437524885206.JavaMail.zimbra@comcast.net> Message-ID: Note: I?m forwarding this; I took several classes from Phil but he was not my major prof at Chicago. p Philip W. Jackson (1928-2015) died this morning, peacefully at his home, here in Hyde Park, Chicago. Phil was a professor at the University of Chicago for almost 50 years. He was a great intellect who had a huge impact on several generations of scholars and teachers. He was my dissertation advisor at the University of Chicago and also became, in the intervening years, a close personal friend. Rest in Peace, my contemporary Socrates. ...See More [Craig A. Cunningham's photo.] -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 8142 bytes Desc: image001.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150722/c8e39fcd/attachment.jpg From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 22 08:11:17 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 08:11:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> References: <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, you have helped clarify why I have been [and remain] confused on the notion of "object" I will try to focus on one particular relation you have highlighted. If I am clear on your distinctions then: It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand ALONE [the object OF labour or the object upon which labour works] where the problem resides. The problem is NOT carried WITHIN the Arbeitsgegenstand as an abstraction. The OBJECT [purposes and motives] includes also the "concept" that the subject-person makes OF the arbeitsgegenstand [object OF labour]. So it is the concept's relation WITH the arbeitsgegenstand [object OF labour] that generates "subject's socially shared OBJECTs [purposes and motives]. Andy, I may have garbled your construal of the relations involved in these two meanings of "object", my question is why not just say "object of labour" [when we mean arbeitsgegenstand] AND say "purposes and motives" when we mean OBJECT. In the same way that Dewey wishes he had used a different term for "experience" it seems we need alternative terms for "object". I am also struggling to understand the historical movement implied in the alternative changing OBJECTs [purposes and motives] expressed in how a term is situated. The notion of "polyphonic" languages with shifting meanings and OBJECTS seems very complex and seems to require expansive understandings of multiple different "language-games" [as Wittgenstein uses that concept. The labour process AND the conceptual process and multiple modern / postmodern understandings of "their" [using personal pronoun] relations. Very complex process. On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some distinctions in > this field ... we have at least three different versions of Activity Theory > involved here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that > have spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the word > "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate uses of the English > word, but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake of this > discussion I will invent some different terms. > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of labour, the material > which is to be worked upon, the blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that > if may be a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word > "Object" in the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean > Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it becomes "Outcome." > The hammer that the blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are > respectively the base and apex of the triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose and motive of > the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is not shown on the triangle, > but I will call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when > he talks about "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); it is not a > material thing or process as such. Behaviourists would exclude it > altogether. But this is what is motivating all the members of the design > team when they sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood and another > thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. > These OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in the End an > OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone shares the same > Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the > road they construe the object differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > clearly in Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some > problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but *the concept > the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely notices) > postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration within an ostensibly > neutral infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules and > Instruments, which are naively supposed to be there just to aid > collaboration. And Leigh Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations which carry within > them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs of past collaborations. It is > these one-time OBJECTs, now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary > Objects. > > But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique elements of > this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded > sense of socially constructed entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > things, or artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, > reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept of the OBJECT, as > Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object in the place > of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems of activity," for the > purpose of looking not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the > broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > deliberate and aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as "the Other.") > thereby introducing yet a different strand of postmodern critique into the > equation, namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great > effect. > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, OBject, obJECT > and obJect. And I might say, the situation is almost as bad in Russian and > German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >> >> To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am a >> bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity >> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the >> process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object >> of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing >> with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess >> we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account >> of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. >> Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's >> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete >> events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >> distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing >> in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >> ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was in >> and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between >> means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this >> is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean >> to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said >> before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). >> >> As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity >> theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for >> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular >> framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >> sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, >> and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the >> Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were >> in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms >> of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything >> goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said >> about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would >> like to add to this. >> >> I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very much >> in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer them; but >> this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those questions. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >> >> There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this >> discussion. >> >> First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great >> example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really >> interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and >> activity. >> >> However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some >> people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others >> might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now >> or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for >> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying >> here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a >> question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not >> saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things >> for myself. >> >> For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How >> much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >> gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological >> realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when >> it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research >> methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If >> we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call >> it Activity Theory? >> >> Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The >> discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses >> can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after >> we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and >> will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become >> completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly >> because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts >> are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to >> name these ideas. >> >> Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is >> going on in the realm of CHAT. >> >> Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Andy, all, >> I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the >> special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the >> difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and >> object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the >> other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. >> We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations >> (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room >> while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a >> final design product. >> >> At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the >> designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a >> common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >> representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being >> there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. >> >> Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered >> whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and >> tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body >> and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >> differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work >> delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before >> the design thing is finished). >> >> When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could >> discuss the history of development of these relations between the different >> forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without >> necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was >> that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already >> mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in >> action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, >> the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the >> working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both >> object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I >> still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between >> object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read >> more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). >> Any thoughts? >> >> Alfredo >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some >> role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a >> symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and >> one subject challenges that role and turns the object into >> its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. >> A number of examples spring to mind. >> >> * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are >> embraced by a despised group who take control of the >> word and assertively embrace it; >> * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their >> stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; >> * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon >> against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before >> them rather than in shame); >> * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which >> put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by >> printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and >> obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and >> read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >> organising tool; >> * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / >> Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared >> object (the land); >> * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool >> for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it >> from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a >> symbol of India. >> >> In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when >> she introduced the term, but core point is that the >> ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to >> contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an >> artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. >> >> Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >> mediating artefact or the object of work >> (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these >> cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according >> to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >> Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >>> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about >>> video? >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the >>>> photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >>>> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to >>>> the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>>> Thanks Rolf! >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> >>>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs >>>>> as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities >>>>> between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity >>>>> one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of >>>>> what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>>>> man-of-the-world. >>>>> Does that make better sense? >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>>>> but also the ideological context. >>>>> >>>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>>>> and regulations, communications resources, >>>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I think that a particular institution or >>>>> government system could potentially be a >>>>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>>>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>>>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>>>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>>>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>>>> >>>>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>>>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>>>> would say that one would have to justify the >>>>> utility of applying the concept to a >>>>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>>>> object within an institution. >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Phew! >>>>> So would it be correct to describe the >>>>> government >>>>> institutions and political system are >>>>> "boundary objects"? >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Andy - >>>>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>>>> and should >>>>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>>>> Thank you for >>>>> pointing that out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>>>> suggestion that >>>>> Greg made in the other thread >>>>> suggesting we look >>>>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>>>> been familiar >>>>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>>>> after doing >>>>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>>>> found his >>>>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>>>> potentially >>>>> useful in dealing with some of my >>>>> questions.( >>>>> >>>>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>>>> ) >>>>> >>>>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>>>> unexpected >>>>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>>>> >>>>> /The logic is that unexpected >>>>> metaphors arise >>>>> from the >>>>> need to create images when the >>>>> culture does >>>>> not have >>>>> them readily at hand. These images >>>>> join linguistic >>>>> content as growth points and >>>>> differentiate what >>>>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>>>> predicates, or >>>>> points of contrast in the >>>>> immediate ongoing >>>>> context of >>>>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>>>> precisely >>>>> because they >>>>> are outside the conventions of >>>>> language and >>>>> culture, >>>>> can capture abstractions in novel >>>>> ways and >>>>> provide the >>>>> fluidity of thought and language >>>>> that is the >>>>> essence >>>>> of ongoing discourse./ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>>>> Blunden >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>>>> achievement of >>>>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>>>> p. 131, >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Are we allowed to ask >>>>> questions about our >>>>> paper as >>>>> well? I hope so! >>>>> >>>>> For a little context -in our >>>>> paper, we >>>>> identified >>>>> particular kinds of >>>>> episodes in which participants >>>>> from different >>>>> disciplines seek coherence >>>>> and continuity of shared >>>>> representations >>>>> through >>>>> bodily action. These >>>>> actions include gesture, >>>>> movement and physical >>>>> performance linking the >>>>> present material artifacts to >>>>> objects of >>>>> design. >>>>> Most of these episodes >>>>> seem to involve some form of >>>>> improvisation, >>>>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>>>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>>>> characterize >>>>> these >>>>> aspects of the >>>>> interactions. In most cases, the >>>>> participants seem >>>>> to be searching for the >>>>> best words or material >>>>> representation to >>>>> convey a >>>>> particular intention - >>>>> when this becomes problematic >>>>> or limiting >>>>> - they >>>>> almost fall back on what >>>>> is available - these >>>>> improvised bodily >>>>> performances - as a way of >>>>> maintaining continuity, and of >>>>> inviting >>>>> co-participants into a shared and >>>>> imagined space. These bodily >>>>> actions don't >>>>> seem to >>>>> begin the proposals, but >>>>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>>>> participants. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think there is something >>>>> really fascinating >>>>> about this kind of creativity >>>>> and resourcefulness in >>>>> interaction that >>>>> could be >>>>> explored more deeply - and >>>>> that I'm having trouble >>>>> articulating. >>>>> Maybe some >>>>> of you have some thoughts >>>>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>>>> we've talked >>>>> about this >>>>> a bit before so maybe you >>>>> can add a little clarity to my >>>>> question. >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>>>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo, >>>>> Thank you very much for >>>>> the sketch of your >>>>> roots. I taught English in >>>>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>>>> for 5 years >>>>> back in >>>>> the early 70s, just before >>>>> Franco died. (He died the >>>>> day I >>>>> boarded the >>>>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>>>> and language are interesting, >>>>> especially where >>>>> language varieties meet. >>>>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>>>> from my >>>>> familiarity >>>>> with the music of Catalunya >>>>> and Mallorca that the speech >>>>> communities in >>>>> each of those places treasure >>>>> their unique languages >>>>> (Catalan and >>>>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>>>> commonality >>>>> vis-a-vis their >>>>> separateness from >>>>> Castilian >>>>> Spanish, the national language >>>>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>>>> see a parallel >>>>> between your work on boundary >>>>> objects, where individual >>>>> persons >>>>> collaborate >>>>> to create spaces, AND >>>>> boundary objects >>>>> "negotiated" by groups of >>>>> people who live in real >>>>> spaces. >>>>> I am thinking, among other >>>>> things, of >>>>> indigeneity, a big topic >>>>> here in New >>>>> Mexico, with so many >>>>> Native Americans. >>>>> Assymetries of power. >>>>> Bullying. >>>>> Testing and curriculum become >>>>> instruments of >>>>> war by other means. I hope my >>>>> tone does not distract >>>>> from, nor >>>>> diminish, the >>>>> optimism created by this >>>>> thread. Yet I think that >>>>> optimism is so >>>>> precious because of the >>>>> ground (the >>>>> world) of the dialog. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>>>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>>>> Jornet Gil >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Well, you could say >>>>> that I am partly >>>>> Catalan. I grew up in >>>>> the province >>>>> >>>>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>>>> language is >>>>> official language together >>>>> with >>>>> Castilian Spanish. >>>>> Although Valencia (the >>>>> county) and Catalonia are >>>>> different regional >>>>> counties, Catalan >>>>> is spoken >>>>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>>>> the Balear Islands. Some >>>>> call the three >>>>> together as the Catalan >>>>> Countries. >>>>> I don't like borders, but >>>>> I respect >>>>> and enjoy >>>>> cultural diversity. >>>>> >>>>> Standardized testing, >>>>> and the whole >>>>> assumptions behind it, >>>>> are an issue >>>>> >>>>> also in Spain and in >>>>> Catalonia; but >>>>> education >>>>> has been so battered during >>>>> the last years of right-wing >>>>> government that I >>>>> the debate have been more >>>>> about means and access >>>>> than about >>>>> contents and >>>>> aims. Which in some sense >>>>> may be good because it >>>>> moves the >>>>> debates away >>>>> from performance. But I have >>>>> been living outside of >>>>> Spain for eight >>>>> years >>>>> now, so I am not the best to >>>>> update you on this either. >>>>> >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> on >>>>> behalf of >>>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>>> Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>> The Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo, >>>>> Yes, you have answered >>>>> my question >>>>> very >>>>> nicely! I especially >>>>> appreciate >>>>> >>>>> that you were willing to >>>>> wrestle with my >>>>> question, despite your lack of >>>>> familiarity with the >>>>> issues here in >>>>> the U.S. >>>>> Am I wrong, or are you >>>>> Catalan? In which case >>>>> your experience in >>>>> Catalunya would take you to a >>>>> different place in critiquing >>>>> schooling there, >>>>> though not necessarily >>>>> unconnected to yours and >>>>> Rolf's work on >>>>> boundary objects. I just >>>>> met for >>>>> the second day in a row >>>>> with a friend >>>>> who is >>>>> the liaison between our public >>>>> school district and a >>>>> children's science >>>>> museum called Explora. I >>>>> feel like >>>>> I'm swimming in this >>>>> thread, talk about a >>>>> mixed metaphor! >>>>> >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>>>> at 12:18 AM, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> Jornet Gil >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I am sorry, Henry, >>>>> but I am >>>>> not very >>>>> familiar with >>>>> high-stakes >>>>> >>>>> standardized testing (as >>>>> different to >>>>> standardized testing in >>>>> general) or >>>>> with common core (which I >>>>> quickly read >>>>> is an >>>>> issue in US). But I would say >>>>> that, if (school) >>>>> curricula were to be >>>>> consistent with the view of >>>>> education as the practice >>>>> of creating >>>>> conditions for certain >>>>> attitudes and >>>>> dispositions to >>>>> emerge--which is what >>>>> I was >>>>> suggesting in the >>>>> paragraph you >>>>> copy--curricula would not >>>>> be so much about >>>>> standardized contents, but >>>>> about >>>>> human sensitivities and >>>>> relations. So, >>>>> I would >>>>> say, no, standardized >>>>> testing is not in >>>>> principle in line >>>>> with what >>>>> I was trying to say. >>>>> >>>>> I was trying to >>>>> make a distinction >>>>> between trying to >>>>> design someone's >>>>> >>>>> particular experience, and >>>>> trying to >>>>> design >>>>> conditions for the development >>>>> of attitudes and >>>>> orientations. The >>>>> first is >>>>> likely impossible. The second >>>>> seems to make more sense. >>>>> >>>>> One may of course >>>>> wonder >>>>> whether those >>>>> attitudes and >>>>> orientations can >>>>> >>>>> be considered general, and >>>>> then form >>>>> part of >>>>> standardize measures instead >>>>> of the traditional >>>>> "contents and >>>>> skills". But >>>>> measuring assumes some >>>>> quantitative increment in >>>>> a particular >>>>> aspect >>>>> as the result of learning. >>>>> Growth and development, >>>>> however, are about >>>>> qualitative change. So, as >>>>> soon >>>>> as you start measuring you >>>>> would be >>>>> missing >>>>> growth and development. So, >>>>> again, no. I would not say >>>>> that >>>>> high-stakes >>>>> standardized testing is in >>>>> line >>>>> with what I was trying to say. >>>>> >>>>> I hope I have >>>>> answered your >>>>> question, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> on >>>>> behalf of >>>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>>>> 07:48 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>>> Culture, >>>>> Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>> Re: The >>>>> Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo, you say: >>>>> >>>>> "However, we >>>>> cannot aim at >>>>> determining >>>>> any particular >>>>> >>>>> situation/experience. The >>>>> same may be said >>>>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>>>> intend to communicate the >>>>> curriculum >>>>> and make >>>>> it the content of the >>>>> students' experience in >>>>> the way we >>>>> intend. But >>>>> we can try to create the >>>>> conditions for certain >>>>> attitudes and >>>>> dispositions to emerge." >>>>> >>>>> Would you say that >>>>> high-stakes >>>>> standardized >>>>> testing is in >>>>> line with >>>>> >>>>> your construal of >>>>> curriculum design? >>>>> How about >>>>> common core? >>>>> >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Jul 15, >>>>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>>>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> < >>>>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thanks a lot >>>>> for the >>>>> >>>>> clarifications. I see now >>>>> why it >>>>> may be said that >>>>> >>>>> designers can aim at >>>>> designing for >>>>> constrains >>>>> but not for affordances. I >>>>> see that this way of >>>>> talking is part of a >>>>> designers' way to get things >>>>> done, and that it may >>>>> indeed be an >>>>> effective >>>>> way to design for >>>>> place-making, as in the >>>>> example that >>>>> Michael >>>>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>>>> what we report in our >>>>> study is about >>>>> designers >>>>> talking about how spatial >>>>> features might afford some >>>>> experiences >>>>> in the >>>>> museum while constraining >>>>> others. >>>>> >>>>> I must admit, >>>>> however, that I >>>>> still consider >>>>> the distinction >>>>> >>>>> problematic from an >>>>> analytical perspective >>>>> whenever our object of >>>>> study is >>>>> experience, situated >>>>> action, or design as >>>>> situated practice. A more >>>>> correct >>>>> way to talk is that >>>>> affordances and >>>>> constrains >>>>> are the positive and >>>>> negative >>>>> sides/interpretations of a single >>>>> unitary category. As an actual >>>>> and concrete phenomenon, >>>>> walking into >>>>> a musuem >>>>> implies both affordances and >>>>> constrains at the same >>>>> time, whether >>>>> intended >>>>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>>>> whether other terminology, >>>>> such as >>>>> Ingold's >>>>> notion of "correspondence," >>>>> might be more appropriated >>>>> when we >>>>> talk about >>>>> how materials and actions >>>>> become entangled into >>>>> particular >>>>> trajectories. >>>>> >>>>> In any case, >>>>> and as Rolf >>>>> emphasizes, >>>>> what the >>>>> designers in >>>>> our study >>>>> >>>>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>>>> ways of being >>>>> in the >>>>> museum. Imagination versus >>>>> prediction may be an >>>>> interesting topic >>>>> emerging here for further >>>>> inquiry >>>>> into design work. >>>>> >>>>> Another >>>>> important (and >>>>> related) >>>>> issue that I >>>>> think is >>>>> emerging here >>>>> >>>>> has to do with the level >>>>> of generality at >>>>> which design intentions can be >>>>> expected to work (just as >>>>> Bateson >>>>> argued with >>>>> regard to prediction). At the >>>>> level of generic social >>>>> processes, and >>>>> given a >>>>> particular >>>>> cultural-historical >>>>> background, we as >>>>> designers may try to make some >>>>> generic situations more >>>>> likely to >>>>> occur than >>>>> others (facilitating that more >>>>> or less people end up >>>>> together in a given >>>>> place). However, we cannot >>>>> aim at >>>>> determining any particular >>>>> situation/experience. The >>>>> same may be >>>>> said about >>>>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>>>> communicate the >>>>> curriculum and make it the >>>>> content of the students' >>>>> experience in >>>>> the way >>>>> we intend. But we can try to >>>>> create the conditions for >>>>> certain >>>>> attitudes >>>>> and dispositions to emerge. >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>>> From ablunden@mira.net Wed Jul 22 08:17:48 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 01:17:48 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> Message-ID: <55AFB41C.6020803@mira.net> You are right, Larry, that everything that's going on in these situation arises from the *relation between a subject and the Arbeitsgegenstand*, not the Arbeitsgegenstand alone. For example, there are hundreds of "syndromes" listed in DMV which in past times or other countries are not considered illnesses at all. And apologies for all the silly typos in that message. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 23/07/2015 1:11 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, you have helped clarify why I have been [and remain] > confused on the notion of "object" > > I will try to focus on one particular relation you have > highlighted. > If I am clear on your distinctions then: > > It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand ALONE [the object OF > labour or the object upon which labour works] where the > problem resides. The problem is NOT carried WITHIN the > Arbeitsgegenstand as an abstraction. The OBJECT [purposes > and motives] includes also the "concept" that the > subject-person makes OF the arbeitsgegenstand [object OF > labour]. > > So it is the concept's relation WITH the arbeitsgegenstand > [object OF labour] that generates "subject's socially > shared OBJECTs [purposes and motives]. > > Andy, I may have garbled your construal of the relations > involved in these two meanings of "object", my question is > why not just say "object of labour" [when we mean > arbeitsgegenstand] AND say "purposes and motives" when we > mean OBJECT. > > In the same way that Dewey wishes he had used a different > term for "experience" it seems we need alternative terms > for "object". > > I am also struggling to understand the historical movement > implied in the alternative changing OBJECTs [purposes and > motives] expressed in how a term is situated. > > The notion of "polyphonic" languages with shifting > meanings and OBJECTS seems very complex and seems to > require expansive understandings of multiple different > "language-games" [as Wittgenstein uses that concept. > > The labour process AND the conceptual process and multiple > modern / postmodern understandings of "their" [using > personal pronoun] relations. Very complex process. > > > > > On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to > some distinctions in this field ... we have at least > three different versions of Activity Theory involved > here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the > theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial > idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different > way, all of them legitimate uses of the English word, > but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake > of this discussion I will invent some different terms. > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be > a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > man with a broom, but it is all the same > Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in > the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean > Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it > becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the blacksmith uses > is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and > the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are > respectively the base and apex of the triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > purpose and motive of the activity." So this "purpose > or motive" is not shown on the triangle, but I will > call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by > "object" when he talks about "object-oriented > activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because it > is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); > it is not a material thing or process as such. > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is > what is motivating all the members of the design team > when they sit down to collaborate with one another. > Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the > nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is to > sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These > OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in > the End an OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" > of the collaboration, to use Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > everyone shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends > up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the road > they construe the object differently. This is what > Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It > is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried > within it alone which motivates action, but *the > concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir > astutely notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > collaboration within an ostensibly neutral > infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules > and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be > there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows > that this is an illusion; the Rules and Instruments > are in fact residues of past collaborations which > carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern > critique elements of this idea, that apparently > ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded sense > of socially constructed entities, usually far more > than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including > institutions - fossilised "systems of activity") and > recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, > reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept > of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary > Object in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > two "systems of activity," for the purpose of looking > not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the > broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the > Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to change > the relation between Subject and obJECT (here > referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > strand of postmodern critique into the equation, > namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, > with great effect. > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > Object, OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, > the situation is almost as bad in Russian and German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > distinction between object and tool in activity > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > were aware through the process, that what we > describe in the paper has to do with how the > object of design emerged and developed for the > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > lack of a historical account of the object that > goes over and above the particular instances > analyzed. Although we provide with some > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > is grounded on concrete events and their > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > distinction between object and means because it > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > ented towards anything beyond what was there in > the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' > means. How would then the distinction between > means and object have added to our understanding > of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the > contribution from such a distinction, I really > mean to ask this question for the purpose of > growing and expanding; and as said before, part of > the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > contribution). > > As to how we would position our contribution with > regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what > we said when introducing the paper for discussion: > we begun with the purpose of working outside any > particular framework and think, as we think Star > did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These > included cultural historical psychology, > ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also > the ideas about Experience (in the > Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic > in this discussion were in the background all the > time, but we did not operationalize them in terms > of any particular theory. This is not to say that > we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best > to keep internal coherence between what we said > about the data, and what the data was exhibiting > for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. > > I think the questions you are rising about > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > places to be asking those questions. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf > of Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > There are also a few other things that I would > like to bring to this discussion. > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > article. It is a great example of an > interpretativist approach to everyday life > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > However, how is your approach related to classic > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > decades; still other people might look for > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > template or categorize your methodology -- just > raising a question about its connection to > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > certain things for myself. > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of > Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > gain when we infuse new methodological, > epistemological, and ontological realities into > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > methodology.) Do we need to call something > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > to call it Activity Theory? > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > they will "change hands" and will change their > particular discourse affiliation and will become > completely different components of a completely > different discourse. Mostly because the > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > the concepts are very different despite of the > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > ideas. > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > understand better what is going on in the realm of > CHAT. > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov > =bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of > Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Andy, all, > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > very interesting. I have particular interest in > the difference that they point out between > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > distinction while writing our own paper. We > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > floor plan, performances of being in the room > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > At the same time, the museum space begun to become > the object of the designers' activity. Since this > were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners > had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what > seemed to be a common object for all them was the > museum as place. Thus, most representations of it > begun to be made in terms of narratives about > being there. That was the orientation that seemed > to stick them together. > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > connections to notions of object of activity and > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > away from the focus on body and experience. We > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > differentiate between object of design, the design > thing that work delivers, and the object's > constituents (or means of presentation before the > design thing is finished). > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > the picture, we could discuss the history of > development of these relations between the > different forms of presentations of the museum > means towards the object without necessarily > articulating the differences between the two. One > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > about materials in themselves, but about > consequences in action. From the point of view of > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > space as object of design was an issue in and > through the working with some material, some form > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > get out of making the distinction between object > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > should perhaps read more carefully their study > rather than be here thinking aloud). > Any thoughts? > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf > of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > play some > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > probably a > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, > too, and > one subject challenges that role and turns the > object into > its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. > A number of examples spring to mind. > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as > Queer, are > embraced by a despised group who take control > of the > word and assertively embrace it; > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > deployed their > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > magnificant effect; > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a > weapon > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS > flee before > them rather than in shame); > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > stamp which > put newspapers out of reach of workers > against them by > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > newspaper and > obliging workers to club together in groups > to buy and > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > organising tool; > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > Territory / > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a > shared > object (the land); > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon > and tool > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, > raising it > from the status of obsolete and inferior > technology to a > symbol of India. > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in > mind when > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > ideological construction placed upon an object is > subject to > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > subjectivity. > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > mediating artefact or the object of work > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that > in these > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols > according > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > I got to thinking about the photographs as > boundary objects. What about video? > Henry > > > On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came > to see that it was the photographs that > Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to > recover his humanity. This is consonant > with how Yrjo was using the idea in > relation to the subsistence farmers' > movement in Mexico and their corn. > Thanks Rolf! > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > This makes sense to me, Andy. I could > also interpret the photographs as > boundary objects as they support the > coordination of therapy activities > between Thomas and the nurse. I think > it depends on the aspect of activity > one is attempting to explore as > opposed to the definite identification > of what may or may not be a boundary > object. This is only my opinion though! > > > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy > Blunden > >> wrote: > > Or alternatively, the boundary > object in question is > Thomas's aged body, which is > subject to an > interpretation which Thomas > contests by showing > photographs of far away places > and explaining how > well-travelled he is, seeking an > interpretation of > himself as a well-travelled and > experiences > man-of-the-world. > Does that make better sense? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy > Blunden wrote: > > Yes, I agree. My own interest > is in social theory > and I'd never heard of > "boundary objects." It > seems to me that what BOs do > is introduce some > social theory into domains of > activity (scientific > and work collaborations for > example) where the > participants naively think > they are collaborating > on neutral ground. So it is > not just granularity, > but also the ideological context. > > In Yjro Engestrom's article, > the home care workers > collaborate with the old > couple according to rules > and regulations, > communications resources, > technology, finance and so > on, which in the > unnamed country, the old > couple are apparently > cast as "patients". Isn't it > the case that here it > is those rules and > regulations, etc., which are > the "boundary objects"? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf > Steier wrote: > > I think that a particular > institution or > government system could > potentially be a > boundary object depending > on how the concept > is applied. Star > describes three criteria: 1) > interpretive flexibility > 2) material/ > organizational structure > and 3) scale/ > granularity in which the > concept is useful. > > She argues that boundary > objects are typically > most useful at the > organizational level - so I > would say that one would > have to justify the > utility of applying the > concept to a > particular institution, > as opposed to, say, an > object within an institution. > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at > 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Phew! > So would it be > correct to describe the > government > institutions and > political system are > "boundary objects"? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 20/07/2015 9:42 > PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > Hi Andy - > Good catch! I > believe that is a typo > and should > read "despite a > LACK of consensus". > Thank you for > pointing that out. > > > I also wanted to > follow up on a > suggestion that > Greg made in the > other thread > suggesting we look > at David > McNeill's work. I had only > been familiar > with his earlier > work on gesture, but > after doing > a bit of reading > over the weekend, I > found his > concept of > 'unexpected metaphors' > potentially > useful in dealing > with some of my > questions.( > http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf > ) > > Here is a > relevant quote describing > unexpected > metaphors as a > form of gesture: > > /The logic is > that unexpected > metaphors arise > from the > need to > create images when the > culture does > not have > them readily > at hand. These images > join linguistic > content as > growth points and > differentiate what > Vygotsky > (1987) called psychological > predicates, or > points of > contrast in the > immediate ongoing > context of > speaking. > Unexpected metaphors, > precisely > because they > are outside > the conventions of > language and > culture, > can capture > abstractions in novel > ways and > provide the > fluidity of > thought and language > that is the > essence > of ongoing > discourse./ > > > > > On Mon, Jul 20, > 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy > Blunden > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > Rolf, what > did you mean by "the > achievement of > cooperation > despite consensus"? > p. 131, > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > On 17/07/2015 > 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier > wrote: > > Are we > allowed to ask > questions about our > paper as > well? I > hope so! > > For a > little context -in our > paper, we > identified > > particular kinds of > episodes > in which participants > from different > > disciplines seek coherence > and > continuity of shared > representations > through > bodily > action. These > actions > include gesture, > movement and physical > > performance linking the > present > material artifacts to > objects of > design. > Most of > these episodes > seem to > involve some form of > improvisation, > > resourcefulness or creativity, > and I'm > not fully sure how to > characterize > these > aspects > of the > > interactions. In most cases, the > participants seem > to be > searching for the > best > words or material > representation to > convey a > > particular intention - > when this > becomes problematic > or limiting > - they > almost > fall back on what > is > available - these > improvised bodily > > performances - as a way of > > maintaining continuity, and of > inviting > > co-participants into a shared and > imagined > space. These bodily > actions don't > seem to > begin the > proposals, but > are in a > sense *discovered* by the > participants. > > > I think > there is something > really fascinating > about > this kind of creativity > and > resourcefulness in > interaction that > could be > explored > more deeply - and > that I'm > having trouble > articulating. > Maybe some > of you > have some thoughts > on this? > Alfredo - I know > we've talked > about this > a bit > before so maybe you > can add a > little clarity to my > question. > > On Thu, > Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 > PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > wrote: > > Alfredo, > Thank > you very much for > the sketch of your > > roots. I taught English in > > Puigcerda and Barcelona > for 5 years > back in > the > early 70s, just before > > Franco died. (He died the > day I > boarded the > plane > back to the U.S.) Place > and > language are interesting, > especially where > > language varieties meet. > > Boundaries. I know mostly > from my > familiarity > with > the music of Catalunya > and > Mallorca that the speech > communities in > each > of those places treasure > their > unique languages > (Catalan and > > Mallorquin), yet see a > commonality > > vis-a-vis their > separateness from > Castilian > > Spanish, the national language > of > Spain from 1492 on. I > see a parallel > > between your work on boundary > > objects, where individual > persons > collaborate > to > create spaces, AND > > boundary objects > "negotiated" by groups of > > people who live in real > spaces. > I am > thinking, among other > things, of > > indigeneity, a big topic > here in New > > Mexico, with so many > Native Americans. > > Assymetries of power. > Bullying. > > Testing and curriculum become > instruments of > war > by other means. I hope my > tone > does not distract > from, nor > diminish, the > > optimism created by this > > thread. Yet I think that > optimism is so > > precious because of the > ground (the > > world) of the dialog. > Henry > > > > On Jul 16, 2015, at > 12:13 PM, Alfredo > > Jornet Gil > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > wrote: > > > Well, you could say > that I am partly > > Catalan. I grew up in > the province > > of > Valencia, where Catalan > language is > > official language together > with > > Castilian Spanish. > Although Valencia (the > > county) and Catalonia are > > different regional > counties, Catalan > is spoken > in > Catalonia, Valencia, and > the > Balear Islands. Some > call the three > > together as the Catalan > Countries. > I > don't like borders, but > I respect > and enjoy > > cultural diversity. > > > Standardized testing, > and the whole > > assumptions behind it, > are an issue > > also > in Spain and in > Catalonia; but > education > has > been so battered during > the > last years of right-wing > government that I > the > debate have been more > about > means and access > than about > contents and > aims. > Which in some sense > may > be good because it > moves the > debates away > from > performance. But I have > been > living outside of > Spain for eight > years > now, > so I am not the best to > > update you on this either. > > > Best wishes, > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>>> > on > behalf of > HENRY > SHONERD > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 > > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > The Emergence of > > Boundary Objects > > > Alfredo, > > Yes, you have answered > my question > very > > nicely! I especially > appreciate > > that > you were willing to > wrestle with my > > question, despite your lack of > > familiarity with the > issues here in > the U.S. > Am I > wrong, or are you > > Catalan? In which case > your experience in > > Catalunya would take you to a > > different place in critiquing > schooling there, > > though not necessarily > > unconnected to yours and > Rolf's work on > > boundary objects. I just > met for > the > second day in a row > with a friend > who is > the > liaison between our public > > school district and a > children's science > > museum called Explora. I > feel like > I'm > swimming in this > thread, talk about a > mixed > metaphor! > > Henry > > > > On Jul 16, 2015, > at 12:18 AM, > Alfredo > > Jornet Gil > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > wrote: > > > I am sorry, Henry, > but I am > not very > > familiar with > high-stakes > > > standardized testing (as > different to > > standardized testing in > general) or > with > common core (which I > quickly read > is an > issue > in US). But I would say > that, > if (school) > curricula were to be > > consistent with the view of > > education as the practice > of creating > > conditions for certain > attitudes and > > dispositions to > emerge--which is what > I was > > suggesting in the > paragraph you > > copy--curricula would not > be so much about > > standardized contents, but > about > human > sensitivities and > relations. So, > I would > say, > no, standardized > > testing is not in > principle in line > with what > I was > trying to say. > > > I was trying to > make a distinction > > between trying to > design someone's > > > particular experience, and > trying to > design > > conditions for the development > of > attitudes and > orientations. The > first is > > likely impossible. The second > seems > to make more sense. > > > One may of course > wonder > whether those > > attitudes and > orientations can > > be > considered general, and > then form > part of > > standardize measures instead > of > the traditional > "contents and > skills". But > > measuring assumes some > > quantitative increment in > a particular > aspect > as > the result of learning. > > Growth and development, > however, are about > > qualitative change. So, as > soon > as > you start measuring you > would be > missing > > growth and development. So, > > again, no. I would not say > that > high-stakes > > standardized testing is in > line > with > what I was trying to say. > > > I hope I have > answered your > question, > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>>> > on > behalf of > HENRY > SHONERD > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > Sent: 16 July 2015 > 07:48 > > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, > Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] > Re: The > Emergence of > > Boundary Objects > > > Alfredo, you say: > > > "However, we > cannot aim at > determining > > any particular > > situation/experience. The > same may be said > about > EDUCATION. We cannot > > intend to communicate the > curriculum > and make > it > the content of the > > students' experience in > the way we > intend. But > we > can try to create the > > conditions for certain > attitudes and > > dispositions to emerge." > > > Would you say that > high-stakes > standardized > testing is in > line with > > your > construal of > curriculum design? > How about > > common core? > > > Henry > > > > > > > > On Jul 15, > 2015, at 5:29 PM, > > Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > wrote: > > > Thanks a lot > for the > clarifications. I see now > why it > > may be said that > > > designers can aim at > designing for > constrains > but > not for affordances. I > see > that this way of > talking is part of a > > designers' way to get things > done, > and that it may > indeed be an > effective > way > to design for > > place-making, as in the > example that > Michael > gives > of MOMA. Indeed, much of > what > we report in our > study is about > designers > > talking about how spatial > > features might afford some > experiences > in the > > museum while constraining > others. > > > I must admit, > however, that I > > still consider > the distinction > > > problematic from an > analytical perspective > > whenever our object of > study is > > experience, situated > action, or design as > > situated practice. A more > correct > way > to talk is that > affordances and > constrains > are > the positive and > negative > sides/interpretations of > a single > > unitary category. As an actual > and > concrete phenomenon, > walking into > a musuem > > implies both affordances and > > constrains at the same > time, whether > intended > or > not. Which makes me wonder > > whether other terminology, > such as > Ingold's > > notion of "correspondence," > might > be more appropriated > when we > talk about > how > materials and actions > > become entangled into > particular > trajectories. > > > In any case, > and as Rolf > emphasizes, > what the > designers in > > our study > > > indeed do is to IMAGINE > ways of being > in the > > museum. Imagination versus > > prediction may be an > interesting topic > > emerging here for further > inquiry > into > design work. > > > Another > important (and > related) > > issue that I > think is > emerging here > > has > to do with the level > of generality at > which > design intentions can be > > expected to work (just as > Bateson > argued with > > regard to prediction). At the > level > of generic social > processes, and > given a > > particular > > cultural-historical > background, we as > > designers may try to make some > > generic situations more > likely to > occur than > > others (facilitating that more > or > less people end up > together in a given > > place). However, we cannot > aim at > > determining any particular > situation/experience. The > same may be > said about > > EDUCATION. We cannot intend to > communicate the > > curriculum and make it the > > content of the students' > experience in > the way > we > intend. But we can try to > > create the conditions for > certain > attitudes > and > dispositions to emerge. > > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Wed Jul 22 08:23:43 2015 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 15:23:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Phil Jackson, R.I.P. In-Reply-To: References: <901012604.20931931.1437524885206.JavaMail.zimbra@comcast.net> Message-ID: Thank you for sharing this, Peter. His ethnographic research has been an inspiration to many of us. Best - Jen On 2015-07-22, at 3:20 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Note: I?m forwarding this; I took several classes from Phil but he was not my major prof at Chicago. p > > Philip W. Jackson (1928-2015) died this morning, peacefully at his home, here in Hyde Park, Chicago. > > Phil was a professor at the University of Chicago for almost 50 years. He was a great intellect who had a huge impact on several generations of scholars and teachers. He was my dissertation advisor at the University of Chicago and also became, in the intervening years, a close personal friend. > > Rest in Peace, my contemporary Socrates. > ...See More > [Craig A. Cunningham's photo.] > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jul 22 08:24:40 2015 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 15:24:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> References: <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no>, <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no>,<55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> Message-ID: <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very much in line with the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. I have many questions, most of which I should find in the literature rather than bother here. But I would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote that the object "carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." What does "in itself" mean here? Thanks again for a very informative post, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some distinctions in this field ... we have at least three different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate uses of the English word, but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent some different terms. The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the triangle. Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what is motivating all the members of the design team when they sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use Hegel's apt terminology here. Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is almost as bad in Russian and German, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). > > As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. > > I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those questions. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this discussion. > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call it Activity Theory? > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Andy, all, > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. > > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). > Any thoughts? > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some > role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and > one subject challenges that role and turns the object into > its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. > A number of examples spring to mind. > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are > embraced by a despised group who take control of the > word and assertively embrace it; > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before > them rather than in shame); > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > organising tool; > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared > object (the land); > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a > symbol of India. > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > mediating artefact or the object of work > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? >> Henry >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>> Thanks Rolf! >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>>> man-of-the-world. >>>> Does that make better sense? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>>> but also the ideological context. >>>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>>> and regulations, communications resources, >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> >>>> I think that a particular institution or >>>> government system could potentially be a >>>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>>> >>>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>>> would say that one would have to justify the >>>> utility of applying the concept to a >>>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>>> object within an institution. >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> >>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Phew! >>>> So would it be correct to describe the >>>> government >>>> institutions and political system are >>>> "boundary objects"? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy - >>>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>>> and should >>>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>>> Thank you for >>>> pointing that out. >>>> >>>> >>>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>>> suggestion that >>>> Greg made in the other thread >>>> suggesting we look >>>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>>> been familiar >>>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>>> after doing >>>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>>> found his >>>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>>> potentially >>>> useful in dealing with some of my >>>> questions.( >>>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>>> ) >>>> >>>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>>> unexpected >>>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>>> >>>> /The logic is that unexpected >>>> metaphors arise >>>> from the >>>> need to create images when the >>>> culture does >>>> not have >>>> them readily at hand. These images >>>> join linguistic >>>> content as growth points and >>>> differentiate what >>>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>>> predicates, or >>>> points of contrast in the >>>> immediate ongoing >>>> context of >>>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>>> precisely >>>> because they >>>> are outside the conventions of >>>> language and >>>> culture, >>>> can capture abstractions in novel >>>> ways and >>>> provide the >>>> fluidity of thought and language >>>> that is the >>>> essence >>>> of ongoing discourse./ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>>> Blunden >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>>> achievement of >>>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>>> p. 131, >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Are we allowed to ask >>>> questions about our >>>> paper as >>>> well? I hope so! >>>> >>>> For a little context -in our >>>> paper, we >>>> identified >>>> particular kinds of >>>> episodes in which participants >>>> from different >>>> disciplines seek coherence >>>> and continuity of shared >>>> representations >>>> through >>>> bodily action. These >>>> actions include gesture, >>>> movement and physical >>>> performance linking the >>>> present material artifacts to >>>> objects of >>>> design. >>>> Most of these episodes >>>> seem to involve some form of >>>> improvisation, >>>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>>> characterize >>>> these >>>> aspects of the >>>> interactions. In most cases, the >>>> participants seem >>>> to be searching for the >>>> best words or material >>>> representation to >>>> convey a >>>> particular intention - >>>> when this becomes problematic >>>> or limiting >>>> - they >>>> almost fall back on what >>>> is available - these >>>> improvised bodily >>>> performances - as a way of >>>> maintaining continuity, and of >>>> inviting >>>> co-participants into a shared and >>>> imagined space. These bodily >>>> actions don't >>>> seem to >>>> begin the proposals, but >>>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>>> participants. >>>> >>>> >>>> I think there is something >>>> really fascinating >>>> about this kind of creativity >>>> and resourcefulness in >>>> interaction that >>>> could be >>>> explored more deeply - and >>>> that I'm having trouble >>>> articulating. >>>> Maybe some >>>> of you have some thoughts >>>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>>> we've talked >>>> about this >>>> a bit before so maybe you >>>> can add a little clarity to my >>>> question. >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Alfredo, >>>> Thank you very much for >>>> the sketch of your >>>> roots. I taught English in >>>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>>> for 5 years >>>> back in >>>> the early 70s, just before >>>> Franco died. (He died the >>>> day I >>>> boarded the >>>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>>> and language are interesting, >>>> especially where >>>> language varieties meet. >>>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>>> from my >>>> familiarity >>>> with the music of Catalunya >>>> and Mallorca that the speech >>>> communities in >>>> each of those places treasure >>>> their unique languages >>>> (Catalan and >>>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>>> commonality >>>> vis-a-vis their >>>> separateness from >>>> Castilian >>>> Spanish, the national language >>>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>>> see a parallel >>>> between your work on boundary >>>> objects, where individual >>>> persons >>>> collaborate >>>> to create spaces, AND >>>> boundary objects >>>> "negotiated" by groups of >>>> people who live in real >>>> spaces. >>>> I am thinking, among other >>>> things, of >>>> indigeneity, a big topic >>>> here in New >>>> Mexico, with so many >>>> Native Americans. >>>> Assymetries of power. >>>> Bullying. >>>> Testing and curriculum become >>>> instruments of >>>> war by other means. I hope my >>>> tone does not distract >>>> from, nor >>>> diminish, the >>>> optimism created by this >>>> thread. Yet I think that >>>> optimism is so >>>> precious because of the >>>> ground (the >>>> world) of the dialog. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, you could say >>>> that I am partly >>>> Catalan. I grew up in >>>> the province >>>> >>>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>>> language is >>>> official language together >>>> with >>>> Castilian Spanish. >>>> Although Valencia (the >>>> county) and Catalonia are >>>> different regional >>>> counties, Catalan >>>> is spoken >>>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>>> the Balear Islands. Some >>>> call the three >>>> together as the Catalan >>>> Countries. >>>> I don't like borders, but >>>> I respect >>>> and enjoy >>>> cultural diversity. >>>> >>>> Standardized testing, >>>> and the whole >>>> assumptions behind it, >>>> are an issue >>>> >>>> also in Spain and in >>>> Catalonia; but >>>> education >>>> has been so battered during >>>> the last years of right-wing >>>> government that I >>>> the debate have been more >>>> about means and access >>>> than about >>>> contents and >>>> aims. Which in some sense >>>> may be good because it >>>> moves the >>>> debates away >>>> from performance. But I have >>>> been living outside of >>>> Spain for eight >>>> years >>>> now, so I am not the best to >>>> update you on this either. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>> The Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Alfredo, >>>> Yes, you have answered >>>> my question >>>> very >>>> nicely! I especially >>>> appreciate >>>> >>>> that you were willing to >>>> wrestle with my >>>> question, despite your lack of >>>> familiarity with the >>>> issues here in >>>> the U.S. >>>> Am I wrong, or are you >>>> Catalan? In which case >>>> your experience in >>>> Catalunya would take you to a >>>> different place in critiquing >>>> schooling there, >>>> though not necessarily >>>> unconnected to yours and >>>> Rolf's work on >>>> boundary objects. I just >>>> met for >>>> the second day in a row >>>> with a friend >>>> who is >>>> the liaison between our public >>>> school district and a >>>> children's science >>>> museum called Explora. I >>>> feel like >>>> I'm swimming in this >>>> thread, talk about a >>>> mixed metaphor! >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>>> at 12:18 AM, >>>> Alfredo >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I am sorry, Henry, >>>> but I am >>>> not very >>>> familiar with >>>> high-stakes >>>> >>>> standardized testing (as >>>> different to >>>> standardized testing in >>>> general) or >>>> with common core (which I >>>> quickly read >>>> is an >>>> issue in US). But I would say >>>> that, if (school) >>>> curricula were to be >>>> consistent with the view of >>>> education as the practice >>>> of creating >>>> conditions for certain >>>> attitudes and >>>> dispositions to >>>> emerge--which is what >>>> I was >>>> suggesting in the >>>> paragraph you >>>> copy--curricula would not >>>> be so much about >>>> standardized contents, but >>>> about >>>> human sensitivities and >>>> relations. So, >>>> I would >>>> say, no, standardized >>>> testing is not in >>>> principle in line >>>> with what >>>> I was trying to say. >>>> >>>> I was trying to >>>> make a distinction >>>> between trying to >>>> design someone's >>>> >>>> particular experience, and >>>> trying to >>>> design >>>> conditions for the development >>>> of attitudes and >>>> orientations. The >>>> first is >>>> likely impossible. The second >>>> seems to make more sense. >>>> >>>> One may of course >>>> wonder >>>> whether those >>>> attitudes and >>>> orientations can >>>> >>>> be considered general, and >>>> then form >>>> part of >>>> standardize measures instead >>>> of the traditional >>>> "contents and >>>> skills". But >>>> measuring assumes some >>>> quantitative increment in >>>> a particular >>>> aspect >>>> as the result of learning. >>>> Growth and development, >>>> however, are about >>>> qualitative change. So, as >>>> soon >>>> as you start measuring you >>>> would be >>>> missing >>>> growth and development. So, >>>> again, no. I would not say >>>> that >>>> high-stakes >>>> standardized testing is in >>>> line >>>> with what I was trying to say. >>>> >>>> I hope I have >>>> answered your >>>> question, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>>> 07:48 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, >>>> Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>> Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Alfredo, you say: >>>> >>>> "However, we >>>> cannot aim at >>>> determining >>>> any particular >>>> >>>> situation/experience. The >>>> same may be said >>>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>>> intend to communicate the >>>> curriculum >>>> and make >>>> it the content of the >>>> students' experience in >>>> the way we >>>> intend. But >>>> we can try to create the >>>> conditions for certain >>>> attitudes and >>>> dispositions to emerge." >>>> >>>> Would you say that >>>> high-stakes >>>> standardized >>>> testing is in >>>> line with >>>> >>>> your construal of >>>> curriculum design? >>>> How about >>>> common core? >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 15, >>>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks a lot >>>> for the >>>> clarifications. I see now >>>> why it >>>> may be said that >>>> >>>> designers can aim at >>>> designing for >>>> constrains >>>> but not for affordances. I >>>> see that this way of >>>> talking is part of a >>>> designers' way to get things >>>> done, and that it may >>>> indeed be an >>>> effective >>>> way to design for >>>> place-making, as in the >>>> example that >>>> Michael >>>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>>> what we report in our >>>> study is about >>>> designers >>>> talking about how spatial >>>> features might afford some >>>> experiences >>>> in the >>>> museum while constraining >>>> others. >>>> >>>> I must admit, >>>> however, that I >>>> still consider >>>> the distinction >>>> >>>> problematic from an >>>> analytical perspective >>>> whenever our object of >>>> study is >>>> experience, situated >>>> action, or design as >>>> situated practice. A more >>>> correct >>>> way to talk is that >>>> affordances and >>>> constrains >>>> are the positive and >>>> negative >>>> sides/interpretations of a single >>>> unitary category. As an actual >>>> and concrete phenomenon, >>>> walking into >>>> a musuem >>>> implies both affordances and >>>> constrains at the same >>>> time, whether >>>> intended >>>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>>> whether other terminology, >>>> such as >>>> Ingold's >>>> notion of "correspondence," >>>> might be more appropriated >>>> when we >>>> talk about >>>> how materials and actions >>>> become entangled into >>>> particular >>>> trajectories. >>>> >>>> In any case, >>>> and as Rolf >>>> emphasizes, >>>> what the >>>> designers in >>>> our study >>>> >>>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>>> ways of being >>>> in the >>>> museum. Imagination versus >>>> prediction may be an >>>> interesting topic >>>> emerging here for further >>>> inquiry >>>> into design work. >>>> >>>> Another >>>> important (and >>>> related) >>>> issue that I >>>> think is >>>> emerging here >>>> >>>> has to do with the level >>>> of generality at >>>> which design intentions can be >>>> expected to work (just as >>>> Bateson >>>> argued with >>>> regard to prediction). At the >>>> level of generic social >>>> processes, and >>>> given a >>>> particular >>>> cultural-historical >>>> background, we as >>>> designers may try to make some >>>> generic situations more >>>> likely to >>>> occur than >>>> others (facilitating that more >>>> or less people end up >>>> together in a given >>>> place). However, we cannot >>>> aim at >>>> determining any particular >>>> situation/experience. The >>>> same may be >>>> said about >>>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>>> communicate the >>>> curriculum and make it the >>>> content of the students' >>>> experience in >>>> the way >>>> we intend. But we can try to >>>> create the conditions for >>>> certain >>>> attitudes >>>> and dispositions to emerge. >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 23:30 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>> >>>> I think Rolf >>>> may have >>>> addressed >>>> the question >>>> of the >>>> differences >>>> >>>> between affordances and >>>> constraints in his >>>> post. The way he described the >>>> designers as possibly >>>> setting up the >>>> corner >>>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>>> was a >>>> long time ago so I'm not >>>> sure if this >>>> is the >>>> way it was or the way I >>>> remember it, but let's >>>> just believe >>>> this is >>>> the way it was. The painting, >>>> I think there were three >>>> were set up in a >>>> corner off a main >>>> corridor. The >>>> lighting was dark, which >>>> if you have >>>> ever been >>>> to MOMA is different, in >>>> many other parts of the >>>> museum there >>>> is a good >>>> deal of natural light (there >>>> was this great fountain, I >>>> wonder if it is >>>> still there). The paintings >>>> were on tripods rather >>>> than hung on >>>> the walls >>>> and they were surrounded on >>>> three sides by walls. All >>>> of these I >>>> think >>>> would be considered restraints >>>> - pushing me in to the >>>> works rather than >>>> stepping back away. It was >>>> impossible for more than >>>> two or three >>>> people >>>> to view the paintings at one >>>> time and movement was >>>> limited, so >>>> there were >>>> fewer chances for social >>>> interactions (you were not >>>> going to >>>> pick up >>>> anybody looking at Jackson >>>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>>> brooding, making >>>> it more likely that viewers >>>> would move towards internal >>>> reflection. All >>>> of these were constraints that >>>> canalized perspectives and >>>> feelings >>>> viewing >>>> the paintings. You really had >>>> only two choices, you >>>> moved in to the >>>> paintings or you moved on, >>>> which I >>>> had done every previous >>>> time coming >>>> upon them. >>>> >>>> The painting >>>> itself though >>>> became >>>> an >>>> affordances, an object >>>> at the >>>> >>>> nexus of my journey >>>> through the >>>> museum, where >>>> I was in my life, and my >>>> abilities to perceive the >>>> painitings. This >>>> was something that could >>>> not be >>>> designed I think because >>>> nobody could >>>> think >>>> that moment was going to >>>> happen. So then what is >>>> a perceived >>>> affordance. Way back when >>>> there was >>>> also a Manet room. It was >>>> a round >>>> room with >>>> different variations of his >>>> water lilies in a circle. >>>> Almost the >>>> exact >>>> opposite in constraints it was >>>> large, airy, a lot of >>>> natural light. If you >>>> were looking to brood you went >>>> somewhere else. In the >>>> middle of the >>>> room was >>>> a wooden structure (not an >>>> obvious bench), but you >>>> realized as random >>>> colors dissolved into water >>>> lilies that you wanted to >>>> sit down. You >>>> naturally moved to the >>>> center of >>>> the room and sat >>>> (wondering if a guard >>>> would >>>> come and tell you it was >>>> actually an important >>>> piece of art and you >>>> should get off). The designer >>>> anticipates a desire to >>>> soak in the >>>> room, to >>>> almost get dizzy in the >>>> lights, and included in >>>> the design the >>>> piece >>>> of wood that will have the >>>> perceived affordance for >>>> sitting, changing >>>> your concept of time and >>>> space. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original >>>> Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> [mailto: >>>> >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>] On Behalf >>>> Of Alfredo >>>> >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> Sent: >>>> Wednesday, July 15, >>>> 2015 3:01 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Thanks Michael, >>>> >>>> I think we are >>>> saying the same >>>> things, >>>> indeed, or at >>>> least more or >>>> >>>> less. I am quite certain >>>> that Bateson >>>> referred >>>> to energy, and that he used >>>> the mentioned examples (or >>>> similar >>>> ones) to >>>> show how the energy that moves >>>> the pig is not a direct >>>> transfer of energy >>>> from the kick, whereas in the >>>> case of the billiard >>>> balls, the >>>> movement of >>>> one ball is caused by the >>>> energy that the kicking >>>> ball brings. I >>>> might >>>> be wrong in the context within >>>> which Bateson was >>>> discussing the >>>> example, and >>>> I see that your account is in >>>> that regard is more >>>> accurate. But the >>>> point is >>>> the same: you can not intend >>>> the outcomes of a system >>>> by addressing >>>> only >>>> its parts as if they were >>>> connected directly, in a >>>> linear causal >>>> fashion; as if the whole >>>> was the sum >>>> of its parts. I do see a >>>> link with >>>> Vygotsky's >>>> rejection of S-R and his >>>> inclusion of a third >>>> element that >>>> transforms >>>> the whole system. >>>> >>>> But I totally >>>> agree with your >>>> comments on design >>>> intentions as they >>>> >>>> relate to ecology, and I, >>>> as I know >>>> also Rolf >>>> does, also like very much the >>>> notion of ecology to >>>> address these issues. >>>> >>>> If I read you >>>> correctly, and >>>> citing Don >>>> Norman (whose >>>> work I >>>> ignore), >>>> >>>> you suggest the >>>> possibility that the >>>> relations >>>> between design intentions >>>> and actual experience >>>> could be thought >>>> of in >>>> terms of different levels? >>>> That one thing is to >>>> design for what is >>>> general, but that we >>>> cannot design >>>> for the particular. Is >>>> that right? If >>>> so, I >>>> think that Bateson had a >>>> similar argument on >>>> prediction, does >>>> not him? >>>> That we can predict on >>>> general levels (e.g. >>>> population), but >>>> not at >>>> the level of the particular >>>> (e.g., individual). I >>>> haven't gone >>>> that way, >>>> but seems a promising road to >>>> consider this jumps >>>> between levels of >>>> generality or scales. >>>> >>>> Finally, I am >>>> not sure if >>>> I get >>>> what you mean >>>> when you say >>>> that we can >>>> >>>> design for constrains but >>>> not for >>>> affordances. >>>> I still see that the one >>>> presupposes the other; you can >>>> separate them >>>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>>> experience, a constrain is an >>>> affordance and >>>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>>> the road has any inherent >>>> constrain >>>> that could >>>> not be an affordance at the >>>> same time. Of course, if >>>> you take the >>>> normative stance that >>>> roads are for >>>> cars driving through them, >>>> you may be >>>> right. >>>> But if we think of roads as >>>> asphalt on the ground, as >>>> yet more >>>> ground only >>>> of a different shape, >>>> texture, and color, how is >>>> that a >>>> constrain >>>> but not an affordance? Or an >>>> affordance but not a >>>> constrain? Of course, >>>> culture constrains once >>>> you are >>>> within the road and you >>>> are driving. >>>> But then, >>>> the constrain is not in the >>>> road, as you seem to >>>> suggest, but in the >>>> journey; in the journeyman >>>> that >>>> carries some cultural way >>>> of orienting and >>>> affectively relating to its >>>> environment so that particular >>>> constrains are >>>> taken for granted despite the >>>> possibility of being >>>> otherwise. But I >>>> might >>>> not have thought it well/long >>>> enough and of course I >>>> might be wrong. >>>> I would >>>> like to understand your >>>> position here better. >>>> >>>> Thanks! >>>> Alfredo >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 20:32 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>> >>>> I have been >>>> reading Bateson >>>> through a >>>> cybernetics lens >>>> lately >>>> (Bateson >>>> >>>> along with Lewin and his >>>> wife Margaret >>>> Mead >>>> were part of the original >>>> Sears >>>> conferences) and I'm not >>>> sure that's >>>> right or >>>> I am victim to the "when you >>>> have a hammer, everything >>>> looks like a >>>> nail" >>>> but.... >>>> >>>> I think >>>> Bateson was >>>> arguing with >>>> those looking >>>> to apply the >>>> more >>>> >>>> physical/mathematical >>>> origins of >>>> cybernetics >>>> to human or really (pace the >>>> pig story) and system that >>>> moves >>>> beyond simple >>>> physical feedback loops. I >>>> think his larger point is that >>>> everything has >>>> a response within the larger >>>> feedback system that >>>> exists but we >>>> cannot go - >>>> what Bateson refers to as >>>> MIND. Attempts to create >>>> and control >>>> feedback >>>> loops, to try and design a >>>> system for specific types >>>> of feedback is a >>>> dangerous proposition. >>>> >>>> This I think >>>> is the reason >>>> that >>>> affordances >>>> really can't >>>> be designed >>>> >>>> into an ecology, only a >>>> recognition of the >>>> context in which actions are >>>> taking place (and I say >>>> this having no >>>> idea >>>> what Gibson's relationship to >>>> cybernetics was). Taking >>>> Larry's >>>> example of >>>> the girl it is perhaps also >>>> likely that the girl could >>>> have taken the >>>> fixing of hair as a >>>> criticism, an >>>> attack, and it might have >>>> destroyed her >>>> confidence. Both make >>>> sense in >>>> terms of feedback loops, >>>> but only ad >>>> hoc. So >>>> if a designer does in some >>>> way design that experience >>>> into the >>>> action, >>>> even without meaning they are >>>> taking a large chance, >>>> because they do not >>>> know the trajectory it will >>>> take. We simply need >>>> objects that are >>>> part of >>>> our journey, part of the >>>> larger context but not >>>> designed for >>>> purpose, >>>> for feedback. There is no >>>> assumption about trajectory. >>>> >>>> I think Don >>>> Norman sort of >>>> muddied >>>> the waters on >>>> this, but in an >>>> >>>> interesting way. That we >>>> can assume >>>> people >>>> are going to want to do >>>> certain >>>> things in a very general >>>> environment - >>>> when you enter a dark room >>>> you want >>>> light, so it is possible >>>> to design objects >>>> that meet that need that >>>> we are >>>> more likely to find in the >>>> moment that >>>> we need >>>> them. But I think that is >>>> very different from the >>>> idea of >>>> specifically >>>> guiding feedback loops that >>>> even take generalized >>>> experience in a >>>> certain >>>> direction. I am thinking >>>> about Dewey, and he makes >>>> a similar >>>> argument >>>> to Bateson with his concept of >>>> transactions. Although he >>>> does seem >>>> to think >>>> that it is possible to create >>>> a larger field of action >>>> so we can see at >>>> least local >>>> interrelationships. >>>> But his idea of experience >>>> is also >>>> very much >>>> one of discovery based on >>>> needs at the immediate >>>> moment - social >>>> relations act as a vehicle >>>> for these >>>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>>> course was writing >>>> before Gibson and for most >>>> of his >>>> life before cybernetics. I also >>>> wonder what >>>> he thought of cybernetics). >>>> >>>> I think I >>>> disagree with you, >>>> constraints >>>> are not about the >>>> journey but >>>> >>>> about the road. If you >>>> build a road >>>> on the >>>> side of the river you are >>>> constrained because no >>>> matter what, >>>> you cannot >>>> turn right. Your direction >>>> has already been partially >>>> determined >>>> by the >>>> designer of the road. But the >>>> mistake we make is in >>>> thinking that also >>>> controls the trajectory of the >>>> individual's journey. The >>>> effect of >>>> designers >>>> on trajectories of action is >>>> important, but limited. >>>> >>>> The primary >>>> place that >>>> designers >>>> have influence on >>>> affordances it >>>> >>>> seems to me is by being >>>> able to create a >>>> unique context for an >>>> individual's >>>> and a group's that limit >>>> possible >>>> trajectories >>>> on an individual's journey. >>>> But we should never >>>> mistake those >>>> constraints >>>> for affordances. I think >>>> Bateson might argue it is >>>> hubris to do so. >>>> Perhaps this is what you are >>>> saying Alfredo. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original >>>> Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>] On >>>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> Sent: >>>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>>> 12:38 PM >>>> To: Rolf >>>> Steier; eXtended >>>> Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> I'd like to >>>> follow up on >>>> Michael's >>>> post by asking >>>> a question: >>>> Are not >>>> >>>> affordances presupposed by >>>> constraints >>>> and are >>>> not constraints presupposed >>>> by affordances? If so, I >>>> would wonder >>>> whether >>>> it makes sense to ask whether >>>> museums should be designed for >>>> affordances and >>>> constraints. >>>> >>>> What I think >>>> is clear from the >>>> anecdote that >>>> you bring >>>> about the >>>> >>>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>>> that whatever >>>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>>> somewhere (i.e. being >>>> someone at some >>>> time in >>>> some place) cannot be >>>> INTENDED. And I think this >>>> applies both to >>>> designers and users, to those >>>> who set things up for you to >>>> experience and to >>>> you, who could not foresee >>>> what your experience was >>>> going to turn you >>>> into before you go through it. >>>> >>>> I think that >>>> the big issue >>>> that >>>> you bring on >>>> the table (to >>>> continue >>>> >>>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>>> to do with a >>>> difference between physical >>>> relations and social >>>> relations, and >>>> the idea >>>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>>> noticed that the relations >>>> that are the >>>> subject matter in physics >>>> are not >>>> the same as those that are >>>> the subject >>>> matter >>>> in communication. He noticed >>>> that physical relations >>>> (relations >>>> that are >>>> the object of study of >>>> physics) >>>> transfer energy in direct >>>> manners: a >>>> billiard >>>> ball hits another ball and we >>>> can anticipate the exact >>>> speed and >>>> direction >>>> that the second ball will take >>>> based on the energy that >>>> is in the >>>> system ball >>>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>>> living beings, the things >>>> are different. >>>> Bateson explained, if we >>>> kick a >>>> pig's ass (I think he used >>>> this somehow >>>> bizarre example) the >>>> reaction of >>>> the pig is not accounted >>>> for by the energy >>>> that is contained in the kick, >>>> at least not in a direct >>>> manner. The >>>> energy >>>> that moves the pig is from a >>>> different source. Before >>>> Bateson, it was >>>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>>> mediation who would most >>>> clearly state >>>> that >>>> social relations are not >>>> direct, but mediated. >>>> >>>> So, how can >>>> design go >>>> about this? >>>> If we, along >>>> with Dewey and >>>> >>>> Vygotsky, consider >>>> experience to be a >>>> unity of >>>> person and environment, and >>>> we assume as well that >>>> this is a >>>> social (not >>>> just individual) category, and >>>> that how a situation is >>>> experienced is >>>> also >>>> refracted through the social >>>> relations within which we >>>> engage, the most >>>> designers can do is to foster >>>> social relations go on, giving >>>> afordances to >>>> prcesses of signification, >>>> without intending to embed >>>> meanings. It is >>>> about affordances/constraints, >>>> but not about how to interpret >>>> something, but >>>> about going about >>>> interpreting. I think. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 18:04 >>>> To: Rolf >>>> Steier; eXtended >>>> Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> So after >>>> reading the >>>> article and >>>> the e-mail >>>> discussion I'm >>>> beginning >>>> >>>> to think there is a really >>>> big issue >>>> here that >>>> I am trying to grapple with, >>>> especially in terms of >>>> boundary >>>> objects (which >>>> I admittedly do not >>>> understand very well). And it relates >>>> to the >>>> metaphor of the table (both >>>> as discussed by Larry and >>>> Ingold as >>>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>>> is this, in >>>> the museum should the >>>> place be set up as >>>> affordances, perceived >>>> affordances, or >>>> constraints? It seems the >>>> museum in the study has >>>> potential affordances for >>>> the users. The >>>> cultural historical moment >>>> (unable to think of any >>>> other word) of the >>>> museum sets the context, >>>> meaning >>>> those walking through the >>>> museum are >>>> going to >>>> be restricted by the >>>> historical and cultural >>>> boundaries >>>> leading up >>>> to the art work, along with >>>> the expectations and needs >>>> of the >>>> individuals >>>> moving through the museum, >>>> but they will come across >>>> objects/artifacts >>>> that they think meets the >>>> needs >>>> >>>> >> > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Jul 22 08:45:48 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 01:45:48 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> References: <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no>, <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no>, <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55AFBAAC.3050301@mira.net> Well, they're Yrjo's words so he will have to tell you, but I can tell you how I've construed them. Not until you asked, did I see that there is ambiguity in the phrase. I had always taken it that the purpose and motive is "in the nature" of the Arbeitsgegenstand. I think Yrjo gives an example somewhere of a person who is ill - it is obvious that the illness needs to be cured. So I read "in itself" literally. "in it" would be the same. But there is an alternative Hegelian reading, that in the Arbeitsgegenstand, the is an OBJECT which is only "in itself," that is, not yet realised, and that makes good sense. It slides over the point that Larry raised, that the OBJECT is not in the Arbeitsgegenstand alone but in the relation of the Arbeitsgegenstand to the Subject, but that is consistent with how Hegel uses the phrase "in itself." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 23/07/2015 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very much in line with the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > I have many questions, most of which I should find in the literature rather than bother here. But I would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote that the object "carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." What does "in itself" mean here? > Thanks again for a very informative post, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the > word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent > some different terms. > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the > triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what > is motivating all the members of the design team when they > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in > the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is > *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in > Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some > problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but > *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique > elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation > but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and > aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of > postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >> >> To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >> ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). >> >> As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. >> >> I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those questions. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >> >> There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this discussion. >> >> First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >> >> However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. >> >> For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call it Activity Theory? >> >> Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. >> >> Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. >> >> Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Andy, all, >> I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. >> >> At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. >> >> Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). >> >> When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). >> Any thoughts? >> >> Alfredo >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some >> role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a >> symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and >> one subject challenges that role and turns the object into >> its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. >> A number of examples spring to mind. >> >> * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are >> embraced by a despised group who take control of the >> word and assertively embrace it; >> * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their >> stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; >> * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon >> against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before >> them rather than in shame); >> * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which >> put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by >> printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and >> obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and >> read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >> organising tool; >> * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / >> Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared >> object (the land); >> * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool >> for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it >> from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a >> symbol of India. >> >> In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when >> she introduced the term, but core point is that the >> ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to >> contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an >> artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. >> >> Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >> mediating artefact or the object of work >> (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these >> cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according >> to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >> Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >>> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? >>> Henry >>> >>> >>>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>>> Thanks Rolf! >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>>>> man-of-the-world. >>>>> Does that make better sense? >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>>>> but also the ideological context. >>>>> >>>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>>>> and regulations, communications resources, >>>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I think that a particular institution or >>>>> government system could potentially be a >>>>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>>>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>>>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>>>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>>>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>>>> >>>>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>>>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>>>> would say that one would have to justify the >>>>> utility of applying the concept to a >>>>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>>>> object within an institution. >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Phew! >>>>> So would it be correct to describe the >>>>> government >>>>> institutions and political system are >>>>> "boundary objects"? >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Andy - >>>>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>>>> and should >>>>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>>>> Thank you for >>>>> pointing that out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>>>> suggestion that >>>>> Greg made in the other thread >>>>> suggesting we look >>>>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>>>> been familiar >>>>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>>>> after doing >>>>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>>>> found his >>>>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>>>> potentially >>>>> useful in dealing with some of my >>>>> questions.( >>>>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>>>> ) >>>>> >>>>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>>>> unexpected >>>>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>>>> >>>>> /The logic is that unexpected >>>>> metaphors arise >>>>> from the >>>>> need to create images when the >>>>> culture does >>>>> not have >>>>> them readily at hand. These images >>>>> join linguistic >>>>> content as growth points and >>>>> differentiate what >>>>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>>>> predicates, or >>>>> points of contrast in the >>>>> immediate ongoing >>>>> context of >>>>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>>>> precisely >>>>> because they >>>>> are outside the conventions of >>>>> language and >>>>> culture, >>>>> can capture abstractions in novel >>>>> ways and >>>>> provide the >>>>> fluidity of thought and language >>>>> that is the >>>>> essence >>>>> of ongoing discourse./ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>>>> Blunden >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>>>> achievement of >>>>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>>>> p. 131, >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Are we allowed to ask >>>>> questions about our >>>>> paper as >>>>> well? I hope so! >>>>> >>>>> For a little context -in our >>>>> paper, we >>>>> identified >>>>> particular kinds of >>>>> episodes in which participants >>>>> from different >>>>> disciplines seek coherence >>>>> and continuity of shared >>>>> representations >>>>> through >>>>> bodily action. These >>>>> actions include gesture, >>>>> movement and physical >>>>> performance linking the >>>>> present material artifacts to >>>>> objects of >>>>> design. >>>>> Most of these episodes >>>>> seem to involve some form of >>>>> improvisation, >>>>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>>>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>>>> characterize >>>>> these >>>>> aspects of the >>>>> interactions. In most cases, the >>>>> participants seem >>>>> to be searching for the >>>>> best words or material >>>>> representation to >>>>> convey a >>>>> particular intention - >>>>> when this becomes problematic >>>>> or limiting >>>>> - they >>>>> almost fall back on what >>>>> is available - these >>>>> improvised bodily >>>>> performances - as a way of >>>>> maintaining continuity, and of >>>>> inviting >>>>> co-participants into a shared and >>>>> imagined space. These bodily >>>>> actions don't >>>>> seem to >>>>> begin the proposals, but >>>>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>>>> participants. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think there is something >>>>> really fascinating >>>>> about this kind of creativity >>>>> and resourcefulness in >>>>> interaction that >>>>> could be >>>>> explored more deeply - and >>>>> that I'm having trouble >>>>> articulating. >>>>> Maybe some >>>>> of you have some thoughts >>>>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>>>> we've talked >>>>> about this >>>>> a bit before so maybe you >>>>> can add a little clarity to my >>>>> question. >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>>>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo, >>>>> Thank you very much for >>>>> the sketch of your >>>>> roots. I taught English in >>>>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>>>> for 5 years >>>>> back in >>>>> the early 70s, just before >>>>> Franco died. (He died the >>>>> day I >>>>> boarded the >>>>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>>>> and language are interesting, >>>>> especially where >>>>> language varieties meet. >>>>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>>>> from my >>>>> familiarity >>>>> with the music of Catalunya >>>>> and Mallorca that the speech >>>>> communities in >>>>> each of those places treasure >>>>> their unique languages >>>>> (Catalan and >>>>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>>>> commonality >>>>> vis-a-vis their >>>>> separateness from >>>>> Castilian >>>>> Spanish, the national language >>>>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>>>> see a parallel >>>>> between your work on boundary >>>>> objects, where individual >>>>> persons >>>>> collaborate >>>>> to create spaces, AND >>>>> boundary objects >>>>> "negotiated" by groups of >>>>> people who live in real >>>>> spaces. >>>>> I am thinking, among other >>>>> things, of >>>>> indigeneity, a big topic >>>>> here in New >>>>> Mexico, with so many >>>>> Native Americans. >>>>> Assymetries of power. >>>>> Bullying. >>>>> Testing and curriculum become >>>>> instruments of >>>>> war by other means. I hope my >>>>> tone does not distract >>>>> from, nor >>>>> diminish, the >>>>> optimism created by this >>>>> thread. Yet I think that >>>>> optimism is so >>>>> precious because of the >>>>> ground (the >>>>> world) of the dialog. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>>>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>>>> Jornet Gil >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Well, you could say >>>>> that I am partly >>>>> Catalan. I grew up in >>>>> the province >>>>> >>>>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>>>> language is >>>>> official language together >>>>> with >>>>> Castilian Spanish. >>>>> Although Valencia (the >>>>> county) and Catalonia are >>>>> different regional >>>>> counties, Catalan >>>>> is spoken >>>>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>>>> the Balear Islands. Some >>>>> call the three >>>>> together as the Catalan >>>>> Countries. >>>>> I don't like borders, but >>>>> I respect >>>>> and enjoy >>>>> cultural diversity. >>>>> >>>>> Standardized testing, >>>>> and the whole >>>>> assumptions behind it, >>>>> are an issue >>>>> >>>>> also in Spain and in >>>>> Catalonia; but >>>>> education >>>>> has been so battered during >>>>> the last years of right-wing >>>>> government that I >>>>> the debate have been more >>>>> about means and access >>>>> than about >>>>> contents and >>>>> aims. Which in some sense >>>>> may be good because it >>>>> moves the >>>>> debates away >>>>> from performance. But I have >>>>> been living outside of >>>>> Spain for eight >>>>> years >>>>> now, so I am not the best to >>>>> update you on this either. >>>>> >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> on >>>>> behalf of >>>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>>> Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>> The Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo, >>>>> Yes, you have answered >>>>> my question >>>>> very >>>>> nicely! I especially >>>>> appreciate >>>>> >>>>> that you were willing to >>>>> wrestle with my >>>>> question, despite your lack of >>>>> familiarity with the >>>>> issues here in >>>>> the U.S. >>>>> Am I wrong, or are you >>>>> Catalan? In which case >>>>> your experience in >>>>> Catalunya would take you to a >>>>> different place in critiquing >>>>> schooling there, >>>>> though not necessarily >>>>> unconnected to yours and >>>>> Rolf's work on >>>>> boundary objects. I just >>>>> met for >>>>> the second day in a row >>>>> with a friend >>>>> who is >>>>> the liaison between our public >>>>> school district and a >>>>> children's science >>>>> museum called Explora. I >>>>> feel like >>>>> I'm swimming in this >>>>> thread, talk about a >>>>> mixed metaphor! >>>>> >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>>>> at 12:18 AM, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> Jornet Gil >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I am sorry, Henry, >>>>> but I am >>>>> not very >>>>> familiar with >>>>> high-stakes >>>>> >>>>> standardized testing (as >>>>> different to >>>>> standardized testing in >>>>> general) or >>>>> with common core (which I >>>>> quickly read >>>>> is an >>>>> issue in US). But I would say >>>>> that, if (school) >>>>> curricula were to be >>>>> consistent with the view of >>>>> education as the practice >>>>> of creating >>>>> conditions for certain >>>>> attitudes and >>>>> dispositions to >>>>> emerge--which is what >>>>> I was >>>>> suggesting in the >>>>> paragraph you >>>>> copy--curricula would not >>>>> be so much about >>>>> standardized contents, but >>>>> about >>>>> human sensitivities and >>>>> relations. So, >>>>> I would >>>>> say, no, standardized >>>>> testing is not in >>>>> principle in line >>>>> with what >>>>> I was trying to say. >>>>> >>>>> I was trying to >>>>> make a distinction >>>>> between trying to >>>>> design someone's >>>>> >>>>> particular experience, and >>>>> trying to >>>>> design >>>>> conditions for the development >>>>> of attitudes and >>>>> orientations. The >>>>> first is >>>>> likely impossible. The second >>>>> seems to make more sense. >>>>> >>>>> One may of course >>>>> wonder >>>>> whether those >>>>> attitudes and >>>>> orientations can >>>>> >>>>> be considered general, and >>>>> then form >>>>> part of >>>>> standardize measures instead >>>>> of the traditional >>>>> "contents and >>>>> skills". But >>>>> measuring assumes some >>>>> quantitative increment in >>>>> a particular >>>>> aspect >>>>> as the result of learning. >>>>> Growth and development, >>>>> however, are about >>>>> qualitative change. So, as >>>>> soon >>>>> as you start measuring you >>>>> would be >>>>> missing >>>>> growth and development. So, >>>>> again, no. I would not say >>>>> that >>>>> high-stakes >>>>> standardized testing is in >>>>> line >>>>> with what I was trying to say. >>>>> >>>>> I hope I have >>>>> answered your >>>>> question, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> on >>>>> behalf of >>>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>>>> 07:48 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>>> Culture, >>>>> Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>> Re: The >>>>> Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo, you say: >>>>> >>>>> "However, we >>>>> cannot aim at >>>>> determining >>>>> any particular >>>>> >>>>> situation/experience. The >>>>> same may be said >>>>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>>>> intend to communicate the >>>>> curriculum >>>>> and make >>>>> it the content of the >>>>> students' experience in >>>>> the way we >>>>> intend. But >>>>> we can try to create the >>>>> conditions for certain >>>>> attitudes and >>>>> dispositions to emerge." >>>>> >>>>> Would you say that >>>>> high-stakes >>>>> standardized >>>>> testing is in >>>>> line with >>>>> >>>>> your construal of >>>>> curriculum design? >>>>> How about >>>>> common core? >>>>> >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Jul 15, >>>>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>>>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thanks a lot >>>>> for the >>>>> clarifications. I see now >>>>> why it >>>>> may be said that >>>>> >>>>> designers can aim at >>>>> designing for >>>>> constrains >>>>> but not for affordances. I >>>>> see that this way of >>>>> talking is part of a >>>>> designers' way to get things >>>>> done, and that it may >>>>> indeed be an >>>>> effective >>>>> way to design for >>>>> place-making, as in the >>>>> example that >>>>> Michael >>>>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>>>> what we report in our >>>>> study is about >>>>> designers >>>>> talking about how spatial >>>>> features might afford some >>>>> experiences >>>>> in the >>>>> museum while constraining >>>>> others. >>>>> >>>>> I must admit, >>>>> however, that I >>>>> still consider >>>>> the distinction >>>>> >>>>> problematic from an >>>>> analytical perspective >>>>> whenever our object of >>>>> study is >>>>> experience, situated >>>>> action, or design as >>>>> situated practice. A more >>>>> correct >>>>> way to talk is that >>>>> affordances and >>>>> constrains >>>>> are the positive and >>>>> negative >>>>> sides/interpretations of a single >>>>> unitary category. As an actual >>>>> and concrete phenomenon, >>>>> walking into >>>>> a musuem >>>>> implies both affordances and >>>>> constrains at the same >>>>> time, whether >>>>> intended >>>>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>>>> whether other terminology, >>>>> such as >>>>> Ingold's >>>>> notion of "correspondence," >>>>> might be more appropriated >>>>> when we >>>>> talk about >>>>> how materials and actions >>>>> become entangled into >>>>> particular >>>>> trajectories. >>>>> >>>>> In any case, >>>>> and as Rolf >>>>> emphasizes, >>>>> what the >>>>> designers in >>>>> our study >>>>> >>>>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>>>> ways of being >>>>> in the >>>>> museum. Imagination versus >>>>> prediction may be an >>>>> interesting topic >>>>> emerging here for further >>>>> inquiry >>>>> into design work. >>>>> >>>>> Another >>>>> important (and >>>>> related) >>>>> issue that I >>>>> think is >>>>> emerging here >>>>> >>>>> has to do with the level >>>>> of generality at >>>>> which design intentions can be >>>>> expected to work (just as >>>>> Bateson >>>>> argued with >>>>> regard to prediction). At the >>>>> level of generic social >>>>> processes, and >>>>> given a >>>>> particular >>>>> cultural-historical >>>>> background, we as >>>>> designers may try to make some >>>>> generic situations more >>>>> likely to >>>>> occur than >>>>> others (facilitating that more >>>>> or less people end up >>>>> together in a given >>>>> place). However, we cannot >>>>> aim at >>>>> determining any particular >>>>> situation/experience. The >>>>> same may be >>>>> said about >>>>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>>>> communicate the >>>>> curriculum and make it the >>>>> content of the students' >>>>> experience in >>>>> the way >>>>> we intend. But we can try to >>>>> create the conditions for >>>>> certain >>>>> attitudes >>>>> and dispositions to emerge. >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> on >>>>> behalf of >>>>> Glassman, Michael >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent: 15 July >>>>> 2015 23:30 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>>> Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: >>>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>>> Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>>> >>>>> I think Rolf >>>>> may have >>>>> addressed >>>>> the question >>>>> of the >>>>> differences >>>>> >>>>> between affordances and >>>>> constraints in his >>>>> post. The way he described the >>>>> designers as possibly >>>>> setting up the >>>>> corner >>>>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>>>> was a >>>>> long time ago so I'm not >>>>> sure if this >>>>> is the >>>>> way it was or the way I >>>>> remember it, but let's >>>>> just believe >>>>> this is >>>>> the way it was. The painting, >>>>> I think there were three >>>>> were set up in a >>>>> corner off a main >>>>> corridor. The >>>>> lighting was dark, which >>>>> if you have >>>>> ever been >>>>> to MOMA is different, in >>>>> many other parts of the >>>>> museum there >>>>> is a good >>>>> deal of natural light (there >>>>> was this great fountain, I >>>>> wonder if it is >>>>> still there). The paintings >>>>> were on tripods rather >>>>> than hung on >>>>> the walls >>>>> and they were surrounded on >>>>> three sides by walls. All >>>>> of these I >>>>> think >>>>> would be considered restraints >>>>> - pushing me in to the >>>>> works rather than >>>>> stepping back away. It was >>>>> impossible for more than >>>>> two or three >>>>> people >>>>> to view the paintings at one >>>>> time and movement was >>>>> limited, so >>>>> there were >>>>> fewer chances for social >>>>> interactions (you were not >>>>> going to >>>>> pick up >>>>> anybody looking at Jackson >>>>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>>>> brooding, making >>>>> it more likely that viewers >>>>> would move towards internal >>>>> reflection. All >>>>> of these were constraints that >>>>> canalized perspectives and >>>>> feelings >>>>> viewing >>>>> the paintings. You really had >>>>> only two choices, you >>>>> moved in to the >>>>> paintings or you moved on, >>>>> which I >>>>> had done every previous >>>>> time coming >>>>> upon them. >>>>> >>>>> The painting >>>>> itself though >>>>> became >>>>> an >>>>> affordances, an object >>>>> at the >>>>> >>>>> nexus of my journey >>>>> through the >>>>> museum, where >>>>> I was in my life, and my >>>>> abilities to perceive the >>>>> painitings. This >>>>> was something that could >>>>> not be >>>>> designed I think because >>>>> nobody could >>>>> think >>>>> that moment was going to >>>>> happen. So then what is >>>>> a perceived >>>>> affordance. Way back when >>>>> there was >>>>> also a Manet room. It was >>>>> a round >>>>> room with >>>>> different variations of his >>>>> water lilies in a circle. >>>>> Almost the >>>>> exact >>>>> opposite in constraints it was >>>>> large, airy, a lot of >>>>> natural light. If you >>>>> were looking to brood you went >>>>> somewhere else. In the >>>>> middle of the >>>>> room was >>>>> a wooden structure (not an >>>>> obvious bench), but you >>>>> realized as random >>>>> colors dissolved into water >>>>> lilies that you wanted to >>>>> sit down. You >>>>> naturally moved to the >>>>> center of >>>>> the room and sat >>>>> (wondering if a guard >>>>> would >>>>> come and tell you it was >>>>> actually an important >>>>> piece of art and you >>>>> should get off). The designer >>>>> anticipates a desire to >>>>> soak in the >>>>> room, to >>>>> almost get dizzy in the >>>>> lights, and included in >>>>> the design the >>>>> piece >>>>> of wood that will have the >>>>> perceived affordance for >>>>> sitting, changing >>>>> your concept of time and >>>>> space. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> -----Original >>>>> Message----- >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> [mailto: >>>>> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>] On Behalf >>>>> Of Alfredo >>>>> >>>>> Jornet Gil >>>>> >>>>> Sent: >>>>> Wednesday, July 15, >>>>> 2015 3:01 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>>> Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: >>>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>>> Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Thanks Michael, >>>>> >>>>> I think we are >>>>> saying the same >>>>> things, >>>>> indeed, or at >>>>> least more or >>>>> >>>>> less. I am quite certain >>>>> that Bateson >>>>> referred >>>>> to energy, and that he used >>>>> the mentioned examples (or >>>>> similar >>>>> ones) to >>>>> show how the energy that moves >>>>> the pig is not a direct >>>>> transfer of energy >>>>> from the kick, whereas in the >>>>> case of the billiard >>>>> balls, the >>>>> movement of >>>>> one ball is caused by the >>>>> energy that the kicking >>>>> ball brings. I >>>>> might >>>>> be wrong in the context within >>>>> which Bateson was >>>>> discussing the >>>>> example, and >>>>> I see that your account is in >>>>> that regard is more >>>>> accurate. But the >>>>> point is >>>>> the same: you can not intend >>>>> the outcomes of a system >>>>> by addressing >>>>> only >>>>> its parts as if they were >>>>> connected directly, in a >>>>> linear causal >>>>> fashion; as if the whole >>>>> was the sum >>>>> of its parts. I do see a >>>>> link with >>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>> rejection of S-R and his >>>>> inclusion of a third >>>>> element that >>>>> transforms >>>>> the whole system. >>>>> >>>>> But I totally >>>>> agree with your >>>>> comments on design >>>>> intentions as they >>>>> >>>>> relate to ecology, and I, >>>>> as I know >>>>> also Rolf >>>>> does, also like very much the >>>>> notion of ecology to >>>>> address these issues. >>>>> >>>>> If I read you >>>>> correctly, and >>>>> citing Don >>>>> Norman (whose >>>>> work I >>>>> ignore), >>>>> >>>>> you suggest the >>>>> possibility that the >>>>> relations >>>>> between design intentions >>>>> and actual experience >>>>> could be thought >>>>> of in >>>>> terms of different levels? >>>>> That one thing is to >>>>> design for what is >>>>> general, but that we >>>>> cannot design >>>>> for the particular. Is >>>>> that right? If >>>>> so, I >>>>> think that Bateson had a >>>>> similar argument on >>>>> prediction, does >>>>> not him? >>>>> That we can predict on >>>>> general levels (e.g. >>>>> population), but >>>>> not at >>>>> the level of the particular >>>>> (e.g., individual). I >>>>> haven't gone >>>>> that way, >>>>> but seems a promising road to >>>>> consider this jumps >>>>> between levels of >>>>> generality or scales. >>>>> >>>>> Finally, I am >>>>> not sure if >>>>> I get >>>>> what you mean >>>>> when you say >>>>> that we can >>>>> >>>>> design for constrains but >>>>> not for >>>>> affordances. >>>>> I still see that the one >>>>> presupposes the other; you can >>>>> separate them >>>>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>>>> experience, a constrain is an >>>>> affordance and >>>>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>>>> the road has any inherent >>>>> constrain >>>>> that could >>>>> not be an affordance at the >>>>> same time. Of course, if >>>>> you take the >>>>> normative stance that >>>>> roads are for >>>>> cars driving through them, >>>>> you may be >>>>> right. >>>>> But if we think of roads as >>>>> asphalt on the ground, as >>>>> yet more >>>>> ground only >>>>> of a different shape, >>>>> texture, and color, how is >>>>> that a >>>>> constrain >>>>> but not an affordance? Or an >>>>> affordance but not a >>>>> constrain? Of course, >>>>> culture constrains once >>>>> you are >>>>> within the road and you >>>>> are driving. >>>>> But then, >>>>> the constrain is not in the >>>>> road, as you seem to >>>>> suggest, but in the >>>>> journey; in the journeyman >>>>> that >>>>> carries some cultural way >>>>> of orienting and >>>>> affectively relating to its >>>>> environment so that particular >>>>> constrains are >>>>> taken for granted despite the >>>>> possibility of being >>>>> otherwise. But I >>>>> might >>>>> not have thought it well/long >>>>> enough and of course I >>>>> might be wrong. >>>>> I would >>>>> like to understand your >>>>> position here better. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks! >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> on >>>>> behalf of >>>>> Glassman, Michael >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent: 15 July >>>>> 2015 20:32 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>>> Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: >>>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>>> Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>>> >>>>> I have been >>>>> reading Bateson >>>>> through a >>>>> cybernetics lens >>>>> lately >>>>> (Bateson >>>>> >>>>> along with Lewin and his >>>>> wife Margaret >>>>> Mead >>>>> were part of the original >>>>> Sears >>>>> conferences) and I'm not >>>>> sure that's >>>>> right or >>>>> I am victim to the "when you >>>>> have a hammer, everything >>>>> looks like a >>>>> nail" >>>>> but.... >>>>> >>>>> I think >>>>> Bateson was >>>>> arguing with >>>>> those looking >>>>> to apply the >>>>> more >>>>> >>>>> physical/mathematical >>>>> origins of >>>>> cybernetics >>>>> to human or really (pace the >>>>> pig story) and system that >>>>> moves >>>>> beyond simple >>>>> physical feedback loops. I >>>>> think his larger point is that >>>>> everything has >>>>> a response within the larger >>>>> feedback system that >>>>> exists but we >>>>> cannot go - >>>>> what Bateson refers to as >>>>> MIND. Attempts to create >>>>> and control >>>>> feedback >>>>> loops, to try and design a >>>>> system for specific types >>>>> of feedback is a >>>>> dangerous proposition. >>>>> >>>>> This I think >>>>> is the reason >>>>> that >>>>> affordances >>>>> really can't >>>>> be designed >>>>> >>>>> into an ecology, only a >>>>> recognition of the >>>>> context in which actions are >>>>> taking place (and I say >>>>> this having no >>>>> idea >>>>> what Gibson's relationship to >>>>> cybernetics was). Taking >>>>> Larry's >>>>> example of >>>>> the girl it is perhaps also >>>>> likely that the girl could >>>>> have taken the >>>>> fixing of hair as a >>>>> criticism, an >>>>> attack, and it might have >>>>> destroyed her >>>>> confidence. Both make >>>>> sense in >>>>> terms of feedback loops, >>>>> but only ad >>>>> hoc. So >>>>> if a designer does in some >>>>> way design that experience >>>>> into the >>>>> action, >>>>> even without meaning they are >>>>> taking a large chance, >>>>> because they do not >>>>> know the trajectory it will >>>>> take. We simply need >>>>> objects that are >>>>> part of >>>>> our journey, part of the >>>>> larger context but not >>>>> designed for >>>>> purpose, >>>>> for feedback. There is no >>>>> assumption about trajectory. >>>>> >>>>> I think Don >>>>> Norman sort of >>>>> muddied >>>>> the waters on >>>>> this, but in an >>>>> >>>>> interesting way. That we >>>>> can assume >>>>> people >>>>> are going to want to do >>>>> certain >>>>> things in a very general >>>>> environment - >>>>> when you enter a dark room >>>>> you want >>>>> light, so it is possible >>>>> to design objects >>>>> that meet that need that >>>>> we are >>>>> more likely to find in the >>>>> moment that >>>>> we need >>>>> them. But I think that is >>>>> very different from the >>>>> idea of >>>>> specifically >>>>> guiding feedback loops that >>>>> even take generalized >>>>> experience in a >>>>> certain >>>>> direction. I am thinking >>>>> about Dewey, and he makes >>>>> a similar >>>>> argument >>>>> to Bateson with his concept of >>>>> transactions. Although he >>>>> does seem >>>>> to think >>>>> that it is possible to create >>>>> a larger field of action >>>>> so we can see at >>>>> least local >>>>> interrelationships. >>>>> But his idea of experience >>>>> is also >>>>> very much >>>>> one of discovery based on >>>>> needs at the immediate >>>>> moment - social >>>>> relations act as a vehicle >>>>> for these >>>>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>>>> course was writing >>>>> before Gibson and for most >>>>> of his >>>>> life before cybernetics. I also >>>>> wonder what >>>>> he thought of cybernetics). >>>>> >>>>> I think I >>>>> disagree with you, >>>>> constraints >>>>> are not about the >>>>> journey but >>>>> >>>>> about the road. If you >>>>> build a road >>>>> on the >>>>> side of the river you are >>>>> constrained because no >>>>> matter what, >>>>> you cannot >>>>> turn right. Your direction >>>>> has already been partially >>>>> determined >>>>> by the >>>>> designer of the road. But the >>>>> mistake we make is in >>>>> thinking that also >>>>> controls the trajectory of the >>>>> individual's journey. The >>>>> effect of >>>>> designers >>>>> on trajectories of action is >>>>> important, but limited. >>>>> >>>>> The primary >>>>> place that >>>>> designers >>>>> have influence on >>>>> affordances it >>>>> >>>>> seems to me is by being >>>>> able to create a >>>>> unique context for an >>>>> individual's >>>>> and a group's that limit >>>>> possible >>>>> trajectories >>>>> on an individual's journey. >>>>> But we should never >>>>> mistake those >>>>> constraints >>>>> for affordances. I think >>>>> Bateson might argue it is >>>>> hubris to do so. >>>>> Perhaps this is what you are >>>>> saying Alfredo. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original >>>>> Message----- >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>] On >>>>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> >>>>> Sent: >>>>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>>>> 12:38 PM >>>>> To: Rolf >>>>> Steier; eXtended >>>>> Mind, >>>>> Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: >>>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>>> Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> I'd like to >>>>> follow up on >>>>> Michael's >>>>> post by asking >>>>> a question: >>>>> Are not >>>>> >>>>> affordances presupposed by >>>>> constraints >>>>> and are >>>>> not constraints presupposed >>>>> by affordances? If so, I >>>>> would wonder >>>>> whether >>>>> it makes sense to ask whether >>>>> museums should be designed for >>>>> affordances and >>>>> constraints. >>>>> >>>>> What I think >>>>> is clear from the >>>>> anecdote that >>>>> you bring >>>>> about the >>>>> >>>>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>>>> that whatever >>>>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>>>> somewhere (i.e. being >>>>> someone at some >>>>> time in >>>>> some place) cannot be >>>>> INTENDED. And I think this >>>>> applies both to >>>>> designers and users, to those >>>>> who set things up for you to >>>>> experience and to >>>>> you, who could not foresee >>>>> what your experience was >>>>> going to turn you >>>>> into before you go through it. >>>>> >>>>> I think that >>>>> the big issue >>>>> that >>>>> you bring on >>>>> the table (to >>>>> continue >>>>> >>>>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>>>> to do with a >>>>> difference between physical >>>>> relations and social >>>>> relations, and >>>>> the idea >>>>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>>>> noticed that the relations >>>>> that are the >>>>> subject matter in physics >>>>> are not >>>>> the same as those that are >>>>> the subject >>>>> matter >>>>> in communication. He noticed >>>>> that physical relations >>>>> (relations >>>>> that are >>>>> the object of study of >>>>> physics) >>>>> transfer energy in direct >>>>> manners: a >>>>> billiard >>>>> ball hits another ball and we >>>>> can anticipate the exact >>>>> speed and >>>>> direction >>>>> that the second ball will take >>>>> based on the energy that >>>>> is in the >>>>> system ball >>>>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>>>> living beings, the things >>>>> are different. >>>>> Bateson explained, if we >>>>> kick a >>>>> pig's ass (I think he used >>>>> this somehow >>>>> bizarre example) the >>>>> reaction of >>>>> the pig is not accounted >>>>> for by the energy >>>>> that is contained in the kick, >>>>> at least not in a direct >>>>> manner. The >>>>> energy >>>>> that moves the pig is from a >>>>> different source. Before >>>>> Bateson, it was >>>>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>>>> mediation who would most >>>>> clearly state >>>>> that >>>>> social relations are not >>>>> direct, but mediated. >>>>> >>>>> So, how can >>>>> design go >>>>> about this? >>>>> If we, along >>>>> with Dewey and >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky, consider >>>>> experience to be a >>>>> unity of >>>>> person and environment, and >>>>> we assume as well that >>>>> this is a >>>>> social (not >>>>> just individual) category, and >>>>> that how a situation is >>>>> experienced is >>>>> also >>>>> refracted through the social >>>>> relations within which we >>>>> engage, the most >>>>> designers can do is to foster >>>>> social relations go on, giving >>>>> afordances to >>>>> prcesses of signification, >>>>> without intending to embed >>>>> meanings. It is >>>>> about affordances/constraints, >>>>> but not about how to interpret >>>>> something, but >>>>> about going about >>>>> interpreting. I think. >>>>> >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> on >>>>> behalf of >>>>> Glassman, Michael >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent: 15 July >>>>> 2015 18:04 >>>>> To: Rolf >>>>> Steier; eXtended >>>>> Mind, >>>>> Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: >>>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>>> Emergence of >>>>> Boundary Objects >>>>> >>>>> So after >>>>> reading the >>>>> article and >>>>> the e-mail >>>>> discussion I'm >>>>> beginning >>>>> >>>>> to think there is a really >>>>> big issue >>>>> here that >>>>> I am trying to grapple with, >>>>> especially in terms of >>>>> boundary >>>>> objects (which >>>>> I admittedly do not >>>>> understand very well). And it relates >>>>> to the >>>>> metaphor of the table (both >>>>> as discussed by Larry and >>>>> Ingold as >>>>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>>>> is this, in >>>>> the museum should the >>>>> place be set up as >>>>> affordances, perceived >>>>> affordances, or >>>>> constraints? It seems the >>>>> museum in the study has >>>>> potential affordances for >>>>> the users. The >>>>> cultural historical moment >>>>> (unable to think of any >>>>> other word) of the >>>>> museum sets the context, >>>>> meaning >>>>> those walking through the >>>>> museum are >>>>> going to >>>>> be restricted by the >>>>> historical and cultural >>>>> boundaries >>>>> leading up >>>>> to the art work, along with >>>>> the expectations and needs >>>>> of the >>>>> individuals >>>>> moving through the museum, >>>>> but they will come across >>>>> objects/artifacts >>>>> that they think meets the >>>>> needs >>>>> >>>>> >> >> >> >> > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Jul 22 08:52:51 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 15:52:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> References: <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no>, <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no>,<55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi Alfredo, The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on the motive and purpose of activity, the object can be approached in many different ways. It is true that the relationship between the object and the subject caries the purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This type of relationship might has several aspects and the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, in AT, the teleological aspect is central one among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at several levels with distinctive teleological phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure of activity with its three levels. I just tried to do that and in most cases I got the famous "triangle." The internet is dominated by English language texts where the authors evidently use that version of activity theory. The three structural levels of activity might be found in t Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very much in line with the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. I have many questions, most of which I should find in the literature rather than bother here. But I would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote that the object "carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." What does "in itself" mean here? Thanks again for a very informative post, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some distinctions in this field ... we have at least three different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate uses of the English word, but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent some different terms. The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the triangle. Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what is motivating all the members of the design team when they sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use Hegel's apt terminology here. Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is almost as bad in Russian and German, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). > > As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. > > I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those questions. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this discussion. > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call it Activity Theory? > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Andy, all, > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. > > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). > Any thoughts? > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some > role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and > one subject challenges that role and turns the object into > its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. > A number of examples spring to mind. > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are > embraced by a despised group who take control of the > word and assertively embrace it; > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before > them rather than in shame); > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > organising tool; > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared > object (the land); > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a > symbol of India. > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > mediating artefact or the object of work > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? >> Henry >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>> Thanks Rolf! >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>>> man-of-the-world. >>>> Does that make better sense? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>>> but also the ideological context. >>>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>>> and regulations, communications resources, >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> >>>> I think that a particular institution or >>>> government system could potentially be a >>>> boundary object depending on how the concept >>>> is applied. Star describes three criteria: 1) >>>> interpretive flexibility 2) material/ >>>> organizational structure and 3) scale/ >>>> granularity in which the concept is useful. >>>> >>>> She argues that boundary objects are typically >>>> most useful at the organizational level - so I >>>> would say that one would have to justify the >>>> utility of applying the concept to a >>>> particular institution, as opposed to, say, an >>>> object within an institution. >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> >>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Phew! >>>> So would it be correct to describe the >>>> government >>>> institutions and political system are >>>> "boundary objects"? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 9:42 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy - >>>> Good catch! I believe that is a typo >>>> and should >>>> read "despite a LACK of consensus". >>>> Thank you for >>>> pointing that out. >>>> >>>> >>>> I also wanted to follow up on a >>>> suggestion that >>>> Greg made in the other thread >>>> suggesting we look >>>> at David McNeill's work. I had only >>>> been familiar >>>> with his earlier work on gesture, but >>>> after doing >>>> a bit of reading over the weekend, I >>>> found his >>>> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >>>> potentially >>>> useful in dealing with some of my >>>> questions.( >>>> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >>>> ) >>>> >>>> Here is a relevant quote describing >>>> unexpected >>>> metaphors as a form of gesture: >>>> >>>> /The logic is that unexpected >>>> metaphors arise >>>> from the >>>> need to create images when the >>>> culture does >>>> not have >>>> them readily at hand. These images >>>> join linguistic >>>> content as growth points and >>>> differentiate what >>>> Vygotsky (1987) called psychological >>>> predicates, or >>>> points of contrast in the >>>> immediate ongoing >>>> context of >>>> speaking. Unexpected metaphors, >>>> precisely >>>> because they >>>> are outside the conventions of >>>> language and >>>> culture, >>>> can capture abstractions in novel >>>> ways and >>>> provide the >>>> fluidity of thought and language >>>> that is the >>>> essence >>>> of ongoing discourse./ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >>>> Blunden >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Rolf, what did you mean by "the >>>> achievement of >>>> cooperation despite consensus"? >>>> p. 131, >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 17/07/2015 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Are we allowed to ask >>>> questions about our >>>> paper as >>>> well? I hope so! >>>> >>>> For a little context -in our >>>> paper, we >>>> identified >>>> particular kinds of >>>> episodes in which participants >>>> from different >>>> disciplines seek coherence >>>> and continuity of shared >>>> representations >>>> through >>>> bodily action. These >>>> actions include gesture, >>>> movement and physical >>>> performance linking the >>>> present material artifacts to >>>> objects of >>>> design. >>>> Most of these episodes >>>> seem to involve some form of >>>> improvisation, >>>> resourcefulness or creativity, >>>> and I'm not fully sure how to >>>> characterize >>>> these >>>> aspects of the >>>> interactions. In most cases, the >>>> participants seem >>>> to be searching for the >>>> best words or material >>>> representation to >>>> convey a >>>> particular intention - >>>> when this becomes problematic >>>> or limiting >>>> - they >>>> almost fall back on what >>>> is available - these >>>> improvised bodily >>>> performances - as a way of >>>> maintaining continuity, and of >>>> inviting >>>> co-participants into a shared and >>>> imagined space. These bodily >>>> actions don't >>>> seem to >>>> begin the proposals, but >>>> are in a sense *discovered* by the >>>> participants. >>>> >>>> >>>> I think there is something >>>> really fascinating >>>> about this kind of creativity >>>> and resourcefulness in >>>> interaction that >>>> could be >>>> explored more deeply - and >>>> that I'm having trouble >>>> articulating. >>>> Maybe some >>>> of you have some thoughts >>>> on this? Alfredo - I know >>>> we've talked >>>> about this >>>> a bit before so maybe you >>>> can add a little clarity to my >>>> question. >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >>>> PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Alfredo, >>>> Thank you very much for >>>> the sketch of your >>>> roots. I taught English in >>>> Puigcerda and Barcelona >>>> for 5 years >>>> back in >>>> the early 70s, just before >>>> Franco died. (He died the >>>> day I >>>> boarded the >>>> plane back to the U.S.) Place >>>> and language are interesting, >>>> especially where >>>> language varieties meet. >>>> Boundaries. I know mostly >>>> from my >>>> familiarity >>>> with the music of Catalunya >>>> and Mallorca that the speech >>>> communities in >>>> each of those places treasure >>>> their unique languages >>>> (Catalan and >>>> Mallorquin), yet see a >>>> commonality >>>> vis-a-vis their >>>> separateness from >>>> Castilian >>>> Spanish, the national language >>>> of Spain from 1492 on. I >>>> see a parallel >>>> between your work on boundary >>>> objects, where individual >>>> persons >>>> collaborate >>>> to create spaces, AND >>>> boundary objects >>>> "negotiated" by groups of >>>> people who live in real >>>> spaces. >>>> I am thinking, among other >>>> things, of >>>> indigeneity, a big topic >>>> here in New >>>> Mexico, with so many >>>> Native Americans. >>>> Assymetries of power. >>>> Bullying. >>>> Testing and curriculum become >>>> instruments of >>>> war by other means. I hope my >>>> tone does not distract >>>> from, nor >>>> diminish, the >>>> optimism created by this >>>> thread. Yet I think that >>>> optimism is so >>>> precious because of the >>>> ground (the >>>> world) of the dialog. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 16, 2015, at >>>> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, you could say >>>> that I am partly >>>> Catalan. I grew up in >>>> the province >>>> >>>> of Valencia, where Catalan >>>> language is >>>> official language together >>>> with >>>> Castilian Spanish. >>>> Although Valencia (the >>>> county) and Catalonia are >>>> different regional >>>> counties, Catalan >>>> is spoken >>>> in Catalonia, Valencia, and >>>> the Balear Islands. Some >>>> call the three >>>> together as the Catalan >>>> Countries. >>>> I don't like borders, but >>>> I respect >>>> and enjoy >>>> cultural diversity. >>>> >>>> Standardized testing, >>>> and the whole >>>> assumptions behind it, >>>> are an issue >>>> >>>> also in Spain and in >>>> Catalonia; but >>>> education >>>> has been so battered during >>>> the last years of right-wing >>>> government that I >>>> the debate have been more >>>> about means and access >>>> than about >>>> contents and >>>> aims. Which in some sense >>>> may be good because it >>>> moves the >>>> debates away >>>> from performance. But I have >>>> been living outside of >>>> Spain for eight >>>> years >>>> now, so I am not the best to >>>> update you on this either. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>> The Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Alfredo, >>>> Yes, you have answered >>>> my question >>>> very >>>> nicely! I especially >>>> appreciate >>>> >>>> that you were willing to >>>> wrestle with my >>>> question, despite your lack of >>>> familiarity with the >>>> issues here in >>>> the U.S. >>>> Am I wrong, or are you >>>> Catalan? In which case >>>> your experience in >>>> Catalunya would take you to a >>>> different place in critiquing >>>> schooling there, >>>> though not necessarily >>>> unconnected to yours and >>>> Rolf's work on >>>> boundary objects. I just >>>> met for >>>> the second day in a row >>>> with a friend >>>> who is >>>> the liaison between our public >>>> school district and a >>>> children's science >>>> museum called Explora. I >>>> feel like >>>> I'm swimming in this >>>> thread, talk about a >>>> mixed metaphor! >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 16, 2015, >>>> at 12:18 AM, >>>> Alfredo >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I am sorry, Henry, >>>> but I am >>>> not very >>>> familiar with >>>> high-stakes >>>> >>>> standardized testing (as >>>> different to >>>> standardized testing in >>>> general) or >>>> with common core (which I >>>> quickly read >>>> is an >>>> issue in US). But I would say >>>> that, if (school) >>>> curricula were to be >>>> consistent with the view of >>>> education as the practice >>>> of creating >>>> conditions for certain >>>> attitudes and >>>> dispositions to >>>> emerge--which is what >>>> I was >>>> suggesting in the >>>> paragraph you >>>> copy--curricula would not >>>> be so much about >>>> standardized contents, but >>>> about >>>> human sensitivities and >>>> relations. So, >>>> I would >>>> say, no, standardized >>>> testing is not in >>>> principle in line >>>> with what >>>> I was trying to say. >>>> >>>> I was trying to >>>> make a distinction >>>> between trying to >>>> design someone's >>>> >>>> particular experience, and >>>> trying to >>>> design >>>> conditions for the development >>>> of attitudes and >>>> orientations. The >>>> first is >>>> likely impossible. The second >>>> seems to make more sense. >>>> >>>> One may of course >>>> wonder >>>> whether those >>>> attitudes and >>>> orientations can >>>> >>>> be considered general, and >>>> then form >>>> part of >>>> standardize measures instead >>>> of the traditional >>>> "contents and >>>> skills". But >>>> measuring assumes some >>>> quantitative increment in >>>> a particular >>>> aspect >>>> as the result of learning. >>>> Growth and development, >>>> however, are about >>>> qualitative change. So, as >>>> soon >>>> as you start measuring you >>>> would be >>>> missing >>>> growth and development. So, >>>> again, no. I would not say >>>> that >>>> high-stakes >>>> standardized testing is in >>>> line >>>> with what I was trying to say. >>>> >>>> I hope I have >>>> answered your >>>> question, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 16 July 2015 >>>> 07:48 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, >>>> Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>> Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Alfredo, you say: >>>> >>>> "However, we >>>> cannot aim at >>>> determining >>>> any particular >>>> >>>> situation/experience. The >>>> same may be said >>>> about EDUCATION. We cannot >>>> intend to communicate the >>>> curriculum >>>> and make >>>> it the content of the >>>> students' experience in >>>> the way we >>>> intend. But >>>> we can try to create the >>>> conditions for certain >>>> attitudes and >>>> dispositions to emerge." >>>> >>>> Would you say that >>>> high-stakes >>>> standardized >>>> testing is in >>>> line with >>>> >>>> your construal of >>>> curriculum design? >>>> How about >>>> common core? >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jul 15, >>>> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >>>> Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks a lot >>>> for the >>>> clarifications. I see now >>>> why it >>>> may be said that >>>> >>>> designers can aim at >>>> designing for >>>> constrains >>>> but not for affordances. I >>>> see that this way of >>>> talking is part of a >>>> designers' way to get things >>>> done, and that it may >>>> indeed be an >>>> effective >>>> way to design for >>>> place-making, as in the >>>> example that >>>> Michael >>>> gives of MOMA. Indeed, much of >>>> what we report in our >>>> study is about >>>> designers >>>> talking about how spatial >>>> features might afford some >>>> experiences >>>> in the >>>> museum while constraining >>>> others. >>>> >>>> I must admit, >>>> however, that I >>>> still consider >>>> the distinction >>>> >>>> problematic from an >>>> analytical perspective >>>> whenever our object of >>>> study is >>>> experience, situated >>>> action, or design as >>>> situated practice. A more >>>> correct >>>> way to talk is that >>>> affordances and >>>> constrains >>>> are the positive and >>>> negative >>>> sides/interpretations of a single >>>> unitary category. As an actual >>>> and concrete phenomenon, >>>> walking into >>>> a musuem >>>> implies both affordances and >>>> constrains at the same >>>> time, whether >>>> intended >>>> or not. Which makes me wonder >>>> whether other terminology, >>>> such as >>>> Ingold's >>>> notion of "correspondence," >>>> might be more appropriated >>>> when we >>>> talk about >>>> how materials and actions >>>> become entangled into >>>> particular >>>> trajectories. >>>> >>>> In any case, >>>> and as Rolf >>>> emphasizes, >>>> what the >>>> designers in >>>> our study >>>> >>>> indeed do is to IMAGINE >>>> ways of being >>>> in the >>>> museum. Imagination versus >>>> prediction may be an >>>> interesting topic >>>> emerging here for further >>>> inquiry >>>> into design work. >>>> >>>> Another >>>> important (and >>>> related) >>>> issue that I >>>> think is >>>> emerging here >>>> >>>> has to do with the level >>>> of generality at >>>> which design intentions can be >>>> expected to work (just as >>>> Bateson >>>> argued with >>>> regard to prediction). At the >>>> level of generic social >>>> processes, and >>>> given a >>>> particular >>>> cultural-historical >>>> background, we as >>>> designers may try to make some >>>> generic situations more >>>> likely to >>>> occur than >>>> others (facilitating that more >>>> or less people end up >>>> together in a given >>>> place). However, we cannot >>>> aim at >>>> determining any particular >>>> situation/experience. The >>>> same may be >>>> said about >>>> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >>>> communicate the >>>> curriculum and make it the >>>> content of the students' >>>> experience in >>>> the way >>>> we intend. But we can try to >>>> create the conditions for >>>> certain >>>> attitudes >>>> and dispositions to emerge. >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 23:30 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>> >>>> I think Rolf >>>> may have >>>> addressed >>>> the question >>>> of the >>>> differences >>>> >>>> between affordances and >>>> constraints in his >>>> post. The way he described the >>>> designers as possibly >>>> setting up the >>>> corner >>>> with Pollock at MOMA. It >>>> was a >>>> long time ago so I'm not >>>> sure if this >>>> is the >>>> way it was or the way I >>>> remember it, but let's >>>> just believe >>>> this is >>>> the way it was. The painting, >>>> I think there were three >>>> were set up in a >>>> corner off a main >>>> corridor. The >>>> lighting was dark, which >>>> if you have >>>> ever been >>>> to MOMA is different, in >>>> many other parts of the >>>> museum there >>>> is a good >>>> deal of natural light (there >>>> was this great fountain, I >>>> wonder if it is >>>> still there). The paintings >>>> were on tripods rather >>>> than hung on >>>> the walls >>>> and they were surrounded on >>>> three sides by walls. All >>>> of these I >>>> think >>>> would be considered restraints >>>> - pushing me in to the >>>> works rather than >>>> stepping back away. It was >>>> impossible for more than >>>> two or three >>>> people >>>> to view the paintings at one >>>> time and movement was >>>> limited, so >>>> there were >>>> fewer chances for social >>>> interactions (you were not >>>> going to >>>> pick up >>>> anybody looking at Jackson >>>> Pollock). The atmosphere was >>>> brooding, making >>>> it more likely that viewers >>>> would move towards internal >>>> reflection. All >>>> of these were constraints that >>>> canalized perspectives and >>>> feelings >>>> viewing >>>> the paintings. You really had >>>> only two choices, you >>>> moved in to the >>>> paintings or you moved on, >>>> which I >>>> had done every previous >>>> time coming >>>> upon them. >>>> >>>> The painting >>>> itself though >>>> became >>>> an >>>> affordances, an object >>>> at the >>>> >>>> nexus of my journey >>>> through the >>>> museum, where >>>> I was in my life, and my >>>> abilities to perceive the >>>> painitings. This >>>> was something that could >>>> not be >>>> designed I think because >>>> nobody could >>>> think >>>> that moment was going to >>>> happen. So then what is >>>> a perceived >>>> affordance. Way back when >>>> there was >>>> also a Manet room. It was >>>> a round >>>> room with >>>> different variations of his >>>> water lilies in a circle. >>>> Almost the >>>> exact >>>> opposite in constraints it was >>>> large, airy, a lot of >>>> natural light. If you >>>> were looking to brood you went >>>> somewhere else. In the >>>> middle of the >>>> room was >>>> a wooden structure (not an >>>> obvious bench), but you >>>> realized as random >>>> colors dissolved into water >>>> lilies that you wanted to >>>> sit down. You >>>> naturally moved to the >>>> center of >>>> the room and sat >>>> (wondering if a guard >>>> would >>>> come and tell you it was >>>> actually an important >>>> piece of art and you >>>> should get off). The designer >>>> anticipates a desire to >>>> soak in the >>>> room, to >>>> almost get dizzy in the >>>> lights, and included in >>>> the design the >>>> piece >>>> of wood that will have the >>>> perceived affordance for >>>> sitting, changing >>>> your concept of time and >>>> space. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original >>>> Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> [mailto: >>>> >>>> xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>] On Behalf >>>> Of Alfredo >>>> >>>> Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> Sent: >>>> Wednesday, July 15, >>>> 2015 3:01 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Thanks Michael, >>>> >>>> I think we are >>>> saying the same >>>> things, >>>> indeed, or at >>>> least more or >>>> >>>> less. I am quite certain >>>> that Bateson >>>> referred >>>> to energy, and that he used >>>> the mentioned examples (or >>>> similar >>>> ones) to >>>> show how the energy that moves >>>> the pig is not a direct >>>> transfer of energy >>>> from the kick, whereas in the >>>> case of the billiard >>>> balls, the >>>> movement of >>>> one ball is caused by the >>>> energy that the kicking >>>> ball brings. I >>>> might >>>> be wrong in the context within >>>> which Bateson was >>>> discussing the >>>> example, and >>>> I see that your account is in >>>> that regard is more >>>> accurate. But the >>>> point is >>>> the same: you can not intend >>>> the outcomes of a system >>>> by addressing >>>> only >>>> its parts as if they were >>>> connected directly, in a >>>> linear causal >>>> fashion; as if the whole >>>> was the sum >>>> of its parts. I do see a >>>> link with >>>> Vygotsky's >>>> rejection of S-R and his >>>> inclusion of a third >>>> element that >>>> transforms >>>> the whole system. >>>> >>>> But I totally >>>> agree with your >>>> comments on design >>>> intentions as they >>>> >>>> relate to ecology, and I, >>>> as I know >>>> also Rolf >>>> does, also like very much the >>>> notion of ecology to >>>> address these issues. >>>> >>>> If I read you >>>> correctly, and >>>> citing Don >>>> Norman (whose >>>> work I >>>> ignore), >>>> >>>> you suggest the >>>> possibility that the >>>> relations >>>> between design intentions >>>> and actual experience >>>> could be thought >>>> of in >>>> terms of different levels? >>>> That one thing is to >>>> design for what is >>>> general, but that we >>>> cannot design >>>> for the particular. Is >>>> that right? If >>>> so, I >>>> think that Bateson had a >>>> similar argument on >>>> prediction, does >>>> not him? >>>> That we can predict on >>>> general levels (e.g. >>>> population), but >>>> not at >>>> the level of the particular >>>> (e.g., individual). I >>>> haven't gone >>>> that way, >>>> but seems a promising road to >>>> consider this jumps >>>> between levels of >>>> generality or scales. >>>> >>>> Finally, I am >>>> not sure if >>>> I get >>>> what you mean >>>> when you say >>>> that we can >>>> >>>> design for constrains but >>>> not for >>>> affordances. >>>> I still see that the one >>>> presupposes the other; you can >>>> separate them >>>> in talk, but, to me, in actual >>>> experience, a constrain is an >>>> affordance and >>>> vice-versa. I don't see how >>>> the road has any inherent >>>> constrain >>>> that could >>>> not be an affordance at the >>>> same time. Of course, if >>>> you take the >>>> normative stance that >>>> roads are for >>>> cars driving through them, >>>> you may be >>>> right. >>>> But if we think of roads as >>>> asphalt on the ground, as >>>> yet more >>>> ground only >>>> of a different shape, >>>> texture, and color, how is >>>> that a >>>> constrain >>>> but not an affordance? Or an >>>> affordance but not a >>>> constrain? Of course, >>>> culture constrains once >>>> you are >>>> within the road and you >>>> are driving. >>>> But then, >>>> the constrain is not in the >>>> road, as you seem to >>>> suggest, but in the >>>> journey; in the journeyman >>>> that >>>> carries some cultural way >>>> of orienting and >>>> affectively relating to its >>>> environment so that particular >>>> constrains are >>>> taken for granted despite the >>>> possibility of being >>>> otherwise. But I >>>> might >>>> not have thought it well/long >>>> enough and of course I >>>> might be wrong. >>>> I would >>>> like to understand your >>>> position here better. >>>> >>>> Thanks! >>>> Alfredo >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 20:32 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>> >>>> I have been >>>> reading Bateson >>>> through a >>>> cybernetics lens >>>> lately >>>> (Bateson >>>> >>>> along with Lewin and his >>>> wife Margaret >>>> Mead >>>> were part of the original >>>> Sears >>>> conferences) and I'm not >>>> sure that's >>>> right or >>>> I am victim to the "when you >>>> have a hammer, everything >>>> looks like a >>>> nail" >>>> but.... >>>> >>>> I think >>>> Bateson was >>>> arguing with >>>> those looking >>>> to apply the >>>> more >>>> >>>> physical/mathematical >>>> origins of >>>> cybernetics >>>> to human or really (pace the >>>> pig story) and system that >>>> moves >>>> beyond simple >>>> physical feedback loops. I >>>> think his larger point is that >>>> everything has >>>> a response within the larger >>>> feedback system that >>>> exists but we >>>> cannot go - >>>> what Bateson refers to as >>>> MIND. Attempts to create >>>> and control >>>> feedback >>>> loops, to try and design a >>>> system for specific types >>>> of feedback is a >>>> dangerous proposition. >>>> >>>> This I think >>>> is the reason >>>> that >>>> affordances >>>> really can't >>>> be designed >>>> >>>> into an ecology, only a >>>> recognition of the >>>> context in which actions are >>>> taking place (and I say >>>> this having no >>>> idea >>>> what Gibson's relationship to >>>> cybernetics was). Taking >>>> Larry's >>>> example of >>>> the girl it is perhaps also >>>> likely that the girl could >>>> have taken the >>>> fixing of hair as a >>>> criticism, an >>>> attack, and it might have >>>> destroyed her >>>> confidence. Both make >>>> sense in >>>> terms of feedback loops, >>>> but only ad >>>> hoc. So >>>> if a designer does in some >>>> way design that experience >>>> into the >>>> action, >>>> even without meaning they are >>>> taking a large chance, >>>> because they do not >>>> know the trajectory it will >>>> take. We simply need >>>> objects that are >>>> part of >>>> our journey, part of the >>>> larger context but not >>>> designed for >>>> purpose, >>>> for feedback. There is no >>>> assumption about trajectory. >>>> >>>> I think Don >>>> Norman sort of >>>> muddied >>>> the waters on >>>> this, but in an >>>> >>>> interesting way. That we >>>> can assume >>>> people >>>> are going to want to do >>>> certain >>>> things in a very general >>>> environment - >>>> when you enter a dark room >>>> you want >>>> light, so it is possible >>>> to design objects >>>> that meet that need that >>>> we are >>>> more likely to find in the >>>> moment that >>>> we need >>>> them. But I think that is >>>> very different from the >>>> idea of >>>> specifically >>>> guiding feedback loops that >>>> even take generalized >>>> experience in a >>>> certain >>>> direction. I am thinking >>>> about Dewey, and he makes >>>> a similar >>>> argument >>>> to Bateson with his concept of >>>> transactions. Although he >>>> does seem >>>> to think >>>> that it is possible to create >>>> a larger field of action >>>> so we can see at >>>> least local >>>> interrelationships. >>>> But his idea of experience >>>> is also >>>> very much >>>> one of discovery based on >>>> needs at the immediate >>>> moment - social >>>> relations act as a vehicle >>>> for these >>>> discoveriesn(Dewey of >>>> course was writing >>>> before Gibson and for most >>>> of his >>>> life before cybernetics. I also >>>> wonder what >>>> he thought of cybernetics). >>>> >>>> I think I >>>> disagree with you, >>>> constraints >>>> are not about the >>>> journey but >>>> >>>> about the road. If you >>>> build a road >>>> on the >>>> side of the river you are >>>> constrained because no >>>> matter what, >>>> you cannot >>>> turn right. Your direction >>>> has already been partially >>>> determined >>>> by the >>>> designer of the road. But the >>>> mistake we make is in >>>> thinking that also >>>> controls the trajectory of the >>>> individual's journey. The >>>> effect of >>>> designers >>>> on trajectories of action is >>>> important, but limited. >>>> >>>> The primary >>>> place that >>>> designers >>>> have influence on >>>> affordances it >>>> >>>> seems to me is by being >>>> able to create a >>>> unique context for an >>>> individual's >>>> and a group's that limit >>>> possible >>>> trajectories >>>> on an individual's journey. >>>> But we should never >>>> mistake those >>>> constraints >>>> for affordances. I think >>>> Bateson might argue it is >>>> hubris to do so. >>>> Perhaps this is what you are >>>> saying Alfredo. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original >>>> Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>] On >>>> Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> >>>> Sent: >>>> Wednesday, July 15, 2015 >>>> 12:38 PM >>>> To: Rolf >>>> Steier; eXtended >>>> Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> I'd like to >>>> follow up on >>>> Michael's >>>> post by asking >>>> a question: >>>> Are not >>>> >>>> affordances presupposed by >>>> constraints >>>> and are >>>> not constraints presupposed >>>> by affordances? If so, I >>>> would wonder >>>> whether >>>> it makes sense to ask whether >>>> museums should be designed for >>>> affordances and >>>> constraints. >>>> >>>> What I think >>>> is clear from the >>>> anecdote that >>>> you bring >>>> about the >>>> >>>> Jackson Pollock corner is >>>> that whatever >>>> EXPERIENCE emerges from being >>>> somewhere (i.e. being >>>> someone at some >>>> time in >>>> some place) cannot be >>>> INTENDED. And I think this >>>> applies both to >>>> designers and users, to those >>>> who set things up for you to >>>> experience and to >>>> you, who could not foresee >>>> what your experience was >>>> going to turn you >>>> into before you go through it. >>>> >>>> I think that >>>> the big issue >>>> that >>>> you bring on >>>> the table (to >>>> continue >>>> >>>> with Larry's metaphor) has >>>> to do with a >>>> difference between physical >>>> relations and social >>>> relations, and >>>> the idea >>>> of MEDIATION. Gregory Bateson >>>> noticed that the relations >>>> that are the >>>> subject matter in physics >>>> are not >>>> the same as those that are >>>> the subject >>>> matter >>>> in communication. He noticed >>>> that physical relations >>>> (relations >>>> that are >>>> the object of study of >>>> physics) >>>> transfer energy in direct >>>> manners: a >>>> billiard >>>> ball hits another ball and we >>>> can anticipate the exact >>>> speed and >>>> direction >>>> that the second ball will take >>>> based on the energy that >>>> is in the >>>> system ball >>>> + ball + someone hitting. In >>>> living beings, the things >>>> are different. >>>> Bateson explained, if we >>>> kick a >>>> pig's ass (I think he used >>>> this somehow >>>> bizarre example) the >>>> reaction of >>>> the pig is not accounted >>>> for by the energy >>>> that is contained in the kick, >>>> at least not in a direct >>>> manner. The >>>> energy >>>> that moves the pig is from a >>>> different source. Before >>>> Bateson, it was >>>> Vygotsky and his notion of >>>> mediation who would most >>>> clearly state >>>> that >>>> social relations are not >>>> direct, but mediated. >>>> >>>> So, how can >>>> design go >>>> about this? >>>> If we, along >>>> with Dewey and >>>> >>>> Vygotsky, consider >>>> experience to be a >>>> unity of >>>> person and environment, and >>>> we assume as well that >>>> this is a >>>> social (not >>>> just individual) category, and >>>> that how a situation is >>>> experienced is >>>> also >>>> refracted through the social >>>> relations within which we >>>> engage, the most >>>> designers can do is to foster >>>> social relations go on, giving >>>> afordances to >>>> prcesses of signification, >>>> without intending to embed >>>> meanings. It is >>>> about affordances/constraints, >>>> but not about how to interpret >>>> something, but >>>> about going about >>>> interpreting. I think. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> on >>>> behalf of >>>> Glassman, Michael >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Sent: 15 July >>>> 2015 18:04 >>>> To: Rolf >>>> Steier; eXtended >>>> Mind, >>>> Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: >>>> [Xmca-l] Re: The >>>> Emergence of >>>> Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> So after >>>> reading the >>>> article and >>>> the e-mail >>>> discussion I'm >>>> beginning >>>> >>>> to think there is a really >>>> big issue >>>> here that >>>> I am trying to grapple with, >>>> especially in terms of >>>> boundary >>>> objects (which >>>> I admittedly do not >>>> understand very well). And it relates >>>> to the >>>> metaphor of the table (both >>>> as discussed by Larry and >>>> Ingold as >>>> interpreted by Rolf). It >>>> is this, in >>>> the museum should the >>>> place be set up as >>>> affordances, perceived >>>> affordances, or >>>> constraints? It seems the >>>> museum in the study has >>>> potential affordances for >>>> the users. The >>>> cultural historical moment >>>> (unable to think of any >>>> other word) of the >>>> museum sets the context, >>>> meaning >>>> those walking through the >>>> museum are >>>> going to >>>> be restricted by the >>>> historical and cultural >>>> boundaries >>>> leading up >>>> to the art work, along with >>>> the expectations and needs >>>> of the >>>> individuals >>>> moving through the museum, >>>> but they will come across >>>> objects/artifacts >>>> that they think meets the >>>> needs >>>> >>>> >> > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 22 09:24:44 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 09:24:44 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no>, <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no>, <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic of the subject. "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE conceiving of processes without subjects." This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw the failure of phenomenology and the residual links between subjectivism and anthropology. The force of Foucault's argument was tying the philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an outmoded humanism. It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. -----Original Message----- From: "Lubomir Savov Popov" Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ; "Andy Blunden" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Alfredo, The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on the motive and purpose of activity, the object can be approached in many different ways. It is true that the relationship between the object and the subject caries the purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This type of relationship might has several aspects and the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, in AT, the teleological aspect is central one among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at several levels with distinctive teleological phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure of activity with its three levels. I just tried to do that and in most cases I got the famous "triangle." The internet is dominated by English language texts where the authors evidently use that version of activity theory. The three structural levels of activity might be found in t Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very much in line with the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. I have many questions, most of which I should find in the literature rather than bother here. But I would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote that the object "carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." What does "in itself" mean here? Thanks again for a very informative post, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some distinctions in this field ... we have at least three different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate uses of the English word, but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent some different terms. The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the triangle. Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what is motivating all the members of the design team when they sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use Hegel's apt terminology here. Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is almost as bad in Russian and German, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). > > As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. > > I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those questions. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this discussion. > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call it Activity Theory? > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Andy, all, > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. > > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). > Any thoughts? > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some > role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and > one subject challenges that role and turns the object into > its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. > A number of examples spring to mind. > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are > embraced by a despised group who take control of the > word and assertively embrace it; > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before > them rather than in shame); > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > organising tool; > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared > object (the land); > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a > symbol of India. > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > mediating artefact or the object of work > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? >> Henry >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>> Thanks Rolf! >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>>> man-of-the-world. >>>> Does that make better sense? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>>> but also the ideological context. >>>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>>> and regulations, communications resources, >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 [The entire original message is not included.] From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 22 09:31:54 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 10:31:54 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55AFB41C.6020803@mira.net> References: <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <55AFB41C.6020803@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, Speaking of typos, I am assuming you meant DSM - The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), not DVM - which is the Dept of Motor Vehicles, here in New Mexico. Not that there hasn?t been a lot of traffic on this thread lately. Your substantive point about what is considered mental illness, and how the DSM defines it, seems super relevant to this thread, where subject/object issues touch on individual and collective sanity and insanity, however sanity and insanity are construed. Henry > On Jul 22, 2015, at 9:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > You are right, Larry, that everything that's going on in these situation arises from the *relation between a subject and the Arbeitsgegenstand*, not the Arbeitsgegenstand alone. > For example, there are hundreds of "syndromes" listed in DMV which in past times or other countries are not considered illnesses at all. > And apologies for all the silly typos in that message. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 1:11 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> Andy, you have helped clarify why I have been [and remain] confused on the notion of "object" >> >> I will try to focus on one particular relation you have highlighted. >> If I am clear on your distinctions then: >> >> It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand ALONE [the object OF labour or the object upon which labour works] where the problem resides. The problem is NOT carried WITHIN the Arbeitsgegenstand as an abstraction. The OBJECT [purposes and motives] includes also the "concept" that the subject-person makes OF the arbeitsgegenstand [object OF labour]. >> >> So it is the concept's relation WITH the arbeitsgegenstand [object OF labour] that generates "subject's socially shared OBJECTs [purposes and motives]. >> >> Andy, I may have garbled your construal of the relations involved in these two meanings of "object", my question is why not just say "object of labour" [when we mean arbeitsgegenstand] AND say "purposes and motives" when we mean OBJECT. >> >> In the same way that Dewey wishes he had used a different term for "experience" it seems we need alternative terms for "object". >> >> I am also struggling to understand the historical movement implied in the alternative changing OBJECTs [purposes and motives] expressed in how a term is situated. >> >> The notion of "polyphonic" languages with shifting meanings and OBJECTS seems very complex and seems to require expansive understandings of multiple different "language-games" [as Wittgenstein uses that concept. >> >> The labour process AND the conceptual process and multiple modern / postmodern understandings of "their" [using personal pronoun] relations. Very complex process. >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to >> some distinctions in this field ... we have at least >> three different versions of Activity Theory involved >> here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the >> theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial >> idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different >> way, all of them legitimate uses of the English word, >> but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake >> of this discussion I will invent some different terms. >> >> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be >> a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a >> man with a broom, but it is all the same >> Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in >> the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean >> Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it >> becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the blacksmith uses >> is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and >> the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are >> respectively the base and apex of the triangle. >> >> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the >> purpose and motive of the activity." So this "purpose >> or motive" is not shown on the triangle, but I will >> call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by >> "object" when he talks about "object-oriented >> activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because it >> is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); >> it is not a material thing or process as such. >> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is >> what is motivating all the members of the design team >> when they sit down to collaborate with one another. >> Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the >> nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is to >> sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These >> OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in >> the End an OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" >> of the collaboration, to use Hegel's apt terminology here. >> >> Surely it is important to recognise that while >> everyone shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends >> up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the road >> they construe the object differently. This is what >> Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It >> is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried >> within it alone which motivates action, but *the >> concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! >> >> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir >> astutely notices) postmodern ideology critique to the >> collaboration within an ostensibly neutral >> infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules >> and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be >> there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows >> that this is an illusion; the Rules and Instruments >> are in fact residues of past collaborations which >> carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs >> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >> >> But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern >> critique elements of this idea, that apparently >> ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded sense >> of socially constructed entities, usually far more >> than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including >> institutions - fossilised "systems of activity") and >> recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, >> reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept >> of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >> >> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary >> Object in the place of Object on his triangle, joining >> two "systems of activity," for the purpose of looking >> not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the >> broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the >> Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to change >> the relation between Subject and obJECT (here >> referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as >> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different >> strand of postmodern critique into the equation, >> namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, >> with great effect. >> >> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >> Object, OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, >> the situation is almost as bad in Russian and German, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >> >> To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I >> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the >> distinction between object and tool in activity >> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we >> were aware through the process, that what we >> describe in the paper has to do with how the >> object of design emerged and developed for the >> team in and as they were dealing with, developing, >> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I >> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a >> lack of a historical account of the object that >> goes over and above the particular instances >> analyzed. Although we provide with some >> ethnographic contextualization of the team's >> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion >> is grounded on concrete events and their >> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >> distinction between object and means because it >> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then >> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >> ented towards anything beyond what was there in >> the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' >> means. How would then the distinction between >> means and object have added to our understanding >> of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the >> contribution from such a distinction, I really >> mean to ask this question for the purpose of >> growing and expanding; and as said before, part of >> the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. >> contribution). >> >> As to how we would position our contribution with >> regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what >> we said when introducing the paper for discussion: >> we begun with the purpose of working outside any >> particular framework and think, as we think Star >> did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These >> included cultural historical psychology, >> ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also >> the ideas about Experience (in the >> Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic >> in this discussion were in the background all the >> time, but we did not operationalize them in terms >> of any particular theory. This is not to say that >> we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best >> to keep internal coherence between what we said >> about the data, and what the data was exhibiting >> for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. >> >> I think the questions you are rising about >> activity theory are very much in the spirit of >> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best >> places to be asking those questions. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > on behalf >> of Lubomir Savov Popov > > >> Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >> >> There are also a few other things that I would >> like to bring to this discussion. >> >> First, you have a wonderful project and a great >> article. It is a great example of an >> interpretativist approach to everyday life >> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It >> is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >> >> However, how is your approach related to classic >> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is >> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might >> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >> emerge right now or have emerged in the last >> decades; still other people might look for >> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a >> template or categorize your methodology -- just >> raising a question about its connection to >> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that >> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify >> certain things for myself. >> >> For example: What are the limits and boundaries of >> Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity >> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >> gain when we infuse new methodological, >> epistemological, and ontological realities into >> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the >> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? >> (I mean here Activity Theory as research >> methodology.) Do we need to call something >> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new >> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need >> to call it Activity Theory? >> >> Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, >> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your >> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can >> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but >> after we assimilate them for use in our project, >> they will "change hands" and will change their >> particular discourse affiliation and will become >> completely different components of a completely >> different discourse. Mostly because the >> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and >> the concepts are very different despite of the >> similarities in ideas and words used to name these >> ideas. >> >> Just a few questions that I hope will help me >> understand better what is going on in the realm of >> CHAT. >> >> Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov >> =bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Andy, all, >> I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and >> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is >> very interesting. I have particular interest in >> the difference that they point out between >> boundary object on the one hand, and object and >> instrumentality as different aspects of activity >> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this >> distinction while writing our own paper. We >> noticed that the museum space, through multiple >> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a >> floor plan, performances of being in the room >> while not being there, etc), was a means, an >> instrument for achieving a final design product. >> >> At the same time, the museum space begun to become >> the object of the designers' activity. Since this >> were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners >> had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what >> seemed to be a common object for all them was the >> museum as place. Thus, most representations of it >> begun to be made in terms of narratives about >> being there. That was the orientation that seemed >> to stick them together. >> >> Thus, the museum space was both object and >> instrument. We wondered whether we should do >> connections to notions of object of activity and >> tools, but we felt that that road would take us >> away from the focus on body and experience. We >> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >> differentiate between object of design, the design >> thing that work delivers, and the object's >> constituents (or means of presentation before the >> design thing is finished). >> >> When bringing the notion of boundary object into >> the picture, we could discuss the history of >> development of these relations between the >> different forms of presentations of the museum >> means towards the object without necessarily >> articulating the differences between the two. One >> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not >> about materials in themselves, but about >> consequences in action. From the point of view of >> the persons implicated in the process, the museum >> space as object of design was an issue in and >> through the working with some material, some form >> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and >> instrument seemed to be moments of a same >> experience. But I still want to learn what we may >> get out of making the distinction between object >> and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I >> should perhaps read more carefully their study >> rather than be here thinking aloud). >> Any thoughts? >> >> Alfredo >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > on behalf >> of Andy Blunden > > >> Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Henry, anything. But the point is objects which >> play some >> role in mediating the relation between subjects, >> probably a >> symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, >> too, and >> one subject challenges that role and turns the >> object into >> its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. >> A number of examples spring to mind. >> >> * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as >> Queer, are >> embraced by a despised group who take control >> of the >> word and assertively embrace it; >> * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who >> deployed their >> stereotype as housewives and mothers to >> magnificant effect; >> * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a >> weapon >> against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS >> flee before >> them rather than in shame); >> * The Chartists who turned the British govt's >> stamp which >> put newspapers out of reach of workers >> against them by >> printing the Northern Star as a stamped >> newspaper and >> obliging workers to club together in groups >> to buy and >> read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >> organising tool; >> * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied >> Territory / >> Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a >> shared >> object (the land); >> * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon >> and tool >> for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, >> raising it >> from the status of obsolete and inferior >> technology to a >> symbol of India. >> >> In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in >> mind when >> she introduced the term, but core point is that the >> ideological construction placed upon an object is >> subject to >> contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an >> artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to >> subjectivity. >> >> Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >> mediating artefact or the object of work >> (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that >> in these >> cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols >> according >> to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >> Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> I got to thinking about the photographs as >> boundary objects. What about video? >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden >> > > wrote: >> >> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came >> to see that it was the photographs that >> Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to >> recover his humanity. This is consonant >> with how Yrjo was using the idea in >> relation to the subsistence farmers' >> movement in Mexico and their corn. >> Thanks Rolf! >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could >> also interpret the photographs as >> boundary objects as they support the >> coordination of therapy activities >> between Thomas and the nurse. I think >> it depends on the aspect of activity >> one is attempting to explore as >> opposed to the definite identification >> of what may or may not be a boundary >> object. This is only my opinion though! >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy >> Blunden > >> > >> wrote: >> >> Or alternatively, the boundary >> object in question is >> Thomas's aged body, which is >> subject to an >> interpretation which Thomas >> contests by showing >> photographs of far away places >> and explaining how >> well-travelled he is, seeking an >> interpretation of >> himself as a well-travelled and >> experiences >> man-of-the-world. >> Does that make better sense? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy >> Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, I agree. My own interest >> is in social theory >> and I'd never heard of >> "boundary objects." It >> seems to me that what BOs do >> is introduce some >> social theory into domains of >> activity (scientific >> and work collaborations for >> example) where the >> participants naively think >> they are collaborating >> on neutral ground. So it is >> not just granularity, >> but also the ideological context. >> >> In Yjro Engestrom's article, >> the home care workers >> collaborate with the old >> couple according to rules >> and regulations, >> communications resources, >> technology, finance and so >> on, which in the >> unnamed country, the old >> couple are apparently >> cast as "patients". Isn't it >> the case that here it >> is those rules and >> regulations, etc., which are >> the "boundary objects"? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf >> Steier wrote: >> >> I think that a particular >> institution or >> government system could >> potentially be a >> boundary object depending >> on how the concept >> is applied. Star >> describes three criteria: 1) >> interpretive flexibility >> 2) material/ >> organizational structure >> and 3) scale/ >> granularity in which the >> concept is useful. >> >> She argues that boundary >> objects are typically >> most useful at the >> organizational level - so I >> would say that one would >> have to justify the >> utility of applying the >> concept to a >> particular institution, >> as opposed to, say, an >> object within an institution. >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at >> 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> wrote: >> >> Phew! >> So would it be >> correct to describe the >> government >> institutions and >> political system are >> "boundary objects"? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> On 20/07/2015 9:42 >> PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> Hi Andy - >> Good catch! I >> believe that is a typo >> and should >> read "despite a >> LACK of consensus". >> Thank you for >> pointing that out. >> >> >> I also wanted to >> follow up on a >> suggestion that >> Greg made in the >> other thread >> suggesting we look >> at David >> McNeill's work. I had only >> been familiar >> with his earlier >> work on gesture, but >> after doing >> a bit of reading >> over the weekend, I >> found his >> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >> potentially >> useful in dealing >> with some of my >> questions.( >> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >> ) >> >> Here is a >> relevant quote describing >> unexpected >> metaphors as a >> form of gesture: >> >> /The logic is >> that unexpected >> metaphors arise >> from the >> need to >> create images when the >> culture does >> not have >> them readily >> at hand. These images >> join linguistic >> content as >> growth points and >> differentiate what >> Vygotsky >> (1987) called psychological >> predicates, or >> points of >> contrast in the >> immediate ongoing >> context of >> speaking. >> Unexpected metaphors, >> precisely >> because they >> are outside >> the conventions of >> language and >> culture, >> can capture >> abstractions in novel >> ways and >> provide the >> fluidity of >> thought and language >> that is the >> essence >> of ongoing >> discourse./ >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, >> 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >> Blunden >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> wrote: >> >> Rolf, what >> did you mean by "the >> achievement of >> cooperation >> despite consensus"? >> p. 131, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 >> 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >> wrote: >> >> Are we >> allowed to ask >> questions about our >> paper as >> well? I >> hope so! >> >> For a >> little context -in our >> paper, we >> identified >> particular kinds of >> episodes >> in which participants >> from different >> disciplines seek coherence >> and >> continuity of shared >> representations >> through >> bodily >> action. These >> actions >> include gesture, >> movement and physical >> performance linking the >> present >> material artifacts to >> objects of >> design. >> Most of >> these episodes >> seem to >> involve some form of >> improvisation, >> resourcefulness or creativity, >> and I'm >> not fully sure how to >> characterize >> these >> aspects >> of the >> interactions. In most cases, the >> participants seem >> to be >> searching for the >> best >> words or material >> representation to >> convey a >> particular intention - >> when this >> becomes problematic >> or limiting >> - they >> almost >> fall back on what >> is >> available - these >> improvised bodily >> performances - as a way of >> maintaining continuity, and of >> inviting >> co-participants into a shared and >> imagined >> space. These bodily >> actions don't >> seem to >> begin the >> proposals, but >> are in a >> sense *discovered* by the >> participants. >> >> >> I think >> there is something >> really fascinating >> about >> this kind of creativity >> and >> resourcefulness in >> interaction that >> could be >> explored >> more deeply - and >> that I'm >> having trouble >> articulating. >> Maybe some >> of you >> have some thoughts >> on this? >> Alfredo - I know >> we've talked >> about this >> a bit >> before so maybe you >> can add a >> little clarity to my >> question. >> >> On Thu, >> Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >> PM, HENRY SHONERD >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> wrote: >> >> Alfredo, >> Thank >> you very much for >> the sketch of your >> roots. I taught English in >> Puigcerda and Barcelona >> for 5 years >> back in >> the >> early 70s, just before >> Franco died. (He died the >> day I >> boarded the >> plane >> back to the U.S.) Place >> and >> language are interesting, >> especially where >> language varieties meet. >> Boundaries. I know mostly >> from my >> familiarity >> with >> the music of Catalunya >> and >> Mallorca that the speech >> communities in >> each >> of those places treasure >> their >> unique languages >> (Catalan and >> Mallorquin), yet see a >> commonality >> vis-a-vis their >> separateness from >> Castilian >> Spanish, the national language >> of >> Spain from 1492 on. I >> see a parallel >> between your work on boundary >> objects, where individual >> persons >> collaborate >> to >> create spaces, AND >> boundary objects >> "negotiated" by groups of >> people who live in real >> spaces. >> I am >> thinking, among other >> things, of >> indigeneity, a big topic >> here in New >> Mexico, with so many >> Native Americans. >> Assymetries of power. >> Bullying. >> Testing and curriculum become >> instruments of >> war >> by other means. I hope my >> tone >> does not distract >> from, nor >> diminish, the >> optimism created by this >> thread. Yet I think that >> optimism is so >> precious because of the >> ground (the >> world) of the dialog. >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at >> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> wrote: >> >> Well, you could say >> that I am partly >> Catalan. I grew up in >> the province >> >> of >> Valencia, where Catalan >> language is >> official language together >> with >> Castilian Spanish. >> Although Valencia (the >> county) and Catalonia are >> different regional >> counties, Catalan >> is spoken >> in >> Catalonia, Valencia, and >> the >> Balear Islands. Some >> call the three >> together as the Catalan >> Countries. >> I >> don't like borders, but >> I respect >> and enjoy >> cultural diversity. >> >> Standardized testing, >> and the whole >> assumptions behind it, >> are an issue >> >> also >> in Spain and in >> Catalonia; but >> education >> has >> been so battered during >> the >> last years of right-wing >> government that I >> the >> debate have been more >> about >> means and access >> than about >> contents and >> aims. >> Which in some sense >> may >> be good because it >> moves the >> debates away >> from >> performance. But I have >> been >> living outside of >> Spain for eight >> years >> now, >> so I am not the best to >> update you on this either. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> on >> behalf of >> HENRY >> SHONERD >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >> The Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, >> Yes, you have answered >> my question >> very >> nicely! I especially >> appreciate >> >> that >> you were willing to >> wrestle with my >> question, despite your lack of >> familiarity with the >> issues here in >> the U.S. >> Am I >> wrong, or are you >> Catalan? In which case >> your experience in >> Catalunya would take you to a >> different place in critiquing >> schooling there, >> though not necessarily >> unconnected to yours and >> Rolf's work on >> boundary objects. I just >> met for >> the >> second day in a row >> with a friend >> who is >> the >> liaison between our public >> school district and a >> children's science >> museum called Explora. I >> feel like >> I'm >> swimming in this >> thread, talk about a >> mixed >> metaphor! >> >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, >> at 12:18 AM, >> Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> wrote: >> >> I am sorry, Henry, >> but I am >> not very >> familiar with >> high-stakes >> >> standardized testing (as >> different to >> standardized testing in >> general) or >> with >> common core (which I >> quickly read >> is an >> issue >> in US). But I would say >> that, >> if (school) >> curricula were to be >> consistent with the view of >> education as the practice >> of creating >> conditions for certain >> attitudes and >> dispositions to >> emerge--which is what >> I was >> suggesting in the >> paragraph you >> copy--curricula would not >> be so much about >> standardized contents, but >> about >> human >> sensitivities and >> relations. So, >> I would >> say, >> no, standardized >> testing is not in >> principle in line >> with what >> I was >> trying to say. >> >> I was trying to >> make a distinction >> between trying to >> design someone's >> >> particular experience, and >> trying to >> design >> conditions for the development >> of >> attitudes and >> orientations. The >> first is >> likely impossible. The second >> seems >> to make more sense. >> >> One may of course >> wonder >> whether those >> attitudes and >> orientations can >> >> be >> considered general, and >> then form >> part of >> standardize measures instead >> of >> the traditional >> "contents and >> skills". But >> measuring assumes some >> quantitative increment in >> a particular >> aspect >> as >> the result of learning. >> Growth and development, >> however, are about >> qualitative change. So, as >> soon >> as >> you start measuring you >> would be >> missing >> growth and development. So, >> again, no. I would not say >> that >> high-stakes >> standardized testing is in >> line >> with >> what I was trying to say. >> >> I hope I have >> answered your >> question, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> on >> behalf of >> HENRY >> SHONERD >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 >> 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, >> Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] >> Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, you say: >> >> "However, we >> cannot aim at >> determining >> any particular >> >> situation/experience. The >> same may be said >> about >> EDUCATION. We cannot >> intend to communicate the >> curriculum >> and make >> it >> the content of the >> students' experience in >> the way we >> intend. But >> we >> can try to create the >> conditions for certain >> attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge." >> >> Would you say that >> high-stakes >> standardized >> testing is in >> line with >> >> your >> construal of >> curriculum design? >> How about >> common core? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jul 15, >> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot >> for the >> clarifications. I see now >> why it >> may be said that >> >> designers can aim at >> designing for >> constrains >> but >> not for affordances. I >> see >> that this way of >> talking is part of a >> designers' way to get things >> done, >> and that it may >> indeed be an >> effective >> way >> to design for >> place-making, as in the >> example that >> Michael >> gives >> of MOMA. Indeed, much of >> what >> we report in our >> study is about >> designers >> talking about how spatial >> features might afford some >> experiences >> in the >> museum while constraining >> others. >> >> I must admit, >> however, that I >> still consider >> the distinction >> >> problematic from an >> analytical perspective >> whenever our object of >> study is >> experience, situated >> action, or design as >> situated practice. A more >> correct >> way >> to talk is that >> affordances and >> constrains >> are >> the positive and >> negative >> sides/interpretations of >> a single >> unitary category. As an actual >> and >> concrete phenomenon, >> walking into >> a musuem >> implies both affordances and >> constrains at the same >> time, whether >> intended >> or >> not. Which makes me wonder >> whether other terminology, >> such as >> Ingold's >> notion of "correspondence," >> might >> be more appropriated >> when we >> talk about >> how >> materials and actions >> become entangled into >> particular >> trajectories. >> >> In any case, >> and as Rolf >> emphasizes, >> what the >> designers in >> our study >> >> indeed do is to IMAGINE >> ways of being >> in the >> museum. Imagination versus >> prediction may be an >> interesting topic >> emerging here for further >> inquiry >> into >> design work. >> >> Another >> important (and >> related) >> issue that I >> think is >> emerging here >> >> has >> to do with the level >> of generality at >> which >> design intentions can be >> expected to work (just as >> Bateson >> argued with >> regard to prediction). At the >> level >> of generic social >> processes, and >> given a >> particular >> cultural-historical >> background, we as >> designers may try to make some >> generic situations more >> likely to >> occur than >> others (facilitating that more >> or >> less people end up >> together in a given >> place). However, we cannot >> aim at >> determining any particular >> situation/experience. The >> same may be >> said about >> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >> communicate the >> curriculum and make it the >> content of the students' >> experience in >> the way >> we >> intend. But we can try to >> create the conditions for >> certain >> attitudes >> and >> dispositions to emerge. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> >> > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Jul 22 09:40:06 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:40:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> References: <1437002969090.5146@iped.uio.no> <7D2C67A8-D637-4940-A65F-7A96CE29A867@gmail.com> <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no>, <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no>, <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Larry, I have a few considerations: Merleau-Ponty works in a completely different paradigm than AT and what he says should be interpreted in the context of that paradigm. AT should be interpreted in the context of Historical Materialism. Otherwise, it is not AT. It might be a study of activity, but in a different paradigm. It might be even more productive in some ways than AT. I do not object such situation. Actually, a phenomenological approach to activity is more productive regarding a number of research problem and objectives. In historical materialism, activity and process are two different things. Activity is a process, but it is more than a process. It is planned and goal-directed, while the process is naturally flowing. In the natural world (Nature) there are processes, but they are not activities. The primacy of the subject is typical for historical materialism. If someone disagrees with this, they can just work in a different paradigmatic environment. No pressure. The study of activity and AT are two different things. AT is a particular way of studying activity in the framework of historical materialism. Any attempt to fuse phenomenology or hermeneutics in AT might create a product that is not AT. However, I don't see a reason why people will study activity only in the AT way. I personally break away from it many times. AT is not the most productive way to engage in experiential and descriptive study of activity as an everyday phenomenon. AT presupposes a top-down approach to the study of activity, imposing a set of methodological principles and theoretical framework. There are situations when this approach is very productive. However, if we emphasize the human experience aspect and the importance to unveil new aspects and their subsequent descriptions, I would not use AT. Best, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lplarry Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 12:25 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Here is a quote from the introduction of "The Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic of the subject. "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE conceiving of processes without subjects." This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw the failure of phenomenology and the residual links between subjectivism and anthropology. The force of Foucault's argument was tying the philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an outmoded humanism. It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. -----Original Message----- From: "Lubomir Savov Popov" Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ; "Andy Blunden" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Alfredo, The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on the motive and purpose of activity, the object can be approached in many different ways. It is true that the relationship between the object and the subject caries the purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This type of relationship might has several aspects and the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, in AT, the teleological aspect is central one among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at several levels with distinctive teleological phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure of activity with its three levels. I just tried to do that and in most cases I got the famous "triangle." The internet is dominated by English language texts where the authors evidently use that version of activity theory. The three structural levels of activity might be found in t Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very much in line with the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. I have many questions, most of which I should find in the literature rather than bother here. But I would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote that the object "carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." What does "in itself" mean here? Thanks again for a very informative post, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some distinctions in this field ... we have at least three different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate uses of the English word, but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent some different terms. The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the triangle. Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what is motivating all the members of the design team when they sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use Hegel's apt terminology here. Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is almost as bad in Russian and German, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). > > As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. > > I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those questions. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this discussion. > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call it Activity Theory? > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Andy, all, > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final design product. > > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before the design thing is finished). > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could discuss the history of development of these relations between the different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). > Any thoughts? > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Andy Blunden > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some role in > mediating the relation between subjects, probably a symbolic role, but > possibly an instrumental role, too, and one subject challenges that > role and turns the object into its opposite, and changes the terms of > collaboration. > A number of examples spring to mind. > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are > embraced by a despised group who take control of the > word and assertively embrace it; > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before > them rather than in shame); > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > organising tool; > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared > object (the land); > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a > symbol of India. > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when she > introduced the term, but core point is that the ideological > construction placed upon an object is subject to contestation, and if > successful, the re-marking of an artefact is a tremendously powerful > spur to subjectivity. > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a mediating artefact > or the object of work (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > that in these cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols > according to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What about video? >> Henry >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>> Thanks Rolf! >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>>> man-of-the-world. >>>> Does that make better sense? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >>>> but also the ideological context. >>>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >>>> and regulations, communications resources, >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 [The entire original message is not included.] From smago@uga.edu Wed Jul 22 09:46:34 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:46:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: NPR.org - The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future In-Reply-To: References: <957aba5b-f3e4-4d83-8f68-6802f9e5b55c@xtinp2mta4200.xt.local> Message-ID: The latest in brain research. Oy. The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future Researchers say they've come up with a 30-minute test that can predict a child's language skill and diagnose learning disabilities. Read this story From smago@uga.edu Wed Jul 22 09:49:21 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:49:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1437027495936.54815@iped.uio.no> <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <55AFB41C.6020803@mira.net> Message-ID: In case anyone's interested, I've got a set of articles that draw on LSV's volume on Defectology to consider current conceptions of mental health. They should be evident by title at http://smago.coe.uga.edu/vita/vitaweb.htm although it might take some sifting. p -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 12:32 PM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Andy, Speaking of typos, I am assuming you meant DSM - The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), not DVM - which is the Dept of Motor Vehicles, here in New Mexico. Not that there hasn?t been a lot of traffic on this thread lately. Your substantive point about what is considered mental illness, and how the DSM defines it, seems super relevant to this thread, where subject/object issues touch on individual and collective sanity and insanity, however sanity and insanity are construed. Henry > On Jul 22, 2015, at 9:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > You are right, Larry, that everything that's going on in these situation arises from the *relation between a subject and the Arbeitsgegenstand*, not the Arbeitsgegenstand alone. > For example, there are hundreds of "syndromes" listed in DMV which in past times or other countries are not considered illnesses at all. > And apologies for all the silly typos in that message. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 1:11 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> Andy, you have helped clarify why I have been [and remain] confused on the notion of "object" >> >> I will try to focus on one particular relation you have highlighted. >> If I am clear on your distinctions then: >> >> It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand ALONE [the object OF labour or the object upon which labour works] where the problem resides. The problem is NOT carried WITHIN the Arbeitsgegenstand as an abstraction. The OBJECT [purposes and motives] includes also the "concept" that the subject-person makes OF the arbeitsgegenstand [object OF labour]. >> >> So it is the concept's relation WITH the arbeitsgegenstand [object OF labour] that generates "subject's socially shared OBJECTs [purposes and motives]. >> >> Andy, I may have garbled your construal of the relations involved in these two meanings of "object", my question is why not just say "object of labour" [when we mean arbeitsgegenstand] AND say "purposes and motives" when we mean OBJECT. >> >> In the same way that Dewey wishes he had used a different term for "experience" it seems we need alternative terms for "object". >> >> I am also struggling to understand the historical movement implied in the alternative changing OBJECTs [purposes and motives] expressed in how a term is situated. >> >> The notion of "polyphonic" languages with shifting meanings and OBJECTS seems very complex and seems to require expansive understandings of multiple different "language-games" [as Wittgenstein uses that concept. >> >> The labour process AND the conceptual process and multiple modern / postmodern understandings of "their" [using personal pronoun] relations. Very complex process. >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to >> some distinctions in this field ... we have at least >> three different versions of Activity Theory involved >> here plus Leigh Star's theory and in addition the >> theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial >> idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different >> way, all of them legitimate uses of the English word, >> but all indexing different concepts. So for the sake >> of this discussion I will invent some different terms. >> >> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be >> a nail to a man with a hammer and waste material for a >> man with a broom, but it is all the same >> Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in >> the middle of the left side of the triangle to mean >> Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been worked upon it >> becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the blacksmith uses >> is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and >> the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are >> respectively the base and apex of the triangle. >> >> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the >> purpose and motive of the activity." So this "purpose >> or motive" is not shown on the triangle, but I will >> call it the OBJECT. This is what Leontyev meant by >> "object" when he talks about "object-oriented >> activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because it >> is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); >> it is not a material thing or process as such. >> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is >> what is motivating all the members of the design team >> when they sit down to collaborate with one another. >> Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the >> nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is to >> sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These >> OBJECTs change in the course of collaboration and in >> the End an OBJECT Is *realised* which is the "truth" >> of the collaboration, to use Hegel's apt terminology here. >> >> Surely it is important to recognise that while >> everyone shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends >> up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, along the road >> they construe the object differently. This is what >> Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It >> is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried >> within it alone which motivates action, but *the >> concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! >> >> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir >> astutely notices) postmodern ideology critique to the >> collaboration within an ostensibly neutral >> infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms Rules >> and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be >> there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows >> that this is an illusion; the Rules and Instruments >> are in fact residues of past collaborations which >> carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs >> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >> >> But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern >> critique elements of this idea, that apparently >> ideologically neutral obJects (in the expanded sense >> of socially constructed entities, usually far more >> than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including >> institutions - fossilised "systems of activity") and >> recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, >> reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept >> of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >> >> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary >> Object in the place of Object on his triangle, joining >> two "systems of activity," for the purpose of looking >> not at cooperation but rather the conflict within the >> broader collaboration. The reconstrual of the >> Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to change >> the relation between Subject and obJECT (here >> referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as >> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different >> strand of postmodern critique into the equation, >> namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, >> with great effect. >> >> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >> Object, OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, >> the situation is almost as bad in Russian and German, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >> >> To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I >> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the >> distinction between object and tool in activity >> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we >> were aware through the process, that what we >> describe in the paper has to do with how the >> object of design emerged and developed for the >> team in and as they were dealing with, developing, >> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I >> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a >> lack of a historical account of the object that >> goes over and above the particular instances >> analyzed. Although we provide with some >> ethnographic contextualization of the team's >> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion >> is grounded on concrete events and their >> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >> distinction between object and means because it >> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then >> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >> ented towards anything beyond what was there in >> the meetings, it was in and through the meetings' >> means. How would then the distinction between >> means and object have added to our understanding >> of the events? (And this is not to doubt of the >> contribution from such a distinction, I really >> mean to ask this question for the purpose of >> growing and expanding; and as said before, part of >> the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. >> contribution). >> >> As to how we would position our contribution with >> regard to activity theory, I would reiterate what >> we said when introducing the paper for discussion: >> we begun with the purpose of working outside any >> particular framework and think, as we think Star >> did, broadly, drawing from several sources. These >> included cultural historical psychology, >> ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also >> the ideas about Experience (in the >> Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic >> in this discussion were in the background all the >> time, but we did not operationalize them in terms >> of any particular theory. This is not to say that >> we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best >> to keep internal coherence between what we said >> about the data, and what the data was exhibiting >> for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. >> >> I think the questions you are rising about >> activity theory are very much in the spirit of >> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best >> places to be asking those questions. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > on behalf >> of Lubomir Savov Popov > > >> Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >> >> There are also a few other things that I would >> like to bring to this discussion. >> >> First, you have a wonderful project and a great >> article. It is a great example of an >> interpretativist approach to everyday life >> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It >> is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >> >> However, how is your approach related to classic >> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is >> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might >> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >> emerge right now or have emerged in the last >> decades; still other people might look for >> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a >> template or categorize your methodology -- just >> raising a question about its connection to >> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that >> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify >> certain things for myself. >> >> For example: What are the limits and boundaries of >> Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity >> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >> gain when we infuse new methodological, >> epistemological, and ontological realities into >> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the >> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? >> (I mean here Activity Theory as research >> methodology.) Do we need to call something >> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new >> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need >> to call it Activity Theory? >> >> Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, >> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your >> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can >> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but >> after we assimilate them for use in our project, >> they will "change hands" and will change their >> particular discourse affiliation and will become >> completely different components of a completely >> different discourse. Mostly because the >> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and >> the concepts are very different despite of the >> similarities in ideas and words used to name these >> ideas. >> >> Just a few questions that I hope will help me >> understand better what is going on in the realm of >> CHAT. >> >> Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov >> =bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Andy, all, >> I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and >> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is >> very interesting. I have particular interest in >> the difference that they point out between >> boundary object on the one hand, and object and >> instrumentality as different aspects of activity >> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this >> distinction while writing our own paper. We >> noticed that the museum space, through multiple >> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a >> floor plan, performances of being in the room >> while not being there, etc), was a means, an >> instrument for achieving a final design product. >> >> At the same time, the museum space begun to become >> the object of the designers' activity. Since this >> were interdisciplinary designs, and the partners >> had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what >> seemed to be a common object for all them was the >> museum as place. Thus, most representations of it >> begun to be made in terms of narratives about >> being there. That was the orientation that seemed >> to stick them together. >> >> Thus, the museum space was both object and >> instrument. We wondered whether we should do >> connections to notions of object of activity and >> tools, but we felt that that road would take us >> away from the focus on body and experience. We >> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >> differentiate between object of design, the design >> thing that work delivers, and the object's >> constituents (or means of presentation before the >> design thing is finished). >> >> When bringing the notion of boundary object into >> the picture, we could discuss the history of >> development of these relations between the >> different forms of presentations of the museum >> means towards the object without necessarily >> articulating the differences between the two. One >> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not >> about materials in themselves, but about >> consequences in action. From the point of view of >> the persons implicated in the process, the museum >> space as object of design was an issue in and >> through the working with some material, some form >> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and >> instrument seemed to be moments of a same >> experience. But I still want to learn what we may >> get out of making the distinction between object >> and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I >> should perhaps read more carefully their study >> rather than be here thinking aloud). >> Any thoughts? >> >> Alfredo >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > on behalf >> of Andy Blunden > > >> Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Henry, anything. But the point is objects which >> play some >> role in mediating the relation between subjects, >> probably a >> symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, >> too, and >> one subject challenges that role and turns the >> object into >> its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. >> A number of examples spring to mind. >> >> * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as >> Queer, are >> embraced by a despised group who take control >> of the >> word and assertively embrace it; >> * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who >> deployed their >> stereotype as housewives and mothers to >> magnificant effect; >> * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a >> weapon >> against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS >> flee before >> them rather than in shame); >> * The Chartists who turned the British govt's >> stamp which >> put newspapers out of reach of workers >> against them by >> printing the Northern Star as a stamped >> newspaper and >> obliging workers to club together in groups >> to buy and >> read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >> organising tool; >> * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied >> Territory / >> Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a >> shared >> object (the land); >> * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon >> and tool >> for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, >> raising it >> from the status of obsolete and inferior >> technology to a >> symbol of India. >> >> In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in >> mind when >> she introduced the term, but core point is that the >> ideological construction placed upon an object is >> subject to >> contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an >> artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to >> subjectivity. >> >> Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >> mediating artefact or the object of work >> (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that >> in these >> cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols >> according >> to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >> Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> I got to thinking about the photographs as >> boundary objects. What about video? >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden >> > > wrote: >> >> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came >> to see that it was the photographs that >> Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to >> recover his humanity. This is consonant >> with how Yrjo was using the idea in >> relation to the subsistence farmers' >> movement in Mexico and their corn. >> Thanks Rolf! >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could >> also interpret the photographs as >> boundary objects as they support the >> coordination of therapy activities >> between Thomas and the nurse. I think >> it depends on the aspect of activity >> one is attempting to explore as >> opposed to the definite identification >> of what may or may not be a boundary >> object. This is only my opinion though! >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy >> Blunden > >> > >> wrote: >> >> Or alternatively, the boundary >> object in question is >> Thomas's aged body, which is >> subject to an >> interpretation which Thomas >> contests by showing >> photographs of far away places >> and explaining how >> well-travelled he is, seeking an >> interpretation of >> himself as a well-travelled and >> experiences >> man-of-the-world. >> Does that make better sense? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy >> Blunden wrote: >> >> Yes, I agree. My own interest >> is in social theory >> and I'd never heard of >> "boundary objects." It >> seems to me that what BOs do >> is introduce some >> social theory into domains of >> activity (scientific >> and work collaborations for >> example) where the >> participants naively think >> they are collaborating >> on neutral ground. So it is >> not just granularity, >> but also the ideological context. >> >> In Yjro Engestrom's article, >> the home care workers >> collaborate with the old >> couple according to rules >> and regulations, >> communications resources, >> technology, finance and so >> on, which in the >> unnamed country, the old >> couple are apparently >> cast as "patients". Isn't it >> the case that here it >> is those rules and >> regulations, etc., which are >> the "boundary objects"? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 20/07/2015 11:13 PM, Rolf >> Steier wrote: >> >> I think that a particular >> institution or >> government system could >> potentially be a >> boundary object depending >> on how the concept >> is applied. Star >> describes three criteria: 1) >> interpretive flexibility >> 2) material/ >> organizational structure >> and 3) scale/ >> granularity in which the >> concept is useful. >> >> She argues that boundary >> objects are typically >> most useful at the >> organizational level - so I >> would say that one would >> have to justify the >> utility of applying the >> concept to a >> particular institution, >> as opposed to, say, an >> object within an institution. >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at >> 2:46 PM, Andy Blunden >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> wrote: >> >> Phew! >> So would it be >> correct to describe the >> government >> institutions and >> political system are >> "boundary objects"? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> On 20/07/2015 9:42 >> PM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> Hi Andy - >> Good catch! I >> believe that is a typo >> and should >> read "despite a >> LACK of consensus". >> Thank you for >> pointing that out. >> >> >> I also wanted to >> follow up on a >> suggestion that >> Greg made in the >> other thread >> suggesting we look >> at David >> McNeill's work. I had only >> been familiar >> with his earlier >> work on gesture, but >> after doing >> a bit of reading >> over the weekend, I >> found his >> concept of 'unexpected metaphors' >> potentially >> useful in dealing >> with some of my >> questions.( >> http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/unexpected_metaphors.pdf >> ) >> >> Here is a >> relevant quote describing >> unexpected >> metaphors as a >> form of gesture: >> >> /The logic is >> that unexpected >> metaphors arise >> from the >> need to >> create images when the >> culture does >> not have >> them readily >> at hand. These images >> join linguistic >> content as >> growth points and >> differentiate what >> Vygotsky >> (1987) called psychological >> predicates, or >> points of >> contrast in the >> immediate ongoing >> context of >> speaking. >> Unexpected metaphors, >> precisely >> because they >> are outside >> the conventions of >> language and >> culture, >> can capture >> abstractions in novel >> ways and >> provide the >> fluidity of >> thought and language >> that is the >> essence >> of ongoing >> discourse./ >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 20, >> 2015 at 1:00 PM, Andy >> Blunden >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> wrote: >> >> Rolf, what >> did you mean by "the >> achievement of >> cooperation >> despite consensus"? >> p. 131, >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> On 17/07/2015 >> 8:45 AM, Rolf Steier >> wrote: >> >> Are we >> allowed to ask >> questions about our >> paper as >> well? I >> hope so! >> >> For a >> little context -in our >> paper, we >> identified >> particular kinds of >> episodes >> in which participants >> from different >> disciplines seek coherence >> and >> continuity of shared >> representations >> through >> bodily >> action. These >> actions >> include gesture, >> movement and physical >> performance linking the >> present >> material artifacts to >> objects of >> design. >> Most of >> these episodes >> seem to >> involve some form of >> improvisation, >> resourcefulness or creativity, >> and I'm >> not fully sure how to >> characterize >> these >> aspects >> of the >> interactions. In most cases, the >> participants seem >> to be >> searching for the >> best >> words or material >> representation to >> convey a >> particular intention - >> when this >> becomes problematic >> or limiting >> - they >> almost >> fall back on what >> is >> available - these >> improvised bodily >> performances - as a way of >> maintaining continuity, and of >> inviting >> co-participants into a shared and >> imagined >> space. These bodily >> actions don't >> seem to >> begin the >> proposals, but >> are in a >> sense *discovered* by the >> participants. >> >> >> I think >> there is something >> really fascinating >> about >> this kind of creativity >> and >> resourcefulness in >> interaction that >> could be >> explored >> more deeply - and >> that I'm >> having trouble >> articulating. >> Maybe some >> of you >> have some thoughts >> on this? >> Alfredo - I know >> we've talked >> about this >> a bit >> before so maybe you >> can add a >> little clarity to my >> question. >> >> On Thu, >> Jul 16, 2015 at 9:37 >> PM, HENRY SHONERD >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> wrote: >> >> Alfredo, >> Thank >> you very much for >> the sketch of your >> roots. I taught English in >> Puigcerda and Barcelona >> for 5 years >> back in >> the >> early 70s, just before >> Franco died. (He died the >> day I >> boarded the >> plane >> back to the U.S.) Place >> and >> language are interesting, >> especially where >> language varieties meet. >> Boundaries. I know mostly >> from my >> familiarity >> with >> the music of Catalunya >> and >> Mallorca that the speech >> communities in >> each >> of those places treasure >> their >> unique languages >> (Catalan and >> Mallorquin), yet see a >> commonality >> vis-a-vis their >> separateness from >> Castilian >> Spanish, the national language >> of >> Spain from 1492 on. I >> see a parallel >> between your work on boundary >> objects, where individual >> persons >> collaborate >> to >> create spaces, AND >> boundary objects >> "negotiated" by groups of >> people who live in real >> spaces. >> I am >> thinking, among other >> things, of >> indigeneity, a big topic >> here in New >> Mexico, with so many >> Native Americans. >> Assymetries of power. >> Bullying. >> Testing and curriculum become >> instruments of >> war >> by other means. I hope my >> tone >> does not distract >> from, nor >> diminish, the >> optimism created by this >> thread. Yet I think that >> optimism is so >> precious because of the >> ground (the >> world) of the dialog. >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, at >> 12:13 PM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> wrote: >> >> Well, you could say >> that I am partly >> Catalan. I grew up in >> the province >> >> of >> Valencia, where Catalan >> language is >> official language together >> with >> Castilian Spanish. >> Although Valencia (the >> county) and Catalonia are >> different regional >> counties, Catalan >> is spoken >> in >> Catalonia, Valencia, and >> the >> Balear Islands. Some >> call the three >> together as the Catalan >> Countries. >> I >> don't like borders, but >> I respect >> and enjoy >> cultural diversity. >> >> Standardized testing, >> and the whole >> assumptions behind it, >> are an issue >> >> also >> in Spain and in >> Catalonia; but >> education >> has >> been so battered during >> the >> last years of right-wing >> government that I >> the >> debate have been more >> about >> means and access >> than about >> contents and >> aims. >> Which in some sense >> may >> be good because it >> moves the >> debates away >> from >> performance. But I have >> been >> living outside of >> Spain for eight >> years >> now, >> so I am not the best to >> update you on this either. >> >> Best wishes, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> on >> behalf of >> HENRY >> SHONERD >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 19:54 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >> The Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, >> Yes, you have answered >> my question >> very >> nicely! I especially >> appreciate >> >> that >> you were willing to >> wrestle with my >> question, despite your lack of >> familiarity with the >> issues here in >> the U.S. >> Am I >> wrong, or are you >> Catalan? In which case >> your experience in >> Catalunya would take you to a >> different place in critiquing >> schooling there, >> though not necessarily >> unconnected to yours and >> Rolf's work on >> boundary objects. I just >> met for >> the >> second day in a row >> with a friend >> who is >> the >> liaison between our public >> school district and a >> children's science >> museum called Explora. I >> feel like >> I'm >> swimming in this >> thread, talk about a >> mixed >> metaphor! >> >> Henry >> >> >> On Jul 16, 2015, >> at 12:18 AM, >> Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> wrote: >> >> I am sorry, Henry, >> but I am >> not very >> familiar with >> high-stakes >> >> standardized testing (as >> different to >> standardized testing in >> general) or >> with >> common core (which I >> quickly read >> is an >> issue >> in US). But I would say >> that, >> if (school) >> curricula were to be >> consistent with the view of >> education as the practice >> of creating >> conditions for certain >> attitudes and >> dispositions to >> emerge--which is what >> I was >> suggesting in the >> paragraph you >> copy--curricula would not >> be so much about >> standardized contents, but >> about >> human >> sensitivities and >> relations. So, >> I would >> say, >> no, standardized >> testing is not in >> principle in line >> with what >> I was >> trying to say. >> >> I was trying to >> make a distinction >> between trying to >> design someone's >> >> particular experience, and >> trying to >> design >> conditions for the development >> of >> attitudes and >> orientations. The >> first is >> likely impossible. The second >> seems >> to make more sense. >> >> One may of course >> wonder >> whether those >> attitudes and >> orientations can >> >> be >> considered general, and >> then form >> part of >> standardize measures instead >> of >> the traditional >> "contents and >> skills". But >> measuring assumes some >> quantitative increment in >> a particular >> aspect >> as >> the result of learning. >> Growth and development, >> however, are about >> qualitative change. So, as >> soon >> as >> you start measuring you >> would be >> missing >> growth and development. So, >> again, no. I would not say >> that >> high-stakes >> standardized testing is in >> line >> with >> what I was trying to say. >> >> I hope I have >> answered your >> question, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>> >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> on >> behalf of >> HENRY >> SHONERD >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> Sent: 16 July 2015 >> 07:48 >> To: eXtended Mind, >> Culture, >> Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] >> Re: The >> Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> Alfredo, you say: >> >> "However, we >> cannot aim at >> determining >> any particular >> >> situation/experience. The >> same may be said >> about >> EDUCATION. We cannot >> intend to communicate the >> curriculum >> and make >> it >> the content of the >> students' experience in >> the way we >> intend. But >> we >> can try to create the >> conditions for certain >> attitudes and >> dispositions to emerge." >> >> Would you say that >> high-stakes >> standardized >> testing is in >> line with >> >> your >> construal of >> curriculum design? >> How about >> common core? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jul 15, >> 2015, at 5:29 PM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >>>> >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks a lot >> for the >> clarifications. I see now >> why it >> may be said that >> >> designers can aim at >> designing for >> constrains >> but >> not for affordances. I >> see >> that this way of >> talking is part of a >> designers' way to get things >> done, >> and that it may >> indeed be an >> effective >> way >> to design for >> place-making, as in the >> example that >> Michael >> gives >> of MOMA. Indeed, much of >> what >> we report in our >> study is about >> designers >> talking about how spatial >> features might afford some >> experiences >> in the >> museum while constraining >> others. >> >> I must admit, >> however, that I >> still consider >> the distinction >> >> problematic from an >> analytical perspective >> whenever our object of >> study is >> experience, situated >> action, or design as >> situated practice. A more >> correct >> way >> to talk is that >> affordances and >> constrains >> are >> the positive and >> negative >> sides/interpretations of >> a single >> unitary category. As an actual >> and >> concrete phenomenon, >> walking into >> a musuem >> implies both affordances and >> constrains at the same >> time, whether >> intended >> or >> not. Which makes me wonder >> whether other terminology, >> such as >> Ingold's >> notion of "correspondence," >> might >> be more appropriated >> when we >> talk about >> how >> materials and actions >> become entangled into >> particular >> trajectories. >> >> In any case, >> and as Rolf >> emphasizes, >> what the >> designers in >> our study >> >> indeed do is to IMAGINE >> ways of being >> in the >> museum. Imagination versus >> prediction may be an >> interesting topic >> emerging here for further >> inquiry >> into >> design work. >> >> Another >> important (and >> related) >> issue that I >> think is >> emerging here >> >> has >> to do with the level >> of generality at >> which >> design intentions can be >> expected to work (just as >> Bateson >> argued with >> regard to prediction). At the >> level >> of generic social >> processes, and >> given a >> particular >> cultural-historical >> background, we as >> designers may try to make some >> generic situations more >> likely to >> occur than >> others (facilitating that more >> or >> less people end up >> together in a given >> place). However, we cannot >> aim at >> determining any particular >> situation/experience. The >> same may be >> said about >> EDUCATION. We cannot intend to >> communicate the >> curriculum and make it the >> content of the students' >> experience in >> the way >> we >> intend. But we can try to >> create the conditions for >> certain >> attitudes >> and >> dispositions to emerge. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > >> >> > From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jul 22 11:04:02 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 18:04:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: NPR.org - The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future In-Reply-To: References: <957aba5b-f3e4-4d83-8f68-6802f9e5b55c@xtinp2mta4200.xt.local> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9BD5720@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Took a look at the study. Seems little more than the age old field dependent, field independent tests except for auditory perception. I'm not surprised they predict success on pre-literacy because the tests are almost exclusively based on phonics, which reward field independence. It may mean children will be better decoders, but better readers? It's a combination of our insane ride into automation of everything combined with our insane funding practices - cue the John Lovitz voice, Yeah suuuure I can predict reading with this test, absooooolutely, one hundred percent. Just given me twenty million dollars and I'll show you. Sure, twenty million dollars, that's the ticket. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 12:47 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu) Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: NPR.org - The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future The latest in brain research. Oy. The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future Researchers say they've come up with a 30-minute test that can predict a child's language skill and diagnose learning disabilities. Read this story From pfarruggio@utpa.edu Wed Jul 22 11:15:02 2015 From: pfarruggio@utpa.edu (Peter Farruggio) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 18:15:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future Message-ID: Great! Just what we need to bolster the current tyranny of behavioristic reading instruction, in which "reading" is considered the ability to sound out words, with no regard to understanding the meaning of a text. So, to test this new test empirically, these psychologists will have to take 5-10 years to compare experimental vs control groups on how well they interpret real texts (stories and informational reading); but, instead, they will probably rush to use the usual word lists as a measure of "reading". And they'll likely get funding from the Gates Foundation, Pearson, and other supporters of standardized tests. Here Stephen Krashen pokes fun at this nonsense. He is a staunch advocate of phonemic awareness (PA) training in the womb http://susanohanian.org/show_letter.php?id=1578 Pete Farruggio, PhD Associate Professor Bilingual Education University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Here's to the crazy ones. The misfits. The rebels. The troublemakers. The round pegs in the square holes. The ones who see things differently. They're not fond of rules, and they have no respect for the status quo. You can quote them, disagree with them, glorify, or vilify them. About the only thing you can't do is ignore them because they change things. They push the human race forward. And while some may see them as crazy, we see genius. Because the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do. - Jack Kerouac, letter to Ed White, 1950 "The war is not meant to be won, it is meant to be continuous. Hierarchical society is only possible on the basis of poverty and ignorance." ~ George Orwell -----Original Message----- From: [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+pfarruggio=utpa.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 9:47 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu) Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: NPR.org - The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future The latest in brain research. Oy. Researchers say they've come up with a 30-minute test that can predict a child's language skill and diagnose learning disabilities. Read this story From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 22 12:15:46 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 13:15:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Peter (Smagorinsky), It wasn?t hard to find a good article by you that deals with mental health, not just from a Vygotskian perspective, but with lots of personal anecdotes. Perhaps there are other better articles by you on the topic(s). When I started reading/listening to the link from the reading researchers, I felt ill, had to force myself to go through it. Much of that WOULD make me crazy, I think! Henry -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Who's Normal Here?.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1592274 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150722/7d78bef6/attachment-0001.pdf -------------- next part -------------- > On Jul 22, 2015, at 12:15 PM, Peter Farruggio wrote: > > Great! Just what we need to bolster the current tyranny of behavioristic reading instruction, in which "reading" is considered the ability to sound out words, with no regard to understanding the meaning of a text. So, to test this new test empirically, these psychologists will have to take 5-10 years to compare experimental vs control groups on how well they interpret real texts (stories and informational reading); but, instead, they will probably rush to use the usual word lists as a measure of "reading". And they'll likely get funding from the Gates Foundation, Pearson, and other supporters of standardized tests. > > Here Stephen Krashen pokes fun at this nonsense. He is a staunch advocate of phonemic awareness (PA) training in the womb > > http://susanohanian.org/show_letter.php?id=1578 > > Pete Farruggio, PhD > Associate Professor > Bilingual Education > University of Texas Rio Grande Valley > > Here's to the crazy ones. The misfits. The rebels. The troublemakers. The round pegs in the square holes. The ones who see things differently. They're not fond of rules, and they have no respect for the status quo. You can quote them, disagree with them, glorify, or vilify them. About the only thing you can't do is ignore them because they change things. They push the human race forward. And while some may see them as crazy, we see genius. Because the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do. - Jack Kerouac, letter to Ed White, 1950 > > "The war is not meant to be won, it is meant to be continuous. Hierarchical society is only possible on the basis of poverty and ignorance." ~ George Orwell > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+pfarruggio=utpa.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 9:47 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu) > Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: NPR.org - The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future > > The latest in brain research. Oy. > > Researchers say they've come up with a 30-minute test that can predict a child's language skill and diagnose learning disabilities. > Read this story > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 22 12:19:23 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 13:19:23 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Peter (Smagorinsky), It wasn?t hard to find a good article by you that deals with mental health, not just from a Vygotskian perspective, but with lots of personal anecdotes. Perhaps there are other better articles by you on the topic(s). When I started reading/listening to the link from the reading researchers, I felt ill, had to force myself to go through it. Much of that WOULD make me crazy, I think! Henry -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Who's Normal Here?.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1592274 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20150722/4fe55c1a/attachment-0001.pdf -------------- next part -------------- > On Jul 22, 2015, at 12:15 PM, Peter Farruggio wrote: > > Great! Just what we need to bolster the current tyranny of behavioristic reading instruction, in which "reading" is considered the ability to sound out words, with no regard to understanding the meaning of a text. So, to test this new test empirically, these psychologists will have to take 5-10 years to compare experimental vs control groups on how well they interpret real texts (stories and informational reading); but, instead, they will probably rush to use the usual word lists as a measure of "reading". And they'll likely get funding from the Gates Foundation, Pearson, and other supporters of standardized tests. > > Here Stephen Krashen pokes fun at this nonsense. He is a staunch advocate of phonemic awareness (PA) training in the womb > > http://susanohanian.org/show_letter.php?id=1578 > > Pete Farruggio, PhD > Associate Professor > Bilingual Education > University of Texas Rio Grande Valley > > Here's to the crazy ones. The misfits. The rebels. The troublemakers. The round pegs in the square holes. The ones who see things differently. They're not fond of rules, and they have no respect for the status quo. You can quote them, disagree with them, glorify, or vilify them. About the only thing you can't do is ignore them because they change things. They push the human race forward. And while some may see them as crazy, we see genius. Because the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do. - Jack Kerouac, letter to Ed White, 1950 > > "The war is not meant to be won, it is meant to be continuous. Hierarchical society is only possible on the basis of poverty and ignorance." ~ George Orwell > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+pfarruggio=utpa.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 9:47 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu) > Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: NPR.org - The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future > > The latest in brain research. Oy. > > Researchers say they've come up with a 30-minute test that can predict a child's language skill and diagnose learning disabilities. > Read this story > > > > > From smago@uga.edu Wed Jul 22 12:30:15 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 19:30:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Henry, the one you attached was written for a "between" audience--not lay people or hard-boiled academics, but teachers in between. So it's not very technical like some of the other work, ergo its anecdotal character. p -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 3:19 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future Peter (Smagorinsky), It wasn?t hard to find a good article by you that deals with mental health, not just from a Vygotskian perspective, but with lots of personal anecdotes. Perhaps there are other better articles by you on the topic(s). When I started reading/listening to the link from the reading researchers, I felt ill, had to force myself to go through it. Much of that WOULD make me crazy, I think! Henry From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 22 14:12:50 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 15:12:50 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7016FED4-9C68-4880-8C7A-F55D1AB70602@gmail.com> Peter, I guess I am enough of a hard-boiled academic that it was skimming and scanning, rather than doing a slow read. (I was hoping that I didn?t go so fast that I misconstrued important things!) But those kinds of articles are so important for communicating Vygotsky to a larger audience. As you were doing. In the same way one of those ?teachers in between? reads the children?s literature she reads to her kids. And with relish! As I did your article. Sometimes reading Dr. Seuss does more for me than reading Hegel. (In fact, most everything I know about Hegel, I know from Andy.) Or substitute whatever academic you like. Anyway, I liked your article, and I?ll bet others do as well. Silence will not convince me otherwise. Henry P.S. Is technical writing never anecdotal? > On Jul 22, 2015, at 1:30 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > Henry, the one you attached was written for a "between" audience--not lay people or hard-boiled academics, but teachers in between. So it's not very technical like some of the other work, ergo its anecdotal character. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 3:19 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Test That Can Look Into A Child's (Reading) Future > > Peter (Smagorinsky), > It wasn?t hard to find a good article by you that deals with mental health, not just from a Vygotskian perspective, but with lots of personal anecdotes. Perhaps there are other better articles by you on the topic(s). When I started reading/listening to the link from the reading researchers, I felt ill, had to force myself to go through it. Much of that WOULD make me crazy, I think! > Henry > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Jul 22 18:30:30 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 11:30:30 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> References: <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> , <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no>, <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no>, <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory which give everything to the Object. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The Cambridge > Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic of the subject. > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early 1970's, > most notably "The Order of Things" and "The Archaeology of > Knowledge", did perhaps more than any other work of the > period to LEGITIMIZE conceiving of processes without > subjects." > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw the > failure of phenomenology and the residual links between > subjectivism and anthropology. > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the philosophy > of the subject to what he saw as an outmoded humanism. > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > ; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and the > purpose of activity. Actually, depending on the motive and > purpose of activity, the object can be approached in many > different ways. > > It is true that the relationship between the object and > the subject caries the purpose/goal/objective/motive of > activity. This type of relationship might has several > aspects and the teleological aspect is one of them. > Actually, in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at several > levels with distinctive teleological phenomena: > motivation, goal, etc. > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure of > activity with its three levels. I just tried to do that > and in most cases I got the famous "triangle." The > internet is dominated by English language texts where the > authors evidently use that version of activity theory. The > three structural levels of activity might be found in t > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very > much in line with the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you > describe it. > > I have many questions, most of which I should find in the > literature rather than bother here. But I would like to > ask one here. It concerns the quote that the object > "carries in itself the purpose and motive of the > activity." What does "in itself" mean here? > Thanks again for a very informative post, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the > word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent > some different terms. > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the > triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what > is motivating all the members of the design team when they > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in > the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is > *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in > Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some > problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but > *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique > elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation > but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and > aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of > postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to > add that I am a bit familiar with the distinction between > object and tool in activity theory, though not enough yet. > I can see, and we were aware through the process, that > what we describe in the paper has to do with how the > object of design emerged and developed for the team in and > as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to > particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that > in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account of > the object that goes over and above the particular > instances analyzed. Although we provide with some > ethnographic contextualization of the team's developmental > trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on > concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did > not resort to the distinction between object and means > because it seemed to be the same thing in the there and > then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the > meetings, it was in and through the meetings' means. How > would then the distinction between means and object have > added to our understanding of the events? (And this is not > to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I > really mean to ask this question for the purpose of > growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the > answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). > > > > As to how we would position our contribution with regard > to activity theory, I would reiterate what we said when > introducing the paper for discussion: we begun with the > purpose of working outside any particular framework and > think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > sources. These included cultural historical psychology, > ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the > ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) > that have been the topic in this discussion were in the > background all the time, but we did not operationalize > them in terms of any particular theory. This is not to say > that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried our best to > keep internal coherence between what we said about the > data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps > Rolf would like to add to this. > > > > I think the questions you are rising about activity > theory are very much in the spirit of what I am after, and > I am not the best to answer them; but this xmca list may > be one of the best places to be asking those questions. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > There are also a few other things that I would like to > bring to this discussion. > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. > It is a great example of an interpretativist approach to > everyday life phenomena. Really interesting and > fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is a > Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might say it one > of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now > or have emerged in the last decades; still other people > might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template > or categorize your methodology -- just raising a question > about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am > not saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to > clarify certain things for myself. > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of > Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity Theory and > Postmodernist approaches? What do we gain when we infuse > new methodological, epistemological, and ontological > realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is > the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I > mean here Activity Theory as research methodology.) Do we > need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If we > create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we > need to call it Activity Theory? > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late > Modernism. The discourse you use in your paper borrows > strongly from Postmodern discourses and approaches. I am > not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses can > be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of > discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our > project, they will "change hands" and will change their > particular discourse affiliation and will become > completely different components of a completely different > discourse. Mostly because the epistemologies and > ontologies are different; and the concepts are very > different despite of the similarities in ideas and words > used to name these ideas. > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand > better what is going on in the realm of CHAT. > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Andy, all, > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. > contribution to the special issue, which is very > interesting. I have particular interest in the difference > that they point out between boundary object on the one > hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects > of activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across > this distinction while writing our own paper. We noticed > that the museum space, through multiple forms of > presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, > performances of being in the room while not being there, > etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a final > design product. > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the > object of the designers' activity. Since this were > interdisciplinary designs, and the partners had multiple, > sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a common > object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > narratives about being there. That was the orientation > that seemed to stick them together. > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. > We wondered whether we should do connections to notions of > object of activity and tools, but we felt that that road > would take us away from the focus on body and experience. > We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > differentiate between object of design, the design thing > that work delivers, and the object's constituents (or > means of presentation before the design thing is finished). > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the > picture, we could discuss the history of development of > these relations between the different forms of > presentations of the museum means towards the object > without necessarily articulating the differences between > the two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on > the materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about > materials in themselves, but about consequences in action. > From the point of view of the persons implicated in the > process, the museum space as object of design was an issue > in and through the working with some material, some form > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But > I still want to learn what we may get out of making the > distinction between object and tool, as Engestr?m and > colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully > their study rather than be here thinking aloud). > > Any thoughts? > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and > > one subject challenges that role and turns the object into > > its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are > > embraced by a despised group who take control of the > > word and assertively embrace it; > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant > effect; > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon > > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee > before > > them rather than in shame); > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which > > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and > > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > organising tool; > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared > > object (the land); > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool > > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, > raising it > > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology > to a > > symbol of India. > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary > objects. What about video? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that > it was the photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to > turn to use to recover his humanity. This is consonant > with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to the > subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > >>> Thanks Rolf! > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret > the photographs as boundary objects as they support the > coordination of therapy activities between Thomas and the > nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity one is > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > identification of what may or may not be a boundary > object. This is only my opinion though! > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing > >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > >>>> man-of-the-world. > >>>> Does that make better sense? > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social > theory > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some > >>>> social theory into domains of activity > (scientific > >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the > >>>> participants naively think they are > collaborating > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > granularity, > >>>> but also the ideological context. > >>>> > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care > workers > >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to > rules > >>>> and regulations, communications resources, > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that > here it > >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > [The entire original message is not included.] From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 22 21:13:17 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 21:13:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> References: <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy/Lubomir-- I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give everything to the object. Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? Or? What is at stake here theoretically and practically? Mike PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of the discussion. It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? Mike On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden wrote: > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a humanism, in opposition to > poststructuralism, structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > which give everything to the Object. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The Cambridge Handbook of >> Merleau-Ponty on the topic of the subject. >> >> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early 1970's, most notably "The >> Order of Things" and "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more than >> any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE conceiving of processes without >> subjects." >> >> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw the failure of >> phenomenology and the residual links between subjectivism and anthropology. >> >> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the philosophy of the subject >> to what he saw as an outmoded humanism. >> >> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; >> Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and the purpose of >> activity. Actually, depending on the motive and purpose of activity, the >> object can be approached in many different ways. >> >> It is true that the relationship between the object and the subject >> caries the purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This type of >> relationship might has several aspects and the teleological aspect is one >> of them. Actually, in AT, the teleological aspect is central one among all >> aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >> >> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at several levels with >> distinctive teleological phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >> >> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure of activity with its >> three levels. I just tried to do that and in most cases I got the famous >> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English language texts where the >> authors evidently use that version of activity theory. The three structural >> levels of activity might be found in t >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very much in line with >> the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >> >> I have many questions, most of which I should find in the literature >> rather than bother here. But I would like to ask one here. It concerns the >> quote that the object "carries in itself the purpose and motive of the >> activity." What does "in itself" mean here? >> Thanks again for a very informative post, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some >> distinctions in this field ... we have at least three >> different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus >> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have >> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the >> word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate >> uses of the English word, but all indexing different >> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent >> some different terms. >> >> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail >> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a >> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom >> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the >> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been >> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the >> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now >> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or >> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the >> triangle. >> >> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose >> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is >> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. >> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about >> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, >> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the >> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. >> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what >> is motivating all the members of the design team when they >> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the >> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood >> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the >> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in >> the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is >> *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use >> Hegel's apt terminology here. >> >> Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone >> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome >> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object >> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in >> Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some >> problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but >> *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! >> >> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely >> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration >> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in >> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively >> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh >> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and >> Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations >> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs >> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >> >> But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique >> elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral >> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed >> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or >> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of >> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary >> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same >> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >> >> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object >> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems >> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation >> but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. >> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and >> aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT >> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as >> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of >> postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's >> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. >> >> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, >> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is >> almost as bad in Russian and German, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >> > >> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am >> a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity >> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the >> process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object >> of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing >> with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess >> we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account >> of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. >> Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's >> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete >> events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >> distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing >> in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >> > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was >> in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between >> means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this >> is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean >> to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said >> before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). >> > >> > As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity >> theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for >> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular >> framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >> sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, >> and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the >> Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were >> in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms >> of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything >> goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said >> about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would >> like to add to this. >> > >> > I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very >> much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those >> questions. >> > >> > Alfredo >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Lubomir Savov Popov >> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >> > >> > There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this >> discussion. >> > >> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great >> example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really >> interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and >> activity. >> > >> > However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some >> people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others >> might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now >> or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for >> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying >> here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a >> question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not >> saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things >> for myself. >> > >> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How >> much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >> gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological >> realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when >> it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research >> methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If >> we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call >> it Activity Theory? >> > >> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The >> discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses >> can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after >> we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and >> will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become >> completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly >> because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts >> are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to >> name these ideas. >> > >> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is >> going on in the realm of CHAT. >> > >> > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >> > >> > Lubomir >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Andy, all, >> > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the >> special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the >> difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and >> object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the >> other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. >> We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations >> (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room >> while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a >> final design product. >> > >> > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the >> designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a >> common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >> representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being >> there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. >> > >> > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered >> whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and >> tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body >> and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >> differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work >> delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before >> the design thing is finished). >> > >> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could >> discuss the history of development of these relations between the different >> forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without >> necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was >> that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already >> mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in >> action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, >> the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the >> working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both >> object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I >> still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between >> object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read >> more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). >> > Any thoughts? >> > >> > Alfredo >> > >> > >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Andy Blunden >> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some >> > role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a >> > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and >> > one subject challenges that role and turns the object into >> > its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. >> > A number of examples spring to mind. >> > >> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are >> > embraced by a despised group who take control of the >> > word and assertively embrace it; >> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their >> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; >> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon >> > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before >> > them rather than in shame); >> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which >> > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by >> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and >> > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and >> > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >> > organising tool; >> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / >> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared >> > object (the land); >> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool >> > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it >> > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a >> > symbol of India. >> > >> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when >> > she introduced the term, but core point is that the >> > ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to >> > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an >> > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. >> > >> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >> > mediating artefact or the object of work >> > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these >> > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according >> > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >> > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >> > >> > Andy >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What >> about video? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the >> photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to >> the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> >>> Thanks Rolf! >> >>> Andy >> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs >> as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities >> between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity >> one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of >> what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >> >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >> >>>> man-of-the-world. >> >>>> Does that make better sense? >> >>>> Andy >> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>> >> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >> >>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >> >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >> >>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >> >>>> but also the ideological context. >> >>>> >> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >> >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >> >>>> and regulations, communications resources, >> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >> >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >> >>>> the "boundary objects"? >> >>>> >> >>>> Andy >> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>> >> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] >> > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From ablunden@mira.net Wed Jul 22 21:31:40 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 14:31:40 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> Message-ID: <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the question about subjectivism and objectivism. When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem anomalous. What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting contradictions between the "subjective sense" and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though I know nothing at all of his work. The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > Andy/Lubomir-- > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be > badly timed. But > .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory > that give everything to the object. > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev > schools' conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the > environment? > > Or? > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > Mike > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted > discussion of boundary object. I almost want to ask -- > what forms of joint mediated activity do not involve > boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that not knowing > the answer to this question is a result of the richness of > the discussion. > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > Mike > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > which give everything to the Object. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > of the subject. > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > outmoded humanism. > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > ; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > be approached in many different ways. > > It is true that the relationship between the > object and the subject caries the > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > type of relationship might has several aspects and > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > several levels with distinctive teleological > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > do that and in most cases I got the famous > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > language texts where the authors evidently use > that version of activity theory. The three > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > very much in line with the notion of > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > mean here? > Thanks again for a very informative post, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > to some > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > different versions of Activity Theory involved > here plus > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > that have > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > using the > word "object" in a different way, all of them > legitimate > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > will invent > some different terms. > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > be a nail > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > man with a > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > Engestrom > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > side of the > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > has been > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > of the > triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > purpose > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > motive" is > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > OBJECT. > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > talks about > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > complex notion, > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > as such. > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > this is what > is motivating all the members of the design team > when they > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > of the > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > the wood > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > change in > the course of collaboration and in the End an > OBJECT Is > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > collaboration, to use > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > everyone > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > with Outcome > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > the object > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > clearly in > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > problem carried within it alone which motivates > action, but > *the concept the subject makes of the > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > Lubomir astutely > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > collaboration > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > is, in > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > naively > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > And Leigh > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > Instruments are in fact residues of past > collaborations > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > realised OBJECTs > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > But it seems that other have grasped the > postmodern critique > elements of this idea, that apparently > ideologically neutral > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > things, or > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > "systems of > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > Boundary > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > Boundary Object > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > two "systems > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > cooperation > but rather the conflict within the broader > collaboration. > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > deliberate and > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > obJECT > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > rendered as > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > strand of > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > Foucault's > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > Object, > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > situation is > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > distinction between object and tool in activity > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > were aware through the process, that what we > describe in the paper has to do with how the > object of design emerged and developed for the > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > lack of a historical account of the object that > goes over and above the particular instances > analyzed. Although we provide with some > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > is grounded on concrete events and their > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > distinction between object and means because it > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > in the meetings, it was in and through the > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > between means and object have added to our > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > contribution). > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > what we said when introducing the paper for > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > outside any particular framework and think, as we > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > sources. These included cultural historical > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > topic in this discussion were in the background > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > our best to keep internal coherence between what > we said about the data, and what the data was > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > to this. > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > places to be asking those questions. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > article. It is a great example of an > interpretativist approach to everyday life > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > decades; still other people might look for > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > template or categorize your methodology -- just > raising a question about its connection to > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > certain things for myself. > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > gain when we infuse new methodological, > epistemological, and ontological realities into > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > methodology.) Do we need to call something > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > they will "change hands" and will change their > particular discourse affiliation and will become > completely different components of a completely > different discourse. Mostly because the > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > the concepts are very different despite of the > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > ideas. > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > understand better what is going on in the realm of > CHAT. > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Andy, all, > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > very interesting. I have particular interest in > the difference that they point out between > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > distinction while writing our own paper. We > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > floor plan, performances of being in the room > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > become the object of the designers' activity. > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > narratives about being there. That was the > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > connections to notions of object of activity and > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > away from the focus on body and experience. We > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > differentiate between object of design, the design > thing that work delivers, and the object's > constituents (or means of presentation before the > design thing is finished). > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > the picture, we could discuss the history of > development of these relations between the > different forms of presentations of the museum > means towards the object without necessarily > articulating the differences between the two. One > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > about materials in themselves, but about > consequences in action. From the point of view of > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > space as object of design was an issue in and > through the working with some material, some form > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > get out of making the distinction between object > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > should perhaps read more carefully their study > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > Any thoughts? > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > play some > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > probably a > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > role, too, and > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > object into > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > collaboration. > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > as Queer, are > > embraced by a despised group who take > control of the > > word and assertively embrace it; > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > deployed their > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > magnificant effect; > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > a weapon > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > (ISIS flee before > > them rather than in shame); > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > stamp which > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > against them by > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > newspaper and > > obliging workers to club together in groups > to buy and > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > organising tool; > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > Territory / > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > a shared > > object (the land); > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > weapon and tool > > for Indian independence and > self-sufficiency, raising it > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > technology to a > > symbol of India. > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > in mind when > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > ideological construction placed upon an object > is subject to > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > of an > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > subjectivity. > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > that in these > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > symbols according > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > boundary objects. What about video? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > >>> Thanks Rolf! > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > they support the coordination of therapy > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > identification of what may or may not be a > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > question is > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > showing > >>>> photographs of far away places and > explaining how > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > interpretation of > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > >>>> man-of-the-world. > >>>> Does that make better sense? > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > social theory > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > objects." It > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > introduce some > >>>> social theory into domains of > activity (scientific > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > where the > >>>> participants naively think they are > collaborating > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > granularity, > >>>> but also the ideological context. > >>>> > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > home care workers > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > according to rules > >>>> and regulations, communications > resources, > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > in the > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > apparently > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > case that here it > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > etc., which are > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, > and thus ecological niches are not stable and given > forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de Thu Jul 23 05:37:15 2015 From: manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de (Holodynski, Manfred) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 12:37:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> Message-ID: <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Hi Andy, with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective meaning. As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal signs and their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her socially embedded activity. What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through the use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the individual within the process of internalization. a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings during social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use them in the light of their actually elicited motives along with the motives they assign to the interaction partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not have to match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree on the same definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, however, will be situated very differently and enriched with other sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the other person experienced a highly dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination that more or less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of personal sense. People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want to communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to express this personal relations. So, this is the overall tension between objective meaning of an event or an object and its personal sense for a specific person. Best Manfred Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 D-48149 M?nster +49-(0)-251-83-34311 +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the question about subjectivism and objectivism. When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem anomalous. What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting contradictions between the "subjective sense" and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though I know nothing at all of his work. The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > Andy/Lubomir-- > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > everything to the object. > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > Or? > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > Mike > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated > activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that > not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of > the discussion. > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > Mike > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > which give everything to the Object. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > of the subject. > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > outmoded humanism. > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > ; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > be approached in many different ways. > > It is true that the relationship between the > object and the subject caries the > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > type of relationship might has several aspects and > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > several levels with distinctive teleological > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > do that and in most cases I got the famous > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > language texts where the authors evidently use > that version of activity theory. The three > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > very much in line with the notion of > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > mean here? > Thanks again for a very informative post, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > to some > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > different versions of Activity Theory involved > here plus > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > that have > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > using the > word "object" in a different way, all of them > legitimate > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > will invent > some different terms. > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > be a nail > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > man with a > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > Engestrom > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > side of the > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > has been > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > of the > triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > purpose > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > motive" is > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > OBJECT. > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > talks about > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > complex notion, > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > as such. > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > this is what > is motivating all the members of the design team > when they > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > of the > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > the wood > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > change in > the course of collaboration and in the End an > OBJECT Is > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > collaboration, to use > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > everyone > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > with Outcome > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > the object > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > clearly in > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > problem carried within it alone which motivates > action, but > *the concept the subject makes of the > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > Lubomir astutely > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > collaboration > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > is, in > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > naively > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > And Leigh > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > Instruments are in fact residues of past > collaborations > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > realised OBJECTs > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > But it seems that other have grasped the > postmodern critique > elements of this idea, that apparently > ideologically neutral > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > things, or > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > "systems of > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > Boundary > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > Boundary Object > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > two "systems > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > cooperation > but rather the conflict within the broader > collaboration. > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > deliberate and > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > obJECT > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > rendered as > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > strand of > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > Foucault's > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > Object, > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > situation is > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > distinction between object and tool in activity > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > were aware through the process, that what we > describe in the paper has to do with how the > object of design emerged and developed for the > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > lack of a historical account of the object that > goes over and above the particular instances > analyzed. Although we provide with some > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > is grounded on concrete events and their > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > distinction between object and means because it > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > in the meetings, it was in and through the > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > between means and object have added to our > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > contribution). > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > what we said when introducing the paper for > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > outside any particular framework and think, as we > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > sources. These included cultural historical > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > topic in this discussion were in the background > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > our best to keep internal coherence between what > we said about the data, and what the data was > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > to this. > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > places to be asking those questions. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > article. It is a great example of an > interpretativist approach to everyday life > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > decades; still other people might look for > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > template or categorize your methodology -- just > raising a question about its connection to > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > certain things for myself. > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > gain when we infuse new methodological, > epistemological, and ontological realities into > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > methodology.) Do we need to call something > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > they will "change hands" and will change their > particular discourse affiliation and will become > completely different components of a completely > different discourse. Mostly because the > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > the concepts are very different despite of the > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > ideas. > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > understand better what is going on in the realm of > CHAT. > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Andy, all, > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > very interesting. I have particular interest in > the difference that they point out between > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > distinction while writing our own paper. We > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > floor plan, performances of being in the room > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > become the object of the designers' activity. > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > narratives about being there. That was the > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > connections to notions of object of activity and > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > away from the focus on body and experience. We > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > differentiate between object of design, the design > thing that work delivers, and the object's > constituents (or means of presentation before the > design thing is finished). > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > the picture, we could discuss the history of > development of these relations between the > different forms of presentations of the museum > means towards the object without necessarily > articulating the differences between the two. One > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > about materials in themselves, but about > consequences in action. From the point of view of > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > space as object of design was an issue in and > through the working with some material, some form > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > get out of making the distinction between object > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > should perhaps read more carefully their study > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > Any thoughts? > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > play some > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > probably a > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > role, too, and > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > object into > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > collaboration. > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > as Queer, are > > embraced by a despised group who take > control of the > > word and assertively embrace it; > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > deployed their > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > magnificant effect; > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > a weapon > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > (ISIS flee before > > them rather than in shame); > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > stamp which > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > against them by > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > newspaper and > > obliging workers to club together in groups > to buy and > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > organising tool; > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > Territory / > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > a shared > > object (the land); > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > weapon and tool > > for Indian independence and > self-sufficiency, raising it > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > technology to a > > symbol of India. > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > in mind when > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > ideological construction placed upon an object > is subject to > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > of an > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > subjectivity. > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > that in these > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > symbols according > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > boundary objects. What about video? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > >>> Thanks Rolf! > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > they support the coordination of therapy > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > identification of what may or may not be a > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > question is > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > showing > >>>> photographs of far away places and > explaining how > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > interpretation of > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > >>>> man-of-the-world. > >>>> Does that make better sense? > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > social theory > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > objects." It > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > introduce some > >>>> social theory into domains of > activity (scientific > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > where the > >>>> participants naively think they are > collaborating > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > granularity, > >>>> but also the ideological context. > >>>> > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > home care workers > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > according to rules > >>>> and regulations, communications > resources, > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > in the > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > apparently > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > case that here it > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > etc., which are > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 23 07:10:22 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 00:10:22 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> References: <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Message-ID: <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice again on this list. I understand what you are saying. I will try to better explain how I stand with A N Leontyev. I am a social theorist, that is I am interested in changing societal arrangements (to put it very politely), and I am one of few social theorists, properly so-called, who base themselves on Vygotsky's theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My position is a contradictory one because Vygotsky and Leontyev were psychologists (like you) and not social theorists. Social Theorists and Psychologists generally live in different buildings on the university campus, in different departments, publish in different journals, refer to different founding theorists, and altogether inhabit different universes. Social theorists have ideas about psychology, but generally not scientific ones, and vice versa. In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an excellent foundation for social theory because he introduced into human development and every interaction between two individuals a culturally produced sign. But he only went so far. He showed how people acted and developed within their social situation, but he did not tackle the problem of how that situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of the Activity as a macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making development which opened CHAT to become a fully developed social-and-psychological theory. But what he said himself on questions of social theory was of very poor quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the sort of ideas that would win any following among social theorists today. But he was after all a Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he is forgiven. Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken "objective meaning" is not a psychological category at all for Leontyev. Yes? And personal sense is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental Psychological category. So if what I said were to be interpreted to say that personal sense is a subset of objective meaning, that would be quite wrong. While I accept (as I must) a categorical difference between material objects/processes and their reflection in my mind, I do not at all understand societal processes as nonpsychological processes. I try to conceive of them together in one unit, and I think I am on my own there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). There remains of course the distinction between the individual (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), mediated by the particular (Besonder). A human individual is something radically different from a number of individuals. For the human individual and how they erleben a social situation, I rely on my friends and collaborator-psychologists. I am interested in how the Activities go. In small part to avoid having arguments with followers of Leontyev I call activities "projects." So I reserve the right to say things about projects without a follower of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a mysterious or esoteric concept; every English-speaker knows what a project is, and if there is any confusion with projects as defined by Existentialists, I call them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people usually join them, not create them). These include capitalist firms, political parties, sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a family, a professional career - all those things which gives our lives mening while we build the world we and our children must live in, what Fedor Vasilyuk called an ????????? . A project is not a collection of people, it is an aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and the "logic" of projects is something different from Psychology, but it is inclusive of Psychology as well. A project is a kind of psychological phenomenon, but it is also much more than psychology, because, as you remind us, people regulate their own behaviour using signs created in the world beyond their ken. Projects are the material substance of Concepts, and I rely on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? Everything you said (except how you characterised my ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > Hi Andy, > with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective meaning. As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal signs and their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her socially embedded activity. > What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through the use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the individual within the process of internalization. > a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings during social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use them in the light of their actually elicited motives along with > the motives they assign to the interaction partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not have to match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. > b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree on the same definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, however, will be situated very differently and enriched with other sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the other person experienced a highly dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. > Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination that more or less successfully supports the embodiment > and expression of personal sense. People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on the appropriation > and use of conventionalized signs when they want to communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. > By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to express this personal relations. So, this is the overall tension between objective meaning of an event or an object and its personal sense for a specific person. > Best > Manfred > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the question about subjectivism and objectivism. > When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem anomalous. > > What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting contradictions between the "subjective sense" > and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" > for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. > > I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though I know nothing at all of his work. > > The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: >> Andy/Lubomir-- >> >> I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. >> But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the >> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give >> everything to the object. >> >> Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' >> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? >> >> Or? >> >> What is at stake here theoretically and practically? >> Mike >> PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of >> boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated >> activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that >> not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of >> the discussion. >> >> It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? >> Mike >> >> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a >> humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, >> structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory >> which give everything to the Object. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The >> Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic >> of the subject. >> >> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early >> 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and >> "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more >> than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE >> conceiving of processes without subjects." >> >> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw >> the failure of phenomenology and the residual >> links between subjectivism and anthropology. >> >> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the >> philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an >> outmoded humanism. >> >> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> ; Andy Blunden >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and >> the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on >> the motive and purpose of activity, the object can >> be approached in many different ways. >> >> It is true that the relationship between the >> object and the subject caries the >> purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This >> type of relationship might has several aspects and >> the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, >> in AT, the teleological aspect is central one >> among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >> >> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at >> several levels with distinctive teleological >> phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >> >> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure >> of activity with its three levels. I just tried to >> do that and in most cases I got the famous >> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English >> language texts where the authors evidently use >> that version of activity theory. The three >> structural levels of activity might be found in t >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is >> very much in line with the notion of >> Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >> >> I have many questions, most of which I should find >> in the literature rather than bother here. But I >> would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote >> that the object "carries in itself the purpose and >> motive of the activity." What does "in itself" >> mean here? >> Thanks again for a very informative post, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention >> to some >> distinctions in this field ... we have at least three >> different versions of Activity Theory involved >> here plus >> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories >> that have >> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is >> using the >> word "object" in a different way, all of them >> legitimate >> uses of the English word, but all indexing different >> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I >> will invent >> some different terms. >> >> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may >> be a nail >> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a >> man with a >> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. >> Engestrom >> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left >> side of the >> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it >> has been >> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the >> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now >> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or >> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex >> of the >> triangle. >> >> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the >> purpose >> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or >> motive" is >> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the >> OBJECT. >> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he >> talks about >> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a >> complex notion, >> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the >> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process >> as such. >> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But >> this is what >> is motivating all the members of the design team >> when they >> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one >> of the >> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into >> the wood >> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the >> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs >> change in >> the course of collaboration and in the End an >> OBJECT Is >> *realised* which is the "truth" of the >> collaboration, to use >> Hegel's apt terminology here. >> >> Surely it is important to recognise that while >> everyone >> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up >> with Outcome >> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe >> the object >> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so >> clearly in >> Thinking and Speech. It is not the >> Arbeitsgegenstand or some >> problem carried within it alone which motivates >> action, but >> *the concept the subject makes of the >> Arbeitsgegenstand*! >> >> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as >> Lubomir astutely >> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the >> collaboration >> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that >> is, in >> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are >> naively >> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. >> And Leigh >> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and >> Instruments are in fact residues of past >> collaborations >> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., >> realised OBJECTs >> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >> >> But it seems that other have grasped the >> postmodern critique >> elements of this idea, that apparently >> ideologically neutral >> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed >> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as >> things, or >> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised >> "systems of >> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a >> Boundary >> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same >> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >> >> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the >> Boundary Object >> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining >> two "systems >> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at >> cooperation >> but rather the conflict within the broader >> collaboration. >> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is >> deliberate and >> aimed to change the relation between Subject and >> obJECT >> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually >> rendered as >> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different >> strand of >> postmodern critique into the equation, namely >> Foucault's >> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. >> >> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >> Object, >> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the >> situation is >> almost as bad in Russian and German, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >> > >> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I >> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the >> distinction between object and tool in activity >> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we >> were aware through the process, that what we >> describe in the paper has to do with how the >> object of design emerged and developed for the >> team in and as they were dealing with, developing, >> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I >> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a >> lack of a historical account of the object that >> goes over and above the particular instances >> analyzed. Although we provide with some >> ethnographic contextualization of the team's >> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion >> is grounded on concrete events and their >> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >> distinction between object and means because it >> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then >> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >> > ented towards anything beyond what was there >> in the meetings, it was in and through the >> meetings' means. How would then the distinction >> between means and object have added to our >> understanding of the events? (And this is not to >> doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, >> I really mean to ask this question for the purpose >> of growing and expanding; and as said before, part >> of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. >> contribution). >> > >> > As to how we would position our contribution >> with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate >> what we said when introducing the paper for >> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working >> outside any particular framework and think, as we >> think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >> sources. These included cultural historical >> psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse >> analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in >> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the >> topic in this discussion were in the background >> all the time, but we did not operationalize them >> in terms of any particular theory. This is not to >> say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried >> our best to keep internal coherence between what >> we said about the data, and what the data was >> exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add >> to this. >> > >> > I think the questions you are rising about >> activity theory are very much in the spirit of >> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best >> places to be asking those questions. >> > >> > Alfredo >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov >> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> > >> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >> > >> > There are also a few other things that I would >> like to bring to this discussion. >> > >> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great >> article. It is a great example of an >> interpretativist approach to everyday life >> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It >> is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >> > >> > However, how is your approach related to classic >> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is >> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might >> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >> emerge right now or have emerged in the last >> decades; still other people might look for >> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a >> template or categorize your methodology -- just >> raising a question about its connection to >> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that >> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify >> certain things for myself. >> > >> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries >> of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity >> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >> gain when we infuse new methodological, >> epistemological, and ontological realities into >> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the >> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? >> (I mean here Activity Theory as research >> methodology.) Do we need to call something >> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new >> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need >> to call it Activity Theory? >> > >> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, >> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your >> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can >> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but >> after we assimilate them for use in our project, >> they will "change hands" and will change their >> particular discourse affiliation and will become >> completely different components of a completely >> different discourse. Mostly because the >> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and >> the concepts are very different despite of the >> similarities in ideas and words used to name these >> ideas. >> > >> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me >> understand better what is going on in the realm of >> CHAT. >> > >> > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >> > >> > Lubomir >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> > >> > Andy, all, >> > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and >> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is >> very interesting. I have particular interest in >> the difference that they point out between >> boundary object on the one hand, and object and >> instrumentality as different aspects of activity >> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this >> distinction while writing our own paper. We >> noticed that the museum space, through multiple >> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a >> floor plan, performances of being in the room >> while not being there, etc), was a means, an >> instrument for achieving a final design product. >> > >> > At the same time, the museum space begun to >> become the object of the designers' activity. >> Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite >> interests, what seemed to be a common object for >> all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >> representations of it begun to be made in terms of >> narratives about being there. That was the >> orientation that seemed to stick them together. >> > >> > Thus, the museum space was both object and >> instrument. We wondered whether we should do >> connections to notions of object of activity and >> tools, but we felt that that road would take us >> away from the focus on body and experience. We >> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >> differentiate between object of design, the design >> thing that work delivers, and the object's >> constituents (or means of presentation before the >> design thing is finished). >> > >> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into >> the picture, we could discuss the history of >> development of these relations between the >> different forms of presentations of the museum >> means towards the object without necessarily >> articulating the differences between the two. One >> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not >> about materials in themselves, but about >> consequences in action. From the point of view of >> the persons implicated in the process, the museum >> space as object of design was an issue in and >> through the working with some material, some form >> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and >> instrument seemed to be moments of a same >> experience. But I still want to learn what we may >> get out of making the distinction between object >> and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I >> should perhaps read more carefully their study >> rather than be here thinking aloud). >> > Any thoughts? >> > >> > Alfredo >> > >> > >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> > >> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which >> play some >> > role in mediating the relation between subjects, >> probably a >> > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental >> role, too, and >> > one subject challenges that role and turns the >> object into >> > its opposite, and changes the terms of >> collaboration. >> > A number of examples spring to mind. >> > >> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such >> as Queer, are >> > embraced by a despised group who take >> control of the >> > word and assertively embrace it; >> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who >> deployed their >> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to >> magnificant effect; >> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into >> a weapon >> > against them by Kurdish women fighters >> (ISIS flee before >> > them rather than in shame); >> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's >> stamp which >> > put newspapers out of reach of workers >> against them by >> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped >> newspaper and >> > obliging workers to club together in groups >> to buy and >> > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >> > organising tool; >> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied >> Territory / >> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of >> a shared >> > object (the land); >> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a >> weapon and tool >> > for Indian independence and >> self-sufficiency, raising it >> > from the status of obsolete and inferior >> technology to a >> > symbol of India. >> > >> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had >> in mind when >> > she introduced the term, but core point is that the >> > ideological construction placed upon an object >> is subject to >> > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking >> of an >> > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to >> subjectivity. >> > >> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >> > mediating artefact or the object of work >> > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is >> that in these >> > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or >> symbols according >> > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >> > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >> > >> > Andy >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as >> boundary objects. What about video? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to >> see that it was the photographs that Thomas was >> endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was >> using the idea in relation to the subsistence >> farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> >>> Thanks Rolf! >> >>> Andy >> >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also >> interpret the photographs as boundary objects as >> they support the coordination of therapy >> activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think >> it depends on the aspect of activity one is >> attempting to explore as opposed to the definite >> identification of what may or may not be a >> boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in >> question is >> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by >> showing >> >>>> photographs of far away places and >> explaining how >> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an >> interpretation of >> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >> >>>> man-of-the-world. >> >>>> Does that make better sense? >> >>>> Andy >> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >>>> >> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in >> social theory >> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary >> objects." It >> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is >> introduce some >> >>>> social theory into domains of >> activity (scientific >> >>>> and work collaborations for example) >> where the >> >>>> participants naively think they are >> collaborating >> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just >> granularity, >> >>>> but also the ideological context. >> >>>> >> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the >> home care workers >> >>>> collaborate with the old couple >> according to rules >> >>>> and regulations, communications >> resources, >> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which >> in the >> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are >> apparently >> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the >> case that here it >> >>>> is those rules and regulations, >> etc., which are >> >>>> the "boundary objects"? >> >>>> >> >>>> Andy >> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >>>> >> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, >> Ecological Niche, 2008) >> >> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 23 07:26:07 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 00:26:07 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> References: <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> Message-ID: <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". :( Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice again on > this list. > I understand what you are saying. I will try to better > explain how I stand with A N Leontyev. > > I am a social theorist, that is I am interested in > changing societal arrangements (to put it very politely), > and I am one of few social theorists, properly so-called, > who base themselves on Vygotsky's theories, and use > Activity Theory as well. My position is a contradictory > one because Vygotsky and Leontyev were psychologists (like > you) and not social theorists. Social Theorists and > Psychologists generally live in different buildings on the > university campus, in different departments, publish in > different journals, refer to different founding theorists, > and altogether inhabit different universes. Social > theorists have ideas about psychology, but generally not > scientific ones, and vice versa. > In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an excellent > foundation for social theory because he introduced into > human development and every interaction between two > individuals a culturally produced sign. But he only went > so far. He showed how people acted and developed within > their social situation, but he did not tackle the problem > of how that situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of > the Activity as a macro-unity of activity, made an > epoch-making development which opened CHAT to become a > fully developed social-and-psychological theory. But what > he said himself on questions of social theory was of very > poor quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the sort of > ideas that would win any following among social theorists > today. But he was after all a Psychologist and not a > Social Theorist, so he is forgiven. > > Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken "objective > meaning" is not a psychological category at all for > Leontyev. Yes? And personal sense is, as you eloquently > explain, a fundamental Psychological category. So if what > I said were to be interpreted to say that personal sense > is a subset of objective meaning, that would be quite > wrong. While I accept (as I must) a categorical difference > between material objects/processes and their reflection in > my mind, I do not at all understand societal processes as > nonpsychological processes. I try to conceive of them > together in one unit, and I think I am on my own there > (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). > There remains of course the distinction between the > individual (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), > mediated by the particular (Besonder). A human individual > is something radically different from a number of > individuals. For the human individual and how they erleben > a social situation, I rely on my friends and > collaborator-psychologists. I am interested in how the > Activities go. In small part to avoid having arguments > with followers of Leontyev I call activities "projects." > So I reserve the right to say things about projects > without a follower of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is > not a mysterious or esoteric concept; every > English-speaker knows what a project is, and if there is > any confusion with projects as defined by Existentialists, > I call them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people > usually join them, not create them). These include > capitalist firms, political parties, sporting clubs or > indeed whole sports, a family, a professional career - all > those things which gives our lives mening while we build > the world we and our children must live in, what Fedor > Vasilyuk called an ????????? . A project is not a > collection of people, it is an aggregate of actions (like > an Activity) and the "logic" of projects is something > different from Psychology, but it is inclusive of > Psychology as well. A project is a kind of psychological > phenomenon, but it is also much more than psychology, > because, as you remind us, people regulate their own > behaviour using signs created in the world beyond their > ken. Projects are the material substance of Concepts, and > I rely on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? > > Everything you said (except how you characterised my > ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >> Hi Andy, >> with great interest, I follow the discussion and your >> interpretation of A N Leontyev's contradiction between >> subjective sense and objective meaning. As far as I >> interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the >> relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective >> sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as >> you seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality >> that emerges when a person uses societal signs and their >> objective meanings in order to regulate his or her >> socially embedded activity. >> What happens is a transformation of societal meanings >> into the personal sense of those involved. The personal >> sense that an individual assigns to interactions, facts, >> and experiences through the use of signs can be >> conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but >> as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two >> psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to >> the motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the >> situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the >> individual within the process of internalization. >> a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their >> meanings during social interactions in an impartial way. >> They interpret and use them in the light of their >> actually elicited motives along with >> the motives they assign to the interaction partner. The >> societal meaning of the used signs does not have to match >> the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an >> outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a >> low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an >> inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for >> the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion of >> self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by >> the situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous >> encounters in which the use of signs is (or was) >> embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by >> propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or >> ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) but through their ties to >> sensorially mediated and situated perceptions?as complex >> as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For >> example, two persons can use propositional phrases to >> agree on the same definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? >> These terms, however, will be situated very differently >> and enriched with other sensory perceptions when one >> person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the >> other person experienced a highly dramatic episode with >> an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to >> them are subject to an interpersonal process of >> interpretation and coordination that more or less >> successfully supports the embodiment >> and expression of personal sense. People do not have a >> private ?speech? at their disposal that they can >> construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, >> they depend on the appropriation >> and use of conventionalized signs when they want to >> communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in >> social interactions. >> By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize >> and to become aware of his personal relation and sense of >> the situation and the used signs, but also this >> reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to >> express this personal relations. So, this is the overall >> tension between objective meaning of an event or an >> object and its personal sense for a specific person. >> Best >> Manfred >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster >> Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html >> >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response >> to my post to take it from there, Mike, but I will try to >> respond as best I can to the question about subjectivism >> and objectivism. >> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought >> that A N Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten >> Nissen remarked that that was odd, because in Europe >> ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! >> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of >> Psychology, and yet I want to use AT as a foundation for >> social theory, so my claim does seem anomalous. >> >> What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in >> interpreting contradictions between the "subjective sense" >> and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of >> the social vs. the individual. This reduces subjectivity >> to a matter of the capriciousness of the individual mind >> or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is hardly >> objectionable in the domain of child development, but in >> the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. >> Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints >> among which none have the right to claim unproblematic >> "objective truth" >> for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL >> as giving too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other >> hand, is different, but people's intentions are relegated >> to "phenomenological investigation" which are preliminary >> to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach >> as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change >> occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different >> levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the >> "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its >> life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human >> action to Activity Theory. The interpretation of purposes >> and intentions in social science is a challenge, but I >> believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. >> >> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the >> Subject!" though I know nothing at all of his work. >> >> The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, >> Mike, is that though I knew nothing of them a little >> while ago, I can now see 3 different meanings of the >> term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to >> answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> Andy/Lubomir-- >>> >>> I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be >>> badly timed. >>> But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered >>> on the >>> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT >>> theory that give >>> everything to the object. >>> >>> Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev >>> schools' >>> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the >>> environment? >>> >>> Or? >>> >>> What is at stake here theoretically and practically? >>> Mike >>> PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted >>> discussion of >>> boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of >>> joint mediated >>> activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am >>> pretty sure that >>> not knowing the answer to this question is a result of >>> the richness of >>> the discussion. >>> >>> It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? >>> Mike >>> >>> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden >>> >> > wrote: >>> >>> That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a >>> humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, >>> structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory >>> which give everything to the Object. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The >>> Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic >>> of the subject. >>> >>> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early >>> 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and >>> "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more >>> than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE >>> conceiving of processes without subjects." >>> >>> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw >>> the failure of phenomenology and the residual >>> links between subjectivism and anthropology. >>> >>> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the >>> philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an >>> outmoded humanism. >>> >>> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new >>> humanism. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>> >>> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> ; Andy Blunden >>> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and >>> the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on >>> the motive and purpose of activity, the object can >>> be approached in many different ways. >>> >>> It is true that the relationship between the >>> object and the subject caries the >>> purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This >>> type of relationship might has several aspects and >>> the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, >>> in AT, the teleological aspect is central one >>> among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >>> >>> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at >>> several levels with distinctive teleological >>> phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >>> >>> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure >>> of activity with its three levels. I just tried to >>> do that and in most cases I got the famous >>> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English >>> language texts where the authors evidently use >>> that version of activity theory. The three >>> structural levels of activity might be found in t >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> >>> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >>> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is >>> very much in line with the notion of >>> Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >>> >>> I have many questions, most of which I should find >>> in the literature rather than bother here. But I >>> would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote >>> that the object "carries in itself the purpose and >>> motive of the activity." What does "in itself" >>> mean here? >>> Thanks again for a very informative post, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> >>> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention >>> to some >>> distinctions in this field ... we have at least >>> three >>> different versions of Activity Theory involved >>> here plus >>> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories >>> that have >>> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is >>> using the >>> word "object" in a different way, all of them >>> legitimate >>> uses of the English word, but all indexing >>> different >>> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I >>> will invent >>> some different terms. >>> >>> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the >>> object of >>> labour, the material which is to be worked >>> upon, the >>> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may >>> be a nail >>> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a >>> man with a >>> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. >>> Engestrom >>> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left >>> side of the >>> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it >>> has been >>> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer >>> that the >>> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now >>> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether >>> implicit or >>> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex >>> of the >>> triangle. >>> >>> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the >>> purpose >>> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or >>> motive" is >>> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the >>> OBJECT. >>> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he >>> talks about >>> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a >>> complex notion, >>> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of >>> the >>> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process >>> as such. >>> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But >>> this is what >>> is motivating all the members of the design team >>> when they >>> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one >>> of the >>> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into >>> the wood >>> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the >>> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs >>> change in >>> the course of collaboration and in the End an >>> OBJECT Is >>> *realised* which is the "truth" of the >>> collaboration, to use >>> Hegel's apt terminology here. >>> >>> Surely it is important to recognise that while >>> everyone >>> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up >>> with Outcome >>> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe >>> the object >>> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so >>> clearly in >>> Thinking and Speech. It is not the >>> Arbeitsgegenstand or some >>> problem carried within it alone which motivates >>> action, but >>> *the concept the subject makes of the >>> Arbeitsgegenstand*! >>> >>> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as >>> Lubomir astutely >>> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the >>> collaboration >>> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that >>> is, in >>> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are >>> naively >>> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. >>> And Leigh >>> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and >>> Instruments are in fact residues of past >>> collaborations >>> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., >>> realised OBJECTs >>> of past collaborations. It is these one-time >>> OBJECTs, >>> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary >>> Objects. >>> >>> But it seems that other have grasped the >>> postmodern critique >>> elements of this idea, that apparently >>> ideologically neutral >>> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially >>> constructed >>> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as >>> things, or >>> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised >>> "systems of >>> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a >>> Boundary >>> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has >>> the same >>> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >>> >>> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the >>> Boundary Object >>> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining >>> two "systems >>> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at >>> cooperation >>> but rather the conflict within the broader >>> collaboration. >>> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is >>> deliberate and >>> aimed to change the relation between Subject and >>> obJECT >>> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually >>> rendered as >>> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different >>> strand of >>> postmodern critique into the equation, namely >>> Foucault's >>> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great >>> effect. >>> >>> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >>> Object, >>> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the >>> situation is >>> almost as bad in Russian and German, >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >>> > >>> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I >>> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the >>> distinction between object and tool in activity >>> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we >>> were aware through the process, that what we >>> describe in the paper has to do with how the >>> object of design emerged and developed for the >>> team in and as they were dealing with, developing, >>> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I >>> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a >>> lack of a historical account of the object that >>> goes over and above the particular instances >>> analyzed. Although we provide with some >>> ethnographic contextualization of the team's >>> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion >>> is grounded on concrete events and their >>> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >>> distinction between object and means because it >>> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then >>> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >>> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >>> > ented towards anything beyond what was there >>> in the meetings, it was in and through the >>> meetings' means. How would then the distinction >>> between means and object have added to our >>> understanding of the events? (And this is not to >>> doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, >>> I really mean to ask this question for the purpose >>> of growing and expanding; and as said before, part >>> of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. >>> contribution). >>> > >>> > As to how we would position our contribution >>> with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate >>> what we said when introducing the paper for >>> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working >>> outside any particular framework and think, as we >>> think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >>> sources. These included cultural historical >>> psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse >>> analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in >>> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the >>> topic in this discussion were in the background >>> all the time, but we did not operationalize them >>> in terms of any particular theory. This is not to >>> say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried >>> our best to keep internal coherence between what >>> we said about the data, and what the data was >>> exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add >>> to this. >>> > >>> > I think the questions you are rising about >>> activity theory are very much in the spirit of >>> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >>> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best >>> places to be asking those questions. >>> > >>> > Alfredo >>> > ________________________________________ >>> > From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov >>> >>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> > >>> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >>> > >>> > There are also a few other things that I would >>> like to bring to this discussion. >>> > >>> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great >>> article. It is a great example of an >>> interpretativist approach to everyday life >>> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It >>> is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >>> > >>> > However, how is your approach related to classic >>> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is >>> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might >>> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >>> emerge right now or have emerged in the last >>> decades; still other people might look for >>> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >>> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a >>> template or categorize your methodology -- just >>> raising a question about its connection to >>> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that >>> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify >>> certain things for myself. >>> > >>> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries >>> of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity >>> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >>> gain when we infuse new methodological, >>> epistemological, and ontological realities into >>> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the >>> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? >>> (I mean here Activity Theory as research >>> methodology.) Do we need to call something >>> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new >>> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need >>> to call it Activity Theory? >>> > >>> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, >>> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your >>> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >>> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >>> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can >>> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but >>> after we assimilate them for use in our project, >>> they will "change hands" and will change their >>> particular discourse affiliation and will become >>> completely different components of a completely >>> different discourse. Mostly because the >>> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and >>> the concepts are very different despite of the >>> similarities in ideas and words used to name these >>> ideas. >>> > >>> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me >>> understand better what is going on in the realm of >>> CHAT. >>> > >>> > Thank you very much for this exciting >>> discussion, >>> > >>> > Lubomir >>> > >>> > -----Original Message----- >>> > From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy >>> Blunden >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> > >>> > Andy, all, >>> > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and >>> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is >>> very interesting. I have particular interest in >>> the difference that they point out between >>> boundary object on the one hand, and object and >>> instrumentality as different aspects of activity >>> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this >>> distinction while writing our own paper. We >>> noticed that the museum space, through multiple >>> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a >>> floor plan, performances of being in the room >>> while not being there, etc), was a means, an >>> instrument for achieving a final design product. >>> > >>> > At the same time, the museum space begun to >>> become the object of the designers' activity. >>> Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >>> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite >>> interests, what seemed to be a common object for >>> all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >>> representations of it begun to be made in terms of >>> narratives about being there. That was the >>> orientation that seemed to stick them together. >>> > >>> > Thus, the museum space was both object and >>> instrument. We wondered whether we should do >>> connections to notions of object of activity and >>> tools, but we felt that that road would take us >>> away from the focus on body and experience. We >>> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >>> differentiate between object of design, the design >>> thing that work delivers, and the object's >>> constituents (or means of presentation before the >>> design thing is finished). >>> > >>> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into >>> the picture, we could discuss the history of >>> development of these relations between the >>> different forms of presentations of the museum >>> means towards the object without necessarily >>> articulating the differences between the two. One >>> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >>> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not >>> about materials in themselves, but about >>> consequences in action. From the point of view of >>> the persons implicated in the process, the museum >>> space as object of design was an issue in and >>> through the working with some material, some form >>> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and >>> instrument seemed to be moments of a same >>> experience. But I still want to learn what we may >>> get out of making the distinction between object >>> and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I >>> should perhaps read more carefully their study >>> rather than be here thinking aloud). >>> > Any thoughts? >>> > >>> > Alfredo >>> > >>> > >>> > ________________________________________ >>> > From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> > >>> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which >>> play some >>> > role in mediating the relation between subjects, >>> probably a >>> > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental >>> role, too, and >>> > one subject challenges that role and turns the >>> object into >>> > its opposite, and changes the terms of >>> collaboration. >>> > A number of examples spring to mind. >>> > >>> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such >>> as Queer, are >>> > embraced by a despised group who take >>> control of the >>> > word and assertively embrace it; >>> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who >>> deployed their >>> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to >>> magnificant effect; >>> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into >>> a weapon >>> > against them by Kurdish women fighters >>> (ISIS flee before >>> > them rather than in shame); >>> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's >>> stamp which >>> > put newspapers out of reach of workers >>> against them by >>> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped >>> newspaper and >>> > obliging workers to club together in groups >>> to buy and >>> > read it, thus making the paper into a >>> glorious >>> > organising tool; >>> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied >>> Territory / >>> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of >>> a shared >>> > object (the land); >>> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a >>> weapon and tool >>> > for Indian independence and >>> self-sufficiency, raising it >>> > from the status of obsolete and inferior >>> technology to a >>> > symbol of India. >>> > >>> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had >>> in mind when >>> > she introduced the term, but core point is >>> that the >>> > ideological construction placed upon an object >>> is subject to >>> > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking >>> of an >>> > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to >>> subjectivity. >>> > >>> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary >>> object" a >>> > mediating artefact or the object of work >>> > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is >>> that in these >>> > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or >>> symbols according >>> > to context. In principle it is not the Object >>> in the >>> > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to >>> be. >>> > >>> > Andy >>> > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> > *Andy Blunden* >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >>> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as >>> boundary objects. What about video? >>> >> Henry >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to >>> see that it was the photographs that Thomas was >>> endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >>> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was >>> using the idea in relation to the subsistence >>> farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>> >>> Thanks Rolf! >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also >>> interpret the photographs as boundary objects as >>> they support the coordination of therapy >>> activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think >>> it depends on the aspect of activity one is >>> attempting to explore as opposed to the definite >>> identification of what may or may not be a >>> boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden >>> > >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in >>> question is >>> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject >>> to an >>> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by >>> showing >>> >>>> photographs of far away places and >>> explaining how >>> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an >>> interpretation of >>> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and >>> experiences >>> >>>> man-of-the-world. >>> >>>> Does that make better sense? >>> >>>> Andy >>> >>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in >>> social theory >>> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary >>> objects." It >>> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is >>> introduce some >>> >>>> social theory into domains of >>> activity (scientific >>> >>>> and work collaborations for example) >>> where the >>> >>>> participants naively think they are >>> collaborating >>> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just >>> granularity, >>> >>>> but also the ideological context. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the >>> home care workers >>> >>>> collaborate with the old couple >>> according to rules >>> >>>> and regulations, communications >>> resources, >>> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which >>> in the >>> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are >>> apparently >>> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the >>> case that here it >>> >>>> is those rules and regulations, >>> etc., which are >>> >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Andy >>> >>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >>> >>> [The entire original message is not included.] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species change in the course of >>> time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever >>> (Polotova & Storch, >>> Ecological Niche, 2008) >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Thu Jul 23 07:49:37 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 14:49:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no> <9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com> <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Mike and Andy, Sorry, it takes time to respond, and there are some other business going on. Both Rubinstein and Leontiev work in a Historical Materialist (Histmat) paradigm. In this respect, there are no substantial differences between them. If we look from outside, the differences are minor. If we go in the details, there are always differences. However, my personal impression is that Rubenstein was more systematic and deep. He was also more of a psychologist rather than activity theorist. In Historical Materialism, the subject is an active social agent. The subject exists objectively. This is not a paradox in that paradigm. On the other hand, although materialists talk about the objective existence of the world, they conceptualize people as active social agents, while the object of activity is subservient to the social agent/subject of activity. In addition, there is a dialectic between the objective existence of human beings and their subjective (in the sense of personal, individual) perception of the world. The subject is in the center of everything. When we talk about "subject", we do not mean subjectivity in the US sense. The Histmat is an objectivist paradigm that professes the objective existence of humans but at the same time acknowledges the perceptions and agency of the individual. It is a bit different to translate/transfer these concepts. In Historical Materialism the subject is not subjective in the Anglo sense, not biased, not partial, but exists objectively according to the laws of social reality. Of course, in a different usage of the term "subjective," the subject can display subjectivity in the Anglo sense, like developing political bias and prejudice in his/her perceptions and actions regarding the social world. So, the subject exists objectively and always in control of the object. The dialectic of the subjective and objective regarding a social individual also means that each individual has his/her own specific consciousness, but its content is affected strongly by objective social laws that the subject cannot disregard, even if he/she wishes so. By "social laws" we mean social regularities, and actually the Histmat people say -- objectively existing social regularities. This means that the subjects or individuals can not affect or change these objective social regularities. Again, there is no paradox when the Histmat people believe that the objective laws of social reality cannot be changed, but at the same time subjects have the power to change their lives and the organizatio n of society. Yes, subjects/social agents can make changed, but within the limits of social regularities and using these objective social processes to their advantage, creating synergy. In Histmat, they talk about subjective meaning (like in the Anglo discourses) and objective meaning (socially agreed and accepted in everyday life conventions). There is also one other topic, about the dialectics of the leader and the masses, and how the leader cannot change the world, only the masses can change the world, but they cannot do that without their leader. Basically, this is a political idea: you need a leader, but if you lose your leader, you can get another one and fight again. That is an example how Histmat was used to idelogize political situations and actions. In principle, it is very difficult to translate/convert Histmat ideas into Anglo discourses. Most of the staff will be lost in translation. Even German words like Tatigkeit and Activitat are used very differently than in German language where they are synonyms. Marx has used these words to denote two very different concepts: Tatigkeit is activity, whole Aktivitat is used for all kinds of chemical and biological process, denoting some kind of movement and development of the situation or the cell, or whatever. The Histmat people religiously follow and keep this differentiation. It is a big mistake to substitute Tatigkeit (deyatelnost in Russian) for Aktivitat (aktivnost in Russian). Actually, the definition of deyatelnost is that it is goal-directed aktivnost. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 12:13 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Andy/Lubomir-- I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give everything to the object. Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? Or? What is at stake here theoretically and practically? Mike PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of the discussion. It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? Mike On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden wrote: > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a humanism, in > opposition to poststructuralism, structuralism Marxism, and strands of > Activity Theory which give everything to the Object. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The Cambridge Handbook of >> Merleau-Ponty on the topic of the subject. >> >> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early 1970's, most notably >> "The Order of Things" and "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps >> more than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE conceiving of >> processes without subjects." >> >> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw the failure of >> phenomenology and the residual links between subjectivism and anthropology. >> >> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the philosophy of the >> subject to what he saw as an outmoded humanism. >> >> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> ; Andy Blunden >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and the purpose of >> activity. Actually, depending on the motive and purpose of activity, >> the object can be approached in many different ways. >> >> It is true that the relationship between the object and the subject >> caries the purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This type of >> relationship might has several aspects and the teleological aspect is >> one of them. Actually, in AT, the teleological aspect is central one >> among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >> >> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at several levels with >> distinctive teleological phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >> >> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure of activity with >> its three levels. I just tried to do that and in most cases I got the >> famous "triangle." The internet is dominated by English language >> texts where the authors evidently use that version of activity >> theory. The three structural levels of activity might be found in t >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of >> xmca-l-bounces+Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very much in line >> with the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >> >> I have many questions, most of which I should find in the literature >> rather than bother here. But I would like to ask one here. It >> concerns the quote that the object "carries in itself the purpose and >> motive of the activity." What does "in itself" mean here? >> Thanks again for a very informative post, Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some distinctions >> in this field ... we have at least three different versions of >> Activity Theory involved here plus Leigh Star's theory and in >> addition the theories that have spun off from Leigh Star's initial >> idea. Each is using the word "object" in a different way, all of them >> legitimate uses of the English word, but all indexing different >> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent some >> different terms. >> >> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of labour, the >> material which is to be worked upon, the blacksmith's iron. It is >> objective, in that if may be a nail to a man with a hammer and waste >> material for a man with a broom, but it is all the same >> Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom use the word "Object" in the middle of >> the left side of the triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it >> has been worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the >> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now "instrumentality," and >> the Rules, whether implicit or explicit, these are respectively the >> base and apex of the triangle. >> >> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose and motive >> of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is not shown on the >> triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. >> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about >> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, because >> it is only *implicit* in the actions of the subject(s); it is not a >> material thing or process as such. >> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what is >> motivating all the members of the design team when they sit down to >> collaborate with one another. Bone one of the team thinks the OBJECT >> is to drive the nail into the wood and another thinks the OBJECT is >> to sweep the Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs >> change in the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is >> *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use Hegel's >> apt terminology here. >> >> Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone shares the >> same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome as the same OBJECT, >> along the road they construe the object differently. This is what >> Vygotsky showed so clearly in Thinking and Speech. It is not the >> Arbeitsgegenstand or some problem carried within it alone which >> motivates action, but *the concept the subject makes of the >> Arbeitsgegenstand*! >> >> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely >> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration within an >> ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in Engestrom's terms >> Rules and Instruments, which are naively supposed to be there just to >> aid collaboration. And Leigh Star shows that this is an illusion; the >> Rules and Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations >> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs of past >> collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >> >> But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique elements >> of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral obJects (in the >> expanded sense of socially constructed entities, usually far more >> than OBJects - as things, or artefacts, including institutions - >> fossilised "systems of >> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary Object, >> reflecting the fact not everyone has the same concept of the OBJECT, >> as Vygotsky proved. >> >> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object in the >> place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems of activity," >> for the purpose of looking not at cooperation but rather the conflict >> within the broader collaboration. >> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and aimed to >> change the relation between Subject and obJECT (here referring to the >> Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as "the Other.") thereby >> introducing yet a different strand of postmodern critique into the >> equation, namely Foucault's Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with >> great effect. >> >> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, OBject, >> obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is almost as bad in >> Russian and German, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >> > >> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I >> > am >> a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in >> activity theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware >> through the process, that what we describe in the paper has to do >> with how the object of design emerged and developed for the team in >> and as they were dealing with, developing, and resorting to >> particular means or tools. But I guess we could say that in our >> analyses there is a lack of a historical account of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. >> Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the >> team's developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded >> on concrete events and their transactional unfolding. We did not >> resort to the distinction between object and means because it seemed >> to be the same thing in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, >> at least in what participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >> > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it >> > was >> in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction >> between means and object have added to our understanding of the >> events? (And this is not to doubt of the contribution from such a >> distinction, I really mean to ask this question for the purpose of >> growing and expanding; and as said before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). >> > >> > As to how we would position our contribution with regard to >> > activity >> theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for >> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any >> particular framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, >> drawing from several sources. These included cultural historical >> psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis. But also the >> ideas about Experience (in the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have >> been the topic in this discussion were in the background all the >> time, but we did not operationalize them in terms of any particular >> theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything goes;" we >> tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said about >> the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add to this. >> > >> > I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very >> much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to >> answer them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be >> asking those questions. >> > >> > Alfredo >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Lubomir Savov Popov >> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >> > >> > There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to >> > this >> discussion. >> > >> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a >> > great >> example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. >> Really interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, >> culture, and activity. >> > >> > However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? >> > Some >> people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; >> others might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >> emerge right now or have emerged in the last decades; still other >> people might look for connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a template or >> categorize your methodology -- just raising a question about its >> connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that this >> is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things for myself. >> > >> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? >> > How >> much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What >> do we gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and >> ontological realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is >> the threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here >> Activity Theory as research >> methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is >> not? If we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we >> need to call it Activity Theory? >> > >> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. >> > The >> discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern >> discourses and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the >> range of discourses, but after we assimilate them for use in our >> project, they will "change hands" and will change their particular >> discourse affiliation and will become completely different components >> of a completely different discourse. Mostly because the >> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts are >> very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to name these ideas. >> > >> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better >> > what is >> going on in the realm of CHAT. >> > >> > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >> > >> > Lubomir >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of >> xmca-l-bounces+Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Andy, all, >> > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to >> > the >> special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest >> in the difference that they point out between boundary object on the >> one hand, and object and instrumentality as different aspects of >> activity theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. >> We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of >> presentations (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of >> being in the room while not being there, etc), was a means, an >> instrument for achieving a final design product. >> > >> > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of >> > the >> designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and >> the partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed >> to be a common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, >> most representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives >> about being there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. >> > >> > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered >> whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and >> tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus >> on body and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), >> who differentiate between object of design, the design thing that >> work delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of >> presentation before the design thing is finished). >> > >> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we >> > could >> discuss the history of development of these relations between the >> different forms of presentations of the museum means towards the >> object without necessarily articulating the differences between the >> two. One advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not about materials in >> themselves, but about consequences in action. From the point of view >> of the persons implicated in the process, the museum space as object >> of design was an issue in and through the working with some material, >> some form of presenting it or changing it. Both object and instrument >> seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I still want to learn >> what we may get out of making the distinction between object and >> tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). >> > Any thoughts? >> > >> > Alfredo >> > >> > >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Andy Blunden >> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some role in >> > mediating the relation between subjects, probably a symbolic role, >> > but possibly an instrumental role, too, and one subject challenges >> > that role and turns the object into its opposite, and changes the >> > terms of collaboration. >> > A number of examples spring to mind. >> > >> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are >> > embraced by a despised group who take control of the >> > word and assertively embrace it; >> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their >> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; >> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon >> > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before >> > them rather than in shame); >> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which >> > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by >> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and >> > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and >> > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >> > organising tool; >> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / >> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared >> > object (the land); >> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool >> > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it >> > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a >> > symbol of India. >> > >> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when she >> > introduced the term, but core point is that the ideological >> > construction placed upon an object is subject to contestation, and >> > if successful, the re-marking of an artefact is a tremendously >> > powerful spur to subjectivity. >> > >> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a mediating >> > artefact or the object of work (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the >> > answer is that in these cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or >> > symbols according to context. In principle it is not the Object in >> > the Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >> > >> > Andy >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What >> about video? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the >> photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover >> his humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in >> relation to the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> >>> Thanks Rolf! >> >>> Andy >> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf >> >>> Steier wrote: >> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the >> >>>> photographs >> as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy >> activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the >> aspect of activity one is attempting to explore as opposed to the >> definite identification of what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >> >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >> >>>> man-of-the-world. >> >>>> Does that make better sense? >> >>>> Andy >> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>> >> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >> >>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >> >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >> >>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >> >>>> but also the ideological context. >> >>>> >> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >> >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >> >>>> and regulations, communications resources, >> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >> >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >> >>>> the "boundary objects"? >> >>>> >> >>>> Andy >> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>> >> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] >> > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From lspopov@bgsu.edu Thu Jul 23 07:51:00 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 14:51:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Message-ID: Thank you Manfred, Well said and well explained. Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Holodynski, Manfred Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Andy, with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective meaning. As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal signs and their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her socially embedded activity. What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through the use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the individual within the process of internalization. a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings during social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use them in the light of their actually elicited motives along with the motives they assign to the interaction partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not have to match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree on the same definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, however, will be situated very differently and enriched with other sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the other person experienced a highly dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination that more or less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of personal sense. People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want to communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to express this personal relations. So, this is the overall tension between objective meaning of an event or an object and its personal sense for a specific person. Best Manfred Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 D-48149 M?nster +49-(0)-251-83-34311 +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the question about subjectivism and objectivism. When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem anomalous. What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting contradictions between the "subjective sense" and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though I know nothing at all of his work. The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > Andy/Lubomir-- > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > everything to the object. > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > Or? > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > Mike > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated > activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that > not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of > the discussion. > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > Mike > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > which give everything to the Object. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > of the subject. > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > outmoded humanism. > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > ; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > be approached in many different ways. > > It is true that the relationship between the > object and the subject caries the > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > type of relationship might has several aspects and > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > several levels with distinctive teleological > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > do that and in most cases I got the famous > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > language texts where the authors evidently use > that version of activity theory. The three > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > very much in line with the notion of > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > mean here? > Thanks again for a very informative post, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > to some > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > different versions of Activity Theory involved > here plus > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > that have > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > using the > word "object" in a different way, all of them > legitimate > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > will invent > some different terms. > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > be a nail > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > man with a > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > Engestrom > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > side of the > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > has been > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > of the > triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > purpose > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > motive" is > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > OBJECT. > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > talks about > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > complex notion, > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > as such. > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > this is what > is motivating all the members of the design team > when they > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > of the > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > the wood > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > change in > the course of collaboration and in the End an > OBJECT Is > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > collaboration, to use > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > everyone > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > with Outcome > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > the object > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > clearly in > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > problem carried within it alone which motivates > action, but > *the concept the subject makes of the > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > Lubomir astutely > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > collaboration > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > is, in > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > naively > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > And Leigh > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > Instruments are in fact residues of past > collaborations > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > realised OBJECTs > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > But it seems that other have grasped the > postmodern critique > elements of this idea, that apparently > ideologically neutral > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > things, or > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > "systems of > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > Boundary > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > Boundary Object > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > two "systems > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > cooperation > but rather the conflict within the broader > collaboration. > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > deliberate and > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > obJECT > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > rendered as > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > strand of > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > Foucault's > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > Object, > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > situation is > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > distinction between object and tool in activity > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > were aware through the process, that what we > describe in the paper has to do with how the > object of design emerged and developed for the > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > lack of a historical account of the object that > goes over and above the particular instances > analyzed. Although we provide with some > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > is grounded on concrete events and their > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > distinction between object and means because it > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > in the meetings, it was in and through the > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > between means and object have added to our > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > contribution). > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > what we said when introducing the paper for > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > outside any particular framework and think, as we > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > sources. These included cultural historical > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > topic in this discussion were in the background > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > our best to keep internal coherence between what > we said about the data, and what the data was > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > to this. > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > places to be asking those questions. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > article. It is a great example of an > interpretativist approach to everyday life > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > decades; still other people might look for > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > template or categorize your methodology -- just > raising a question about its connection to > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > certain things for myself. > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > gain when we infuse new methodological, > epistemological, and ontological realities into > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > methodology.) Do we need to call something > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > they will "change hands" and will change their > particular discourse affiliation and will become > completely different components of a completely > different discourse. Mostly because the > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > the concepts are very different despite of the > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > ideas. > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > understand better what is going on in the realm of > CHAT. > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Andy, all, > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > very interesting. I have particular interest in > the difference that they point out between > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > distinction while writing our own paper. We > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > floor plan, performances of being in the room > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > become the object of the designers' activity. > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > narratives about being there. That was the > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > connections to notions of object of activity and > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > away from the focus on body and experience. We > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > differentiate between object of design, the design > thing that work delivers, and the object's > constituents (or means of presentation before the > design thing is finished). > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > the picture, we could discuss the history of > development of these relations between the > different forms of presentations of the museum > means towards the object without necessarily > articulating the differences between the two. One > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > about materials in themselves, but about > consequences in action. From the point of view of > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > space as object of design was an issue in and > through the working with some material, some form > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > get out of making the distinction between object > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > should perhaps read more carefully their study > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > Any thoughts? > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > play some > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > probably a > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > role, too, and > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > object into > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > collaboration. > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > as Queer, are > > embraced by a despised group who take > control of the > > word and assertively embrace it; > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > deployed their > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > magnificant effect; > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > a weapon > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > (ISIS flee before > > them rather than in shame); > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > stamp which > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > against them by > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > newspaper and > > obliging workers to club together in groups > to buy and > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > organising tool; > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > Territory / > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > a shared > > object (the land); > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > weapon and tool > > for Indian independence and > self-sufficiency, raising it > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > technology to a > > symbol of India. > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > in mind when > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > ideological construction placed upon an object > is subject to > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > of an > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > subjectivity. > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > that in these > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > symbols according > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > boundary objects. What about video? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > >>> Thanks Rolf! > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > they support the coordination of therapy > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > identification of what may or may not be a > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > question is > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > showing > >>>> photographs of far away places and > explaining how > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > interpretation of > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > >>>> man-of-the-world. > >>>> Does that make better sense? > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > social theory > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > objects." It > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > introduce some > >>>> social theory into domains of > activity (scientific > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > where the > >>>> participants naively think they are > collaborating > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > granularity, > >>>> but also the ideological context. > >>>> > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > home care workers > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > according to rules > >>>> and regulations, communications > resources, > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > in the > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > apparently > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > case that here it > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > etc., which are > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Thu Jul 23 09:38:00 2015 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 12:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexd ag3.wwu.de> Message-ID: <004801d0c565$f05ab6b0$d1102410$@att.net> I agree, much thanks to all of you on this issue. PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lubomir Savov Popov Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 10:51 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you Manfred, Well said and well explained. Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Holodynski, Manfred Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Hi Andy, with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective meaning. As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal signs and their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her socially embedded activity. What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through the use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the individual within the process of internalization. a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings during social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use them in the light of their actually elicited motives along with the motives they assign to the interaction partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not have to match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree on the same definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, however, will be situated very differently and enriched with other sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the other person experienced a highly dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination that more or less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of personal sense. People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want to communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to express this personal relations. So, this is the overall tension between objective meaning of an event or an object and its personal sense for a specific person. Best Manfred Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 D-48149 M?nster +49-(0)-251-83-34311 +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the question about subjectivism and objectivism. When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem anomalous. What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting contradictions between the "subjective sense" and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though I know nothing at all of his work. The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > Andy/Lubomir-- > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > everything to the object. > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > Or? > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > Mike > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated > activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that > not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of > the discussion. > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > Mike > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > which give everything to the Object. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > of the subject. > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > outmoded humanism. > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > ; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > be approached in many different ways. > > It is true that the relationship between the > object and the subject caries the > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > type of relationship might has several aspects and > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > several levels with distinctive teleological > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > do that and in most cases I got the famous > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > language texts where the authors evidently use > that version of activity theory. The three > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > very much in line with the notion of > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > mean here? > Thanks again for a very informative post, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > to some > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > different versions of Activity Theory involved > here plus > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > that have > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > using the > word "object" in a different way, all of them > legitimate > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > will invent > some different terms. > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > be a nail > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > man with a > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > Engestrom > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > side of the > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > has been > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > of the > triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > purpose > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > motive" is > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > OBJECT. > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > talks about > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > complex notion, > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > as such. > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > this is what > is motivating all the members of the design team > when they > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > of the > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > the wood > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > change in > the course of collaboration and in the End an > OBJECT Is > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > collaboration, to use > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > everyone > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > with Outcome > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > the object > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > clearly in > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > problem carried within it alone which motivates > action, but > *the concept the subject makes of the > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > Lubomir astutely > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > collaboration > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > is, in > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > naively > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > And Leigh > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > Instruments are in fact residues of past > collaborations > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > realised OBJECTs > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > But it seems that other have grasped the > postmodern critique > elements of this idea, that apparently > ideologically neutral > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > things, or > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > "systems of > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > Boundary > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > Boundary Object > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > two "systems > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > cooperation > but rather the conflict within the broader > collaboration. > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > deliberate and > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > obJECT > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > rendered as > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > strand of > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > Foucault's > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > Object, > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > situation is > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > distinction between object and tool in activity > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > were aware through the process, that what we > describe in the paper has to do with how the > object of design emerged and developed for the > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > lack of a historical account of the object that > goes over and above the particular instances > analyzed. Although we provide with some > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > is grounded on concrete events and their > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > distinction between object and means because it > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > in the meetings, it was in and through the > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > between means and object have added to our > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > contribution). > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > what we said when introducing the paper for > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > outside any particular framework and think, as we > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > sources. These included cultural historical > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > topic in this discussion were in the background > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > our best to keep internal coherence between what > we said about the data, and what the data was > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > to this. > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > places to be asking those questions. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > article. It is a great example of an > interpretativist approach to everyday life > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > decades; still other people might look for > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > template or categorize your methodology -- just > raising a question about its connection to > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > certain things for myself. > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > gain when we infuse new methodological, > epistemological, and ontological realities into > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > methodology.) Do we need to call something > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > they will "change hands" and will change their > particular discourse affiliation and will become > completely different components of a completely > different discourse. Mostly because the > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > the concepts are very different despite of the > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > ideas. > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > understand better what is going on in the realm of > CHAT. > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Andy, all, > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > very interesting. I have particular interest in > the difference that they point out between > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > distinction while writing our own paper. We > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > floor plan, performances of being in the room > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > become the object of the designers' activity. > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > narratives about being there. That was the > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > connections to notions of object of activity and > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > away from the focus on body and experience. We > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > differentiate between object of design, the design > thing that work delivers, and the object's > constituents (or means of presentation before the > design thing is finished). > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > the picture, we could discuss the history of > development of these relations between the > different forms of presentations of the museum > means towards the object without necessarily > articulating the differences between the two. One > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > about materials in themselves, but about > consequences in action. From the point of view of > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > space as object of design was an issue in and > through the working with some material, some form > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > get out of making the distinction between object > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > should perhaps read more carefully their study > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > Any thoughts? > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > play some > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > probably a > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > role, too, and > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > object into > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > collaboration. > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > as Queer, are > > embraced by a despised group who take > control of the > > word and assertively embrace it; > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > deployed their > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > magnificant effect; > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > a weapon > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > (ISIS flee before > > them rather than in shame); > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > stamp which > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > against them by > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > newspaper and > > obliging workers to club together in groups > to buy and > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > organising tool; > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > Territory / > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > a shared > > object (the land); > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > weapon and tool > > for Indian independence and > self-sufficiency, raising it > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > technology to a > > symbol of India. > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > in mind when > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > ideological construction placed upon an object > is subject to > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > of an > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > subjectivity. > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > that in these > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > symbols according > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > boundary objects. What about video? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > >>> Thanks Rolf! > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > they support the coordination of therapy > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > identification of what may or may not be a > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > question is > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > showing > >>>> photographs of far away places and > explaining how > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > interpretation of > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > >>>> man-of-the-world. > >>>> Does that make better sense? > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > social theory > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > objects." It > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > introduce some > >>>> social theory into domains of > activity (scientific > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > where the > >>>> participants naively think they are > collaborating > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > granularity, > >>>> but also the ideological context. > >>>> > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > home care workers > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > according to rules > >>>> and regulations, communications > resources, > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > in the > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > apparently > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > case that here it > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > etc., which are > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Jul 23 14:12:15 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 22:12:15 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <004801d0c565$f05ab6b0$d1102410$@att.net> References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <004801d0c565$f05ab6b0$d1102410$@att.net> Message-ID: I too have enjoyed reading and skimming through this thread, and look forward to reading the related papers soon. A few points: 1. A salient point for me was an apparent absence of reference to "transitional objects" as coined by Donald Winnicott. "Transitional" appears to carry more relevant connotations than "boundary" because psychologically the objects are of central concern to the subjects and are not on a periphery. 2. The kinds of psychological dynamics involved in transitional objects are, I believe, broadly equivalent to those of the object of activity. 3. I do not really subscribe to the plethora of objects situation suggested by Andy although clearly there is much room for confusion. My view is that if enough thinking and care is undertaken then the student will arrive at a reasonably unambiguous delineation in which the object of activity (motive) is the special concern psychologically. As far as I can see the principal confusion lies in taking the object of activity to be the object of labour, whereas I take it that a labourer's object of activity may, for example, equally be the relations he has with his employers etc, which may be negotiated through the ostensive objects of labour. Best, Huw On 23 July 2015 at 17:38, Peg Griffin wrote: > I agree, much thanks to all of you on this issue. > PG > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lubomir > Savov Popov > Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 10:51 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Manfred, > > Well said and well explained. > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > Holodynski, Manfred > Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Andy, > with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation of A > N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective meaning. > As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the > relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a part > or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), but a > psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal signs and > their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her socially embedded > activity. > What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the personal > sense of those involved. The personal sense that an individual assigns to > interactions, facts, and experiences through the use of signs can be > conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but as a particular > sphere of mind that is constituted by two psychological factors in > particular (a) the relation to the motives of the person, and (b) the > relation to the situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the > individual within the process of internalization. > a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings during > social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use them in the > light of their actually elicited motives along with the motives they assign > to the interaction partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not > have to match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an > outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking bank > employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of social > etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion > of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. > b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the situatedness > and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which the use of signs > is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by > propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal > fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated > perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For > example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree on the same > definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, however, will be > situated very differently and enriched with other sensory perceptions when > one person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the other person > experienced a highly dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and > aggressive dog. > Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are subject > to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination that more or > less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of personal sense. > People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can > construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on > the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want to > communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. > By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become aware > of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used signs, but > also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to express > this personal relations. So, this is the overall tension between objective > meaning of an event or an object and its personal sense for a specific > person. > Best > Manfred > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische > Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] > Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to take > it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the > question about subjectivism and objectivism. > When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev > was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, > because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! > Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I > want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem > anomalous. > > What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting > contradictions between the "subjective sense" > and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the > individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness of > the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is > hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the domain > of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of a > multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim > unproblematic "objective truth" > for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too > much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but people's > intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are > preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a > kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks to > "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing > to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life > cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. > The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a > challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. > > I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though I > know nothing at all of his work. > > The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that > though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 different > meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to answer > this question, and I look forward to his answer. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Andy/Lubomir-- > > > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > > everything to the object. > > > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > > > Or? > > > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > > Mike > > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated > > activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that > > not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of > > the discussion. > > > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > > Mike > > > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > > which give everything to the Object. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > > of the subject. > > > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > > outmoded humanism. > > > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > ; Andy Blunden > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > > be approached in many different ways. > > > > It is true that the relationship between the > > object and the subject caries the > > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > > type of relationship might has several aspects and > > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > > several levels with distinctive teleological > > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > > do that and in most cases I got the famous > > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > > language texts where the authors evidently use > > that version of activity theory. The three > > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > > very much in line with the notion of > > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > > mean here? > > Thanks again for a very informative post, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > > to some > > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > > different versions of Activity Theory involved > > here plus > > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > > that have > > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > > using the > > word "object" in a different way, all of them > > legitimate > > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > > will invent > > some different terms. > > > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > > be a nail > > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > > man with a > > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > > Engestrom > > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > > side of the > > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > > has been > > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > > of the > > triangle. > > > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > > purpose > > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > > motive" is > > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > > OBJECT. > > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > > talks about > > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > > complex notion, > > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > > as such. > > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > > this is what > > is motivating all the members of the design team > > when they > > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > > of the > > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > > the wood > > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > > change in > > the course of collaboration and in the End an > > OBJECT Is > > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > > collaboration, to use > > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > > everyone > > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > > with Outcome > > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > > the object > > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > > clearly in > > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > > problem carried within it alone which motivates > > action, but > > *the concept the subject makes of the > > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > > Lubomir astutely > > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > > collaboration > > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > > is, in > > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > > naively > > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > > And Leigh > > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > > Instruments are in fact residues of past > > collaborations > > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > > realised OBJECTs > > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > > > But it seems that other have grasped the > > postmodern critique > > elements of this idea, that apparently > > ideologically neutral > > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > > things, or > > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > > "systems of > > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > > Boundary > > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > > Boundary Object > > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > > two "systems > > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > > cooperation > > but rather the conflict within the broader > > collaboration. > > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > > deliberate and > > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > > obJECT > > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > > rendered as > > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > > strand of > > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > > Foucault's > > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > > Object, > > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > > situation is > > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > > distinction between object and tool in activity > > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > > were aware through the process, that what we > > describe in the paper has to do with how the > > object of design emerged and developed for the > > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > > lack of a historical account of the object that > > goes over and above the particular instances > > analyzed. Although we provide with some > > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > > is grounded on concrete events and their > > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > > distinction between object and means because it > > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > > in the meetings, it was in and through the > > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > > between means and object have added to our > > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > > contribution). > > > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > > what we said when introducing the paper for > > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > > outside any particular framework and think, as we > > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > > sources. These included cultural historical > > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > > topic in this discussion were in the background > > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > > our best to keep internal coherence between what > > we said about the data, and what the data was > > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > > to this. > > > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > > places to be asking those questions. > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > > article. It is a great example of an > > interpretativist approach to everyday life > > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > > decades; still other people might look for > > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > > template or categorize your methodology -- just > > raising a question about its connection to > > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > > certain things for myself. > > > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > > gain when we infuse new methodological, > > epistemological, and ontological realities into > > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > > methodology.) Do we need to call something > > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > > they will "change hands" and will change their > > particular discourse affiliation and will become > > completely different components of a completely > > different discourse. Mostly because the > > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > > the concepts are very different despite of the > > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > > ideas. > > > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > > understand better what is going on in the realm of > > CHAT. > > > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > > > Lubomir > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Andy, all, > > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > > very interesting. I have particular interest in > > the difference that they point out between > > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > > distinction while writing our own paper. We > > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > > floor plan, performances of being in the room > > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > > become the object of the designers' activity. > > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > > narratives about being there. That was the > > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > > connections to notions of object of activity and > > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > > away from the focus on body and experience. We > > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > > differentiate between object of design, the design > > thing that work delivers, and the object's > > constituents (or means of presentation before the > > design thing is finished). > > > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > > the picture, we could discuss the history of > > development of these relations between the > > different forms of presentations of the museum > > means towards the object without necessarily > > articulating the differences between the two. One > > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > > about materials in themselves, but about > > consequences in action. From the point of view of > > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > > space as object of design was an issue in and > > through the working with some material, some form > > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > > get out of making the distinction between object > > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > > should perhaps read more carefully their study > > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > > Any thoughts? > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > > play some > > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > > probably a > > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > > role, too, and > > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > > object into > > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > > collaboration. > > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > > as Queer, are > > > embraced by a despised group who take > > control of the > > > word and assertively embrace it; > > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > > deployed their > > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > > magnificant effect; > > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > > a weapon > > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > > (ISIS flee before > > > them rather than in shame); > > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > > stamp which > > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > > against them by > > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > > newspaper and > > > obliging workers to club together in groups > > to buy and > > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > > organising tool; > > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > > Territory / > > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > > a shared > > > object (the land); > > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > > weapon and tool > > > for Indian independence and > > self-sufficiency, raising it > > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > > technology to a > > > symbol of India. > > > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > > in mind when > > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > > ideological construction placed upon an object > > is subject to > > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > > of an > > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > > subjectivity. > > > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > > that in these > > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > > symbols according > > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > > boundary objects. What about video? > > >> Henry > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > > >>> Thanks Rolf! > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > > they support the coordination of therapy > > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > > identification of what may or may not be a > > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > > question is > > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > > showing > > >>>> photographs of far away places and > > explaining how > > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > > interpretation of > > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > > >>>> man-of-the-world. > > >>>> Does that make better sense? > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > > social theory > > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > > objects." It > > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > > introduce some > > >>>> social theory into domains of > > activity (scientific > > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > > where the > > >>>> participants naively think they are > > collaborating > > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > > granularity, > > >>>> but also the ideological context. > > >>>> > > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > > home care workers > > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > > according to rules > > >>>> and regulations, communications > > resources, > > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > > in the > > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > > apparently > > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > > case that here it > > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > > etc., which are > > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 23 18:47:04 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 11:47:04 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> Message-ID: <55B19918.4030409@mira.net> Thank you Lubomir. Lubomir, it is not a problem of unfamiliarity with diamat. I was educated in the same diamat school as you were. Diamat translates very well into English. And nor is it a problem of translating between German, Russian and English. It is partly a problem of the departmentalisation of knowledge and activity, and partly a problem of getting one's head around genuinely interdisciplinary concepts. Unlike Manfred, you have ventured beyond the bounds of Psychology, so you give me the opportunity to illustrate my point. Let us suppose that there are three characters whom I will call the Psychologist, the Sociologist and the Social Theorist for the sake of convenience. You play the role of *the Psychologist*. Everything in your explanation is about the individual (a.k.a. subject) on one side, and society with its unchangeable laws, on the other. Objective meaning, is *socially agreed*! By whom? Pretty well any Psychologist will be inclined to see things this way, whether they were trained in diamat or not and whether they spoke Russian or English. Yes, the subject, i.e., the individual person, is an"active social agent" and can go out in the world and try to change things. They are a very small agent in the world, but enough of an agent to change what matters to them. It is the subject, an individual, on one side, and society with its unchanging, "agreed," "objective" meanings on the other. *The Sociologist* on the other hand, does his or her survey and tells us that men and women think differently, as do retired people and workers, and blue collar workers have different opinions from white collar workers and so on. And these different groups of people interact. The Sociologist agrees that "objective laws of social reality cannot be changed" but he/she knows that every proposition you want to make about the social reality is contested, and there is no "socially agreed" meaning for anything. Muslims see things differently from Christians, etc., etc., and if things change it is because of the changing relations between these groups, and these changes are beyond the power of any individual to do anything about them. History sweeps over the individual like wave over a grain of sand. It is a matter of formulating the laws governing the interaction between these groups. For *the Social Theorist*, the individual is an agent in the world beyond their immediate sphere of life only insofar as they can participate in some project, e.g. practising their profession, building up a firm or a political party, etc., and it here, taking actions as part of a collaborative project, that the the regularities of social life are made and broken. These projects are motivated by concepts of themselves which are manifested by their actions in the world as a whole, embedded in artefacts and signs and active in the consciousness of individual participants. The concept of "trade union" enters the consciousness of other people who are not unionists, thanks to the actions of trade unions, people learn about science, and have a concept of science, only because of the activity of scientific institutions and movements. These projects are not the Sociologists' social groups, but activities made up not of individuals but of actions. Projects are not sociological entities. They are the actions of individuals and are just as much part of Psychology as Social Theory, but the actions of individuals as such are mere capriciousness, grains of dust in the wind, except insofar as they are coordinated by concepts, that is, are carried out in collaboration with others. The world is made up not of old and young, male and female, Muslim and Christian, but feminism, business, farming, sport, socialism, etc., activities, the unit of which is a project. Mike asked what is at stake here? What is at stake if we insist that there is an objective world, whose laws cannot be changed, and words/signs have objective meanings which are "socially agreed"? Where, if you don't accept the "socially agreed" meaning, you need to see a Psychologist to find out why. And who is it that is the arbiter of the "socially agreed" meaning of everything? Surely it speaks for itself. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 24/07/2015 12:49 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: Hi Mike and Andy, Sorry, it takes time to respond, and there are some other business going on. Both Rubinstein and Leontiev work in a Historical Materialist (Histmat) paradigm. In this respect, there are no substantial differences between them. If we look from outside, the differences are minor. If we go in the details, there are always differences. However, my personal impression is that Rubenstein was more systematic and deep. He was also more of a psychologist rather than activity theorist. In Historical Materialism, the subject is an active social agent. The subject exists objectively. This is not a paradox in that paradigm. On the other hand, although materialists talk about the objective existence of the world, they conceptualize people as active social agents, while the object of activity is subservient to the social agent/subject of activity. In addition, there is a dialectic between the objective existence of human beings and their*subjective (in the sense of personal*, individual) perception of the world. The subject is in the center of everything. When we talk about "subject", we do not mean subjectivity in the US sense. The Histmat is an objectivist paradigm that professes the objective existence of humans but at the same time acknowledges the perceptions and agency of the individual. It is a bit different to translate/transfer these concepts. In Historical Materialism the subject is not subjective in the Anglo sense, not biased, not partial, but exists objectively according to the laws of social reality. Of course, in a different usage of the term "subjective," the subject can display subjectivity in the Anglo sense, like developing political bias and prejudice in his/her perceptions and actions regarding the social world. So, the subject exists objectively and always in control of the object. The dialectic of the subjective and objective regarding a social individual also means that*each individual has his/her own specific consciousness*, but its content is affected strongly by*objective social laws that the subject cannot disregard*, even if he/she wishes so. By "social laws" we mean social regularities, and actually the Histmat people say -- objectively existing social regularities. This means that*the subjects or individuals can not affect or change these objective social regularities*. Again, there is no paradox when the Histmat people believe that the*objective laws of social reality cannot be changed*, but at the same time subjects have the power to change their lives and the organization of society. Yes, subjects/social agents can make changed, but within the limits of social regularities and using these objective social processes to their advantage, creating synergy. In Histmat, they talk about subjective meaning (like in the Anglo discourses) and objective meaning (*socially agreed and accepted* in everyday life conventions). There is also one other topic, about the dialectics of the leader and the masses, and how the leader cannot change the world, only the masses can change the world, but they cannot do that without their leader. Basically, this is a political idea: you need a leader, but if you lose your leader, you can get another one and fight again. That is an example how Histmat was used to idelogize political situations and actions. In principle, it is very difficult to translate/convert Histmat ideas into Anglo discourses. Most of the staff will be lost in translation. Even German words like Tatigkeit and Activitat are used very differently than in German language where they are synonyms. Marx has used these words to denote two very different concepts: Tatigkeit is activity, whole Aktivitat is used for all kinds of chemical and biological process, denoting some kind of movement and development of the situation or the cell, or whatever. The Histmat people religiously follow and keep this differentiation. It is a big mistake to substitute Tatigkeit (deyatelnost in Russian) for Aktivitat (aktivnost in Russian). Actually, the definition of deyatelnost is that it is goal-directed aktivnost. Best wishes, Lubomir From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 23 20:38:14 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 20:38:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55B19918.4030409@mira.net> References: <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B19918.4030409@mira.net> Message-ID: <55b1b32c.2f82460a.495d.fffff5e7@mx.google.com> Andy, This is a very insightful narrative pointing to clear differences. I find myself wondering about the characteristics of "action" which are NOT individual. Actions "manifest" projects which are "realized" by concepts OF the projects. In other words, projects manifest "by" concepts "upon" these projects. Andy, as I try to grasp this understanding I reflect on Dewey's "having an experience" in relation to "having knowledges. Your way of unifying experiences and knowledges though shared actions (undergone and manifested) as historically effected activities coming to be through developing concepts. I hope I have grasped (slightly) what you want us to perceive (as Dewey uses this concept) This months topic is something to "savor" (or savour/savoir) -----Original Message----- From: "Andy Blunden" Sent: ?2015-?07-?23 6:48 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Cc: "Geoffrey C. Bowker" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you Lubomir. Lubomir, it is not a problem of unfamiliarity with diamat. I was educated in the same diamat school as you were. Diamat translates very well into English. And nor is it a problem of translating between German, Russian and English. It is partly a problem of the departmentalisation of knowledge and activity, and partly a problem of getting one's head around genuinely interdisciplinary concepts. Unlike Manfred, you have ventured beyond the bounds of Psychology, so you give me the opportunity to illustrate my point. Let us suppose that there are three characters whom I will call the Psychologist, the Sociologist and the Social Theorist for the sake of convenience. You play the role of *the Psychologist*. Everything in your explanation is about the individual (a.k.a. subject) on one side, and society with its unchangeable laws, on the other. Objective meaning, is *socially agreed*! By whom? Pretty well any Psychologist will be inclined to see things this way, whether they were trained in diamat or not and whether they spoke Russian or English. Yes, the subject, i.e., the individual person, is an"active social agent" and can go out in the world and try to change things. They are a very small agent in the world, but enough of an agent to change what matters to them. It is the subject, an individual, on one side, and society with its unchanging, "agreed," "objective" meanings on the other. *The Sociologist* on the other hand, does his or her survey and tells us that men and women think differently, as do retired people and workers, and blue collar workers have different opinions from white collar workers and so on. And these different groups of people interact. The Sociologist agrees that "objective laws of social reality cannot be changed" but he/she knows that every proposition you want to make about the social reality is contested, and there is no "socially agreed" meaning for anything. Muslims see things differently from Christians, etc., etc., and if things change it is because of the changing relations between these groups, and these changes are beyond the power of any individual to do anything about them. History sweeps over the individual like wave over a grain of sand. It is a matter of formulating the laws governing the interaction between these groups. For *the Social Theorist*, the individual is an agent in the world beyond their immediate sphere of life only insofar as they can participate in some project, e.g. practising their profession, building up a firm or a political party, etc., and it here, taking actions as part of a collaborative project, that the the regularities of social life are made and broken. These projects are motivated by concepts of themselves which are manifested by their actions in the world as a whole, embedded in artefacts and signs and active in the consciousness of individual participants. The concept of "trade union" enters the consciousness of other people who are not unionists, thanks to the actions of trade unions, people learn about science, and have a concept of science, only because of the activity of scientific institutions and movements. These projects are not the Sociologists' social groups, but activities made up not of individuals but of actions. Projects are not sociological entities. They are the actions of individuals and are just as much part of Psychology as Social Theory, but the actions of individuals as such are mere capriciousness, grains of dust in the wind, except insofar as they are coordinated by concepts, that is, are carried out in collaboration with others. The world is made up not of old and young, male and female, Muslim and Christian, but feminism, business, farming, sport, socialism, etc., activities, the unit of which is a project. Mike asked what is at stake here? What is at stake if we insist that there is an objective world, whose laws cannot be changed, and words/signs have objective meanings which are "socially agreed"? Where, if you don't accept the "socially agreed" meaning, you need to see a Psychologist to find out why. And who is it that is the arbiter of the "socially agreed" meaning of everything? Surely it speaks for itself. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 24/07/2015 12:49 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: Hi Mike and Andy, Sorry, it takes time to respond, and there are some other business going on. Both Rubinstein and Leontiev work in a Historical Materialist (Histmat) paradigm. In this respect, there are no substantial differences between them. If we look from outside, the differences are minor. If we go in the details, there are always differences. However, my personal impression is that Rubenstein was more systematic and deep. He was also more of a psychologist rather than activity theorist. In Historical Materialism, the subject is an active social agent. The subject exists objectively. This is not a paradox in that paradigm. On the other hand, although materialists talk about the objective existence of the world, they conceptualize people as active social agents, while the object of activity is subservient to the social agent/subject of activity. In addition, there is a dialectic between the objective existence of human beings and their*subjective (in the sense of personal*, individual) perception of the world. The subject is in the center of everything. When we talk about "subject", we do not mean subjectivity in the US sense. The Histmat is an objectivist paradigm that professes the objective existence of humans but at the same time acknowledges the perceptions and agency of the individual. It is a bit different to translate/transfer these concepts. In Historical Materialism the subject is not subjective in the Anglo sense, not biased, not partial, but exists objectively according to the laws of social reality. Of course, in a different usage of the term "subjective," the subject can display subjectivity in the Anglo sense, like developing political bias and prejudice in his/her perceptions and actions regarding the social world. So, the subject exists objectively and always in control of the object. The dialectic of the subjective and objective regarding a social individual also means that*each individual has his/her own specific consciousness*, but its content is affected strongly by*objective social laws that the subject cannot disregard*, even if he/she wishes so. By "social laws" we mean social regularities, and actually the Histmat people say -- objectively existing social regularities. This means that*the subjects or individuals can not affect or change these objective social regularities*. Again, there is no paradox when the Histmat people believe that the*objective laws of social reality cannot be changed*, but at the same time subjects have the power to change their lives and the organization of society. Yes, subjects/social agents can make changed, but within the limits of social regularities and using these objective social processes to their advantage, creating synergy. In Histmat, they talk about subjective meaning (like in the Anglo discourses) and objective meaning (*socially agreed and accepted* in everyday life conventions). There is also one other topic, about the dialectics of the leader and the masses, and how the leader cannot change the world, only the masses can change the world, but they cannot do that without their leader. Basically, this is a political idea: you need a leader, but if you lose your leader, you can get another one and fight again. That is an example how Histmat was used to idelogize political situations and actions. In principle, it is very difficult to translate/convert Histmat ideas into Anglo discourses. Most of the staff will be lost in translation. Even German words like Tatigkeit and Activitat are used very differently than in German language where they are synonyms. Marx has used these words to denote two very different concepts: Tatigkeit is activity, whole Aktivitat is used for all kinds of chemical and biological process, denoting some kind of movement and development of the situation or the cell, or whatever. The Histmat people religiously follow and keep this differentiation. It is a big mistake to substitute Tatigkeit (deyatelnost in Russian) for Aktivitat (aktivnost in Russian). Actually, the definition of deyatelnost is that it is goal-directed aktivnost. Best wishes, Lubomir From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 23 20:50:19 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 13:50:19 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55b1b32c.2f82460a.495d.fffff5e7@mx.google.com> References: <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B19918.4030409@mira.net> <55b1b32c.2f82460a.495d.fffff5e7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <55B1B5FB.5010703@mira.net> Larry, When I say: "activities made up not of individuals but of actions," I should have said "activities made up not of persons but of actions." It is always persons who act. I referred to concepts being "manifested", not projects. Projects are aggregates of actions, and both projects and actions are manifested in physical movements of things and people. It is not projects which are realised by concepts, but concepts which are realised by projects. And this is the only part of Activity Theory as I see it which is really difficult to get your head around. OK? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 24/07/2015 1:38 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Andy, > This is a very insightful narrative pointing to clear > differences. > > I find myself wondering about the characteristics of > "action" which are NOT individual. Actions "manifest" > projects which are "realized" by concepts OF the projects. > In other words, projects manifest "by" concepts "upon" > these projects. > > Andy, as I try to grasp this understanding I reflect on > Dewey's "having an experience" in relation to "having > knowledges. > > Your way of unifying experiences and knowledges though > shared actions (undergone and manifested) as historically > effected activities coming to be through developing concepts. > > I hope I have grasped (slightly) what you want us to > perceive (as Dewey uses this concept) > > This months topic is something to "savor" (or savour/savoir) > ------------------------------------------------------------ > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: ?2015-?07-?23 6:48 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you Lubomir. > Lubomir, it is not a problem of unfamiliarity with diamat. I > was educated in the same diamat school as you were. Diamat > translates very well into English. And nor is it a problem > of translating between German, Russian and English. It is > partly a problem of the departmentalisation of knowledge and > activity, and partly a problem of getting one's head around > genuinely interdisciplinary concepts. Unlike Manfred, you > have ventured beyond the bounds of Psychology, so you give > me the opportunity to illustrate my point. > Let us suppose that there are three characters whom I will > call the Psychologist, the Sociologist and the Social > Theorist for the sake of convenience. > > You play the role of *the Psychologist*. Everything in your > explanation is about the individual (a.k.a. subject) on one > side, and society with its unchangeable laws, on the other. > Objective meaning, is *socially agreed*! By whom? Pretty > well any Psychologist will be inclined to see things this > way, whether they were trained in diamat or not and whether > they spoke Russian or English. Yes, the subject, i.e., the > individual person, is an"active social agent" and can go out > in the world and try to change things. They are a very small > agent in the world, but enough of an agent to change what > matters to them. It is the subject, an individual, on one > side, and society with its unchanging, "agreed," "objective" > meanings on the other. > > *The Sociologist* on the other hand, does his or her survey > and tells us that men and women think differently, as do > retired people and workers, and blue collar workers have > different opinions from white collar workers and so on. And > these different groups of people interact. The Sociologist > agrees that "objective laws of social reality cannot be > changed" but he/she knows that every proposition you want to > make about the social reality is contested, and there is no > "socially agreed" meaning for anything. Muslims see things > differently from Christians, etc., etc., and if things > change it is because of the changing relations between these > groups, and these changes are beyond the power of any > individual to do anything about them. History sweeps over > the individual like wave over a grain of sand. It is a > matter of formulating the laws governing the interaction > between these groups. > > For *the Social Theorist*, the individual is an agent in the > world beyond their immediate sphere of life only insofar as > they can participate in some project, e.g. practising their > profession, building up a firm or a political party, etc., > and it here, taking actions as part of a collaborative > project, that the the regularities of social life are made > and broken. These projects are motivated by concepts of > themselves which are manifested by their actions in the > world as a whole, embedded in artefacts and signs and active > in the consciousness of individual participants. The concept > of "trade union" enters the consciousness of other people > who are not unionists, thanks to the actions of trade > unions, people learn about science, and have a concept of > science, only because of the activity of scientific > institutions and movements. These projects are not the > Sociologists' social groups, but activities made up not of > individuals but of actions. Projects are not sociological > entities. They are the actions of individuals and are just > as much part of Psychology as Social Theory, but the actions > of individuals as such are mere capriciousness, grains of > dust in the wind, except insofar as they are coordinated by > concepts, that is, are carried out in collaboration with > others. The world is made up not of old and young, male and > female, Muslim and Christian, but feminism, business, > farming, sport, socialism, etc., activities, the unit of > which is a project. > > Mike asked what is at stake here? What is at stake if we > insist that there is an objective world, whose laws cannot > be changed, and words/signs have objective meanings which > are "socially agreed"? Where, if you don't accept the > "socially agreed" meaning, you need to see a Psychologist to > find out why. And who is it that is the arbiter of the > "socially agreed" meaning of everything? Surely it speaks > for itself. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 24/07/2015 12:49 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > > Hi Mike and Andy, > > Sorry, it takes time to respond, and there are some other > business going on. > > Both Rubinstein and Leontiev work in a Historical > Materialist (Histmat) paradigm. In this respect, there are > no substantial differences between them. If we look from > outside, the differences are minor. If we go in the > details, there are always differences. However, my > personal impression is that Rubenstein was more systematic > and deep. He was also more of a psychologist rather than > activity theorist. > > In Historical Materialism, the subject is an active social > agent. The subject exists objectively. This is not a > paradox in that paradigm. On the other hand, although > materialists talk about the objective existence of the > world, they conceptualize people as active social agents, > while the object of activity is subservient to the social > agent/subject of activity. In addition, there is a > dialectic between the objective existence of human beings > and their*subjective (in the sense of personal*, > individual) perception of the world. The subject is in the > center of everything. When we talk about "subject", we do > not mean subjectivity in the US sense. The Histmat is an > objectivist paradigm that professes the objective > existence of humans but at the same time acknowledges the > perceptions and agency of the individual. It is a bit > different to translate/transfer these concepts. In > Historical Materialism the subject is not subjective in > the Anglo sense, not biased, not partial, but exists > objectively according to the laws of social reality. Of > course, in a different usage of the term "subjective," the > subject can display subjectivity in the Anglo sense, like > developing political bias and prejudice in his/her > perceptions and actions regarding the social world. So, > the subject exists objectively and always in control of > the object. The dialectic of the subjective and objective > regarding a social individual also means that*each > individual has his/her own specific consciousness*, but > its content is affected strongly by*objective social laws > that the subject cannot disregard*, even if he/she wishes > so. By "social laws" we mean social regularities, and > actually the Histmat people say -- objectively existing > social regularities. This means that*the subjects or > individuals can not affect or change these objective > social regularities*. Again, there is no paradox when the > Histmat people believe that the*objective laws of social > reality cannot be changed*, but at the same time subjects > have the power to change their lives and the organization > of society. Yes, subjects/social agents can make changed, > but within the limits of social regularities and using > these objective social processes to their advantage, > creating synergy. > > In Histmat, they talk about subjective meaning (like in > the Anglo discourses) and objective meaning (*socially > agreed and accepted* in everyday life conventions). > > There is also one other topic, about the dialectics of the > leader and the masses, and how the leader cannot change > the world, only the masses can change the world, but they > cannot do that without their leader. Basically, this is a > political idea: you need a leader, but if you lose your > leader, you can get another one and fight again. That is > an example how Histmat was used to idelogize political > situations and actions. > > In principle, it is very difficult to translate/convert > Histmat ideas into Anglo discourses. Most of the staff > will be lost in translation. Even German words like > Tatigkeit and Activitat are used very differently than in > German language where they are synonyms. Marx has used > these words to denote two very different concepts: > Tatigkeit is activity, whole Aktivitat is used for all > kinds of chemical and biological process, denoting some > kind of movement and development of the situation or the > cell, or whatever. The Histmat people religiously follow > and keep this differentiation. It is a big mistake to > substitute Tatigkeit (deyatelnost in Russian) for > Aktivitat (aktivnost in Russian). Actually, the definition > of deyatelnost is that it is goal-directed aktivnost. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > > From eg100@hermes.cam.ac.uk Fri Jul 24 03:48:35 2015 From: eg100@hermes.cam.ac.uk (Esther Goody) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 11:48:35 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <1437070378875.81501@iped.uio.no><9EA93094-1AAA-4791-A1ED-CF0E6E54733B@gmail.com><55ACD4C4.704@mira.net><55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net><55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net><55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net><55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no><1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net><1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no><55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com><55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> Message-ID: <650C6B5463E842848E5C3C98FEF6F0B1@EstherTOSH> Dear Mike--- I tried to find a way of writing you apart from Xmca. Do you have an office or home email? Mainly to say Jack has died. I see the book you and David edited for him as special in following so well several of his key themes. (I suspect it's treatment of these themes will outlast some of his papers.) Eventually I want to send you something I am working on about Dialogue as key for the emergence of spoken language. (This sounds like a contradiction -- but isn't.) Best to all, Esther -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+eg100=hermes.cam.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+eg100=hermes.cam.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 23 July 2015 05:13 To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Andy/Lubomir-- I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give everything to the object. Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? Or? What is at stake here theoretically and practically? Mike PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of the discussion. It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? Mike On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden wrote: > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a humanism, in opposition to > poststructuralism, structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > which give everything to the Object. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The Cambridge Handbook of >> Merleau-Ponty on the topic of the subject. >> >> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early 1970's, most notably "The >> Order of Things" and "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more than >> any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE conceiving of processes without >> subjects." >> >> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw the failure of >> phenomenology and the residual links between subjectivism and anthropology. >> >> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the philosophy of the subject >> to what he saw as an outmoded humanism. >> >> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; >> Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and the purpose of >> activity. Actually, depending on the motive and purpose of activity, the >> object can be approached in many different ways. >> >> It is true that the relationship between the object and the subject >> caries the purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This type of >> relationship might has several aspects and the teleological aspect is one >> of them. Actually, in AT, the teleological aspect is central one among all >> aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >> >> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at several levels with >> distinctive teleological phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >> >> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure of activity with its >> three levels. I just tried to do that and in most cases I got the famous >> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English language texts where the >> authors evidently use that version of activity theory. The three structural >> levels of activity might be found in t >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is very much in line with >> the notion of Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >> >> I have many questions, most of which I should find in the literature >> rather than bother here. But I would like to ask one here. It concerns the >> quote that the object "carries in itself the purpose and motive of the >> activity." What does "in itself" mean here? >> Thanks again for a very informative post, >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention to some >> distinctions in this field ... we have at least three >> different versions of Activity Theory involved here plus >> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories that have >> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is using the >> word "object" in a different way, all of them legitimate >> uses of the English word, but all indexing different >> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I will invent >> some different terms. >> >> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may be a nail >> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a man with a >> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. Engestrom >> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left side of the >> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it has been >> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the >> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now >> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or >> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex of the >> triangle. >> >> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the purpose >> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or motive" is >> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the OBJECT. >> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he talks about >> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a complex notion, >> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the >> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process as such. >> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But this is what >> is motivating all the members of the design team when they >> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one of the >> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into the wood >> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the >> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs change in >> the course of collaboration and in the End an OBJECT Is >> *realised* which is the "truth" of the collaboration, to use >> Hegel's apt terminology here. >> >> Surely it is important to recognise that while everyone >> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up with Outcome >> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe the object >> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so clearly in >> Thinking and Speech. It is not the Arbeitsgegenstand or some >> problem carried within it alone which motivates action, but >> *the concept the subject makes of the Arbeitsgegenstand*! >> >> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as Lubomir astutely >> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the collaboration >> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that is, in >> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are naively >> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. And Leigh >> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and >> Instruments are in fact residues of past collaborations >> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., realised OBJECTs >> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >> >> But it seems that other have grasped the postmodern critique >> elements of this idea, that apparently ideologically neutral >> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed >> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as things, or >> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised "systems of >> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a Boundary >> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same >> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >> >> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the Boundary Object >> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining two "systems >> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at cooperation >> but rather the conflict within the broader collaboration. >> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is deliberate and >> aimed to change the relation between Subject and obJECT >> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually rendered as >> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different strand of >> postmodern critique into the equation, namely Foucault's >> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. >> >> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary Object, >> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the situation is >> almost as bad in Russian and German, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >> > >> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I wish to add that I am >> a bit familiar with the distinction between object and tool in activity >> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we were aware through the >> process, that what we describe in the paper has to do with how the object >> of design emerged and developed for the team in and as they were dealing >> with, developing, and resorting to particular means or tools. But I guess >> we could say that in our analyses there is a lack of a historical account >> of the object that goes over and above the particular instances analyzed. >> Although we provide with some ethnographic contextualization of the team's >> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion is grounded on concrete >> events and their transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >> distinction between object and means because it seemed to be the same thing >> in the there and then of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >> > ented towards anything beyond what was there in the meetings, it was >> in and through the meetings' means. How would then the distinction between >> means and object have added to our understanding of the events? (And this >> is not to doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, I really mean >> to ask this question for the purpose of growing and expanding; and as said >> before, part of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. contribution). >> > >> > As to how we would position our contribution with regard to activity >> theory, I would reiterate what we said when introducing the paper for >> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working outside any particular >> framework and think, as we think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >> sources. These included cultural historical psychology, ethnomethodology, >> and discourse analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in the >> Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the topic in this discussion were >> in the background all the time, but we did not operationalize them in terms >> of any particular theory. This is not to say that we went for the "anything >> goes;" we tried our best to keep internal coherence between what we said >> about the data, and what the data was exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would >> like to add to this. >> > >> > I think the questions you are rising about activity theory are very >> much in the spirit of what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best places to be asking those >> questions. >> > >> > Alfredo >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Lubomir Savov Popov >> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >> > >> > There are also a few other things that I would like to bring to this >> discussion. >> > >> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great article. It is a great >> example of an interpretativist approach to everyday life phenomena. Really >> interesting and fascinating. It is all about our minds, culture, and >> activity. >> > >> > However, how is your approach related to classic Activity Theory? Some >> people might find that it is a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others >> might say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that emerge right now >> or have emerged in the last decades; still other people might look for >> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, etc. I am not trying >> here to impose a template or categorize your methodology -- just raising a >> question about its connection to Activity Theory. And again, I am not >> saying that this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify certain things >> for myself. >> > >> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries of Activity Theory? How >> much we can fuse Activity Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >> gain when we infuse new methodological, epistemological, and ontological >> realities into Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the threshold when >> it is not Activity Theory anymore? (I mean here Activity Theory as research >> methodology.) Do we need to call something Activity Theory if it is not? If >> we create a new approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need to call >> it Activity Theory? >> > >> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, Late Modernism. The >> discourse you use in your paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and Postmodernist discourses >> can be fused. We can borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but after >> we assimilate them for use in our project, they will "change hands" and >> will change their particular discourse affiliation and will become >> completely different components of a completely different discourse. Mostly >> because the epistemologies and ontologies are different; and the concepts >> are very different despite of the similarities in ideas and words used to >> name these ideas. >> > >> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me understand better what is >> going on in the realm of CHAT. >> > >> > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >> > >> > Lubomir >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo >> Jornet Gil >> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Andy, all, >> > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and cols. contribution to the >> special issue, which is very interesting. I have particular interest in the >> difference that they point out between boundary object on the one hand, and >> object and instrumentality as different aspects of activity theory on the >> other. Rolf and I came across this distinction while writing our own paper. >> We noticed that the museum space, through multiple forms of presentations >> (e.g., the room itself, a floor plan, performances of being in the room >> while not being there, etc), was a means, an instrument for achieving a >> final design product. >> > >> > At the same time, the museum space begun to become the object of the >> designers' activity. Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite interests, what seemed to be a >> common object for all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >> representations of it begun to be made in terms of narratives about being >> there. That was the orientation that seemed to stick them together. >> > >> > Thus, the museum space was both object and instrument. We wondered >> whether we should do connections to notions of object of activity and >> tools, but we felt that that road would take us away from the focus on body >> and experience. We ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >> differentiate between object of design, the design thing that work >> delivers, and the object's constituents (or means of presentation before >> the design thing is finished). >> > >> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into the picture, we could >> discuss the history of development of these relations between the different >> forms of presentations of the museum means towards the object without >> necessarily articulating the differences between the two. One advantage was >> that boundary objects focus on the materiality, which, as already >> mentioned, is not about materials in themselves, but about consequences in >> action. From the point of view of the persons implicated in the process, >> the museum space as object of design was an issue in and through the >> working with some material, some form of presenting it or changing it. Both >> object and instrument seemed to be moments of a same experience. But I >> still want to learn what we may get out of making the distinction between >> object and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I should perhaps read >> more carefully their study rather than be here thinking aloud). >> > Any thoughts? >> > >> > Alfredo >> > >> > >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of >> Andy Blunden >> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> > >> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which play some >> > role in mediating the relation between subjects, probably a >> > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental role, too, and >> > one subject challenges that role and turns the object into >> > its opposite, and changes the terms of collaboration. >> > A number of examples spring to mind. >> > >> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such as Queer, are >> > embraced by a despised group who take control of the >> > word and assertively embrace it; >> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who deployed their >> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to magnificant effect; >> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into a weapon >> > against them by Kurdish women fighters (ISIS flee before >> > them rather than in shame); >> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's stamp which >> > put newspapers out of reach of workers against them by >> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped newspaper and >> > obliging workers to club together in groups to buy and >> > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >> > organising tool; >> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied Territory / >> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of a shared >> > object (the land); >> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a weapon and tool >> > for Indian independence and self-sufficiency, raising it >> > from the status of obsolete and inferior technology to a >> > symbol of India. >> > >> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had in mind when >> > she introduced the term, but core point is that the >> > ideological construction placed upon an object is subject to >> > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking of an >> > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to subjectivity. >> > >> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >> > mediating artefact or the object of work >> > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is that in these >> > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or symbols according >> > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >> > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >> > >> > Andy >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as boundary objects. What >> about video? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to see that it was the >> photographs that Thomas was endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was using the idea in relation to >> the subsistence farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >> >>> Thanks Rolf! >> >>> Andy >> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also interpret the photographs >> as boundary objects as they support the coordination of therapy activities >> between Thomas and the nurse. I think it depends on the aspect of activity >> one is attempting to explore as opposed to the definite identification of >> what may or may not be a boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in question is >> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by showing >> >>>> photographs of far away places and explaining how >> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an interpretation of >> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >> >>>> man-of-the-world. >> >>>> Does that make better sense? >> >>>> Andy >> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>> >> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in social theory >> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary objects." It >> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is introduce some >> >>>> social theory into domains of activity (scientific >> >>>> and work collaborations for example) where the >> >>>> participants naively think they are collaborating >> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just granularity, >> >>>> but also the ideological context. >> >>>> >> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the home care workers >> >>>> collaborate with the old couple according to rules >> >>>> and regulations, communications resources, >> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which in the >> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are apparently >> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the case that here it >> >>>> is those rules and regulations, etc., which are >> >>>> the "boundary objects"? >> >>>> >> >>>> Andy >> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>> >> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >> >> [The entire original message is not included.] >> > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2015.0.6081 / Virus Database: 4392/10290 - Release Date: 07/23/15 From lspopov@bgsu.edu Fri Jul 24 07:26:18 2015 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 14:26:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55B19918.4030409@mira.net> References: <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B19918.4030409@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy, I read your mail with interest and appreciate your insightful ideas. I agree that different social sciences have quite different cultures, conceptualizations, terminological systems, and this makes interdisciplinary communication quite difficult. I am continue reading your ideas and will come back to you again. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 9:47 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you Lubomir. Lubomir, it is not a problem of unfamiliarity with diamat. I was educated in the same diamat school as you were. Diamat translates very well into English. And nor is it a problem of translating between German, Russian and English. It is partly a problem of the departmentalisation of knowledge and activity, and partly a problem of getting one's head around genuinely interdisciplinary concepts. Unlike Manfred, you have ventured beyond the bounds of Psychology, so you give me the opportunity to illustrate my point. Let us suppose that there are three characters whom I will call the Psychologist, the Sociologist and the Social Theorist for the sake of convenience. You play the role of *the Psychologist*. Everything in your explanation is about the individual (a.k.a. subject) on one side, and society with its unchangeable laws, on the other. Objective meaning, is *socially agreed*! By whom? Pretty well any Psychologist will be inclined to see things this way, whether they were trained in diamat or not and whether they spoke Russian or English. Yes, the subject, i.e., the individual person, is an"active social agent" and can go out in the world and try to change things. They are a very small agent in the world, but enough of an agent to change what matters to them. It is the subject, an individual, on one side, and society with its unchanging, "agreed," "objective" meanings on the other. *The Sociologist* on the other hand, does his or her survey and tells us that men and women think differently, as do retired people and workers, and blue collar workers have different opinions from white collar workers and so on. And these different groups of people interact. The Sociologist agrees that "objective laws of social reality cannot be changed" but he/she knows that every proposition you want to make about the social reality is contested, and there is no "socially agreed" meaning for anything. Muslims see things differently from Christians, etc., etc., and if things change it is because of the changing relations between these groups, and these changes are beyond the power of any individual to do anything about them. History sweeps over the individual like wave over a grain of sand. It is a matter of formulating the laws governing the interaction between these groups. For *the Social Theorist*, the individual is an agent in the world beyond their immediate sphere of life only insofar as they can participate in some project, e.g. practising their profession, building up a firm or a political party, etc., and it here, taking actions as part of a collaborative project, that the the regularities of social life are made and broken. These projects are motivated by concepts of themselves which are manifested by their actions in the world as a whole, embedded in artefacts and signs and active in the consciousness of individual participants. The concept of "trade union" enters the consciousness of other people who are not unionists, thanks to the actions of trade unions, people learn about science, and have a concept of science, only because of the activity of scientific institutions and movements. These projects are not the Sociologists' social groups, but activities made up not of individuals but of actions. Projects are not sociological entities. They are the actions of individuals and are just as much part of Psychology as Social Theory, but the actions of individuals as such are mere capriciousness, grains of dust in the wind, except insofar as they are coordinated by concepts, that is, are carried out in collaboration with others. The world is made up not of old and young, male and female, Muslim and Christian, but feminism, business, farming, sport, socialism, etc., activities, the unit of which is a project. Mike asked what is at stake here? What is at stake if we insist that there is an objective world, whose laws cannot be changed, and words/signs have objective meanings which are "socially agreed"? Where, if you don't accept the "socially agreed" meaning, you need to see a Psychologist to find out why. And who is it that is the arbiter of the "socially agreed" meaning of everything? Surely it speaks for itself. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 24/07/2015 12:49 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: Hi Mike and Andy, Sorry, it takes time to respond, and there are some other business going on. Both Rubinstein and Leontiev work in a Historical Materialist (Histmat) paradigm. In this respect, there are no substantial differences between them. If we look from outside, the differences are minor. If we go in the details, there are always differences. However, my personal impression is that Rubenstein was more systematic and deep. He was also more of a psychologist rather than activity theorist. In Historical Materialism, the subject is an active social agent. The subject exists objectively. This is not a paradox in that paradigm. On the other hand, although materialists talk about the objective existence of the world, they conceptualize people as active social agents, while the object of activity is subservient to the social agent/subject of activity. In addition, there is a dialectic between the objective existence of human beings and their*subjective (in the sense of personal*, individual) perception of the world. The subject is in the center of everything. When we talk about "subject", we do not mean subjectivity in the US sense. The Histmat is an objectivist paradigm that professes the objective existence of humans but at the same time acknowledges the perceptions and agency of the individual. It is a bit different to translate/transfer these concepts. In Historical Materialism the subject is not subjective in the Anglo sense, not biased, not partial, but exists objectively according to the laws of social reality. Of course, in a different usage of the term "subjective," the subject can display subjectivity in the Anglo sense, like developing political bias and prejudice in his/her perceptions and actions regarding the social world. So, the subject exists objectively and always in control of the object. The dialectic of the subjective and objective regarding a social individual also means that*each individual has his/her own specific consciousness*, but its content is affected strongly by*objective social laws that the subject cannot disregard*, even if he/she wishes so. By "social laws" we mean social regularities, and actually the Histmat people say -- objectively existing social regularities. This means that*the subjects or individuals can not affect or change these objective social regularities*. Again, there is no paradox when the Histmat people believe that the*objective laws of social reality cannot be changed*, but at the same time subjects have the power to change their lives and the organi zation of society. Yes, subjects/social agents can make changed, but within the limits of social regularities and using these objective social processes to their advantage, creating synergy. In Histmat, they talk about subjective meaning (like in the Anglo discourses) and objective meaning (*socially agreed and accepted* in everyday life conventions). There is also one other topic, about the dialectics of the leader and the masses, and how the leader cannot change the world, only the masses can change the world, but they cannot do that without their leader. Basically, this is a political idea: you need a leader, but if you lose your leader, you can get another one and fight again. That is an example how Histmat was used to idelogize political situations and actions. In principle, it is very difficult to translate/convert Histmat ideas into Anglo discourses. Most of the staff will be lost in translation. Even German words like Tatigkeit and Activitat are used very differently than in German language where they are synonyms. Marx has used these words to denote two very different concepts: Tatigkeit is activity, whole Aktivitat is used for all kinds of chemical and biological process, denoting some kind of movement and development of the situation or the cell, or whatever. The Histmat people religiously follow and keep this differentiation. It is a big mistake to substitute Tatigkeit (deyatelnost in Russian) for Aktivitat (aktivnost in Russian). Actually, the definition of deyatelnost is that it is goal-directed aktivnost. Best wishes, Lubomir From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jul 24 10:03:23 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 02:03:23 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Message-ID: I think that the theory of language described here is really on a par with the Social Theory that Andy described--that is, Neanderthal. But even the Neanderthals, at least according to N.Y. Marr, and Volosinov, and Vygotsky knew that sense is actually primary, not signification. Signification emerges, in the life of the child and for all we know in the life of primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of signification. That is why Voloshinov says that if there were a language that consisted of a single word (e.g. childly language) it would have sense and not signification. Whenever someone tries to justify the Leontievian idea that sense is a psychological category that emerges from the activation of signification in social contexts, and that it is underwritten by perception, they always use examples like "dog". But a much more appropriate example would be "this", since this is very often the child's first word in English. Since the sense of "this" changes with almost every single use, it's quite impossible to see how it might emerge from a correspondence to perceptual categories. "This", "that", "those", "there", and "then" (as well as their interrogative forms, "which", "what", "whose", "where" and "when") may or may not correspond to perceptions; they certainly don't correspond to any perceptual categories. What kind of perception or experience corresponds to "If you are thirsty, there's some beer in the fridge"? Does it correspond to the the experience that every time I am thirsty beer appears in the fridge by magic? David Kellogg On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 11:51 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Thank you Manfred, > > Well said and well explained. > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > Holodynski, Manfred > Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Andy, > with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation of A > N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective meaning. > As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the > relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a part > or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), but a > psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal signs and > their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her socially embedded > activity. > What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the personal > sense of those involved. The personal sense that an individual assigns to > interactions, facts, and experiences through the use of signs can be > conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but as a particular > sphere of mind that is constituted by two psychological factors in > particular (a) the relation to the motives of the person, and (b) the > relation to the situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the > individual within the process of internalization. > a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings during > social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use them in the > light of their actually elicited motives along with the motives they assign > to the interaction partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not > have to match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an > outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking bank > employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of social > etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion > of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. > b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the situatedness > and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which the use of signs > is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by > propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal > fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated > perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For > example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree on the same > definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, however, will be > situated very differently and enriched with other sensory perceptions when > one person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the other person > experienced a highly dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and > aggressive dog. > Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are subject > to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination that more or > less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of personal sense. > People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can > construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on > the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want to > communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. > By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become aware > of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used signs, but > also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to express > this personal relations. So, this is the overall tension between objective > meaning of an event or an object and its personal sense for a specific > person. > Best > Manfred > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische > Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] > Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to take > it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the > question about subjectivism and objectivism. > When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev > was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, > because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! > Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I > want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem > anomalous. > > What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting > contradictions between the "subjective sense" > and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the > individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness of > the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is > hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the domain > of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of a > multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim > unproblematic "objective truth" > for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too > much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but people's > intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are > preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a > kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks to > "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing > to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life > cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. > The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a > challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. > > I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though I > know nothing at all of his work. > > The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that > though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 different > meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to answer > this question, and I look forward to his answer. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Andy/Lubomir-- > > > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > > everything to the object. > > > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > > > Or? > > > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > > Mike > > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated > > activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that > > not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of > > the discussion. > > > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > > Mike > > > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > > which give everything to the Object. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > > of the subject. > > > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > > outmoded humanism. > > > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > ; Andy Blunden > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > > be approached in many different ways. > > > > It is true that the relationship between the > > object and the subject caries the > > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > > type of relationship might has several aspects and > > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > > several levels with distinctive teleological > > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > > do that and in most cases I got the famous > > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > > language texts where the authors evidently use > > that version of activity theory. The three > > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > > very much in line with the notion of > > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > > mean here? > > Thanks again for a very informative post, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > > to some > > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > > different versions of Activity Theory involved > > here plus > > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > > that have > > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > > using the > > word "object" in a different way, all of them > > legitimate > > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > > will invent > > some different terms. > > > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > > be a nail > > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > > man with a > > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > > Engestrom > > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > > side of the > > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > > has been > > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > > of the > > triangle. > > > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > > purpose > > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > > motive" is > > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > > OBJECT. > > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > > talks about > > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > > complex notion, > > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > > as such. > > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > > this is what > > is motivating all the members of the design team > > when they > > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > > of the > > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > > the wood > > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > > change in > > the course of collaboration and in the End an > > OBJECT Is > > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > > collaboration, to use > > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > > everyone > > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > > with Outcome > > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > > the object > > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > > clearly in > > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > > problem carried within it alone which motivates > > action, but > > *the concept the subject makes of the > > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > > Lubomir astutely > > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > > collaboration > > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > > is, in > > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > > naively > > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > > And Leigh > > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > > Instruments are in fact residues of past > > collaborations > > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > > realised OBJECTs > > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > > > But it seems that other have grasped the > > postmodern critique > > elements of this idea, that apparently > > ideologically neutral > > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > > things, or > > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > > "systems of > > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > > Boundary > > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > > Boundary Object > > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > > two "systems > > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > > cooperation > > but rather the conflict within the broader > > collaboration. > > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > > deliberate and > > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > > obJECT > > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > > rendered as > > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > > strand of > > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > > Foucault's > > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > > Object, > > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > > situation is > > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > > distinction between object and tool in activity > > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > > were aware through the process, that what we > > describe in the paper has to do with how the > > object of design emerged and developed for the > > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > > lack of a historical account of the object that > > goes over and above the particular instances > > analyzed. Although we provide with some > > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > > is grounded on concrete events and their > > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > > distinction between object and means because it > > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > > in the meetings, it was in and through the > > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > > between means and object have added to our > > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > > contribution). > > > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > > what we said when introducing the paper for > > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > > outside any particular framework and think, as we > > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > > sources. These included cultural historical > > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > > topic in this discussion were in the background > > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > > our best to keep internal coherence between what > > we said about the data, and what the data was > > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > > to this. > > > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > > places to be asking those questions. > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > > article. It is a great example of an > > interpretativist approach to everyday life > > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > > decades; still other people might look for > > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > > template or categorize your methodology -- just > > raising a question about its connection to > > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > > certain things for myself. > > > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > > gain when we infuse new methodological, > > epistemological, and ontological realities into > > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > > methodology.) Do we need to call something > > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > > they will "change hands" and will change their > > particular discourse affiliation and will become > > completely different components of a completely > > different discourse. Mostly because the > > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > > the concepts are very different despite of the > > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > > ideas. > > > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > > understand better what is going on in the realm of > > CHAT. > > > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > > > Lubomir > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Andy, all, > > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > > very interesting. I have particular interest in > > the difference that they point out between > > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > > distinction while writing our own paper. We > > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > > floor plan, performances of being in the room > > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > > become the object of the designers' activity. > > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > > narratives about being there. That was the > > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > > connections to notions of object of activity and > > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > > away from the focus on body and experience. We > > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > > differentiate between object of design, the design > > thing that work delivers, and the object's > > constituents (or means of presentation before the > > design thing is finished). > > > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > > the picture, we could discuss the history of > > development of these relations between the > > different forms of presentations of the museum > > means towards the object without necessarily > > articulating the differences between the two. One > > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > > about materials in themselves, but about > > consequences in action. From the point of view of > > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > > space as object of design was an issue in and > > through the working with some material, some form > > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > > get out of making the distinction between object > > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > > should perhaps read more carefully their study > > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > > Any thoughts? > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > > play some > > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > > probably a > > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > > role, too, and > > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > > object into > > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > > collaboration. > > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > > as Queer, are > > > embraced by a despised group who take > > control of the > > > word and assertively embrace it; > > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > > deployed their > > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > > magnificant effect; > > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > > a weapon > > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > > (ISIS flee before > > > them rather than in shame); > > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > > stamp which > > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > > against them by > > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > > newspaper and > > > obliging workers to club together in groups > > to buy and > > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > > organising tool; > > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > > Territory / > > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > > a shared > > > object (the land); > > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > > weapon and tool > > > for Indian independence and > > self-sufficiency, raising it > > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > > technology to a > > > symbol of India. > > > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > > in mind when > > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > > ideological construction placed upon an object > > is subject to > > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > > of an > > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > > subjectivity. > > > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > > that in these > > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > > symbols according > > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > > boundary objects. What about video? > > >> Henry > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > > >>> Thanks Rolf! > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > > they support the coordination of therapy > > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > > identification of what may or may not be a > > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > > question is > > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > > showing > > >>>> photographs of far away places and > > explaining how > > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > > interpretation of > > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > > >>>> man-of-the-world. > > >>>> Does that make better sense? > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > > social theory > > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > > objects." It > > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > > introduce some > > >>>> social theory into domains of > > activity (scientific > > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > > where the > > >>>> participants naively think they are > > collaborating > > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > > granularity, > > >>>> but also the ideological context. > > >>>> > > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > > home care workers > > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > > according to rules > > >>>> and regulations, communications > > resources, > > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > > in the > > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > > apparently > > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > > case that here it > > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > > etc., which are > > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jul 24 11:37:18 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 18:37:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?The_Emergence_of_Boundary_Objects?= In-Reply-To: References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> , Message-ID: <55b28ae8.8758460a.137dc.ffff9e71@mx.google.com> David [and Andy] and others interested in this topic. I am trying to get clear on the question of the "starting" point/place. David wrote: sense is actually primary, not signification. Signification emerges, in the life of the child and for all we know in the life of primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of signification. THIS sense before THAT generalization. David, you are making a claim that Andy starts from a place of generalization. ALL signification is generalization. Your claim is THAT THIS occurs after "sense". SO the question becomes the relation of sense AND signification. [this and that]. Categories such AS the psychological category do or do not emerge FROM activating signification. Is this relation the question? Apologies if I misunderstand Sent from Windows Mail From: David Kellogg Sent: ?Friday?, ?July? ?24?, ?2015 ?10?:?03? ?AM we know in the life of primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of signification. To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity I think that the theory of language described here is really on a par with the Social Theory that Andy described--that is, Neanderthal. But even the Neanderthals, at least according to N.Y. Marr, and Volosinov, and Vygotsky knew that sense is actually primary, not signification. Signification emerges, in the life of the child and for all we know in the life of primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of signification. That is why Voloshinov says that if there were a language that consisted of a single word (e.g. childly language) it would have sense and not signification. Whenever someone tries to justify the Leontievian idea that sense is a psychological category that emerges from the activation of signification in social contexts, and that it is underwritten by perception, they always use examples like "dog". But a much more appropriate example would be "this", since this is very often the child's first word in English. Since the sense of "this" changes with almost every single use, it's quite impossible to see how it might emerge from a correspondence to perceptual categories. "This", "that", "those", "there", and "then" (as well as their interrogative forms, "which", "what", "whose", "where" and "when") may or may not correspond to perceptions; they certainly don't correspond to any perceptual categories. What kind of perception or experience corresponds to "If you are thirsty, there's some beer in the fridge"? Does it correspond to the the experience that every time I am thirsty beer appears in the fridge by magic? David Kellogg On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 11:51 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Thank you Manfred, > > Well said and well explained. > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > Holodynski, Manfred > Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Andy, > with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation of A > N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective meaning. > As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the > relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a part > or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), but a > psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal signs and > their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her socially embedded > activity. > What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the personal > sense of those involved. The personal sense that an individual assigns to > interactions, facts, and experiences through the use of signs can be > conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but as a particular > sphere of mind that is constituted by two psychological factors in > particular (a) the relation to the motives of the person, and (b) the > relation to the situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the > individual within the process of internalization. > a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings during > social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use them in the > light of their actually elicited motives along with the motives they assign > to the interaction partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not > have to match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an > outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking bank > employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of social > etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion > of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. > b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the situatedness > and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which the use of signs > is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by > propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal > fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated > perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For > example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree on the same > definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, however, will be > situated very differently and enriched with other sensory perceptions when > one person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the other person > experienced a highly dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and > aggressive dog. > Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are subject > to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination that more or > less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of personal sense. > People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can > construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on > the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want to > communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. > By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become aware > of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used signs, but > also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to express > this personal relations. So, this is the overall tension between objective > meaning of an event or an object and its personal sense for a specific > person. > Best > Manfred > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische > Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] > Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to take > it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the > question about subjectivism and objectivism. > When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev > was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, > because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! > Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I > want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem > anomalous. > > What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting > contradictions between the "subjective sense" > and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the > individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness of > the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is > hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the domain > of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of a > multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim > unproblematic "objective truth" > for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too > much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but people's > intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are > preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a > kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks to > "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing > to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life > cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. > The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a > challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. > > I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though I > know nothing at all of his work. > > The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that > though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 different > meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to answer > this question, and I look forward to his answer. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Andy/Lubomir-- > > > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > > everything to the object. > > > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > > > Or? > > > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > > Mike > > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated > > activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that > > not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of > > the discussion. > > > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > > Mike > > > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > > which give everything to the Object. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > > of the subject. > > > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > > outmoded humanism. > > > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > ; Andy Blunden > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > > be approached in many different ways. > > > > It is true that the relationship between the > > object and the subject caries the > > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > > type of relationship might has several aspects and > > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > > several levels with distinctive teleological > > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > > do that and in most cases I got the famous > > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > > language texts where the authors evidently use > > that version of activity theory. The three > > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > > very much in line with the notion of > > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > > mean here? > > Thanks again for a very informative post, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > > to some > > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > > different versions of Activity Theory involved > > here plus > > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > > that have > > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > > using the > > word "object" in a different way, all of them > > legitimate > > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > > will invent > > some different terms. > > > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > > be a nail > > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > > man with a > > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > > Engestrom > > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > > side of the > > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > > has been > > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > > of the > > triangle. > > > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > > purpose > > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > > motive" is > > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > > OBJECT. > > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > > talks about > > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > > complex notion, > > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > > as such. > > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > > this is what > > is motivating all the members of the design team > > when they > > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > > of the > > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > > the wood > > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > > change in > > the course of collaboration and in the End an > > OBJECT Is > > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > > collaboration, to use > > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > > everyone > > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > > with Outcome > > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > > the object > > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > > clearly in > > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > > problem carried within it alone which motivates > > action, but > > *the concept the subject makes of the > > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > > Lubomir astutely > > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > > collaboration > > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > > is, in > > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > > naively > > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > > And Leigh > > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > > Instruments are in fact residues of past > > collaborations > > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > > realised OBJECTs > > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > > > But it seems that other have grasped the > > postmodern critique > > elements of this idea, that apparently > > ideologically neutral > > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > > things, or > > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > > "systems of > > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > > Boundary > > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > > Boundary Object > > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > > two "systems > > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > > cooperation > > but rather the conflict within the broader > > collaboration. > > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > > deliberate and > > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > > obJECT > > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > > rendered as > > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > > strand of > > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > > Foucault's > > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > > Object, > > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > > situation is > > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > > distinction between object and tool in activity > > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > > were aware through the process, that what we > > describe in the paper has to do with how the > > object of design emerged and developed for the > > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > > lack of a historical account of the object that > > goes over and above the particular instances > > analyzed. Although we provide with some > > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > > is grounded on concrete events and their > > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > > distinction between object and means because it > > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > > in the meetings, it was in and through the > > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > > between means and object have added to our > > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > > contribution). > > > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > > what we said when introducing the paper for > > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > > outside any particular framework and think, as we > > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > > sources. These included cultural historical > > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > > topic in this discussion were in the background > > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > > our best to keep internal coherence between what > > we said about the data, and what the data was > > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > > to this. > > > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > > places to be asking those questions. > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > > article. It is a great example of an > > interpretativist approach to everyday life > > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > > decades; still other people might look for > > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > > template or categorize your methodology -- just > > raising a question about its connection to > > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > > certain things for myself. > > > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > > gain when we infuse new methodological, > > epistemological, and ontological realities into > > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > > methodology.) Do we need to call something > > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > > they will "change hands" and will change their > > particular discourse affiliation and will become > > completely different components of a completely > > different discourse. Mostly because the > > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > > the concepts are very different despite of the > > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > > ideas. > > > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > > understand better what is going on in the realm of > > CHAT. > > > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > > > Lubomir > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Andy, all, > > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > > very interesting. I have particular interest in > > the difference that they point out between > > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > > distinction while writing our own paper. We > > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > > floor plan, performances of being in the room > > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > > become the object of the designers' activity. > > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > > narratives about being there. That was the > > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > > connections to notions of object of activity and > > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > > away from the focus on body and experience. We > > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > > differentiate between object of design, the design > > thing that work delivers, and the object's > > constituents (or means of presentation before the > > design thing is finished). > > > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > > the picture, we could discuss the history of > > development of these relations between the > > different forms of presentations of the museum > > means towards the object without necessarily > > articulating the differences between the two. One > > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > > about materials in themselves, but about > > consequences in action. From the point of view of > > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > > space as object of design was an issue in and > > through the working with some material, some form > > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > > get out of making the distinction between object > > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > > should perhaps read more carefully their study > > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > > Any thoughts? > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > > play some > > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > > probably a > > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > > role, too, and > > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > > object into > > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > > collaboration. > > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > > as Queer, are > > > embraced by a despised group who take > > control of the > > > word and assertively embrace it; > > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > > deployed their > > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > > magnificant effect; > > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > > a weapon > > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > > (ISIS flee before > > > them rather than in shame); > > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > > stamp which > > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > > against them by > > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > > newspaper and > > > obliging workers to club together in groups > > to buy and > > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > > organising tool; > > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > > Territory / > > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > > a shared > > > object (the land); > > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > > weapon and tool > > > for Indian independence and > > self-sufficiency, raising it > > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > > technology to a > > > symbol of India. > > > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > > in mind when > > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > > ideological construction placed upon an object > > is subject to > > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > > of an > > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > > subjectivity. > > > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > > that in these > > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > > symbols according > > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > > boundary objects. What about video? > > >> Henry > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > > >>> Thanks Rolf! > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > > they support the coordination of therapy > > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > > identification of what may or may not be a > > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > > question is > > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > > showing > > >>>> photographs of far away places and > > explaining how > > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > > interpretation of > > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > > >>>> man-of-the-world. > > >>>> Does that make better sense? > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > > social theory > > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > > objects." It > > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > > introduce some > > >>>> social theory into domains of > > activity (scientific > > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > > where the > > >>>> participants naively think they are > > collaborating > > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > > granularity, > > >>>> but also the ideological context. > > >>>> > > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > > home care workers > > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > > according to rules > > >>>> and regulations, communications > > resources, > > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > > in the > > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > > apparently > > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > > case that here it > > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > > etc., which are > > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > From manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de Fri Jul 24 12:16:15 2015 From: manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de (Holodynski, Manfred) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:16:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Message-ID: <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833731@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Hi David, may be you misunderstood my claim. That is what I said that a person has to use signs with their objective meaning in order to express his sense and to realize and satisfy his motives. So, sense doesn't emerge from signification - that is what I tried to say - and I also understand Leontyev in this way. Also, the first words of children are related to a perception. Also first words such as "this" are related to a common situation or object that child and caregiver share and the meaning of this may be "look at this and share it with me" as a kind of joint attention between child and caregiver. Of course, the word "this" or "da" is related to different objects in different situations, but in socially shared situations where the referent of "this" is clear to both. What is "Neanderthal" of this explanation? The argument that speech can go far beyond perceptions, ok, this is obvious, but this is not the starting point of speech development. So, what is your point? Best Manfred Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 D-48149 M?nster +49-(0)-251-83-34311 +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] Im Auftrag von David Kellogg Gesendet: Freitag, 24. Juli 2015 19:03 An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I think that the theory of language described here is really on a par with the Social Theory that Andy described--that is, Neanderthal. But even the Neanderthals, at least according to N.Y. Marr, and Volosinov, and Vygotsky knew that sense is actually primary, not signification. Signification emerges, in the life of the child and for all we know in the life of primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of signification. That is why Voloshinov says that if there were a language that consisted of a single word (e.g. childly language) it would have sense and not signification. Whenever someone tries to justify the Leontievian idea that sense is a psychological category that emerges from the activation of signification in social contexts, and that it is underwritten by perception, they always use examples like "dog". But a much more appropriate example would be "this", since this is very often the child's first word in English. Since the sense of "this" changes with almost every single use, it's quite impossible to see how it might emerge from a correspondence to perceptual categories. "This", "that", "those", "there", and "then" (as well as their interrogative forms, "which", "what", "whose", "where" and "when") may or may not correspond to perceptions; they certainly don't correspond to any perceptual categories. What kind of perception or experience corresponds to "If you are thirsty, there's some beer in the fridge"? Does it correspond to the the experience that every time I am thirsty beer appears in the fridge by magic? David Kellogg On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 11:51 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Thank you Manfred, > > Well said and well explained. > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > Holodynski, Manfred > Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Hi Andy, > with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation > of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective meaning. > As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the > relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a > part or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), > but a psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal > signs and their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her > socially embedded activity. > What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the > personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an > individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through the > use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal > meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two > psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the motives of > the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and sensorially > mediated experiences of the individual within the process of internalization. > a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings > during social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use > them in the light of their actually elicited motives along with the > motives they assign to the interaction partner. The societal meaning > of the used signs does not have to match the individually assigned > personal sense. For example, an outsider may well interpret a public > fit of rage by a low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an > inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for the menial > employee, it may well be a reassertion of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. > b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the > situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which > the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded > primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or > ?wide-open eyes signal > fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated > perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, > 1978). For example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree > on the same definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, > however, will be situated very differently and enriched with other > sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very likeable > family dog and the other person experienced a highly dramatic episode > with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. > Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are > subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination > that more or less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of personal sense. > People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can > construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend > on the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want > to communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. > By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become > aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used > signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in > order to express this personal relations. So, this is the overall > tension between objective meaning of an event or an object and its > personal sense for a specific person. > Best > Manfred > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische > Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.htm > l > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: > xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd > .edu] > Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to > take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to > the question about subjectivism and objectivism. > When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N > Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that > that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! > Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and > yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim > does seem anomalous. > > What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting > contradictions between the "subjective sense" > and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. > the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the > capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the > child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child > development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal > position. Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints > among which none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" > for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving > too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but > people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" > which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's > approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change > occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different levels in the > "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a "project" at > one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. > The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a > challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. > > I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" > though I know nothing at all of his work. > > The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that > though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 > different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best > position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Andy/Lubomir-- > > > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > > everything to the object. > > > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > > > Or? > > > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > > Mike > > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint > > mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty > > sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the > > richness of the discussion. > > > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > > Mike > > > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > > which give everything to the Object. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > > of the subject. > > > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > > outmoded humanism. > > > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > ; Andy Blunden > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > > be approached in many different ways. > > > > It is true that the relationship between the > > object and the subject caries the > > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > > type of relationship might has several aspects and > > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > > several levels with distinctive teleological > > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > > do that and in most cases I got the famous > > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > > language texts where the authors evidently use > > that version of activity theory. The three > > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > > very much in line with the notion of > > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > > mean here? > > Thanks again for a very informative post, > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > > to some > > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > > different versions of Activity Theory involved > > here plus > > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > > that have > > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > > using the > > word "object" in a different way, all of them > > legitimate > > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > > will invent > > some different terms. > > > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > > be a nail > > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > > man with a > > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > > Engestrom > > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > > side of the > > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > > has been > > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > > of the > > triangle. > > > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > > purpose > > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > > motive" is > > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > > OBJECT. > > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > > talks about > > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > > complex notion, > > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > > as such. > > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > > this is what > > is motivating all the members of the design team > > when they > > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > > of the > > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > > the wood > > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > > change in > > the course of collaboration and in the End an > > OBJECT Is > > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > > collaboration, to use > > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > > everyone > > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > > with Outcome > > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > > the object > > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > > clearly in > > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > > problem carried within it alone which motivates > > action, but > > *the concept the subject makes of the > > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > > Lubomir astutely > > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > > collaboration > > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > > is, in > > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > > naively > > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > > And Leigh > > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > > Instruments are in fact residues of past > > collaborations > > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > > realised OBJECTs > > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > > > But it seems that other have grasped the > > postmodern critique > > elements of this idea, that apparently > > ideologically neutral > > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > > things, or > > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > > "systems of > > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > > Boundary > > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > > Boundary Object > > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > > two "systems > > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > > cooperation > > but rather the conflict within the broader > > collaboration. > > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > > deliberate and > > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > > obJECT > > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > > rendered as > > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > > strand of > > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > > Foucault's > > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > > Object, > > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > > situation is > > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > > distinction between object and tool in activity > > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > > were aware through the process, that what we > > describe in the paper has to do with how the > > object of design emerged and developed for the > > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > > lack of a historical account of the object that > > goes over and above the particular instances > > analyzed. Although we provide with some > > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > > is grounded on concrete events and their > > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > > distinction between object and means because it > > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > > in the meetings, it was in and through the > > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > > between means and object have added to our > > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > > contribution). > > > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > > what we said when introducing the paper for > > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > > outside any particular framework and think, as we > > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > > sources. These included cultural historical > > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > > topic in this discussion were in the background > > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > > our best to keep internal coherence between what > > we said about the data, and what the data was > > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > > to this. > > > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > > places to be asking those questions. > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > > article. It is a great example of an > > interpretativist approach to everyday life > > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > > decades; still other people might look for > > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > > template or categorize your methodology -- just > > raising a question about its connection to > > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > > certain things for myself. > > > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > > gain when we infuse new methodological, > > epistemological, and ontological realities into > > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > > methodology.) Do we need to call something > > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > > they will "change hands" and will change their > > particular discourse affiliation and will become > > completely different components of a completely > > different discourse. Mostly because the > > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > > the concepts are very different despite of the > > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > > ideas. > > > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > > understand better what is going on in the realm of > > CHAT. > > > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > > > Lubomir > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Andy, all, > > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > > very interesting. I have particular interest in > > the difference that they point out between > > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > > distinction while writing our own paper. We > > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > > floor plan, performances of being in the room > > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > > become the object of the designers' activity. > > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > > narratives about being there. That was the > > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > > connections to notions of object of activity and > > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > > away from the focus on body and experience. We > > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > > differentiate between object of design, the design > > thing that work delivers, and the object's > > constituents (or means of presentation before the > > design thing is finished). > > > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > > the picture, we could discuss the history of > > development of these relations between the > > different forms of presentations of the museum > > means towards the object without necessarily > > articulating the differences between the two. One > > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > > about materials in themselves, but about > > consequences in action. From the point of view of > > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > > space as object of design was an issue in and > > through the working with some material, some form > > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > > get out of making the distinction between object > > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > > should perhaps read more carefully their study > > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > > Any thoughts? > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > Objects > > > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > > play some > > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > > probably a > > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > > role, too, and > > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > > object into > > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > > collaboration. > > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > > as Queer, are > > > embraced by a despised group who take > > control of the > > > word and assertively embrace it; > > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > > deployed their > > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > > magnificant effect; > > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > > a weapon > > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > > (ISIS flee before > > > them rather than in shame); > > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > > stamp which > > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > > against them by > > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > > newspaper and > > > obliging workers to club together in groups > > to buy and > > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > > organising tool; > > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > > Territory / > > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > > a shared > > > object (the land); > > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > > weapon and tool > > > for Indian independence and > > self-sufficiency, raising it > > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > > technology to a > > > symbol of India. > > > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > > in mind when > > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > > ideological construction placed upon an object > > is subject to > > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > > of an > > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > > subjectivity. > > > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > > that in these > > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > > symbols according > > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > > boundary objects. What about video? > > >> Henry > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > > >>> Thanks Rolf! > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > > they support the coordination of therapy > > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > > identification of what may or may not be a > > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > > question is > > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > > showing > > >>>> photographs of far away places and > > explaining how > > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > > interpretation of > > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > > >>>> man-of-the-world. > > >>>> Does that make better sense? > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > > social theory > > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > > objects." It > > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > > introduce some > > >>>> social theory into domains of > > activity (scientific > > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > > where the > > >>>> participants naively think they are > > collaborating > > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > > granularity, > > >>>> but also the ideological context. > > >>>> > > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > > home care workers > > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > > according to rules > > >>>> and regulations, communications > > resources, > > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > > in the > > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > > apparently > > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > > case that here it > > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > > etc., which are > > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > From manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de Fri Jul 24 12:50:38 2015 From: manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de (Holodynski, Manfred) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:50:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> References: <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> Message-ID: <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Hi Andy, thanks for your clarification. I now think I have understood your message. You are "travelling" in the social world and discussing Leontyev's understanding of the concept of objective meaning. I can now understand your critique that he might believe that something like an objective meaning may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of social interactions. Ok, if one is going to analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle of different meanings that are also changing with time. So, the objective meaning of a word or concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate their personal sense by using words and concepts. This is not a hopeless endeavor although it sometimes and for some people fails miserably. Your construction of a theory of collaborative projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal with the societal emergence and change of the objective meanings of concepts that maintain the link between the social and psychological plane. Best Manfred Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 D-48149 M?nster +49-(0)-251-83-34311 +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". :( Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice again on this list. > I understand what you are saying. I will try to better explain how I > stand with A N Leontyev. > > I am a social theorist, that is I am interested in changing societal > arrangements (to put it very politely), and I am one of few social > theorists, properly so-called, who base themselves on Vygotsky's > theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My position is a > contradictory one because Vygotsky and Leontyev were psychologists > (like > you) and not social theorists. Social Theorists and Psychologists > generally live in different buildings on the university campus, in > different departments, publish in different journals, refer to > different founding theorists, and altogether inhabit different > universes. Social theorists have ideas about psychology, but generally > not scientific ones, and vice versa. > In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an excellent foundation for > social theory because he introduced into human development and every > interaction between two individuals a culturally produced sign. But he > only went so far. He showed how people acted and developed within > their social situation, but he did not tackle the problem of how that > situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of the Activity as a > macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making development which opened > CHAT to become a fully developed social-and-psychological theory. But > what he said himself on questions of social theory was of very poor > quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the sort of ideas that would > win any following among social theorists today. But he was after all a > Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he is forgiven. > > Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken "objective meaning" is not a > psychological category at all for Leontyev. Yes? And personal sense > is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental Psychological category. > So if what I said were to be interpreted to say that personal sense is > a subset of objective meaning, that would be quite wrong. While I > accept (as I must) a categorical difference between material > objects/processes and their reflection in my mind, I do not at all > understand societal processes as nonpsychological processes. I try to > conceive of them together in one unit, and I think I am on my own > there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). > There remains of course the distinction between the individual > (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), mediated by the particular > (Besonder). A human individual is something radically different from a > number of individuals. For the human individual and how they erleben a > social situation, I rely on my friends and collaborator-psychologists. > I am interested in how the Activities go. In small part to avoid > having arguments with followers of Leontyev I call activities > "projects." > So I reserve the right to say things about projects without a follower > of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a mysterious or esoteric > concept; every English-speaker knows what a project is, and if there > is any confusion with projects as defined by Existentialists, I call > them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people usually join them, not > create them). These include capitalist firms, political parties, > sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a family, a professional career > - all those things which gives our lives mening while we build the > world we and our children must live in, what Fedor Vasilyuk called an > ????????? . A project is not a collection of people, it is an > aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and the "logic" of projects is > something different from Psychology, but it is inclusive of Psychology > as well. A project is a kind of psychological phenomenon, but it is > also much more than psychology, because, as you remind us, people > regulate their own behaviour using signs created in the world beyond > their ken. Projects are the material substance of Concepts, and I rely > on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? > > Everything you said (except how you characterised my > ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >> Hi Andy, >> with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation >> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and >> objective meaning. As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very >> elegant solution of the relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, >> subjective sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as you >> seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality that emerges when >> a person uses societal signs and their objective meanings in order to >> regulate his or her socially embedded activity. >> What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the >> personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an >> individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through >> the use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal >> meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by >> two psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the >> motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and >> sensorially mediated experiences of the individual within the process >> of internalization. >> a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings >> during social interactions in an impartial way. >> They interpret and use them in the light of their actually elicited >> motives along with the motives they assign to the interaction >> partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not have to >> match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an >> outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking >> bank employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of >> social etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a >> reassertion of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the >> situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in >> which the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are >> coded primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a >> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) but through their ties to >> sensorially mediated and situated perceptions?as complex as these >> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For example, two persons can >> use propositional phrases to agree on the same definition of the term >> ?dog? or ?fear.? >> These terms, however, will be situated very differently and enriched >> with other sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very >> likeable family dog and the other person experienced a highly >> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are >> subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and >> coordination that more or less successfully supports the embodiment >> and expression of personal sense. People do not have a private >> ?speech? at their disposal that they can construct and use on their >> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on the appropriation and >> use of conventionalized signs when they want to communicate >> successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. >> By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become >> aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the >> used signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal >> signs in order to express this personal relations. So, this is the >> overall tension between objective meaning of an event or an object >> and its personal sense for a specific person. >> Best >> Manfred >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische >> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht >> ml >> >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucs >> d.edu] >> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to >> take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to >> the question about subjectivism and objectivism. >> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N >> Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that >> that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. >> So there you are! >> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and >> yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim >> does seem anomalous. >> >> What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting >> contradictions between the "subjective sense" >> and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. >> the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the >> capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the >> child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child >> development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal >> position. >> Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints among which >> none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" >> for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving >> too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, >> but people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological >> investigation" which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I >> see Engestrom's approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in >> which change occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different >> levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a >> "project" at one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore >> the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. The >> interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a >> challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. >> >> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" >> though I know nothing at all of his work. >> >> The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that >> though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 >> different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best >> position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> Andy/Lubomir-- >>> >>> I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. >>> But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the >>> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give >>> everything to the object. >>> >>> Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' >>> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? >>> >>> Or? >>> >>> What is at stake here theoretically and practically? >>> Mike >>> PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of >>> boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint >>> mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty >>> sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the >>> richness of the discussion. >>> >>> It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? >>> Mike >>> >>> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a >>> humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, >>> structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory >>> which give everything to the Object. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The >>> Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic >>> of the subject. >>> >>> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early >>> 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and >>> "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more >>> than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE >>> conceiving of processes without subjects." >>> >>> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw >>> the failure of phenomenology and the residual >>> links between subjectivism and anthropology. >>> >>> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the >>> philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an >>> outmoded humanism. >>> >>> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>> >>> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> ; Andy Blunden >>> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> >>> Hi Alfredo, >>> >>> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and >>> the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on >>> the motive and purpose of activity, the object can >>> be approached in many different ways. >>> >>> It is true that the relationship between the >>> object and the subject caries the >>> purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This >>> type of relationship might has several aspects and >>> the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, >>> in AT, the teleological aspect is central one >>> among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >>> >>> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at >>> several levels with distinctive teleological >>> phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >>> >>> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure >>> of activity with its three levels. I just tried to >>> do that and in most cases I got the famous >>> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English >>> language texts where the authors evidently use >>> that version of activity theory. The three >>> structural levels of activity might be found in t >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> >>> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >>> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is >>> very much in line with the notion of >>> Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >>> >>> I have many questions, most of which I should find >>> in the literature rather than bother here. But I >>> would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote >>> that the object "carries in itself the purpose and >>> motive of the activity." What does "in itself" >>> mean here? >>> Thanks again for a very informative post, >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> >>> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention >>> to some >>> distinctions in this field ... we have at least three >>> different versions of Activity Theory involved >>> here plus >>> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories >>> that have >>> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is >>> using the >>> word "object" in a different way, all of them >>> legitimate >>> uses of the English word, but all indexing different >>> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I >>> will invent >>> some different terms. >>> >>> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >>> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >>> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may >>> be a nail >>> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a >>> man with a >>> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. >>> Engestrom >>> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left >>> side of the >>> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it >>> has been >>> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the >>> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now >>> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or >>> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex >>> of the >>> triangle. >>> >>> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the >>> purpose >>> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or >>> motive" is >>> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the >>> OBJECT. >>> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he >>> talks about >>> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a >>> complex notion, >>> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the >>> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process >>> as such. >>> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But >>> this is what >>> is motivating all the members of the design team >>> when they >>> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one >>> of the >>> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into >>> the wood >>> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the >>> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs >>> change in >>> the course of collaboration and in the End an >>> OBJECT Is >>> *realised* which is the "truth" of the >>> collaboration, to use >>> Hegel's apt terminology here. >>> >>> Surely it is important to recognise that while >>> everyone >>> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up >>> with Outcome >>> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe >>> the object >>> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so >>> clearly in >>> Thinking and Speech. It is not the >>> Arbeitsgegenstand or some >>> problem carried within it alone which motivates >>> action, but >>> *the concept the subject makes of the >>> Arbeitsgegenstand*! >>> >>> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as >>> Lubomir astutely >>> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the >>> collaboration >>> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that >>> is, in >>> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are >>> naively >>> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. >>> And Leigh >>> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and >>> Instruments are in fact residues of past >>> collaborations >>> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., >>> realised OBJECTs >>> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >>> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >>> >>> But it seems that other have grasped the >>> postmodern critique >>> elements of this idea, that apparently >>> ideologically neutral >>> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed >>> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as >>> things, or >>> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised >>> "systems of >>> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a >>> Boundary >>> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same >>> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >>> >>> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the >>> Boundary Object >>> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining >>> two "systems >>> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at >>> cooperation >>> but rather the conflict within the broader >>> collaboration. >>> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is >>> deliberate and >>> aimed to change the relation between Subject and >>> obJECT >>> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually >>> rendered as >>> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different >>> strand of >>> postmodern critique into the equation, namely >>> Foucault's >>> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. >>> >>> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >>> Object, >>> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the >>> situation is >>> almost as bad in Russian and German, >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >>> > >>> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I >>> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the >>> distinction between object and tool in activity >>> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we >>> were aware through the process, that what we >>> describe in the paper has to do with how the >>> object of design emerged and developed for the >>> team in and as they were dealing with, developing, >>> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I >>> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a >>> lack of a historical account of the object that >>> goes over and above the particular instances >>> analyzed. Although we provide with some >>> ethnographic contextualization of the team's >>> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion >>> is grounded on concrete events and their >>> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >>> distinction between object and means because it >>> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then >>> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >>> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >>> > ented towards anything beyond what was there >>> in the meetings, it was in and through the >>> meetings' means. How would then the distinction >>> between means and object have added to our >>> understanding of the events? (And this is not to >>> doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, >>> I really mean to ask this question for the purpose >>> of growing and expanding; and as said before, part >>> of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. >>> contribution). >>> > >>> > As to how we would position our contribution >>> with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate >>> what we said when introducing the paper for >>> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working >>> outside any particular framework and think, as we >>> think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >>> sources. These included cultural historical >>> psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse >>> analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in >>> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the >>> topic in this discussion were in the background >>> all the time, but we did not operationalize them >>> in terms of any particular theory. This is not to >>> say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried >>> our best to keep internal coherence between what >>> we said about the data, and what the data was >>> exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add >>> to this. >>> > >>> > I think the questions you are rising about >>> activity theory are very much in the spirit of >>> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >>> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best >>> places to be asking those questions. >>> > >>> > Alfredo >>> > ________________________________________ >>> > From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov >>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> > >>> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >>> > >>> > There are also a few other things that I would >>> like to bring to this discussion. >>> > >>> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great >>> article. It is a great example of an >>> interpretativist approach to everyday life >>> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It >>> is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >>> > >>> > However, how is your approach related to classic >>> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is >>> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might >>> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >>> emerge right now or have emerged in the last >>> decades; still other people might look for >>> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >>> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a >>> template or categorize your methodology -- just >>> raising a question about its connection to >>> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that >>> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify >>> certain things for myself. >>> > >>> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries >>> of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity >>> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >>> gain when we infuse new methodological, >>> epistemological, and ontological realities into >>> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the >>> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? >>> (I mean here Activity Theory as research >>> methodology.) Do we need to call something >>> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new >>> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need >>> to call it Activity Theory? >>> > >>> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, >>> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your >>> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >>> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >>> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can >>> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but >>> after we assimilate them for use in our project, >>> they will "change hands" and will change their >>> particular discourse affiliation and will become >>> completely different components of a completely >>> different discourse. Mostly because the >>> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and >>> the concepts are very different despite of the >>> similarities in ideas and words used to name these >>> ideas. >>> > >>> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me >>> understand better what is going on in the realm of >>> CHAT. >>> > >>> > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >>> > >>> > Lubomir >>> > >>> > -----Original Message----- >>> > From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> > >>> > Andy, all, >>> > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and >>> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is >>> very interesting. I have particular interest in >>> the difference that they point out between >>> boundary object on the one hand, and object and >>> instrumentality as different aspects of activity >>> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this >>> distinction while writing our own paper. We >>> noticed that the museum space, through multiple >>> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a >>> floor plan, performances of being in the room >>> while not being there, etc), was a means, an >>> instrument for achieving a final design product. >>> > >>> > At the same time, the museum space begun to >>> become the object of the designers' activity. >>> Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >>> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite >>> interests, what seemed to be a common object for >>> all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >>> representations of it begun to be made in terms of >>> narratives about being there. That was the >>> orientation that seemed to stick them together. >>> > >>> > Thus, the museum space was both object and >>> instrument. We wondered whether we should do >>> connections to notions of object of activity and >>> tools, but we felt that that road would take us >>> away from the focus on body and experience. We >>> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >>> differentiate between object of design, the design >>> thing that work delivers, and the object's >>> constituents (or means of presentation before the >>> design thing is finished). >>> > >>> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into >>> the picture, we could discuss the history of >>> development of these relations between the >>> different forms of presentations of the museum >>> means towards the object without necessarily >>> articulating the differences between the two. One >>> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >>> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not >>> about materials in themselves, but about >>> consequences in action. From the point of view of >>> the persons implicated in the process, the museum >>> space as object of design was an issue in and >>> through the working with some material, some form >>> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and >>> instrument seemed to be moments of a same >>> experience. But I still want to learn what we may >>> get out of making the distinction between object >>> and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I >>> should perhaps read more carefully their study >>> rather than be here thinking aloud). >>> > Any thoughts? >>> > >>> > Alfredo >>> > >>> > >>> > ________________________________________ >>> > From: >>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>> Objects >>> > >>> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which >>> play some >>> > role in mediating the relation between subjects, >>> probably a >>> > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental >>> role, too, and >>> > one subject challenges that role and turns the >>> object into >>> > its opposite, and changes the terms of >>> collaboration. >>> > A number of examples spring to mind. >>> > >>> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such >>> as Queer, are >>> > embraced by a despised group who take >>> control of the >>> > word and assertively embrace it; >>> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who >>> deployed their >>> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to >>> magnificant effect; >>> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into >>> a weapon >>> > against them by Kurdish women fighters >>> (ISIS flee before >>> > them rather than in shame); >>> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's >>> stamp which >>> > put newspapers out of reach of workers >>> against them by >>> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped >>> newspaper and >>> > obliging workers to club together in groups >>> to buy and >>> > read it, thus making the paper into a >>> glorious >>> > organising tool; >>> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied >>> Territory / >>> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of >>> a shared >>> > object (the land); >>> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a >>> weapon and tool >>> > for Indian independence and >>> self-sufficiency, raising it >>> > from the status of obsolete and inferior >>> technology to a >>> > symbol of India. >>> > >>> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had >>> in mind when >>> > she introduced the term, but core point is that the >>> > ideological construction placed upon an object >>> is subject to >>> > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking >>> of an >>> > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to >>> subjectivity. >>> > >>> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >>> > mediating artefact or the object of work >>> > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is >>> that in these >>> > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or >>> symbols according >>> > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >>> > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >>> > >>> > Andy >>> > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> > *Andy Blunden* >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >>> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as >>> boundary objects. What about video? >>> >> Henry >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to >>> see that it was the photographs that Thomas was >>> endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >>> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was >>> using the idea in relation to the subsistence >>> farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>> >>> Thanks Rolf! >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also >>> interpret the photographs as boundary objects as >>> they support the coordination of therapy >>> activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think >>> it depends on the aspect of activity one is >>> attempting to explore as opposed to the definite >>> identification of what may or may not be a >>> boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden >>> > >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in >>> question is >>> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject >>> to an >>> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by >>> showing >>> >>>> photographs of far away places and >>> explaining how >>> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an >>> interpretation of >>> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and >>> experiences >>> >>>> man-of-the-world. >>> >>>> Does that make better sense? >>> >>>> Andy >>> >>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in >>> social theory >>> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary >>> objects." It >>> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is >>> introduce some >>> >>>> social theory into domains of >>> activity (scientific >>> >>>> and work collaborations for example) >>> where the >>> >>>> participants naively think they are >>> collaborating >>> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just >>> granularity, >>> >>>> but also the ideological context. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the >>> home care workers >>> >>>> collaborate with the old couple >>> according to rules >>> >>>> and regulations, communications >>> resources, >>> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which >>> in the >>> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are >>> apparently >>> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the >>> case that here it >>> >>>> is those rules and regulations, >>> etc., which are >>> >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Andy >>> >>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >>> >>> [The entire original message is not included.] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 24 17:00:21 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 10:00:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> References: <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Message-ID: <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire psychological meanings, and children learn not only by observing but by participating in those activities. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > Hi Andy, > thanks for your clarification. I now think I have understood your message. You are "travelling" in the social world and discussing Leontyev's understanding of the concept of objective meaning. I can now understand your critique that he might believe that something like an objective meaning may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of social interactions. Ok, if one is going to analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle of different meanings that are also changing with time. So, the objective meaning of a word or concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate their personal sense by using words and concepts. This is not a hopeless endeavor although it sometimes and for some people fails miserably. > Your construction of a theory of collaborative projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal with the societal emergence and change of the objective meanings of concepts that maintain the link between the social and psychological plane. > Best Manfred > > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". > :( Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice again on this list. >> I understand what you are saying. I will try to better explain how I >> stand with A N Leontyev. >> >> I am a social theorist, that is I am interested in changing societal >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I am one of few social >> theorists, properly so-called, who base themselves on Vygotsky's >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My position is a >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and Leontyev were psychologists >> (like >> you) and not social theorists. Social Theorists and Psychologists >> generally live in different buildings on the university campus, in >> different departments, publish in different journals, refer to >> different founding theorists, and altogether inhabit different >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about psychology, but generally >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an excellent foundation for >> social theory because he introduced into human development and every >> interaction between two individuals a culturally produced sign. But he >> only went so far. He showed how people acted and developed within >> their social situation, but he did not tackle the problem of how that >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of the Activity as a >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making development which opened >> CHAT to become a fully developed social-and-psychological theory. But >> what he said himself on questions of social theory was of very poor >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the sort of ideas that would >> win any following among social theorists today. But he was after all a >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he is forgiven. >> >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken "objective meaning" is not a >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. Yes? And personal sense >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental Psychological category. >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to say that personal sense is >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be quite wrong. While I >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference between material >> objects/processes and their reflection in my mind, I do not at all >> understand societal processes as nonpsychological processes. I try to >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I think I am on my own >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). >> There remains of course the distinction between the individual >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), mediated by the particular >> (Besonder). A human individual is something radically different from a >> number of individuals. For the human individual and how they erleben a >> social situation, I rely on my friends and collaborator-psychologists. >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In small part to avoid >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I call activities >> "projects." >> So I reserve the right to say things about projects without a follower >> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a mysterious or esoteric >> concept; every English-speaker knows what a project is, and if there >> is any confusion with projects as defined by Existentialists, I call >> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people usually join them, not >> create them). These include capitalist firms, political parties, >> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a family, a professional career >> - all those things which gives our lives mening while we build the >> world we and our children must live in, what Fedor Vasilyuk called an >> ????????? . A project is not a collection of people, it is an >> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and the "logic" of projects is >> something different from Psychology, but it is inclusive of Psychology >> as well. A project is a kind of psychological phenomenon, but it is >> also much more than psychology, because, as you remind us, people >> regulate their own behaviour using signs created in the world beyond >> their ken. Projects are the material substance of Concepts, and I rely >> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? >> >> Everything you said (except how you characterised my >> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >>> Hi Andy, >>> with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation >>> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and >>> objective meaning. As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very >>> elegant solution of the relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, >>> subjective sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as you >>> seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality that emerges when >>> a person uses societal signs and their objective meanings in order to >>> regulate his or her socially embedded activity. >>> What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the >>> personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an >>> individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through >>> the use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal >>> meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by >>> two psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the >>> motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and >>> sensorially mediated experiences of the individual within the process >>> of internalization. >>> a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings >>> during social interactions in an impartial way. >>> They interpret and use them in the light of their actually elicited >>> motives along with the motives they assign to the interaction >>> partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not have to >>> match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an >>> outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking >>> bank employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of >>> social etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a >>> reassertion of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. >>> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the >>> situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in >>> which the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are >>> coded primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a >>> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) but through their ties to >>> sensorially mediated and situated perceptions?as complex as these >>> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For example, two persons can >>> use propositional phrases to agree on the same definition of the term >>> ?dog? or ?fear.? >>> These terms, however, will be situated very differently and enriched >>> with other sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very >>> likeable family dog and the other person experienced a highly >>> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. >>> Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are >>> subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and >>> coordination that more or less successfully supports the embodiment >>> and expression of personal sense. People do not have a private >>> ?speech? at their disposal that they can construct and use on their >>> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on the appropriation and >>> use of conventionalized signs when they want to communicate >>> successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. >>> By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become >>> aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the >>> used signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal >>> signs in order to express this personal relations. So, this is the >>> overall tension between objective meaning of an event or an object >>> and its personal sense for a specific person. >>> Best >>> Manfred >>> >>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >>> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische >>> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 >>> D-48149 M?nster >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) >>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht >>> ml >>> >>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >>> >>> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >>> Von: >>> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucs >>> d.edu] >>> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden >>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 >>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker >>> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to >>> take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to >>> the question about subjectivism and objectivism. >>> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N >>> Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that >>> that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. >>> So there you are! >>> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and >>> yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim >>> does seem anomalous. >>> >>> What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting >>> contradictions between the "subjective sense" >>> and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. >>> the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the >>> capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the >>> child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child >>> development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal >>> position. >>> Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints among which >>> none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" >>> for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving >>> too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, >>> but people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological >>> investigation" which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I >>> see Engestrom's approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in >>> which change occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different >>> levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a >>> "project" at one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore >>> the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. The >>> interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a >>> challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. >>> >>> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" >>> though I know nothing at all of his work. >>> >>> The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that >>> though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 >>> different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best >>> position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> Andy/Lubomir-- >>>> >>>> I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. >>>> But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the >>>> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give >>>> everything to the object. >>>> >>>> Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' >>>> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? >>>> >>>> Or? >>>> >>>> What is at stake here theoretically and practically? >>>> Mike >>>> PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of >>>> boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint >>>> mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty >>>> sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the >>>> richness of the discussion. >>>> >>>> It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a >>>> humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, >>>> structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory >>>> which give everything to the Object. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>> >>>> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The >>>> Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic >>>> of the subject. >>>> >>>> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early >>>> 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and >>>> "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more >>>> than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE >>>> conceiving of processes without subjects." >>>> >>>> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw >>>> the failure of phenomenology and the residual >>>> links between subjectivism and anthropology. >>>> >>>> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the >>>> philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an >>>> outmoded humanism. >>>> >>>> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>> >>>> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> ; Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> >>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>> >>>> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and >>>> the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on >>>> the motive and purpose of activity, the object can >>>> be approached in many different ways. >>>> >>>> It is true that the relationship between the >>>> object and the subject caries the >>>> purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This >>>> type of relationship might has several aspects and >>>> the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, >>>> in AT, the teleological aspect is central one >>>> among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >>>> >>>> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at >>>> several levels with distinctive teleological >>>> phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >>>> >>>> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure >>>> of activity with its three levels. I just tried to >>>> do that and in most cases I got the famous >>>> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English >>>> language texts where the authors evidently use >>>> that version of activity theory. The three >>>> structural levels of activity might be found in t >>>> >>>> Lubomir >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> >>>> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >>>> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is >>>> very much in line with the notion of >>>> Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >>>> >>>> I have many questions, most of which I should find >>>> in the literature rather than bother here. But I >>>> would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote >>>> that the object "carries in itself the purpose and >>>> motive of the activity." What does "in itself" >>>> mean here? >>>> Thanks again for a very informative post, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> >>>> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention >>>> to some >>>> distinctions in this field ... we have at least three >>>> different versions of Activity Theory involved >>>> here plus >>>> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories >>>> that have >>>> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is >>>> using the >>>> word "object" in a different way, all of them >>>> legitimate >>>> uses of the English word, but all indexing different >>>> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I >>>> will invent >>>> some different terms. >>>> >>>> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >>>> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >>>> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may >>>> be a nail >>>> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a >>>> man with a >>>> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. >>>> Engestrom >>>> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left >>>> side of the >>>> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it >>>> has been >>>> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the >>>> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now >>>> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or >>>> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex >>>> of the >>>> triangle. >>>> >>>> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the >>>> purpose >>>> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or >>>> motive" is >>>> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the >>>> OBJECT. >>>> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he >>>> talks about >>>> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a >>>> complex notion, >>>> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the >>>> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process >>>> as such. >>>> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But >>>> this is what >>>> is motivating all the members of the design team >>>> when they >>>> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one >>>> of the >>>> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into >>>> the wood >>>> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the >>>> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs >>>> change in >>>> the course of collaboration and in the End an >>>> OBJECT Is >>>> *realised* which is the "truth" of the >>>> collaboration, to use >>>> Hegel's apt terminology here. >>>> >>>> Surely it is important to recognise that while >>>> everyone >>>> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up >>>> with Outcome >>>> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe >>>> the object >>>> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so >>>> clearly in >>>> Thinking and Speech. It is not the >>>> Arbeitsgegenstand or some >>>> problem carried within it alone which motivates >>>> action, but >>>> *the concept the subject makes of the >>>> Arbeitsgegenstand*! >>>> >>>> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as >>>> Lubomir astutely >>>> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the >>>> collaboration >>>> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that >>>> is, in >>>> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are >>>> naively >>>> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. >>>> And Leigh >>>> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and >>>> Instruments are in fact residues of past >>>> collaborations >>>> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., >>>> realised OBJECTs >>>> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >>>> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >>>> >>>> But it seems that other have grasped the >>>> postmodern critique >>>> elements of this idea, that apparently >>>> ideologically neutral >>>> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed >>>> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as >>>> things, or >>>> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised >>>> "systems of >>>> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a >>>> Boundary >>>> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same >>>> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >>>> >>>> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the >>>> Boundary Object >>>> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining >>>> two "systems >>>> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at >>>> cooperation >>>> but rather the conflict within the broader >>>> collaboration. >>>> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is >>>> deliberate and >>>> aimed to change the relation between Subject and >>>> obJECT >>>> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually >>>> rendered as >>>> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different >>>> strand of >>>> postmodern critique into the equation, namely >>>> Foucault's >>>> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. >>>> >>>> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >>>> Object, >>>> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the >>>> situation is >>>> almost as bad in Russian and German, >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >>>> > >>>> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I >>>> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the >>>> distinction between object and tool in activity >>>> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we >>>> were aware through the process, that what we >>>> describe in the paper has to do with how the >>>> object of design emerged and developed for the >>>> team in and as they were dealing with, developing, >>>> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I >>>> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a >>>> lack of a historical account of the object that >>>> goes over and above the particular instances >>>> analyzed. Although we provide with some >>>> ethnographic contextualization of the team's >>>> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion >>>> is grounded on concrete events and their >>>> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >>>> distinction between object and means because it >>>> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then >>>> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >>>> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >>>> > ented towards anything beyond what was there >>>> in the meetings, it was in and through the >>>> meetings' means. How would then the distinction >>>> between means and object have added to our >>>> understanding of the events? (And this is not to >>>> doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, >>>> I really mean to ask this question for the purpose >>>> of growing and expanding; and as said before, part >>>> of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. >>>> contribution). >>>> > >>>> > As to how we would position our contribution >>>> with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate >>>> what we said when introducing the paper for >>>> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working >>>> outside any particular framework and think, as we >>>> think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >>>> sources. These included cultural historical >>>> psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse >>>> analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in >>>> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the >>>> topic in this discussion were in the background >>>> all the time, but we did not operationalize them >>>> in terms of any particular theory. This is not to >>>> say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried >>>> our best to keep internal coherence between what >>>> we said about the data, and what the data was >>>> exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add >>>> to this. >>>> > >>>> > I think the questions you are rising about >>>> activity theory are very much in the spirit of >>>> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >>>> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best >>>> places to be asking those questions. >>>> > >>>> > Alfredo >>>> > ________________________________________ >>>> > From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov >>>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> > >>>> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >>>> > >>>> > There are also a few other things that I would >>>> like to bring to this discussion. >>>> > >>>> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great >>>> article. It is a great example of an >>>> interpretativist approach to everyday life >>>> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It >>>> is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >>>> > >>>> > However, how is your approach related to classic >>>> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is >>>> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might >>>> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >>>> emerge right now or have emerged in the last >>>> decades; still other people might look for >>>> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >>>> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a >>>> template or categorize your methodology -- just >>>> raising a question about its connection to >>>> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that >>>> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify >>>> certain things for myself. >>>> > >>>> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries >>>> of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity >>>> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >>>> gain when we infuse new methodological, >>>> epistemological, and ontological realities into >>>> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the >>>> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? >>>> (I mean here Activity Theory as research >>>> methodology.) Do we need to call something >>>> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new >>>> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need >>>> to call it Activity Theory? >>>> > >>>> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, >>>> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your >>>> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >>>> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >>>> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can >>>> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but >>>> after we assimilate them for use in our project, >>>> they will "change hands" and will change their >>>> particular discourse affiliation and will become >>>> completely different components of a completely >>>> different discourse. Mostly because the >>>> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and >>>> the concepts are very different despite of the >>>> similarities in ideas and words used to name these >>>> ideas. >>>> > >>>> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me >>>> understand better what is going on in the realm of >>>> CHAT. >>>> > >>>> > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >>>> > >>>> > Lubomir >>>> > >>>> > -----Original Message----- >>>> > From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> > >>>> > Andy, all, >>>> > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and >>>> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is >>>> very interesting. I have particular interest in >>>> the difference that they point out between >>>> boundary object on the one hand, and object and >>>> instrumentality as different aspects of activity >>>> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this >>>> distinction while writing our own paper. We >>>> noticed that the museum space, through multiple >>>> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a >>>> floor plan, performances of being in the room >>>> while not being there, etc), was a means, an >>>> instrument for achieving a final design product. >>>> > >>>> > At the same time, the museum space begun to >>>> become the object of the designers' activity. >>>> Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >>>> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite >>>> interests, what seemed to be a common object for >>>> all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >>>> representations of it begun to be made in terms of >>>> narratives about being there. That was the >>>> orientation that seemed to stick them together. >>>> > >>>> > Thus, the museum space was both object and >>>> instrument. We wondered whether we should do >>>> connections to notions of object of activity and >>>> tools, but we felt that that road would take us >>>> away from the focus on body and experience. We >>>> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >>>> differentiate between object of design, the design >>>> thing that work delivers, and the object's >>>> constituents (or means of presentation before the >>>> design thing is finished). >>>> > >>>> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into >>>> the picture, we could discuss the history of >>>> development of these relations between the >>>> different forms of presentations of the museum >>>> means towards the object without necessarily >>>> articulating the differences between the two. One >>>> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >>>> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not >>>> about materials in themselves, but about >>>> consequences in action. From the point of view of >>>> the persons implicated in the process, the museum >>>> space as object of design was an issue in and >>>> through the working with some material, some form >>>> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and >>>> instrument seemed to be moments of a same >>>> experience. But I still want to learn what we may >>>> get out of making the distinction between object >>>> and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I >>>> should perhaps read more carefully their study >>>> rather than be here thinking aloud). >>>> > Any thoughts? >>>> > >>>> > Alfredo >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > ________________________________________ >>>> > From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> > >>>> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which >>>> play some >>>> > role in mediating the relation between subjects, >>>> probably a >>>> > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental >>>> role, too, and >>>> > one subject challenges that role and turns the >>>> object into >>>> > its opposite, and changes the terms of >>>> collaboration. >>>> > A number of examples spring to mind. >>>> > >>>> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such >>>> as Queer, are >>>> > embraced by a despised group who take >>>> control of the >>>> > word and assertively embrace it; >>>> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who >>>> deployed their >>>> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to >>>> magnificant effect; >>>> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into >>>> a weapon >>>> > against them by Kurdish women fighters >>>> (ISIS flee before >>>> > them rather than in shame); >>>> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's >>>> stamp which >>>> > put newspapers out of reach of workers >>>> against them by >>>> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped >>>> newspaper and >>>> > obliging workers to club together in groups >>>> to buy and >>>> > read it, thus making the paper into a >>>> glorious >>>> > organising tool; >>>> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied >>>> Territory / >>>> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of >>>> a shared >>>> > object (the land); >>>> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a >>>> weapon and tool >>>> > for Indian independence and >>>> self-sufficiency, raising it >>>> > from the status of obsolete and inferior >>>> technology to a >>>> > symbol of India. >>>> > >>>> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had >>>> in mind when >>>> > she introduced the term, but core point is that the >>>> > ideological construction placed upon an object >>>> is subject to >>>> > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking >>>> of an >>>> > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to >>>> subjectivity. >>>> > >>>> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >>>> > mediating artefact or the object of work >>>> > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is >>>> that in these >>>> > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or >>>> symbols according >>>> > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >>>> > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >>>> > >>>> > Andy >>>> > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> > *Andy Blunden* >>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >>>> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as >>>> boundary objects. What about video? >>>> >> Henry >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>> >>> >>>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to >>>> see that it was the photographs that Thomas was >>>> endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >>>> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was >>>> using the idea in relation to the subsistence >>>> farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>>> >>> Thanks Rolf! >>>> >>> Andy >>>> >>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also >>>> interpret the photographs as boundary objects as >>>> they support the coordination of therapy >>>> activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think >>>> it depends on the aspect of activity one is >>>> attempting to explore as opposed to the definite >>>> identification of what may or may not be a >>>> boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> > >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in >>>> question is >>>> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject >>>> to an >>>> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by >>>> showing >>>> >>>> photographs of far away places and >>>> explaining how >>>> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an >>>> interpretation of >>>> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and >>>> experiences >>>> >>>> man-of-the-world. >>>> >>>> Does that make better sense? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in >>>> social theory >>>> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary >>>> objects." It >>>> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is >>>> introduce some >>>> >>>> social theory into domains of >>>> activity (scientific >>>> >>>> and work collaborations for example) >>>> where the >>>> >>>> participants naively think they are >>>> collaborating >>>> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just >>>> granularity, >>>> >>>> but also the ideological context. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the >>>> home care workers >>>> >>>> collaborate with the old couple >>>> according to rules >>>> >>>> and regulations, communications >>>> resources, >>>> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which >>>> in the >>>> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are >>>> apparently >>>> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the >>>> case that here it >>>> >>>> is those rules and regulations, >>>> etc., which are >>>> >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >>>> >>>> [The entire original message is not included.] >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Jul 24 20:13:17 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:13:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> References: <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> Message-ID: This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire psychological meanings. In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its complexity. Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, only when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE through a multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to the teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general but also the individual and particular. In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection and relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. > This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing other > than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire psychological > meanings, and children learn not only by observing but by participating in > those activities. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have understood your >> message. You are "travelling" in the social world and discussing Leontyev's >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. I can now understand >> your critique that he might believe that something like an objective >> meaning may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of social >> interactions. Ok, if one is going to analyze what the essence of an >> "objective meaning" e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of abstract >> terms such as feminism, social justice), then one will find oneself in a >> confusing struggle of different meanings that are also changing with time. >> So, the objective meaning of a word or concept is fuzzy and of many voices. >> Nevertheless, people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate their >> personal sense by using words and concepts. This is not a hopeless endeavor >> although it sometimes and for some people fails miserably. >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative projects is indeed a >> noteworthy proposal to deal with the societal emergence and change of the >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the link between the social >> and psychological plane. >> Best Manfred >> >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster >> Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> >> >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". >> :( Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice again on this list. >>> I understand what you are saying. I will try to better explain how I >>> stand with A N Leontyev. >>> >>> I am a social theorist, that is I am interested in changing societal >>> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I am one of few social >>> theorists, properly so-called, who base themselves on Vygotsky's >>> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My position is a >>> contradictory one because Vygotsky and Leontyev were psychologists >>> (like >>> you) and not social theorists. Social Theorists and Psychologists >>> generally live in different buildings on the university campus, in >>> different departments, publish in different journals, refer to >>> different founding theorists, and altogether inhabit different >>> universes. Social theorists have ideas about psychology, but generally >>> not scientific ones, and vice versa. >>> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an excellent foundation for >>> social theory because he introduced into human development and every >>> interaction between two individuals a culturally produced sign. But he >>> only went so far. He showed how people acted and developed within >>> their social situation, but he did not tackle the problem of how that >>> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of the Activity as a >>> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making development which opened >>> CHAT to become a fully developed social-and-psychological theory. But >>> what he said himself on questions of social theory was of very poor >>> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the sort of ideas that would >>> win any following among social theorists today. But he was after all a >>> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he is forgiven. >>> >>> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken "objective meaning" is not a >>> psychological category at all for Leontyev. Yes? And personal sense >>> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental Psychological category. >>> So if what I said were to be interpreted to say that personal sense is >>> a subset of objective meaning, that would be quite wrong. While I >>> accept (as I must) a categorical difference between material >>> objects/processes and their reflection in my mind, I do not at all >>> understand societal processes as nonpsychological processes. I try to >>> conceive of them together in one unit, and I think I am on my own >>> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). >>> There remains of course the distinction between the individual >>> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), mediated by the particular >>> (Besonder). A human individual is something radically different from a >>> number of individuals. For the human individual and how they erleben a >>> social situation, I rely on my friends and collaborator-psychologists. >>> I am interested in how the Activities go. In small part to avoid >>> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I call activities >>> "projects." >>> So I reserve the right to say things about projects without a follower >>> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a mysterious or esoteric >>> concept; every English-speaker knows what a project is, and if there >>> is any confusion with projects as defined by Existentialists, I call >>> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people usually join them, not >>> create them). These include capitalist firms, political parties, >>> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a family, a professional career >>> - all those things which gives our lives mening while we build the >>> world we and our children must live in, what Fedor Vasilyuk called an >>> ????????? . A project is not a collection of people, it is an >>> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and the "logic" of projects is >>> something different from Psychology, but it is inclusive of Psychology >>> as well. A project is a kind of psychological phenomenon, but it is >>> also much more than psychology, because, as you remind us, people >>> regulate their own behaviour using signs created in the world beyond >>> their ken. Projects are the material substance of Concepts, and I rely >>> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? >>> >>> Everything you said (except how you characterised my >>> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation >>>> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and >>>> objective meaning. As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very >>>> elegant solution of the relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, >>>> subjective sense is not a part or subset of objective meaning (as you >>>> seem to insinuate him), but a psychological quality that emerges when >>>> a person uses societal signs and their objective meanings in order to >>>> regulate his or her socially embedded activity. >>>> What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the >>>> personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an >>>> individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through >>>> the use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal >>>> meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by >>>> two psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the >>>> motives of the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and >>>> sensorially mediated experiences of the individual within the process >>>> of internalization. >>>> a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings >>>> during social interactions in an impartial way. >>>> They interpret and use them in the light of their actually elicited >>>> motives along with the motives they assign to the interaction >>>> partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does not have to >>>> match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an >>>> outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking >>>> bank employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of >>>> social etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a >>>> reassertion of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. >>>> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the >>>> situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in >>>> which the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are >>>> coded primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a >>>> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) but through their ties to >>>> sensorially mediated and situated perceptions?as complex as these >>>> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). For example, two persons can >>>> use propositional phrases to agree on the same definition of the term >>>> ?dog? or ?fear.? >>>> These terms, however, will be situated very differently and enriched >>>> with other sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very >>>> likeable family dog and the other person experienced a highly >>>> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. >>>> Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are >>>> subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and >>>> coordination that more or less successfully supports the embodiment >>>> and expression of personal sense. People do not have a private >>>> ?speech? at their disposal that they can construct and use on their >>>> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on the appropriation and >>>> use of conventionalized signs when they want to communicate >>>> successfully and satisfy their motives in social interactions. >>>> By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become >>>> aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the >>>> used signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal >>>> signs in order to express this personal relations. So, this is the >>>> overall tension between objective meaning of an event or an object >>>> and its personal sense for a specific person. >>>> Best >>>> Manfred >>>> >>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >>>> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische >>>> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 >>>> D-48149 M?nster >>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) >>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) >>>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht >>>> ml >>>> >>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >>>> >>>> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >>>> Von: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucs >>>> d.edu] >>>> >>>> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden >>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 >>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker >>>> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>>> >>>> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to >>>> take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to >>>> the question about subjectivism and objectivism. >>>> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N >>>> Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that >>>> that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. >>>> So there you are! >>>> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and >>>> yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim >>>> does seem anomalous. >>>> >>>> What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting >>>> contradictions between the "subjective sense" >>>> and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. >>>> the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the >>>> capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the >>>> child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child >>>> development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal >>>> position. >>>> Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints among which >>>> none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" >>>> for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving >>>> too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, >>>> but people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological >>>> investigation" which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I >>>> see Engestrom's approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in >>>> which change occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different >>>> levels in the "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a >>>> "project" at one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore >>>> the purposiveness of human action to Activity Theory. The >>>> interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a >>>> challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. >>>> >>>> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" >>>> though I know nothing at all of his work. >>>> >>>> The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that >>>> though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 >>>> different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best >>>> position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy/Lubomir-- >>>>> >>>>> I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. >>>>> But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the >>>>> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give >>>>> everything to the object. >>>>> >>>>> Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' >>>>> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? >>>>> >>>>> Or? >>>>> >>>>> What is at stake here theoretically and practically? >>>>> Mike >>>>> PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of >>>>> boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint >>>>> mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty >>>>> sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the >>>>> richness of the discussion. >>>>> >>>>> It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a >>>>> humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, >>>>> structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory >>>>> which give everything to the Object. >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The >>>>> Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic >>>>> of the subject. >>>>> >>>>> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early >>>>> 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and >>>>> "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more >>>>> than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE >>>>> conceiving of processes without subjects." >>>>> >>>>> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw >>>>> the failure of phenomenology and the residual >>>>> links between subjectivism and anthropology. >>>>> >>>>> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the >>>>> philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an >>>>> outmoded humanism. >>>>> >>>>> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>>> >>>>> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> ; Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>>> Objects >>>>> >>>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>>> >>>>> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and >>>>> the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on >>>>> the motive and purpose of activity, the object can >>>>> be approached in many different ways. >>>>> >>>>> It is true that the relationship between the >>>>> object and the subject caries the >>>>> purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This >>>>> type of relationship might has several aspects and >>>>> the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, >>>>> in AT, the teleological aspect is central one >>>>> among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >>>>> >>>>> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at >>>>> several levels with distinctive teleological >>>>> phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >>>>> >>>>> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure >>>>> of activity with its three levels. I just tried to >>>>> do that and in most cases I got the famous >>>>> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English >>>>> language texts where the authors evidently use >>>>> that version of activity theory. The three >>>>> structural levels of activity might be found in t >>>>> >>>>> Lubomir >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>>> Objects >>>>> >>>>> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >>>>> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is >>>>> very much in line with the notion of >>>>> Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >>>>> >>>>> I have many questions, most of which I should find >>>>> in the literature rather than bother here. But I >>>>> would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote >>>>> that the object "carries in itself the purpose and >>>>> motive of the activity." What does "in itself" >>>>> mean here? >>>>> Thanks again for a very informative post, >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>>> Objects >>>>> >>>>> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention >>>>> to some >>>>> distinctions in this field ... we have at least three >>>>> different versions of Activity Theory involved >>>>> here plus >>>>> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories >>>>> that have >>>>> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is >>>>> using the >>>>> word "object" in a different way, all of them >>>>> legitimate >>>>> uses of the English word, but all indexing different >>>>> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I >>>>> will invent >>>>> some different terms. >>>>> >>>>> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >>>>> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >>>>> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may >>>>> be a nail >>>>> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a >>>>> man with a >>>>> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. >>>>> Engestrom >>>>> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left >>>>> side of the >>>>> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it >>>>> has been >>>>> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the >>>>> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now >>>>> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or >>>>> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex >>>>> of the >>>>> triangle. >>>>> >>>>> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the >>>>> purpose >>>>> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or >>>>> motive" is >>>>> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the >>>>> OBJECT. >>>>> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he >>>>> talks about >>>>> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a >>>>> complex notion, >>>>> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the >>>>> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process >>>>> as such. >>>>> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But >>>>> this is what >>>>> is motivating all the members of the design team >>>>> when they >>>>> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one >>>>> of the >>>>> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into >>>>> the wood >>>>> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the >>>>> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs >>>>> change in >>>>> the course of collaboration and in the End an >>>>> OBJECT Is >>>>> *realised* which is the "truth" of the >>>>> collaboration, to use >>>>> Hegel's apt terminology here. >>>>> >>>>> Surely it is important to recognise that while >>>>> everyone >>>>> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up >>>>> with Outcome >>>>> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe >>>>> the object >>>>> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so >>>>> clearly in >>>>> Thinking and Speech. It is not the >>>>> Arbeitsgegenstand or some >>>>> problem carried within it alone which motivates >>>>> action, but >>>>> *the concept the subject makes of the >>>>> Arbeitsgegenstand*! >>>>> >>>>> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as >>>>> Lubomir astutely >>>>> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the >>>>> collaboration >>>>> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that >>>>> is, in >>>>> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are >>>>> naively >>>>> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. >>>>> And Leigh >>>>> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and >>>>> Instruments are in fact residues of past >>>>> collaborations >>>>> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., >>>>> realised OBJECTs >>>>> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >>>>> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >>>>> >>>>> But it seems that other have grasped the >>>>> postmodern critique >>>>> elements of this idea, that apparently >>>>> ideologically neutral >>>>> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed >>>>> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as >>>>> things, or >>>>> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised >>>>> "systems of >>>>> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a >>>>> Boundary >>>>> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same >>>>> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >>>>> >>>>> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the >>>>> Boundary Object >>>>> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining >>>>> two "systems >>>>> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at >>>>> cooperation >>>>> but rather the conflict within the broader >>>>> collaboration. >>>>> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is >>>>> deliberate and >>>>> aimed to change the relation between Subject and >>>>> obJECT >>>>> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually >>>>> rendered as >>>>> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different >>>>> strand of >>>>> postmodern critique into the equation, namely >>>>> Foucault's >>>>> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. >>>>> >>>>> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >>>>> Object, >>>>> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the >>>>> situation is >>>>> almost as bad in Russian and German, >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>> > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >>>>> > >>>>> > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I >>>>> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the >>>>> distinction between object and tool in activity >>>>> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we >>>>> were aware through the process, that what we >>>>> describe in the paper has to do with how the >>>>> object of design emerged and developed for the >>>>> team in and as they were dealing with, developing, >>>>> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I >>>>> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a >>>>> lack of a historical account of the object that >>>>> goes over and above the particular instances >>>>> analyzed. Although we provide with some >>>>> ethnographic contextualization of the team's >>>>> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion >>>>> is grounded on concrete events and their >>>>> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >>>>> distinction between object and means because it >>>>> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then >>>>> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >>>>> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >>>>> > ented towards anything beyond what was there >>>>> in the meetings, it was in and through the >>>>> meetings' means. How would then the distinction >>>>> between means and object have added to our >>>>> understanding of the events? (And this is not to >>>>> doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, >>>>> I really mean to ask this question for the purpose >>>>> of growing and expanding; and as said before, part >>>>> of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. >>>>> contribution). >>>>> > >>>>> > As to how we would position our contribution >>>>> with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate >>>>> what we said when introducing the paper for >>>>> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working >>>>> outside any particular framework and think, as we >>>>> think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >>>>> sources. These included cultural historical >>>>> psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse >>>>> analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in >>>>> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the >>>>> topic in this discussion were in the background >>>>> all the time, but we did not operationalize them >>>>> in terms of any particular theory. This is not to >>>>> say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried >>>>> our best to keep internal coherence between what >>>>> we said about the data, and what the data was >>>>> exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add >>>>> to this. >>>>> > >>>>> > I think the questions you are rising about >>>>> activity theory are very much in the spirit of >>>>> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >>>>> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best >>>>> places to be asking those questions. >>>>> > >>>>> > Alfredo >>>>> > ________________________________________ >>>>> > From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov >>>>> >>>>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>>> Objects >>>>> > >>>>> > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >>>>> > >>>>> > There are also a few other things that I would >>>>> like to bring to this discussion. >>>>> > >>>>> > First, you have a wonderful project and a great >>>>> article. It is a great example of an >>>>> interpretativist approach to everyday life >>>>> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It >>>>> is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >>>>> > >>>>> > However, how is your approach related to classic >>>>> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is >>>>> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might >>>>> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >>>>> emerge right now or have emerged in the last >>>>> decades; still other people might look for >>>>> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >>>>> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a >>>>> template or categorize your methodology -- just >>>>> raising a question about its connection to >>>>> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that >>>>> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify >>>>> certain things for myself. >>>>> > >>>>> > For example: What are the limits and boundaries >>>>> of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity >>>>> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >>>>> gain when we infuse new methodological, >>>>> epistemological, and ontological realities into >>>>> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the >>>>> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? >>>>> (I mean here Activity Theory as research >>>>> methodology.) Do we need to call something >>>>> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new >>>>> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need >>>>> to call it Activity Theory? >>>>> > >>>>> > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, >>>>> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your >>>>> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >>>>> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >>>>> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can >>>>> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but >>>>> after we assimilate them for use in our project, >>>>> they will "change hands" and will change their >>>>> particular discourse affiliation and will become >>>>> completely different components of a completely >>>>> different discourse. Mostly because the >>>>> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and >>>>> the concepts are very different despite of the >>>>> similarities in ideas and words used to name these >>>>> ideas. >>>>> > >>>>> > Just a few questions that I hope will help me >>>>> understand better what is going on in the realm of >>>>> CHAT. >>>>> > >>>>> > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >>>>> > >>>>> > Lubomir >>>>> > >>>>> > -----Original Message----- >>>>> > From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>>> Objects >>>>> > >>>>> > Andy, all, >>>>> > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and >>>>> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is >>>>> very interesting. I have particular interest in >>>>> the difference that they point out between >>>>> boundary object on the one hand, and object and >>>>> instrumentality as different aspects of activity >>>>> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this >>>>> distinction while writing our own paper. We >>>>> noticed that the museum space, through multiple >>>>> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a >>>>> floor plan, performances of being in the room >>>>> while not being there, etc), was a means, an >>>>> instrument for achieving a final design product. >>>>> > >>>>> > At the same time, the museum space begun to >>>>> become the object of the designers' activity. >>>>> Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >>>>> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite >>>>> interests, what seemed to be a common object for >>>>> all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >>>>> representations of it begun to be made in terms of >>>>> narratives about being there. That was the >>>>> orientation that seemed to stick them together. >>>>> > >>>>> > Thus, the museum space was both object and >>>>> instrument. We wondered whether we should do >>>>> connections to notions of object of activity and >>>>> tools, but we felt that that road would take us >>>>> away from the focus on body and experience. We >>>>> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >>>>> differentiate between object of design, the design >>>>> thing that work delivers, and the object's >>>>> constituents (or means of presentation before the >>>>> design thing is finished). >>>>> > >>>>> > When bringing the notion of boundary object into >>>>> the picture, we could discuss the history of >>>>> development of these relations between the >>>>> different forms of presentations of the museum >>>>> means towards the object without necessarily >>>>> articulating the differences between the two. One >>>>> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >>>>> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not >>>>> about materials in themselves, but about >>>>> consequences in action. From the point of view of >>>>> the persons implicated in the process, the museum >>>>> space as object of design was an issue in and >>>>> through the working with some material, some form >>>>> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and >>>>> instrument seemed to be moments of a same >>>>> experience. But I still want to learn what we may >>>>> get out of making the distinction between object >>>>> and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I >>>>> should perhaps read more carefully their study >>>>> rather than be here thinking aloud). >>>>> > Any thoughts? >>>>> > >>>>> > Alfredo >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > ________________________________________ >>>>> > From: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>>> Objects >>>>> > >>>>> > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which >>>>> play some >>>>> > role in mediating the relation between subjects, >>>>> probably a >>>>> > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental >>>>> role, too, and >>>>> > one subject challenges that role and turns the >>>>> object into >>>>> > its opposite, and changes the terms of >>>>> collaboration. >>>>> > A number of examples spring to mind. >>>>> > >>>>> > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such >>>>> as Queer, are >>>>> > embraced by a despised group who take >>>>> control of the >>>>> > word and assertively embrace it; >>>>> > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who >>>>> deployed their >>>>> > stereotype as housewives and mothers to >>>>> magnificant effect; >>>>> > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into >>>>> a weapon >>>>> > against them by Kurdish women fighters >>>>> (ISIS flee before >>>>> > them rather than in shame); >>>>> > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's >>>>> stamp which >>>>> > put newspapers out of reach of workers >>>>> against them by >>>>> > printing the Northern Star as a stamped >>>>> newspaper and >>>>> > obliging workers to club together in groups >>>>> to buy and >>>>> > read it, thus making the paper into a >>>>> glorious >>>>> > organising tool; >>>>> > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied >>>>> Territory / >>>>> > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of >>>>> a shared >>>>> > object (the land); >>>>> > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a >>>>> weapon and tool >>>>> > for Indian independence and >>>>> self-sufficiency, raising it >>>>> > from the status of obsolete and inferior >>>>> technology to a >>>>> > symbol of India. >>>>> > >>>>> > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had >>>>> in mind when >>>>> > she introduced the term, but core point is that the >>>>> > ideological construction placed upon an object >>>>> is subject to >>>>> > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking >>>>> of an >>>>> > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to >>>>> subjectivity. >>>>> > >>>>> > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >>>>> > mediating artefact or the object of work >>>>> > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is >>>>> that in these >>>>> > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or >>>>> symbols according >>>>> > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >>>>> > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >>>>> > >>>>> > Andy >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> > *Andy Blunden* >>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >>>>> >> I got to thinking about the photographs as >>>>> boundary objects. What about video? >>>>> >> Henry >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to >>>>> see that it was the photographs that Thomas was >>>>> endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >>>>> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was >>>>> using the idea in relation to the subsistence >>>>> farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>>>> >>> Thanks Rolf! >>>>> >>> Andy >>>>> >>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>>> >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also >>>>> interpret the photographs as boundary objects as >>>>> they support the coordination of therapy >>>>> activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think >>>>> it depends on the aspect of activity one is >>>>> attempting to explore as opposed to the definite >>>>> identification of what may or may not be a >>>>> boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> > >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in >>>>> question is >>>>> >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject >>>>> to an >>>>> >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by >>>>> showing >>>>> >>>> photographs of far away places and >>>>> explaining how >>>>> >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an >>>>> interpretation of >>>>> >>>> himself as a well-travelled and >>>>> experiences >>>>> >>>> man-of-the-world. >>>>> >>>> Does that make better sense? >>>>> >>>> Andy >>>>> >>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in >>>>> social theory >>>>> >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary >>>>> objects." It >>>>> >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is >>>>> introduce some >>>>> >>>> social theory into domains of >>>>> activity (scientific >>>>> >>>> and work collaborations for example) >>>>> where the >>>>> >>>> participants naively think they are >>>>> collaborating >>>>> >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just >>>>> granularity, >>>>> >>>> but also the ideological context. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the >>>>> home care workers >>>>> >>>> collaborate with the old couple >>>>> according to rules >>>>> >>>> and regulations, communications >>>>> resources, >>>>> >>>> technology, finance and so on, which >>>>> in the >>>>> >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are >>>>> apparently >>>>> >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the >>>>> case that here it >>>>> >>>> is those rules and regulations, >>>>> etc., which are >>>>> >>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Andy >>>>> >>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >>>>> >>>>> [The entire original message is not included.] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 24 20:30:28 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 13:30:28 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> Message-ID: <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel citations (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one who insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and particular! The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in turn be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted process but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of hypothetical mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It is all actions which are in one way or another organised around some artefact, and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult points and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is in the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an adult learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on their own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. The problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in a uniform, consistent way. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of > course nothing other than activity. That is how signs and > situations acquire psychological meanings. > > In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I > will share Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: > > "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all > its complexity. Only when we recognize the thing in all > its connections and relations, only when this diversity is > synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE through a > multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. > According to the teaching of dialectical logic, a concept > INCLUDES not only the general but also the individual and > particular. > In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of > an object, a concept is filled with definitions of the > object; it is the RESULT of rational processing of our > existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the object. To > think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO > INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating > connection and relations DISCLOSED in determinations of > the concept" > [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child > Psychology, page 53] > > I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to > others. In particular "when we recognize the thing in all > its connections and relations .... THROUGH a multitude of > DETERMINATIONS". > THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". > > > > > On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. > This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of > course nothing other than activity. That is how signs > and situations acquire psychological meanings, and > children learn not only by observing but by > participating in those activities. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > > Hi Andy, > thanks for your clarification. I now think I have > understood your message. You are "travelling" in > the social world and discussing Leontyev's > understanding of the concept of objective meaning. > I can now understand your critique that he might > believe that something like an objective meaning > may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of > social interactions. Ok, if one is going to > analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" > e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of > abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), > then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle > of different meanings that are also changing with > time. So, the objective meaning of a word or > concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, > people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate > their personal sense by using words and concepts. > This is not a hopeless endeavor although it > sometimes and for some people fails miserably. > Your construction of a theory of collaborative > projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal > with the societal emergence and change of the > objective meanings of concepts that maintain the > link between the social and psychological plane. > Best Manfred > > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: > xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski > =uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] Im > Auftrag von Andy Blunden > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". > :( Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice > again on this list. > I understand what you are saying. I will try > to better explain how I > stand with A N Leontyev. > > I am a social theorist, that is I am > interested in changing societal > arrangements (to put it very politely), and I > am one of few social > theorists, properly so-called, who base > themselves on Vygotsky's > theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My > position is a > contradictory one because Vygotsky and > Leontyev were psychologists > (like > you) and not social theorists. Social > Theorists and Psychologists > generally live in different buildings on the > university campus, in > different departments, publish in different > journals, refer to > different founding theorists, and altogether > inhabit different > universes. Social theorists have ideas about > psychology, but generally > not scientific ones, and vice versa. > In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an > excellent foundation for > social theory because he introduced into human > development and every > interaction between two individuals a > culturally produced sign. But he > only went so far. He showed how people acted > and developed within > their social situation, but he did not tackle > the problem of how that > situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of > the Activity as a > macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making > development which opened > CHAT to become a fully developed > social-and-psychological theory. But > what he said himself on questions of social > theory was of very poor > quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the > sort of ideas that would > win any following among social theorists > today. But he was after all a > Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he > is forgiven. > > Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken > "objective meaning" is not a > psychological category at all for Leontyev. > Yes? And personal sense > is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental > Psychological category. > So if what I said were to be interpreted to > say that personal sense is > a subset of objective meaning, that would be > quite wrong. While I > accept (as I must) a categorical difference > between material > objects/processes and their reflection in my > mind, I do not at all > understand societal processes as > nonpsychological processes. I try to > conceive of them together in one unit, and I > think I am on my own > there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). > There remains of course the distinction > between the individual > (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), > mediated by the particular > (Besonder). A human individual is something > radically different from a > number of individuals. For the human > individual and how they erleben a > social situation, I rely on my friends and > collaborator-psychologists. > I am interested in how the Activities go. In > small part to avoid > having arguments with followers of Leontyev I > call activities > "projects." > So I reserve the right to say things about > projects without a follower > of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a > mysterious or esoteric > concept; every English-speaker knows what a > project is, and if there > is any confusion with projects as defined by > Existentialists, I call > them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people > usually join them, not > create them). These include capitalist firms, > political parties, > sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a > family, a professional career > - all those things which gives our lives > mening while we build the > world we and our children must live in, what > Fedor Vasilyuk called an > ????????? . A project is not a collection of > people, it is an > aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and > the "logic" of projects is > something different from Psychology, but it is > inclusive of Psychology > as well. A project is a kind of psychological > phenomenon, but it is > also much more than psychology, because, as > you remind us, people > regulate their own behaviour using signs > created in the world beyond > their ken. Projects are the material substance > of Concepts, and I rely > on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? > > Everything you said (except how you > characterised my > ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > > Hi Andy, > with great interest, I follow the > discussion and your interpretation > of A N Leontyev's contradiction between > subjective sense and > objective meaning. As far as I interpret > ANL he presented a very > elegant solution of the relation between > sense and meaning: For ANL, > subjective sense is not a part or subset > of objective meaning (as you > seem to insinuate him), but a > psychological quality that emerges when > a person uses societal signs and their > objective meanings in order to > regulate his or her socially embedded > activity. > What happens is a transformation of > societal meanings into the > personal sense of those involved. The > personal sense that an > individual assigns to interactions, facts, > and experiences through > the use of signs can be conceptualized not > as a subset of societal > meanings but as a particular sphere of > mind that is constituted by > two psychological factors in particular > (a) the relation to the > motives of the person, and (b) the > relation to the situated and > sensorially mediated experiences of the > individual within the process > of internalization. > a) People do not appropriate the use of > signs and their meanings > during social interactions in an impartial > way. > They interpret and use them in the light > of their actually elicited > motives along with the motives they assign > to the interaction > partner. The societal meaning of the used > signs does not have to > match the individually assigned personal > sense. For example, an > outsider may well interpret a public fit > of rage by a low-ranking > bank employee toward his superior as an > inexcusable violation of > social etiquette. However, for the menial > employee, it may well be a > reassertion of self-esteem in response to > a humiliating directive. > b) The personal sense of sign-use is also > determined by the > situatedness and sensory mediation of the > previous encounters in > which the use of signs is (or was) > embedded. Societal meanings are > coded primarily not by propositional > phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a > mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) > but through their ties to > sensorially mediated and situated > perceptions?as complex as these > interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). > For example, two persons can > use propositional phrases to agree on the > same definition of the term > ?dog? or ?fear.? > These terms, however, will be situated > very differently and enriched > with other sensory perceptions when one > person grew up with a very > likeable family dog and the other person > experienced a highly > dramatic episode with an overpoweringly > large and aggressive dog. > Thus, conventionalized signs and the > meanings assigned to them are > subject to an interpersonal process of > interpretation and > coordination that more or less > successfully supports the embodiment > and expression of personal sense. People > do not have a private > ?speech? at their disposal that they can > construct and use on their > own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend > on the appropriation and > use of conventionalized signs when they > want to communicate > successfully and satisfy their motives in > social interactions. > By an act of reflection, the person can > try to realize and to become > aware of his personal relation and sense > of the situation and the > used signs, but also this reflection has > to fall back on societal > signs in order to express this personal > relations. So, this is the > overall tension between objective meaning > of an event or an object > and its personal sense for a specific person. > Best > Manfred > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und > Erziehung Westf?lische > Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht > ml > > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: > xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski > =uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucs > d.edu ] > > Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of > Boundary Objects > > I was waiting to see what Lubomir would > say in response to my post to > take it from there, Mike, but I will try > to respond as best I can to > the question about subjectivism and > objectivism. > When I first remarked in my 2009 paper > that I thought that A N > Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, > Morten Nissen remarked that > that was odd, because in Europe ATists > thought he was too subjective. > So there you are! > Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a > theory of Psychology, and > yet I want to use AT as a foundation for > social theory, so my claim > does seem anomalous. > > What it comes down to is the insistence of > ANL in interpreting > contradictions between the "subjective sense" > and the "objective meaning" of an activity > in terms of the social vs. > the individual. This reduces subjectivity > to a matter of the > capriciousness of the individual mind or > the underdevelopment of the > child mind. This is hardly objectionable > in the domain of child > development, but in the domain of social > theory it is a Neanderthal > position. > Social life is made up of a multiplicity > of standpoints among which > none have the right to claim unproblematic > "objective truth" > for themselves. This is the basis on which > I describe ANL as giving > too much to the Object. Engestrom on the > other hand, is different, > but people's intentions are relegated to > "phenomenological > investigation" which are preliminary to > the investigation itself. I > see Engestrom's approach as a kind of > social behaviourist approach in > which change occurs only thanks to > "contradictions" at different > levels in the "system." My aim in > proposing to see the "system" as a > "project" at one or another phase in its > life cycle aims to restore > the purposiveness of human action to > Activity Theory. The > interpretation of purposes and intentions > in social science is a > challenge, but I believe that with the aid > of Hegel it can be met. > > I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare > "All the the Subject!" > though I know nothing at all of his work. > > The problem with your question about > Boundary Objects, Mike, is that > though I knew nothing of them a little > while ago, I can now see 3 > different meanings of the term. So perhaps > Geoffrey is in the best > position to answer this question, and I > look forward to his answer. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Andy/Lubomir-- > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so > this's query may be badly timed. > But .... I recall Lubomir writing > that AT was centered on the > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to > Strands of AT theory that give > everything to the object. > > Question-- isn't this a version of > Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the > problem of the environment? > > Or? > > What is at stake here theoretically > and practically? > Mike > PS. I am still trying to absorb the > multifaceted discussion of > boundary object. I almost want to ask > -- what forms of joint > mediated activity do not involve > boundary objects? But I am pretty > sure that not knowing the answer to > this question is a result of the > richness of the discussion. > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a > boundary object?? > Mike > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy > Blunden > >> wrote: > > That is exactly right, Larry, I > am advocating a > humanism, in opposition to > poststructuralism, > structuralism Marxism, and > strands of Activity Theory > which give everything to the Object. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry > wrote: > > Here is a quote from the > introduction of "The > Cambridge Handbook of > Merleau-Ponty on the topic > of the subject. > > "Foucault's archaeological > studies of the early > 1970's, most notably "The > Order of Things" and > "The Archaeology of > Knowledge", did perhaps more > than any other work of the > period to LEGITIMIZE > conceiving of processes > without subjects." > > This is an "antihumanist" > program as Foucault saw > the failure of phenomenology > and the residual > links between subjectivism > and anthropology. > > The force of Foucault's > argument was tying the > philosophy of the subject to > what he saw as an > outmoded humanism. > > It may be what Andy is > highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > > >; > Andy Blunden > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > Hi Alfredo, > > The object doesn't carry in > itself the motive and > the purpose of activity. > Actually, depending on > the motive and purpose of > activity, the object can > be approached in many > different ways. > > It is true that the > relationship between the > object and the subject > caries the > > purpose/goal/objective/motive of > activity. This > type of relationship might > has several aspects and > the teleological aspect is > one of them. Actually, > in AT, the teleological > aspect is central one > among all aspects of > Subject-Object relationships. > > The teleological aspect in > AT is envisaged at > several levels with > distinctive teleological > phenomena: motivation, goal, > etc. > > It is difficult to find > diagrams of the structure > of activity with its three > levels. I just tried to > do that and in most cases I > got the famous > "triangle." The internet is > dominated by English > language texts where the > authors evidently use > that version of activity > theory. The three > structural levels of > activity might be found in t > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov > =bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, > 2015 11:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > That was a very helpful > entry, Andy. Thanks! > I see that our treatment of > object in the paper is > very much in line with the > notion of > Arbeitsgegenstand as you > describe it. > > I have many questions, most > of which I should find > in the literature rather > than bother here. But I > would like to ask one here. > It concerns the quote > that the object "carries in > itself the purpose and > motive of the activity." > What does "in itself" > mean here? > Thanks again for a very > informative post, > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > If I could try to do my > thing and draw attention > to some > distinctions in this field > ... we have at least three > different versions of > Activity Theory involved > here plus > Leigh Star's theory and in > addition the theories > that have > spun off from Leigh Star's > initial idea. Each is > using the > word "object" in a different > way, all of them > legitimate > uses of the English word, > but all indexing different > concepts. So for the sake of > this discussion I > will invent > some different terms. > > The German word > Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > labour, the material which > is to be worked upon, the > blacksmith's iron. It is > objective, in that if may > be a nail > to a man with a hammer and > waste material for a > man with a > broom, but it is all the > same Arbeitsgegenstand. > Engestrom > use the word "Object" in the > middle of the left > side of the > triangle to mean > Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > has been > worked upon it becomes > "Outcome." The hammer that the > blacksmith uses is called > "Instruments" or now > "instrumentality," and the > Rules, whether implicit or > explicit, these are > respectively the base and apex > of the > triangle. > > Engestrom says " The object > carries in itself the > purpose > and motive of the activity." > So this "purpose or > motive" is > not shown on the triangle, > but I will call it the > OBJECT. > This is what Leontyev meant > by "object" when he > talks about > "object-oriented activity." > The OBJECT is a > complex notion, > because it is only > *implicit* in the actions of the > subject(s); it is not a > material thing or process > as such. > Behaviourists would exclude > it altogether. But > this is what > is motivating all the > members of the design team > when they > sit down to collaborate with > one another. Bone one > of the > team thinks the OBJECT is to > drive the nail into > the wood > and another thinks the > OBJECT is to sweep the > Arbeitsgegenstand into the > wastebin. These OBJECTs > change in > the course of collaboration > and in the End an > OBJECT Is > *realised* which is the > "truth" of the > collaboration, to use > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > Surely it is important to > recognise that while > everyone > shares the same > Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > with Outcome > as the same OBJECT, along > the road they construe > the object > differently. This is what > Vygotsky showed so > clearly in > Thinking and Speech. It is > not the > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > problem carried within it > alone which motivates > action, but > *the concept the subject > makes of the > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > Then Leigh Star comes along > and applies (as > Lubomir astutely > notices) postmodern ideology > critique to the > collaboration > within an ostensibly neutral > infrastructure - that > is, in > Engestrom's terms Rules and > Instruments, which are > naively > supposed to be there just to > aid collaboration. > And Leigh > Star shows that this is an > illusion; the Rules and > Instruments are in fact > residues of past > collaborations > which carry within them the > Outcomes, i.e., > realised OBJECTs > of past collaborations. It > is these one-time OBJECTs, > now-Instruments+Rules which > are the Boundary Objects. > > But it seems that other have > grasped the > postmodern critique > elements of this idea, that > apparently > ideologically neutral > obJects (in the expanded > sense of socially constructed > entities, usually far more > than OBJects - as > things, or > artefacts, including > institutions - fossilised > "systems of > activity") and recognised > the shared OBJECT as a > Boundary > Object, reflecting the fact > not everyone has the same > concept of the OBJECT, as > Vygotsky proved. > > But what Engestrom has done, > by placing the > Boundary Object > in the place of Object on > his triangle, joining > two "systems > of activity," for the > purpose of looking not at > cooperation > but rather the conflict > within the broader > collaboration. > The reconstrual of the > Arbeitsgegenstand is > deliberate and > aimed to change the relation > between Subject and > obJECT > (here referring to the > Hegelian "Object" usually > rendered as > "the Other.") thereby > introducing yet a different > strand of > postmodern critique into the > equation, namely > Foucault's > Poststructuralism, to mind > mind, with great effect. > > OK, so we have > Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > Object, > OBject, obJECT and obJect. > And I might say, the > situation is > almost as bad in Russian and > German, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, > Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks a lot for your > appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > To clarify my question in > the previous e-mail, I > wish to add that I am a bit > familiar with the > distinction between object > and tool in activity > theory, though not enough > yet. I can see, and we > were aware through the > process, that what we > describe in the paper has to > do with how the > object of design emerged and > developed for the > team in and as they were > dealing with, developing, > and resorting to particular > means or tools. But I > guess we could say that in > our analyses there is a > lack of a historical account > of the object that > goes over and above the > particular instances > analyzed. Although we > provide with some > ethnographic > contextualization of the team's > developmental trajectories, > all of our discussion > is grounded on concrete > events and their > transactional unfolding. We > did not resort to the > distinction between object > and means because it > seemed to be the same thing > in the there and then > of the episodes analyzed, at > least in what > participants' orientations > concerned. If they ori > > ented towards anything > beyond what was there > in the meetings, it was in > and through the > meetings' means. How would > then the distinction > between means and object > have added to our > understanding of the events? > (And this is not to > doubt of the contribution > from such a distinction, > I really mean to ask this > question for the purpose > of growing and expanding; > and as said before, part > of the answer may be found > in Engestrom et al. > contribution). > > > > As to how we would > position our contribution > with regard to activity > theory, I would reiterate > what we said when > introducing the paper for > discussion: we begun with > the purpose of working > outside any particular > framework and think, as we > think Star did, broadly, > drawing from several > sources. These included > cultural historical > psychology, > ethnomethodology, and discourse > analysis. But also the ideas > about Experience (in > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan > sense) that have been the > topic in this discussion > were in the background > all the time, but we did not > operationalize them > in terms of any particular > theory. This is not to > say that we went for the > "anything goes;" we tried > our best to keep internal > coherence between what > we said about the data, and > what the data was > exhibiting for us. Perhaps > Rolf would like to add > to this. > > > > I think the questions you > are rising about > activity theory are very > much in the spirit of > what I am after, and I am > not the best to answer > them; but this xmca list may > be one of the best > places to be asking those > questions. > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov > Popov > > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > There are also a few other > things that I would > like to bring to this > discussion. > > > > First, you have a > wonderful project and a great > article. It is a great > example of an > interpretativist approach to > everyday life > phenomena. Really > interesting and fascinating. It > is all about our minds, > culture, and activity. > > > > However, how is your > approach related to classic > Activity Theory? Some people > might find that it is > a Symbolic Interactionist > approach; others might > say it one of the > Deconstructivist approaches that > emerge right now or have > emerged in the last > decades; still other people > might look for > connections to > ethnomethodology, discourse > analysis, etc. I am not > trying here to impose a > template or categorize your > methodology -- just > raising a question about its > connection to > Activity Theory. And again, > I am not saying that > this is a shortcoming -- I > would like to clarify > certain things for myself. > > > > For example: What are the > limits and boundaries > of Activity Theory? How much > we can fuse Activity > Theory and Postmodernist > approaches? What do we > gain when we infuse new > methodological, > epistemological, and > ontological realities into > Activity Theory? What do we > lose? What is the > threshold when it is not > Activity Theory anymore? > (I mean here Activity Theory > as research > methodology.) Do we need to > call something > Activity Theory if it is > not? If we create a new > approach starting with > Activity Theory, do we need > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > Activity Theory is a > product of Modern thinking, > Late Modernism. The > discourse you use in your > paper borrows strongly from > Postmodern discourses > and approaches. I am not > sure that Modernist and > Postmodernist discourses can > be fused. We can > borrow ideas across the > range of discourses, but > after we assimilate them for > use in our project, > they will "change hands" and > will change their > particular discourse > affiliation and will become > completely different > components of a completely > different discourse. Mostly > because the > epistemologies and > ontologies are different; and > the concepts are very > different despite of the > similarities in ideas and > words used to name these > ideas. > > > > Just a few questions that > I hope will help me > understand better what is > going on in the realm of > CHAT. > > > > Thank you very much for > this exciting discussion, > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov > =bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, > 2015 11:36 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Andy, all, > > I just recently begun to > read Engestr?m and > cols. contribution to the > special issue, which is > very interesting. I have > particular interest in > the difference that they > point out between > boundary object on the one > hand, and object and > instrumentality as different > aspects of activity > theory on the other. Rolf > and I came across this > distinction while writing > our own paper. We > noticed that the museum > space, through multiple > forms of presentations > (e.g., the room itself, a > floor plan, performances of > being in the room > while not being there, etc), > was a means, an > instrument for achieving a > final design product. > > > > At the same time, the > museum space begun to > become the object of the > designers' activity. > Since this were > interdisciplinary designs, and the > partners had multiple, > sometimes opposite > interests, what seemed to be > a common object for > all them was the museum as > place. Thus, most > representations of it begun > to be made in terms of > narratives about being > there. That was the > orientation that seemed to > stick them together. > > > > Thus, the museum space was > both object and > instrument. We wondered > whether we should do > connections to notions of > object of activity and > tools, but we felt that that > road would take us > away from the focus on body > and experience. We > ended up drawing from Binder > et al (2011), who > differentiate between object > of design, the design > thing that work delivers, > and the object's > constituents (or means of > presentation before the > design thing is finished). > > > > When bringing the notion > of boundary object into > the picture, we could > discuss the history of > development of these > relations between the > different forms of > presentations of the museum > means towards the object > without necessarily > articulating the differences > between the two. One > advantage was that boundary > objects focus on the > materiality, which, as > already mentioned, is not > about materials in > themselves, but about > consequences in action. From > the point of view of > the persons implicated in > the process, the museum > space as object of design > was an issue in and > through the working with > some material, some form > of presenting it or changing > it. Both object and > instrument seemed to be > moments of a same > experience. But I still want > to learn what we may > get out of making the > distinction between object > and tool, as Engestr?m and > colleagues do (so I > should perhaps read more > carefully their study > rather than be here thinking > aloud). > > Any thoughts? > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The > Emergence of Boundary > Objects > > > > Henry, anything. But the > point is objects which > play some > > role in mediating the > relation between subjects, > probably a > > symbolic role, but > possibly an instrumental > role, too, and > > one subject challenges > that role and turns the > object into > > its opposite, and changes > the terms of > collaboration. > > A number of examples > spring to mind. > > > > * Loaded, especially > pejorative words, such > as Queer, are > > embraced by a > despised group who take > control of the > > word and assertively > embrace it; > > * The post-WW2 women's > peace movement who > deployed their > > stereotype as > housewives and mothers to > magnificant effect; > > * ISIS's hatred and > fear of women turned into > a weapon > > against them by > Kurdish women fighters > (ISIS flee before > > them rather than in > shame); > > * The Chartists who > turned the British govt's > stamp which > > put newspapers out of > reach of workers > against them by > > printing the Northern > Star as a stamped > newspaper and > > obliging workers to > club together in groups > to buy and > > read it, thus making > the paper into a > glorious > > organising tool; > > * the naming of > Palestine and the Occupied > Territory / > > Israel is the > struggle over the meaning of > a shared > > object (the land); > > * Gandhi's use of the > landloom as both a > weapon and tool > > for Indian > independence and > self-sufficiency, raising it > > from the status of > obsolete and inferior > technology to a > > symbol of India. > > > > In think this is not what > Susan Leigh Star had > in mind when > > she introduced the term, > but core point is that the > > ideological construction > placed upon an object > is subject to > > contestation, and if > successful, the re-marking > of an > > artefact is a tremendously > powerful spur to > subjectivity. > > > > Yrjo raises the question: > is the"boundary object" a > > mediating artefact or the > object of work > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I > think the answer is > that in these > > cases it is a mediating > artefact, tool or > symbols according > > to context. In principle > it is not the Object in the > > Engestromian sense, though > it might happen to be. > > > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, > HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > >> I got to thinking about > the photographs as > boundary objects. What about > video? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 > PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >>> > >>> Yes, thinking about this > overnight, I came to > see that it was the > photographs that Thomas was > endeavouring to turn to use > to recover his > humanity. This is consonant > with how Yrjo was > using the idea in relation > to the subsistence > farmers' movement in Mexico > and their corn. > >>> Thanks Rolf! > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, > Rolf Steier wrote: > >>>> This makes sense to me, > Andy. I could also > interpret the photographs as > boundary objects as > they support the > coordination of therapy > activities between Thomas > and the nurse. I think > it depends on the aspect of > activity one is > attempting to explore as > opposed to the definite > identification of what may > or may not be a > boundary object. This is > only my opinion though! > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at > 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Or alternatively, > the boundary object in > question is > >>>> Thomas's aged > body, which is subject > to an > >>>> interpretation > which Thomas contests by > showing > >>>> photographs of far > away places and > explaining how > >>>> well-travelled he > is, seeking an > interpretation of > >>>> himself as a > well-travelled and > experiences > >>>> man-of-the-world. > >>>> Does that make > better sense? > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 > 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I agree. > My own interest is in > social theory > >>>> and I'd never > heard of "boundary > objects." It > >>>> seems to me > that what BOs do is > introduce some > >>>> social theory > into domains of > activity (scientific > >>>> and work > collaborations for example) > where the > >>>> participants > naively think they are > collaborating > >>>> on neutral > ground. So it is not just > granularity, > >>>> but also the > ideological context. > >>>> > >>>> In Yjro > Engestrom's article, the > home care workers > >>>> collaborate > with the old couple > according to rules > >>>> and > regulations, communications > resources, > >>>> technology, > finance and so on, which > in the > >>>> unnamed > country, the old couple are > apparently > >>>> cast as > "patients". Isn't it the > case that here it > >>>> is those rules > and regulations, > etc., which are > >>>> the "boundary > objects"? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > [The entire original message > is not included.] > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in > the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and > given forever (Polotova & > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jul 24 21:52:33 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 13:52:33 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55b28ae8.8758460a.137dc.ffff9e71@mx.google.com> References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55b28ae8.8758460a.137dc.ffff9e71@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, Manfred: My claim goes with Andy's--he wants to organize a little colloquium where the sociologist and the psychologist are each put right by the social theories. I am inviting linguists too--I think that linguists actually provide the practical means by which the social becomes psychological and vice versa. Andy wanted to point out how grossly inadequate Leontiev's social theory was. I would like to add that his theory of language is (as a consequence, actually) grossly inadequate as well. Much of Thinking and Speech is devoted to showing that learning the names of objects is not the same thing as learning language; the power of language does not lie in its ability to signify objects or even percepts but rather in its ability to realize meanings (Vygotsky says "signifying" as opposed to "nominative" or "indicative" function). Meanings aren't things that you see; in fact, if we have to relate them to things we see at all, we might start by saying that the meanings are precisely the things you don't see. David Kellogg On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 3:37 AM, wrote: > David [and Andy] and others interested in this topic. I am trying to get > clear on the question of the "starting" point/place. David wrote: > > > sense is actually primary, not signification. Signification > emerges, in the life of the child and for all we know in the life of > primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than > sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of > signification. > > > THIS sense before THAT generalization. > > > David, you are making a claim that Andy starts from a place of > generalization. ALL signification is generalization. Your claim is THAT > THIS occurs after "sense". > > > SO the question becomes the relation of sense AND signification. [this and > that]. Categories such AS the psychological category do or do not emerge > FROM activating signification. > > > Is this relation the question? Apologies if I misunderstand > > > > Sent from Windows Mail > > > > > > From: David Kellogg > Sent: ?Friday?, ?July? ?24?, ?2015 ?10?:?03? ?AM we know in the life of > primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than > sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of > signification. > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > I think that the theory of language described here is really on a par with > the Social Theory that Andy described--that is, Neanderthal. But even the > Neanderthals, at least according to N.Y. Marr, and Volosinov, and Vygotsky > knew that sense is actually primary, not signification. Signification > emerges, in the life of the child and for all we know in the life of > primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than > sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of > signification. That is why Voloshinov says that if there were a language > that consisted of a single word (e.g. childly language) it would have sense > and not signification. > > Whenever someone tries to justify the Leontievian idea that sense is a > psychological category that emerges from the activation of signification in > social contexts, and that it is underwritten by perception, they always use > examples like "dog". But a much more appropriate example would be "this", > since this is very often the child's first word in English. Since the sense > of "this" changes with almost every single use, it's quite impossible to > see how it might emerge from a correspondence to perceptual categories. > "This", "that", "those", "there", and "then" (as well as their > interrogative forms, "which", "what", "whose", "where" and "when") may or > may not correspond to perceptions; they certainly don't correspond to any > perceptual categories. > > What kind of perception or experience corresponds to "If you are thirsty, > there's some beer in the fridge"? Does it correspond to the the experience > that every time I am thirsty beer appears in the fridge by magic? > > David Kellogg > > On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 11:51 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: > > > Thank you Manfred, > > > > Well said and well explained. > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > > Holodynski, Manfred > > Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM > > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Hi Andy, > > with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation of A > > N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective > meaning. > > As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the > > relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a > part > > or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), but a > > psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal signs and > > their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her socially > embedded > > activity. > > What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the personal > > sense of those involved. The personal sense that an individual assigns to > > interactions, facts, and experiences through the use of signs can be > > conceptualized not as a subset of societal meanings but as a particular > > sphere of mind that is constituted by two psychological factors in > > particular (a) the relation to the motives of the person, and (b) the > > relation to the situated and sensorially mediated experiences of the > > individual within the process of internalization. > > a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings during > > social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use them in > the > > light of their actually elicited motives along with the motives they > assign > > to the interaction partner. The societal meaning of the used signs does > not > > have to match the individually assigned personal sense. For example, an > > outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a low-ranking bank > > employee toward his superior as an inexcusable violation of social > > etiquette. However, for the menial employee, it may well be a reassertion > > of self-esteem in response to a humiliating directive. > > b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the situatedness > > and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which the use of > signs > > is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded primarily not by > > propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or ?wide-open eyes > signal > > fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated > > perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). > For > > example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree on the same > > definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, however, will be > > situated very differently and enriched with other sensory perceptions > when > > one person grew up with a very likeable family dog and the other person > > experienced a highly dramatic episode with an overpoweringly large and > > aggressive dog. > > Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are > subject > > to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination that more > or > > less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of personal > sense. > > People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can > > construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend on > > the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want to > > communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social > interactions. > > By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become > aware > > of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used signs, > but > > also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in order to > express > > this personal relations. So, this is the overall tension between > objective > > meaning of an event or an object and its personal sense for a specific > > person. > > Best > > Manfred > > > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische > > Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > > D-48149 M?nster > > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > > Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= > uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 > > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to > take > > it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to the > > question about subjectivism and objectivism. > > When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N Leontyev > > was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that that was odd, > > because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So there you are! > > Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and yet I > > want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim does seem > > anomalous. > > > > What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting > > contradictions between the "subjective sense" > > and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. the > > individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the capriciousness > of > > the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the child mind. This is > > hardly objectionable in the domain of child development, but in the > domain > > of social theory it is a Neanderthal position. Social life is made up of > a > > multiplicity of standpoints among which none have the right to claim > > unproblematic "objective truth" > > for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving too > > much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but > people's > > intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" which are > > preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's approach as a > > kind of social behaviourist approach in which change occurs only thanks > to > > "contradictions" at different levels in the "system." My aim in proposing > > to see the "system" as a "project" at one or another phase in its life > > cycle aims to restore the purposiveness of human action to Activity > Theory. > > The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a > > challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. > > > > I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" though > I > > know nothing at all of his work. > > > > The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that > > though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 > different > > meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best position to > answer > > this question, and I look forward to his answer. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Andy/Lubomir-- > > > > > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > > > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > > > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > > > everything to the object. > > > > > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > > > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > > > > > Or? > > > > > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > > > Mike > > > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > > > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint mediated > > > activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty sure that > > > not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the richness of > > > the discussion. > > > > > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > > > Mike > > > > > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > > > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > > > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > > > which give everything to the Object. > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > > > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > > > of the subject. > > > > > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > > > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > > > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > > > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > > > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > > > > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > > > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > > > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > > > > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > > > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > > > outmoded humanism. > > > > > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > ; Andy Blunden > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > > > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > > > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > > > be approached in many different ways. > > > > > > It is true that the relationship between the > > > object and the subject caries the > > > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > > > type of relationship might has several aspects and > > > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > > > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > > > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > > > > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > > > several levels with distinctive teleological > > > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > > > > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > > > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > > > do that and in most cases I got the famous > > > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > > > language texts where the authors evidently use > > > that version of activity theory. The three > > > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > > > > > Lubomir > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > > > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > > > very much in line with the notion of > > > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > > > > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > > > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > > > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > > > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > > > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > > > mean here? > > > Thanks again for a very informative post, > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > > > to some > > > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > > > different versions of Activity Theory involved > > > here plus > > > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > > > that have > > > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > > > using the > > > word "object" in a different way, all of them > > > legitimate > > > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > > > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > > > will invent > > > some different terms. > > > > > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > > > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > > > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > > > be a nail > > > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > > > man with a > > > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > > > Engestrom > > > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > > > side of the > > > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > > > has been > > > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > > > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > > > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > > > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > > > of the > > > triangle. > > > > > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > > > purpose > > > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > > > motive" is > > > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > > > OBJECT. > > > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > > > talks about > > > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > > > complex notion, > > > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > > > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > > > as such. > > > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > > > this is what > > > is motivating all the members of the design team > > > when they > > > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > > > of the > > > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > > > the wood > > > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > > > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > > > change in > > > the course of collaboration and in the End an > > > OBJECT Is > > > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > > > collaboration, to use > > > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > > > > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > > > everyone > > > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > > > with Outcome > > > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > > > the object > > > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > > > clearly in > > > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > > > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > > > problem carried within it alone which motivates > > > action, but > > > *the concept the subject makes of the > > > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > > > > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > > > Lubomir astutely > > > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > > > collaboration > > > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > > > is, in > > > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > > > naively > > > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > > > And Leigh > > > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > > > Instruments are in fact residues of past > > > collaborations > > > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > > > realised OBJECTs > > > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > > > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > > > > > But it seems that other have grasped the > > > postmodern critique > > > elements of this idea, that apparently > > > ideologically neutral > > > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > > > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > > > things, or > > > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > > > "systems of > > > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > > > Boundary > > > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > > > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > > > > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > > > Boundary Object > > > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > > > two "systems > > > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > > > cooperation > > > but rather the conflict within the broader > > > collaboration. > > > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > > > deliberate and > > > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > > > obJECT > > > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > > > rendered as > > > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > > > strand of > > > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > > > Foucault's > > > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > > > > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > > > Object, > > > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > > > situation is > > > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > > > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > > > distinction between object and tool in activity > > > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > > > were aware through the process, that what we > > > describe in the paper has to do with how the > > > object of design emerged and developed for the > > > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > > > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > > > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > > > lack of a historical account of the object that > > > goes over and above the particular instances > > > analyzed. Although we provide with some > > > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > > > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > > > is grounded on concrete events and their > > > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > > > distinction between object and means because it > > > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > > > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > > > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > > > in the meetings, it was in and through the > > > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > > > between means and object have added to our > > > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > > > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > > > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > > > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > > > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > > > contribution). > > > > > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > > > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > > > what we said when introducing the paper for > > > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > > > outside any particular framework and think, as we > > > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > > > sources. These included cultural historical > > > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > > > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > > > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > > > topic in this discussion were in the background > > > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > > > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > > > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > > > our best to keep internal coherence between what > > > we said about the data, and what the data was > > > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > > > to this. > > > > > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > > > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > > > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > > > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > > > places to be asking those questions. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > > > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > > > article. It is a great example of an > > > interpretativist approach to everyday life > > > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > > > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > > > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > > > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > > > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > > > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > > > decades; still other people might look for > > > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > > > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > > > template or categorize your methodology -- just > > > raising a question about its connection to > > > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > > > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > > > certain things for myself. > > > > > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > > > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > > > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > > > gain when we infuse new methodological, > > > epistemological, and ontological realities into > > > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > > > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > > > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > > > methodology.) Do we need to call something > > > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > > > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > > > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > > > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > > > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > > > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > > > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > > > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > > > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > > > they will "change hands" and will change their > > > particular discourse affiliation and will become > > > completely different components of a completely > > > different discourse. Mostly because the > > > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > > > the concepts are very different despite of the > > > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > > > ideas. > > > > > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > > > understand better what is going on in the realm of > > > CHAT. > > > > > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > > > > > Lubomir > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > > > Andy, all, > > > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > > > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > > > very interesting. I have particular interest in > > > the difference that they point out between > > > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > > > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > > > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > > > distinction while writing our own paper. We > > > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > > > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > > > floor plan, performances of being in the room > > > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > > > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > > > become the object of the designers' activity. > > > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > > > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > > > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > > > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > > > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > > > narratives about being there. That was the > > > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > > > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > > > connections to notions of object of activity and > > > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > > > away from the focus on body and experience. We > > > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > > > differentiate between object of design, the design > > > thing that work delivers, and the object's > > > constituents (or means of presentation before the > > > design thing is finished). > > > > > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > > > the picture, we could discuss the history of > > > development of these relations between the > > > different forms of presentations of the museum > > > means towards the object without necessarily > > > articulating the differences between the two. One > > > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > > > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > > > about materials in themselves, but about > > > consequences in action. From the point of view of > > > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > > > space as object of design was an issue in and > > > through the working with some material, some form > > > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > > > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > > > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > > > get out of making the distinction between object > > > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > > > should perhaps read more carefully their study > > > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > > > Any thoughts? > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > > > play some > > > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > > > probably a > > > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > > > role, too, and > > > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > > > object into > > > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > > > collaboration. > > > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > > > as Queer, are > > > > embraced by a despised group who take > > > control of the > > > > word and assertively embrace it; > > > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > > > deployed their > > > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > > > magnificant effect; > > > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > > > a weapon > > > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > > > (ISIS flee before > > > > them rather than in shame); > > > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > > > stamp which > > > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > > > against them by > > > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > > > newspaper and > > > > obliging workers to club together in groups > > > to buy and > > > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > > > organising tool; > > > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > > > Territory / > > > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > > > a shared > > > > object (the land); > > > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > > > weapon and tool > > > > for Indian independence and > > > self-sufficiency, raising it > > > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > > > technology to a > > > > symbol of India. > > > > > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > > > in mind when > > > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > > > ideological construction placed upon an object > > > is subject to > > > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > > > of an > > > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > > > subjectivity. > > > > > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > > > that in these > > > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > > > symbols according > > > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > > > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > > > boundary objects. What about video? > > > >> Henry > > > >> > > > >> > > > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > > > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > > > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > > > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > > > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > > > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > > > >>> Thanks Rolf! > > > >>> Andy > > > >>> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > > > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > > > they support the coordination of therapy > > > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > > > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > > > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > > > identification of what may or may not be a > > > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > > > question is > > > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > > > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > > > showing > > > >>>> photographs of far away places and > > > explaining how > > > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > > > interpretation of > > > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > > > >>>> man-of-the-world. > > > >>>> Does that make better sense? > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > > > social theory > > > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > > > objects." It > > > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > > > introduce some > > > >>>> social theory into domains of > > > activity (scientific > > > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > > > where the > > > >>>> participants naively think they are > > > collaborating > > > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > > > granularity, > > > >>>> but also the ideological context. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > > > home care workers > > > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > > > according to rules > > > >>>> and regulations, communications > > > resources, > > > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > > > in the > > > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > > > apparently > > > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > > > case that here it > > > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > > > etc., which are > > > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > > > Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jul 24 22:02:39 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 14:02:39 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833731@zivexdag3.wwu.de> References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833731@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Message-ID: Dear Manfred: I think that Leontiev and Vygotsky disagreed, and they disagreed fundamentally. For Leontiev, language use is essentially ancillary; that is, it is there to help along material processes (perception in the child and labor in the adult) which would function without language. A rose is a rose by any other name, and in fact a rose is a rose without any name at all. For Vygotsky language use is not ancillary at all. This is because the specifically human functions--the things that make language into language and the things that make human beings into truly human beings--are actually produced by language itself (verbal thinking, social thinking, culture, higher psychological processes, whatever we wish to call them). A name is a name without a rose. Child language isn't brought into being through perception; animals do perception pretty well, and they never develop language. It would be much truer to say that it is brought into being through gesture, or that it arises alongside gesture. This is certainly true ontogenetically, and it is probably just as true sociogenetically (although there isn't really any way to know this). Meaning, in the sense of "intending" is primary not perception. A name is not a name until the child intends to name the rose. David Kellogg On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 4:16 AM, Holodynski, Manfred < manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de> wrote: > Hi David, > may be you misunderstood my claim. That is what I said that a person has > to use signs with their objective meaning in order to express his sense and > to realize and satisfy his motives. So, sense doesn't emerge from > signification - that is what I tried to say - and I also understand > Leontyev in this way. > Also, the first words of children are related to a perception. Also first > words such as "this" are related to a common situation or object that child > and caregiver share and the meaning of this may be "look at this and share > it with me" as a kind of joint attention between child and caregiver. Of > course, the word "this" or "da" is related to different objects in > different situations, but in socially shared situations where the referent > of "this" is clear to both. What is "Neanderthal" of this explanation? The > argument that speech can go far beyond perceptions, ok, this is obvious, > but this is not the starting point of speech development. So, what is your > point? > Best > Manfred > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > Fliednerstr. 21 > D-48149 M?nster > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] > Im Auftrag von David Kellogg > Gesendet: Freitag, 24. Juli 2015 19:03 > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I think that the theory of language described here is really on a par with > the Social Theory that Andy described--that is, Neanderthal. But even the > Neanderthals, at least according to N.Y. Marr, and Volosinov, and Vygotsky > knew that sense is actually primary, not signification. Signification > emerges, in the life of the child and for all we know in the life of > primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than > sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of > signification. That is why Voloshinov says that if there were a language > that consisted of a single word (e.g. childly language) it would have sense > and not signification. > > Whenever someone tries to justify the Leontievian idea that sense is a > psychological category that emerges from the activation of signification in > social contexts, and that it is underwritten by perception, they always use > examples like "dog". But a much more appropriate example would be "this", > since this is very often the child's first word in English. Since the sense > of "this" changes with almost every single use, it's quite impossible to > see how it might emerge from a correspondence to perceptual categories. > "This", "that", "those", "there", and "then" (as well as their > interrogative forms, "which", "what", "whose", "where" and "when") may or > may not correspond to perceptions; they certainly don't correspond to any > perceptual categories. > > What kind of perception or experience corresponds to "If you are thirsty, > there's some beer in the fridge"? Does it correspond to the the experience > that every time I am thirsty beer appears in the fridge by magic? > > David Kellogg > > On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 11:51 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: > > > Thank you Manfred, > > > > Well said and well explained. > > > > Lubomir > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > > Holodynski, Manfred > > Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM > > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > Hi Andy, > > with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation > > of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective > meaning. > > As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the > > relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a > > part or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), > > but a psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal > > signs and their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her > > socially embedded activity. > > What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the > > personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an > > individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through the > > use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal > > meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two > > psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the motives of > > the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and sensorially > > mediated experiences of the individual within the process of > internalization. > > a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings > > during social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use > > them in the light of their actually elicited motives along with the > > motives they assign to the interaction partner. The societal meaning > > of the used signs does not have to match the individually assigned > > personal sense. For example, an outsider may well interpret a public > > fit of rage by a low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an > > inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for the menial > > employee, it may well be a reassertion of self-esteem in response to a > humiliating directive. > > b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the > > situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which > > the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded > > primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or > > ?wide-open eyes signal > > fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated > > perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, > > 1978). For example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree > > on the same definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, > > however, will be situated very differently and enriched with other > > sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very likeable > > family dog and the other person experienced a highly dramatic episode > > with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. > > Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are > > subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination > > that more or less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of > personal sense. > > People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can > > construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend > > on the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want > > to communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social > interactions. > > By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become > > aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used > > signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in > > order to express this personal relations. So, this is the overall > > tension between objective meaning of an event or an object and its > > personal sense for a specific person. > > Best > > Manfred > > > > Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > > Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische > > Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > > D-48149 M?nster > > +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > > +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > > +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.htm > > l > > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > > > -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > > Von: > > xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd > > .edu] > > Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden > > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 > > An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker > > Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to > > take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to > > the question about subjectivism and objectivism. > > When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N > > Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that > > that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So > there you are! > > Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and > > yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim > > does seem anomalous. > > > > What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting > > contradictions between the "subjective sense" > > and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. > > the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the > > capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the > > child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child > > development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal > > position. Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints > > among which none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" > > for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving > > too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but > > people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" > > which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's > > approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change > > occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different levels in the > > "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a "project" at > > one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness > of human action to Activity Theory. > > The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a > > challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. > > > > I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" > > though I know nothing at all of his work. > > > > The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that > > though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 > > different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best > > position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Andy/Lubomir-- > > > > > > I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. > > > But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the > > > subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give > > > everything to the object. > > > > > > Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' > > > conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? > > > > > > Or? > > > > > > What is at stake here theoretically and practically? > > > Mike > > > PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of > > > boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint > > > mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty > > > sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the > > > richness of the discussion. > > > > > > It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? > > > Mike > > > > > > On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > > > That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a > > > humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, > > > structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory > > > which give everything to the Object. > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > > Here is a quote from the introduction of "The > > > Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic > > > of the subject. > > > > > > "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early > > > 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and > > > "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more > > > than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE > > > conceiving of processes without subjects." > > > > > > This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw > > > the failure of phenomenology and the residual > > > links between subjectivism and anthropology. > > > > > > The force of Foucault's argument was tying the > > > philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an > > > outmoded humanism. > > > > > > It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > From: Lubomir Savov Popov > > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > ; Andy Blunden > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > > > The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and > > > the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on > > > the motive and purpose of activity, the object can > > > be approached in many different ways. > > > > > > It is true that the relationship between the > > > object and the subject caries the > > > purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This > > > type of relationship might has several aspects and > > > the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, > > > in AT, the teleological aspect is central one > > > among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. > > > > > > The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at > > > several levels with distinctive teleological > > > phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. > > > > > > It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure > > > of activity with its three levels. I just tried to > > > do that and in most cases I got the famous > > > "triangle." The internet is dominated by English > > > language texts where the authors evidently use > > > that version of activity theory. The three > > > structural levels of activity might be found in t > > > > > > Lubomir > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! > > > I see that our treatment of object in the paper is > > > very much in line with the notion of > > > Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. > > > > > > I have many questions, most of which I should find > > > in the literature rather than bother here. But I > > > would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote > > > that the object "carries in itself the purpose and > > > motive of the activity." What does "in itself" > > > mean here? > > > Thanks again for a very informative post, > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > If I could try to do my thing and draw attention > > > to some > > > distinctions in this field ... we have at least three > > > different versions of Activity Theory involved > > > here plus > > > Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories > > > that have > > > spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is > > > using the > > > word "object" in a different way, all of them > > > legitimate > > > uses of the English word, but all indexing different > > > concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I > > > will invent > > > some different terms. > > > > > > The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of > > > labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the > > > blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may > > > be a nail > > > to a man with a hammer and waste material for a > > > man with a > > > broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. > > > Engestrom > > > use the word "Object" in the middle of the left > > > side of the > > > triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it > > > has been > > > worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the > > > blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now > > > "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or > > > explicit, these are respectively the base and apex > > > of the > > > triangle. > > > > > > Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the > > > purpose > > > and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or > > > motive" is > > > not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the > > > OBJECT. > > > This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he > > > talks about > > > "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a > > > complex notion, > > > because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the > > > subject(s); it is not a material thing or process > > > as such. > > > Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But > > > this is what > > > is motivating all the members of the design team > > > when they > > > sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one > > > of the > > > team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into > > > the wood > > > and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the > > > Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs > > > change in > > > the course of collaboration and in the End an > > > OBJECT Is > > > *realised* which is the "truth" of the > > > collaboration, to use > > > Hegel's apt terminology here. > > > > > > Surely it is important to recognise that while > > > everyone > > > shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up > > > with Outcome > > > as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe > > > the object > > > differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so > > > clearly in > > > Thinking and Speech. It is not the > > > Arbeitsgegenstand or some > > > problem carried within it alone which motivates > > > action, but > > > *the concept the subject makes of the > > > Arbeitsgegenstand*! > > > > > > Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as > > > Lubomir astutely > > > notices) postmodern ideology critique to the > > > collaboration > > > within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that > > > is, in > > > Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are > > > naively > > > supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. > > > And Leigh > > > Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and > > > Instruments are in fact residues of past > > > collaborations > > > which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., > > > realised OBJECTs > > > of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, > > > now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. > > > > > > But it seems that other have grasped the > > > postmodern critique > > > elements of this idea, that apparently > > > ideologically neutral > > > obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed > > > entities, usually far more than OBJects - as > > > things, or > > > artefacts, including institutions - fossilised > > > "systems of > > > activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a > > > Boundary > > > Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same > > > concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. > > > > > > But what Engestrom has done, by placing the > > > Boundary Object > > > in the place of Object on his triangle, joining > > > two "systems > > > of activity," for the purpose of looking not at > > > cooperation > > > but rather the conflict within the broader > > > collaboration. > > > The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is > > > deliberate and > > > aimed to change the relation between Subject and > > > obJECT > > > (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually > > > rendered as > > > "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different > > > strand of > > > postmodern critique into the equation, namely > > > Foucault's > > > Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. > > > > > > OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary > > > Object, > > > OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the > > > situation is > > > almost as bad in Russian and German, > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. > > > > > > > > To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I > > > wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the > > > distinction between object and tool in activity > > > theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we > > > were aware through the process, that what we > > > describe in the paper has to do with how the > > > object of design emerged and developed for the > > > team in and as they were dealing with, developing, > > > and resorting to particular means or tools. But I > > > guess we could say that in our analyses there is a > > > lack of a historical account of the object that > > > goes over and above the particular instances > > > analyzed. Although we provide with some > > > ethnographic contextualization of the team's > > > developmental trajectories, all of our discussion > > > is grounded on concrete events and their > > > transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the > > > distinction between object and means because it > > > seemed to be the same thing in the there and then > > > of the episodes analyzed, at least in what > > > participants' orientations concerned. If they ori > > > > ented towards anything beyond what was there > > > in the meetings, it was in and through the > > > meetings' means. How would then the distinction > > > between means and object have added to our > > > understanding of the events? (And this is not to > > > doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, > > > I really mean to ask this question for the purpose > > > of growing and expanding; and as said before, part > > > of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. > > > contribution). > > > > > > > > As to how we would position our contribution > > > with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate > > > what we said when introducing the paper for > > > discussion: we begun with the purpose of working > > > outside any particular framework and think, as we > > > think Star did, broadly, drawing from several > > > sources. These included cultural historical > > > psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse > > > analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in > > > the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the > > > topic in this discussion were in the background > > > all the time, but we did not operationalize them > > > in terms of any particular theory. This is not to > > > say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried > > > our best to keep internal coherence between what > > > we said about the data, and what the data was > > > exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add > > > to this. > > > > > > > > I think the questions you are rising about > > > activity theory are very much in the spirit of > > > what I am after, and I am not the best to answer > > > them; but this xmca list may be one of the best > > > places to be asking those questions. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov > > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > > > Dear Alfredo and Rolf, > > > > > > > > There are also a few other things that I would > > > like to bring to this discussion. > > > > > > > > First, you have a wonderful project and a great > > > article. It is a great example of an > > > interpretativist approach to everyday life > > > phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It > > > is all about our minds, culture, and activity. > > > > > > > > However, how is your approach related to classic > > > Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is > > > a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might > > > say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that > > > emerge right now or have emerged in the last > > > decades; still other people might look for > > > connections to ethnomethodology, discourse > > > analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a > > > template or categorize your methodology -- just > > > raising a question about its connection to > > > Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that > > > this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify > > > certain things for myself. > > > > > > > > For example: What are the limits and boundaries > > > of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity > > > Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we > > > gain when we infuse new methodological, > > > epistemological, and ontological realities into > > > Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the > > > threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? > > > (I mean here Activity Theory as research > > > methodology.) Do we need to call something > > > Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new > > > approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need > > > to call it Activity Theory? > > > > > > > > Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, > > > Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your > > > paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses > > > and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and > > > Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can > > > borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but > > > after we assimilate them for use in our project, > > > they will "change hands" and will change their > > > particular discourse affiliation and will become > > > completely different components of a completely > > > different discourse. Mostly because the > > > epistemologies and ontologies are different; and > > > the concepts are very different despite of the > > > similarities in ideas and words used to name these > > > ideas. > > > > > > > > Just a few questions that I hope will help me > > > understand better what is going on in the realm of > > > CHAT. > > > > > > > > Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, > > > > > > > > Lubomir > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > > > Andy, all, > > > > I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and > > > cols. contribution to the special issue, which is > > > very interesting. I have particular interest in > > > the difference that they point out between > > > boundary object on the one hand, and object and > > > instrumentality as different aspects of activity > > > theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this > > > distinction while writing our own paper. We > > > noticed that the museum space, through multiple > > > forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a > > > floor plan, performances of being in the room > > > while not being there, etc), was a means, an > > > instrument for achieving a final design product. > > > > > > > > At the same time, the museum space begun to > > > become the object of the designers' activity. > > > Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the > > > partners had multiple, sometimes opposite > > > interests, what seemed to be a common object for > > > all them was the museum as place. Thus, most > > > representations of it begun to be made in terms of > > > narratives about being there. That was the > > > orientation that seemed to stick them together. > > > > > > > > Thus, the museum space was both object and > > > instrument. We wondered whether we should do > > > connections to notions of object of activity and > > > tools, but we felt that that road would take us > > > away from the focus on body and experience. We > > > ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who > > > differentiate between object of design, the design > > > thing that work delivers, and the object's > > > constituents (or means of presentation before the > > > design thing is finished). > > > > > > > > When bringing the notion of boundary object into > > > the picture, we could discuss the history of > > > development of these relations between the > > > different forms of presentations of the museum > > > means towards the object without necessarily > > > articulating the differences between the two. One > > > advantage was that boundary objects focus on the > > > materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not > > > about materials in themselves, but about > > > consequences in action. From the point of view of > > > the persons implicated in the process, the museum > > > space as object of design was an issue in and > > > through the working with some material, some form > > > of presenting it or changing it. Both object and > > > instrument seemed to be moments of a same > > > experience. But I still want to learn what we may > > > get out of making the distinction between object > > > and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I > > > should perhaps read more carefully their study > > > rather than be here thinking aloud). > > > > Any thoughts? > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > > Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > > Objects > > > > > > > > Henry, anything. But the point is objects which > > > play some > > > > role in mediating the relation between subjects, > > > probably a > > > > symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental > > > role, too, and > > > > one subject challenges that role and turns the > > > object into > > > > its opposite, and changes the terms of > > > collaboration. > > > > A number of examples spring to mind. > > > > > > > > * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such > > > as Queer, are > > > > embraced by a despised group who take > > > control of the > > > > word and assertively embrace it; > > > > * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who > > > deployed their > > > > stereotype as housewives and mothers to > > > magnificant effect; > > > > * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into > > > a weapon > > > > against them by Kurdish women fighters > > > (ISIS flee before > > > > them rather than in shame); > > > > * The Chartists who turned the British govt's > > > stamp which > > > > put newspapers out of reach of workers > > > against them by > > > > printing the Northern Star as a stamped > > > newspaper and > > > > obliging workers to club together in groups > > > to buy and > > > > read it, thus making the paper into a glorious > > > > organising tool; > > > > * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied > > > Territory / > > > > Israel is the struggle over the meaning of > > > a shared > > > > object (the land); > > > > * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a > > > weapon and tool > > > > for Indian independence and > > > self-sufficiency, raising it > > > > from the status of obsolete and inferior > > > technology to a > > > > symbol of India. > > > > > > > > In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had > > > in mind when > > > > she introduced the term, but core point is that the > > > > ideological construction placed upon an object > > > is subject to > > > > contestation, and if successful, the re-marking > > > of an > > > > artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to > > > subjectivity. > > > > > > > > Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a > > > > mediating artefact or the object of work > > > > (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is > > > that in these > > > > cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or > > > symbols according > > > > to context. In principle it is not the Object in the > > > > Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, > > > >> I got to thinking about the photographs as > > > boundary objects. What about video? > > > >> Henry > > > >> > > > >> > > > >>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to > > > see that it was the photographs that Thomas was > > > endeavouring to turn to use to recover his > > > humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was > > > using the idea in relation to the subsistence > > > farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. > > > >>> Thanks Rolf! > > > >>> Andy > > > >>> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > >>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also > > > interpret the photographs as boundary objects as > > > they support the coordination of therapy > > > activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think > > > it depends on the aspect of activity one is > > > attempting to explore as opposed to the definite > > > identification of what may or may not be a > > > boundary object. This is only my opinion though! > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in > > > question is > > > >>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an > > > >>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by > > > showing > > > >>>> photographs of far away places and > > > explaining how > > > >>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an > > > interpretation of > > > >>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences > > > >>>> man-of-the-world. > > > >>>> Does that make better sense? > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in > > > social theory > > > >>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary > > > objects." It > > > >>>> seems to me that what BOs do is > > > introduce some > > > >>>> social theory into domains of > > > activity (scientific > > > >>>> and work collaborations for example) > > > where the > > > >>>> participants naively think they are > > > collaborating > > > >>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just > > > granularity, > > > >>>> but also the ideological context. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the > > > home care workers > > > >>>> collaborate with the old couple > > > according to rules > > > >>>> and regulations, communications > > > resources, > > > >>>> technology, finance and so on, which > > > in the > > > >>>> unnamed country, the old couple are > > > apparently > > > >>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the > > > case that here it > > > >>>> is those rules and regulations, > > > etc., which are > > > >>>> the "boundary objects"? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 > > > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > > > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & > > > Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ritva.engestrom@helsinki.fi Sat Jul 25 02:53:01 2015 From: ritva.engestrom@helsinki.fi (=?utf-8?Q?Ritva_Engestr=C3=B6m?=) Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 12:53:01 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55ACD4C4.704@mira.net> <55ACEDA4.70500@mira.net> <55ACF740.50004@mira.net> <55ACFC7F.30904@mira.net> <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833731@zivexdag3.wwu.de> Message-ID: Hi all, although the discussion has taken some other theoretical threads, I like to thank still Alfredo and Rolf for the meaningful and refined article on a boundary object. I agree very much to the solution in the article to start the analysis by differentiating ?the object of design? from ?the object or ?thing? that is handed over at the end of the design process?; the former addressing situated processes in which ?the designers? relation with their object of design? is observable and available for analyses. In terms of object-oriented AT (as I see it), I would designate these different kinds of object as related to the first order activity (?develop technology-enhanced solutions for the design and redesign of museum exhibitions?) and the second order activity that does interactive, epistemic, performative, reflective etc. function and is materialized in collaborative emergent processes while working jointly on the object of the first order activity. A good reason to emphasize this distinction is that today?s complexity is not only a feature of the systems in society, but it is also concerned with the way in which we generate and organize our thinking about those systems and their phenomena. Thus, the article reminds us about co-evolution processes of knowledge production (inter- and multidisciplinary collaboration) and society. The above distinction holds methodologically the objects (activities) as unity but allows a variety of logic of empirical methods depending on the interest of the study (such as the importance of the living body). The research focus on the second order activity highlights also the importance of a dialogical approach which guides us to study object in subject-relation (e.g. Bakhtin, Markov?). The objects are, then, reflexively constituted, being outside and inside at the same time. The next question would be how to incorporate values to the object?s constituents, always present in sciences, and particularly in developmental or intervention research. The examination of the concept of imagination by Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis may include some interesting discussion (?Standpoint theory, situated knowledge and the situated imagination?, Feminist Theory 2002, vol. 3(3). Ritva Engestr?m University of Helsinki > David Kellogg > kirjoitti 25.7.2015 kello 8.02: > > Dear Manfred: > > I think that Leontiev and Vygotsky disagreed, and they disagreed > fundamentally. For Leontiev, language use is essentially ancillary; that > is, it is there to help along material processes (perception in the child > and labor in the adult) which would function without language. A rose is a > rose by any other name, and in fact a rose is a rose without any name at > all. > > For Vygotsky language use is not ancillary at all. This is because the > specifically human functions--the things that make language into language > and the things that make human beings into truly human beings--are actually > produced by language itself (verbal thinking, social thinking, culture, > higher psychological processes, whatever we wish to call them). A name is a > name without a rose. > > Child language isn't brought into being through perception; animals do > perception pretty well, and they never develop language. It would be much > truer to say that it is brought into being through gesture, or that it > arises alongside gesture. This is certainly true ontogenetically, and it is > probably just as true sociogenetically (although there isn't really any way > to know this). Meaning, in the sense of "intending" is primary not > perception. A name is not a name until the child intends to name the rose. > > David Kellogg > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 4:16 AM, Holodynski, Manfred < > manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > wrote: > >> Hi David, >> may be you misunderstood my claim. That is what I said that a person has >> to use signs with their objective meaning in order to express his sense and >> to realize and satisfy his motives. So, sense doesn't emerge from >> signification - that is what I tried to say - and I also understand >> Leontyev in this way. >> Also, the first words of children are related to a perception. Also first >> words such as "this" are related to a common situation or object that child >> and caregiver share and the meaning of this may be "look at this and share >> it with me" as a kind of joint attention between child and caregiver. Of >> course, the word "this" or "da" is related to different objects in >> different situations, but in socially shared situations where the referent >> of "this" is clear to both. What is "Neanderthal" of this explanation? The >> argument that speech can go far beyond perceptions, ok, this is obvious, >> but this is not the starting point of speech development. So, what is your >> point? >> Best >> Manfred >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster >> Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> >> >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> Im Auftrag von David Kellogg >> Gesendet: Freitag, 24. Juli 2015 19:03 >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >> >> I think that the theory of language described here is really on a par with >> the Social Theory that Andy described--that is, Neanderthal. But even the >> Neanderthals, at least according to N.Y. Marr, and Volosinov, and Vygotsky >> knew that sense is actually primary, not signification. Signification >> emerges, in the life of the child and for all we know in the life of >> primitive societies as well, as a generalization of sense, rather than >> sense emerging as a psychological category from the activation of >> signification. That is why Voloshinov says that if there were a language >> that consisted of a single word (e.g. childly language) it would have sense >> and not signification. >> >> Whenever someone tries to justify the Leontievian idea that sense is a >> psychological category that emerges from the activation of signification in >> social contexts, and that it is underwritten by perception, they always use >> examples like "dog". But a much more appropriate example would be "this", >> since this is very often the child's first word in English. Since the sense >> of "this" changes with almost every single use, it's quite impossible to >> see how it might emerge from a correspondence to perceptual categories. >> "This", "that", "those", "there", and "then" (as well as their >> interrogative forms, "which", "what", "whose", "where" and "when") may or >> may not correspond to perceptions; they certainly don't correspond to any >> perceptual categories. >> >> What kind of perception or experience corresponds to "If you are thirsty, >> there's some beer in the fridge"? Does it correspond to the the experience >> that every time I am thirsty beer appears in the fridge by magic? >> >> David Kellogg >> >> On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 11:51 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov >> wrote: >> >>> Thank you Manfred, >>> >>> Well said and well explained. >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Holodynski, Manfred >>> Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 8:37 AM >>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> Hi Andy, >>> with great interest, I follow the discussion and your interpretation >>> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between subjective sense and objective >> meaning. >>> As far as I interpret ANL he presented a very elegant solution of the >>> relation between sense and meaning: For ANL, subjective sense is not a >>> part or subset of objective meaning (as you seem to insinuate him), >>> but a psychological quality that emerges when a person uses societal >>> signs and their objective meanings in order to regulate his or her >>> socially embedded activity. >>> What happens is a transformation of societal meanings into the >>> personal sense of those involved. The personal sense that an >>> individual assigns to interactions, facts, and experiences through the >>> use of signs can be conceptualized not as a subset of societal >>> meanings but as a particular sphere of mind that is constituted by two >>> psychological factors in particular (a) the relation to the motives of >>> the person, and (b) the relation to the situated and sensorially >>> mediated experiences of the individual within the process of >> internalization. >>> a) People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings >>> during social interactions in an impartial way. They interpret and use >>> them in the light of their actually elicited motives along with the >>> motives they assign to the interaction partner. The societal meaning >>> of the used signs does not have to match the individually assigned >>> personal sense. For example, an outsider may well interpret a public >>> fit of rage by a low-ranking bank employee toward his superior as an >>> inexcusable violation of social etiquette. However, for the menial >>> employee, it may well be a reassertion of self-esteem in response to a >> humiliating directive. >>> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also determined by the >>> situatedness and sensory mediation of the previous encounters in which >>> the use of signs is (or was) embedded. Societal meanings are coded >>> primarily not by propositional phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a mammal? or >>> ?wide-open eyes signal >>> fear?) but through their ties to sensorially mediated and situated >>> perceptions?as complex as these interrelations may be (Leont?ev, >>> 1978). For example, two persons can use propositional phrases to agree >>> on the same definition of the term ?dog? or ?fear.? These terms, >>> however, will be situated very differently and enriched with other >>> sensory perceptions when one person grew up with a very likeable >>> family dog and the other person experienced a highly dramatic episode >>> with an overpoweringly large and aggressive dog. >>> Thus, conventionalized signs and the meanings assigned to them are >>> subject to an interpersonal process of interpretation and coordination >>> that more or less successfully supports the embodiment and expression of >> personal sense. >>> People do not have a private ?speech? at their disposal that they can >>> construct and use on their own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend >>> on the appropriation and use of conventionalized signs when they want >>> to communicate successfully and satisfy their motives in social >> interactions. >>> By an act of reflection, the person can try to realize and to become >>> aware of his personal relation and sense of the situation and the used >>> signs, but also this reflection has to fall back on societal signs in >>> order to express this personal relations. So, this is the overall >>> tension between objective meaning of an event or an object and its >>> personal sense for a specific person. >>> Best >>> Manfred >>> >>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >>> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung Westf?lische >>> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 >>> D-48149 M?nster >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) >>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.htm >>> l >>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >>> >>> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >>> Von: >>> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd >>> .edu] >>> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden >>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 >>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker >>> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would say in response to my post to >>> take it from there, Mike, but I will try to respond as best I can to >>> the question about subjectivism and objectivism. >>> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper that I thought that A N >>> Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, Morten Nissen remarked that >>> that was odd, because in Europe ATists thought he was too subjective. So >> there you are! >>> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a theory of Psychology, and >>> yet I want to use AT as a foundation for social theory, so my claim >>> does seem anomalous. >>> >>> What it comes down to is the insistence of ANL in interpreting >>> contradictions between the "subjective sense" >>> and the "objective meaning" of an activity in terms of the social vs. >>> the individual. This reduces subjectivity to a matter of the >>> capriciousness of the individual mind or the underdevelopment of the >>> child mind. This is hardly objectionable in the domain of child >>> development, but in the domain of social theory it is a Neanderthal >>> position. Social life is made up of a multiplicity of standpoints >>> among which none have the right to claim unproblematic "objective truth" >>> for themselves. This is the basis on which I describe ANL as giving >>> too much to the Object. Engestrom on the other hand, is different, but >>> people's intentions are relegated to "phenomenological investigation" >>> which are preliminary to the investigation itself. I see Engestrom's >>> approach as a kind of social behaviourist approach in which change >>> occurs only thanks to "contradictions" at different levels in the >>> "system." My aim in proposing to see the "system" as a "project" at >>> one or another phase in its life cycle aims to restore the purposiveness >> of human action to Activity Theory. >>> The interpretation of purposes and intentions in social science is a >>> challenge, but I believe that with the aid of Hegel it can be met. >>> >>> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare "All the the Subject!" >>> though I know nothing at all of his work. >>> >>> The problem with your question about Boundary Objects, Mike, is that >>> though I knew nothing of them a little while ago, I can now see 3 >>> different meanings of the term. So perhaps Geoffrey is in the best >>> position to answer this question, and I look forward to his answer. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> Andy/Lubomir-- >>>> >>>> I am overwhelmed by this thread so this's query may be badly timed. >>>> But .... I recall Lubomir writing that AT was centered on the >>>> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to Strands of AT theory that give >>>> everything to the object. >>>> >>>> Question-- isn't this a version of Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' >>>> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the problem of the environment? >>>> >>>> Or? >>>> >>>> What is at stake here theoretically and practically? >>>> Mike >>>> PS. I am still trying to absorb the multifaceted discussion of >>>> boundary object. I almost want to ask -- what forms of joint >>>> mediated activity do not involve boundary objects? But I am pretty >>>> sure that not knowing the answer to this question is a result of the >>>> richness of the discussion. >>>> >>>> It's fair to say that XMCA is a boundary object?? >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> That is exactly right, Larry, I am advocating a >>>> humanism, in opposition to poststructuralism, >>>> structuralism Marxism, and strands of Activity Theory >>>> which give everything to the Object. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>> >>>> Here is a quote from the introduction of "The >>>> Cambridge Handbook of Merleau-Ponty on the topic >>>> of the subject. >>>> >>>> "Foucault's archaeological studies of the early >>>> 1970's, most notably "The Order of Things" and >>>> "The Archaeology of Knowledge", did perhaps more >>>> than any other work of the period to LEGITIMIZE >>>> conceiving of processes without subjects." >>>> >>>> This is an "antihumanist" program as Foucault saw >>>> the failure of phenomenology and the residual >>>> links between subjectivism and anthropology. >>>> >>>> The force of Foucault's argument was tying the >>>> philosophy of the subject to what he saw as an >>>> outmoded humanism. >>>> >>>> It may be what Andy is highlighting is a new humanism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >>>> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> ; Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> >>>> Hi Alfredo, >>>> >>>> The object doesn't carry in itself the motive and >>>> the purpose of activity. Actually, depending on >>>> the motive and purpose of activity, the object can >>>> be approached in many different ways. >>>> >>>> It is true that the relationship between the >>>> object and the subject caries the >>>> purpose/goal/objective/motive of activity. This >>>> type of relationship might has several aspects and >>>> the teleological aspect is one of them. Actually, >>>> in AT, the teleological aspect is central one >>>> among all aspects of Subject-Object relationships. >>>> >>>> The teleological aspect in AT is envisaged at >>>> several levels with distinctive teleological >>>> phenomena: motivation, goal, etc. >>>> >>>> It is difficult to find diagrams of the structure >>>> of activity with its three levels. I just tried to >>>> do that and in most cases I got the famous >>>> "triangle." The internet is dominated by English >>>> language texts where the authors evidently use >>>> that version of activity theory. The three >>>> structural levels of activity might be found in t >>>> >>>> Lubomir >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:25 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> >>>> That was a very helpful entry, Andy. Thanks! >>>> I see that our treatment of object in the paper is >>>> very much in line with the notion of >>>> Arbeitsgegenstand as you describe it. >>>> >>>> I have many questions, most of which I should find >>>> in the literature rather than bother here. But I >>>> would like to ask one here. It concerns the quote >>>> that the object "carries in itself the purpose and >>>> motive of the activity." What does "in itself" >>>> mean here? >>>> Thanks again for a very informative post, >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>> >>>> If I could try to do my thing and draw attention >>>> to some >>>> distinctions in this field ... we have at least three >>>> different versions of Activity Theory involved >>>> here plus >>>> Leigh Star's theory and in addition the theories >>>> that have >>>> spun off from Leigh Star's initial idea. Each is >>>> using the >>>> word "object" in a different way, all of them >>>> legitimate >>>> uses of the English word, but all indexing different >>>> concepts. So for the sake of this discussion I >>>> will invent >>>> some different terms. >>>> >>>> The German word Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >>>> labour, the material which is to be worked upon, the >>>> blacksmith's iron. It is objective, in that if may >>>> be a nail >>>> to a man with a hammer and waste material for a >>>> man with a >>>> broom, but it is all the same Arbeitsgegenstand. >>>> Engestrom >>>> use the word "Object" in the middle of the left >>>> side of the >>>> triangle to mean Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it >>>> has been >>>> worked upon it becomes "Outcome." The hammer that the >>>> blacksmith uses is called "Instruments" or now >>>> "instrumentality," and the Rules, whether implicit or >>>> explicit, these are respectively the base and apex >>>> of the >>>> triangle. >>>> >>>> Engestrom says " The object carries in itself the >>>> purpose >>>> and motive of the activity." So this "purpose or >>>> motive" is >>>> not shown on the triangle, but I will call it the >>>> OBJECT. >>>> This is what Leontyev meant by "object" when he >>>> talks about >>>> "object-oriented activity." The OBJECT is a >>>> complex notion, >>>> because it is only *implicit* in the actions of the >>>> subject(s); it is not a material thing or process >>>> as such. >>>> Behaviourists would exclude it altogether. But >>>> this is what >>>> is motivating all the members of the design team >>>> when they >>>> sit down to collaborate with one another. Bone one >>>> of the >>>> team thinks the OBJECT is to drive the nail into >>>> the wood >>>> and another thinks the OBJECT is to sweep the >>>> Arbeitsgegenstand into the wastebin. These OBJECTs >>>> change in >>>> the course of collaboration and in the End an >>>> OBJECT Is >>>> *realised* which is the "truth" of the >>>> collaboration, to use >>>> Hegel's apt terminology here. >>>> >>>> Surely it is important to recognise that while >>>> everyone >>>> shares the same Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up >>>> with Outcome >>>> as the same OBJECT, along the road they construe >>>> the object >>>> differently. This is what Vygotsky showed so >>>> clearly in >>>> Thinking and Speech. It is not the >>>> Arbeitsgegenstand or some >>>> problem carried within it alone which motivates >>>> action, but >>>> *the concept the subject makes of the >>>> Arbeitsgegenstand*! >>>> >>>> Then Leigh Star comes along and applies (as >>>> Lubomir astutely >>>> notices) postmodern ideology critique to the >>>> collaboration >>>> within an ostensibly neutral infrastructure - that >>>> is, in >>>> Engestrom's terms Rules and Instruments, which are >>>> naively >>>> supposed to be there just to aid collaboration. >>>> And Leigh >>>> Star shows that this is an illusion; the Rules and >>>> Instruments are in fact residues of past >>>> collaborations >>>> which carry within them the Outcomes, i.e., >>>> realised OBJECTs >>>> of past collaborations. It is these one-time OBJECTs, >>>> now-Instruments+Rules which are the Boundary Objects. >>>> >>>> But it seems that other have grasped the >>>> postmodern critique >>>> elements of this idea, that apparently >>>> ideologically neutral >>>> obJects (in the expanded sense of socially constructed >>>> entities, usually far more than OBJects - as >>>> things, or >>>> artefacts, including institutions - fossilised >>>> "systems of >>>> activity") and recognised the shared OBJECT as a >>>> Boundary >>>> Object, reflecting the fact not everyone has the same >>>> concept of the OBJECT, as Vygotsky proved. >>>> >>>> But what Engestrom has done, by placing the >>>> Boundary Object >>>> in the place of Object on his triangle, joining >>>> two "systems >>>> of activity," for the purpose of looking not at >>>> cooperation >>>> but rather the conflict within the broader >>>> collaboration. >>>> The reconstrual of the Arbeitsgegenstand is >>>> deliberate and >>>> aimed to change the relation between Subject and >>>> obJECT >>>> (here referring to the Hegelian "Object" usually >>>> rendered as >>>> "the Other.") thereby introducing yet a different >>>> strand of >>>> postmodern critique into the equation, namely >>>> Foucault's >>>> Poststructuralism, to mind mind, with great effect. >>>> >>>> OK, so we have Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >>>> Object, >>>> OBject, obJECT and obJect. And I might say, the >>>> situation is >>>> almost as bad in Russian and German, >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>> Thanks a lot for your appreciation, Lubomir. >>>>> >>>>> To clarify my question in the previous e-mail, I >>>> wish to add that I am a bit familiar with the >>>> distinction between object and tool in activity >>>> theory, though not enough yet. I can see, and we >>>> were aware through the process, that what we >>>> describe in the paper has to do with how the >>>> object of design emerged and developed for the >>>> team in and as they were dealing with, developing, >>>> and resorting to particular means or tools. But I >>>> guess we could say that in our analyses there is a >>>> lack of a historical account of the object that >>>> goes over and above the particular instances >>>> analyzed. Although we provide with some >>>> ethnographic contextualization of the team's >>>> developmental trajectories, all of our discussion >>>> is grounded on concrete events and their >>>> transactional unfolding. We did not resort to the >>>> distinction between object and means because it >>>> seemed to be the same thing in the there and then >>>> of the episodes analyzed, at least in what >>>> participants' orientations concerned. If they ori >>>>> ented towards anything beyond what was there >>>> in the meetings, it was in and through the >>>> meetings' means. How would then the distinction >>>> between means and object have added to our >>>> understanding of the events? (And this is not to >>>> doubt of the contribution from such a distinction, >>>> I really mean to ask this question for the purpose >>>> of growing and expanding; and as said before, part >>>> of the answer may be found in Engestrom et al. >>>> contribution). >>>>> >>>>> As to how we would position our contribution >>>> with regard to activity theory, I would reiterate >>>> what we said when introducing the paper for >>>> discussion: we begun with the purpose of working >>>> outside any particular framework and think, as we >>>> think Star did, broadly, drawing from several >>>> sources. These included cultural historical >>>> psychology, ethnomethodology, and discourse >>>> analysis. But also the ideas about Experience (in >>>> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan sense) that have been the >>>> topic in this discussion were in the background >>>> all the time, but we did not operationalize them >>>> in terms of any particular theory. This is not to >>>> say that we went for the "anything goes;" we tried >>>> our best to keep internal coherence between what >>>> we said about the data, and what the data was >>>> exhibiting for us. Perhaps Rolf would like to add >>>> to this. >>>>> >>>>> I think the questions you are rising about >>>> activity theory are very much in the spirit of >>>> what I am after, and I am not the best to answer >>>> them; but this xmca list may be one of the best >>>> places to be asking those questions. >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov >>>>> Sent: 21 July 2015 21:16 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>>> >>>>> Dear Alfredo and Rolf, >>>>> >>>>> There are also a few other things that I would >>>> like to bring to this discussion. >>>>> >>>>> First, you have a wonderful project and a great >>>> article. It is a great example of an >>>> interpretativist approach to everyday life >>>> phenomena. Really interesting and fascinating. It >>>> is all about our minds, culture, and activity. >>>>> >>>>> However, how is your approach related to classic >>>> Activity Theory? Some people might find that it is >>>> a Symbolic Interactionist approach; others might >>>> say it one of the Deconstructivist approaches that >>>> emerge right now or have emerged in the last >>>> decades; still other people might look for >>>> connections to ethnomethodology, discourse >>>> analysis, etc. I am not trying here to impose a >>>> template or categorize your methodology -- just >>>> raising a question about its connection to >>>> Activity Theory. And again, I am not saying that >>>> this is a shortcoming -- I would like to clarify >>>> certain things for myself. >>>>> >>>>> For example: What are the limits and boundaries >>>> of Activity Theory? How much we can fuse Activity >>>> Theory and Postmodernist approaches? What do we >>>> gain when we infuse new methodological, >>>> epistemological, and ontological realities into >>>> Activity Theory? What do we lose? What is the >>>> threshold when it is not Activity Theory anymore? >>>> (I mean here Activity Theory as research >>>> methodology.) Do we need to call something >>>> Activity Theory if it is not? If we create a new >>>> approach starting with Activity Theory, do we need >>>> to call it Activity Theory? >>>>> >>>>> Activity Theory is a product of Modern thinking, >>>> Late Modernism. The discourse you use in your >>>> paper borrows strongly from Postmodern discourses >>>> and approaches. I am not sure that Modernist and >>>> Postmodernist discourses can be fused. We can >>>> borrow ideas across the range of discourses, but >>>> after we assimilate them for use in our project, >>>> they will "change hands" and will change their >>>> particular discourse affiliation and will become >>>> completely different components of a completely >>>> different discourse. Mostly because the >>>> epistemologies and ontologies are different; and >>>> the concepts are very different despite of the >>>> similarities in ideas and words used to name these >>>> ideas. >>>>> >>>>> Just a few questions that I hope will help me >>>> understand better what is going on in the realm of >>>> CHAT. >>>>> >>>>> Thank you very much for this exciting discussion, >>>>> >>>>> Lubomir >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:36 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>>> >>>>> Andy, all, >>>>> I just recently begun to read Engestr?m and >>>> cols. contribution to the special issue, which is >>>> very interesting. I have particular interest in >>>> the difference that they point out between >>>> boundary object on the one hand, and object and >>>> instrumentality as different aspects of activity >>>> theory on the other. Rolf and I came across this >>>> distinction while writing our own paper. We >>>> noticed that the museum space, through multiple >>>> forms of presentations (e.g., the room itself, a >>>> floor plan, performances of being in the room >>>> while not being there, etc), was a means, an >>>> instrument for achieving a final design product. >>>>> >>>>> At the same time, the museum space begun to >>>> become the object of the designers' activity. >>>> Since this were interdisciplinary designs, and the >>>> partners had multiple, sometimes opposite >>>> interests, what seemed to be a common object for >>>> all them was the museum as place. Thus, most >>>> representations of it begun to be made in terms of >>>> narratives about being there. That was the >>>> orientation that seemed to stick them together. >>>>> >>>>> Thus, the museum space was both object and >>>> instrument. We wondered whether we should do >>>> connections to notions of object of activity and >>>> tools, but we felt that that road would take us >>>> away from the focus on body and experience. We >>>> ended up drawing from Binder et al (2011), who >>>> differentiate between object of design, the design >>>> thing that work delivers, and the object's >>>> constituents (or means of presentation before the >>>> design thing is finished). >>>>> >>>>> When bringing the notion of boundary object into >>>> the picture, we could discuss the history of >>>> development of these relations between the >>>> different forms of presentations of the museum >>>> means towards the object without necessarily >>>> articulating the differences between the two. One >>>> advantage was that boundary objects focus on the >>>> materiality, which, as already mentioned, is not >>>> about materials in themselves, but about >>>> consequences in action. From the point of view of >>>> the persons implicated in the process, the museum >>>> space as object of design was an issue in and >>>> through the working with some material, some form >>>> of presenting it or changing it. Both object and >>>> instrument seemed to be moments of a same >>>> experience. But I still want to learn what we may >>>> get out of making the distinction between object >>>> and tool, as Engestr?m and colleagues do (so I >>>> should perhaps read more carefully their study >>>> rather than be here thinking aloud). >>>>> Any thoughts? >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: 21 July 2015 14:38 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>> Objects >>>>> >>>>> Henry, anything. But the point is objects which >>>> play some >>>>> role in mediating the relation between subjects, >>>> probably a >>>>> symbolic role, but possibly an instrumental >>>> role, too, and >>>>> one subject challenges that role and turns the >>>> object into >>>>> its opposite, and changes the terms of >>>> collaboration. >>>>> A number of examples spring to mind. >>>>> >>>>> * Loaded, especially pejorative words, such >>>> as Queer, are >>>>> embraced by a despised group who take >>>> control of the >>>>> word and assertively embrace it; >>>>> * The post-WW2 women's peace movement who >>>> deployed their >>>>> stereotype as housewives and mothers to >>>> magnificant effect; >>>>> * ISIS's hatred and fear of women turned into >>>> a weapon >>>>> against them by Kurdish women fighters >>>> (ISIS flee before >>>>> them rather than in shame); >>>>> * The Chartists who turned the British govt's >>>> stamp which >>>>> put newspapers out of reach of workers >>>> against them by >>>>> printing the Northern Star as a stamped >>>> newspaper and >>>>> obliging workers to club together in groups >>>> to buy and >>>>> read it, thus making the paper into a glorious >>>>> organising tool; >>>>> * the naming of Palestine and the Occupied >>>> Territory / >>>>> Israel is the struggle over the meaning of >>>> a shared >>>>> object (the land); >>>>> * Gandhi's use of the landloom as both a >>>> weapon and tool >>>>> for Indian independence and >>>> self-sufficiency, raising it >>>>> from the status of obsolete and inferior >>>> technology to a >>>>> symbol of India. >>>>> >>>>> In think this is not what Susan Leigh Star had >>>> in mind when >>>>> she introduced the term, but core point is that the >>>>> ideological construction placed upon an object >>>> is subject to >>>>> contestation, and if successful, the re-marking >>>> of an >>>>> artefact is a tremendously powerful spur to >>>> subjectivity. >>>>> >>>>> Yrjo raises the question: is the"boundary object" a >>>>> mediating artefact or the object of work >>>>> (/Arbeitsgegenstand/)? I think the answer is >>>> that in these >>>>> cases it is a mediating artefact, tool or >>>> symbols according >>>>> to context. In principle it is not the Object in the >>>>> Engestromian sense, though it might happen to be. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>>> On 21/07/2015 12:27 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> Rolf, Alfredo, Andy, >>>>>> I got to thinking about the photographs as >>>> boundary objects. What about video? >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jul 20, 2015, at 6:07 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, thinking about this overnight, I came to >>>> see that it was the photographs that Thomas was >>>> endeavouring to turn to use to recover his >>>> humanity. This is consonant with how Yrjo was >>>> using the idea in relation to the subsistence >>>> farmers' movement in Mexico and their corn. >>>>>>> Thanks Rolf! >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>>>>> On 21/07/2015 3:04 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >>>>>>>> This makes sense to me, Andy. I could also >>>> interpret the photographs as boundary objects as >>>> they support the coordination of therapy >>>> activities between Thomas and the nurse. I think >>>> it depends on the aspect of activity one is >>>> attempting to explore as opposed to the definite >>>> identification of what may or may not be a >>>> boundary object. This is only my opinion though! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or alternatively, the boundary object in >>>> question is >>>>>>>> Thomas's aged body, which is subject to an >>>>>>>> interpretation which Thomas contests by >>>> showing >>>>>>>> photographs of far away places and >>>> explaining how >>>>>>>> well-travelled he is, seeking an >>>> interpretation of >>>>>>>> himself as a well-travelled and experiences >>>>>>>> man-of-the-world. >>>>>>>> Does that make better sense? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 20/07/2015 11:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, I agree. My own interest is in >>>> social theory >>>>>>>> and I'd never heard of "boundary >>>> objects." It >>>>>>>> seems to me that what BOs do is >>>> introduce some >>>>>>>> social theory into domains of >>>> activity (scientific >>>>>>>> and work collaborations for example) >>>> where the >>>>>>>> participants naively think they are >>>> collaborating >>>>>>>> on neutral ground. So it is not just >>>> granularity, >>>>>>>> but also the ideological context. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In Yjro Engestrom's article, the >>>> home care workers >>>>>>>> collaborate with the old couple >>>> according to rules >>>>>>>> and regulations, communications >>>> resources, >>>>>>>> technology, finance and so on, which >>>> in the >>>>>>>> unnamed country, the old couple are >>>> apparently >>>>>>>> cast as "patients". Isn't it the >>>> case that here it >>>>>>>> is those rules and regulations, >>>> etc., which are >>>>>>>> the "boundary objects"? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 20/07/2015 11:1 >>>> >>>> [The entire original message is not included.] >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus >>>> ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & >>>> Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Jul 25 22:56:29 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2015 14:56:29 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> Message-ID: I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it isn't image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also why it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important sense the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is taken. David Kellogg On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel citations > (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one who > insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and particular! > > The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the > child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in turn > be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted process > but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains > concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of hypothetical > mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It is > all actions which are in one way or another organised around some artefact, > and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult points > and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is in > the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an adult > learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and > coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on their > own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in > collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. The > problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in a > uniform, consistent way. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing >> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire psychological >> meanings. >> >> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share >> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: >> >> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its complexity. >> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, only >> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE through a >> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to the >> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general but >> also the individual and particular. >> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a >> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of >> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the >> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO >> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection and >> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" >> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] >> >> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In >> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and >> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". >> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of >> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs >> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and >> children learn not only by observing but by >> participating in those activities. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have >> understood your message. You are "travelling" in >> the social world and discussing Leontyev's >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. >> I can now understand your critique that he might >> believe that something like an objective meaning >> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of >> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to >> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" >> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of >> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), >> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle >> of different meanings that are also changing with >> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or >> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, >> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate >> their personal sense by using words and concepts. >> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it >> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative >> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal >> with the societal emergence and change of the >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the >> link between the social and psychological plane. >> Best Manfred >> >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster >> Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 >> (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 >> (Fax) >> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> >> >> >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski >> = >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] Im >> Auftrag von Andy Blunden >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". >> :( Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice >> again on this list. >> I understand what you are saying. I will try >> to better explain how I >> stand with A N Leontyev. >> >> I am a social theorist, that is I am >> interested in changing societal >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I >> am one of few social >> theorists, properly so-called, who base >> themselves on Vygotsky's >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My >> position is a >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and >> Leontyev were psychologists >> (like >> you) and not social theorists. Social >> Theorists and Psychologists >> generally live in different buildings on the >> university campus, in >> different departments, publish in different >> journals, refer to >> different founding theorists, and altogether >> inhabit different >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about >> psychology, but generally >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an >> excellent foundation for >> social theory because he introduced into human >> development and every >> interaction between two individuals a >> culturally produced sign. But he >> only went so far. He showed how people acted >> and developed within >> their social situation, but he did not tackle >> the problem of how that >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of >> the Activity as a >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making >> development which opened >> CHAT to become a fully developed >> social-and-psychological theory. But >> what he said himself on questions of social >> theory was of very poor >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the >> sort of ideas that would >> win any following among social theorists >> today. But he was after all a >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he >> is forgiven. >> >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken >> "objective meaning" is not a >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. >> Yes? And personal sense >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental >> Psychological category. >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to >> say that personal sense is >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be >> quite wrong. While I >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference >> between material >> objects/processes and their reflection in my >> mind, I do not at all >> understand societal processes as >> nonpsychological processes. I try to >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I >> think I am on my own >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). >> There remains of course the distinction >> between the individual >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), >> mediated by the particular >> (Besonder). A human individual is something >> radically different from a >> number of individuals. For the human >> individual and how they erleben a >> social situation, I rely on my friends and >> collaborator-psychologists. >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In >> small part to avoid >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I >> call activities >> "projects." >> So I reserve the right to say things about >> projects without a follower >> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a >> mysterious or esoteric >> concept; every English-speaker knows what a >> project is, and if there >> is any confusion with projects as defined by >> Existentialists, I call >> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people >> usually join them, not >> create them). These include capitalist firms, >> political parties, >> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a >> family, a professional career >> - all those things which gives our lives >> mening while we build the >> world we and our children must live in, what >> Fedor Vasilyuk called an >> ????????? . A project is not a collection of >> people, it is an >> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and >> the "logic" of projects is >> something different from Psychology, but it is >> inclusive of Psychology >> as well. A project is a kind of psychological >> phenomenon, but it is >> also much more than psychology, because, as >> you remind us, people >> regulate their own behaviour using signs >> created in the world beyond >> their ken. Projects are the material substance >> of Concepts, and I rely >> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? >> >> Everything you said (except how you >> characterised my >> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> with great interest, I follow the >> discussion and your interpretation >> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between >> subjective sense and >> objective meaning. As far as I interpret >> ANL he presented a very >> elegant solution of the relation between >> sense and meaning: For ANL, >> subjective sense is not a part or subset >> of objective meaning (as you >> seem to insinuate him), but a >> psychological quality that emerges when >> a person uses societal signs and their >> objective meanings in order to >> regulate his or her socially embedded >> activity. >> What happens is a transformation of >> societal meanings into the >> personal sense of those involved. The >> personal sense that an >> individual assigns to interactions, facts, >> and experiences through >> the use of signs can be conceptualized not >> as a subset of societal >> meanings but as a particular sphere of >> mind that is constituted by >> two psychological factors in particular >> (a) the relation to the >> motives of the person, and (b) the >> relation to the situated and >> sensorially mediated experiences of the >> individual within the process >> of internalization. >> a) People do not appropriate the use of >> signs and their meanings >> during social interactions in an impartial >> way. >> They interpret and use them in the light >> of their actually elicited >> motives along with the motives they assign >> to the interaction >> partner. The societal meaning of the used >> signs does not have to >> match the individually assigned personal >> sense. For example, an >> outsider may well interpret a public fit >> of rage by a low-ranking >> bank employee toward his superior as an >> inexcusable violation of >> social etiquette. However, for the menial >> employee, it may well be a >> reassertion of self-esteem in response to >> a humiliating directive. >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also >> determined by the >> situatedness and sensory mediation of the >> previous encounters in >> which the use of signs is (or was) >> embedded. Societal meanings are >> coded primarily not by propositional >> phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a >> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) >> but through their ties to >> sensorially mediated and situated >> perceptions?as complex as these >> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). >> For example, two persons can >> use propositional phrases to agree on the >> same definition of the term >> ?dog? or ?fear.? >> These terms, however, will be situated >> very differently and enriched >> with other sensory perceptions when one >> person grew up with a very >> likeable family dog and the other person >> experienced a highly >> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly >> large and aggressive dog. >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the >> meanings assigned to them are >> subject to an interpersonal process of >> interpretation and >> coordination that more or less >> successfully supports the embodiment >> and expression of personal sense. People >> do not have a private >> ?speech? at their disposal that they can >> construct and use on their >> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend >> on the appropriation and >> use of conventionalized signs when they >> want to communicate >> successfully and satisfy their motives in >> social interactions. >> By an act of reflection, the person can >> try to realize and to become >> aware of his personal relation and sense >> of the situation and the >> used signs, but also this reflection has >> to fall back on societal >> signs in order to express this personal >> relations. So, this is the >> overall tension between objective meaning >> of an event or an object >> and its personal sense for a specific person. >> Best >> Manfred >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und >> Erziehung Westf?lische >> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 >> (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 >> (Fax) >> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht >> ml >> >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> >> >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski >> > >=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucs >> d.edu ] >> >> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32 >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of >> Boundary Objects >> >> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would >> say in response to my post to >> take it from there, Mike, but I will try >> to respond as best I can to >> the question about subjectivism and >> objectivism. >> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper >> that I thought that A N >> Leontyev was too much of an objectivist, >> Morten Nissen remarked that >> that was odd, because in Europe ATists >> thought he was too subjective. >> So there you are! >> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a >> theory of Psychology, and >> yet I want to use AT as a foundation for >> social theory, so my claim >> does seem anomalous. >> >> What it comes down to is the insistence of >> ANL in interpreting >> contradictions between the "subjective sense" >> and the "objective meaning" of an activity >> in terms of the social vs. >> the individual. This reduces subjectivity >> to a matter of the >> capriciousness of the individual mind or >> the underdevelopment of the >> child mind. This is hardly objectionable >> in the domain of child >> development, but in the domain of social >> theory it is a Neanderthal >> position. >> Social life is made up of a multiplicity >> of standpoints among which >> none have the right to claim unproblematic >> "objective truth" >> for themselves. This is the basis on which >> I describe ANL as giving >> too much to the Object. Engestrom on the >> other hand, is different, >> but people's intentions are relegated to >> "phenomenological >> investigation" which are preliminary to >> the investigation itself. I >> see Engestrom's approach as a kind of >> social behaviourist approach in >> which change occurs only thanks to >> "contradictions" at different >> levels in the "system." My aim in >> proposing to see the "system" as a >> "project" at one or another phase in its >> life cycle aims to restore >> the purposiveness of human action to >> Activity Theory. The >> interpretation of purposes and intentions >> in social science is a >> challenge, but I believe that with the aid >> of Hegel it can be met. >> >> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare >> "All the the Subject!" >> though I know nothing at all of his work. >> >> The problem with your question about >> Boundary Objects, Mike, is that >> though I knew nothing of them a little >> while ago, I can now see 3 >> different meanings of the term. So perhaps >> Geoffrey is in the best >> position to answer this question, and I >> look forward to his answer. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Andy/Lubomir-- >> >> I am overwhelmed by this thread so >> this's query may be badly timed. >> But .... I recall Lubomir writing >> that AT was centered on the >> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to >> Strands of AT theory that give >> everything to the object. >> >> Question-- isn't this a version of >> Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools' >> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the >> problem of the environment? >> >> Or? >> >> What is at stake here theoretically >> and practically? >> Mike >> PS. I am still trying to absorb the >> multifaceted discussion of >> boundary object. I almost want to ask >> -- what forms of joint >> mediated activity do not involve >> boundary objects? But I am pretty >> sure that not knowing the answer to >> this question is a result of the >> richness of the discussion. >> >> It's fair to say that XMCA is a >> boundary object?? >> Mike >> >> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy >> Blunden > >> > >> wrote: >> >> That is exactly right, Larry, I >> am advocating a >> humanism, in opposition to >> poststructuralism, >> structuralism Marxism, and >> strands of Activity Theory >> which give everything to the Object. >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> < >> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry >> wrote: >> >> Here is a quote from the >> introduction of "The >> Cambridge Handbook of >> Merleau-Ponty on the topic >> of the subject. >> >> "Foucault's archaeological >> studies of the early >> 1970's, most notably "The >> Order of Things" and >> "The Archaeology of >> Knowledge", did perhaps more >> than any other work of the >> period to LEGITIMIZE >> conceiving of processes >> without subjects." >> >> This is an "antihumanist" >> program as Foucault saw >> the failure of phenomenology >> and the residual >> links between subjectivism >> and anthropology. >> >> The force of Foucault's >> argument was tying the >> philosophy of the subject to >> what he saw as an >> outmoded humanism. >> >> It may be what Andy is >> highlighting is a new humanism. >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> From: Lubomir Savov Popov >> > > >> Sent: ?2015-?07-?22 8:55 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >> > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >; >> Andy Blunden >> > > >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> The object doesn't carry in >> itself the motive and >> the purpose of activity. >> Actually, depending on >> the motive and purpose of >> activity, the object can >> be approached in many >> different ways. >> >> It is true that the >> relationship between the >> object and the subject >> caries the >> >> purpose/goal/objective/motive of >> activity. This >> type of relationship might >> has several aspects and >> the teleological aspect is >> one of them. Actually, >> in AT, the teleological >> aspect is central one >> among all aspects of >> Subject-Object relationships. >> >> The teleological aspect in >> AT is envisaged at >> several levels with >> distinctive teleological >> phenomena: motivation, goal, >> etc. >> >> It is difficult to find >> diagrams of the structure >> of activity with its three >> levels. I just tried to >> do that and in most cases I >> got the famous >> "triangle." The internet is >> dominated by English >> language texts where the >> authors evidently use >> that version of activity >> theory. The three >> structural levels of >> activity might be found in t >> >> Lubomir >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov= >> bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov >> = >> bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil >> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, >> 2015 11:25 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity; Andy Blunden >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> That was a very helpful >> entry, Andy. Thanks! >> I see that our treatment of >> object in the paper is >> very much in line with the >> notion of >> Arbeitsgegenstand as you >> describe it. >> >> I have many questions, most >> of which I should find >> in the literature rather >> than bother here. But I >> would like to ask one here. >> It concerns the quote >> that the object "carries in >> itself the purpose and >> motive of the activity." >> What does "in itself" >> mean here? >> Thanks again for a very >> informative post, >> Alfredo >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet= >> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > >> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> > > >> >> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The >> Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> If I could try to do my >> thing and draw attention >> to some >> distinctions in this field >> ... we have at least three >> different versions of >> Activity Theory involved >> here plus >> Leigh Star's theory and in >> addition the theories >> that have >> spun off from Leigh Star's >> initial idea. Each is >> using the >> word "object" in a different >> way, all of them >> legitimate >> uses of the English word, >> but all indexing different >> concepts. So for the sake of >> this discussion I >> will invent >> some different terms. >> >> The German word >> Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of >> labour, the material which >> is to be worked upon, the >> blacksmith's iron. It is >> objective, in that if may >> be a nail >> to a man with a hammer and >> waste material for a >> man with a >> broom, but it is all the >> same Arbeitsgegenstand. >> Engestrom >> use the word "Object" in the >> middle of the left >> side of the >> triangle to mean >> Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it >> has been >> worked upon it becomes >> "Outcome." The hammer that the >> blacksmith uses is called >> "Instruments" or now >> "instrumentality," and the >> Rules, whether implicit or >> explicit, these are >> respectively the base and apex >> of the >> triangle. >> >> Engestrom says " The object >> carries in itself the >> purpose >> and motive of the activity." >> So this "purpose or >> motive" is >> not shown on the triangle, >> but I will call it the >> OBJECT. >> This is what Leontyev meant >> by "object" when he >> talks about >> "object-oriented activity." >> The OBJECT is a >> complex notion, >> because it is only >> *implicit* in the actions of the >> subject(s); it is not a >> material thing or process >> as such. >> Behaviourists would exclude >> it altogether. But >> this is what >> is motivating all the >> members of the design team >> when they >> sit down to collaborate with >> one another. Bone one >> of the >> team thinks the OBJECT is to >> drive the nail into >> the wood >> and another thinks the >> OBJECT is to sweep the >> Arbeitsgegenstand into the >> wastebin. These OBJECTs >> change in >> the course of collaboration >> and in the End an >> OBJECT Is >> *realised* which is the >> "truth" of the >> collaboration, to use >> Hegel's apt terminology here. >> >> Surely it is important to >> recognise that while >> everyone >> shares the same >> Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up >> with Outcome >> as the same OBJECT, along >> the road they construe >> the object >> differently. This is what >> Vygotsky showed so >> clearly in >> Thinking and Speech. It is >> not the >> Arbeitsgegenstand or some >> problem carried within it >> alone which motivates >> action, but >> *the concept the subject >> makes of the >> Arbeitsgegenstand*! >> >> Then Leigh Star comes along >> and applies (as >> Lubomir astutely >> notices) postmodern ideology >> critique to the >> collaboration >> within an ostensibly neutral >> infrastructure - that >> is, in >> Engestrom's terms Rules and >> Instruments, which are >> naively >> supposed to be there just to >> aid collaboration. >> And Leigh >> Star shows that this is an >> illusion; the Rules and >> Instruments are in fact >> residues of past >> collaborations >> which carry within them the >> Outcomes, i.e., >> realised OBJECTs >> of past collaborations. It >> is these one-time OBJECTs, >> now-Instruments+Rules which >> are the Boundary Objects. >> >> But it seems that other have >> grasped the >> postmodern critique >> elements of this idea, that >> apparently >> ideologically neutral >> obJects (in the expanded >> sense of socially constructed >> entities, usually far more >> than OBJects - as >> things, or >> artefacts, including >> institutions - fossilised >> "systems of >> activity") and recognised >> the shared OBJECT as a >> Boundary >> Object, reflecting the fact >> not everyone has the same >> concept of the OBJECT, as >> Vygotsky proved. >> >> But what Engestrom has done, >> by placing the >> Boundary Object >> in the place of Object on >> his triangle, joining >> two "systems >> of activity," for the >> purpose of looking not at >> cooperation >> but rather the conflict >> within the broader >> collaboration. >> The reconstrual of the >> Arbeitsgegenstand is >> deliberate and >> aimed to change the relation >> between Subject and >> obJECT >> (here referring to the >> Hegelian "Object" usually >> rendered as >> "the Other.") thereby >> introducing yet a different >> strand of >> postmodern critique into the >> equation, namely >> Foucault's >> Poststructuralism, to mind >> mind, with great effect. >> >> OK, so we have >> Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary >> Object, >> OBject, obJECT and obJect. >> And I might say, the >> situation is >> almost as bad in Russian and >> German, >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> < >> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/> >> >> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM, >> Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> > Thanks a lot for your >> appreciation, Lubomir. >> > >> > To clarify my question in >> the previous e-mail, I >> wish to add that I am a bit >> familiar with the >> distinction between object >> and tool in activity >> theory, though not enough >> yet. I can see, and we >> were aware through the >> process, that what we >> describe in the paper has to >> do with how the >> object of design emerged and >> developed for the >> team in and as they were >> dealing with, developing, >> and resorting to particular >> means or tools. But I >> guess we could say that in >> our analyses there is a >> lack of a historical account >> of the object that >> goes over and above the >> particular instances >> analyzed. Although we >> provide with some >> ethnographic >> contextualization of the team's >> developmental trajectories, >> all of our discussion >> is grounded on concrete >> events and their >> transactional unfolding. We >> did not resort to the >> distinction between object >> and means because it >> seemed to be the same thing >> in the there and then >> of the episodes analyzed, at >> least in what >> participants' orientations >> concerned. If they ori >> > ented towards anything >> beyond what was there >> in the meetings, it was in >> and through the >> meetings' means. How would >> then the distinction >> between means and object >> have added to our >> understanding of the events? >> (And this is not to >> doubt of the contribution >> from such a distinction, >> I really mean to ask this >> question for the purpose >> of growing and expanding; >> and as said before, part >> of the answer may be found >> in Engestrom et al. >> contribution). >> > >> > As to how we would >> position our contribution >> with regard to activity >> theory, I would reiterate >> what we said when >> introducing the paper for >> discussion: we begun with >> the purpose of working >> outside any particular >> framework and think, as we >> think Star did, broadly, >> drawing from several >> sources. These included >> cultural historical >> psychology, >> ethnomethodology, and discourse >> analysis. But also the ideas >> about Experience (in >> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan >> sense) that have been the >> topic in this discussion >> were in the background >> all the time, but we did not >> operationalize them >> in terms of any particular >> theory. This is not to >> say that we went for the >> "anything goes;" we tried >> our best to keep internal >> coherence between what >> we said about the data, and >> what the data was >> exhibiting for us. Perhaps >> Rolf would like to add >> to this. >> > >> > I think the questions you >> are rising about >> activity theory are very >> much in the spirit of >> what I am after, and I am >> not the best to answer >> them; but this xmca list may >> be one of the best >> places to be asking those >> questions. >> > >> > Alfredo > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jul 26 07:55:54 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2015 07:55:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> Message-ID: <55b4f50b.edb8420a.7c661.0dd5@mx.google.com> David, This answer to my struggle shifts or slants everything. If we cannot "reduce" or "abstract" actions from "having an experience" then to be explicit and clear we must also include some other factor that is "beyond" reducing having "an" experience to just actions. This other factor is "construal" or "imaginal" phenomena. Having an experience is an INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE including both the imaginal and actions. David the other relation is the unity of "construing" and "disclosing"/"undergoing" an experience (as a unity or integral phenomena.) The relation(s) of the imaginal to action and the slant from which we approach THIS unity (that cannot be reduced or abstracted) from having an experience. How we understand THIS integral phenomena that is extending "beyond" actions but must necessarily INCLUDE actions -----Original Message----- From: "David Kellogg" Sent: ?2015-?07-?25 10:58 PM To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it isn't image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also why it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important sense the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is taken. David Kellogg On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel citations > (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one who > insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and particular! > > The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the > child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in turn > be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted process > but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains > concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of hypothetical > mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It is > all actions which are in one way or another organised around some artefact, > and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult points > and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is in > the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an adult > learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and > coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on their > own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in > collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. The > problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in a > uniform, consistent way. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing >> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire psychological >> meanings. >> >> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share >> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: >> >> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its complexity. >> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, only >> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE through a >> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to the >> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general but >> also the individual and particular. >> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a >> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of >> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the >> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO >> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection and >> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" >> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] >> >> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In >> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and >> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". >> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of >> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs >> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and >> children learn not only by observing but by >> participating in those activities. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have >> understood your message. You are "travelling" in >> the social world and discussing Leontyev's >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. >> I can now understand your critique that he might >> believe that something like an objective meaning >> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of >> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to >> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" >> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of >> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), >> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle >> of different meanings that are also changing with >> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or >> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, >> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate >> their personal sense by using words and concepts. >> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it >> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative >> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal >> with the societal emergence and change of the >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the >> link between the social and psychological plane. >> Best Manfred >> >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster >> Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 >> (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 >> (Fax) >> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> >> >> >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski >> = >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] Im >> Auftrag von Andy Blunden >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". >> :( Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice >> again on this list. >> I understand what you are saying. I will try >> to better explain how I >> stand with A N Leontyev. >> >> I am a social theorist, that is I am >> interested in changing societal >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I >> am one of few social >> theorists, properly so-called, who base >> themselves on Vygotsky's >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My >> position is a >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and >> Leontyev were psychologists >> (like >> you) and not social theorists. Social >> Theorists and Psychologists >> generally live in different buildings on the >> university campus, in >> different departments, publish in different >> journals, refer to >> different founding theorists, and altogether >> inhabit different >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about >> psychology, but generally >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an >> excellent foundation for >> social theory because he introduced into human >> development and every >> interaction between two individuals a >> culturally produced sign. But he >> only went so far. He showed how people acted >> and developed within >> their social situation, but he did not tackle >> the problem of how that >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of >> the Activity as a >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making >> development which opened >> CHAT to become a fully developed >> social-and-psychological theory. But >> what he said himself on questions of social >> theory was of very poor >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the >> sort of ideas that would >> win any following among social theorists >> today. But he was after all a >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he >> is forgiven. >> >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken >> "objective meaning" is not a >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. >> Yes? And personal sense >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental >> Psychological category. >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to >> say that personal sense is >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be >> quite wrong. While I >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference >> between material >> objects/processes and their reflection in my >> mind, I do not at all >> understand societal processes as >> nonpsychological processes. I try to >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I >> think I am on my own >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). >> There remains of course the distinction >> between the individual >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), >> mediated by the particular >> (Besonder). A human individual is something >> radically different from a >> number of individuals. For the human >> individual and how they erleben a >> social situation, I rely on my friends and >> collaborator-psychologists. >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In >> small part to avoid >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I >> call activities >> "projects." >> So I reserve the right to say things about >> projects without a follower >> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a >> mysterious or esoteric >> concept; every English-speaker knows what a >> project is, and if there >> is any confusion with projects as defined by >> Existentialists, I call >> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people >> usually join them, not >> create them). These include capitalist firms, >> political parties, >> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a >> family, a professional career >> - all those things which gives our lives >> mening while we build the >> world we and our children must live in, what >> Fedor Vasilyuk called an >> ????????? . A project is not a collection of >> people, it is an >> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and >> the "logic" of projects is >> something different from Psychology, but it is >> inclusive of Psychology >> as well. A project is a kind of psychological >> phenomenon, but it is >> also much more than psychology, because, as >> you remind us, people >> regulate their own behaviour using signs >> created in the world beyond >> their ken. Projects are the material substance >> of Concepts, and I rely >> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? >> >> Everything you said (except how you >> characterised my >> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> with great interest, I follow the >> discussion and your interpretation >> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between >> subjective sense and >> objective meaning. As far as I interpret >> ANL he presented a very >> elegant solution of the relation between >> sense and meaning: For ANL, >> subjective sense is not a part or subset >> of objective meaning (as you >> seem to insinuate him), but a >> psychological quality that emerges when >> a person uses societal signs and their >> objective meanings in order to >> regulate his or her socially embedded >> activity. >> What happens is a transformation of >> societal meanings into the >> personal sense of those involved. The >> personal sense that an >> individual assigns to interactions, facts, >> and experiences through >> the use of signs can be conceptualized not >> as a subset of societal >> meanings but as a particular sphere of >> mind that is constituted by >> two psychological factors in particular >> (a) the relation to the >> motives of the person, and (b) the >> relation to the situated and >> sensorially mediated experiences of the >> individual within the process >> of internalization. >> a) People do not appropriate the use of >> signs and their meanings >> during social interactions in an impartial >> way. >> They interpret and use them in the light >> of their actually elicited >> motives along with the motives they assign >> to the interaction >> partner. The societal meaning of the used >> signs does not have to >> match the individually assigned personal >> sense. For example, an >> outsider may well interpret a public fit >> of rage by a low-ranking >> bank employee toward his superior as an >> inexcusable violation of >> social etiquette. However, for the menial >> employee, it may well be a >> reassertion of self-esteem in response to >> a humiliating directive. >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also >> determined by the >> situatedness and sensory mediation of the >> previous encounters in >> which the use of signs is (or was) >> embedded. Societal meanings are >> coded primarily not by propositional >> phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a >> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) >> but through their ties to >> sensorially mediated and situated >> perceptions?as complex as these >> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). >> For example, two persons can >> use propositional phrases to agree on the >> same definition of the term >> ?dog? or ?fear.? >> These terms, however, will be situated >> very differently and enriched >> with other sensory perceptions when one >> person grew up with a very >> likeable family dog and the other person >> experienced a highly >> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly >> large and aggressive dog. >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the >> meanings assigned to them are >> subject to an interpersonal process of >> interpretation and >> coordination that more or less >> successfully supports the embodiment >> and expression of personal sense. People >> do not have a private >> ?speech? at their disposal that they can >> construct and use on their >> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend >> on the appropriation and >> use of conventionalized signs when they >> want to communicate >> successfully and satisfy their motives in >> social interactions. >> By an act of reflection, the person can >> try to realize and to become >> aware of his personal relation and sense >> of the situation and the >> used signs, but also this reflection has >> to fall back on societal >> signs in order to express this personal >> relations. So, this is the >> overall tension between objective meaning >> of an event or an object >> and its personal sense for a specific person. >> Best >> Manfred >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und >> Erziehung Westf?lische >> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 >> (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 >> (Fax) >> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht >> ml >> >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> , <55b4f50b.edb8420a.7c661.0dd5@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1438109414921.65790@iped.uio.no> Thanks all for having brought this discussion to these heights. I am personally learning a lot, although it's been hard to keep up with it and deal with other everyday tasks. Thanks, Ritva, for emphasizing the links between the discussion and the article when they may had seemed to be no longer there. I just want to wrap up in a think-aloud fashion, and from my view, how the issues that have arisen in the discussion relate, but also expand, on the ideas in our article; as a learning exercise. In the last entry, Larry notes that we need to include an "imaginal" aspect, not just actions, as part of the larger units of experience(s) that bring both forth. So the challenge is to think, theorize, research both action and imagination as aspects of a common unit, and one that is not only psychological, but also and at the same time societal. Following that line of thinking, I want to bring attention back to "bodies" and "space", which feature prominently in our paper, by means of a quotation from Nancy (Corpus, 2008): "With thoughts about the body, the body always forces us to think farther, always too far: too far to carry on as thought, but never far enough to become a body" (p. 37). That is, doing, being a body, carries us "too far to carry on (only) as thought, but never far enough to become (only, purely) body." Thus, there is not a real division between body and thinking, but a delay, which is but feature of their unity. In this regard, Nancy argues that bodies are about spacing (which is another way to say that being is about making place). Again space crops up as (subject) matter here. Dewey (1929, nature and experience) refers to that space between the doing and the undergoing in terms of "an adventure," where "the old self is put off and the new self is only forming." So, if my thinking here makes sense, the challenge is to link this characterization of being as going through an adventure (an "advening" (from "advenire") of oneself to oneself, to use Claude Romano's terms) with that of activity (or collaborative projects) as collective and historical achievements that provide for the possibility of any experience to go on. David writes: "In a very important sense the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is taken." So, although we may take the first-time-through perspective of the one (body) who goes through an experience, there is something on place (is on "place" the right word?) before she does/undergoes it. As Andy notes, playing is done in and through actions, although play, or the game, is not reducible to any single action. So play, as a societal feature or category, is larger; it is a method of organization. And, not many e-mails ago, we did notice Dewey's and Bentley's reference of experience as precisely that: a method of organization. But experience and activity are not the same thing; how are they different? So, it seems to me, the difference is not about substance. They both are about actions, concrete and material. The difference (between experience and activity) might be then about time. The notion of heterochrony that Lemke brought in his 2000 paper "scales of time" seems most appealing to me here, although I do not know of much work that has continued to develop research in terms of the diachronies and delays that may exist between history and experiences thereof (or rather there is lots of literature I don't yet know/understand properly). In any case, these loose ideas seem relevant for further understanding how creativity and imagination develop as part of (design, teaching/learning, etc) activities. Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lplarry Sent: 26 July 2015 16:55 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects David, This answer to my struggle shifts or slants everything. If we cannot "reduce" or "abstract" actions from "having an experience" then to be explicit and clear we must also include some other factor that is "beyond" reducing having "an" experience to just actions. This other factor is "construal" or "imaginal" phenomena. Having an experience is an INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE including both the imaginal and actions. David the other relation is the unity of "construing" and "disclosing"/"undergoing" an experience (as a unity or integral phenomena.) The relation(s) of the imaginal to action and the slant from which we approach THIS unity (that cannot be reduced or abstracted) from having an experience. How we understand THIS integral phenomena that is extending "beyond" actions but must necessarily INCLUDE actions -----Original Message----- From: "David Kellogg" Sent: ?2015-?07-?25 10:58 PM To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it isn't image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also why it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important sense the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is taken. David Kellogg On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel citations > (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one who > insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and particular! > > The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the > child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in turn > be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted process > but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains > concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of hypothetical > mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It is > all actions which are in one way or another organised around some artefact, > and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult points > and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is in > the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an adult > learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and > coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on their > own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in > collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. The > problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in a > uniform, consistent way. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing >> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire psychological >> meanings. >> >> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share >> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: >> >> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its complexity. >> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, only >> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE through a >> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to the >> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general but >> also the individual and particular. >> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a >> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of >> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the >> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO >> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection and >> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" >> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] >> >> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In >> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and >> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". >> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of >> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs >> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and >> children learn not only by observing but by >> participating in those activities. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have >> understood your message. You are "travelling" in >> the social world and discussing Leontyev's >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. >> I can now understand your critique that he might >> believe that something like an objective meaning >> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of >> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to >> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" >> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of >> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), >> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle >> of different meanings that are also changing with >> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or >> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, >> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate >> their personal sense by using words and concepts. >> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it >> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative >> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal >> with the societal emergence and change of the >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the >> link between the social and psychological plane. >> Best Manfred >> >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster >> Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 >> (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 >> (Fax) >> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> >> >> >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski >> = >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] Im >> Auftrag von Andy Blunden >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >> Objects >> >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". >> :( Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice >> again on this list. >> I understand what you are saying. I will try >> to better explain how I >> stand with A N Leontyev. >> >> I am a social theorist, that is I am >> interested in changing societal >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I >> am one of few social >> theorists, properly so-called, who base >> themselves on Vygotsky's >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My >> position is a >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and >> Leontyev were psychologists >> (like >> you) and not social theorists. Social >> Theorists and Psychologists >> generally live in different buildings on the >> university campus, in >> different departments, publish in different >> journals, refer to >> different founding theorists, and altogether >> inhabit different >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about >> psychology, but generally >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an >> excellent foundation for >> social theory because he introduced into human >> development and every >> interaction between two individuals a >> culturally produced sign. But he >> only went so far. He showed how people acted >> and developed within >> their social situation, but he did not tackle >> the problem of how that >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of >> the Activity as a >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making >> development which opened >> CHAT to become a fully developed >> social-and-psychological theory. But >> what he said himself on questions of social >> theory was of very poor >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the >> sort of ideas that would >> win any following among social theorists >> today. But he was after all a >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he >> is forgiven. >> >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken >> "objective meaning" is not a >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. >> Yes? And personal sense >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental >> Psychological category. >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to >> say that personal sense is >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be >> quite wrong. While I >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference >> between material >> objects/processes and their reflection in my >> mind, I do not at all >> understand societal processes as >> nonpsychological processes. I try to >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I >> think I am on my own >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). >> There remains of course the distinction >> between the individual >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), >> mediated by the particular >> (Besonder). A human individual is something >> radically different from a >> number of individuals. For the human >> individual and how they erleben a >> social situation, I rely on my friends and >> collaborator-psychologists. >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In >> small part to avoid >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I >> call activities >> "projects." >> So I reserve the right to say things about >> projects without a follower >> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a >> mysterious or esoteric >> concept; every English-speaker knows what a >> project is, and if there >> is any confusion with projects as defined by >> Existentialists, I call >> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people >> usually join them, not >> create them). These include capitalist firms, >> political parties, >> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a >> family, a professional career >> - all those things which gives our lives >> mening while we build the >> world we and our children must live in, what >> Fedor Vasilyuk called an >> ????????? . A project is not a collection of >> people, it is an >> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and >> the "logic" of projects is >> something different from Psychology, but it is >> inclusive of Psychology >> as well. A project is a kind of psychological >> phenomenon, but it is >> also much more than psychology, because, as >> you remind us, people >> regulate their own behaviour using signs >> created in the world beyond >> their ken. Projects are the material substance >> of Concepts, and I rely >> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? >> >> Everything you said (except how you >> characterised my >> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> with great interest, I follow the >> discussion and your interpretation >> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between >> subjective sense and >> objective meaning. As far as I interpret >> ANL he presented a very >> elegant solution of the relation between >> sense and meaning: For ANL, >> subjective sense is not a part or subset >> of objective meaning (as you >> seem to insinuate him), but a >> psychological quality that emerges when >> a person uses societal signs and their >> objective meanings in order to >> regulate his or her socially embedded >> activity. >> What happens is a transformation of >> societal meanings into the >> personal sense of those involved. The >> personal sense that an >> individual assigns to interactions, facts, >> and experiences through >> the use of signs can be conceptualized not >> as a subset of societal >> meanings but as a particular sphere of >> mind that is constituted by >> two psychological factors in particular >> (a) the relation to the >> motives of the person, and (b) the >> relation to the situated and >> sensorially mediated experiences of the >> individual within the process >> of internalization. >> a) People do not appropriate the use of >> signs and their meanings >> during social interactions in an impartial >> way. >> They interpret and use them in the light >> of their actually elicited >> motives along with the motives they assign >> to the interaction >> partner. The societal meaning of the used >> signs does not have to >> match the individually assigned personal >> sense. For example, an >> outsider may well interpret a public fit >> of rage by a low-ranking >> bank employee toward his superior as an >> inexcusable violation of >> social etiquette. However, for the menial >> employee, it may well be a >> reassertion of self-esteem in response to >> a humiliating directive. >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also >> determined by the >> situatedness and sensory mediation of the >> previous encounters in >> which the use of signs is (or was) >> embedded. Societal meanings are >> coded primarily not by propositional >> phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a >> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) >> but through their ties to >> sensorially mediated and situated >> perceptions?as complex as these >> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). >> For example, two persons can >> use propositional phrases to agree on the >> same definition of the term >> ?dog? or ?fear.? >> These terms, however, will be situated >> very differently and enriched >> with other sensory perceptions when one >> person grew up with a very >> likeable family dog and the other person >> experienced a highly >> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly >> large and aggressive dog. >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the >> meanings assigned to them are >> subject to an interpersonal process of >> interpretation and >> coordination that more or less >> successfully supports the embodiment >> and expression of personal sense. People >> do not have a private >> ?speech? at their disposal that they can >> construct and use on their >> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend >> on the appropriation and >> use of conventionalized signs when they >> want to communicate >> successfully and satisfy their motives in >> social interactions. >> By an act of reflection, the person can >> try to realize and to become >> aware of his personal relation and sense >> of the situation and the >> used signs, but also this reflection has >> to fall back on societal >> signs in order to express this personal >> relations. So, this is the >> overall tension between objective meaning >> of an event or an object >> and its personal sense for a specific person. >> Best >> Manfred >> >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und >> Erziehung Westf?lische >> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 >> D-48149 M?nster >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >> >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 >> (Sekretariat) >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 >> (Fax) >> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht >> ml >> >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >> References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> <55b4f50b.edb8420a.7c661.0dd5@mx.google.com> <1438109414921.65790@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: It is great of you to lead us in a wrap up of your paper, Alfredo. The discussion sits in my active arena of attention because it opened up and enriched so many different concerns. We had a thread not that long ago focused on imagination. It might not be a bad idea to return to those threads and pick them up to see what can be woven from them now. I, for example, have always considered the 5th D Dimension as a boundary object even as I have written about it as a tertiary artifact, or, for that matter, a personal experience. In fact, i believe it could be said to be a terrific boundary object for joint exploration among those who, like myself, believe imagination to THE core process in human experience/perezhivanie. But I think we could find the time to look back, at this long thread, we would see that the word imagination (and experience!) are used in somewhat different ways/have slightly different meanings (if we could settle on what we meant by meaning! How could all of that happen if imagination were not there picking up dropped threads, making new ones, and then trying to "make something of it" ? (Of course, now I have to imagine I can remember how to find that prior discussion!) A great learning experience for me. Thanks for the two of you for taking the time to create the discussion. That must be our record long thread. mike On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks all for having brought this discussion to these heights. I am > personally learning a lot, although it's been hard to keep up with it and > deal with other everyday tasks. > > Thanks, Ritva, for emphasizing the links between the discussion and the > article when they may had seemed to be no longer there. I just want to wrap > up in a think-aloud fashion, and from my view, how the issues that have > arisen in the discussion relate, but also expand, on the ideas in our > article; as a learning exercise. > > In the last entry, Larry notes that we need to include an "imaginal" > aspect, not just actions, as part of the larger units of experience(s) that > bring both forth. So the challenge is to think, theorize, research both > action and imagination as aspects of a common unit, and one that is not > only psychological, but also and at the same time societal. > > Following that line of thinking, I want to bring attention back to > "bodies" and "space", which feature prominently in our paper, by means of a > quotation from Nancy (Corpus, 2008): > > "With thoughts about the body, the body always forces us to think farther, > always too far: too far to carry on as thought, but never far enough to > become a body" (p. 37). > > That is, doing, being a body, carries us "too far to carry on (only) as > thought, but never far enough to become (only, purely) body." Thus, there > is not a real division between body and thinking, but a delay, which is but > feature of their unity. In this regard, Nancy argues that bodies are about > spacing (which is another way to say that being is about making place). > Again space crops up as (subject) matter here. Dewey (1929, nature and > experience) refers to that space between the doing and the undergoing in > terms of "an adventure," where "the old self is put off and the new self is > only forming." > > So, if my thinking here makes sense, the challenge is to link this > characterization of being as going through an adventure (an "advening" > (from "advenire") of oneself to oneself, to use Claude Romano's terms) with > that of activity (or collaborative projects) as collective and historical > achievements that provide for the possibility of any experience to go on. > David writes: "In a very important sense the ideal image of the painting > exists long before any action at all is taken." So, although we may take > the first-time-through perspective of the one (body) who goes through an > experience, there is something on place (is on "place" the right word?) > before she does/undergoes it. As Andy notes, playing is done in and through > actions, although play, or the game, is not reducible to any single action. > So play, as a societal feature or category, is larger; it is a method of > organization. And, not many e-mails ago, we did notice Dewey's and > Bentley's reference of experience as precisely that: a method of > organization. But experience and activity are not the same thing; how are > they different? > > So, it seems to me, the difference is not about substance. They both are > about actions, concrete and material. The difference (between experience > and activity) might be then about time. The notion of heterochrony that > Lemke brought in his 2000 paper "scales of time" seems most appealing to me > here, although I do not know of much work that has continued to develop > research in terms of the diachronies and delays that may exist between > history and experiences thereof (or rather there is lots of literature I > don't yet know/understand properly). In any case, these loose ideas seem > relevant for further understanding how creativity and imagination develop > as part of (design, teaching/learning, etc) activities. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Lplarry > Sent: 26 July 2015 16:55 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > David, > > This answer to my struggle shifts or slants everything. > > If we cannot "reduce" or "abstract" actions from "having an experience" > then to be explicit and clear we must also include some other factor that > is "beyond" reducing having "an" experience to just actions. This other > factor is "construal" or "imaginal" phenomena. Having an experience is an > INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE including both the imaginal and actions. > > David the other relation is the unity of "construing" and > "disclosing"/"undergoing" an experience (as a unity or integral phenomena.) > > The relation(s) of the imaginal to action and the slant from which we > approach THIS unity (that cannot be reduced or abstracted) from having an > experience. > How we understand THIS integral phenomena that is extending "beyond" > actions but must necessarily INCLUDE actions > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "David Kellogg" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?25 10:58 PM > To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as > "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it isn't > image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a > Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also why > it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through > actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important sense > the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is > taken. > > David Kellogg > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel > citations > > (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one > who > > insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and > particular! > > > > The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the > > child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in turn > > be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted > process > > but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains > > concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of hypothetical > > mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It is > > all actions which are in one way or another organised around some > artefact, > > and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult > points > > and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is in > > the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an > adult > > learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and > > coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on their > > own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in > > collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. The > > problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in a > > uniform, consistent way. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing > >> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire > psychological > >> meanings. > >> > >> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share > >> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: > >> > >> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its complexity. > >> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, > only > >> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE > through a > >> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to the > >> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general > but > >> also the individual and particular. > >> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a > >> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of > >> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the > >> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO > >> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection and > >> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" > >> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] > >> > >> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In > >> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and > >> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". > >> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of > >> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs > >> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and > >> children learn not only by observing but by > >> participating in those activities. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > >> > >> Hi Andy, > >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have > >> understood your message. You are "travelling" in > >> the social world and discussing Leontyev's > >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. > >> I can now understand your critique that he might > >> believe that something like an objective meaning > >> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of > >> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to > >> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" > >> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of > >> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), > >> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle > >> of different meanings that are also changing with > >> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or > >> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, > >> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate > >> their personal sense by using words and concepts. > >> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it > >> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. > >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative > >> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal > >> with the societal emergence and change of the > >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the > >> link between the social and psychological plane. > >> Best Manfred > >> > >> > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > >> Fliednerstr. 21 > >> D-48149 M?nster > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > >> (Sekretariat) > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > >> (Fax) > >> > >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > >> > >> > >> > >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > >> Von: > >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski > >> = > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] Im > >> Auftrag von Andy Blunden > >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 > >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > >> Objects > >> > >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". > >> :( Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice > >> again on this list. > >> I understand what you are saying. I will try > >> to better explain how I > >> stand with A N Leontyev. > >> > >> I am a social theorist, that is I am > >> interested in changing societal > >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I > >> am one of few social > >> theorists, properly so-called, who base > >> themselves on Vygotsky's > >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My > >> position is a > >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and > >> Leontyev were psychologists > >> (like > >> you) and not social theorists. Social > >> Theorists and Psychologists > >> generally live in different buildings on the > >> university campus, in > >> different departments, publish in different > >> journals, refer to > >> different founding theorists, and altogether > >> inhabit different > >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about > >> psychology, but generally > >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. > >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an > >> excellent foundation for > >> social theory because he introduced into human > >> development and every > >> interaction between two individuals a > >> culturally produced sign. But he > >> only went so far. He showed how people acted > >> and developed within > >> their social situation, but he did not tackle > >> the problem of how that > >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of > >> the Activity as a > >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making > >> development which opened > >> CHAT to become a fully developed > >> social-and-psychological theory. But > >> what he said himself on questions of social > >> theory was of very poor > >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the > >> sort of ideas that would > >> win any following among social theorists > >> today. But he was after all a > >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he > >> is forgiven. > >> > >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken > >> "objective meaning" is not a > >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. > >> Yes? And personal sense > >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental > >> Psychological category. > >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to > >> say that personal sense is > >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be > >> quite wrong. While I > >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference > >> between material > >> objects/processes and their reflection in my > >> mind, I do not at all > >> understand societal processes as > >> nonpsychological processes. I try to > >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I > >> think I am on my own > >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). > >> There remains of course the distinction > >> between the individual > >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), > >> mediated by the particular > >> (Besonder). A human individual is something > >> radically different from a > >> number of individuals. For the human > >> individual and how they erleben a > >> social situation, I rely on my friends and > >> collaborator-psychologists. > >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In > >> small part to avoid > >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I > >> call activities > >> "projects." > >> So I reserve the right to say things about > >> projects without a follower > >> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a > >> mysterious or esoteric > >> concept; every English-speaker knows what a > >> project is, and if there > >> is any confusion with projects as defined by > >> Existentialists, I call > >> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people > >> usually join them, not > >> create them). These include capitalist firms, > >> political parties, > >> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a > >> family, a professional career > >> - all those things which gives our lives > >> mening while we build the > >> world we and our children must live in, what > >> Fedor Vasilyuk called an > >> ????????? . A project is not a collection of > >> people, it is an > >> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and > >> the "logic" of projects is > >> something different from Psychology, but it is > >> inclusive of Psychology > >> as well. A project is a kind of psychological > >> phenomenon, but it is > >> also much more than psychology, because, as > >> you remind us, people > >> regulate their own behaviour using signs > >> created in the world beyond > >> their ken. Projects are the material substance > >> of Concepts, and I rely > >> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? > >> > >> Everything you said (except how you > >> characterised my > >> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > >> > >> Hi Andy, > >> with great interest, I follow the > >> discussion and your interpretation > >> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between > >> subjective sense and > >> objective meaning. As far as I interpret > >> ANL he presented a very > >> elegant solution of the relation between > >> sense and meaning: For ANL, > >> subjective sense is not a part or subset > >> of objective meaning (as you > >> seem to insinuate him), but a > >> psychological quality that emerges when > >> a person uses societal signs and their > >> objective meanings in order to > >> regulate his or her socially embedded > >> activity. > >> What happens is a transformation of > >> societal meanings into the > >> personal sense of those involved. The > >> personal sense that an > >> individual assigns to interactions, facts, > >> and experiences through > >> the use of signs can be conceptualized not > >> as a subset of societal > >> meanings but as a particular sphere of > >> mind that is constituted by > >> two psychological factors in particular > >> (a) the relation to the > >> motives of the person, and (b) the > >> relation to the situated and > >> sensorially mediated experiences of the > >> individual within the process > >> of internalization. > >> a) People do not appropriate the use of > >> signs and their meanings > >> during social interactions in an impartial > >> way. > >> They interpret and use them in the light > >> of their actually elicited > >> motives along with the motives they assign > >> to the interaction > >> partner. The societal meaning of the used > >> signs does not have to > >> match the individually assigned personal > >> sense. For example, an > >> outsider may well interpret a public fit > >> of rage by a low-ranking > >> bank employee toward his superior as an > >> inexcusable violation of > >> social etiquette. However, for the menial > >> employee, it may well be a > >> reassertion of self-esteem in response to > >> a humiliating directive. > >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also > >> determined by the > >> situatedness and sensory mediation of the > >> previous encounters in > >> which the use of signs is (or was) > >> embedded. Societal meanings are > >> coded primarily not by propositional > >> phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a > >> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) > >> but through their ties to > >> sensorially mediated and situated > >> perceptions?as complex as these > >> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). > >> For example, two persons can > >> use propositional phrases to agree on the > >> same definition of the term > >> ?dog? or ?fear.? > >> These terms, however, will be situated > >> very differently and enriched > >> with other sensory perceptions when one > >> person grew up with a very > >> likeable family dog and the other person > >> experienced a highly > >> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly > >> large and aggressive dog. > >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the > >> meanings assigned to them are > >> subject to an interpersonal process of > >> interpretation and > >> coordination that more or less > >> successfully supports the embodiment > >> and expression of personal sense. People > >> do not have a private > >> ?speech? at their disposal that they can > >> construct and use on their > >> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend > >> on the appropriation and > >> use of conventionalized signs when they > >> want to communicate > >> successfully and satisfy their motives in > >> social interactions. > >> By an act of reflection, the person can > >> try to realize and to become > >> aware of his personal relation and sense > >> of the situation and the > >> used signs, but also this reflection has > >> to fall back on societal > >> signs in order to express this personal > >> relations. So, this is the > >> overall tension between objective meaning > >> of an event or an object > >> and its personal sense for a specific person. > >> Best > >> Manfred > >> > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und > >> Erziehung Westf?lische > >> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > >> D-48149 M?nster > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > >> > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > >> (Sekretariat) > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > >> (Fax) > >> > >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht > >> ml > >> > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > >> > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 28 23:06:06 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 06:06:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?The_Emergence_of_Boundary_Objects?= In-Reply-To: References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> <55b4f50b.edb8420a.7c661.0dd5@mx.google.com> <1438109414921.65790@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <55b86da4.a108460a.68e0.ffff9464@mx.google.com> Sent from Windows Mail From: mike cole Sent: ?Tuesday?, ?July? ?28?, ?2015 ?4?:?00? ?PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity It is great of you to lead us in a wrap up of your paper, Alfredo. The discussion sits in my active arena of attention because it opened up and enriched so many different concerns. We had a thread not that long ago focused on imagination. It might not be a bad idea to return to those threads and pick them up to see what can be woven from them now. I, for example, have always considered the 5th D Dimension as a boundary object even as I have written about it as a tertiary artifact, or, for that matter, a personal experience. In fact, i believe it could be said to be a terrific boundary object for joint exploration among those who, like myself, believe imagination to THE core process in human experience/perezhivanie. But I think we could find the time to look back, at this long thread, we would see that the word imagination (and experience!) are used in somewhat different ways/have slightly different meanings (if we could settle on what we meant by meaning! How could all of that happen if imagination were not there picking up dropped threads, making new ones, and then trying to "make something of it" ? (Of course, now I have to imagine I can remember how to find that prior discussion!) A great learning experience for me. Thanks for the two of you for taking the time to create the discussion. That must be our record long thread. mike On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks all for having brought this discussion to these heights. I am > personally learning a lot, although it's been hard to keep up with it and > deal with other everyday tasks. > > Thanks, Ritva, for emphasizing the links between the discussion and the > article when they may had seemed to be no longer there. I just want to wrap > up in a think-aloud fashion, and from my view, how the issues that have > arisen in the discussion relate, but also expand, on the ideas in our > article; as a learning exercise. > > In the last entry, Larry notes that we need to include an "imaginal" > aspect, not just actions, as part of the larger units of experience(s) that > bring both forth. So the challenge is to think, theorize, research both > action and imagination as aspects of a common unit, and one that is not > only psychological, but also and at the same time societal. > > Following that line of thinking, I want to bring attention back to > "bodies" and "space", which feature prominently in our paper, by means of a > quotation from Nancy (Corpus, 2008): > > "With thoughts about the body, the body always forces us to think farther, > always too far: too far to carry on as thought, but never far enough to > become a body" (p. 37). > > That is, doing, being a body, carries us "too far to carry on (only) as > thought, but never far enough to become (only, purely) body." Thus, there > is not a real division between body and thinking, but a delay, which is but > feature of their unity. In this regard, Nancy argues that bodies are about > spacing (which is another way to say that being is about making place). > Again space crops up as (subject) matter here. Dewey (1929, nature and > experience) refers to that space between the doing and the undergoing in > terms of "an adventure," where "the old self is put off and the new self is > only forming." > > So, if my thinking here makes sense, the challenge is to link this > characterization of being as going through an adventure (an "advening" > (from "advenire") of oneself to oneself, to use Claude Romano's terms) with > that of activity (or collaborative projects) as collective and historical > achievements that provide for the possibility of any experience to go on. > David writes: "In a very important sense the ideal image of the painting > exists long before any action at all is taken." So, although we may take > the first-time-through perspective of the one (body) who goes through an > experience, there is something on place (is on "place" the right word?) > before she does/undergoes it. As Andy notes, playing is done in and through > actions, although play, or the game, is not reducible to any single action. > So play, as a societal feature or category, is larger; it is a method of > organization. And, not many e-mails ago, we did notice Dewey's and > Bentley's reference of experience as precisely that: a method of > organization. But experience and activity are not the same thing; how are > they different? > > So, it seems to me, the difference is not about substance. They both are > about actions, concrete and material. The difference (between experience > and activity) might be then about time. The notion of heterochrony that > Lemke brought in his 2000 paper "scales of time" seems most appealing to me > here, although I do not know of much work that has continued to develop > research in terms of the diachronies and delays that may exist between > history and experiences thereof (or rather there is lots of literature I > don't yet know/understand properly). In any case, these loose ideas seem > relevant for further understanding how creativity and imagination develop > as part of (design, teaching/learning, etc) activities. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Lplarry > Sent: 26 July 2015 16:55 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > David, > > This answer to my struggle shifts or slants everything. > > If we cannot "reduce" or "abstract" actions from "having an experience" > then to be explicit and clear we must also include some other factor that > is "beyond" reducing having "an" experience to just actions. This other > factor is "construal" or "imaginal" phenomena. Having an experience is an > INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE including both the imaginal and actions. > > David the other relation is the unity of "construing" and > "disclosing"/"undergoing" an experience (as a unity or integral phenomena.) > > The relation(s) of the imaginal to action and the slant from which we > approach THIS unity (that cannot be reduced or abstracted) from having an > experience. > How we understand THIS integral phenomena that is extending "beyond" > actions but must necessarily INCLUDE actions > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "David Kellogg" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?25 10:58 PM > To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as > "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it isn't > image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a > Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also why > it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through > actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important sense > the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is > taken. > > David Kellogg > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel > citations > > (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one > who > > insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and > particular! > > > > The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the > > child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in turn > > be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted > process > > but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains > > concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of hypothetical > > mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It is > > all actions which are in one way or another organised around some > artefact, > > and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult > points > > and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is in > > the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an > adult > > learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and > > coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on their > > own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in > > collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. The > > problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in a > > uniform, consistent way. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing > >> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire > psychological > >> meanings. > >> > >> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share > >> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: > >> > >> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its complexity. > >> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, > only > >> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE > through a > >> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to the > >> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general > but > >> also the individual and particular. > >> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a > >> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of > >> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the > >> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO > >> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection and > >> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" > >> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] > >> > >> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In > >> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and > >> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". > >> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of > >> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs > >> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and > >> children learn not only by observing but by > >> participating in those activities. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > >> > >> Hi Andy, > >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have > >> understood your message. You are "travelling" in > >> the social world and discussing Leontyev's > >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. > >> I can now understand your critique that he might > >> believe that something like an objective meaning > >> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of > >> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to > >> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" > >> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of > >> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), > >> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle > >> of different meanings that are also changing with > >> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or > >> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, > >> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate > >> their personal sense by using words and concepts. > >> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it > >> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. > >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative > >> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal > >> with the societal emergence and change of the > >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the > >> link between the social and psychological plane. > >> Best Manfred > >> > >> > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > >> Fliednerstr. 21 > >> D-48149 M?nster > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > >> (Sekretariat) > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > >> (Fax) > >> > >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > >> > >> > >> > >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > >> Von: > >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski > >> = > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] Im > >> Auftrag von Andy Blunden > >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 > >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > >> Objects > >> > >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". > >> :( Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice > >> again on this list. > >> I understand what you are saying. I will try > >> to better explain how I > >> stand with A N Leontyev. > >> > >> I am a social theorist, that is I am > >> interested in changing societal > >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I > >> am one of few social > >> theorists, properly so-called, who base > >> themselves on Vygotsky's > >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My > >> position is a > >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and > >> Leontyev were psychologists > >> (like > >> you) and not social theorists. Social > >> Theorists and Psychologists > >> generally live in different buildings on the > >> university campus, in > >> different departments, publish in different > >> journals, refer to > >> different founding theorists, and altogether > >> inhabit different > >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about > >> psychology, but generally > >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. > >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an > >> excellent foundation for > >> social theory because he introduced into human > >> development and every > >> interaction between two individuals a > >> culturally produced sign. But he > >> only went so far. He showed how people acted > >> and developed within > >> their social situation, but he did not tackle > >> the problem of how that > >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of > >> the Activity as a > >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making > >> development which opened > >> CHAT to become a fully developed > >> social-and-psychological theory. But > >> what he said himself on questions of social > >> theory was of very poor > >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the > >> sort of ideas that would > >> win any following among social theorists > >> today. But he was after all a > >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he > >> is forgiven. > >> > >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken > >> "objective meaning" is not a > >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. > >> Yes? And personal sense > >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental > >> Psychological category. > >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to > >> say that personal sense is > >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be > >> quite wrong. While I > >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference > >> between material > >> objects/processes and their reflection in my > >> mind, I do not at all > >> understand societal processes as > >> nonpsychological processes. I try to > >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I > >> think I am on my own > >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). > >> There remains of course the distinction > >> between the individual > >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), > >> mediated by the particular > >> (Besonder). A human individual is something > >> radically different from a > >> number of individuals. For the human > >> individual and how they erleben a > >> social situation, I rely on my friends and > >> collaborator-psychologists. > >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In > >> small part to avoid > >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I > >> call activities > >> "projects." > >> So I reserve the right to say things about > >> projects without a follower > >> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a > >> mysterious or esoteric > >> concept; every English-speaker knows what a > >> project is, and if there > >> is any confusion with projects as defined by > >> Existentialists, I call > >> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people > >> usually join them, not > >> create them). These include capitalist firms, > >> political parties, > >> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a > >> family, a professional career > >> - all those things which gives our lives > >> mening while we build the > >> world we and our children must live in, what > >> Fedor Vasilyuk called an > >> ????????? . A project is not a collection of > >> people, it is an > >> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and > >> the "logic" of projects is > >> something different from Psychology, but it is > >> inclusive of Psychology > >> as well. A project is a kind of psychological > >> phenomenon, but it is > >> also much more than psychology, because, as > >> you remind us, people > >> regulate their own behaviour using signs > >> created in the world beyond > >> their ken. Projects are the material substance > >> of Concepts, and I rely > >> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? > >> > >> Everything you said (except how you > >> characterised my > >> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > >> > >> Hi Andy, > >> with great interest, I follow the > >> discussion and your interpretation > >> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between > >> subjective sense and > >> objective meaning. As far as I interpret > >> ANL he presented a very > >> elegant solution of the relation between > >> sense and meaning: For ANL, > >> subjective sense is not a part or subset > >> of objective meaning (as you > >> seem to insinuate him), but a > >> psychological quality that emerges when > >> a person uses societal signs and their > >> objective meanings in order to > >> regulate his or her socially embedded > >> activity. > >> What happens is a transformation of > >> societal meanings into the > >> personal sense of those involved. The > >> personal sense that an > >> individual assigns to interactions, facts, > >> and experiences through > >> the use of signs can be conceptualized not > >> as a subset of societal > >> meanings but as a particular sphere of > >> mind that is constituted by > >> two psychological factors in particular > >> (a) the relation to the > >> motives of the person, and (b) the > >> relation to the situated and > >> sensorially mediated experiences of the > >> individual within the process > >> of internalization. > >> a) People do not appropriate the use of > >> signs and their meanings > >> during social interactions in an impartial > >> way. > >> They interpret and use them in the light > >> of their actually elicited > >> motives along with the motives they assign > >> to the interaction > >> partner. The societal meaning of the used > >> signs does not have to > >> match the individually assigned personal > >> sense. For example, an > >> outsider may well interpret a public fit > >> of rage by a low-ranking > >> bank employee toward his superior as an > >> inexcusable violation of > >> social etiquette. However, for the menial > >> employee, it may well be a > >> reassertion of self-esteem in response to > >> a humiliating directive. > >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also > >> determined by the > >> situatedness and sensory mediation of the > >> previous encounters in > >> which the use of signs is (or was) > >> embedded. Societal meanings are > >> coded primarily not by propositional > >> phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a > >> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) > >> but through their ties to > >> sensorially mediated and situated > >> perceptions?as complex as these > >> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). > >> For example, two persons can > >> use propositional phrases to agree on the > >> same definition of the term > >> ?dog? or ?fear.? > >> These terms, however, will be situated > >> very differently and enriched > >> with other sensory perceptions when one > >> person grew up with a very > >> likeable family dog and the other person > >> experienced a highly > >> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly > >> large and aggressive dog. > >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the > >> meanings assigned to them are > >> subject to an interpersonal process of > >> interpretation and > >> coordination that more or less > >> successfully supports the embodiment > >> and expression of personal sense. People > >> do not have a private > >> ?speech? at their disposal that they can > >> construct and use on their > >> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend > >> on the appropriation and > >> use of conventionalized signs when they > >> want to communicate > >> successfully and satisfy their motives in > >> social interactions. > >> By an act of reflection, the person can > >> try to realize and to become > >> aware of his personal relation and sense > >> of the situation and the > >> used signs, but also this reflection has > >> to fall back on societal > >> signs in order to express this personal > >> relations. So, this is the > >> overall tension between objective meaning > >> of an event or an object > >> and its personal sense for a specific person. > >> Best > >> Manfred > >> > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und > >> Erziehung Westf?lische > >> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > >> D-48149 M?nster > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > >> > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > >> (Sekretariat) > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > >> (Fax) > >> > >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht > >> ml > >> > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > >> > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 28 23:12:18 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 06:12:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?The_Emergence_of_Boundary_Objects?= In-Reply-To: References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> <55b4f50b.edb8420a.7c661.0dd5@mx.google.com> <1438109414921.65790@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <55b87b4d.885e460a.1ac8.ffff9d88@mx.google.com> Alfredo I certainly had an experience undergoing the ?readings? shared this month generated from the article focusing on "boundary objects". The other articles supporting this ?reading? and the lively adventure we all undertook together. I want to draw attention to the contrasting "traditions" [CHAT, pragmatism, phenomenology] that offered an opportunity to read each particular article "through" the structure and pattern of the other traditions. There may be a "place" for this type of activity as an integral experience. Alfredo, I experience you as "reading" this way when you quoted Nancy and then went "beyond". You commented: "With thoughts about the body, the body always forces us to think farther, always too far: too far to carry on as thought, but never far enough to become a body" (p. 37). That is, doing, being a body, carries us "too far to carry on (only) as thought, but never far enough to become (only, purely) body." Thus, there is not a real division between body and thinking, but a delay, which is but feature of their unity. In this regard, Nancy argues that bodies are about spacing (which is another way to say that being is about making place). Again space crops up as (subject) matter here. Dewey (1929, nature and experience) refers to that space between the doing and the undergoing in terms of "an adventure," where "the old self is put off and the new self is only forming." So, if my thinking here makes sense, the challenge is to link this characterization of being as going through an adventure (an "advening" (from "advenire") of oneself to oneself, to use Claude Romano's terms) with that of activity (or collaborative projects) as collective and historical achievements that provide for the possibility of any experience to go on" I will add my commentary to emphasize that the [subject] matter [to be integral] has the quality of both doing and undergoing and also THAT space which Dewey refers to in terms of ?an adventure?. It seems possible that each "tradition" emphasizes one aspect "doing" or "undergoing" or the "space? as more accentuated but the adventure includes an integral intelligence. The imaginal is implicated in this adventure and Dewey's term "perception" [not to be confused with ?recognizing] as FELT integral EXPERIENCE MAY BE A KEY ASPECT OF THIS ADVENTURE. In Nancy's words, not [only] thought, not [only] body but including "spacing". In other words "making place" [dwelling with] within the adventure. This I experience as the reading/perceiving adventure alfredo, thank you for such stimulating thinking out loud. t Sent from Windows Mail From: mike cole Sent: ?Tuesday?, ?July? ?28?, ?2015 ?4?:?00? ?PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity It is great of you to lead us in a wrap up of your paper, Alfredo. The discussion sits in my active arena of attention because it opened up and enriched so many different concerns. We had acei thread nothank you that long ago focused on imagination. It might not be ain bad idea to return to those threads and pick them up to see what can be woven from them now. I, for example, have always considered the 5th D Dimension as a boundary object even as I have written about it as a tertiary artifact, or, for that matter, a personal experience. In fact, i believe it could be said to be a terrific boundary object for joint exploration among those who, like myself, believe imagination to THE core process in human experience/perezhivanie. But I think we could find the time to look back, at this long thread, we would see that the word imagination (and experience!) are used in somewhat different ways/have slightly different meanings (if we could settle on what we meant by meaning! How could all of that happen if imagination were not there picking up dropped threads, making new ones, and then trying to "make something of it" ? (Of course, now I have to imagine I can remember how to find that prior discussion!) A great learning experience for me. Thanks for the two of you for taking the time to create the discussion. That must be our record long thread. mike On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks all for having brought this discussion to these heights. I am > personally learning a lot, although it's been hard to keep up with it and > deal with other everyday tasks. > > Thanks, Ritva, for emphasizing the links between the discussion and the > article when they may had seemed to be no longer there. I just want to wrap > up in a think-aloud fashion, and from my view, how the issues that have > arisen in the discussion relate, but also expand, on the ideas in our > article; as a learning exercise. > > In the last entry, Larry notes that we need to include an "imaginal" > aspect, not just actions, as part of the larger units of experience(s) that > bring both forth. So the challenge is to think, theorize, research both > action and imagination as aspects of a common unit, and one that is not > only psychological, but also and at the same time societal. > > Following that line of thinking, I want to bring attention back to > "bodies" and "space", which feature prominently in our paper, by means of a > quotation from Nancy (Corpus, 2008): > > "With thoughts about the body, the body always forces us to think farther, > always too far: too far to carry on as thought, but never far enough to > become a body" (p. 37). > > That is, doing, being a body, carries us "too far to carry on (only) as > thought, but never far enough to become (only, purely) body." Thus, there > is not a real division between body and thinking, but a delay, which is but > feature of their unity. In this regard, Nancy argues that bodies are about > spacing (which is another way to say that being is about making place). > Again space crops up as (subject) matter here. Dewey (1929, nature and > experience) refers to that space between the doing and the undergoing in > terms of "an adventure," where "the old self is put off and the new self is > only forming." > > So, if my thinking here makes sense, the challenge is to link this > characterization of being as going through an adventure (an "advening" > (from "advenire") of oneself to oneself, to use Claude Romano's terms) with > that of activity (or collaborative projects) as collective and historical > achievements that provide for the possibility of any experience to go on. > David writes: "In a very important sense the ideal image of the painting > exists long before any action at all is taken." So, although we may take > the first-time-through perspective of the one (body) who goes through an > experience, there is something on place (is on "place" the right word?) > before she does/undergoes it. As Andy notes, playing is done in and through > actions, although play, or the game, is not reducible to any single action. > So play, as a societal feature or category, is larger; it is a method of > organization. And, not many e-mails ago, we did notice Dewey's and > Bentley's reference of experience as precisely that: a method of > organization. But experience and activity are not the same thing; how are > they different? > > So, it seems to me, the difference is not about substance. They both are > about actions, concrete and material. The difference (between experience > and activity) might be then about time. The notion of heterochrony that > Lemke brought in his 2000 paper "scales of time" seems most appealing to me > here, although I do not know of much work that has continued to develop > research in terms of the diachronies and delays that may exist between > history and experiences thereof (or rather there is lots of literature I > don't yet know/understand properly). In any case, these loose ideas seem > relevant for further understanding how creativity and imagination develop > as part of (design, teaching/learning, etc) activities. > > Thanks, > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Lplarry > Sent: 26 July 2015 16:55 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > David, > > This answer to my struggle shifts or slants everything. > > If we cannot "reduce" or "abstract" actions from "having an experience" > then to be explicit and clear we must also include some other factor that > is "beyond" reducing having "an" experience to just actions. This other > factor is "construal" or "imaginal" phenomena. Having an experience is an > INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE including both the imaginal and actions. > > David the other relation is the unity of "construing" and > "disclosing"/"undergoing" an experience (as a unity or integral phenomena.) > > The relation(s) of the imaginal to action and the slant from which we > approach THIS unity (that cannot be reduced or abstracted) from having an > experience. > How we understand THIS integral phenomena that is extending "beyond" > actions but must necessarily INCLUDE actions > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "David Kellogg" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?25 10:58 PM > To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as > "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it isn't > image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a > Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also why > it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through > actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important sense > the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is > taken. > > David Kellogg > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel > citations > > (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one > who > > insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and > particular! > > > > The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the > > child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in turn > > be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted > process > > but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains > > concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of hypothetical > > mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It is > > all actions which are in one way or another organised around some > artefact, > > and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult > points > > and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is in > > the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an > adult > > learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and > > coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on their > > own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in > > collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. The > > problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in a > > uniform, consistent way. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing > >> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire > psychological > >> meanings. > >> > >> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share > >> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: > >> > >> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its complexity. > >> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, > only > >> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE > through a > >> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to the > >> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general > but > >> also the individual and particular. > >> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a > >> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of > >> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the > >> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO > >> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection and > >> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" > >> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] > >> > >> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In > >> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and > >> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". > >> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of > >> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs > >> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and > >> children learn not only by observing but by > >> participating in those activities. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > >> > >> Hi Andy, > >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have > >> understood your message. You are "travelling" in > >> the social world and discussing Leontyev's > >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. > >> I can now understand your critique that he might > >> believe that something like an objective meaning > >> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of > >> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to > >> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" > >> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of > >> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), > >> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle > >> of different meanings that are also changing with > >> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or > >> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, > >> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate > >> their personal sense by using words and concepts. > >> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it > >> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. > >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative > >> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal > >> with the societal emergence and change of the > >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the > >> link between the social and psychological plane. > >> Best Manfred > >> > >> > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > >> Fliednerstr. 21 > >> D-48149 M?nster > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > >> (Sekretariat) > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > >> (Fax) > >> > >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > >> > >> > >> > >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > >> Von: > >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski > >> = > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> ] Im > >> Auftrag von Andy Blunden > >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 > >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > >> Objects > >> > >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". > >> :( Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice > >> again on this list. > >> I understand what you are saying. I will try > >> to better explain how I > >> stand with A N Leontyev. > >> > >> I am a social theorist, that is I am > >> interested in changing societal > >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I > >> am one of few social > >> theorists, properly so-called, who base > >> themselves on Vygotsky's > >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My > >> position is a > >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and > >> Leontyev were psychologists > >> (like > >> you) and not social theorists. Social > >> Theorists and Psychologists > >> generally live in different buildings on the > >> university campus, in > >> different departments, publish in different > >> journals, refer to > >> different founding theorists, and altogether > >> inhabit different > >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about > >> psychology, but generally > >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. > >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an > >> excellent foundation for > >> social theory because he introduced into human > >> development and every > >> interaction between two individuals a > >> culturally produced sign. But he > >> only went so far. He showed how people acted > >> and developed within > >> their social situation, but he did not tackle > >> the problem of how that > >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of > >> the Activity as a > >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making > >> development which opened > >> CHAT to become a fully developed > >> social-and-psychological theory. But > >> what he said himself on questions of social > >> theory was of very poor > >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the > >> sort of ideas that would > >> win any following among social theorists > >> today. But he was after all a > >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he > >> is forgiven. > >> > >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken > >> "objective meaning" is not a > >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. > >> Yes? And personal sense > >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental > >> Psychological category. > >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to > >> say that personal sense is > >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be > >> quite wrong. While I > >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference > >> between material > >> objects/processes and their reflection in my > >> mind, I do not at all > >> understand societal processes as > >> nonpsychological processes. I try to > >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I > >> think I am on my own > >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). > >> There remains of course the distinction > >> between the individual > >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), > >> mediated by the particular > >> (Besonder). A human individual is something > >> radically different from a > >> number of individuals. For the human > >> individual and how they erleben a > >> social situation, I rely on my friends and > >> collaborator-psychologists. > >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In > >> small part to avoid > >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I > >> call activities > >> "projects." > >> So I reserve the right to say things about > >> projects without a follower > >> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a > >> mysterious or esoteric > >> concept; every English-speaker knows what a > >> project is, and if there > >> is any confusion with projects as defined by > >> Existentialists, I call > >> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people > >> usually join them, not > >> create them). These include capitalist firms, > >> political parties, > >> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a > >> family, a professional career > >> - all those things which gives our lives > >> mening while we build the > >> world we and our children must live in, what > >> Fedor Vasilyuk called an > >> ????????? . A project is not a collection of > >> people, it is an > >> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and > >> the "logic" of projects is > >> something different from Psychology, but it is > >> inclusive of Psychology > >> as well. A project is a kind of psychological > >> phenomenon, but it is > >> also much more than psychology, because, as > >> you remind us, people > >> regulate their own behaviour using signs > >> created in the world beyond > >> their ken. Projects are the material substance > >> of Concepts, and I rely > >> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? > >> > >> Everything you said (except how you > >> characterised my > >> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > >> > >> Hi Andy, > >> with great interest, I follow the > >> discussion and your interpretation > >> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between > >> subjective sense and > >> objective meaning. As far as I interpret > >> ANL he presented a very > >> elegant solution of the relation between > >> sense and meaning: For ANL, > >> subjective sense is not a part or subset > >> of objective meaning (as you > >> seem to insinuate him), but a > >> psychological quality that emerges when > >> a person uses societal signs and their > >> objective meanings in order to > >> regulate his or her socially embedded > >> activity. > >> What happens is a transformation of > >> societal meanings into the > >> personal sense of those involved. The > >> personal sense that an > >> individual assigns to interactions, facts, > >> and experiences through > >> the use of signs can be conceptualized not > >> as a subset of societal > >> meanings but as a particular sphere of > >> mind that is constituted by > >> two psychological factors in particular > >> (a) the relation to the > >> motives of the person, and (b) the > >> relation to the situated and > >> sensorially mediated experiences of the > >> individual within the process > >> of internalization. > >> a) People do not appropriate the use of > >> signs and their meanings > >> during social interactions in an impartial > >> way. > >> They interpret and use them in the light > >> of their actually elicited > >> motives along with the motives they assign > >> to the interaction > >> partner. The societal meaning of the used > >> signs does not have to > >> match the individually assigned personal > >> sense. For example, an > >> outsider may well interpret a public fit > >> of rage by a low-ranking > >> bank employee toward his superior as an > >> inexcusable violation of > >> social etiquette. However, for the menial > >> employee, it may well be a > >> reassertion of self-esteem in response to > >> a humiliating directive. > >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also > >> determined by the > >> situatedness and sensory mediation of the > >> previous encounters in > >> which the use of signs is (or was) > >> embedded. Societal meanings are > >> coded primarily not by propositional > >> phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a > >> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) > >> but through their ties to > >> sensorially mediated and situated > >> perceptions?as complex as these > >> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). > >> For example, two persons can > >> use propositional phrases to agree on the > >> same definition of the term > >> ?dog? or ?fear.? > >> These terms, however, will be situated > >> very differently and enriched > >> with other sensory perceptions when one > >> person grew up with a very > >> likeable family dog and the other person > >> experienced a highly > >> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly > >> large and aggressive dog. > >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the > >> meanings assigned to them are > >> subject to an interpersonal process of > >> interpretation and > >> coordination that more or less > >> successfully supports the embodiment > >> and expression of personal sense. People > >> do not have a private > >> ?speech? at their disposal that they can > >> construct and use on their > >> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend > >> on the appropriation and > >> use of conventionalized signs when they > >> want to communicate > >> successfully and satisfy their motives in > >> social interactions. > >> By an act of reflection, the person can > >> try to realize and to become > >> aware of his personal relation and sense > >> of the situation and the > >> used signs, but also this reflection has > >> to fall back on societal > >> signs in order to express this personal > >> relations. So, this is the > >> overall tension between objective meaning > >> of an event or an object > >> and its personal sense for a specific person. > >> Best > >> Manfred > >> > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und > >> Erziehung Westf?lische > >> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > >> D-48149 M?nster > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > >> > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > >> (Sekretariat) > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > >> (Fax) > >> > >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht > >> ml > >> > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > >> > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > -- Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, Ecological Niche, 2008) From rolfsteier@gmail.com Wed Jul 29 01:57:46 2015 From: rolfsteier@gmail.com (Rolf Steier) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 10:57:46 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> <55b4f50b.edb8420a.7c661.0dd5@mx.google.com> <1438109414921.65790@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thank you to everyone for such an engaging conversation! This thread has developed into a really rich resource and I'm looking forward to returning to it over the coming year as there is quite a bit to unpack. Rolf On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 1:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > It is great of you to lead us in a wrap up of your paper, Alfredo. The > discussion sits in my active arena of attention because it opened up and > enriched so many different concerns. > > We had a thread not that long ago focused on imagination. It might not be a > bad idea to return to those threads and pick them up to see what can be > woven from them now. I, for example, have always considered the 5th D > Dimension as a boundary object even as I have > written about it as a tertiary artifact, or, for that matter, a personal > experience. In fact, i believe it could be said to be a terrific boundary > object for joint exploration among those who, like > myself, believe imagination to THE core process in human > experience/perezhivanie. But I think we could find the time to look back, > at this long thread, we would see that the word imagination (and > experience!) are used in somewhat different ways/have slightly different > meanings (if we could settle on what we meant by meaning! > > How could all of that happen if imagination were not there picking up > dropped threads, making new ones, and then trying to "make something of it" > ? > > (Of course, now I have to imagine I can remember how to find that prior > discussion!) > > A great learning experience for me. > > Thanks for the two of you for taking the time to create the discussion. > That must be our record long thread. > > mike > > On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Thanks all for having brought this discussion to these heights. I am > > personally learning a lot, although it's been hard to keep up with it and > > deal with other everyday tasks. > > > > Thanks, Ritva, for emphasizing the links between the discussion and the > > article when they may had seemed to be no longer there. I just want to > wrap > > up in a think-aloud fashion, and from my view, how the issues that have > > arisen in the discussion relate, but also expand, on the ideas in our > > article; as a learning exercise. > > > > In the last entry, Larry notes that we need to include an "imaginal" > > aspect, not just actions, as part of the larger units of experience(s) > that > > bring both forth. So the challenge is to think, theorize, research both > > action and imagination as aspects of a common unit, and one that is not > > only psychological, but also and at the same time societal. > > > > Following that line of thinking, I want to bring attention back to > > "bodies" and "space", which feature prominently in our paper, by means > of a > > quotation from Nancy (Corpus, 2008): > > > > "With thoughts about the body, the body always forces us to think > farther, > > always too far: too far to carry on as thought, but never far enough to > > become a body" (p. 37). > > > > That is, doing, being a body, carries us "too far to carry on (only) as > > thought, but never far enough to become (only, purely) body." Thus, there > > is not a real division between body and thinking, but a delay, which is > but > > feature of their unity. In this regard, Nancy argues that bodies are > about > > spacing (which is another way to say that being is about making place). > > Again space crops up as (subject) matter here. Dewey (1929, nature and > > experience) refers to that space between the doing and the undergoing in > > terms of "an adventure," where "the old self is put off and the new self > is > > only forming." > > > > So, if my thinking here makes sense, the challenge is to link this > > characterization of being as going through an adventure (an "advening" > > (from "advenire") of oneself to oneself, to use Claude Romano's terms) > with > > that of activity (or collaborative projects) as collective and historical > > achievements that provide for the possibility of any experience to go on. > > David writes: "In a very important sense the ideal image of the painting > > exists long before any action at all is taken." So, although we may take > > the first-time-through perspective of the one (body) who goes through an > > experience, there is something on place (is on "place" the right word?) > > before she does/undergoes it. As Andy notes, playing is done in and > through > > actions, although play, or the game, is not reducible to any single > action. > > So play, as a societal feature or category, is larger; it is a method of > > organization. And, not many e-mails ago, we did notice Dewey's and > > Bentley's reference of experience as precisely that: a method of > > organization. But experience and activity are not the same thing; how are > > they different? > > > > So, it seems to me, the difference is not about substance. They both are > > about actions, concrete and material. The difference (between experience > > and activity) might be then about time. The notion of heterochrony that > > Lemke brought in his 2000 paper "scales of time" seems most appealing to > me > > here, although I do not know of much work that has continued to develop > > research in terms of the diachronies and delays that may exist between > > history and experiences thereof (or rather there is lots of literature I > > don't yet know/understand properly). In any case, these loose ideas seem > > relevant for further understanding how creativity and imagination develop > > as part of (design, teaching/learning, etc) activities. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > Lplarry > > Sent: 26 July 2015 16:55 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > David, > > > > This answer to my struggle shifts or slants everything. > > > > If we cannot "reduce" or "abstract" actions from "having an experience" > > then to be explicit and clear we must also include some other factor that > > is "beyond" reducing having "an" experience to just actions. This other > > factor is "construal" or "imaginal" phenomena. Having an experience is an > > INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE including both the imaginal and actions. > > > > David the other relation is the unity of "construing" and > > "disclosing"/"undergoing" an experience (as a unity or integral > phenomena.) > > > > The relation(s) of the imaginal to action and the slant from which we > > approach THIS unity (that cannot be reduced or abstracted) from having an > > experience. > > How we understand THIS integral phenomena that is extending "beyond" > > actions but must necessarily INCLUDE actions > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "David Kellogg" > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?25 10:58 PM > > To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as > > "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it > isn't > > image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a > > Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also > why > > it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through > > actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important > sense > > the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is > > taken. > > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel > > citations > > > (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one > > who > > > insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and > > particular! > > > > > > The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the > > > child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in > turn > > > be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted > > process > > > but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains > > > concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of > hypothetical > > > mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It > is > > > all actions which are in one way or another organised around some > > artefact, > > > and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult > > points > > > and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is > in > > > the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an > > adult > > > learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and > > > coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on > their > > > own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in > > > collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. > The > > > problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in > a > > > uniform, consistent way. > > > > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing > > >> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire > > psychological > > >> meanings. > > >> > > >> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share > > >> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: > > >> > > >> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its > complexity. > > >> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, > > only > > >> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE > > through a > > >> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to > the > > >> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general > > but > > >> also the individual and particular. > > >> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a > > >> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of > > >> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of > the > > >> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO > > >> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection > and > > >> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" > > >> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] > > >> > > >> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In > > >> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and > > >> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". > > >> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > >> > > >> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. > > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of > > >> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs > > >> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and > > >> children learn not only by observing but by > > >> participating in those activities. > > >> Andy > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi Andy, > > >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have > > >> understood your message. You are "travelling" in > > >> the social world and discussing Leontyev's > > >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. > > >> I can now understand your critique that he might > > >> believe that something like an objective meaning > > >> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of > > >> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to > > >> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" > > >> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of > > >> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), > > >> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle > > >> of different meanings that are also changing with > > >> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or > > >> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, > > >> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate > > >> their personal sense by using words and concepts. > > >> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it > > >> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. > > >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative > > >> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal > > >> with the societal emergence and change of the > > >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the > > >> link between the social and psychological plane. > > >> Best Manfred > > >> > > >> > > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > > >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > > >> Fliednerstr. 21 > > >> D-48149 M?nster > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > > >> (Sekretariat) > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > > >> (Fax) > > >> > > >> > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > > >> Von: > > >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= > > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski > > >> = > > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> ] Im > > >> Auftrag von Andy Blunden > > >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 > > >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > >> Objects > > >> > > >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". > > >> :( Andy > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice > > >> again on this list. > > >> I understand what you are saying. I will try > > >> to better explain how I > > >> stand with A N Leontyev. > > >> > > >> I am a social theorist, that is I am > > >> interested in changing societal > > >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I > > >> am one of few social > > >> theorists, properly so-called, who base > > >> themselves on Vygotsky's > > >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My > > >> position is a > > >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and > > >> Leontyev were psychologists > > >> (like > > >> you) and not social theorists. Social > > >> Theorists and Psychologists > > >> generally live in different buildings on the > > >> university campus, in > > >> different departments, publish in different > > >> journals, refer to > > >> different founding theorists, and altogether > > >> inhabit different > > >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about > > >> psychology, but generally > > >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. > > >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an > > >> excellent foundation for > > >> social theory because he introduced into human > > >> development and every > > >> interaction between two individuals a > > >> culturally produced sign. But he > > >> only went so far. He showed how people acted > > >> and developed within > > >> their social situation, but he did not tackle > > >> the problem of how that > > >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of > > >> the Activity as a > > >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making > > >> development which opened > > >> CHAT to become a fully developed > > >> social-and-psychological theory. But > > >> what he said himself on questions of social > > >> theory was of very poor > > >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the > > >> sort of ideas that would > > >> win any following among social theorists > > >> today. But he was after all a > > >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he > > >> is forgiven. > > >> > > >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken > > >> "objective meaning" is not a > > >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. > > >> Yes? And personal sense > > >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental > > >> Psychological category. > > >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to > > >> say that personal sense is > > >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be > > >> quite wrong. While I > > >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference > > >> between material > > >> objects/processes and their reflection in my > > >> mind, I do not at all > > >> understand societal processes as > > >> nonpsychological processes. I try to > > >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I > > >> think I am on my own > > >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). > > >> There remains of course the distinction > > >> between the individual > > >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), > > >> mediated by the particular > > >> (Besonder). A human individual is something > > >> radically different from a > > >> number of individuals. For the human > > >> individual and how they erleben a > > >> social situation, I rely on my friends and > > >> collaborator-psychologists. > > >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In > > >> small part to avoid > > >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I > > >> call activities > > >> "projects." > > >> So I reserve the right to say things about > > >> projects without a follower > > >> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a > > >> mysterious or esoteric > > >> concept; every English-speaker knows what a > > >> project is, and if there > > >> is any confusion with projects as defined by > > >> Existentialists, I call > > >> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people > > >> usually join them, not > > >> create them). These include capitalist firms, > > >> political parties, > > >> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a > > >> family, a professional career > > >> - all those things which gives our lives > > >> mening while we build the > > >> world we and our children must live in, what > > >> Fedor Vasilyuk called an > > >> ????????? . A project is not a collection of > > >> people, it is an > > >> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and > > >> the "logic" of projects is > > >> something different from Psychology, but it is > > >> inclusive of Psychology > > >> as well. A project is a kind of psychological > > >> phenomenon, but it is > > >> also much more than psychology, because, as > > >> you remind us, people > > >> regulate their own behaviour using signs > > >> created in the world beyond > > >> their ken. Projects are the material substance > > >> of Concepts, and I rely > > >> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK? > > >> > > >> Everything you said (except how you > > >> characterised my > > >> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?! > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi Andy, > > >> with great interest, I follow the > > >> discussion and your interpretation > > >> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between > > >> subjective sense and > > >> objective meaning. As far as I interpret > > >> ANL he presented a very > > >> elegant solution of the relation between > > >> sense and meaning: For ANL, > > >> subjective sense is not a part or subset > > >> of objective meaning (as you > > >> seem to insinuate him), but a > > >> psychological quality that emerges when > > >> a person uses societal signs and their > > >> objective meanings in order to > > >> regulate his or her socially embedded > > >> activity. > > >> What happens is a transformation of > > >> societal meanings into the > > >> personal sense of those involved. The > > >> personal sense that an > > >> individual assigns to interactions, facts, > > >> and experiences through > > >> the use of signs can be conceptualized not > > >> as a subset of societal > > >> meanings but as a particular sphere of > > >> mind that is constituted by > > >> two psychological factors in particular > > >> (a) the relation to the > > >> motives of the person, and (b) the > > >> relation to the situated and > > >> sensorially mediated experiences of the > > >> individual within the process > > >> of internalization. > > >> a) People do not appropriate the use of > > >> signs and their meanings > > >> during social interactions in an impartial > > >> way. > > >> They interpret and use them in the light > > >> of their actually elicited > > >> motives along with the motives they assign > > >> to the interaction > > >> partner. The societal meaning of the used > > >> signs does not have to > > >> match the individually assigned personal > > >> sense. For example, an > > >> outsider may well interpret a public fit > > >> of rage by a low-ranking > > >> bank employee toward his superior as an > > >> inexcusable violation of > > >> social etiquette. However, for the menial > > >> employee, it may well be a > > >> reassertion of self-esteem in response to > > >> a humiliating directive. > > >> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also > > >> determined by the > > >> situatedness and sensory mediation of the > > >> previous encounters in > > >> which the use of signs is (or was) > > >> embedded. Societal meanings are > > >> coded primarily not by propositional > > >> phrases (e.g., ?a dog is a > > >> mammal? or ?wide-open eyes signal fear?) > > >> but through their ties to > > >> sensorially mediated and situated > > >> perceptions?as complex as these > > >> interrelations may be (Leont?ev, 1978). > > >> For example, two persons can > > >> use propositional phrases to agree on the > > >> same definition of the term > > >> ?dog? or ?fear.? > > >> These terms, however, will be situated > > >> very differently and enriched > > >> with other sensory perceptions when one > > >> person grew up with a very > > >> likeable family dog and the other person > > >> experienced a highly > > >> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly > > >> large and aggressive dog. > > >> Thus, conventionalized signs and the > > >> meanings assigned to them are > > >> subject to an interpersonal process of > > >> interpretation and > > >> coordination that more or less > > >> successfully supports the embodiment > > >> and expression of personal sense. People > > >> do not have a private > > >> ?speech? at their disposal that they can > > >> construct and use on their > > >> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend > > >> on the appropriation and > > >> use of conventionalized signs when they > > >> want to communicate > > >> successfully and satisfy their motives in > > >> social interactions. > > >> By an act of reflection, the person can > > >> try to realize and to become > > >> aware of his personal relation and sense > > >> of the situation and the > > >> used signs, but also this reflection has > > >> to fall back on societal > > >> signs in order to express this personal > > >> relations. So, this is the > > >> overall tension between objective meaning > > >> of an event or an object > > >> and its personal sense for a specific person. > > >> Best > > >> Manfred > > >> > > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und > > >> Erziehung Westf?lische > > >> Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster Fliednerstr. 21 > > >> D-48149 M?nster > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > > >> > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > > >> (Sekretariat) > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > > >> (Fax) > > >> > > >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht > > >> ml > > >> > > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > >> > > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > > -- > > Both environment and species change in the course of time, and thus > ecological niches are not stable and given forever (Polotova & Storch, > Ecological Niche, 2008) > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 29 09:00:48 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 09:00:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> <55b4f50b.edb8420a.7c661.0dd5@mx.google.com> <1438109414921.65790@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <55b8f8c1.4267460a.4d8db.1039@mx.google.com> A further thought about "boundary objects" which shares qualities with the notion of Winnicott's "transitional" objects using Dewey's insights. Art/product in its form unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience. Because of elimination of all that does not contribute to mutual organization of the factors of BOTH action and perception INTO ONE ANOTHER and because of selection of just the aspects and traits that contribute to their INTERPENETRATION OF EACH OTHER, the art/product is a work of aesthetic art. The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of SUCH A NATURE that its QUALITIES AS PERCEIVED have controlled the QUESTION OF production. The act of producing that is directed by intent to produce something that is enjoyed in the immediate experience OF PERCEIVING has qualities that a spontaneous or uncontrolled activity does not have. The artist/producer EMBODIES IN HIMSELF THE ATTITUDE (the disposition) of the perceived while he works. Doing to be artistic in the FINAL SENSE must be "loving"; it must CARE DEEPLY for the subject matter upon which artistic skill is exercised. These are Dewey's words indicating a relation to boundary objects that develops. To "perceive" this relation requires intelligence that is always felt experience. It also emphasizes "development" of attitude/disposition/style. Not particular "positions" taken and held constant BUT a position on positions. Meta-positions as an attitude towards positions. Always both doing and undergoing linked through spaces of adventure that always INTERPENETRATE EACH OTHER. Boundary objects embody this adventure. -----Original Message----- From: "Rolf Steier" Sent: ?2015-?07-?29 1:59 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects Thank you to everyone for such an engaging conversation! This thread has developed into a really rich resource and I'm looking forward to returning to it over the coming year as there is quite a bit to unpack. Rolf On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 1:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > It is great of you to lead us in a wrap up of your paper, Alfredo. The > discussion sits in my active arena of attention because it opened up and > enriched so many different concerns. > > We had a thread not that long ago focused on imagination. It might not be a > bad idea to return to those threads and pick them up to see what can be > woven from them now. I, for example, have always considered the 5th D > Dimension as a boundary object even as I have > written about it as a tertiary artifact, or, for that matter, a personal > experience. In fact, i believe it could be said to be a terrific boundary > object for joint exploration among those who, like > myself, believe imagination to THE core process in human > experience/perezhivanie. But I think we could find the time to look back, > at this long thread, we would see that the word imagination (and > experience!) are used in somewhat different ways/have slightly different > meanings (if we could settle on what we meant by meaning! > > How could all of that happen if imagination were not there picking up > dropped threads, making new ones, and then trying to "make something of it" > ? > > (Of course, now I have to imagine I can remember how to find that prior > discussion!) > > A great learning experience for me. > > Thanks for the two of you for taking the time to create the discussion. > That must be our record long thread. > > mike > > On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Thanks all for having brought this discussion to these heights. I am > > personally learning a lot, although it's been hard to keep up with it and > > deal with other everyday tasks. > > > > Thanks, Ritva, for emphasizing the links between the discussion and the > > article when they may had seemed to be no longer there. I just want to > wrap > > up in a think-aloud fashion, and from my view, how the issues that have > > arisen in the discussion relate, but also expand, on the ideas in our > > article; as a learning exercise. > > > > In the last entry, Larry notes that we need to include an "imaginal" > > aspect, not just actions, as part of the larger units of experience(s) > that > > bring both forth. So the challenge is to think, theorize, research both > > action and imagination as aspects of a common unit, and one that is not > > only psychological, but also and at the same time societal. > > > > Following that line of thinking, I want to bring attention back to > > "bodies" and "space", which feature prominently in our paper, by means > of a > > quotation from Nancy (Corpus, 2008): > > > > "With thoughts about the body, the body always forces us to think > farther, > > always too far: too far to carry on as thought, but never far enough to > > become a body" (p. 37). > > > > That is, doing, being a body, carries us "too far to carry on (only) as > > thought, but never far enough to become (only, purely) body." Thus, there > > is not a real division between body and thinking, but a delay, which is > but > > feature of their unity. In this regard, Nancy argues that bodies are > about > > spacing (which is another way to say that being is about making place). > > Again space crops up as (subject) matter here. Dewey (1929, nature and > > experience) refers to that space between the doing and the undergoing in > > terms of "an adventure," where "the old self is put off and the new self > is > > only forming." > > > > So, if my thinking here makes sense, the challenge is to link this > > characterization of being as going through an adventure (an "advening" > > (from "advenire") of oneself to oneself, to use Claude Romano's terms) > with > > that of activity (or collaborative projects) as collective and historical > > achievements that provide for the possibility of any experience to go on. > > David writes: "In a very important sense the ideal image of the painting > > exists long before any action at all is taken." So, although we may take > > the first-time-through perspective of the one (body) who goes through an > > experience, there is something on place (is on "place" the right word?) > > before she does/undergoes it. As Andy notes, playing is done in and > through > > actions, although play, or the game, is not reducible to any single > action. > > So play, as a societal feature or category, is larger; it is a method of > > organization. And, not many e-mails ago, we did notice Dewey's and > > Bentley's reference of experience as precisely that: a method of > > organization. But experience and activity are not the same thing; how are > > they different? > > > > So, it seems to me, the difference is not about substance. They both are > > about actions, concrete and material. The difference (between experience > > and activity) might be then about time. The notion of heterochrony that > > Lemke brought in his 2000 paper "scales of time" seems most appealing to > me > > here, although I do not know of much work that has continued to develop > > research in terms of the diachronies and delays that may exist between > > history and experiences thereof (or rather there is lots of literature I > > don't yet know/understand properly). In any case, these loose ideas seem > > relevant for further understanding how creativity and imagination develop > > as part of (design, teaching/learning, etc) activities. > > > > Thanks, > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of > > Lplarry > > Sent: 26 July 2015 16:55 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > David, > > > > This answer to my struggle shifts or slants everything. > > > > If we cannot "reduce" or "abstract" actions from "having an experience" > > then to be explicit and clear we must also include some other factor that > > is "beyond" reducing having "an" experience to just actions. This other > > factor is "construal" or "imaginal" phenomena. Having an experience is an > > INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE including both the imaginal and actions. > > > > David the other relation is the unity of "construing" and > > "disclosing"/"undergoing" an experience (as a unity or integral > phenomena.) > > > > The relation(s) of the imaginal to action and the slant from which we > > approach THIS unity (that cannot be reduced or abstracted) from having an > > experience. > > How we understand THIS integral phenomena that is extending "beyond" > > actions but must necessarily INCLUDE actions > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "David Kellogg" > > Sent: ?2015-?07-?25 10:58 PM > > To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > > > I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as > > "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it > isn't > > image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a > > Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also > why > > it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through > > actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important > sense > > the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is > > taken. > > > > David Kellogg > > > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel > > citations > > > (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one > > who > > > insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and > > particular! > > > > > > The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the > > > child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in > turn > > > be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted > > process > > > but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains > > > concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of > hypothetical > > > mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It > is > > > all actions which are in one way or another organised around some > > artefact, > > > and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult > > points > > > and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is > in > > > the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an > > adult > > > learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and > > > coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on > their > > > own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in > > > collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. > The > > > problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in > a > > > uniform, consistent way. > > > > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing > > >> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire > > psychological > > >> meanings. > > >> > > >> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share > > >> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: > > >> > > >> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its > complexity. > > >> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, > > only > > >> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE > > through a > > >> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to > the > > >> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general > > but > > >> also the individual and particular. > > >> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a > > >> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of > > >> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of > the > > >> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO > > >> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection > and > > >> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" > > >> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] > > >> > > >> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In > > >> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and > > >> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". > > >> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > >> > > >> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. > > >> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of > > >> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs > > >> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and > > >> children learn not only by observing but by > > >> participating in those activities. > > >> Andy > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi Andy, > > >> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have > > >> understood your message. You are "travelling" in > > >> the social world and discussing Leontyev's > > >> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. > > >> I can now understand your critique that he might > > >> believe that something like an objective meaning > > >> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of > > >> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to > > >> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" > > >> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of > > >> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), > > >> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle > > >> of different meanings that are also changing with > > >> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or > > >> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, > > >> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate > > >> their personal sense by using words and concepts. > > >> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it > > >> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. > > >> Your construction of a theory of collaborative > > >> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal > > >> with the societal emergence and change of the > > >> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the > > >> link between the social and psychological plane. > > >> Best Manfred > > >> > > >> > > >> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > > >> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > > >> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster > > >> Fliednerstr. 21 > > >> D-48149 M?nster > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 > > >> (Sekretariat) > > >> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 > > >> (Fax) > > >> > > >> > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > > >> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- > > >> Von: > > >> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= > > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski > > >> = > > >> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> ] Im > > >> Auftrag von Andy Blunden > > >> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 > > >> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary > > >> Objects > > >> > > >> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". > > >> :( Andy > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice > > >> again on this list. > > >> I understand what you are saying. I will try > > >> to better explain how I > > >> stand with A N Leontyev. > > >> > > >> I am a social theorist, that is I am > > >> interested in changing societal > > >> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I > > >> am one of few social > > >> theorists, properly so-called, who base > > >> themselves on Vygotsky's > > >> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My > > >> position is a > > >> contradictory one because Vygotsky and > > >> Leontyev were psychologists > > >> (like > > >> you) and not social theorists. Social > > >> Theorists and Psychologists > > >> generally live in different buildings on the > > >> university campus, in > > >> different departments, publish in different > > >> journals, refer to > > >> different founding theorists, and altogether > > >> inhabit different > > >> universes. Social theorists have ideas about > > >> psychology, but generally > > >> not scientific ones, and vice versa. > > >> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an > > >> excellent foundation for > > >> social theory because he introduced into human > > >> development and every > > >> interaction between two individuals a > > >> culturally produced sign. But he > > >> only went so far. He showed how people acted > > >> and developed within > > >> their social situation, but he did not tackle > > >> the problem of how that > > >> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of > > >> the Activity as a > > >> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making > > >> development which opened > > >> CHAT to become a fully developed > > >> social-and-psychological theory. But > > >> what he said himself on questions of social > > >> theory was of very poor > > >> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the > > >> sort of ideas that would > > >> win any following among social theorists > > >> today. But he was after all a > > >> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he > > >> is forgiven. > > >> > > >> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken > > >> "objective meaning" is not a > > >> psychological category at all for Leontyev. > > >> Yes? And personal sense > > >> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental > > >> Psychological category. > > >> So if what I said were to be interpreted to > > >> say that personal sense is > > >> a subset of objective meaning, that would be > > >> quite wrong. While I > > >> accept (as I must) a categorical difference > > >> between material > > >> objects/processes and their reflection in my > > >> mind, I do not at all > > >> understand societal processes as > > >> nonpsychological processes. I try to > > >> conceive of them together in one unit, and I > > >> think I am on my own > > >> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). > > >> There remains of course the distinction > > >> between the individual > > >> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), > > >> mediated by the particular > > >> (Besonder). A human individual is something > > >> radically different from a > > >> number of individuals. For the human > > >> individual and how they erleben a > > >> social situation, I rely on my friends and > > >> collaborator-psychologists. > > >> I am interested in how the Activities go. In > > >> small part to avoid > > >> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I > > >> call activities > > >> "projects." > > >> So I reserve the right to say things about > > >> [The entire original message is not included.] From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 29 19:50:48 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 20:50:48 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects In-Reply-To: <55b8f8c1.4267460a.4d8db.1039@mx.google.com> References: <55AD8D2F.5040507@mira.net> <55AE3D28.6020107@mira.net> <1437492987978.12562@iped.uio.no> <1437507960903.55400@iped.uio.no> <55AF38D7.6070707@mira.net> <1437578677865.9618@iped.uio.no> <55afc3d7.c359460a.8e6fe.ffff97c0@mx.google.com> <55B043B6.9010406@mira.net> <55B06E2C.2020907@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833434@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B0F5CE.8060007@mira.net> <55B0F97F.1060508@mira.net> <343DEDD5EDE9ED46B4B215341514DD58FE833750@zivexdag3.wwu.de> <55B2D195.1080402@mira.net> <55B302D4.9030107@mira.net> <55b4f50b.edb8420a.7c661.0dd5@mx.google.com> <1438109414921.65790@iped.uio.no> <55b8f8c1.4267460a.4d8db.1039@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, You have made me think of an (I believe) 2009 interview by Diane Rehm of the novelist E.L. Doctorow (e.g. Ragtime) on Ms. Rehm?s great talk radio program. It was a re-broadcast honoring the Doctorow, who just died. He said that sometimes, when he was really locked into the writing process, he experienced his own writing as if he were the reader of his writing as he wrote. This maybe would count as a phenomenogical construal of a boundary object, in this case a novel in the making. Henry > On Jul 29, 2015, at 10:00 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > A further thought about "boundary objects" which shares qualities with the notion of Winnicott's "transitional" objects using Dewey's insights. > > Art/product in its form unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience. Because of elimination of all that does not contribute to mutual organization of the factors of BOTH action and perception INTO ONE ANOTHER and because of selection of just the aspects and traits that contribute to their INTERPENETRATION OF EACH OTHER, the art/product is a work of aesthetic art. The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of SUCH A NATURE that its QUALITIES AS PERCEIVED have controlled the QUESTION OF production. The act of producing that is directed by intent to produce something that is enjoyed in the immediate experience OF PERCEIVING has qualities that a spontaneous or uncontrolled activity does not have. The artist/producer EMBODIES IN HIMSELF THE ATTITUDE (the disposition) of the perceived while he works. > Doing to be artistic in the FINAL SENSE must be "loving"; it must CARE DEEPLY for the subject matter upon which artistic skill is exercised. > > These are Dewey's words indicating a relation to boundary objects that develops. > > To "perceive" this relation requires intelligence that is always felt experience. It also emphasizes "development" of attitude/disposition/style. Not particular "positions" taken and held constant BUT a position on positions. Meta-positions as an attitude towards positions. Always both doing and undergoing linked through spaces of adventure that always INTERPENETRATE EACH OTHER. > > Boundary objects embody this adventure. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Rolf Steier" > Sent: ?2015-?07-?29 1:59 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects > > Thank you to everyone for such an engaging conversation! This thread has > developed into a really rich resource and I'm looking forward to returning > to it over the coming year as there is quite a bit to unpack. > Rolf > > > > On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 1:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> It is great of you to lead us in a wrap up of your paper, Alfredo. The >> discussion sits in my active arena of attention because it opened up and >> enriched so many different concerns. >> >> We had a thread not that long ago focused on imagination. It might not be a >> bad idea to return to those threads and pick them up to see what can be >> woven from them now. I, for example, have always considered the 5th D >> Dimension as a boundary object even as I have >> written about it as a tertiary artifact, or, for that matter, a personal >> experience. In fact, i believe it could be said to be a terrific boundary >> object for joint exploration among those who, like >> myself, believe imagination to THE core process in human >> experience/perezhivanie. But I think we could find the time to look back, >> at this long thread, we would see that the word imagination (and >> experience!) are used in somewhat different ways/have slightly different >> meanings (if we could settle on what we meant by meaning! >> >> How could all of that happen if imagination were not there picking up >> dropped threads, making new ones, and then trying to "make something of it" >> ? >> >> (Of course, now I have to imagine I can remember how to find that prior >> discussion!) >> >> A great learning experience for me. >> >> Thanks for the two of you for taking the time to create the discussion. >> That must be our record long thread. >> >> mike >> >> On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >> >>> Thanks all for having brought this discussion to these heights. I am >>> personally learning a lot, although it's been hard to keep up with it and >>> deal with other everyday tasks. >>> >>> Thanks, Ritva, for emphasizing the links between the discussion and the >>> article when they may had seemed to be no longer there. I just want to >> wrap >>> up in a think-aloud fashion, and from my view, how the issues that have >>> arisen in the discussion relate, but also expand, on the ideas in our >>> article; as a learning exercise. >>> >>> In the last entry, Larry notes that we need to include an "imaginal" >>> aspect, not just actions, as part of the larger units of experience(s) >> that >>> bring both forth. So the challenge is to think, theorize, research both >>> action and imagination as aspects of a common unit, and one that is not >>> only psychological, but also and at the same time societal. >>> >>> Following that line of thinking, I want to bring attention back to >>> "bodies" and "space", which feature prominently in our paper, by means >> of a >>> quotation from Nancy (Corpus, 2008): >>> >>> "With thoughts about the body, the body always forces us to think >> farther, >>> always too far: too far to carry on as thought, but never far enough to >>> become a body" (p. 37). >>> >>> That is, doing, being a body, carries us "too far to carry on (only) as >>> thought, but never far enough to become (only, purely) body." Thus, there >>> is not a real division between body and thinking, but a delay, which is >> but >>> feature of their unity. In this regard, Nancy argues that bodies are >> about >>> spacing (which is another way to say that being is about making place). >>> Again space crops up as (subject) matter here. Dewey (1929, nature and >>> experience) refers to that space between the doing and the undergoing in >>> terms of "an adventure," where "the old self is put off and the new self >> is >>> only forming." >>> >>> So, if my thinking here makes sense, the challenge is to link this >>> characterization of being as going through an adventure (an "advening" >>> (from "advenire") of oneself to oneself, to use Claude Romano's terms) >> with >>> that of activity (or collaborative projects) as collective and historical >>> achievements that provide for the possibility of any experience to go on. >>> David writes: "In a very important sense the ideal image of the painting >>> exists long before any action at all is taken." So, although we may take >>> the first-time-through perspective of the one (body) who goes through an >>> experience, there is something on place (is on "place" the right word?) >>> before she does/undergoes it. As Andy notes, playing is done in and >> through >>> actions, although play, or the game, is not reducible to any single >> action. >>> So play, as a societal feature or category, is larger; it is a method of >>> organization. And, not many e-mails ago, we did notice Dewey's and >>> Bentley's reference of experience as precisely that: a method of >>> organization. But experience and activity are not the same thing; how are >>> they different? >>> >>> So, it seems to me, the difference is not about substance. They both are >>> about actions, concrete and material. The difference (between experience >>> and activity) might be then about time. The notion of heterochrony that >>> Lemke brought in his 2000 paper "scales of time" seems most appealing to >> me >>> here, although I do not know of much work that has continued to develop >>> research in terms of the diachronies and delays that may exist between >>> history and experiences thereof (or rather there is lots of literature I >>> don't yet know/understand properly). In any case, these loose ideas seem >>> relevant for further understanding how creativity and imagination develop >>> as part of (design, teaching/learning, etc) activities. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of >>> Lplarry >>> Sent: 26 July 2015 16:55 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> David, >>> >>> This answer to my struggle shifts or slants everything. >>> >>> If we cannot "reduce" or "abstract" actions from "having an experience" >>> then to be explicit and clear we must also include some other factor that >>> is "beyond" reducing having "an" experience to just actions. This other >>> factor is "construal" or "imaginal" phenomena. Having an experience is an >>> INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE including both the imaginal and actions. >>> >>> David the other relation is the unity of "construing" and >>> "disclosing"/"undergoing" an experience (as a unity or integral >> phenomena.) >>> >>> The relation(s) of the imaginal to action and the slant from which we >>> approach THIS unity (that cannot be reduced or abstracted) from having an >>> experience. >>> How we understand THIS integral phenomena that is extending "beyond" >>> actions but must necessarily INCLUDE actions >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "David Kellogg" >>> Sent: ?2015-?07-?25 10:58 PM >>> To: "Andy Blunden" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>> Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects >>> >>> I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as >>> "imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it >> isn't >>> image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a >>> Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also >> why >>> it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through >>> actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important >> sense >>> the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is >>> taken. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>> >>>> Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel >>> citations >>>> (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one >>> who >>>> insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and >>> particular! >>>> >>>> The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the >>>> child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in >> turn >>>> be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted >>> process >>>> but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains >>>> concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of >> hypothetical >>>> mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It >> is >>>> all actions which are in one way or another organised around some >>> artefact, >>>> and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult >>> points >>>> and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is >> in >>>> the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an >>> adult >>>> learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and >>>> coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on >> their >>>> own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in >>>> collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. >> The >>>> problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in >> a >>>> uniform, consistent way. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>>> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing >>>>> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire >>> psychological >>>>> meanings. >>>>> >>>>> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share >>>>> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is: >>>>> >>>>> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its >> complexity. >>>>> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, >>> only >>>>> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE >>> through a >>>>> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to >> the >>>>> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general >>> but >>>>> also the individual and particular. >>>>> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a >>>>> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of >>>>> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of >> the >>>>> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO >>>>> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection >> and >>>>> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept" >>>>> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53] >>>>> >>>>> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In >>>>> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and >>>>> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS". >>>>> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden >> >>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page. >>>>> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of >>>>> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs >>>>> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and >>>>> children learn not only by observing but by >>>>> participating in those activities. >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have >>>>> understood your message. You are "travelling" in >>>>> the social world and discussing Leontyev's >>>>> understanding of the concept of objective meaning. >>>>> I can now understand your critique that he might >>>>> believe that something like an objective meaning >>>>> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of >>>>> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to >>>>> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning" >>>>> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of >>>>> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice), >>>>> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle >>>>> of different meanings that are also changing with >>>>> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or >>>>> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless, >>>>> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate >>>>> their personal sense by using words and concepts. >>>>> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it >>>>> sometimes and for some people fails miserably. >>>>> Your construction of a theory of collaborative >>>>> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal >>>>> with the societal emergence and change of the >>>>> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the >>>>> link between the social and psychological plane. >>>>> Best Manfred >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski >>>>> Institut f?r Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung >>>>> Westf?lische Wilhelms-Universit?t M?nster >>>>> Fliednerstr. 21 >>>>> D-48149 M?nster >>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 >>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 >>>>> (Sekretariat) >>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 >>>>> (Fax) >>>>> >>>>> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html >>>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- >>>>> Von: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski= >>>>> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski >>>>> = >>>>> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> ] Im >>>>> Auftrag von Andy Blunden >>>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26 >>>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary >>>>> Objects >>>>> >>>>> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity". >>>>> :( Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice >>>>> again on this list. >>>>> I understand what you are saying. I will try >>>>> to better explain how I >>>>> stand with A N Leontyev. >>>>> >>>>> I am a social theorist, that is I am >>>>> interested in changing societal >>>>> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I >>>>> am one of few social >>>>> theorists, properly so-called, who base >>>>> themselves on Vygotsky's >>>>> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My >>>>> position is a >>>>> contradictory one because Vygotsky and >>>>> Leontyev were psychologists >>>>> (like >>>>> you) and not social theorists. Social >>>>> Theorists and Psychologists >>>>> generally live in different buildings on the >>>>> university campus, in >>>>> different departments, publish in different >>>>> journals, refer to >>>>> different founding theorists, and altogether >>>>> inhabit different >>>>> universes. Social theorists have ideas about >>>>> psychology, but generally >>>>> not scientific ones, and vice versa. >>>>> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an >>>>> excellent foundation for >>>>> social theory because he introduced into human >>>>> development and every >>>>> interaction between two individuals a >>>>> culturally produced sign. But he >>>>> only went so far. He showed how people acted >>>>> and developed within >>>>> their social situation, but he did not tackle >>>>> the problem of how that >>>>> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of >>>>> the Activity as a >>>>> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making >>>>> development which opened >>>>> CHAT to become a fully developed >>>>> social-and-psychological theory. But >>>>> what he said himself on questions of social >>>>> theory was of very poor >>>>> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the >>>>> sort of ideas that would >>>>> win any following among social theorists >>>>> today. But he was after all a >>>>> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he >>>>> is forgiven. >>>>> >>>>> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken >>>>> "objective meaning" is not a >>>>> psychological category at all for Leontyev. >>>>> Yes? And personal sense >>>>> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental >>>>> Psychological category. >>>>> So if what I said were to be interpreted to >>>>> say that personal sense is >>>>> a subset of objective meaning, that would be >>>>> quite wrong. While I >>>>> accept (as I must) a categorical difference >>>>> between material >>>>> objects/processes and their reflection in my >>>>> mind, I do not at all >>>>> understand societal processes as >>>>> nonpsychological processes. I try to >>>>> conceive of them together in one unit, and I >>>>> think I am on my own >>>>> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside). >>>>> There remains of course the distinction >>>>> between the individual >>>>> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein), >>>>> mediated by the particular >>>>> (Besonder). A human individual is something >>>>> radically different from a >>>>> number of individuals. For the human >>>>> individual and how they erleben a >>>>> social situation, I rely on my friends and >>>>> collaborator-psychologists. >>>>> I am interested in how the Activities go. In >>>>> small part to avoid >>>>> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I >>>>> call activities >>>>> "projects." >>>>> So I reserve the right to say things about >>>>> > > > [The entire original message is not included.] From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Jul 29 21:11:07 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 22:11:07 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Anthropology of Youth and Childhood teaching resources Message-ID: Interesting stuff here: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAJWMx-D8EYn3orNjsCy9k3F2atP31hrZ It is a youtube channel of teaching resources assembled by the Anthropology of Youth and Childhood group. It includes some ethnographies of kids from around the globe as well as a recent redo of the classic black/white doll study. Hopefully it will be of interest to some... -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Wed Jul 29 23:45:35 2015 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 06:45:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Anthropology of Youth and Childhood teaching resources In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102350A64@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Many thanks Greg - some really useful films here. I am sure our students will find much to discuss among them. Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: 30 July 2015 05:11 To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Anthropology of Youth and Childhood teaching resources Interesting stuff here: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAJWMx-D8EYn3orNjsCy9k3F2atP31hrZ It is a youtube channel of teaching resources assembled by the Anthropology of Youth and Childhood group. It includes some ethnographies of kids from around the globe as well as a recent redo of the classic black/white doll study. Hopefully it will be of interest to some... -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Jul 31 10:29:11 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 11:29:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Anthropology of Youth and Childhood teaching resources In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102350A64@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102350A64@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Greg and Rod, I was reading through a nice, long article on the ZPD co-authored and proferred for the chat by David Kellogg some weeks back: http://www.academia.edu/13725202/Between_Lessons_The_Zone_of_Proximal_Development_in_Korean_Schools On page 11 of the article I found the following: "Vygotsky also uses two very different methods in his book on imagination and creativity. In one, Vygotsky uses children?s drawings, songs by street children, and their spontaneous literary productions in class theatre and in class newspapers to try to understand what child imagination is like and how adult intervention in the creative process can build on it rather than substitute itself for it. In the other, he discusses Tolstoy?s experiments with teaching children literary language. Despite Tolstoy?s claim that he is ?learning? from the children, we actually learn a lot more about Tolstoy?s expectations than we do about the children?s independent capabilities.? As a parent, as a teacher, and as a teacher educator, I have struggled for a long with how we can both respect creative youth and be knowledgeable adults, The quote, for me, resonates with what Greg proffered from the Anthropology of Youth and Childhood group. Henry > On Jul 30, 2015, at 12:45 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > > Many thanks Greg - some really useful films here. I am sure our students will find much to discuss among them. > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: 30 July 2015 05:11 > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Anthropology of Youth and Childhood teaching resources > > Interesting stuff here: > https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAJWMx-D8EYn3orNjsCy9k3F2atP31hrZ > > It is a youtube channel of teaching resources assembled by the Anthropology of Youth and Childhood group. > > It includes some ethnographies of kids from around the globe as well as a recent redo of the classic black/white doll study. > > Hopefully it will be of interest to some... > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Jul 31 11:35:06 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 12:35:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [Spa] Postdoc at Oxford on Mothers: Early Intervention Ethics References: <78020CF7-5902-40B0-8433-3E43FC453E44@psych.ox.ac.uk> Message-ID: <429FEF74-634F-4370-9B49-6FE186A4781B@gmail.com> Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: > From: Ilina Singh > Date: July 31, 2015 at 8:52:38 AM MDT > To: "spa@union.edu" > Subject: [Spa] Postdoc at Oxford on Mothers: Early Intervention Ethics > > Dear All, > > Please see attached for a postdoc position that has just been advertised with me at Oxford. As you'll see, the position is part of a broader project on early intervention in child moral development, in which there are 5 studies. One of the studies, on which this postdoc will primarily be working, will focus on prenatal intervention; the research will include work with mums who are part of the Family-Nurse Partnership programme in the UK and Ireland, and with scientific teams looking at the genetics and epigenetics of aggression and anti-social behaviour. > > The person should be in post in Oxford by January 2016. I'm hoping to find someone who is conceptually and methodologically strong and innovative, with a background in anthropology, bioethics, sociology, health geography, or the like. Willingness to think out-of-the-box and an interdisciplinary orientation are important. I'm intrigued by the possibilities of digital ethnography/ e-tools in this project, and would like to find someone who can lead or develop my team's thinking in this area. Oxford is a great place to work, and there is a lot of scope here for an independent-minded young scholar to access unique data sources and to establish a really distinctive project. > > I'd be very happy to answer any questions, or to provide further information. > > The post is officially advertised on 29 July 2015; closing date is 2 September 2015. Here is the link, and see attached descriptions too: https://www.recruit.ox.ac.uk/pls/hrisliverecruit/erq_jobspec_version_4.jobspec?p_id=119322 > > Thanks very much for your support, and all the best, > > Ilina > > > Ilina Singh > Professor of Neuroscience & Society > University of Oxford > > Tel: + 44 (0)1865 223912 > > www.psych.ox.ac.uk/team/PIs/ilina-singh > www.adhdvoices.com > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Spa mailing list > Spa@union.edu > http://lists.union.edu/mailman/listinfo/spa