[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination

[mike cole]

So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed.

http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenomenological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf

On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way they
> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of communication
> (which will require a lot of imagination!).
> mike
>
> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
>
>> Mike
>>
>>      I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination.
>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination.
>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of Edward
>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement that
>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded that of
>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see him
>> mentioned.
>>
>>       I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the
>> same place. Only the questions seem to differ.
>>
>> Ed
>>
>> > On Dec 7, 2015, at  7:42 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>> >
>> > Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we
>> > started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I indicated
>> in
>> > my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my
>> > teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from
>> > psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and  activity-centered
>> > research practices. But here I am.
>> >
>> > So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my
>> understanding.
>> >
>> > I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of
>> the
>> > flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a dozen!
>> > Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the abstractions
>> can
>> > be seen, seem hard to come by.
>> >
>> > My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by
>> > identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered
>> with
>> > that goal in mind.
>> >
>> > The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. I
>> > learned that from the Russians who write about imagination.
>> >
>> > Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6?
>> >
>> > etc?
>> >
>> > To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same
>> kinds
>> > of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are
>> > tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, in
>> > good teaching.
>> >
>> > mike
>> >
>> > mike
>> >
>> > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Larry and Mike
>> >>
>> >>      Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of
>> you
>> >> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a
>> conversation
>> >> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but
>> it is
>> >> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than
>> what
>> >> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to,
>> one
>> >> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the,
>> >> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up.
>> >>
>> >>     Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I
>> >> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain
>> size
>> >> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at
>> things). A
>> >> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are
>> offered
>> >> in the hope that they might be useful.
>> >>
>> >>      1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however,
>> >> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak)
>> often
>> >> does a better job of opening things up.
>> >>
>> >>       2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make
>> your
>> >> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention
>> >> Avicenna.
>> >>
>> >>       3. I have the impression you are using the term ‘stable’ as a
>> >> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky’s concrete; I like that as ‘concrete'
>> >> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try
>> to
>> >> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies
>> >> tooters.
>> >>
>> >>       4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen
>> Keller. I
>> >> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is
>> >> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion
>> that
>> >> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly
>> sure
>> >> Keller was.
>> >>
>> >>       5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin
>> >> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable
>> >>
>> >>       6. In a way you don’t seem to quite come out and say it (or I
>> >> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily
>> >> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur.
>> >>
>> >> Ed
>> >>
>> >>> On Dec 6, 2015, at  4:41 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present)  our
>> >> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor
>> not
>> >> error.
>> >>> Ed,
>> >>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how
>> >> others use text.
>> >>
>> >> Actually I don’t think image has some relation to how others use text.
>> I
>> >> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike
>> is
>> >> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I
>> >> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in
>> mathematics
>> >> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems
>> that
>> >> presently catch my attention.
>> >>
>> >>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words
>> >> can we (read) mutual   shared movements as choreography. The physical
>> >> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on
>> the
>> >> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual
>> >> marks making a circle-like shape.
>> >>
>> >> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too
>> large.
>> >> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now
>> realize
>> >> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view
>> >> imagination. I don’t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to
>> >> result in  different questions than I would/do ask.
>> >>
>> >>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they
>> >> are the material.
>> >>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as
>> >> having a deeper process,
>> >>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions
>> >> but rather having a deeper process.
>> >>
>> >> My initial reaction is “Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the
>> >> contrary, I can’t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting
>> >> thing about what you say is that you seem to  using ‘imagine’ in a non
>> >> visual fashion which was largely my initial point.
>> >>
>> >>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically
>> >> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that
>> unifying
>> >> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses.
>> >>
>> >> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also
>> >> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although
>> >> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on
>> >> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don’t
>> >> physically experience a platonic circle.
>> >>
>> >>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated
>> >> pages of a  book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue,
>> to
>> >> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity)  may possibly have a
>> >> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating
>> >> process lived (into).
>> >>
>> >> Here is where my example wasn’t helpful. I did not mean one ‘sees' the
>> >> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too
>> large a
>> >> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with
>> those
>> >> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of
>> sense.
>> >> The teacher’s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new
>> >> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don’t make
>> the
>> >> leaps.
>> >>
>> >>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the
>> visual
>> >> sense.
>> >>
>> >> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the
>> sensory
>> >> modes
>> >>
>> >>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also
>> >> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal.
>> >>
>> >> This doesn’t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn’t
>> follow
>> >> for me.
>> >>
>> >> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is
>> just
>> >> one that, to a degree, I either don’t share or seems to be the wrong
>> grain
>> >> size.
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> -----Original Message-----
>> >>> From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
>> >>> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎06 1:14 PM
>> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>> >>>
>> >>> Mike
>> >>>
>> >>>       My  wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and
>> my
>> >> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the
>> visual.
>> >> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is
>> a
>> >> ‘concrete’ platonic circle doesn’t seem to be visual or, at least, it
>> never
>> >> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact,
>> >> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can
>> imagine it
>> >> (smile).
>> >>>       On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ‘image’ in
>> the
>> >> way some use the word ‘text.’ That is, to take into account both
>> external
>> >> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you
>> say
>> >> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that
>> >> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky.
>> >>>
>> >>> Ed
>> >>>
>> >>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at  2:35 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of
>> Zinchenko's
>> >>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system
>> that
>> >>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the
>> image
>> >>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color,
>> thus
>> >>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye
>> >>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as
>> if
>> >> it
>> >>>> were continuing to "feel it."
>> >>>>
>> >>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make
>> it
>> >>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to
>> Suvorov,
>> >> of
>> >>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but
>> then he
>> >>>> was blind and deaf).
>> >>>>
>> >>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized
>> >> stabilization
>> >>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the
>> >> always
>> >>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of
>> >> liberty.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first
>> encountered
>> >> it
>> >>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled
>> >> world
>> >>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. *
>> >>>>
>> >>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses*
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core
>> >> common
>> >>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage
>> for
>> >> me
>> >>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> mike
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> Mike
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>   As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging
>> of
>> >>>>> the ‘image’ in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it
>> >> has
>> >>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don’t think it was
>> >> of the
>> >>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would
>> >> disagree
>> >>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics.
>> >>>>>   I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! -
>> >> and
>> >>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge
>> emphasis
>> >> in
>> >>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about
>> >> the
>> >>>>> ‘imaginal’ than you or Larry. That doesn’t mean that what you and
>> >> Larry are
>> >>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point
>> about
>> >>>>> joint, mediated, activity.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Ed
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at  11:11 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings
>> builds
>> >> off
>> >>>>> of
>> >>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the
>> >>>>> sensory
>> >>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the
>> "simple"
>> >> act
>> >>>>> of
>> >>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in
>> >> the
>> >>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal
>> and
>> >>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that
>> must
>> >> be
>> >>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of
>> image
>> >>>>>> formation ceases to function.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that
>> >> simplified
>> >>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets,
>> >> Zinchenko
>> >>>>> and
>> >>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive
>> >>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated,
>> >>>>> activity
>> >>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function
>> and
>> >> the
>> >>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and
>> >>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> in brief
>> >>>>>> mike
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael,
>> >>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period.
>> >>>>>>> Age 2 months.
>> >>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own
>> activity .
>> >>>>>>> Question
>> >>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving
>> into
>> >> the
>> >>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature?
>> >>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin?
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>> >>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
>> >>>>>>> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎05 4:48 PM
>> >>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>> Larry
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>  I wan’t looking at the title, but, yes, ‘or’ can be inclusive or
>> >>>>>>> exclusive.
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>  I don’t think of it as a detour; that doesn’t seem to make sense
>> if
>> >>>>> I
>> >>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly.
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>  I, personally, don’t equate ‘physical' and ‘concrete’;’ perhaps I
>> >>>>>>> wasn’t clear. In any case, I’ve never completely understood the
>> >>>>> tendency to
>> >>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow
>> >>>>> extra-concrete.
>> >>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical
>> >>>>> context
>> >>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain
>> things
>> >>>>> are
>> >>>>>>> ‘concrete.’ This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that
>> is?).
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>   I’m not quite sure where you are going with the development of
>> >>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical.
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>    Fantasy is a complicated word so I don’t know what you mean
>> when
>> >>>>>>> you allude to “assume that or let’ involving fantasy. My answer,
>> >>>>> perhaps,
>> >>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>    Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy
>> in
>> >>>>>>> your email, I can’t give a reasonable answer to your final
>> question.
>> >> An
>> >>>>>>> approximate answer might be “no”; however, I can imagine other
>> >>>>>>> possibilities (smile).
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>> Ed
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at  4:04 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> Ed,
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy
>> >>>>>>>> Is different from
>> >>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy.
>> >>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a
>> >> distanciation?)
>> >>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete.
>> >>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from
>> the
>> >>>>>>> physical to the mathematical?
>> >>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in
>> historical
>> >>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical
>> >> (concrete)
>> >>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical
>> >>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within
>> the
>> >>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways?
>> >>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like.
>> >>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which
>> >> originates
>> >>>>> as
>> >>>>>>> concrete.
>> >>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy.
>> >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy.
>> Does
>> >> one
>> >>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the
>> actual
>> >>>>> can
>> >>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems?
>> >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy?
>> >>>>>>>> Larry
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>> >>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
>> >>>>>>>> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎04 11:05 AM
>> >>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Imagination or Fantasy
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> All
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of
>> >> imagination
>> >>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like “assume that,”
>> “let,” or
>> >>>>>>> “Imagine that” (and these may be, in fact, very different
>> statements
>> >>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.” In
>> doing
>> >> so I
>> >>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and
>> >> Creativity
>> >>>>> in
>> >>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: “It is characteristic for
>> >> imagination
>> >>>>> that
>> >>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only
>> an
>> >>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a
>> >> pass
>> >>>>> in
>> >>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of
>> view,
>> >>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a
>> >> given
>> >>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.”
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous
>> discussion
>> >>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov’s mathematics curriculum in that I
>> am
>> >>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are
>> being
>> >>>>> asked
>> >>>>>>> to “imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the
>> >>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if
>> >> somebody
>> >>>>> is
>> >>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my
>> >>>>> wondering
>> >>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there
>> >> is no
>> >>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to
>> >> speak,
>> >>>>> in
>> >>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering
>> >> about
>> >>>>> and
>> >>>>>>> then a question.
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> My first example:  It is possible that we would all agree that to
>> >> see
>> >>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such
>> thing.
>> >> In a
>> >>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two
>> is
>> >> not
>> >>>>> a
>> >>>>>>> fraction begins with “Assume that the square root of two is a
>> >> fraction.”
>> >>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true
>> and
>> >> then
>> >>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another
>> >>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through
>> >>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction)
>> >>>>> seems to
>> >>>>>>> be very hard for people to do.
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and
>> draws
>> >>>>>>> something rather circular and says “This is a circle.” She then
>> >> draws a
>> >>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says,
>> >> "This
>> >>>>> is
>> >>>>>>> its center.” She then says “Every point on this circle (waving her
>> >> hand
>> >>>>> at
>> >>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.”
>> None
>> >> of
>> >>>>> this
>> >>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each
>> step
>> >>>>> here
>> >>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete.
>> >> (Hmm
>> >>>>> , I
>> >>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the
>> >>>>> mathematical
>> >>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn’t allow this?)
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a
>> >> winged
>> >>>>>>> horse].
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with
>> >>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would
>> Vygotsky
>> >>>>> have
>> >>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something
>> else?
>> >>>>> There
>> >>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I’m
>> interested in
>> >>>>> your
>> >>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky’s take might be.
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> Ed Wall
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> --
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with
>> an
>> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> --
>> >>>>
>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>> >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> >
>> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
>
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
>
>


-- 

It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch